

Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative

Country Desk Study: Uganda

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Summary information for Uganda

- Currency = Ugandan Shilling (UGX)
- Exchange Rate (31 July 2009) USD 1 = UGX 2,115
- Fiscal Year = June – May
- School year = February – December
- Structure of education system: The school system is based on 7 + 4 + 2. Each child potentially spends 7 years in Primary School, 4 years in Secondary Schools and 2 years in High School.
- Population: 31 million
- Population growth rate: 3.2%

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to express its gratitude to the Ministry of Education and Sports in Uganda, whose staff at all levels gave generously of their time. They would also like to thank all those persons interviewed who provided valuable input to the study.

Findings and opinions in this report are those of the evaluation team and should not be ascribed to any of the agencies that sponsored the study.

Preface

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is linked both to the Education for All (EFA) goals and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FTI was launched in 2002, and has now been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership has recognised the need to evaluate whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. The evaluation will provide an opportunity for reform and change if necessary.

As stated in the Terms of Reference:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels.

The evaluation was required to draw lessons learned from the FTI's strengths and weaknesses and to make recommendations to further improve future partnership programming and effectiveness.

The evaluation took place between November 2008 and February 2010. It was independent but jointly supported by a consortium of donors. An Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC) was made up of representatives from the donor community, partner countries and civil society.

The evaluation team was a consortium of three companies Cambridge Education, Mokoro and Oxford Policy Management (OPM). The methodology and process for the evaluation are described in Appendix V (Volume 4) of the final synthesis report.

The main outputs of the evaluation, which included nine country case studies and eight desk studies, are listed overleaf. They can be found at www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative.

Uganda was one of the desk studies. The desk studies were not researched in the same depth as full country case studies (which typically included a two-week field visit by a team of three or four evaluators). They were based on the relevant literature which can be accessed without a visit to the country (including the FTI Secretariat archives for the country in question, plus a standard set of aid data derived from the OECD DAC records). The desk study authors were individuals already familiar with the methodology of the evaluation and with the country concerned..

Since Uganda is not yet FTI endorsed, literature recording the experience of FTI in Uganda is scarce. Accordingly, the author also drew on and synthesised the results of a series of non-attributable telephone and e-mail conversations with donor and government representatives who had been involved in the FTI process in Uganda.

Main Outputs of the Evaluation

All the following reports can be downloaded from www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/.

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

The Evaluation Framework: Evaluation Team Guidelines on Process and Methodology. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 2009.

PRELIMINARY REPORT

Preliminary Report. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, 25 May 2009.

FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT

Final Synthesis Report: Volumes 1–5. Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, February 2010.

FULL COUNTRY STUDIES

- Burkina Faso *Burkina Faso Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and, OPM. Mailan Chiche, Elsa Duret, Clare O'Brien, and Serge Bayala, February 2010.
- Cambodia *Cambodia Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, Abby Riddell, George Taylor and Khieu Vicheanon, February 2010.
- Ghana *Ghana Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative: Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Terry Allsop, Ramlatu Attah, Tim Cammack and Eric Woods, February 2010
- Kenya *Kenya Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Anne Thomson; Eric Woods, Clare O'Brien and Eldah. Onsomu, February 2010.
- Mozambique *Mozambique Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, Tuomas Takala, and Zuber Ahmed, February 2010.
- Nicaragua *Nicaragua Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Muriel Visser-Valfrey, Elisabet Jané, Daniel Wilde, and Marina Escobar, February 2010.
- Nigeria *Nigeria Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Nick Santcross; Keith Hinchliffe, Anthea Sims Williams; Sulliemman Adediran and Felicia Onibon. February 2010.
- Pakistan *Pakistan Country Case Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Stephen Lister, Masooda Bano, Roy Carr-Hill and Ian MacAuslan. February 2010.
- Yemen *Yemen Country Case Study,* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, OPM and Mokoro. Elsa Duret, Hassan Abdulmalik, and Stephen Jones, February 2010.

COUNTRY DESK STUDIES

- Ethiopia *Ethiopia Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Catherine Dom, February 2010.
- Malawi *Malawi Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Georgina Rawle, February 2010
- Mali *Mali Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
- Moldova *Moldova Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM.. Clare O'Brien, February 2010.
- Rwanda *Rwanda Country Desk Study,* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Mailan Chiche, February 2010.
- Uganda *Uganda Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ray Purcell, February 2010
- Vietnam *Vietnam Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.
- Zambia *Zambia Country Desk Study.* Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM. Ann Bartholomew, February 2010.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

BTOR	Back to Office Report
BTVET	Business, Technical, Vocational Education and Training
CF	Catalytic Fund
CSR	Cohort Survival Rate
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DP	Development Partner
EC	European Commission
EDP	Education Development Partnership
EFA	Education for All
EFAG	Education Funding Agency Group
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EPDF	Education Program Development Fund
ESCC	Education Sector Coordinating Committee
ESIP	Education Sector Investment Plan
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
FENU	Foundation for Education NGOs in Uganda
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
FY	Fiscal Year
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GNI	Gross National Income
GOU	Government of Uganda
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAF	Joint Assessment Framework
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NAPE	National Assessment of Progress in Education
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NRM	National Resistance Movement
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAF	Poverty Action Fund
PCR	Primary Completion Rate
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PLE	Primary Leaving Examination
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QEI	The Quality Education Initiative
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach

TA	Technical Assistance
UBoS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UK	United Kingdom
UNHS	Uganda National Household Survey
UPC	Universal Primary Completion
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UPPET	Universal Post-Primary Education and Training
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WBI	World Bank Institute

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sector Context

S1 Uganda's first comprehensive poverty reduction strategy, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP1), was published in 1997. Now in its third iteration, the PEAP is widely regarded as a genuine, government-owned, poverty reduction strategy. The goals set out in the PEAP, along with presidential manifesto commitments and a commitment to achieving Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals, are the driving force behind education sector policy in Uganda.

S2 The PEAPs have informed Uganda's education sector plans, the Education Sector Investment Plan (ESIP 1997) and its successor, the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP 2004–2015). These are the instruments for the implementation of the government's education priorities, which currently focus on expanding the capacity of educational structures and reducing the inequalities of access to education between sexes, geographical areas, and social classes.

S3 This involves channelling substantial resources through the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme, which was launched by government in 1997, when the abolition of primary school fees led to an immediate near-doubling of primary enrolments (characterised as "the big bang"), creating enormous challenges in catching up with the demand for education and a dramatic worsening of measured pupil performance.

S4 More recently there has been shift in policy and resource allocation towards a more balanced and broad-fronted approach to education delivery. Ten years after the launch of UPE, the Universal Post Primary Education and Training Project (UPPET) was launched in 2006 (also as an electoral commitment). UPPET has four purposes: increasing equitable access to post primary education, assuring achievement of the MDG of gender parity in education delivery by 2015, enhancing sustainability of UPE, and reducing the high costs of UPPET. The Government of Uganda has also implemented numerous policies which guide sector efforts to provide quality primary education, including the Quality Education Initiative and Automatic Promotion Policy in primary schools.

S5 Central government decentralised public services including those for education, under the Local Government Act of 1997. It was intended that this would improve basic education by localising its administration and service delivery. This meant that the districts were responsible for teacher recruitment, deployment and supervision, and the disbursement and management of the funds to implement UPE.

Progress towards EFA

S6 The introduction of the UPE programme in Uganda in 1997 was followed by a rapid rise in enrolment of pupils in primary school, with enrolment increasing by 2.3m in a year from 1996 to 1997. Enrolment continued to increase until 2003, when the first cohort of intake after 1997 reached Grade 6; since then it has levelled off. By 2007, the enrolment figures were at the level of 7.5m pupils in primary schools, of whom 51% were boys while 49% were girls. The Net Enrolment Rate increased from 92.0% (94.1% for boys and 90.1% for girls) to 93.3% (95% for boys and 91.4% for girls), and according to the ESSP, "based on current performance trends, Uganda is likely to hit the target Net Enrolment Rate of 100%, by the target date (2015) provided the concerns of low quality of education (as manifested in both learning achievements and survival rates) are overcome". Due to the UPE bulge, the numbers of primary completers have also risen. It should be noted however, that some children still do not have access to education as a consequence of issues such as civil

conflict, disability or other special learning needs, and other social-cultural reasons such as early marriage or pastoralism.

The FTI in Uganda

S7 Uganda was among the first group of eighteen countries invited to participate in the Fast Track Initiative in 2002. However, as it did not qualify as a donor orphan it was not eligible for financial support from the Catalytic Fund (CF), and so at that stage the benefits of endorsement were perceived by the Ministry of Education and Sports as negligible. Furthermore the FTI was requesting a new plan, separate from the regular policy documentation. However, despite the in-country ambivalence about the benefits of THE FTI, and despite work being initiated on the first Education Sector Support Plan (ESSP 2004–15), the Ministry expended a lot of effort on developing a separate dedicated FTI proposal, with World Bank assistance. In the end, this initial FTI proposal for endorsement was never submitted, since the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development was unable to support the FTI proposal under the projected ceilings of the current Medium Term Expenditure Framework.

Table S1 Summary Timeline of FTI Events in Uganda

Year	Month	Event
1989		Education Policy Review Commission, established in 1987 publishes its findings which establish UPE as a goal.
1992		Government White Paper on Education published, outlining several goals, among which is the achievement of UPE for all children aged 6–12 by 2000.
2000		In support of the decision to introduce UPE, the Government of Uganda drastically increases funding for education from 2.6% of GNP in 1996 to 4% in 2000.
2002	June	Uganda is one of the first 18 countries invited to join the FTI.
	July	Uganda accepts invitation to participate in the FTI.
2003	September	Draft FTI Country proposal.
		The Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP 2004–2015) prepared.
	February	New head of the FTI writes to Uganda advising it about the recent developments in the FTI and the implications this has for Uganda.
2006	April	Uganda receives another letter informing it of the latest developments in the FTI.
	April	Sida and DFID write to Uganda to provide an update on recent developments in the FTI. President Museveni announces that Universal Secondary Education will be expanded to Universal Post Primary Education and Training (UPPET), and UPPET policy formulated. The Minister of Finance participates in a Finance Ministers' Roundtable Conference in Singapore where he reports on Uganda's resolve to re-engage with the FTI.
2007		A revised and re-costed ESSP 2007–15 is developed by MES and remains in draft form until 2008.
	December	CF status report notes Uganda's education sector plan as expected to be endorsed in early 2008. EPDF to provide financial and technical support towards the preparation of Education Sector Plan (USD 250,000).
	December	Uganda participates in EPDF-funded capacity development workshop in Cape Town as well as EPDF-funded World Bank Institute course on "Accountability, Governance, and Quality of Decentralised Education in Africa".
2007		Government launches a pilot "Quality Education Initiative".
2008	January	Uganda sends memorandum to the FTI requesting technical assistance for the preparation of ESSP.
	January	In response to the request for TA, the Secretariat proposes a "light" or simplified Quality Support Review (QSR).
	March	ESSP Quality Support Review Panel report delivered.
	September	MES submits the revised and re-costed ESSP to MFPED and to donors.

S8 Following the failure of the first attempt at endorsement in 2002/03, there was no further Uganda FTI activity between 2004 and 2006. In 2006, the change in eligibility criteria for accessing the CF opened up the possibility of Uganda receiving CF funding. Allied with the pressures on sector funding arising out of the UPPET and the progress still needed on UPE, FTI activity in the country was resumed in 2007.

S9 In 2007, a desire for FTI endorsement prompted the Ministry of Education and Sports to update the ESSP 2004–15, bringing it into full conformance with EFA FTI goals. Following a government request, in March 2008 the Secretariat submitted a Quality Support Review of the revised ESSP. It highlighted many issues including those concerning affordability, sustainability and capacity. This prompted a process of ESSP revision by the Ministry of Education and Sports and comment by the donor group, which proceeded slowly, with little consensus. Areas of disagreement included the estimation of the financing gap, which, at USD 1 billion over the eight years of the ESSP was considered by some donors to be far too big to be used as a basis for practical planning. An application was approved in June 2009 for EPDF support to provide consultancies to help finalise the ESSP 2007–15; however, it is not clear that this has been done with the full support of the Ministry. The resources have provided TA to assist with the planning of the ESSP and sponsorship for a small number of capacity building activities including two workshops, but little that has been more substantive. As of July 2009, Uganda was still not endorsed, causing much frustration to the government.

The FTI and the Education Sector

S10 This desk study examines progress in six interrelated areas in education – highlighted in bold below – and seeks to establish what role the FTI played in each of these. Since Uganda has never been an endorsed country, and only recently reawakened its interest in the FTI, it is unlikely that the FTI would have had significant effects, but the study also considers what has influenced attitudes to engagement with the FTI.

S11 **Education Policy and Planning:** the FTI has had minimal influence on education policy and planning. The main driving forces behind education sector policy continue to be the President’s manifesto commitments for education, the pressure to achieve the goals of the PEAP, and the aims of achieving EFA and the MDGs by 2015. In the recent endorsement exercise, the FTI has been positive in explicitly calling for sector plan improvements, but donor perspectives on this have been unhelpfully fragmented; this has slowed the process and may have led, in the eyes of government, to a perception of donor ambivalence on the need for and the specifics of revision. The core issue has been about the quality of the ESSP as a "credible" plan in response to the education needs of Uganda, and the FTI has not been central in the evolution of planning and policy in the sector.

S12 **Education Financing:** Although the share of government expenditure being allocated to education grew in the late 1990s, it has been falling since and in 2008/09 stood at 17.3% of government spending, compared to 26% in 1999/2000. Additionality of funding has been a major stumbling block for FTI progress since the inception of FTI in 2002. The first attempts at endorsement were blocked by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) which was unable to support the FTI proposal under the projected ceilings of the current MTEF. On the donor side, there are concerns that any "additional" FTI funding for UPC could prove fungible into other education subsectors given the pressure on spending in the education sector arising from UPE and UPPET. The financing gap has been an area of disagreement, with donors viewing the gap of USD 1 billion as unrealistic, and the Ministry of Education viewing it as reflective of the real needs and requirements of the sector. Finally the recent slow pace of the FTI process in Uganda has undermined any contribution it could have made to predictability of financing.

S13 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation: FTI has had no discernible impact on data and M&E in the education sector in Uganda. Early World Bank analytical support to the FTI process in 2002 identified some data weaknesses in relation to enrolments, but these related to underlying population statistics rather than to the enrolment data collected by EMIS. The recent FTI Quality Support Review made a number of suggestions on performance reporting, including that the Ministry develop an ESSP Results Framework for the Plan period with performance targets and key outcome indicators, but these suggestions do not appear to have been acted on. Significant improvements to data and M&E, such as the introduction of a Joint Assessment Framework, have taken place over the years but are not linked to FTI.

S14 Capacity: Capacity development has proved to be a key challenge both for donors and for the Ministry of Education and Sports, particularly with the introduction of UPE and UPPET. In its early days, the FTI process can be considered inappropriate for Uganda because of capacity constraints, and in this respect it was fortunate that the Ministry of Finance blocked the FTI process in 2003 because of the additional and unsupportable stresses on systems and capacities it would have created. Although there has been some progress since then, capacity constraints on both the government and the donor sides continue to slow down progress in the education sector. As future investments include substantial developments at the post-primary and tertiary levels, Ministry administrative staff will require even more sophisticated planning and management skills, and with responsibility for service delivery shifting increasingly to the district level, more will be asked of district-based administrators and schools. The EPDF has provided sponsorship for a small number of capacity building activities, for example, participation in the WB courses, and a regional FTI workshop in Cape Town, but views on the utility of these activities are mixed. Not surprisingly, the FTI's influence on capacity development has been marginal.

