

**Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative**

## **Country Desk Study: Mali**

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**Discussion Draft**



## Summary information for Mali

- Currency = CFA Franc (XOF)
- Exchange Rate (31 December 2008) USD 1 = FCFA 479.27
- Fiscal Year = January – December
- School year = September – June
- Structure of education system: Basic Education (*enseignement fondamental*) composed of two cycles (first cycle - six year corresponding to primary education for children aged 7-12; second cycle – three years corresponding to lower secondary education for children aged 13-15); and Upper Secondary general education (three years for 16-18 year olds).
- Population: 13.5m
- Population growth rate: 3%

## Preface

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is linked both to the Education for All (EFA) goals and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FTI was launched in 2002, and has now been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership has recognised the need to evaluate whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. The evaluation will provide an opportunity for reform and change if necessary.

As stated in the Terms of Reference:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels.

The evaluation will draw lessons learned from the FTI's strengths and weaknesses and make a series of recommendations to further improve future partnership programming and effectiveness. Most importantly it is hoped that, as a result of this evaluation, progress towards expanding and enhancing educational opportunities will be strengthened.

The evaluation is independent but is jointly supported by a consortium of donors. The evaluation is taking place between November 2008 and December 2009. The Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC) is made up of representatives from the donor community, partner countries and civil society. It is coordinated by Joe DeStefano (email: [idestefano@futureofschooling.org](mailto:idestefano@futureofschooling.org)).

The evaluation team is a consortium of three companies Cambridge Education, Mokoro and Oxford Policy Management (OPM).

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For regular updates about the evaluation and the most recent outputs please refer to the evaluation website at: [www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative](http://www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative).



## Executive Summary

S1 Mali is one of the eight desk studies prepared for the purpose of the mid-term evaluation of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI). The desk studies are not researched in the same depth as full country case studies. They are based on relevant literature which can be accessed without visit to the country and on a limited number of phone or email interviews.

### Country Context

S2 Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world and the second largest country in West Africa, with diverse population density and partly nomadic northern population. It has the second lowest literacy rate in the world (24% in 2005).

S3 In 1999, the new Government policy on education and training was defined in the Education Orientation Law. This led to the development of Mali's 10 year education development programme (PRODEC, *Programme Décennal de Développement de l'Éducation* 1998-2008) and the elaboration of operational implementation plans PISE (*Programme d'Investissement Sectoriel Éducation*) in three phases starting with PISE I (2001-2005) and PISE II (2006-2008 extended to 2009). PISE III (2008-2010) will most probably start with a year's delay. PISE focus on investments and related operational costs, but do not include the major recurrent costs of education services. Finally, the education sector in Mali has been at the forefront of both deconcentration and devolution processes since the early 1990s.

S4 Regarding education financing, the period between 2000 and 2006 saw dramatic increases in expenditure and a steady shift in the share of recurrent expenditures toward primary education. Nevertheless, the share of recurrent education expenditures going to the primary education level is low in comparison to what is observed in other countries, and efficiency of education expenditure is questionable. Aid commitments to education and basic education have risen sporadically over the period 1999-2006. The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has increased substantially but erratically from 45% to 83% over the period.

S5 A SWAp was adopted and effectively made operational from 2001 onwards with the implementation of PISE I (2001-2005): about 15 donors have since then coordinated their support to the framework. A consultation framework was set up involving monthly meetings between development partners and the Ministry of Education and biannual joint sector reviews to discuss progress. Donor co-chairs rotate through renewable 6-month terms. Sector Budget Support (SBS) started in 2006, now provided by a group of six donors (Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, France, Canada and Belgium) representing approximately two thirds of external financing to education in 2008.

S6 In terms of progress toward Education For All, Mali has undergone the most marked increase in access to education amongst sub-Saharan African countries over the past few years. As a result, and despite considerable population growth, Mali has successfully increased its Gross Enrolment Rate of 27% in 1990/91 to 78% in 2008/09 and its Primary Completion Rate from 25.1% in 1996 to 43.1% in 2005. Main drivers behind this evolution have been the liberalisation of education (which allowed the strong increase in community and private schools), and a significant increase in school construction and teacher recruitment. Although significant, the continuation of the current trend in primary enrolment will be insufficient to reach Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015. It is estimated that it would allow reaching 69% completion of the first cycle of basic education in 2015. In addition, the gender gap remains high and fell only slightly over the period. Strong regional

disparities also persist with enrolment rates in rural areas remaining less than half of those in the urban centres. Finally, learning outcome assessments show a worrying picture.

### **FTI endorsement**

S7 Mali's request for endorsement by the FTI was based on its "Proposed action plan for the accelerated implementation of PISE II for Universal Primary Education" (GoM 2006a).

S8 An independent evaluation of the plan was carried out by a consultant, following which the local education donor group (AfDB, Germany, Canada, WB, Unicef, USAID, France, WFP, UNDP, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, UNESCO, European Commission, and Switzerland) endorsed the plan and recommended support from the FTI Catalytic Fund to finance the financing gap for primary education (first cycle of basic education) of FCFA 12.4bn (approximately USD 23.5m) over 2006-2008.

S9 The FTI CF allocated USD 8.7m (FCFA 4.35bn) to Mali for 2007-2008 during its meeting in Bonn in May 2007. Following discussions at local level, an agreement was reached between the WB, local donor group and Government of Mali to use a project modality and not SBS, mainly to ensure adequate earmarking to the primary education sub-sector as it was assumed this was required to access FTI CF funding.

S10 The project consists of the following components:

- Increasing the quality of basic education, through: (i) supplying textbooks and teacher guides to primary schools; (ii) provision of grants for schools in the first cycle of basic education which have an operational School Management Committee; and (iii) in-service training for community school teachers.
- Increasing the equity in access to education through the construction and equipment of new classrooms for the first cycle of basic education in rural areas.

S11 As of mid-2009, only USD 2.2m has been disbursed out of the USD 8.7m (25%).

S12 Mali has also been allocated less than 200,000 USD from the EPDF, mainly to fund regional activities and conferences.

### **FTI and Education Policy and Planning**

S13 Mali had already a well developed education planning framework before FTI endorsement. The FTI endorsement led the Government of Mali to prepare an "accelerated action plan to achieve Universal Primary Education". Although the action plan is based on existing documents and strategies (PRODEC, PISE, PRSP, Country Status Report), it required extensive revision of the PISE objectives and financing framework.

S14 The rationale for developing an additional action plan was to ensure alignment with the format for the request to the FTI and to ensure "compliance" with IF benchmarks. The action plan therefore included revised objectives compared to the objectives defined in the PISE II. Although the "acceleration" of objectives is in line with the IF benchmarks, it may not be entirely relevant to the existing capacity for implementation. The fact that the design of a plan to "accelerate progress towards UPE" specifically in order to support the request for FTI endorsement has led to un-realistic planning is at odds with the FTI objective to support the development of "credible plans".

S15 Discussions around the Indicative Framework benchmarks raised key issues in relation to Mali's education policy choices. Although the IF can be considered as an FTI input since it was developed in the framework of the design of the FTI, these discussions were held often before Mali sought endorsement by the FTI, mainly under the leadership of the World Bank. The recruitment of contract teachers in particular has allowed additional

enrolments in primary education and has had a rather positive impact on the quality of teaching, but has been inefficient in that it has led to numerous strikes and resentment between the GoM and teachers.

S16 FTI CF support is also relevant to the needs and objectives identified in Mali's PISE II. However, its slow execution rate has hampered its effectiveness. In addition, key issues arise as to the potential effectiveness of the activities it funds, if policy reforms on which they rely are not operational.

### **FTI and the Financing of Education**

S17 The FTI CF contribution did not provide sufficient resources to fill the financing gap. As a result, the World Bank adopted an additional funding to its existing PISE II, and the GoM sought additional support from KfW. The FTI has therefore indirectly contributed to the mobilisation of additional donor support compared to what was expected in PISE II.

S18 Nevertheless, the question of the definition of the financing gap arises. Frequent revisions of the gap based on different assessments of implementation capacity and financial sustainability (PISE II initial and revised) or on IF benchmarks (FTI request) show the subjectivity of such a concept. It should be noted in addition that the calculation of a financing gap to achieve UPE (i.e. until 2015) has not fostered any improvement in predictability of aid or longer term aid commitments from donors.

S19 Regarding the mobilisation of domestic resources, FTI had a marginal influence through the Indicative Framework (IF) benchmarks, in particular in highlighting the need to increase the share of resources going to primary education. Nevertheless this influence comes in addition to existing government objectives, dialogue with donors and funding from the debt relief initiatives.

S20 It should also be noted that since PISE II concerns only investments, the FTI CF does not – as it had set to do – provide support to increase recurrent expenditure in education.

S21 Finally, the FTI CF support to Mali has taken the form of a project whose modalities derogate from key PFM principles and create additional and parallel procedures to the national ones.

### **FTI and the Data Gaps**

S22 The most significant FTI inputs with regards to data and monitoring are the assessment of existing M&E in the appraisal by the local donor group, and the reporting requirements for the monitoring of the CF-funded project.

S23 FTI and CF monitoring uses the same monitoring instruments that are used for the joint monitoring framework, both in terms of matrix of measures and of indicators. In addition, indicators of the IF have been included to the overall monitoring framework “in order to monitor the action plan for accelerating progress toward UPE”, i.e. the FTI request.

S24 Outside of this monitoring framework, the FTI has not provided any significant contribution to the issue of data and M&E.

### **FTI and Capacity Development**

S25 Overall, efforts to strengthen donor coordination in support to capacity development and develop a comprehensive capacity development strategy have mainly happened outside the realm of FTI. Nevertheless, the preparation of the request to FTI and associated

processes may have contributed to build capacity of both Government and the Education Donors.

S26 The CF funding for teacher training for community school teachers is particularly relevant to the needs identified in the PISE II, since community school teachers receive very minimal training. Nevertheless, delayed execution of the CF-funded project may have delayed the implementation of this activity. In addition, the fact that the PISE II covers only investment expenditure and not recurrent GoM expenditures limits un-necessarily the coverage of the education sector dialogue, and may not allow it to address capacity development issues appropriately.

S27 Finally, EPDF support has mainly focused on financing regional initiatives and has not had a significant impact on capacity development.

### **FTI and Aid Effectiveness**

S28 Given the highly participative process for the elaboration of the education sector plans (PRODEC, PISE), the fact that the request to FTI defined and proposed a different set of objectives and associated strategies could be said to have contributed negatively to ownership, and in particular to the transparency and participatory nature of the planning process.

S29 The Catalytic Fund funding is integrated to the existing donor coordination mechanism. Nevertheless, it has not contributed significantly to strengthening or enhancing existing aid effectiveness. In terms of aid modality, the main justifications for the CF funding to be provided through project modality are the fact that sector budget support is for the entire sector and the CF needs to target basic education in this operation, and the assessment by the World Bank (WB) that the procurement procedures cannot be fully relied upon. Nevertheless, this justification does not seem sufficient since other countries have received non-earmarked sector budget support with CF funding, and various donors had started providing Sector Budget Support to Mali before it was endorsed by the FTI, the WB itself providing General Budget Support.

S30 In terms of alignment, several risk-mitigating measures have resulted in derogations from existing national processes which involve significant transactions costs. Although aligned with existing plans and strategies (PISE, PRODEC), the FTI inputs have not provided a push for moving towards a real sector-wide approach, i.e. covering the whole of the education expenditure and not only investment expenditure.

S31 Finally, neither the FTI nor the CF funding have contributed to enhanced predictability of aid. Aid to education remains volatile as shown in 2007 when only 10% of committed project support was disbursed, and only 25% of CF funding was disbursed within the expected timeframe.

### **Cross-Cutting Issues**

S32 FTI inputs related to cross cutting issues include in particular the appraisal of the request in 2006, and the financing from the Catalytic Fund.

S33 The appraisal highlighted that the existing strategy to fight against HIV/AIDS focuses more on prevention than on support to HIV/AIDS orphans or pupils and teachers affected by HIV/AIDS. The evaluation of the request also underlines that gender issues have been adequately addressed, in line with the National Policy on Girl Education, but that attention should be given to actual implementation of the commitments. It is nevertheless doubtful whether the appraisal as such would have an impact on GoM policies to address cross cutting issues in the education sector. Overall, it is not clear whether the influence of the FTI

on cross-cutting issues goes beyond the rephrasing and re-organisation of the PISE II to produce the FTI request following a format more adequate to the FTI, i.e. among other things giving more prominence to cross-cutting issues.

S34 Finally, the Catalytic Fund support has focused on inequalities through support to training of community school teachers, mainly in rural areas, and enhancing the provision of textbooks and school construction, but its effectiveness is hampered by the slow implementation of the project.

### **High level evaluation questions**

S35 *High Level Questions 1: Is what FTI aims to accomplish consistent with current needs and priorities of FTI client countries?* Overall, it is not clear that FTI's support to Mali was fully relevant to the country's needs or to the FTI objectives: it led to the definition of an overly ambitious plan, additional to the existing sector plan and developed outside the existing participative and consultative framework. Issues raised by the discussion around the IF benchmark were relevant, but were already developed by other donors before FTI endorsement – in particular by the World Bank. CF funding through project modality did not contribute to enhanced aid effectiveness or predictability, and involves significant derogations from national processes and from the existing most aligned aid modalities. Finally, FTI contribution on data and M&E issues and on capacity development fell significantly short of the objectives it set itself.

S36 *High Level Questions 2: To what extent is the FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, namely, accelerating progress on EFA?* The contribution of the FTI in Mali has been mainly in the design of the action plan to accelerate progress toward UPE. Nevertheless, the acceleration has mainly been restricted to revising upwards the objectives of the existing strategy. Key issues constraining the acceleration of progress toward UPE have either not been addressed, been addressed inefficiently, or been addressed but through measures taking more time than expected to become operational. CF funding should have contributed financially to the acceleration through additional funding for classroom construction, textbooks and teacher training. In practice only 25% has been disbursed within the proposed timeframe.

S37 *High Level Questions 3: Has the FTI helped mobilize domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies based on Paris Declaration ideals?* CF funding and indirect effect on other donor funding contributed to increased external funding to primary education and the discussion on IF benchmarks may contribute progressively to an increased share of the domestic education budget going to primary education. Nevertheless, donor support to the education sector in Mali remains weakly aligned with government processes (including SBS), and predictability is limited. CF funding itself has contributed to the lack of predictability and heavy processes involved in external funding to education.



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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACDI	Canadian International Development Agency	<i>Agence Canadienne pour le Développement International</i>
ADARS		<i>Appui Direct a l'Amélioration des Rendements Scolaires</i>
AE	Education Academy	<i>Academie d'Education</i>
AFD	French Development Agency	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i>
AfDB	African Development Bank	
ANICT	National Investment Agency of Territorial Authorities	<i>Agence Nationale d'Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales</i>
APE	Parent Associations	
BPE		<i>Bureau des projets éducation</i>
CAF		<i>Centres d'Alphabétisation Fonctionnelle</i>
CAFÉ		<i>Centres d'Apprentissage Féminins</i>
CAP	Pedagogical Activity Center	<i>Centre d'Animation Pédagogique</i>
CAST	Special Treasury Account	
CED		<i>Centres d'Education pour le Développement</i>
CGS	School Management Committee	<i>Comité de Gestion Scolaire</i>
CF	Catalytic Fund	
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	
CPS	Planning and Statistical Unit	<i>Cellule de la Planification et de la Statistique</i>
CSCR	Second generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	<i>Cadre Strategique pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté</i>
CSR	Country Status Report	
DAF	Administrative and Financial Department in each Ministry	<i>Division Administrative et Financière</i>
DGMP	General Procurement Department	<i>Direction Générale des Marchés Publics</i>
DP	Development Partner	
DRE	Regional Education Directorate	<i>Direction Régionale de l'Education</i>
EFA	Education for All	
EMEP	Mali Poverty Assessment	
EOC	Evaluation Oversight Committee	
EPDF	Education Programme Development Fund	
ESEP	Education Sector Expenditure Program	<i>Programme Sectoriel des Dépenses de l'Education</i>
FCFA	CFA Franc (Currency)	<i>Francs de la communauté financière africaine</i>
FTI	Fast Track Initiative	
GBS	General Budget Support	
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate	

GoM	Government of Mali	<i>République du Mali</i>
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country	
ICB	International Competitive Bidding	
IDA	International Development Association	
IEF	basic education inspectorates	<i>Inspection d'Education Fondamentale</i>
IFM	Teacher Training Institute	<i>Institut de Formation des Maîtres</i>
KfW	German government-owned development bank	
MDG	Millennium Development Goal	
MEBA-LN	Ministry of basic education, literacy and national languages	<i>Ministère de l'Education de Base, de l'Alphabétisation et des Langues Nationales</i>
MEFP	Ministry of Employment and vocational education	<i>Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle</i>
MESSRS	Ministry for secondary and higher education and research	<i>Ministère des Enseignements Secondaire Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique</i>
MoE	Ministry of Education	
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework	
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation	
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance	
ODI	Overseas Development Institute	
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee	
PAD	Project Appraisal Document	
PAGAMGFP	Government Action Plan for the Modernisation of Public Finance Management	<i>Plan d'action gouvernemental d'amélioration et de modernisation de la gestion des finances publiques</i>
PASEC	Program of Analysis of Education Systems	<i>Programme d'Analyse des Systèmes de l'Education</i>
PCR	Primary Completion Rate	
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability	
PFM	Public Finance Management	
PIM	Project Implementation Manuel	
PISE	Education Sector Investment Program	<i>Programme d'Investissement Sectoriel Education</i>
PRODEC	Ten-Year Program for the Development of Education	<i>Programme Décennal de Développement de l'Education</i>
PRODESS	Ten-Year Program for the Development of health	<i>Programme Decennal de Developpement Socio-sanitaire</i>
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit	
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	
PTF	Technical and Financial Partners	<i>Partenaires Techniques et Financiers</i>
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program	
SARPE	Alternative Teaching Staff Recruitment Strategy	<i>Stratégie Alternative de Recrutement de Personnel Enseignant</i>
SBS	Sector Budget Support	
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa	
SWAp	Sector-wide Approach	
TOR	Terms of Reference	

TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training	
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation	
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund	<i>Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'Enfance</i>
UPE	Universal Primary Education	
WAEMU (UMEOA)	West African Economic and Monetary Union	<i>Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine</i>
WB	World Bank	
WFP	World Food Programme	



# 1 Introduction

## Purpose and Outputs of the Evaluation

1.1 The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) partnership has commissioned an independent mid-term evaluation. This takes place at the mid-point between the FTI's establishment and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) target date of 2015. It is therefore designed both to assess progress so far and to offer guidance for the FTI's future work. According to the Terms of Reference (TOR):

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels. The evaluation will assess the Initiative's added value, identify lessons learned from its strengths and weaknesses, and formulate recommendations for improved partnership programming and effectiveness. (TOR, ¶12)

1.1 The evaluation is being managed by an independent Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC), and the evaluation process is meant to take account of the viewpoints of all stakeholders and encourage their involvement in debating the issues it raises. The main outputs are shown in Box 1.1.