S15 Aid Effectiveness: Overall the FTI has had little impact on aid effectiveness in the sector. A relatively sophisticated aid architecture was already in place when the FTI was launched and this (plus the dim prospect of additional finance) largely explains why neither government nor donors were keen to pursue FTI endorsement early on. More recently, the relationship between government and donors has become more difficult. Key high level policy decisions are sometimes taken unilaterally, as with introduction of UPPET by government, and although ownership is strong, this can lead to frustration and weaken the coordination and harmonisation of donor activity. The division of labour policy in the sector has not been effective and the number of donors has actually increased. In addition, controversy over the financing gap has divided the government and donors, and joint activities in the sector have become somewhat superficial.

S16 Cross-Cutting Issues: Issues such as equity and access have been prominent in policy. UPE emphasises equal opportunity for boys and girls and a costed framework for basic education for disadvantaged children fed into the 2003/04 planning and budgeting cycle, and HIV/AIDS is also given due prominence. The latest ESSP also refers to new cross-cutting issues which have particular relevance in Uganda, including refugee education. None of these improvements, however, can be attributed to the FTI, which has yet to make substantive inputs in Uganda.

Overall Conclusions

S17 Relevance: the FTI's education policy aims were consistent with those set by the Uganda government in its target of achieving UPE by 2015. However, in 2002, the FTI proved irrelevant to Uganda's financing needs. Uganda was not eligible for CF resources because of the large number of donors working in the country, and the Ministry of Finance's strict macroeconomic policy did not allow for the additionality to the sector that the FTI would have introduced. This changed in 2006 when the CF eligibility criteria changed and the

Ministry of Finance relaxed its fiscal stance. Overall, however, the FTI is not seen as particularly relevant or high profile in Uganda partly because existing sector plans already include FTI objectives, and partly because of high levels of donor support prior to the advent of the FTI.

S18 Accelerating progress on EFA: The early strategic planning support provided by FTI TA was important in improving the domestic capacity and standards of planning for the sector. However, the role and purpose of the ESSP is perceived differently by some of the donors and by the Government, particularly concerning the financing gap and the role of TA. This is stalling progress on endorsement and therefore the opportunity for the FTI to accelerate progress on UPC.

S19 Resource mobilisation and aid effectiveness: the FTI has yet to make any financial contribution to Uganda. the FTI has had little impact on aid effectiveness in the sector. In the early years of the FTI there was already a well developed aid architecture, and the FTI approach has emphasised education policy and strategic planning improvements rather than aid effectiveness. It has not had much influence in dealing with different Government and donor perspectives on difficult issues such as the financing gap and the deployment of TA.

Reflections

S20 The FTI does not have a high profile in Uganda partly because the existing sector plans (ESIP and ESSP) already included FTI objectives and partly because of high levels of donor support prior to the advent of the FTI. As a result the FTI was not seen as particularly relevant in Uganda, until, more recently, it came to be viewed as a potential source of additional finance.

1 Uganda Background

1.1 After independence, Uganda suffered decades of conflict and misrule, during which the economy regressed and living standards declined. The present National Resistance Movement (NRM) government took power in 1986. A more peaceful period ensued during which there has been stability and growth. President Museveni established good relations with the donor community, and Uganda was a pioneer in a number of developmental innovations: it was the first country to qualify for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief, and its own poverty strategy anticipated the now-standard Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

1.2 Good economic growth during the 1990s had a significant effect in reducing income poverty. Economic growth has continued to exceed population growth, averaging 7% between 1999 and 2007. However, Uganda remains one of the world's poorest countries, ranked 154 out of 177 countries on the 2007 Human Development Index (HDI). Progress in raising *per capita* incomes has been restrained by high population growth, which has increased to more than 3% a year since 2005. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) pandemic had a devastating impact on the Ugandan population throughout the 1990s, but there were dramatic reductions in HIV prevalence from around 20% to below 10% by 2000, and levels have stabilised at around 7%. There are significant regional variations in human development outcomes, and the north of the country, which has been ravaged by conflict, lags behind the rest of Uganda.

1.3 From the mid-1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) undertook a series of structural adjustment operations in Uganda. After some early tensions over macroeconomic policy, there was a breakthrough in 1992 when, after an episode of fiscal indiscipline, President Museveni strengthened the position of a unified Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), which introduced a rigorous system of cash budgeting and spending constraints. Since then fiscal deficits and inflation have been kept under control (with inflation mostly remaining below 10% since 1994). The track record of strong macroeconomic management meant that the dialogue between Uganda and its international development partners (DPs) moved on to issues of development strategy and public expenditure.

1.4 In 1995, a forum on poverty attended by the President was held and established a task force to examine how poverty could be tackled. This task force developed Uganda's first comprehensive poverty reduction strategy, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP1), which was published by the Government in 1997. The PEAP, now in its third iteration, is widely regarded as a genuine, government-owned, poverty reduction strategy. Disciplined macroeconomic management was allied to the strengthening of public finance management, led by the MFPED, including the development of increasingly sophisticated links between medium-term plans and budgets, with the result that PEAP priorities could be reflected in budget allocations.

1.5 Uganda has maintained a democratic system of governance, which provided the framework for systematic decentralisation. Elected district councils were given significant powers (consolidated in the 1997 Local Government Act), and resources channelled to district level increased substantially with a series of conditional grants to fund basic services. A multi-party system was instituted in 2006. The NRM government's relations with the international community have been good, but have been strained over Uganda's involvement in regional conflicts, the uncertain and delayed transition to multi-party democracy, high-level corruption, and the amendment of the constitution to allow President Museveni to seek a third elected term of office.

2 Aid Relationships

Aid flows

Overall aid

2.1 Uganda is highly aid-dependent. Aid commitments averaged around 15% of Gross National Income (GNI) annually between 1999 and 2007 (see Annex A, Figure A1), constituting about 50% of total public expenditure.

2.2 Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Uganda fluctuates quite sharply from year to year, and commitments have been in the range of USD 0.9 billion to USD 1.9 billion annually between 1999 and 2007, measured in constant 2007 price terms (see Annex A, Figure A2). The share of multilateral aid in total aid peaked at 65% in 2001, and has settled at about 40% of the total since then.

2.3 There are a large number of donors present in Uganda. Over the period 1999–2007 the most significant donor to total ODA was the World Bank (IDA), followed by the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), the European Commission (EC) and the African Development Fund (AfDF) (see Annex A, Figure A3).

Aid to education

2.4 Aid commitments to education and basic education have been on an uneven but generally downward trend (see Annex A, Figure A4). The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has declined from 93% to 49% between 1999 and 2007 (Annex A, Table A4).

2.5 The most significant donor in terms of aid to education during 1999–2007 was the World Bank (IDA) with a 19% share of the total, followed by the UK with 12%, and the United States (11%), the Netherlands (11%) and Ireland (10%) (Annex A, Figure A5). The main contributors to basic education have been the World Bank (IDA) with 28%, Netherlands (18%), Ireland (14%) and the US (13%) (Annex A, Figure A6).

Aid management in general

Overview

2.6 Uganda has been at the centre of aid effectiveness debates and at the forefront of innovations in aid management. As noted in Chapter 1, the Museveni regime was seen as a strong performer, both politically and economically. It had earned a lot of donor good will with the reconstruction of Uganda's infrastructure and institutions after a generation of conflict and decline. From the early 1990s it had adopted a very disciplined approach to economic and fiscal management under a powerful Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED).

2.7 The regime had a genuine political interest in poverty reduction, since it saw rural peasants as its main support base, and the initiative for the 1997 Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was domestic. The PEAP became a prototype for PRSPs and Uganda became the first country to receive HIPC debt relief. It developed a strong link between plans and budgets, through the operation of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), and MFPED was proactive in aid management, seeking to focus aid on the Government's plans and priorities, and promoting the use of government systems, while engaging donors in very transparent discussions about policies and public expenditure priorities. A subset of the budget, designated as the Poverty Action Fund (PAF), was used to demonstrate that HIPC funds, along with other aid, were being channelled to the expansion of pro-poor expenditures including basic education, and donors were encouraged to provide aid in the form of budget support.

Aid dialogue and budget support

2.8 Prior to PEAP1, Uganda's aid was fragmented and poorly coordinated, despite generally positive relationships with the donor community. The preparation of the first PEAP was, in part, a reaction to this problem. There was a general realisation that the aid architecture needed to be oriented towards the implementation of the PEAP. The latter half of the 1990s saw the Uganda government take various innovative steps in aid management, such as the introduction of sector wide approaches (SWAps), the PAF, and the development of the Partnership Principles in the context of PEAP2. (MFPED 2001)

2.9 From the late 1990s onwards, stimulated by these innovations, there was a surge in aid to Uganda, including a large increase in budget support funding, much of which, via the PAF, was channelled to the financing of basic services delivered by local governments. Following the agreement of HIPC debt relief, budget support took centre stage in the dialogue between Uganda and its development partners. A series of Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) were provided by the World Bank, with additional financing from other donors. The performance conditions for the PRSCs took education into account by requiring a successful continuation of the process of the education SWAp (see ¶2.13 below). (IDD & Associates 2006, Miovic 2004, World Bank 2009)

2.10 In recent years there have been greater political tensions between the government and its aid partners, stemming from concerns about governance and high level corruption. Despite such concerns, donors have moved forward on the harmonisation agenda with the development of the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS), with a number of multilateral and bilateral donors adopting a common strategy and coordinating their support. The results matrix in the latest iteration of the PEAP has been strengthened as a common focus for monitoring of its implementation, so that there is an increasing emphasis on joint Government of Uganda (GOU) and donor assessment of aggregate performance, rather than each partner focusing separately on the effectiveness of its own aid inputs.

Aid management in the education sector

2.11 Since the mid 1990s, Uganda has used the PAF to support both the recurrent and development costs of supporting universal primary completion (UPC). General and sector budget support, alongside HIPC debt relief, has been notionally earmarked to priority poverty-reduction programmes through the GOU budget. Along with earmarked sector budget support, this has been linked to sector programmes in education and then health. The PAF has substantially helped ensure the implementation of national education policy.

2.12 Changing modalities of support reflected the evolution of decentralisation. During the 1990s a number of donors had sponsored specific districts, but district-specific programmes were increasingly seen as outmoded as most donors moved towards funding basic services through the budget, and supporting district capacity development through the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP). Key district financing mechanisms for the education sector were the UPE capitation grant, and the School Facilities Grant (SFG). These grants were accompanied by more responsibilities for school management committees, as well as district education offices, and regular tracking studies to verify that funds were reaching the intended beneficiaries. Donor support to these grants was channelled through the PAF.

2.13 Uganda's SWAp for education was developed in the second half of the 1990s (see Eilor 2004 for an overview). It was described by the 2003 joint evaluation of aid to basic education as "*perhaps the most highly developed example of a SWAp in the education sector to be found anywhere*" (Netherlands MFA 2003). Its preparation involved collaboration between the Ministry of Education and Sports (MES) and key education sector donors, and the experience of preparing it demonstrated the commitment of both sides to

transparency and dialogue. The framework for dialogue between MES and donors was formalised with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1999. This established an Education Sector Coordination Committee (ESCC) chaired by the MES Permanent Secretary, as the focus of the relationship.

2.14 Technical work is undertaken through a series of sub-committees and task forces, including a budget working group through which (as in other sectors) government and donors discuss resource allocations in detail at key points in the budget cycle, stimulated by the need to establish budget priorities within the framework of resource ceilings set by MFPED through the MTEF. An agreement among the donors themselves constituted the Education Funding Agencies Group (EFAG) as a donor coordination forum. There is now a well-established system whereby donors work together to submit joint Technical Notes to MES on key issues.

2.15 Although the SWAp serves as a coordinating framework for all forms of aid to the sector, it fostered increasing use of sector budget support (SBS). In 2002 donors who had previously provided SBS through separate mechanisms adopted a common system whereby their funds are channelled to GOU through a common account. This still allowed individual donors to stipulate that their funds should be allocated to specific education sector budget lines, although some education sector donors also provide budget support that is completely un-earmarked, or only designated to the PAF as a whole, not to particular budget lines within it.

2.16 A common monitoring and reporting framework has been adopted linked to the development of an Education Management Information System (EMIS) and to joint Education Sector Reviews (now held annually). The reviews lead to a series of agreed "undertakings" – priority actions agreed by MES in line with the common sector strategy. At first the list of proposed undertakings was unrealistically long, but the mechanism has been refined, with a shorter, more practical list of undertakings which define the performance against which sector support is disbursed. Sector support is linked to the wider system of general budget support, since a satisfactory education sector review is one of the conditions stipulated in the annual Poverty Reduction Support Credit performance matrix.

2.17 The SWAp facilitated a shift in the balance of aid modalities in the sector, especially for the funding of basic education. Ward et al note:

The shift in aid modality, from projects to programme to sector and then to budget support raised the level of the policy dialogue between education funding and technical assistance agencies and the GoU. A key feature of this process has been the way in which development partner representatives and senior government officials have increasingly listened to the implementers of reforms and responded to issues raised by adjusting financial allocations and refining policies and programmes. (Ward et al 2006)

2.18 The joint evaluation of aid to basic education noted that participants in the SWAp (by then over 20) fall into several distinct groups. Although the SWAp in principle covers the whole sector, there has been a de facto focus on basic education in particular. Donors whose main interest is in other sub-sectors form an outer group; those whose support for basic education is channelled mainly through projects and technical assistance form a middle group, while the inner core consists of those donors who have sought to support basic education via the government budget. (Netherlands MFA 2003)

3 Basic Education in Uganda

The education system

3.1 The system of education in Uganda was set up when Uganda was a British protectorate. The school system is based on 7 - 4 - 2. Each child potentially spends 7 years in Primary School, 4 years in Secondary School and 2 years in High School before going on to vocational technical education and training and higher education through colleges and universities. Pre-primary or nursery education is private and unaffordable for most parents.

3.2 Basic education is mainly provided through state schools, although there are a few private schools. The secondary sub-sector has three types of schools (i.e. government-owned, private sector-owned and community-owned). In 2007, according to Education Management Information System (EMIS) figures quoted in the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP), government-owned secondary schools are 20% of the total, private schools are 69%, and community schools 11%. However, although the majority of existing schools are either privately or community-owned, they cater for a smaller proportion of less than 50% of school enrolments. The Ministry of Education and Sports (MES) is responsible for overseeing the running of all private and public academic institutions in the country.

3.3 The government White Paper on Education (1992) is the basis of official policy in the education sector. The White Paper objectives are to promote citizenship; to eradicate illiteracy; to promote scientific, technical and cultural knowledge, skills and attitudes; and to equip individuals with basic skills, knowledge and the ability to “contribute to the building of an integrated, self-sustaining and independent national economy”.