**Box 1.1 Main Outputs of EFA-FTI evaluation**

<b>Evaluation Framework</b> (January 2009)	This describes the agreed methodology and the detailed work programme of the evaluation.
<b>Preliminary Report</b> (April 2009)	Initial findings from the global desk analysis
<b>Country Studies</b>	9 full country studies and 8 desk studies
<b>Draft Full Report</b> (October/November 2009)	The main substantive report, circulated in draft form to allow extensive review and comment.
<b>Final Full Report</b>	December 2009.

## The Role of Country Studies

1.2 The work programme for the evaluation envisages nine full country case studies (Cambodia, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Yemen), as well as eight desk studies. According to the TOR:

Case studies are expected to be used in this evaluation as a means of developing greater insight into country-level processes, accomplishments, and problems, all in the context of each country, thus making a contribution to the lessons-learned part of the evaluation. (TOR ¶21)

1.3 The selected countries represent a range of country contexts and a range of different experiences with FTI. Each country study is a contribution to the overall evaluation. It is not a full evaluation of the education sector, nor is it linked the FTI's procedures for country endorsement and allocation of funding.

## **The Study Process for Mali**

1.4 Mali is one of the eight desk studies. The desk studies are not researched in the same depth as full country case studies (which typically include a two-week field visit by a team of three or four evaluators). They are based on the same methodology as the full case studies (outlined in the Evaluation Framework), and on relevant literature which can be accessed without visit to the country (including the FTI Secretariat archives for the country in question, plus a standard set of aid data derived from the OECD DAC records). The desk study authors are individuals already familiar with the methodology of the evaluation and with the country concerned. Authors could consult one or two key informants (by phone or email) for clarification or to get the latest available documents etc.

1.5 In the case of Mali, the author was able to draw on her own experience in Mali, as well as recent studies on the education sector in Mali which involved country visit and interviews, in particular the study on Sector Budget Support (SBS) in Practice (upcoming, ODI, Mokoro 2009) and an evaluation of World Bank (WB) support to Primary Education (World Bank 2007b). She also was able to conduct a limited number of interviews to complement the documentation review.

## 2 Mali Background

2.1 Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world ranking 168th out of 179 in the 2008 Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). It is the second largest country in West Africa (after Niger) covering an area of 1.2 million km<sup>2</sup>. Its population density is extremely variable from below 5 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup> in the three northern desert regions (65% area, 10% population) to more than 90 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup> in the delta region of the Niger River against an average country-wide population density of 9.4 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>. This discrepancy in population density, combined with the nomadic lifestyle of the northern population<sup>1</sup> and the insecurity situation in the north caused by the continuous and longstanding uprising of the Tuareg rebels against the democratically elected Government, represent major challenges for economic development and delivery of public services.

2.2 Mali's population (estimated at 13.5m in 2005<sup>2</sup>) is very young, with 48% of the population aged below 14, and predominantly rural, with just under 70% of the population based in rural areas. The proportion of population living below the poverty line, which was 64% in 2001, decreased to 59 % in 2006. While the rate declined in urban areas, from 30 to 23% from 2001-2006, it worsened in rural areas, increasing from 76% to 80% during the same period. Mali education index<sup>3</sup> is amongst lowest in the world (176 out of 179 countries in the 2008 index), and has the second lowest literacy rate in the world (24% in 2005)<sup>4</sup>.

2.3 Following two decades of poor and erratic economic performance (with annual real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates averaging +2,4% in the 1970s and +1,9% in the 1980s), Mali's transition to democracy and its adoption of strong adjustment and reform measures in the early 1990s enabled a recovery of economic growth and a steady increase in income per capita (from USD 240 in 1994 to USD 487 in 2006). Real GDP growth averaged 5,6% per year during the 1990s and 5,2% during 2000-2007 – against a PRSP objective of 6.7%, and against an annual population growth rate of around 3% in the 1990s and 2,3% since 2002. However, Mali's economy remains vulnerable to the risks associated with climatic conditions, world prices of cotton (export) and oil (import) and its dependence upon the performance of its neighbour, Côte d'Ivoire, upon remittances and upon external aid (which contributes to about a third of public expenditure and three quarters of capital outlays).

2.4 In parallel with positive economic developments, Mali achieved a remarkable political transformation with an increasingly strong democratic process taking root throughout the 1990s, culminating in the peaceful transfer of power between two democratically elected leaders in 2002 and 2007. These major political events developed positively and have placed Mali in the forefront of African countries moving to a democratic and pluralistic political system. However, numerous teachers and students' strikes have been seriously undermining the functioning of the education sector, in particular in 2008. (World Bank, 2009)

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<sup>1</sup> Nomadic population in Mali is estimated at 10% of total population

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Statistics Division

<sup>3</sup> The Education Index is measured by the adult literacy rate (with two-thirds weighting) and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (with one-third weighting).

<sup>4</sup> UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008

2.5 Decentralisation was adopted in the 1992 constitution as a policy priority and education became a major area devolved to local authorities. Political decentralisation became effective with the local elections of 1999 which established 761 Local Authorities and was accompanied by the establishment of 346 administrative structures at three levels<sup>5</sup>. Following the gradual shift of powers and capacities to local authorities starting in the early 2000s<sup>6</sup>, the process of fiscal decentralisation effectively started in January 2007, in particular concerning education expenditure.

2.6 In terms of Public Financial Management (PFM) reform, various PFM diagnostics<sup>7</sup> undertaken since 2000 have concluded that Mali's PFM system presents limited fiduciary risk. According to the preliminary report of the recent public expenditure and fiduciary assessment (PEFA), Mali is above average with regard to PFM aspects, notably (i) budget preparation and the quality of information submitted to the National Assembly together with the draft budget; (ii) budget and accounting classifications; and (iii) established procedures such as the quarterly transfer of resources for recurrent expenditures and wage bill oversight. Less satisfactory are the budget execution regulations and practices for ensuring resource management and for covering Mali's financial obligations. Mali's PFM weaknesses lie in the areas of (i) provisional treasury management; (ii) intra-year monitoring of all four budget execution phases aggravated by unreliable budget information flows among staff involved in the budget execution process; (iii) internal budgetary controls (too many control agencies and a lack of coordination amongst them, a general audit agency - the accounts section of the Supreme Court – that is not yet independent); and (iv) consolidation of financial accounts. In April 2005, the Government adopted a Government Action Plan for the Improvement and Modernization of Public Finance Management (PAGAM GFP) to address these issues in a holistic manner.

2.7 Despite the implementation of reforms (in particular in PFM) and good economic performance tax revenues increased only moderately from 13.6% of GDP in 2003 to 14% in 2007 (World Bank 2009). These resources plus those freed up through the HIPC and MDRI initiatives and external support have facilitated the implementation of Mali's Poverty Reduction Strategy.

2.8 Mali's first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was adopted in 2002 and covered the period 2002-2006; its second PRSP covering the period 2007-2011 was approved by the cabinet in December 2006 (Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté – CSCR). The PRSP adopted in 2002 recognizes that "a significant and lasting reduction in poverty levels could not happen without improvement in education, training and literacy".

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<sup>5</sup> Mali's decentralization efforts consist of two parallel processes: devolution [*décentralisation* in the French sense] and deconcentration. Devolution [*decentralisation*] refers to a political arrangement involving the devolution of specific powers and resources by the central GoM to lower levels of government. Deconcentration refers to administrative measures involving the transfer of management responsibilities and resources to agents of the central GoM located outside the central level (in regions and districts)


<sup>6</sup> The National Policy for decentralisation dates from 2005 and covers 2005-2014.

<sup>7</sup> RONC 2001, CFAA 2002, EC audit/conformity test 2003, PEFA 2006.

### 3 Aid Relationships

3.1 Figure 3.1 below provides an overview of total Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) commitments to Mali based on OECD/DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee) data. Total aid commitments increased by just over USD 235m between 1999 and 2006, with its highest peak in 2005. The share of multilateral aid in total aid fluctuated, with peaks at 51% in 2000 and 50% in 2005 and trough at 23% in 2002. Its share in 2006 was sixteen percentage points lower, at 18%, than in 1999. The biggest donor to Mali in terms of total aid commitments in 2006 was the Netherlands, closely followed by Canada. Historically, these donors have made contributions of relatively consistent sizes over the years, but for both the most significant contributions were made in 2006. Over the period 1999-2006 the most significant donor was France, followed by the European Commission (EC) and the World Bank.

**Figure 3.1 : Total aid commitments (constant 2006 US\$bn)**



Source: OECD-DAC data

3.2 Budget support has taken an increasingly important share of external aid, increasing from 20% of aid in 2004 (€ 93m) to 33% in 2006 (€ 179m) with much of the increase due to Sector Budget Support (SBS) which more than doubled from € 31.3 million in 2005 to € 67 million in 2008. SBS in education represents more than half of total SBS (55% in 2006, 57% in 2007 and 69% in 2008). (ODI, Mokoro 2009).

3.3 This trend towards giving sector budget support is a result of efforts in the late 1990s to move toward more programmatic approaches and to establish pooled funding arrangements initially in the health and education sectors. Two such arrangements, Ten-Year Program for the Development of Health (PRODESS) and Ten-Year Program for the Development of Education (PRODEC) in health and education respectively, were centred on sector programme matrices and included a number of bilateral agencies. The recent increase in SBS has come about largely from donors who previously had contributed to the pooled funding arrangements, including the EC, Netherlands, and Sweden, and who switched to SBS. Sector Budget Support is currently given in the sectors of health, education, Public Finance Management (PFM), and cross-sector issues such as decentralisation and institutional development. (Betley M., 2008 and ODI, Mokoro, 2009).

3.4 Donor coordination and harmonisation are achieved in practice through:

- A well organised and formalised framework for Development Partners (DP) dialogue consisting of:

- Monthly donor meetings with the chair rotating every year and alternating between bilateral and multilateral partners, and
- A technical support unit to harmonise donor aid and facilitate consultations with the government.
- A well organised and formalised framework for Government-DP dialogue consisting of:
  - High level meetings between the Government and the heads of donor or agency missions in country assisted by a technical unit comprised of one government representative and two donor representatives; an ad hoc working group on governance;
  - At sector level, 10 technical working groups (of which one on education) and three cross-sector working groups (HIV/AIDS, gender and environment) convene regularly under leadership of one donor and interface with a specific Government interlocutor. In public finance the dialogue is centred on the implementation of the PFM reform Action plan (PAGAM GFP). In education the dialogue concerns the implementation of PISE II.
  - At sub-sector level, a number of working groups are organised; in education there are subgroups on basic education and on vocational training.

3.5 In response to the Donor Round Table Conference for Mali held in Geneva in March 2004, donors and government identified the need to improve coordination of their activities, to progressively replace multiple donor procedures by national procedures and to harmonise programmes and procedures through the adoption of budget support. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness a year later added further impetus. This led in practice to the development of:

- A joint budget support framework: signed on 29th of March 2006 by the government and eleven donors. A Memorandum of Understanding sets out a common set of general principles (reciprocal commitments, implementation modalities) for (all forms of) budget support to Mali. However, General Budget Support (GBS) donors in Mali have not yet adopted a common (harmonised) matrix of disbursement conditions.
- Sector budget support frameworks for the health sector and the education sector (one for public finance management is currently being developed). These sector specific frameworks detail the arrangements of the general framework with regard to the context of the support (objectives of the programme), stakeholders, partners' financial contributions, disbursement conditions, government commitments of information to be provided and the monitoring/evaluation/audit arrangements. (ODI, Mokoro, 2009)

## 4 Basic Education in Mali

### Education System

4.1 Mali's education system is structured as follows:

- Pre-primary schooling (lasting 2 to 3 years);
- Basic Education (*enseignement fondamental*) composed of two cycles (first cycle - six year corresponding to primary education for children aged 7-12; second cycle – three years corresponding to lower secondary education for children aged 13-15);
- Upper Secondary general education (three years for 16-18 year olds)
- Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET, *enseignement technique et professionnelle*), between two and four year long
- Higher Education

4.2 Prior to 2000, Mali's education sector was organised around the central structures at headquarters with regional offices guiding education development at local level. All plans, works and supplies were organised and managed centrally. Since the adoption of decentralisation (written into Mali's constitution of 1992), education has been at the forefront of both deconcentration of authority to (existing) regional and (newly created) district structures as well as devolution of powers and budget to Local Authorities (that control school facilities' construction) and school management committees (who provide school furniture, supplies and teaching aids).

4.3 The decentralization of educational administration was intended to increase the Government of Mali (GoM)'s capacity and authority by bringing decision-making closer to the service delivery level. The deconcentration of educational administration was intended to improve teacher support and supervision.

4.4 School management committees (*Comités de gestion scolaire - CGS*) were instituted in 2005 as a way to improve school management. Each CGS consists of parents, teachers, NGOs, associations, and council representatives. Local authorities are responsible for the development of educational access, the recruitment and management of teachers and school management.

4.5 In the context of the decentralisation process, the following institutions are responsible for education at decentralised level:

- community councils are responsible for basic education 1st cycle (primary),
- district councils for basic education 2nd cycle (lower secondary) and
- regional assemblies for upper secondary, technical and vocational education.


4.6 Since 1st of January 2007, these decentralised structures have benefited from direct budget transfers for education from the state budget (for classroom construction) and mayors have a greater role in the recruitment and promotion of primary school teachers although the payroll is still centralised at the ministry level. In terms of administrative responsibilities, deconcentration of the education ministry implied that the 9 regional directorates (*Directions régionales de l'éducation, DRE*) became 15 Education Academies (*Académies d'enseignement, AE*), and their responsibilities were expanded beyond administration to include pedagogic issues. At District level, the former 35 *Inspections de l'enseignement fondamental* (IEF) or basic education inspectorates became 70 Centers for

Educational Support (*Centres d'animation pedagogique*, CAP) with new responsibilities and, since 1st January 2007, funding received directly from the regional and district budgets.

4.7 AE and CAP deliver pre-service teacher education for contract teachers<sup>8</sup>, advise communities on teacher recruitment and provide in-service professional development for practicing teachers. More than 40% of the sector's non-salary budget is transferred to the AE and the operating budget per CAP increased from 500,000 CFAF in 1998 to more than 10,000,000 CFAF in 2004. Mali's decentralization efforts – which are strongly supported by donors, increased local initiatives and the efficiency of resource allocation. Municipalities spent CFAF 12 billion on classroom construction and hired more than 2,000 teachers from 2001-2003. However, CAP and AE still do not have the capacity to influence the organization of classes, teacher transfers, or student enrollment; despite their staff, equipment and training, they are still only minimally involved in pedagogic support. (World Bank, 2007b p13)

4.8 Finally, the Ministry of Education (MoE) was recently (2006) split into two separate ministries: the MEBA-LN (basic education, literacy and local languages) and the MESSRS (secondary and higher education and research). Technical and vocational training falls under the Ministry of Employment and Professional Education (previously it fell under the Ministry of Labour). (ODI Mokoro 2009)

**Figure 4.1 : Institutional organisation of the education sector**



Source: ODI, 2009 upcoming

## Education plans

4.9 After independence education reforms were launched to achieve universal education but the importance and priority attached to education as a tool for development were only really emphasized with the 1992 constitution, which stipulates (article 18) that “every citizen has the right to education. Public education is compulsory, free and secular”.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See box 5.2 for more details on the recruitment of contract teachers

<sup>9</sup> *Tout citoyen a droit à l'instruction. L'enseignement public est obligatoire, gratuit et laïc*

4.10 This became a turning point for Malian education: a decision was taken to abandon the dual approach of selective formal education for some children and less expensive non formal approaches for most children, and to move ahead with the expansion of the formal system<sup>10</sup>. (World Bank, 2007b p.9) In 1992, GoM revised education laws to allow non-public actors, including parents' associations, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and private entrepreneurs, to open schools. Fees in rural schools were supposedly abolished in the early 1990s, but it is not certain that this is always the case. In addition to fees, parents contribute to school construction costs, teacher salaries and school feeding programmes. (World Bank, 2007b, p.24)

4.11 In 1999, the new Government policy on education and training was defined in the Education Orientation Law (December 1999). This led to the development of Mali's 10 year education development programme (PRODEC, *Programme Décennal de Développement de l'Éducation 1998-2008* (GoM, 2000)) which adopted the following motto: 'one school or one education development centre for every village'. PRODEC covers the whole education system: basic education, pre-school education, special education, teacher training, non formal education, secondary education, general, technical and vocational secondary education, higher education and scientific and technological research. It identifies eleven priorities for establishing universal basic education by 2015 outlined in Box 4.1 below. These eleven priorities were elaborated into operational implementation plans PISE (*Programme d'Investissement Sectoriel Éducation/Education Sector Investment Programme*) in three phases starting with PISE I (2001-2005) and PISE II (initially 2006-2008, extended to 2009) which were accompanied by multi-year financing plans, in the form of Sector Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF). Preparations for PISE III (initially foreseen for 2008-2010) are under way but it will most probably start with a year's delay. It is important to note that from the outset PISE excluded the major recurrent costs of education services, such as salaries of teachers, utility bills and the operating costs of schools and general administration. PISE, instead, focused on investments in the sector and some operational costs including operation and maintenance costs of investments, teaching materials, and teacher continuous training. Nevertheless, the sector MTEF and associated dialogue covers the sector as a whole.

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<sup>10</sup> For nomadic children (estimated at 10% of the population), the abolition of travelling schools and the administrative difficulties associated with school transfers greatly reduces their attendance rates. Nomadic children may attend school during their families' more stable months (usually at the beginning of the school year, before water has dried up), and then withdraw when their families move. (World Bank 2007b)

**Box 4.1 : PRODEC's priorities and strategic orientations**

The eleven priorities of PRODEC are:

1. Quality basic education for all
2. Vocational training adapted to the economy's needs
3. General secondary and technical education renovated and performing
4. Quality higher education at controlled costs and responding to priority needs
5. Use of mother tongue as well as French in formal education
6. An operational policy of text books and didactic materials
7. A sustained training policy for teachers
8. A real partnership around schools
9. Restructuring and institutional adjustment required by the change in education system
10. A communication policy centred on dialogue and consultations with all partners
11. A sustained, balanced, rational financing policy of the education system which fits into the decentralisation framework.