3.4 The main driving forces behind education sector policy are the presidential manifesto commitments to primary and secondary education, the pressure to achieve the goals of the PEAP, and the committed aim of achieving Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. All these have the common purpose of providing relevant education and enhancing efficiency, and strengthening partnerships in the education sector.

3.5 Current education policy focuses on expanding the functional capacity of educational structures and reducing the inequalities of access to education between sexes, geographical areas, and social classes. It commits the government to redistribution of resources through reform of the education sector. Substantial resources have been allocated to the early stages of education through the Universal Primary Education (UPE) programme, and more recently to secondary education, in order to improve equity of access at those levels for boys and girls.

Pursuit of UPE – the "big bang" and its aftermath

Expanding access to primary education

3.6 The policy of universal primary education was launched by government in 1997, following the recommendations of the Education Policy Review Commission (1989), the provisions of the White Paper (1992) and the development of Children’s Statute (1996). The primary driver was the presidential pronouncement and the abolition of primary school fees in 1996.

3.7 The stated objectives of UPE are:

- Making basic education accessible to the learners and relevant to their needs as well as meeting national goals;
- Making education equitable in order to eliminate disparities and inequalities;

- Establishing, providing and maintaining quality education as the basis for promoting the necessary human resource development;
- Initiating a fundamental transformation of society in the social, economic and political fields; and
- Ensuring that education is affordable for the majority of Ugandans by providing initially, the minimum necessary facilities and resources, and progressively, the optimal facilities, to enable every child to enter and remain in school until they complete the primary school education cycle.

3.8 There was a rapid rise in enrolment of pupils in primary school after the introduction of UPE in 1997. Enrolment shot up from 3m in 1996 to 5.3m in 1997 after the start of UPE, and continued to increase until 2003 when the first cohort of intake after 1997 reached Grade 6; and since then has levelled off. By 2007, the enrolment figures were at the level of 7.5m pupils in primary schools, of whom 51 % were boys while 49% were girls.

Table 3.1 Growth in primary school enrolments 1995–2007 (million pupils)

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Male	1.439	1.648	2.832	3.062	3.302	3.396	3.528	3.721	3.873	3.733	3.643	3.553	3.779
Female	1.197	1.421	2.471	2.745	2.986	3.163	3.373	3.633	3.761	3.644	3.581	3.671	3.759
Total	2.636	3.069	5.304	5.806	6.288	6.559	6.901	7.354	7.633	7.377	7.224	7.224	7.538

Source: Education statistical abstract.

3.9 The Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) improved from 114.4% (117.8% for boys and 111.2% for girls) in 2006/07, to 113.1% (116.5% for boys and 110.0% for girls) in 2007/08. This implies that the number of over-age and under-age children is being successfully mopped up in the primary education system. The Net Enrolment Rate (NER) increased from 92.0% (94.1% for boys and 90.1% for girls) to 93.3% (95 % for boys and 91.4% for girls), implying that there are now more children aged 6-12 enrolled in primary education.

Lessons from the "big bang" approach

3.10 The effects of Uganda's "big bang" approach to UPE were dramatic. An assessment in 2002 (World Bank 2002a) drew the following conclusions:

The success of Uganda's "big bang" approach—an all-out effort to achieve UPE by making primary education free and sharply increasing public spending in support of this—confirmed that, for Uganda, financial constraints on the demand side had been by far the most important reason for low primary enrollment.

Uganda was also largely successful in narrowing primary enrollment gaps between rich and poor and between boys and girls. The wealth bias that had characterized access to primary education prior to UPE was all but eliminated by 1999. In addition, the improvements in female access to primary education have been enormous.

3.11 The authors noted as key enabling factors: strong political support, abolition of fees, collaboration by government and donors to finance the system's expansion through the budget, and also measures to improve transparency and accountability of spending at the school level,¹ which, in combination with predictable flows of aid, permitted remarkable efficiency gains in the use of sector resources (the share of funds reaching schools had risen to about 90 percent, from 28 percent in 1996). The following "lessons learned" were highlighted:

¹ These measures included the celebrated requirement to display school budgets on each school's walls. For a more recent review of this initiative and its effects, see Hubbard 2007.

- Successful education reforms in developing countries like Uganda require high levels of political and education management commitment that is sustained over a long period.
- The big bang approach can be a very powerful policy instrument for getting all the children into school and Uganda had managed to do this very well.
- Timely, flexible donor support is a critical factor.

The downside of the big bang approach is that there can be a dramatic decline in quality and the key is to anticipate the likely impact of big bang approaches on quality and prepare accordingly. (World Bank 2002a)

3.12 Because of the UPE bulge, pupils successfully completing primary have also increased. EMIS data indicate that in the year 2000, 238,834 pupils (78%) out of 304,507 pupils passed primary seven while in 2004, the number increased to 320,543 (74%) out of 433,518 pupils. According to the ESSP, “based on current performance trends, Uganda is likely to hit the target Net Enrolment Rate of 100%, by the target date (2015) provided the concerns of low quality of education (as manifested in both learning achievements and survival rates) are overcome.”

3.13 Uganda has thus made significant progress in providing access to most primary and lower secondary school aged children in the country. However, it should be noted that some children still do not have access as a consequence of issues such as civil conflict in the north, disability or other special learning needs and other social-cultural reasons such as early marriage or pastoralism.

Outcomes and quality²

3.14 Annex B reproduces a summary assessment of education performance from the recent evaluation of the PEAP (OPM 2008). It concludes:

Overall, the PEAP has had a positive impact on education. Adult literacy rates have risen and the gender gap has fallen. National enrolment rates at primary level have increased, while enrolment disparities between rural and urban areas, rich and poor, boys and girls, and between regions have all declined. That said, there are enormous challenges to be overcome, which include low completion rates, poor quality of education, high teacher absenteeism and other forms of waste.

3.15 Cohort survival rates and primary completion rates are summarised in Annex B, Table B3, which demonstrates that the rapid expansion of the educational system’s capacity to enrol pupils at primary level since 1997 has not been matched by its capacity to retain them once enrolled. It notes that low completion rates are due in part to the low quality of education (although characteristics of pupils and households, not only school-related factors, play an important role). Annex B, Table B4 shows trends in literacy and numeracy competence at grades 3 and 6. In 2005–06, fewer than half the pupils at grade 3 and barely one-third of pupils at grade 6 reached minimum standards in literacy. Competence in numeracy has increased slightly at grade 3, but has fallen at grade 6 over the whole period. In 2005–06, pupil performance in numeracy was very similar to performance in literacy. Fewer than half the pupils at grade 3 and fewer than one-third of pupils at grade 6 reached minimum standards.

3.16 A decline in test scores when education is expanded to include pupils from more disadvantaged backgrounds is predictable, although it does not lessen the challenge of ensuring that all pupils achieve worthwhile learning at school. As noted in an impact evaluation comparing Uganda and Zambia:

² This section is largely based on Annex D of OPM 2008.

The increased access to education of the poorest groups in society normally has a negative effect on the average examination and test results. There is a positive correlation between educational background and income of the parents and test and examination results of the pupils (see [World Bank 2004c] for the same point with respect to Ghana). Precisely this effect may explain why, in the short run, in many developing countries the effects of increased attention to education may seem to be disappointing. (de Kemp 2008)

Present planning framework and priorities

3.17 Ten years after the launch of UPE, the Universal Post Primary Education and Training Project (UPPET) was launched in 2006. UPPET has four purposes: (i) increasing equitable access to post primary education and training (PPET); (ii) assuring achievement of the MDG of gender parity in education delivery by 2015; (iii) enhancing sustainability of the universal primary education (UPE); and (iv) reducing the high costs of UPPET. The launch of UPPET marks a shift in policy and resource allocation towards a more balanced and broad-fronted approach to primary and post-primary education delivery.

3.18 Other policies which guide sector efforts to provide quality primary education include:

- The Quality Education Initiative (QEI). The QEI is a flagship programme for the improvement of the quality of primary education in the country. It will be rolled out over all districts during the ESSP Plan period.
- Text Book Policy, intended to increase accessibility of core textbooks and other supplementary reading materials to children in order to address the low literacy rates.
- Automatic Promotion Policy, an efficiency measure to reduce repetition and dropout rates in primary schools.
- Instruction in Local Language Policy (lower primary). This supports the implementation of the thematic curriculum by putting emphasis on instruction in local languages because it is believed that teaching in the local language speeds up the learning rate of pupils.
- Early Childhood Development Policy, designed to create a firm foundation for quality education at all levels.

3.19 The Education Sector Investment Plan (ESIP) was the original instrument for implementation of UPE in the context of national development priorities under the auspices of the PEAP. Its successor, the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP), prepared in 2003, is the main instrument for presenting current government strategy for education, and was originally developed to cover the fiscal years 2004–2015. The ESSP now commits government to ensuring that universal access to primary and to secondary education are the sector priorities. It also targets the removal of financial impediments to that objective, and it focuses attention on improving regional and gender equity. Implementation of ESSP is envisaged through shared contributions by the public and private sectors, households and communities.

3.20 The ESSP aims to build on and to take forward the successes of ESIP, particularly in the implementation of UPE, while addressing the gaps in ESIP such as providing adequate treatment of the secondary, tertiary and vocational sub-sectors. The objectives of the ESSP are:

- To build an education system that is relevant to Uganda's national development;
- To ensure that all children participating in the education system achieve education goals; and
- To maintain an effective and efficient education sector.

3.21 The current ESSP was originally drafted and approved by Cabinet in 2005. A Revised and Re-costed ESSP 2007–15 was developed by MES in 2007, and remained in draft in June 2009. The need to update and re-cost the ESSP was promoted by changes in the education policy agenda and objectives discussed above.

3.22 Central government decentralised public services, including those for education, under the Local Government Act of 1997. This involved the devolution to local governments of functions which thus far had been the responsibility of central government. The objective for the education sector was to improve basic education by localising its administration and service delivery. This meant that the districts were responsible for teacher recruitment, deployment and supervision. Districts were also responsible for the disbursement and management of the funds received to implement UPE, namely the UPE Capitation Grant and Primary School Facilities Grant.

3.23 These grants make up the bulk of district budgets for education. There are district level constraints of lack of capacity and training to manage these funds and to fulfil the larger mandate they have been delegated. The introducing of UPE and decentralisation simultaneously, and more recently of UPPET, have inevitably placed considerable strain on the education system.

4 Overview of the FTI in Uganda

4.1 Uganda was among the first group of eighteen countries³ invited to participate in the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) in 2002. In its early days, the FTI's arrangements were very fluid, and subject to changes which were often difficult for stakeholders at the country level to track and understand. Although Uganda was invited to apply for FTI endorsement early in the life of the FTI, it was not eligible for Catalytic Fund (CF) funding since it did not satisfy the "donor orphan" criterion for the CF. The FTI concept was, rather, that a country's existing donors would step up their support for an "FTI-endorsed" education sector plan. Since GOU and its development partners were already collaborating systematically to support basic education, the added value of FTI endorsement was not immediately evident to MES or to the education donors in Uganda. At that stage, it was not clear that the benefits provided by the FTI "quality mark" warranted the costs of obtaining endorsement.

4.2 In the early iteration of the FTI, an FTI plan, separate from the regular policy documentation, was requested. Despite the in-country ambivalence about the benefits and modalities adopted for the FTI, and despite work being initiated on the first Education Sector Support Plan (ESSP 2004–15), MES expended a lot of effort on developing a separate dedicated FTI proposal.⁴

4.3 The early proposal preparation process was backstopped by World Bank education specialists, and included work with the Sector Working Group on the adaptation of a simulation model to the Uganda context.⁵ A World Bank Back To Office Report (BTOR) reported that the Uganda team should be able to submit "their EFA FTI proposal to meet the end-September (2002) deadline", though there were reservations about the estimates of the financing gap.

4.4 However, the initial FTI proposal for endorsement was never submitted since MFPED was unable to support the FTI proposal on macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline grounds. This was because the FTI additionality requirement, i.e. that FTI funding would be in addition to the external and domestic resources already projected, clashed with the requirement that resource allocation should be within the projected ceilings of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).

4.5 The endorsement process at this stage, as outlined by the FTI Secretariat,⁶ was that the FTI proposal, once approved through government processes, would be formally submitted to the donor group, the EFAG (Education Funding Agency Group), via the Coordinator for transmission to the other members of the EFAG and to the FTI Secretariat for review, specifying a review timeframe. On the receipt of comments, the EFAG Coordinator would convene a final review and provide consensus feedback to Government. Once Government had prepared a revised proposal, an email review and formal endorsement of the revised proposal by Headquarters level donors would follow. Formal endorsement would be the trigger for local donors to line up the increased funding required. The FTI Secretariat would work at the Headquarters level to encourage this and complementary support.

4.6 After the failure of the first attempt at endorsement in 2002/03, there seems to have been no further Uganda FTI activity between 2004 and 2006. In 2006, the change in eligibility criteria for accessing the CF opened up the possibility once again for Uganda's

³ Next Steps letter, from the Head of the EFA FTI Secretariat to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education and Sports, April 25, 2003.

⁴ A point acknowledged in the letter of April 25 2003, from the Head of the FTI Secretariat.

⁵ It is not clear if this is the same model that underpinned the projections of the ESSP.

⁶ Letter from the Head of the EFA FTI Secretariat to the Permanent Secretary of April 25 2003.

participation in CF funding. Allied with the pressures on sector funding arising out of the UPPET and the progress still needed on UPE, serious contacts were resumed between Uganda and the FTI Secretariat in 2007.

4.7 In 2007, with promptings from the EFAG, MES recognised the need to revise and update the ESSP 2004–15 as a basis for applying for FTI endorsement. According to a recent version of the revised ESSP:

the decision to re-cost and update the strategic plan was prompted by the addition of six items to Uganda's education policy agenda since the launch of the ESSP 2004–2015:

- Bringing the ESSP into full conformance with EFA FTI goals (the ESSP 2004-2015 had been designed to fit within financial constraints).
- Improving the quality of primary education through introduction of local language instruction and a simplified thematic curriculum.
- Ensuring that all pupils successfully completing Primary 7 have access to either academic secondary education or Business, Technical, Vocational Education and Training (BTJET).
- Strengthening science and technology education by providing science laboratories, ICT laboratory rooms, and well-stocked libraries to secondary schools.
- Increasing participation in tertiary education in order to ensure that Uganda meets its needs for high-level work force.
- Increasing the attractiveness of the teaching profession through the introduction of a scheme of service that creates a career ladder for teachers and school administrators and differentiates salaries in recognition of career status. (MES 2008)

4.8 In January 2008, MES requested help from the FTI Secretariat (again with prompting from EFAG) in the form of a Quality Support Review of the Revised and Re-costed ESSP. By March 2008, the Secretariat had submitted Quality Support Review comments, which were used by MES to prepare a further draft ESSP 2007–15.

4.9 The FTI Quality Support Review comments pointed to the lack of clarity as to how policies were to be translated into strategies, and whether strategies were properly grounded in policies. The comments also highlighted affordability and sustainability issues, noting that the ESSP set out "an extremely ambitious and expensive program". It stressed the need to elaborate on how the ambitions and targets in the plan related to overall and specific capacities to execute the ESSP. It advised also on the need to elaborate proposed funding sources and a financing plan.