The strategic orientations of PRODEC include

- Greater effort to provide public pre primary education
- Restructuring of primary education and lower secondary into a single bloc of 9 year basic education ("*education fondamentale*")
- Improving the link between the private sector and TVET
- Development of short term training in higher education
- Progressive privatisation of textbook conception and distribution

Source: GoM, 2000

4.12 The emphasis of PISE I was on establishing the new institutional structure to manage education in a decentralised manner<sup>11</sup> and to increase access to education. This included: the development of the institutional structure for decentralisation; the holding of a national forum on decentralised school management; the setting up of school management committees (CGS); the elaboration of a guide for preparing education development plans; the preparation of training modules for CGS and parent associations (APE); the definition of a list of specific responsibilities for the seven areas falling under local authorities; the training of CGS and APE in decentralised school management; the preparation and signature of an agreement between the Ministry of Education and the National Investment Agency for Local Authorities (ANICT)<sup>12</sup> ruling their relationships and those with the local communities regarding school construction investments. It also included intensive efforts in increasing access to primary education: 2,812 new classrooms and 4 teacher training centres were built and 9 pedagogic centres were set up. Nevertheless, progress was much slower than anticipated: only about half the number of programmed classrooms was built and the annual output of trained teachers was even more disappointing.

4.13 The focus of PISE II was put on (i) implementing a more decentralized approach to classroom construction and teacher recruitment, making decentralisation effective at municipal and regional level through decentralised management of education with budgetary transfers enabling communities to take charge of their responsibilities for education; (ii) promoting equity and stimulating demand by financing teacher training and salaries through community-based school initiatives; (iii) increasing the recruitment of qualified teachers by improving the quality and efficiency of pre-service training in Teacher Training Institutes (*Institut de Formation des Maîtres* - IFM) and by training of about 2,500 teachers every year through the IFMs and the accelerated training programme (Stratégie Alternative de Recrutement du Personnel Enseignant, Alternative Teaching Staff Recruitment Strategy -

<sup>11</sup> Education is one of seven decentralised areas. Local governments' competences include: (i) general administration, (ii) public education, (iii) public health, (iv) drinking water supply and sanitation, (v) local road infrastructure, (vi) markets and sport and (vii) art and culture.

<sup>12</sup> The ANICT (National Investment Agency of the local authorities) handles the financial management function for the local authorities for school classroom construction. See section on FTI and education financing for more details

SARPE)<sup>13</sup>; and (iv) improving the quality of education through the provision of free textbooks and direct support to the schools for the purchase of teaching materials, in-service teacher training, as well as a comprehensive reading strategy as part of the new curriculum. However, on realisations have been slower than anticipated. Direct support to schools is implemented through the ADARS system (Appui Direct a l'Amélioration des Rendements Scolaires), via a financial transfer to each School Management Committee (CGS) in each primary school through the Local Administration. The objective of this policy is to end the requirement for parents to contribute to the CGS, thereby operationalising the fee free education policy.

4.14 School construction has reportedly been slow since 2006 due to the long process of setting up the new system for classroom construction with funds channelled through and managed by the ANICT. In terms of teacher training, it was expected that 2500 new teachers could be trained per year but only 1525 qualified in 2007 of whom 10% are estimated to end up doing something else than teaching. In terms of in-service training, just over 14,000 teachers should have been trained by the EAs and CAPs in 2007 but training was only delivered to 2,050 teachers. A second priority for basic education was the development of curricula on which no progress was made during 2007. (ODI, Mokoro 2009). A mid-term review of PISE II was done in 2009.

## Education financing

4.15 The existence of the PRODEC accompanied by its two PISE implementation plans has facilitated the adoption of a programmatic approach to the sector (from 2001 onwards) with close donor involvement and coordination in planning, monitoring and financing of the plans. Fourteen bilateral and multilateral donors supported the PRODEC. The PISE plans have provided a coherent and exhaustive framework that has been fine tuned with the donors supportive of the sector; financing plans (MTEF) were planned taking account of likely donor commitments to the sector and activities could thus be scoped accordingly. Harmonisation was further stepped up in 2006 when four donors adopted SBS to PISE II (see below).

4.16 The upcoming study on Sector Budget Support in Practice in the education sector in Mali (ODI, Mokoro 2009) provides a comprehensive update on the existing budgeting instruments used in the education sector in Mali, and outlines their lack of alignment, further challenged by the decentralisation process. (ODI, Mokoro, 2009 p.10)

### Box 4.2 : Planning and budgeting in the education sector

There are three main instruments used in the budget formulation process – the MTEF, Annual Work plans and the Annual Budget. The sector's financial programming situation is complex, with weak links between the three documents and PISE:

- ⇒ the sector MTEF elaborated for 2001-05 and updated for 2006-08 provides the general framework for the financing of the sector; it includes total public expenditure (including donor commitments) estimated to be required to implement the education policy at all education levels and by all executing levels. The MTEF reflects the priorities established in the PISE but is not a direct translation of it: it is presented as 6 programmes as opposed to the PISE's 4 components, the links between components and programmes remaining unidentified.
- ⇒ the Annual Workplans are the detailed activity based operational plans for different sector institutions. Each executing agency's AWP is an annual translation of activities required to implement the PISE; its cost is thus the investment effort required to implement the education sector strategy, including hard core investment and operational costs of these investments,

<sup>13</sup> The SARPE is a temporary alternative teacher training scheme that was initially due to last only during PISE I, and was then extended to PISE II, its length being extended from 3 to 6 months

and does not include recurrent costs such as staff salaries or normal operating costs. Although logically the AWP cost should thus fall within the MTEF's financial ceiling for investment costs, in practice (see 2007) this is not often the case as the AWP is the result of an aggregation of different levels' AWP which have been elaborated at a time when yearly budget ceilings are not necessarily yet available or passed down to the lower levels. The AWP, likewise to the MTEF, includes items for which donor financing has been identified but is not guaranteed. The 2008 AWP for the first time made an attempt at clarifying the link between the MTEF, the budget and the AWP.

- ⇒ Finally, the annual budget (submitted to the ministry of finance and the Parliament), is the legal basis for budget implementation. The annual budget bears no obvious relationship with either the MTEF or the AWP. It includes the recurrent budget (salaries and normal operating costs) and only part of the AWP since it only includes identified and secured investment funding (investment financed on national resources and on existing donor financing).

Major discrepancies in financial figures between the MTEF, the AWP and the Budget thus appear: to illustrate, figures for 2008 showed the voted budget at FCFA 186 billion, the AWP at 94.4 billion, amounting, after addition of recurrent budget, to FCFA 221 billion and the MTEF (dated September 2007) at FCFA 211 billion.

The move towards decentralisation in 2006 has been reflected in budget formulation and execution. Education sector PFM is gradually moving from a highly centralised system to a more deconcentrated and decentralised system. Activity planning and budget programming were deconcentrated in 2006, when the process was transformed from a top-down to a bottom-up ('ascending') approach. Activity work plans (AWP) are prepared then gradually aggregated by the communities, the 70 district CAP, 15 regional AEs and 6 central directorates, and finally costed and aggregated by the ministry's planning and statistical unit (CPS) into one document; the AWP's costs only include the financing of PISE activities (and exclude salaries and normal operating costs). The budget is determined by the Administrative and financial director (DAF) on the basis of (i) carrying forward of salaries of existing staff and operating costs, (ii) determination of costs of new staff and (iii) cost of AWP.

Budget execution has been devolved from the Ministry of Finance (MoF - main authorising officer) to the technical Ministers (secondary authorising officer) who have appointed their DAF as delegated secondary authorising officers. Since the 2007 deconcentration, a part of the education (operational) budget falls directly under the regional budget of which the regional governor is secondary authorising officer with delegation of powers to the regional budget director whilst the regional treasury acts as financial controller of budget execution. Activities of educational administrative/professional staff at field level thus depend on regional funding being made available. This change from the earlier centralised funding channels through the MoE has at times (according to anecdotic evidence) led to blockages as monies were not made available despite authorisation to spend having been received thus creating a backlog of activities. It is true that educational activities now have to compete for funds within the regional pool of funds and at times of tight cash flow educational funding may be penalised if other funding priorities arise; however, overall, Mali's budgetary funding from national resources is considered to be reliable and such occurrences would thus be limited. The reliability of donor funding, at least within the education sector seems to have only seriously failed in 2007. Since 2007 the share of the education budget targeted for primary school construction falls directly under the local communities' budgets which are executed by the presidents of the district councils through the ANICT and information on the flow of funds, their timing and their use appears to be less easily available than when it was all centralised at the Education Ministry's headquarters.

*Source: ODI, Mokoro 2009*

4.17 The period between 2000 and 2006 saw dramatic increases in expenditure and a steady shift in the share of recurrent expenditures towards primary education, allowing increased recruitment of teachers and increases in operational funding. Mali's education budget quadrupled between 1995 and 2005; its share increased from 16% of total public expenditure in 2000 to 22.7% in 2006 and from just over 3% of GDP in 2000 to 5.3% in

2006. However, education expenditures fell back strongly in 2007 due to a sharp shortfall in donor project financing (only 10% of planned donor project financing materialised), falling short of MTEF planned levels by almost half. Thus, investment expenditure was hit particularly hard in 2008. The situation did not recover in 2008, as external funding levels were projected to remain low. (ODI, Mokoro 2009) Table 4.1 presents an overview of the evolution of education expenditure since 1995.

**Table 4.1 : Evolution of the Education budget over time**

Education sector expenditure	in millions of FCFA								in % of total						
	1995	2000	2004	2005	2006	2007 plan'd	2007 real'd (1)	2008 plan'd (2)	1995	2000	2004	2005	2006	2007 real'd	2008 plan'd (3)
<b>Recurrent expenditure</b>	22 602	49 241	82 622	89 199	110 187	119 924	116 765	138 962	n.a.	<b>79%</b>	<b>64%</b>	<b>61%</b>	<b>64%</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>75%</b>
Pre-school	125	438	585	713	1 000				1%	1%	1%	1%	1%		1%
Basic 1st cycle (6-12 yrs)	6 184	16 403	28 937	30 507	42 128				27%	33%	35%	34%	38%		39%
Basic 2nd cycle (12-16yrs)	4 564	9 625	14 673	13 737	15 927				20%	20%	18%	15%	14%		13%
Normal education	564	1 889	3 120	5 619	6 336				2%	4%	4%	6%	6%		5%
Non formal education	201	321	559	892	1 114				1%	1%	1%	1%	1%		3%
General secondary education	3 510	8 310	13 579	13 558	14 389				16%	17%	16%	15%	13%		11%
Technical and vocational education	2 234	4 507	7 679	10 258	13 582				10%	9%	9%	12%	12%		14%
Higher education	5 220	7 748	13 490	13 915	15 711				23%	16%	16%	16%	14%		14%
<b>investment expenditure</b>	n.a.	13 285	46 874	56 435	60 664	99 691	48 109	47 008	n.a.	<b>21%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>25%</b>
National budget (incl ANICT and LA)		2 768	4 685	8 759	9 071	27 820	12 300	5 832		21%	10%	16%	15%	26%	12%
SBS					19 944	21 600	30 092	28 713					33%	63%	61%
Other External financing		10 517	42 189	47 676	31 649	50 271	5 717	12 463		79%	90%	84%	52%	12%	27%
<b>Total</b>	n.a.	<b>62 526</b>	<b>129 496</b>	<b>145 634</b>	<b>170 851</b>	<b>219 615</b>	<b>164 874</b>	<b>185 970</b>							

Note (1): Recurrent expenditure is actuals and investment expenditure is available (of which FCFA 47,545 was executed).

Note (2): Data for 2008 were provided to donors upon request. They include FCFA 5,4 billion education expenditure undertaken by other ministries (Justice, agriculture, Employment, etc.).

Note (3): The breakdown applies to an amount of FCFA 135,575,701 which does not include some expenditure undertaken by other ministries; hence the amounts are not reported in the 2008 column of amounts.

Source: ODI, Mokoro 2009 p.12

4.18 Mali distinguishes itself from other countries in the region with a particular structure of recurrent expenditures per level of education: (i) the share of recurrent expenditures for the primary education level (39% budgeted in 2008) is low in comparison with what is observed in other countries, where an average figure of 49.3% is recorded; (ii) the share of secondary education (second cycle of primary education, secondary general and technical education), which is estimated at 38% in 2008, is high in comparison with other countries (the average value for the 10 countries is 31.3%); and (iii) in accordance with PISE I predictions, there was a relative reduction in the share of higher education as a percentage of total education expenditure - from 23% in 1995 to 14 % in 2008.

4.19 Over the past ten years, budget allocations within education have shifted to primary education: recurrent expenditure on primary education rose from 27.4% of total recurrent education public expenditure in 1995 to 33.3% in 2000, 38.2% in 2006 and 39,2% in 2008 (against 50% benchmark in the Indicative Framework and an average of 49.3% in francophone SSA countries achieved in 2004).

4.20 Regarding the allocation of recurrent expenditures per category, 58.7% of the recurrent budget was devoted to salaries, 29% to operating costs and 12.3% to scholarships and transfers in 2006. (World Bank 2007a)

4.21 The unit cost in the first and second cycles of basic education in Mali is very similar to the average noted in other countries, but there are significant differences at the other levels: (i) the spending per student in higher education is relatively lower (16%) compared to the average in French-speaking countries; and (ii) at the opposite end, the spending per student is much higher (95%) in secondary general (2<sup>nd</sup> cycle secondary in international terms) and in technical and vocational education (76%). Expenditures per pupil in primary have been multiplied by 2.2 between 1995 and 2004. (GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006))

4.22 Half of the education expenditure in 2006 was undertaken at central level, the other half at regional level; recurrent costs were equally divided between the two levels but the majority (65%) of investment costs financed by the national budget were located at regional level whereas 80% of donor financed investments were executed centrally. The donor distribution changed dramatically in 2007 with the coming on stream of budget devolution, supported by SBS funds. The share of investments being devolved to the regions was planned at 47% for 2008.

4.23 Regarding the efficiency of education expenditure, the 2006 Country Status Report (CSR) (GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006)) outlines that there is virtually no relation between education expenditure per school and learning outcomes in this school, whether measured by exam grades or by standardized tests such as the ones carried out by Program of Analysis of Education Systems (PASEC). In addition, due to the average low density of Mali's population, a high number of schools have a small number of pupils that leads to high unit costs (in 2003, 40% of primary schools had less than 100 pupils).

4.24 Finally, an analysis conducted using the 2001 Mali poverty assessment (EMEP) demonstrates that the share of education expenditure covered by families is very high at a low level of education and very low at higher levels - from 46% in pre-school to 17% in primary school, 4% in secondary school and less than 3% in higher education.

## **External financing**


4.25 Mali became eligible for HIPC in 1999, and started receiving resources based on its interim PRSP as soon as 2000. HIPC funds totalled an estimated CFAF 75 billion in 2002-2004. 45% of this amount was allocated to education and adult literacy. (World Bank, 2007b p.xi)

4.26 Figure 4.2 illustrates the evolution of ODA commitments to the education sector in Mali, based on OECD DAC data and using the calculation methods of the Global Monitoring Report produced by United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organisation (UNESCO)<sup>14</sup>. Aid commitments to education and basic education have risen sporadically over the period 1999-2006, peaking in 2006 due mainly to contributions from bilateral donors. There has also been an unsteady decline in the ratio of multilateral to bilateral aid. The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has increased substantially but erratically from 45% to 83% over the period. The most significant donor in terms of aid to education in 2006 was Canada, followed by the Netherlands, commanding a considerable 43% and 29% share respectively and also showing a significant presence over the years. Over the period 1999-2006, France was the most significant donor, closely followed by Canada. The Netherlands, IDA) and the EC also featured in the list of top five donors over the period.

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<sup>14</sup> Total ODA to education includes 20% of GBS commitments, and ODA to basic education includes 10% of GBS commitments, in addition to direct aid to education.


**Figure 4.2 : Total aid to education and aid to basic education (commitment levels), 1999-2006 (constant 2006 USD m)**



Source: OECD DAC data


4.27 Although figures are not comparable, Figure 4.3 provides a more up-to-date situation on levels of external aid to Mali drawn from a recent study on sector budget support in practice (ODI, Mokoro, 2009). It illustrates in particular the increase in the share of SBS funding to the sector since 2006, and the lack of predictability of project support in 2007 (only 10% of commitments materialised).

**Figure 4.3 : Aid to education per aid modality (bn FCFA)**



Source : ODI, Mokoro, 2009

4.28 In terms of aid to basic education, over the course of the period 1999-2006, Canada remains the primary donor to basic education, again followed by the Netherlands, with considerable contributions of 24% and 21% respectively. France has also made consistent contributions over the years, with an 18% share. The United States and IDA have made similar levels of contribution, filling out the remaining top five donors.

**Figure 4.4 : Donor support to basic education, 1999-2006 average**

Source: OECD DAC data

### Education sector dialogue and aid modalities<sup>15</sup>

4.29 In the Mali Education sector, a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) was adopted and effectively made operational from 2001 onwards with the implementation of PISE I: about 15 donors have since then coordinated their support to the framework.

4.30 A consultation framework (*cadre de partenariat*) was set up with PISE I (2001) involving monthly meetings between the MOE and DPs to discuss progress. The group is chaired by the Minister of Education, and donor co-chairs rotate through renewable 6-month terms. In addition thematic groups were set up according to needs (for PISE I there were four with three for each level of education: basic, secondary and high and one for deconcentration /decentralisation of education) and these groups, co-presided by the Director concerned and a DP, were to meet monthly. These meetings are mostly to take decisions on operational, managerial matters and have in practice been less frequent, occurring sometimes only on an *ad hoc* basis. Furthermore, biannual sector monitoring reviews are organised using the same documentation and common performance indicators. Quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports are made available to all donors by the Government during implementation.

4.31 In order to foster harmonisation, a first step was made with the inception of PISE I, through which some donors channel their aid through a special account on which the Ministry applied tailored implementation procedures (similar to a common Project Implementation Unit). Special procedures were laid out in great detail in three manuals covering (i) institutional arrangements and budgetary procedures, (ii) Public procurement, asset management and staff management procedures, and (iii) Financial, accounting and internal auditing procedures. These funds do not follow normal budgetary procedures and thus fall outside the scope of operations that can be monitored and controlled by the Ministry of Finance using its regular system.

4.32 In addition to the funds channelled through this special parallel system, traditional projects implemented by DPs (via a project management units or not) also coexist in the sector: these are not captured by the ministries of education.