4.10 For the rest of 2008, the process of ESSP revision by MES and comment by the donor group (EFAG) proceeded slowly. A series of deadlines were missed. In September 2008, the Permanent Secretary of MES wrote that *"The endorsement process will require the local donor Agencies to assess the completeness and relevancy of the revised ESSP (2008-2015) and forward it to the EFA/FTI Secretariat in time for the next assessment scheduled for January 2009."* By the end of 2008, it was clear that there were some areas of disagreement within the donor group and between some of the donors and government, which, in the view of some members of the EFAG, needed additional resources to address.

4.11 A particularly problematic aspect related to the estimation of the financing gap. There was a view on the part of some donors that the financial estimates were not properly costed. The financing gap which came out at USD 1 billion over the eight years of the ESSP was considered by some donors to be far too big, and was unviable as the basis for a realistic plan; and the revision did not offer donors different funding options.

4.12 This back-and-forth seems to have created serious frustrations within the government. An application was made in early 2009, approved in June 2009, for EPDF support to provide consultancies to help finalise the ESSP 2007–15. It is not clear that this has been done with the full support of MES. At July 2009, Uganda has still not achieved endorsement.

4.13 The use of the EPDF has been quite limited. It has provided TA to assist with the planning of the ESSP and sponsorship for a small number of capacity building activities, for example, participation in the WBI courses, and a regional FTI workshop in Cape Town on “country leadership and implementation for results in the EFA – FTI partnership”.

5 Key Issues

5.1 Since Uganda, seven years after its first invitation to join the FTI, is still not yet endorsed, the following analysis and commentary focus on the experience of sporadic and limited preparatory activities.

The FTI and Education Policy and Planning

5.2 The early FTI endorsement process in 2002–03 bypassed the regular process of sector planning based on the ESIP/ESSP. This was a source of disquiet for some donors who would have preferred the ESIP/ESSP process to be the basis of the FTI endorsement submission, rather than the application of a parallel arrangement.

5.3 In the recent endorsement exercise, the FTI has been positive in explicitly calling for a good strategic sector plan, and has focused on the principle of improving the existing plan. At the local level, the FTI has been used as an incentive by some budget support donors, to put pressure on the government for the production of an improved ESSP. However, donor perspectives on the ESSP have been fragmented, which may have led, in the eyes of government, to a perception of donor ambivalence on the need for and the specifics of revision.

5.4 Different donors have different attitudes to the sector strategic plan, the ESSP, mainly depending on whether they have been involved in budget support (cf. ¶2.18). For those donors which provide significant budget support such as DFID, Irish Aid and the Netherlands, a credible ESSP is the key to providing the basis for their resource flows which are managed through government systems. For those donors dealing purely in projects, while the ESSP is important, their main interest is in satisfying the requirements of their projects.

5.5 Essentially, the FTI has not been a central issue in the evolution of planning and policy in the sector. Rather the issue has been about the quality of the ESSP 2008–15 as a ‘credible’ plan in response to the education needs of Uganda. Credible here means addressing the priority issues, adopting appropriate strategies, providing adequate financing and having a monitoring and evaluation mechanism in place to assess results.

5.6 The FTI has had minimal influence on education policy and planning. Both UPE and UPPET were announced through Presidential manifesto, outside the regular processes of sector planning. The main driving forces behind education sector policy continue to be the President’s manifesto commitments for primary and secondary education, the pressure to achieve the goals of the PEAP, and the aims of achieving EFA and the MDGs by 2015.

5.7 Current education policy focuses on expanding the functional capacity of educational structures and on reducing the inequalities of access to education between sexes, geographical areas, and social classes. It commits the government to redistribution of resources through reform of the education sector. More resources have been allocated to the early stages of education through the UPE programme in order to improve gender equity of access at that level.

5.8 The latest ESSP points to the quality deficiencies at primary school level. Assessments of pupils’ performance show low rates of mastery of literacy and numeracy skills. The most recent assessments of pupils’ achievements published for the National Assessment of Progress in Education (NAPE) undertaken in 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2006 show a slight improvement in learning achievements. However, the overall performance is below acceptable standards. In the 2006 study, about 39% of pupils at P3 level were tested as “inadequate” in their performance in English reading and writing, and in numeracy. At P6

level in 2006, 52% of P6 pupils were tested as “inadequate” in English reading and writing, compared to 67% in 2003 thus registering some improvement in this area. Just under 30% were rated as inadequate in oral English, and over 56% were rated as inadequate in numeracy. (See also Annex B.)

5.9 ESSP 2008–15 presents significant challenges to the government and its stakeholder partners. Much has changed since the government’s early efforts to revitalize the education system, starting with UPE. However, there are fears that the pace of development and reform is too fast, and that the need to consolidate gains (especially with respect to quality) is being overrun by the need for continuing expansion. The Ministry’s dilemma is to find a balance between providing a quality service on the one hand, and satisfying political demands for increasing access at all levels on the other.

The FTI and the Financing of Education

5.10 A surge of government spending on education in the late 1990s took education’s share of overall public spending from 12% in 1992/3 to 26% in 1999/2000. However, since then, the share of education as total government expenditure has declined as indicated in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Share of Education in Total Government Spending

FY	2002/3	2003/4	2004/5	2005/6	2006/7	2007/8	2008/9
% Share	20.6	18.8	18.8	17.1	17.6	17.8	17.3

Source: Budget Framework Paper 2009/10

5.11 The relevance and effectiveness of FTI endorsement in the Uganda education SWAp context is questionable. As recently as the Commonwealth Secretariat workshop in September 2008, government participants in the workshop concluded that “*The value of Fast Track Initiative endorsement is not clear given the existing flows for education in Uganda via SWAps.*”

5.12 Additionality of funding has been a major stumbling block for FTI progress since the inception of the FTI in 2002. The first attempts by Uganda to obtain FTI endorsement were blocked by the MFPED policy on macroeconomic stabilisation and budgetary discipline, and adherence to the macro framework ceilings. There have been signs that the MFPED stance may be changing in relation to global-type funds generally, but discussions have not reached a conclusion, and essentially the financing gap issue in relation to education remains unresolved by MFPED, MES and the donors.

5.13 On the donor side, there are concerns that moves to additionality for UPC will have the opposite effect. The central concern with the FTI is that any “additional” FTI funding for UPC may prove fungible into other education subsectors. Given the pressure on spending in the education sector arising from UPE and UPPET, FTI funding may be used to displace government funding to the subsector. But, like the funding gap, this area of discussion has never been thoroughly followed through in the interactions between government and DPs.

5.14 The financing estimates under the revised ESSP, which provide the basis for the financing gap, take account of both state and private funding to the sector. The latest official estimates represent an increase in total educational expenditures (public and private) of 61% of the amount projected under the original ESSP 2004–2015. The rate of increase differs by subsector of the education system. The largest rate of increase occurs in the BTVET sector where expenditures are projected to rise by about 300%. At the other extreme, expenditures for tertiary education remain nearly unchanged. While spending on primary education increases by about 99%, the share of total government expenditure going to primary

education drops, from 60% under the original ESSP 2004–2015 to 52.4% under the revised Strategy.

5.15 The financing gap has come to the fore in the concerns of some donors since the gap of USD 1 billion proposed in the latest official version of the ESSP is so large. A major contributor to the financing gap is the proposals for a new system of compensation for teachers and school administrators.

5.16 In the eyes of some donors, the key planning need is to look at more realistic financing scenarios based on clearly articulated policy options. In particular, government and DPs need to focus their dialogue on the key issue of UPE and the quality of the learning/teaching processes.

5.17 The MES has a very different perspective on the financing gap. In its perception, since the ESSP was approved by Cabinet in 2005, it has high level authority for taking forward the fundamentals of the ESSP, including the financing gap. The latest MES estimates of the financing gap are now, in fact, considerably higher than USD 1 billion. In the view of MES, the financing gap reflects the real needs and requirements of the sector, and the financing gap is there to be filled, rather than reduced.

5.18 A major spending challenge relates to the share of primary in the overall education sector budget. This is on a declining trend, having reduced from 65% to 62% in the last three years. The FTI is a part of the background psychology in this shift since it is seen as a possible way of compensating for reductions to primary education in the future.

5.19 In terms of financing predictability, the FTI has not so far had any impact. The term “Fast Track” is ironic given that after seven years, Uganda is still not yet at the starting line. How far the FTI itself has been a central contributor to this is arguable. On the one hand, the early eligibility criteria for FTI CF funding were clearly a disincentive for Uganda’s participation. At the same time, however, the fragmented approaches of government and DPs had led to a lack of coherence on sector financing.

The FTI and the Data Gaps

5.20 Early World Bank analytical support to the FTI process in 2002 identified some data weaknesses in relation to enrolments. However, these related to population statistics rather than to the EMIS, and the problems have been largely rectified by the 2002 population census.⁷ The World Bank emphasised at the time that:

the problems in data collection ... are not unique to Uganda. ... the school system has been growing rapidly under new “rules of the game” brought about by the introduction of the UPE policy in 1997 which eliminated fees for primary schooling. The practice of switching schools has apparently intensified ..., since families are now no longer constrained by having already paid fees at the beginning of term, from moving their children to another school that is perceived to be providing better services. Tracking enrolments in such a setting is difficult at best, and the Ministry should be commended for its continuing efforts to improve data collection through various arrangements to verify the school census returns through spot checks. (BTOR 2002)

5.21 Discussion around education sector dialogue and performance had been worked on in the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) process. The PRSC was introduced by the World Bank in 2001 (see Miovic 2004). However, the idea of a performance assessment framework for the education sector was not broached until FY 2007/08 when the EFAG spearheaded the formulation of a performance framework called the Joint Assessment

⁷ The 2002 Census did not solve the problem of counting nomads/ pastoralists, nor of complete coverage in the North.

Framework (JAF). The JAF has three sections. The first has macro level indicators; the second has crosscutting reform programmes; and the last section deals with sector indicators which are qualitative in nature. However, the JAF does not appear to have been incorporated into the revised ESSP.⁸

5.22 In terms of monitoring and evaluation (M&E), donors have focused on the performance of priority areas. As in other sectors, M&E is in the process of moving towards more output and outcome based systems. The FTI Quality Support Review, carried out by a two member review panel based in the World Bank in Washington DC,⁹ made a number of suggestions on performance reporting, including that the Ministry develop an ESSP Results Framework for the Plan period, with performance targets and key outcome indicators. These suggestions do not appear to have been acted on, and the FTI has had no particular influence in this area.

5.23 The FTI Quality Support Review panel expressed concerns about overestimations in the revised ESSP relating to primary and eventually post-primary enrolments. But it did not identify these as the results of weak data, but rather of over-optimistic assumptions.

The FTI and Capacity Development

5.24 One view received during this study was that the FTI process was inappropriate from its inception in Dakar because of capacity constraints. The slogan of no credible UPC plan being allowed to lack funds put unrealistic pressures on recipient governments because increases in human skills and capacities would never be able to match the pace of funding increases. In one interpretation of the Uganda case, it was seen as a good thing that MFPED blocked the FTI process in 2003, because it would have created additional and unsupportable stresses on systems and capacities. Despite some progress, capacity constraints on both the government and the donor sides continue to slow down progress in the education sector.

5.25 At the Ministry level, the capacity to plan, implement, and monitor programmes has improved since the inception of the SWAp in 1998. However, the revised ESSP acknowledges that, as future investments include substantial developments at the post-primary and tertiary levels, the Ministry's administrative staff will require even more sophisticated planning and management skills. Further, the system must be re-tuned to provide incentives for better planning and management. With responsibility for service delivery shifting increasingly to the district level, more will be asked of district-based administrators and schools.

5.26 Overall, capacity development has proved to be a key challenge for both donors and the MES. The introduction of UPE in 1997 and UPPET in 2006, in particular, have placed severe pressures on the system and its associated capacities.

5.27 The FTI Quality Review highlighted the capacity issue and proposed the inclusion of a capacity section in the ESSP where all capacities (Ministry, District and school level) would be more fully addressed. Capacity gaps in Local Government, which is responsible for the implementation of primary education, are as important as those in the Ministry. The FTI Review also drew attention to the potential role of the Joint Annual Sector Reviews of the SWAp in providing a candid assessment of capacities to execute the ESSP.

⁸ The Annex of the ESSP on Draft Monitoring Indicators and Outcome Targets was not available for review during this study.

⁹ The review panel met on February 19 2007, via video conference, with representatives from MES, local donor representatives, and representatives from the FTI Secretariat.

5.28 The local donor group, the EFAG, has recently been re-designated the Education Development Partnership (EDP). This has involved a name change only, and it is still exclusively a donor group. The ability of EFAG/EDP, and their in-country donor representatives, to provide technical backstopping to the ESSP process has been weak because of the range of tasks that donor staff are involved in.

5.29 EPDF provided sponsorship for a small number of capacity building activities, for example, participation in the WBI courses and a regional FTI workshop in Cape Town on “country leadership and implementation for results in the EFA – FTI partnership”. Views on the utility of these activities are mixed.

5.30 There are numerous NGOs working in the education sector and many focus work on good community-based strategies and on local empowerment. However, when it comes to national level debate, NGOs and civil society in general do not appear to have a strong voice or influence. Some donors consider civil society, represented by the Foundation for Education non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Uganda (FENU), to be very weak in the education sector.

5.31 TA had just been approved in June 2009 for gap-filling support for the ESSP revision, and the revised target for revising the ESSP was December 2009. However, as with the financing gap, there are ambivalent views on the necessity and role of TA within the main stakeholder groups.

5.32 Overall, the FTI’s influence on capacity development has been very limited as there have been few activities implemented through the FTI directed at improving capacity.

The FTI and Aid Effectiveness

5.33 In terms of country ownership of policy and strategy, donor alignment and harmonisation through the use of sector SWAps, and joint planning and monitoring arrangements for mutual accountability, Uganda has a strong reputation as an early mover. It is perceived in the international community to have a long record of doing well, and the education sector is prominent in this regard. Most sectors have adopted divisions of labour among donors to reduce the transaction costs on government by reducing the numbers of donors in all the sectors.

5.34 However, there appear to be limitations on this success in the education sector in recent times. Key high level policy decisions are sometimes taken unilaterally, as with the introduction of UPPET by government. And there is a tendency on the donor side for donors to do their own thing. In the education sector, the policy on the division of labour has not been effective and the numbers of donors have increased rather than reduced. It may be fair to say that, to some degree, joint activities are or have become superficial. The extent of real joint activity is open to question. High level policy decisions, domestically and politically driven, have sometimes frustrated donors, but at least in this case domestic ownership of policy is ensured.

5.35 The unfulfilled consummation of FTI endorsement for Uganda, after two attempts and a period of seven years, points to the disjunctures in the aid effectiveness framework for education. Part of the problem is that, despite the long-standing aid architecture for the sector, based on annual joint sector reviews, sector working groups, etc., there are limits to the jointness of decision making, especially at the policy level. The non-participation of the EFAG in dialogue on UPPET, and its surprise public announcement in the middle of the Sector Review Meeting in 2005, is an example which has tested the sector partnership.

5.36 In general, alignment of donor budget support and project activities with the policy agenda set by government is strong. Recent experience of harmonisation of donor activity in

education, on the other hand, appears to have been weaker, as reflected in the operations of the EFAG, and in the lack of concerted donor interaction with government on key issues such as the financing gap and TA in relation to ESSP.