<sup>15</sup> Source of this section: ODI, Mokoro 2009

4.33 In the latter period of PISE I implementation, the Netherlands moved away from the PISE funding channel and experimented with direct financing of selected budget lines (earmarked and traceable sector budget support). These funds were channelled through a Special Treasury Account (CAST). A system of real earmarking was employed where spending units claimed back from this account the monies already spent on specific pre-agreed line items, using normal budgetary procedures.

4.34 Although most donors active in the education sector operated in a bilateral fashion, closer cooperation emerged between the World Bank and Belgium (co-financing) and between Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands (the former being in silent partnership with the latter).

4.35 With the move to the second phase of the education programme (PISE II), and in response to the Geneva Round Table in 2004, a group of six donors (Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, France, Canada and Belgium)<sup>16</sup> adopted a form of Sector Budget Support; two of these (France and Canada) still maintain project support in parallel. It must be noted that SBS was thus not as much the result of a natural progression of operating modalities within the sector as an externally driven initiative within the wider context of moving towards budget support decided at the 2004 Geneva Round Table Conference which found a natural place in the two sectors which had progressed furthest in the coordination of donors and the alignment on the national policy and strategy, health and education.

4.36 An overarching SBS education agreement was formulated, setting out a set of common rules. This agreement and the individual financing agreements describe SBS as coming in support of the education sector's 3 year investment programme (PISE II) and thus of its objectives. The Netherlands was the first to sign the SBS framework agreement in 2006, with Norway and Sweden as silent partners. In 2007, three other donors followed suit. France (in 2007) and Canada (in 2008) provided SBS funding alongside their project funding. Belgium (in 2007) moved from supporting a WB funded project to SBS. SBS partners all scheduled their support running up to 2008, the planned end date for PISE II. However this has been delayed and donors will probably bridge the 2009 gap with a temporary stop-gap support of one single year before designing their support to PISE III. (ODI, Mokoro, 2009 p17)

4.37 SBS funds are transferred to the Treasury via regular government procedures, and dialogue and conditions are predominantly focused on the education sector. Unspent funds are automatically reallocated for the following year, in an attempt to ensure funds could be spent exclusively on education expenditure. The SBS funds were intended to support PISE II as a whole (i.e. mostly investments in the education sector), and so were intended to be largely discretionary. However in practice they have been highly earmarked to specific activities within PISE II. Meanwhile, the dialogue and conditions associated with SBS were in principle to focus on the sector as a whole, but a lot of the dialogue ended up focussing on specific, operational issues. (ODI, Mokoro 2009)

4.38 It is estimated that over 2007-2009, SBS represented two thirds of external financing programmed. Out of fifteen donors providing support to the education sector, nine continue providing support in a project modality specific to their institution. Nevertheless, all donors support the education sector programme. (EFA-FTI 2007c)

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<sup>16</sup> SBS donors are usually counted as four because the Netherlands represent Sweden and Sweden in turn represents Norway (both silent partnerships).

**Box 4.3 : Sector budget support**

The upcoming study on Sector Budget Support in Practice (Inception report and draft Synthesis report ODI, Mokoro 2009) provides a clear definition of Sector Budget support, composed of two dimensions: the funding channel, and the sector focus of dialogue and conditions.

Sector Budget Support [is] defined as those aid programmes where:

- *Aid uses the normal channel used for government's own-funded expenditures. Aid is disbursed to the government's finance ministry (or "treasury"), from where it goes, via regular government procedures, to the ministries, departments or agencies responsible for budget execution.*
- *The dialogue and conditions associated with the aid should be predominately focused on a single sector.*

The first dimension (funding channel) sets the boundary between SBS and both Common Basket Funds and conventional projects. The second dimension differentiates SBS and GBS, by defining the scope of the dialogue and conditions associated with SBS.

Within these two broad parameters lies a spectrum of aid modalities. Aid can be earmarked to specific sub-sectors, programmes or expenditures in the budget, or it can be fully un-earmarked. Whilst monitoring, dialogue and conditions may cover the entire sector, they may instead be focused on a specific sub-sector or programme within a sector, too.

Whilst the level of earmarking and focus of dialogue and conditions define the broad spectrum of SBS, it is important to note that other inputs associated with SBS vary (links to the provision of technical assistance and capacity building; specific coordination arrangements).

Finally, it is important to note that within the spectrum of SBS instruments there is scope for significant derogations from government systems. The pure version of fully un-earmarked SBS, consistent with the OECD/DAC definition appears rare. A key design parameter is whether or not SBS funding from donors can be traced through government systems. It is important to note that traceability is associated with a higher burden of transaction costs on the recipient.

Sector Budget Support as currently provided in Mali flows to through the national Treasury account but involves significant derogations from national budget allocation and execution processes (earmarking to education sector – mainly investment, traceability, non respect of yearly budgeting, etc).

*Source: adapted from upcoming Sector Budget Support in Practice study Synthesis report (ODI, Mokoro 2009)*


**Progress towards Education For All**

4.39 Since independence, there have been four main periods in the growth of primary education in Mali. The first (1960-79) saw steady growth of enrolment, the second (1980-85) was marked by falling attendance, the third (1986-90) saw a revival of enrolment that led to a big upsurge during the fourth period (1991-2009), coinciding with the arrival of the Third Republic. At independence, access to education was extremely limited with only 7% of children attending school in 1962. Despite enormous progress in attendance rates, results achieved 30 years later still showed very low attendance (32.8% in 1992), and high regional and gender disparities. The 1990s marked a radical change, with enrolment in the first stage of basic education (primary education) rising from 336,000 in 1989/90 to more than a million in 2000/01, as a result of the great efforts made over a few years. Figure 4.5 clearly shows the upturn, notes the main political events of the period – the start of the Third Republic (1992), the 1994 education law, the start of the 10-year educational reform (PRODEC, 1998) and the 1999 education law. (Lange, 2003)

4.40 Over the past few years, Mali has undergone the most marked increase in access to education amongst sub-Saharan African countries. As a result, and despite considerable population growth (2.6% average annual growth rate during the last decade), Mali has successfully increased access to primary education to 1.5m pupils in 2004/05, increasing

from a Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 27% in 1990/91 to 64.4% in 2002 to 74% in 2005 and to 78% in 2008/09. The PRODEC had set a target of 95% GER in 2010. The Primary Completion Rate (PCR) increased from 25.1% in 1996 to 43.1% in 2005/06 and 53.3% in 2007/08. Main drivers behind this evolution have been the liberalisation of education (which allowed the strong increase in community and private schools – see 4.42 below), and a significant increase in school construction and teacher recruitment.

**Figure 4.5 : Evolution of primary education enrolment 1960-2000**



4.41 Although significant, the continuation of the current trend in primary enrolment will be insufficient to reach Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015. It is estimated (Pole de Dakar, 2007) that it would allow to reach 69% completion of the first cycle of basic education in 2015.

4.42 In addition, despite clear progress, the education sector still faces some challenges. Disparities persist in primary education. Most of the expansion was due to growth in the three non-public systems which represented overall 20% of enrolments in 1996 and increased to 37% in 2005: (i) private, for-profit schooling (9%); (ii) madrassahs (11%) and, especially, (iii) community schools (17%). Due to a lack of public school facilities, 17 % of students attend community schools that are financed mainly by donors and by poor parents from the lowest income households. The growth of community schools has slowed recently, with a decline in government, USAID and World Bank funding. The madrassah system has had relatively flat enrolment. Its growth in numbers is largely a statistical artefact, since most madrassahs were not officially recognized prior to 1998. (World Bank, 2007 p.12)

4.43 Moreover, as regards enrolment, the gender gap remains high and fell only slightly between 2001/02 and 2007/08. The Gender Parity Index decreased moderately from 0.71 to 0.83 (it was 0.82 in 2005/06) for Gross Enrolment in Primary, and from 0.65 in 2005/06 to 0.70 in 2007/08 for primary completion. For some indicators the gap between girls and boys increased since 1996 (such as completion rates of primary education where the gap increased from 13.8 points to 18.6 points between 1996 and 2005). Strong regional disparities also persist with enrolment rates in rural areas remaining less than half of those in the urban centres and some regions such as Gao, Kayes, Kidal and Tombouctou showing

much lower scores than other regions whether in terms of access or performance such as repeat rates or completion rates. (ODI, Mokoro 2009) See Annex C for further detail.

4.44 In terms of quality, primary education is constrained by a lack of qualified teaching staff: the pupil/teacher ratio remains high at 57 in 2002 (down from 78 in 1996), 54 in 2005 and 65 in 2008/09, and with strong inequalities between regions. The high level of repetition has hindered further progress of the primary completion rate, although they have decreased in recent years from (17% to 14.2% in primary and 23.9% to 16.9% in lower secondary between 2004/05 and 2007/08)<sup>17</sup>. The most disappointing outcome of primary education since 2006 appears to be the result of a survey on the quality of education realised in 2007: testing on learning assessments it was found that less than half the pupils of 6th year have acquired basic science, maths and technology skills whilst a quarter of these pupils had still not acquired minimum language and communication skills. After 2 years of basic schooling, 61% of pupils had not yet acquired minimal skills in sciences, maths and technology and 51% of them had not acquired the minimum standards of reading and communication skills, with no improvements since 2005. According to (Pole de Dakar, 2007), the average level of learning acquisition in Mali is among the lowest in the sub-region.