5.37 The recent but long-drawn-out revision and re-costing of the ESSP has been constrained by the mode of operation: MES sending a draft and asking for comments, rather than joint working sessions where each side can discuss key issues and differences and develop solutions together from baseline thinking. The FTI has had little influence on these modalities.

5.38 In the view of one donor, the FTI application process has stalled partly as a result of the distraction of the processing of the World Bank Universal Post Primary Education and Training Project (USD 150 million). In its view, there was a breakdown in strategic logic, as the project loan was being processed before the broad sector plan (the ESSP) had been approved.

5.39 The latest ESSP provides a strong mapping process, led by government, of the general strategic direction for the sector, but it is weak on applying prioritisation in order to plan within a feasible budgetary framework. Strangely, the financing gap issue has not been fully discussed, face to face, between MFPED, MES and the donors. The monthly Sector Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group meetings are the forum where such matters could be discussed, but financing of the ESSP has not been a main agenda item. The different interests of the budget support and project donors have weakened the coherence and harmonisation of the donor position. Since the government and DP sides have grown quite far apart, the attitude may now be to avoid tension, and to wait and hope for a TA based solution. Another example of disjuncture relates to EPDF funding for TA. This TA, to be engaged to help finalise the ESSP, was approved during the course of this study at the end of June 2009. Surprisingly, the Planning Department in MES does not appear to have been aware that the TA had been applied for, let alone approved.

5.40 In sum, the FTI has had little impact on aid effectiveness in the sector partly because a relatively sophisticated aid architecture was already in place, and partly because the FTI approach emphasised education policy and strategic planning improvements, and aid effectiveness was not prominent. The FTI approach has been unable to deal with different Government and donor perspectives on difficult issues such as the financing gap.

Cross-Cutting Issues

5.41 Cross-cutting issues have long been included in education sector plans developed prior to the FTI. Issues such as equity and access have been prominent in educational discussions and a key part of GOU policy. UPE policy emphasis is on equal opportunity for boys and girls. And a costed framework for basic education for disadvantaged children fed into the 2003/04 planning and budgeting cycle commencing in October 2002. Being particularly badly affected, Uganda has given prominence to HIV/AIDS. The latest ESSP, first drafted in 2005, also refers to new themes which have particular relevance in Uganda, e.g. peace studies, refugee education, and gender equity. How effectively policy intentions have been translated into practice is questioned by some.

6 Conclusions

6.1 The conclusions give overall assessments for Uganda against each of the high level questions. A summary of overall conclusions and conclusions for each work-stream is provided in Annex D, which takes the form of a matrix which identifies the FTI inputs and assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the FTI's contributions.

The High Level Evaluation Questions

Is what the FTI aims to accomplish consistent with current needs and priorities of Uganda?

6.2 The FTI's education policy aims were consistent with the educational policy needs and priorities, as Uganda had already adopted in 1997 a policy of achieving UPE by 2015. However, in 2002, Uganda had high levels of donor support to education, and was not eligible for FTI CF funding, which reduced the incentive for its participation in the FTI. More importantly, the MFPEP was applying a strict macroeconomic policy which did not allow for the additionality to the sector that the FTI would have introduced. So the FTI was out of step with the contemporary macroeconomic and donor context of that time.

6.3 A change in the CF eligibility criteria in 2006 which opened up CF possibilities for Uganda coincided with an apparent relaxation in fiscal stance by the Minister of Finance at that time. This has led to a revival in efforts to achieve FTI endorsement which have still not reached fruition since a disconnection has developed between government and donor perspectives on the role and purpose of the ESSP.

6.4 The FTI does not have a high profile in Uganda partly because existing sector plans (the ESIP and ESSP) already included FTI objectives, and partly because of high levels of donor support prior to the advent of the FTI. In this sense, the FTI has not been seen as particularly relevant as it was focusing on issues that had already been identified as important and were being addressed. In one commentator's recent view, "*FTI is conspicuous by its absence on the Uganda education sector landscape*".

To what extent is the FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, accelerating progress on EFA?

6.5 The early strategic planning support provided by FTI TA was appreciated and was important in improving the domestic capacity and standards of planning for the sector. However, the role and purpose of the main planning instrument for the sector, the ESSP, is perceived differently by some of the donors and by the GOU. The financing gap and the role of TA are two issues where the two sides appear to be far apart. And this is stalling further progress on achieving FTI endorsement. After seven years during which Uganda has still not achieved endorsement, it is hard to claim that the FTI has accelerated progress on UPC.

Has the FTI helped mobilise domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies based on Paris Declaration ideals?

6.6 There is no additionality attributable to the FTI in Uganda. Indeed, for several years, the already substantial flows of ODA to education were a barrier to Uganda's entry to the CF, and government funding for education has decreased as a share of total government spending, over the period reviewed by this desk study. There is also a perception that FTI endorsement and access of funds from the CF could lead to fungibility of funding as GOU addresses the challenge of financing UPPET as well as UPE.

6.7 The FTI has had little impact on aid effectiveness in the sector partly because a developed aid architecture already existed at the inception of the FTI. Further, the FTI approach has emphasised education policy and strategic planning improvements rather than aid effectiveness. The FTI approach has been unable to deal with different government and donor perspectives on difficult issues such as the financing gap and the deployment of TA.

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
The sources for the desk study came from the documentation cited, and from feedback from eight interviewees. Those interviewed were present or former members of donor offices and of government, who had participated in the unfolding of the FTI process in Uganda over the years. Comments of two independent observers were also taken into account.

Annex A – Aid Data

This Annex's data on external aid come from the 2009 EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR), which draws on the OECD Creditor Reporting System to present data on commitments from 1999 to 2007. The analysis is limited to commitments, since most multilaterals (except the EC) have not been reporting disbursements.


The amount of aid to education is estimated using the GMR convention for attributing aid that is not directly committed to education (such as budget support) or to basic education (such as aid for education that is not specified by level). This convention has it that Total aid to education = Direct aid to education plus 20% of direct budget support; Total aid to basic education = Direct aid to basic education plus 10% of direct budget support plus 50% of direct aid to education not specified by level (see Table A4 below).

Figure A1 Aid Dependency (commitments/GNI)




Source: Table A3 below

Figure A2 Total Aid Commitments (constant 2007 USD bn)




Source: Table A2 below

Figure A3 Share of Total Aid Commitments by Donor 1999–2007




Source: Table A5 below

Figure A4 Total Commitments to Education and Basic Education (constant 2007 USDm)




Source: Table A4 below

Figure A5 Share of Total Commitments to Education by Donor (1999–2007)



Source: Table A6 below

Figure A6 Share of Total Commitments to Basic Education by Donor (1999–2007)



Source: Table A7 below

Table A1 Direct aid to education (constant 2007 USDm) – commitments

Category	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Education unspecified	1.14	81.69	20.10	16.90	17.22	2.44	8.30	29.14	28.82
Basic education	92.56	15.85	69.95	31.86	35.45	35.33	18.92	65.96	12.72
Secondary education	2.84	2.90	3.88	9.40	2.95	11.25	6.27	23.93	7.22
Post-secondary education	4.05	31.25	4.39	10.16	4.45	3.78	48.49	17.24	7.49
General Budget Support	0.00	562.20	219.77	284.83	330.90	575.87	165.53	179.67	179.63
10% GBS	0.00	56.22	21.98	28.48	33.09	57.59	16.55	17.97	17.96
20% GBS	0.00	112.44	43.95	56.97	66.18	115.17	33.11	35.93	35.93
Total aid to education	100.59	244.13	142.28	125.29	126.25	167.99	115.09	172.20	92.18
Total aid to basic education	93.14	112.91	101.98	68.80	77.15	94.14	39.63	98.50	45.10

Notes: total aid to education = all direct aid to education + 20% GBS; total aid to basic education = direct aid to basic education + 50% Education unspecified + 10% GBS.

Table A2 Bilateral and multilateral aid commitments 1999–2007 (constant 2007 USD bn)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Bilateral	0.437305	0.964621	0.502259	0.513876	0.762115	1.042614	0.941315	0.826592	0.947438
Multilateral	0.499022	0.659075	0.941779	0.693017	0.508474	0.646604	0.648924	0.511043	0.925736
Total	0.936327	1.623696	1.444038	1.206893	1.270589	1.689218	1.590239	1.337635	1.873174
Share of multilateral aid in total aid (%)	53.30%	40.59%	65.22%	57.42%	40.02%	38.28%	40.81%	38.20%	49.42%

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table A3 Aid dependency ratio (commitments/GDP constant 2007 USDm)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Bilateral	6.3%	13.2%	6.6%	6.3%	8.8%	11.3%	9.6%	7.6%	8.0%
Multilateral	7.2%	9.0%	12.3%	8.5%	5.9%	7.0%	6.6%	4.7%	7.9%
Total	13.6%	22.3%	18.9%	14.8%	14.7%	18.2%	16.1%	12.3%	15.9%

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database; World Bank 2008 World Development Indicators. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36); deflators for GDP from World Bank 2009 World Development Indicators.

Table A4 Total aid commitments to education and basic education (constant 2007 USDm)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total aid to education									
Bilateral	49.73933	159.5801	96.27078	75.36742	88.52751	133.3229	87.8822	88.92233	63.89259
Multilateral	50.85482	84.55026	46.00786	49.92258	37.72227	34.66563	27.20756	83.27578	28.28563
Total	100.5942	244.1304	142.2786	125.29	126.2498	167.9885	115.0898	172.1981	92.17822
Aid to basic education									
Bilateral	42.28143	70.17353	79.13745	47.0782	58.00913	76.59157	25.60099	40.49195	30.34058
Multilateral	50.85482	42.74041	22.84448	21.71864	19.14244	17.55049	14.02534	58.00388	14.75799
Total	93.13625	112.9139	101.9819	68.79684	77.15157	94.14206	39.62633	98.49583	45.09857
Share of multilateral aid in total aid to education (%)	50.55%	34.63%	32.34%	39.85%	29.88%	20.64%	23.64%	48.36%	30.69%
Share of multilateral aid in aid to basic education (%)	54.60%	37.85%	22.40%	31.57%	24.81%	18.64%	35.39%	58.89%	32.72%
Share of aid to basic education in total aid to education (%)	92.59%	46.25%	71.68%	54.91%	61.11%	56.04%	34.43%	57.20%	48.93%

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table A5 Total aid commitments by donor 1999–2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total aid commitments 1999–2007
AfDF	56.31676	152.3856	0	162.3922	0.37513	0	178.7909	95.69289	156.3887	802.3422
Australia	1.039281	2.511351	0.543338	1.686692	0.548468	0.199626	0.025486	3.199408	1.438695	11.19235
Austria	29.7653	5.899304	9.821589	7.201509	13.88799	7.56733	8.653335	18.52133	11.36622	112.6839
Belgium	3.192853	11.28832	12.64389	9.566791	8.784633	8.820521	21.02308	13.69368	15.20208	104.2158
Canada	2.791957	10.25301	19.65079	3.841931	2.99324	4.70597	9.44463	18.74553	7.247503	79.67456
Denmark	20.01936	39.08216	12.57613	17.16426	61.49436	73.85812	126.2911	12.16021	78.68408	441.3298
EC	62.80418	323.9828	85.63105	88.16515	33.82259	111.455	342.0743	104.0502	81.64193	1233.627
Finland	8.173279	0.46663	2.258586	1.452152	1.813196	2.370186	6.857923	7.286026	5.725736	36.40371
France	11.79311	13.54227	13.95678	10.71286	4.002189	4.759629	9.494503	5.879526	21.05769	95.19856
Germany	43.07746	14.54335	41.97252	45.31482	27.82496	73.63731	58.23095	44.69148	45.33164	394.6245
Global Fund	0	0	0	0	44.98165	111.6563	73.64833	0	0	230.2863
Greece	0	0	0	0.094723	0.233089	0.088973	0.075545	0.028907	0.175674	0.696911
IDA	358.6296	149.2389	842.489	403.8478	413.9092	402.861	32.43837	255.8713	640.6	3499.885
IFAD	17.73694	24.43106	0	25.97735	0	0	0	30.18306	15.013	113.3414
Ireland	0	22.57842	41.37611	56.30076	57.21386	54.03445	52.87417	63.9411	64.26122	412.5801
Italy	7.834635	148.7147	8.624577	44.91159	13.06926	13.61962	12.09528	6.257858	10.52459	265.6521
Japan	29.28472	0.684177	0	4.084101	13.4317	60.27937	19.88383	24.55328	64.35919	216.5604
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0.144663	0.137233	0.124067	1.551266	1.957229
Netherlands	43.45766	81.83165	91.93815	50.76361	74.77386	44.7008	57.13228	110.0614	81.24495	635.9044
New Zealand	0	0	0	0.213063	0.551607	0.231715	0.525565	0.170975	0.73328	2.426205
Norway	43.86581	47.871	56.24063	54.51896	23.31973	88.22142	40.00763	34.6497	67.86087	456.5558
Spain	43.99168	1.250994	1.937994	1.705661	0.752335	1.194438	1.653125	3.088188	4.687173	60.26159

Annex A – Aid Data

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total aid commitments 1999–2007
Sweden	16.50179	45.88773	28.7184	42.46486	161.1703	16.80334	69.00549	35.79749	23.26341	439.6128
Switzerland	1.735472	0.927507	0.073335	0	0.860364	3.208039	3.619123	3.586107	4.261544	18.27149
UNAIDS	0	0	1.778947	0.349663	0.721856	0.071398	0.573762	0.5056	0.990653	4.991879
UNDP	3.534422	0	0	0	0	6.451232	6.987163	8.123283	8.109789	33.20589
UNFPA	0	0	3.759301	5.211502	7.086911	4.370333	3.814989	3.966575	4.483099	32.69271
UNICEF	0	9.036123	8.120659	7.072893	7.576927	9.739026	10.59616	12.65029	18.50924	83.30132
United Kingdom	43.22376	441.6506	77.39371	33.75324	98.556	347.4634	174.6126	137.2158	59.77086	1413.64
United States	87.55669	75.63781	82.53259	128.1248	196.8339	236.7046	269.6725	282.94	378.6902	1738.693
Total	936.3267	1623.696	1444.038	1206.893	1270.589	1689.218	1590.239	1337.635	1873.174	12971.81

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table A6 Total commitments to education by donor, 2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Commitments to education: total 1999–2007
AfDF	0	41.20247	0	0	0	0	0	31.89763	0	73.1001
Australia	0.24894	0.401346	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.382566	1.032851
Austria	3.343355	0.265078	1.294806	1.484365	0.68517	0.743849	0.568695	1.497481	0.282559	10.16536
Belgium	0.596568	0.895681	0.262248	0.820899	0.472569	0.621614	0.876042	1.299399	0	5.845019
Canada	0.056524	4.757697	12.20304	0	0	0	0.592265	1.157263	1.861677	20.62847
Denmark	0.354067	7.697191	0.034884	5.113832	0.494071	0.65027	0	3.971599	0.300408	18.61632
EC	50.85482	34.56636	1.191903	0.024229	0	0.140548	26.36444	0.12849	0	113.2708

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donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Commitments to education: total 1999–2007
Finland	0	0.037499	0.565196	0.133043	0.48353	0.280829	0.377415	0.249826	1.123272	3.250609
France	1.006382	2.900459	0.911881	1.642223	1.266839	1.838063	0.161433	0.994614	0.475078	11.19697
Germany	3.366513	2.65508	4.832396	9.102708	4.796552	10.48664	5.673395	19.86894	8.469684	69.25191
Greece	0	0	0	0.047313	0.034954	0.079038	0.056814	0.022092	0.168446	0.408657
IDA	0	7.091987	43.94296	49.33569	37.15967	34.08973	0	50.41532	25	247.0354
Ireland	0	11.29769	18.92639	20.46737	18.51538	12.7481	11.88047	14.02203	14.79599	122.6534
Italy	0.101883	0.234932	0.697732	0.076608	0.005408	0.606829	0.290315	0.653305	1.398269	4.065281
Japan	0	0	0	0	1.919608	1.026855	2.736285	2.304494	2.786192	10.77343
Netherlands	20.38594	6.668609	42.71693	13.61573	7.680157	8.006111	10.81692	15.76107	16.19321	141.8447
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.070284	0.02009	0.006393	0.096766
Norway	8.193162	24.84498	2.799876	4.785823	2.907082	12.84515	12.00598	5.797966	7.904728	82.08475
Spain	0.208453	0.205511	0.746503	0	0	0	0.041817	0.025878	0.801904	2.030067
Sweden	0	4.341434	0	2.08813	8.199895	0	28.03047	0	0	42.65993
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNICEF	0	1.689444	0.873	0.562659	0.562604	0.435358	0.843119	0.834339	3.285626	9.086149
United Kingdom	1.394064	82.02011	0	0.076101	10.00619	62.87205	0	0	0.94221	157.3107
United States	10.48348	10.35682	10.2789	15.91327	31.0601	20.51749	13.7036	21.2763	6	139.59
Total	100.5942	244.1304	142.2786	125.29	126.2498	167.9885	115.0898	172.1981	92.17822	1285.998

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table A7 Total commitments to basic education by donor, 2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

donor	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Commitments to basic education : total 1999-2007
AfDF	0	20.60123	0	0	0	0	0	31.89763	0	52.49886
Austria	1.852232	0.041477	0.362708	1.027123	0.01789	0.141717	0.051727	0.572836	0.032225	4.099934
Belgium	0.548348	0.602923	0.011085	0.550693	0.197161	0.375121	0.374299	0	0	2.65963
Canada	0.028262	2.533695	11.95737	0	0	0	0	1.157263	1.861677	17.53827
Denmark	0	3.848595	0.034884	4.09795	0.247035	0.325135	0	3.971599	0	12.5252
EC	50.85482	16.90374	0	0.012114	0	0.070274	13.18222	0.064245	0	81.08741
Finland	0	0	0.530459	0.133043	0.48353	0.280829	0.377415	0.249826	1.013005	3.068107
France	0.417211	0.010401	0.021402	0	0	0	0	0.124386	0.119252	0.692653
Germany	0.068715	0	2.247205	0.312169	0.796001	0.946162	1.229966	1.663505	2.741752	10.00547
Greece	0	0	0	0.018105	0.017477	0.010149	0	0	0	0.045731
IDA	0	3.545994	21.97148	21.14387	18.57983	17.04486	0	25.20766	12.5	119.9937
Ireland	0	5.810189	9.452688	10.28083	9.293912	8.94961	7.642327	6.641926	6.109217	64.1807
Italy	0	0.019923	0	0.010877	0	0.22911	0	0.002108	0.564638	0.826656
Japan	0	0	0	0	0.351428	0.243823	0.281121	0.295617	0.439456	1.611446
Netherlands	20.37981	3.339824	42.46386	11.31201	3.840079	4.858194	2.461404	2.28062	8.096607	99.03241
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.070284	0	0	0.070284
Norway	7.19471	0.599927	1.23482	2.340003	2.601481	8.278204	0.5172	4.701924	2.184529	29.6528
Spain	0	0.094518	0.542075	0	0	0	0.041817	0	0.70712	1.38553
Sweden	0	0.915376	0	1.044065	4.099947	0	0	0	0	6.059388
Switzerland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UNICEF	0	1.689444	0.873	0.562659	0.562604	0.435358	0.843119	0.834339	2.257991	8.058514
United Kingdom	1.308662	42.02378	0	0.03805	5.003097	31.43603	0	0	0.471105	80.28072
United States	10.48348	10.3329	10.2789	15.91327	31.0601	20.51749	12.55343	18.83034	6	135.9699
Total	93.13625	112.9139	101.9819	68.79684	77.15157	94.14206	39.62633	98.49583	45.09857	731.3433

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Annex B – A Note on Education Sector Performance

This note is extracted from Chapter 7 and Annex D of OPM 2008 (*Independent Evaluation of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP): Final Synthesis Report*, Oxford Policy Management, July 2008).

Education outcomes

B1 PEAP 1997 included a target for literacy rates of 76% for both sexes, which was raised in PEAP 2000 to 85%. The literacy rate is defined as the proportion of the population aged 15 to 24 years who can read and write. Table B1 below shows trends in literacy rates for men and women between 1992/93 and 2005/06. During this period, the national literacy rate increased from 75% to 83%. The table shows that although women still have lower literacy rates than men, the gender gap is closing. Between 1992/93 and 2005/06, the difference between male and female literacy rates was reduced from 14 to 6 percentage points.

Table B1 Literacy rates for individuals aged 15–24 years (%), 1992/93–2005/06

	1992/93	1996/97	1999/2000	2002/03	2005/06
All	75.4	75	78.5	81.1	83.5
Male	83	80.9	84.5	85.8	86.5
Female	68.5	69.7	72.9	76.8	80.4

Source: Author's calculations from 1992/93, 1996/97, 1999/00, 2002/03, and 2005/06 Uganda National Household Surveys (UNHS).

B2 The improvement in adult literacy can be largely attributed to the UPE initiative, which was a major intervention under PEAP 1997. Apart from UPE, other more recent attempts to boost literacy rates include the introduction of a thematic curriculum in lower level primary school.

B3 The introduction of UPE was accompanied by changes in school management as well as new sources of funds for public education. First, the Government decentralised the management of schools. Henceforth the responsibility of recruiting teachers, constructing classrooms, and inspecting schools was vested with the local authorities. Secondly, development partners earmarked most of the debt relief arising from the HIPC initiative to the education sector. As a result, the total public expenditure on education doubled between 1996 and 1999.

B4 The UPE programme resulted in a near doubling of primary school pupils from 2.9 million in 1996 to 5.3 million in 1997. By 2003, when the first UPE cohort completed the final year of primary education, there were over 7 million pupils enrolled in primary schools. The number of teachers on the public payroll increased from 65,000 in 1996 to 144,000 by 2005, while the number of classrooms more than doubled from 40,000 to 97,000 over the same period. Education spending was maintained at over 20% of the total public expenditure.

B5 One result of the UPE initiative was a significant increase in both net and gross enrolment rates for primary schooling (see Table B2 below). Most important, by 1999/2000 gender parity in primary enrolment had been attained, while the enrolment differential between poor and rich children fell substantially (Deininger 2003). Nevertheless, by 2005/06, primary enrolment among the richest quintile (90%) was still 12 percentage points higher

than among the poorest quintile (78%). Regional variation in enrolment persists with the northern region exhibiting a rate (79%) which is nine percentage points lower than the central region (88%).

Table B2 Trends in primary enrolments (%), 1992/93–2005/06

	1992/93			1999/2000			2002/03			2005/06		
	All	Girls	Boys	All	Girls	Boys	All	Girls	Boys	All	Girls	Boys
Net Primary Enrolment Rates												
Uganda	62.8	59.5	64.2	83.5	83.0	83.9	85.4	85.9	84.8	84.6	84.9	84.1
Rural	60.1	57.8	62.2	82.9	82.6	83.2	84.7	85.4	84.0	83.7	83.9	83.5
Urban	73.5	70.7	76.4	87.2	86.2	88.1	89.7	89.3	90.0	88.9	90.8	87.1
Gross Primary Enrolment Rates												
Uganda	92.5	83.6	98.8	123.9	119.9	127.8	124.4	121.9	127.5	129.5	127.7	131.3
Rural	89.7	81.5	97.3	124.5	120.0	128.8	125.1	121.9	128.6	130.6	128.5	132.7
Urban	102.8	97.6	108.7	120.2	119.5	120.8	120.2	119.5	120.9	123.6	123.5	123.8

Source: Author's calculations from the UNHS surveys.

B6 What has been the likely impact of the PEAP on primary enrolment? The household decision to enrol a child at school is affected by both demand and supply factors. On the demand side, analysis of the UNHS 2005–2006 indicates that the probability of enrolment increases with the educational level of the household head and with household income (as proxied by consumption per adult equivalent). The former would be partly determined by public expenditure on education twenty or thirty years ago, while the latter would be positively affected by economic growth during the 1990s. Children with disabilities are less likely to be enrolled which suggests there may be a case for developing a programme targeted at this group.

B7 On the supply side, enrolment is negatively associated with distance from the household to the nearest primary school and positively associated with the proportion of qualified teachers at the school. These are the most direct potential links to the PEAP as a school building programme reduces the average distance to school, while improving the quality of teachers (and hence the quality of education) is within the Government's control.

B8 It was not possible to obtain a time series showing the annual number of functioning, fully-staffed primary schools during the last decade, but some information is available on quality-related indicators. Thus, the number of pupils per classroom has fallen steadily from 106 in 2000 to 72 in 2007. The proportion of primary school teachers qualified to teach has declined from 89.5% in 2000 to 84.7% in 2006. Over the same period, the proportion of qualified primary school teachers certified to teach according to national standards declined from 81.5% in 2000 to 74% in 2002 before increasing to 92.9% in 2006.

B9 Enrolling children at primary school is demanding, but keeping them at school once enrolled is an even bigger challenge. The cohort survival rate (CSR) measures the proportion of children starting the first year of primary education at a given date who reach the last year of the cycle seven years later. Table B3 below shows that only 22.5% of the first UPE cohort who started school in 1997 were still enrolled in primary seven. This CSR is less than half that of the cohort who began their schooling in 1996. Although survival improves by 2005–06, it is still very low and is lower for girls than boys.

B10 The table also shows the primary completion rate (PCR) which measures the number of pupils sitting the primary leaving examination (PLE) in a given year divided by the total

number of children of official graduation age (which is 12 years) in the population. Since over age children can sit the PLE, the PCR is not an indicator of on-time completion. This explains why the PCR is higher than the CSR. Nevertheless, even by this measure, less than half of all 12 year olds sit the primary leaving examination.

Table B3 Cohort survival rates and completion rates in primary education (%), 2003–2006

	2002 (started 1996)	2003 (started 1997)	2004 (started 1998)	2005 (started 1999)	2006 (started 2000)
Cohort survival rate (all)	57.7	22.5		29.8	28.0
Cohort survival rate (boys)				31.5	29.3
Cohort survival rate (girls)				28.1	26.7
Completion rate (all)		56	60	51	48
Completion rate (boys)		66			55
Completion rate (girls)		47			42

Source: EPRC (2008).

B11 Clearly, the rapid expansion in primary enrolment under the PEAP has been undermined by a sharp fall in retention. Several factors may explain this development, including declining quality of education. However, the limited evidence on educational quality in Uganda does not tell a consistent story (see Table B4 below).

B12 Enrolment at lower secondary level (13–16 years) is much lower than at primary level, although it increased from 8.6% to 12.2% between 2002/03 and 2005/06. Net enrolment rates are slightly higher for girls than boys, but vary widely across regions and the income distribution. In 2005/06, the NER in the central region (19.2%) was over six times higher than that in the north (3.1%). In the richest quintile, 27% of secondary school age children attend school, while the corresponding figure for the poorest quintile is 3%. These data suggest a very low transition rate from primary to secondary education, which constitutes a major challenge to the Government's programme of Universal Secondary Education.

B13 [...] Overall, the PEAP has had a positive impact on education. Adult literacy rates have risen and the gender gap has fallen. National enrolment rates at primary level have increased, while enrolment disparities between rural and urban areas, rich and poor, boys and girls, and between regions have all declined. That said, there are enormous challenges to be overcome, which include low completion rates, poor quality of education, high teacher absenteeism and other forms of waste.

Quality of primary education

B14 The GOU's goals and plans for secondary and tertiary education will be put at risk unless the quality of primary education improves. [As discussed above] the rapid expansion of the educational system's capacity to enrol pupils at primary level since 1997 has not been matched by its capacity to retain them once enrolled. There are many reasons why children leave education and recent research suggests that it is the characteristics of pupils and households, rather than school related factors, which are the main determinants of the decision to drop out. Nevertheless, low completion rates are due in part to the low quality of education.

B15 Table B4 below shows how educational quality has evolved since 1999 at the primary level. Competence in literacy was much lower than competence in numeracy at the start of the period, but it has improved much faster under the PEAP. Nevertheless, in 2005–06, less than half the pupils at grade 3 and barely one third of pupils at grade 6 reached minimum standards in literacy. Competence in numeracy has increased slightly at grade 3, but has fallen at grade 6 over the whole period. In 2005–06, pupil performance in numeracy was very similar to performance in literacy. Less than half the pupils at grade 3 and less than one-third of pupils at grade 6 reached minimum standards.

Table B4 Quality of primary education

	1999/2000	2002/2003	2005/2006
Percentage of pupils reaching defined level of competence in literacy at:			
Grade 3	18%	34%	46%
Grade 6	13%	21%	34%
Percentage of pupils reaching defined level of competence in numeracy at:			
Grade 3	39%	43%	43%
Grade 6	41%	21%	31%

Source: World Bank, Efficiency of Primary Education Expenditure, PowerPoint presentation, 2007.

B16 Educational quality is low for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is a leakage of resources between the central government and the schools, which lowers the quantity and quality of education actually provided in Uganda. This includes payments to ‘ghost’ workers on the payroll and the diversion of some capitation grant funds to other, non-educational purposes. These leakages have been as high as 20% of annual recurrent expenditure on primary education in recent years [World Bank 2007].

B17 Secondly, there are expenditure leakages within schools, of which teacher absenteeism is the most important, which also reduce the quantity and quality of education provided. The rate of teacher absenteeism has been estimated at between 20%–30% depending on how it is defined. It is more of a problem in rural than in urban areas, while the northern and eastern regions seem particularly badly affected. Teacher absenteeism harms educational performance through reducing teachers’ contact time with pupils and may increase the likelihood of parents not sending their children to school.

B18 Thirdly, the poor training of many teachers who do turn up for work contributes to the low quality of education. Recent research indicates that improvements in teacher training lead to higher attendance rates of both pupils and teachers, reduced pupil drop-out rates and better examination results [IOB/MES 2008]. Fourthly, other features of the school environment, such as large class sizes and low spending by state schools on scholastic materials, have an adverse effect on the quality of education. Finally, there are aspects of a pupil’s home environment that affect educational outcomes, such as parental encouragement to complete homework and the provision of adequate space for children to do so.

Annex C – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
1960s		<p>1962 – Uganda gains Independence with Milton Obote as prime minister. At independence, Uganda is characterized by good growth, low inflation and balanced current accounts. Uganda’s education sector was also in good shape.</p> <p>1966: Abrogation of the 1962 constitution and its replacement by a republican constitution that gives the president sweeping powers.</p>	<p>1963: Following independence, the Castle Education Commission is appointed to review the education system in order to meet the challenges of newly independent Uganda. The Commission places a strong emphasis on quality education and argues for raising standards of agricultural education and technical education, expansion of girls’ education, and provision of adult education. The commission changes the structure of education which has not changed much since then..</p> <p>1963: Education Act passed to put all government aided school under government control. The act is established for three reasons: (i) to encourage Ugandan unity (ii) to create enough qualified Ugandans for jobs in government (iii) to give every pupil the ideology “<i>African identity and African personality</i>”</p>		<p>After independence the demand was for high-level human power to take over the running and management of both the public and private sectors. Although the need for expanding primary education was recognised, it was felt that there were not enough resources for both primary-level and higher levels. A large proportion of the education budget then went to post-primary institutions. The practice of more resources going to post-primary institutions continued for more two decades.</p>

Annex C – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
1970s		<p>1971- 1979 Idi Amin Years 1971: Milton Obote is toppled in coup led by Idi Amin. Uganda is therefore under military dictatorship. Rule of law ceases to exist, there is endless civil unrest, insecurity and economic ruin.</p> <p>1972: Amin orders Asians who were not Ugandan citizens – around 60,000 people – to leave the country</p> <p>1972-73: Uganda engages in border clashes with Tanzania.</p> <p>1978: Uganda invades Tanzania with a view to annexing Kagera region.</p> <p>1979: Tanzania invades Uganda, unifying the various anti-Amin forces under the Uganda National Liberation Front and Amin is overthrown.</p> <p>But successive governments fail to establish economic and political stability.</p>	<p>1977: Education Policy Review</p>		

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
1980s		<p>In 1987 the National Resistance Movement comes to power under Museveni. NRM halts the process of economic and political retrogression through reform from previous decades. With respect to economic reform the NRM adopts SAP aimed to restore fiscal discipline, monetary stability, and rehabilitating infrastructure (economic, social and institutional). SAP therefore involves trade liberalization, privatization, divestiture of public enterprises, civil service reforms, reorganization of tax revenue collection etc. The economy responds favourably to measures under SAP.</p>	<p>Late 1980s: political instability caused by dictatorial regime leads to deteriorated physical infrastructure. A large percentage of the primary classes meet in temporary structures; permanent structures have had little or maintenance for nearly two decades. Text books, instructional materials almost non-existent in most schools, making teaching and learning extremely difficult. The few remaining teachers who did not flee the country during repression are underpaid, under trained and demoralised..</p> <p>1987: Establishment of the Education Policy Review Committee by National Resistance Movement, which establishes UPE as a goal and determines strategies to achieve it. Education Policy Review Committee also evaluates the education system and identifies areas and mechanisms for improvement.</p> <p>1989: The Committee releases report.</p>		
1990s	<p>March 1990 World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopts the World Declaration on Education for All, which states that all have a right to education. The conference</p>	<p>1995: New Constitution of Uganda legalises political parties but maintains the ban on political activity. With regards to education, the constitution states that <i>“all persons have a right to education”</i> and promises free</p>	<p>At the beginning of 1990s, the gross primary enrolment ratio is only 87%, basic inputs are lacking, and Ugandan households are paying too much for primary education.</p> <p>1992: The commission’s report in 1989 resulted in Government</p>		

Annex C – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
	<p>recognises the setbacks experienced in the 1980s by many South nations and makes a commitment to meeting basic learning needs of every citizen.</p>	<p>and compulsory education for all school-age children.</p> <p>1996: First presidential elections. Museveni resumes offices.</p> <p>1997: Poverty Eradication Action Plan: Following concerns about equitable growth, household poverty, and poor social sector services, the GOU is obliged to re- orient the development programme towards poverty reduction and improvement in social services. The government therefore launches the first Poverty Eradication Action Plan with priority interventions in the following areas: basic education; basic health; rural sanitation; and rural roads. Within the PEAP framework, the government adopts SWAps to address specific constraints. In education, this is known as the Education Strategic Investment Plan (ESIP) (See next Column).</p>	<p>White Paper on Education in 1992. The White Paper sets the stage for subsequent reforms in the education system, and especially for reforms in access to primary education. The White Paper emphasizes the importance of equal access to education, regardless of social status, sex, and ethnicity; identifies the lack of adequate educational facilities; and condemns the selective, discriminatory, and elitist nature of the system with respect to disadvantaged and low-income groups. It outlines several goals, among which is the achievement of Universal Primary Education for all children in the primary school age range (6-12) by 2000. Strategies to achieve the goal of UPE include (i) eliminating school fees; (ii) redesigning the curriculum with emphasis on communication skills, English, and Maths; (iii) improving infrastructure; (iv) seeking supplementary funds from international sources; (v) improvement in monitoring programmes and accountability of resources; (vi) outlining specific procedural goals with regard to improving the quality and efficiency of the education system.</p>		

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
			<p>In short, the White Paper of 1992 outlined the basis for what would later become the applied UPE experiment in 1997</p> <p>1993: New Textbook Policy. Liberalisation of textbook market, access to private sector, multiple textbook choice and school-based purchasing power.</p> <p>1997: Universal Primary Education – to promote equity in education. Fees removed for up to four children per family. UPE also provides text books and instructional material for both for pupils and for all teachers</p> <p>An additional 2.3 million children (1.1 m girls and 1.2 m boys) respond immediately, bringing the total primary enrolment to 5.7 million in 1997.</p> <p>1997: Local Government Act Decentralisation of basic service delivery to Districts, including primary and secondary education.</p>		<p>The four children per family criteria under UPE has changed to include all children in a family.</p> <p>The UPE project was a direct beneficiary of HIPC under which Uganda received USD 630 million of debt relief covering 30 years, of which USD 40 million was to be received annually over a period of four years.</p> <p>Though UPE led to increased accessibility for the poor there was also an immediate acute educational crisis involving overcrowding, a decline in teaching quality, and insufficient materials.</p>
			<p>1998: Education Strategy Investment Plan (ESIP): Sectoral development framework over a period (1989–2003). The broad objectives of ESIP are:</p> <p>(a) achieving equitable access to education at all levels i.e. across income groups and gender;</p> <p>(b) improving quality of education, particularly at the primary level;</p> <p>(c) enhancing the management of education service delivery at all</p>		

Annex C – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
			levels; and (d) developing the capacity of MES to plan, programme and manage an investment portfolio that will effectively develop the education sector.		
1999	Education For All (EFA) Assessment 1999–2000 , involving six regional conferences, reveals that the EFA agenda has been neglected.		1998/99: Launching of Schools Facilities Grant (SFG), a decentralised modality for constructing and completing primary classrooms 1999: Launching of new Primary Education Curriculum: Expansion of subjects from four to eleven and introduction of local languages for first four years of primary schooling.		
2000	United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000 : 189 world leaders sign up to try to end poverty by 2015 when they agree to meet the Millennium Development Goals. World Education Forum: 164 governments adopt the Dakar Framework for Action in which they promise to commit the necessary resources and effort to create a comprehensive and inclusive education system for all.	2000 - Ugandans vote to reject multi-party politics in favour of continuing Museveni's "no-party" system.	2000: In support of the decision to introduce UPE, the Government of Uganda (GOU) drastically increases the funding for education from 2.6% of GNP in 1996 to 4% in 2000. By 2001, 32% of the total discretionary recurrent budget is allocated to education (up from 24% in 1996) and, within it, the share of primary education reaches 70%.		

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Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
2001	<p>G8 Meeting in Genoa, Italy. July 2001: G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada.</p>	<p>2001 January: East African Community (EAC) inaugurated in Arusha, Tanzania, laying groundwork for common East African passport, flag, economic and monetary integration. Members are Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya.</p> <p>Museveni wins another term in office, beating his rival Kizza Besigye by 69% to 28%.</p>			
2002	<p>G8 Washington, DC USA. April 2002: The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), amid overwhelming support from the international community.</p> <p>Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands. April 2002: Developing countries and their external partners agree at a Dutch-World Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits 135 million Euro to set the process in motion.</p>			<p>2002 June: Uganda is one of the first 18 countries invited to join the FTI. The letter also encourages Uganda to apply and outlines its benefits.</p> <p>2002 July 17th: Uganda accepts invitation to participate in the FTI. Uganda stresses that funds from the FTI should be fully consistent with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).</p> <p>2002 September: Draft FTI Country proposal</p>	

Annex C – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
	<p>G8 Kananaskis, Canada. June 2002: agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of the FTI.</p> <p>EFA Global Monitoring Report established to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.</p>				
2003	<p>Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome, Feb 2003. The development community commits to work towards aligning its assistance around country development priorities and to harmonize donor policies and priorities around country systems</p> <p>FTI Donors Meeting - Paris, March 2003: Donors agree on modus operandi for the FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for the FTI.</p> <p>The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) is established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of 2-3 years to enable countries lacking resources at country level but</p>		<p>The Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) prepared to cover the fiscal years 2004–15. The ESSP commits government to ensuring that universal access to primary education is the highest sector priority. It also targets the removal of financial impediments to that objective, and focuses attention on improving regional and gender equity. Implementation of ESSP is envisaged through shared contributions by the public and private sectors, households and communities.</p> <p>The ESSP aims to build on and to take forward the successes of ESIP, particularly in the implementation of UPE, while addressing the gaps in ESIP such as providing adequate treatment of the secondary, tertiary and vocational sub-sectors. The objectives of the ESSP are:</p>	<p>2003 February 5th: New head of the FTI writes to Uganda advising it about the recent developments in the FTI and the implications this has for Uganda. Uganda is briefed on some of the major conclusions of the recent Brussels meeting, held on November 27, 2002. A request is made for more information about the current status of the FTI in Uganda ahead of Donor Agency representative meeting to be held in March. Uganda is encouraged not to be deterred by the elaborated process under the FTI and is invited to submit the proposal to the secretariat and share it with local Donors.</p>	

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Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
	<p>with FTI-endorsed education sector plans to scale up the implementation of their plans.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, November 2003: Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors meeting together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that the FTI should be opened to all low-income countries.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To build an education system that is relevant to Uganda's national development; • To ensure that all children participating in the education system achieve education goals; and • To maintain an effective and efficient education sector. 	<p>2003 April 25th –'<i>FTI Uganda next steps letter</i>'. Uganda receives letter informing it of the latest developments in the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI), following the meeting of Donors in Paris on March 25th, and the implications this has for Uganda. The letter also outlines the next steps for Uganda in order to be included in the FTI.</p>	
<p>2004</p>	<p>Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) was established in November 2004 as a funding window under the FTI to support low income countries improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and programme development.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting, Nov 2004, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines.</p>				

Annex C – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
2005	<p>March 2005, Paris Declaration endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other senior officials who commit their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and management of aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.</p> <p>UN World Summit New York, September 2005: delegates accused of producing a 'watered-down' outcome document, which merely reiterates existing pledges.</p>	<p>2005 July Voters in a referendum overwhelmingly back a return to multi-party politics.</p>		<p>2005 April 21st : Sida and DFID write to Uganda to provide an update on recent developments in the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI) and on how the initiative has evolved since 2002.</p>	
2006	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>Educational Roundtable, held during World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, September 2006, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education millennium development goals.</p>	<p>2006 February - President Museveni wins multi-party elections, taking 59% of the vote against the 37% share of his rival, Kizza Besigye</p>	<p>The President of Uganda, Mr Museveni, in his 2006 Election Manifesto, declares that Universal Secondary Education (USE) would be expanded to Universal Post Primary Education and Training (UPPET). UPPET policy formulated in the context of the: 1992 Government White Paper on Education; the Education Sector Strategic Plan (2004-2015); the education sector long-term expenditure frame; international long term commitments (in particular the Millennium Development Goals and Educational for All); and the medium term goals and plans of</p>	<p>The Minister of Finance expresses support for the idea of reviving the FTI application process.</p> <p>The Minister of Finance participates in a Finance Ministers' Roundtable Conference in Singapore where he reports on Uganda's resolve to re-engage with the FTI.</p>	

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Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
	<p><i>FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee meeting</i> takes place in <i>Cairo</i> on 12th November 2006. In this meeting the eligibility criteria regarding accessing the Fund are changed, allowing countries with large number of in-country donors, such as Mozambique, to qualify.</p>		<p>the sector.</p> <p>UPPET has four purposes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - increasing equitable access to post primary education and training (PPET); - assuring achievement of the MDG of Gender parity in education delivery by 2015; - enhancing sustainability of the universal primary education (UPE); - reducing the high costs of PPET. 		
<p>2007</p>	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session). Keeping our Promises on Education, May 2007, Brussels, organised by the EC, the UK and the World Bank. The objective is to seek concrete proposals and commitments for action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015.</p> <p>In Oct 2007, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organises an international forum on "Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice." Participants recommend more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities, and to harmonise and align donor support for technical</p>		<p>A revised and re-costed ESSP 2007-15 is developed by MES and remains in draft in 2008. The need to update and re-cost the ESSP is promoted by changes in the education policy agenda and objectives (MES 2008), namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compliance with the EFA FTI goals; • Introduction of local language instruction and simplified thematic curriculum to improve primary education quality; • Ensuring access to post-primary education for pupils completing P7; • Strengthening education in science and technology through facilities and instructional materials; • Increasing participation in tertiary education to support labour market needs; and • Introducing a career ladder for teachers and school administrators 	<p>December 2007: 'CF status report'. Uganda's education sector plan is expected to be endorsed in early 2008. EPDF to provide financial and technical support towards the preparation of Education Sector Plan (USD 250,000). Such assistance aims at producing a strategic document that includes the macroeconomic and demographic context of the education system, an analysis of education data, and a discussion of financing issues facing the sector. Moreover, a simulation model that demonstrates the effects of different education policy scenarios will also be developed.</p> <p>December 2007: EPDF regional Annex: EPDF funds a capacity development workshop on "country</p>	

Annex C – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
	<p>assistance and capacity development in all low-income countries.</p> <p>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Bonn, Germany, on May 23, 2007: CF funding for Mozambique approved</p> <p>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Dakar, December 10 2007</p>		<p>to improve attractiveness of teaching profession.</p> <p>Once adopted, the new ESSP 2007-15 will form the major strategy and policy document for the sector.</p>	<p>leadership and implementation for results in the EFA – FTI partnership” held in Cape Town in which Uganda participates. EPDF also funds two World Bank institute courses. Uganda participates in second course titled “Accountability, Governance, and Quality of Decentralized Education in Africa”</p>	
<p>2008</p>	<p>September 2008, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries agree to end the fragmentation of aid.</p> <p>Donors agree to donate half of aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects.</p> <p>Donors also agree to coordinate aid better.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Tokyo, April 22, 2008</i></p>		<p>Government launches a pilot “Quality Education Initiative” (QEI); has been piloted in 12 school districts, supported by a multi-donor basket fund for consultancy and policy advice, in response to the poor learning outcomes of UPE. This pilot aims to improve the quality of education. Under the project, the government provides funding to build teachers' houses, laboratories, and meet other infrastructure requirements. The QEI will be rolled out overall all districts during the Plan period.</p> <p>QEI targets and indicators are incorporated into the revised ESSP.</p>	<p>January 3rd 2008: Uganda sends memorandum to the FTI requesting technical assistance for the preparation of the Uganda Education Sector Plan</p> <p>January 31st 2008: ‘Support to Uganda from the Education For All – Fast Track Initiative’. FTI secretariat responds positively to Uganda following request for technical assistance to Sector plan made on January 3rd. The secretariat proposes a "light" or simplified Quality Support Review (QSR) which will be both constructive and supportive</p> <p>March 7th 2008: ‘Uganda Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) Quality Support Review Panel’ .FTI Secretariat sends report from</p>	

FTI Mid-Term Evaluation – Uganda Desk Study

Date	International Context	Uganda Context	Education Policy in Uganda	FTI in Uganda	Comments & questions
				<p>the panel who reviewed the Ugandan ESSP.</p> <p>September 2008: MES submits the Revised and Re-costed ESSP to MFPED and to donors</p>	

Annex D – Analytical Summary Matrix

SUMMARY – UGANDA		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero? What was happening in country before FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The main milestone prior to FTI was the introduction of UPE in 1997. Budget increases to support UPE were forthcoming from the Government budget and through the Poverty Action Fund (PAF). The PAF was an important pro-poor fund where general and sector budget support, together with HIPC debt relief, were earmarked to priority poverty-reduction programmes through the GOU budget. An aid management architecture was put in place on the back of the PEAP consisting of sector wide approaches (SWAp), the Poverty Action Fund, and later the development of the Partnership Principles in the context of PEAP2. At the time of the introduction of FTI, MES and donors in Uganda were working with a credible Education Sector Investment Plan (ESIP). This was replaced in 2003 by the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) 2004–2015 which was developed to build on and improve the ESIP. Thus, alignment and a degree of harmonisation (several donors were providing sector budget support) in education were taking place through the SWAp, and government/donor partnership in education was an accepted practice. The key capacity issues were that although plans were good, implementation was weak. The capacity of MES was weak but improving, as was that of the districts. PFM systems, including an MTEF, were relatively strong, as was monitoring through the EMIS. Key cross-cutting issues especially access and equity and HIV/AIDs were also being addressed. 		
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initially, FTI required a dedicated FTI endorsement document involving a parallel process, which caused disquiet amongst some donors since it distracted from mainstream planning processes. The early FTI endorsement process was backstopped by World Bank TA supporting the introduction of a simulation model, and work on a results framework. Since Uganda has not yet been endorsed or received Catalytic Funding, FTI has not yet made any financial contributions to the education sector. EPDF funds have been used to provide TA to assist with the planning of the ESSP and for some capacity building activities. 		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to improving education sector policies, planning, data, budgeting, level of finance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation and aid effectiveness?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How economically was FTI support translated into results?</i>
<p>FTI's aims were consistent with the needs and priorities of Uganda in that Government had introduced an ambitious policy of free UPE which it needed resource assistance in achieving.</p> <p>However, Uganda's position as a "donor darling" meant that it was not eligible for FTI CF funding which substantially reduced the incentive to move towards FTI endorsement.</p> <p>But the main factor in not achieving early endorsement was that MFPED was applying a strict policy of macroeconomic stabilisation and associated budget ceilings.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been little change in education policy as a result of FTI as it built on already existing GOU policies. For example, the goal of increasing GOU funds to education was a policy prior to FTI. FTI/EFA has provided moral support for these policies but not much more than that. Structures through which donors could align their support to country priorities already existed pre-FTI. The situation is the same for other areas (capacity building, harmonisation and alignment). The latest attempts to achieve FTI endorsement have stalled as a result of weakness in the operation of the aid architecture which FTI, and indeed other DPs, and government have not so far been able to address. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The early FTI approach of requesting a separate FTI proposal for endorsement was not efficient.
Outcomes: <i>What has been the effect on quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education?</i>		
Not applicable since FTI has not yet started.		
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in policy and planning, finance, capacity, M&E and aid effectiveness interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
Not applicable since FTI has not yet started.		

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to policy and planning? What was happening in country before FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A comprehensive education sector plan existed in the form of an Education Sector Investment Plan (ESIP). ESIP was designed to place implementation of UPE in the context of national development priorities under the auspices of the PEAP. Its successor, the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP), prepared in 2003, aims to build on and to take forward the successes of ESIP, particularly in the implementation of UPE, while addressing the gaps in ESIP such as providing adequate treatment of the secondary, tertiary and vocational sub-sectors. Uganda had introduced UPE as a central policy in 1997, now aiming at its achievement by 2015. The strategy was to make UPE free for up to four children per family, later amended to be free to all children. UPE also provided text books and instructional material both for pupils and for all teachers. Though UPE led to increased accessibility for the poor there was also an immediate acute educational crisis involving as overcrowding, decline in teaching quality, insufficient material. Donors responded positively to the increased budget needs for funding UPE, both through the PAF and the education sector SWAp. Gender, equity, exclusion and HIV/AIDs were being addressed in the sector plan. Educational planning processes were very integrated and inclusive, with the decentralisation process leading to considerable autonomy at district level. 		
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
<p>FTI specific inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI in 2002–03 promoted a process of FTI endorsement which bypassed the regular process of sector planning based on the ESIP/ESSP. This was a source of disquiet for some donors who would have preferred the ESIP/ESSP process to be the basis of the FTI endorsement submission, rather than the application of a parallel arrangement. Nevertheless, the initial FTI approach to strategy was considered by MES to be good. It covered basic education comprehensively including HIV/AIDS. However, the early preparatory work for FTI was carried out against an FTI template, which, in the view of some local donor offices, distracted attention from the main planning instrument for the sector, the ESSP. Since there are conflicting views about the role and purpose of the ESSP, the latest FTI inputs to the endorsement process since 2007 are regarded differently by MES and some donors. 		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to policy and planning relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to developing quality education plans encompassing UPC targets? To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of sector policies?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How economically was FTI support to country level policy and planning translated into results?</i>
FTI support was relevant in assisting in supporting already established GOU policy on UPC. However, initially, it was in conflict with the macroeconomic framework and the strong role that donors were already playing in providing funds to the sector.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The effectiveness of FTI can only be assessed against its performance in terms of the planning for endorsement. Early FTI activities were designed to improve domestic strategic planning for the sector, and the early inputs to support better strategy, through, for example, the introduction of the simulation model, have been useful and influential. Recent attempts to support the process have been unsuccessful and there are now quite diverging stakeholder views on the usefulness of TA support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been little influence of FTI on policy and planning apart from what is mentioned in the previous column.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in policy and planning interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been little if any sustainable change due to FTI in planning and policy as it was already integrated into strong national planning processes. 		

Annex D – Analytical Summary Matrix

STREAM 2: Finance		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to education finance? What was happening in country before FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External and domestic finance have played a strong role in supporting UPE. Additional donor resources had been leveraged through the education sector SWAp and GOU budget funds did increase to primary education in real terms. This was not an explicit impact of FTI, but reflected GOU commitment to EFA. Macroeconomic stabilisation policy, applied through medium and long term budget frameworks, was a critical part of the finance landscape, and influenced the initial rejection of FTI by MFPED. Financial and budgeting systems have been reasonably well developed, particularly in terms of budget planning through a sector budget working group, with MTEFs linked to SWAps and associated budget ceilings playing a strong role. 		
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
FTI specific inputs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI CF funds have not yet been provided though some EPDF funds have been used for a limited amount of capacity building. Additional donor funds have not been leveraged as a result of the still non-consummated FTI process. 		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to education finance relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to a stronger education budget process? To what extent did FTI contribute to the increase in total funds for primary education?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How economically was FTI support to country level finance for education translated into results?</i>
The relevance and effectiveness of FTI funding in the Uganda education SWAp context is questionable. As recently as the Commonwealth Secretariat workshop in September 2008, government participants in the workshop concluded that “ <i>The value of Fast Track Initiative endorsement is not clear given the existing flows for education in Uganda via SWAps.</i> ”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The first attempts to obtain FTI endorsement were blocked by the MFPED policy on budgetary discipline and adherence to the macro framework ceilings. There have been signs that the MFPED stance may be changing in relation to global-type funds generally, but discussions have not reached a conclusion. The financing gap issue is subject to different perspectives on the part of MES and some of the donors. And it also remains unresolved with MFPED. The central concern with FTI is that any “additional” FTI funding may prove fungible. On the donor side, there are concerns that moves to additionality will actually have the opposite effect as the government will use CF funds to compensate for funds shifted to UPPEP. Given the pressure on spending generally and elsewhere in the education sector, FTI funding may be used to displace government funding to the sector. But this area of discussion has never been thoroughly followed through in the interactions between government and DPs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In terms of financing predictability, FTI has not so far added value. The term “Fast Track” is ironic given that after eight years, Uganda is still not at the starting line. How far FTI has been a central contributor to this is arguable. On the one hand, the early eligibility criteria for FTI CF funding, were clearly a disincentive for Uganda’s participation. At the same time, however, the fragmented approaches of stakeholders had led to a lack of coherence on sector financing.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in the education budget process and the level of finance for primary education likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There have been few changes in the education budget process. Given the negative macroeconomic outlook and the pressures arising from UPPEP, it is unlikely that domestic finance for primary education will increase further. 		

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to data and M&E? What was happening in country before FTI? Was quality and use of data relevant to the context and to the monitoring needs of the education strategies?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comprehensive data on the education sector are available for schools, districts and provinces and are used extensively for planning. GERs and NERs, class repetition, drop out and pupil teacher ratio were being monitored prior to FTI 		
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
FTI specific inputs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Early FTI TA support on concentrated on the results framework. 		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support relevant to data and M&E needs? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to improved collection of data and better information services? To what extent is there better use of data to inform policy and funding?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How economically was support to country data and M&E translated into results?</i>
The early FTI TA support on the results framework was considered to be useful and influential by MES at that time.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FTI Quality Support Review in early 2008 made a number of suggestions on performance reporting, including that the Ministry develop an ESSP Results Framework for the Plan period, with performance targets and key outcome indicators. As with the earlier FTI inputs in this area, these suggestions appear to have not yet been acted on, and FTI has had no discernible impact in this area. 	
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place data and M&E management likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> n/a 		

Annex D – Analytical Summary Matrix

STREAM 4: Capacity		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to capacity? To what extent was the capacity adequate for EFA and UPC targets?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At the Ministry level, the capacity to plan, implement, and monitor programmes has improved since the inception of the SWAp in 1998. However, the revised ESSP acknowledges that, as investments begin to include substantial developments at the post-primary and tertiary levels, the Ministry’s administrative staff will require even more sophisticated planning and management skills. Further, the system must be re-tuned to provide incentives for better planning and management. With responsibility for service delivery shifting increasingly to the district level, centrally based administrators will take leadership roles, transferring routine tasks to district staffs. 		
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them? What non-FTI inputs and processes took place over the same period?</i>		
FTI specific inputs:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI TA helped with the introduction of the simulation model. 		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to policy and planning relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of measures to strengthen capacity? To what extent was quality capacity created to implement policy and services?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How economically was FTI support to country level capacity building translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of simulation models to explore planning and budget options was relevant. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is argued by some that the FTI process was inappropriate from its inception in Dakar because of capacity constraints. The slogan of “no credible UPC plan being allowed to lack funds” put unrealistic pressures on recipient governments because increases in human skills and capacities could not match the same pace of funding increases. The FTI TA at the beginning of the FTI process was much appreciated by MES. The simulation model is used to help important planning exercises, e.g. with secondary education planning recently, and in the near future it is likely to be used for TVET development. The FTI Quality Review in early 2008 highlighted the capacity issue and proposed the inclusion of a capacity section in the ESSP where all capacities (Ministry, District and school level) would be more fully addressed. It also drew attention to the potential role of the Joint Annual Sector Reviews of the SWAp in providing a candid assessment of capacities to execute ESSP. However, it appears that these have not yet been acted upon. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The EPDF sponsorship for a small number of capacity building activities, for example, participation in the WBI courses, and a regional FTI workshop in Cape Town on “country leadership and implementation for results in the EFA – FTI partnership”, are considered to have marginal benefits.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in capacity likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
n/a		

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to aid effectiveness? What was happening in the sector before FTI? To what extent was aid for education efficiently & effectively provided?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prior to PEAP1 in 1997, Uganda's aid was fragmented and poorly coordinated, despite generally positive relationships with the donor community. The preparation of the first PEAP was, in part, a reaction to this problem. There was a realisation that the aid architecture needed to be oriented towards the implementation of the PEAP, and the latter half of the 1990s saw the Uganda government take various innovative steps in aid management, such as the introduction of sector wide approaches (SWAs) and the Poverty Action Fund, and later the development of the Partnership Principles in the context of PEAP2. In combination, these three initiatives have helped provide the frameworks within which aid management has evolved in Uganda. 		
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
FTI specific inputs to improving aid effectiveness: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI inputs to the endorsement process have been mainly to the education sector planning process rather than to aid management. 		
Relevance - <i>Was FTI support to aid effectiveness relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to more international aid, and to aid that is better, coordinated and more coherent with domestic efforts in the sector?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How efficiently was aid delivered?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The unfulfilled consummation of FTI endorsement for Uganda, after two attempts and a period of seven years, points to the disjunctures in the aid effectiveness framework for education. Part of the problem is that, despite a long standing aid architecture for the sector, based on annual joint sector reviews, sector working groups etc., there are limits to the jointness of decision making, especially at the policy level. The FTI approach in Uganda which has focused mainly on technical improvements has had limited relevance to issues of aid effectiveness. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI has had little impact on aid effectiveness in the sector partly because a relatively sophisticated aid architecture was already in place, and partly because the FTI approach emphasised education policy and strategic planning improvements, and much less aid effectiveness. The FTI approach has failed to deal with different Government and donor perspectives on difficult issues such as the financing gap. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FTI has so far played no role in reducing transaction costs on Government.
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place with respect to aid effectiveness likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
N/a		

Annex D – Analytical Summary Matrix

STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, equity and exclusion)		
Context: <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to cross-cutting issues? What was happening in country before FTI?</i>		
<p>ss-cutting issues have long been included in education sector plans which were developed prior to FTI. Issues such as equity and access have been prominent in educational discussions and a key part of GOU cy. UPE policy emphasis is on equal opportunity for boys and girls. And a costed framework for basic education for disadvantaged children fed into the 2003/04 planning and budgeting cycle commencing October 2. Being particularly badly affected, Uganda has given prominence to HIV/AIDS. The latest ESSP, first drafted in 2005, also refers to new themes which have particular relevance in Uganda e.g. to peace studies, gee education and gender equity.</p>		
Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
<p>FTI specific inputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None. 		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to cross cutting issues relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector planning and implementation with respect to cross-cutting issues)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to improved strategies to address cross cutting issues? To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of these strategies?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How economically was FTI support to cross cutting issues translated into results?</i>
The general FTI approach seems to be to support the ongoing strategies on CCIs, which is appropriate.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cross-cutting issue of poverty and equity is mainstreamed, but this was the case before FTI. • There were no references to CCI issues in the FTI Quality Support Review comments circulated in March 2008. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • n/a
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in the manner in which cross-cutting issues are addressed likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
n/a		