4.45 The 2005 RESEN/Country Status Report (GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006)) outlines that the policy based on classroom construction, teacher recruitment and distribution of textbooks over the past few years is reaching its limits, and more emphasis should be put on demand-side constraints. Household surveys show that in 2003, although distance to school is a constraint to school enrolments, only 70% of children living within 15min walk of a school actually attend school. It also outlines that key challenges for the future of the education sector in Mali include management of flows of pupils between basic and upper secondary education, and better alignment of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and general secondary education outputs with needs identified in the labour market; and a more equitable teacher salary policy among the different existing status for teachers, which balances the need for increased teacher recruitment with financial sustainability.

4.46 In secondary education private schools provide a large share of intakes (one third of enrolments in general secondary education and two-thirds in vocational and technical secondary education are in private sector). The public sector was unable to respond to demand and also unsuccessful in stemming the flow of pupils from primary to secondary education: enrolment rates for the 12-16 years old doubled during 1996-2005 from 15.6% to 33.1%. Similarly, in higher education the intake of students has risen by 17% annually since 1996. Secondary and higher education remain highly inefficient with unit costs in the public facilities being up to 10 and 20 times higher than in primary education and inequitable since 10% of most educated students use up 47% of education public resources whilst parents still pay a large part of contractual teachers' salaries in community schools.

4.47 Pre-primary enrolment increased steadily between 1996 and 2004 reaching 2% Gross Enrolment Rate, and 46% of pupils were enrolled in private institutions in 2003.

4.48 Non Formal education is carried out by *Centres d'Alphabétisation Fonctionnelle* (CAF – Functional Literacy centre), *Centres d'Education pour le Développement* (CED – Education Development centre) and *Centres d'Apprentissage Féminins* (CAFE – Women Learning Centre). Between 1996 and 2005, number of people attending non formal education increased by 5% annually on average.

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<sup>17</sup> Decreasing repetition rates seem to be the result of a concerted policy to fight against high repetition rates, including teaching in local languages, catch up classes, reduction in double shifting and strengthening of school feeding schemes, as well as the use of experienced teachers in Primary

4.49 Despite the progress in delivery of education in Mali, less a quarter of the population is literate. It is important to put educational levels in context. At 36.7% Mali's combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment rate is 164th out of 172 countries<sup>18</sup>. (ODI, Mokoro, 2009 p.7)

4.50 Annex B presents an overview of education input, output and outcome indicators.

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<sup>18</sup> Source: Human Development Report 2007-2008, data concern the year 2005.

## 5 Overview of the FTI in Mali

### FTI endorsement

5.1 Mali's request for endorsement by the FTI is based on its "Proposed action plan for the accelerated implementation of PISE II for Universal Primary Education" (GoM 2006a). This document was discussed with the local donor group and shared with donor headquarters several times between May and July 2006, and integrated their comments and observations. It was adopted by the Cabinet meeting in June, and an official request was sent out to all education donors in August 2006 for formal endorsement of the plan.

5.2 An independent assessment of the plan was carried out by a consultant. It assesses the degree of consultation, alignment with FTI Indicative Framework (IF) benchmarks, relevance, feasibility and key issues with proposed policies, analyses the proposed financing framework and recommends endorsement by donors (Education donors 2006b).

5.3 The local education donor group (AfDB, Germany, Canada, WB, Unicef, USAID, France, WFP, UNDP, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, UNESCO, European Commission, and Switzerland) endorsed the plan and request, and recommended support from the FTI Catalytic Fund to finance the financing gap for primary education (first cycle of basic education) of FCFA 12.4bn (approximately USD23.5m) over 2006-2008<sup>19</sup> in an endorsement letter addressed to the FTI Secretariat in November 2006 (Education Donors, 2006).

### Catalytic Fund support

5.4 The background document prepared by the FTI Secretariat for the CF included a recommendation for an allocation from the CF of USD 8.7m over the two-year period 2007-2008, and outlined the preferred modality being Sector Budget Support. In this document, the FTI Secretariat recommends that the Expanded Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee responds to the detailed analysis that was conducted in Mali by providing a bridging allocation of USD 8.7million for the period 2007-2008, with the justification that "This would reduce risks of potential future disincentive for the local education partners in Mali or elsewhere, to conduct proper analysis and negotiation and produce a reasonably costed plan." (EFA-FTI 2007c). No explanation is provided as to why the proposed allocation is lower than the requested USD 23.5m.

5.5 The FTI CF allocated USD 8.7m (FCFA 4.35bn) to Mali for 2007-2008 during its meeting in Bonn in May 2007. No further information is available on the calculation of the amount allocated to Mali by the CF. The minutes of the Bonn meeting (EFA-FTI, 2007) outline that "The Strategy Committee asked what the impact of a CF grant to Mali would be, considering that the country did not seem to face "exceptional limitations" in funding for the education sector thanks to the presence of many donors. The World Bank responded that a CF grant would have a direct impact on access to school, as it would allow hiring more contractual teachers and building new schools. The Strategy Committee also asked which funding modality would be used in Mali, and how resources for primary education could be protected if general budget support was used. The World Bank said that the final modality would still need to be agreed at the country level, as donors are using various modalities currently. The World Bank also assured that the share of primary education in the budget would continue growing but cautioned against imposing a fast pace to the country which could lead to student unrest."

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<sup>19</sup> In reality the request identified a financing gap for primary education covering 2007/08 and 2008/09

5.6 Following the Bonn meeting, the head of the FTI Secretariat informed the lead donor (France) of the CF Strategy Committee approval through a letter dated July 2007, asking local donors to “move forward with the dialogue with the Government in consultation and collaboration with the local development partners, including the World Bank as appropriate, to reach agreement on activities to be financed under the CF grant” and informing them that “a ‘CF Programme Document’ template is currently being developed. This document, to be used by the Government with inputs from the local partners, will be shared with you before the end of July.” Box 6.1 below provides further details on the role of Mali in the development of the CF programme document template.

**Box 6.1 : Mali’s input to the CF programme document template**

The September 2007 CF Strategy Committee meeting was presented the proposed new CF programme document by the WB team working on Mali. Minutes of the meeting (EFA-FTI, 2007a) present lessons drawn by the World Bank Mali Country Team on the proposed programme document template, including suggestions for improvements in order to minimise transactions costs and ensure alignment with country processes: “*the overall objective is to avoid parallel processes and to maximize efficiency by not repeating what has already been done*”. The December 2007 FTI Catalytic Fund Status Report (EFA-FTI, 2007b) highlights that “*based on the Mali experience, (...) streamlined CF operations guidelines were prepared and shared with other Bank Task Team Leaders.*”

Source: EFA-FTI 2007a and 2007b

5.7 Following the discussions at local level, an agreement was reached between the WB, local donor group and Government of Mali to use a project modality and not SBS, mainly to ensure adequate earmarking to the primary education sub-sector as it was assumed this was required to access FTI CF funding. See section on FTI and aid effectiveness for more details.

5.8 In November 2007, the local donors, representatives of the WB and of Government held discussions around the proposed grant agreement and project document (GoM 2007), which led to precisions in particular on procurement of textbooks (additional requirement for the precise list of textbooks to be procured, procurement plan for textbooks). It was also decided that complementary training on national and IDA procurement procedures could be supported either by the WB or by another DP. (GoM 2007)

5.9 In December 2007, the WB and GoM signed the grant agreement for the USD 8.7m. It was to be implemented in accordance with the Project Implementation Manual (PIM) used for the WB projects (World Bank, 2007). The project consists of the following components:

- (a) Increasing the quality of basic education, through: (i) supplying textbooks and teacher guides to primary schools; (ii) implementation of the Direct Support to Improve School Productivity Scheme (Appui direct à l'amélioration des rendements scolaires, ADARS) through the provision of grants for the purchase of school supplies to schools in the first cycle of basic education which have an operational School Management Committee; and (iii) in-service training for the certification of community school teachers.
- (b) Increasing the equity in access to education through the construction and equipment of new classrooms for the first cycle of basic education in rural areas in the regions of Sikasso, Kayes, Mopti, and Segou and in nomadic areas. (World Bank 2007a)

5.10 Table 5.1 provides a summary of estimated project costs per component and an update on expenditure levels as of April 2009

**Table 5.1 : Summary of Estimated Project Costs**

<b>I. Improving the quality of basic education</b>	<b>USD</b>	<b>Spent as of April 2009</b>	<b>% execution</b>
(i) Increasing reading practice - Provision of 229,721 textbooks and 30,738 teacher guides	\$1,600,000	\$0	0%
(ii) Support to 3,000 School Management Committees	\$1,400,000	\$366,897	26%
(iii) Training of 1,000 community school teachers	\$700,000	\$687,557	98%
<b>II. Increasing access to education</b>			
School construction (300 classrooms) and equipment in basic education	\$5,000,000	\$0	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$8,700,000</b>	<b>\$2,238,802</b>	<b>31%</b>

Source: World Bank 2007a and World Bank 2009b

5.11 Table 5.2 below summarises initial estimates of project disbursements on CF support to Mali and provide an update on disbursements to date.

**Table 5.2 : Contributions from the Catalytic Fund (current USDm)**

	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>Total</b>
CF Allocations (as of May 2007)	2.5	6.2	0	0	<b>8.7</b>
Updated forecast in April 2009 CF Status Report	0	2.2	4.3	2.2	<b>8.7</b>
Disbursements	0	2.2	0	0	<b>2.2</b>

Source: Fast Track Initiative, Catalytic Fund and (EFA-FTI, 2009)

5.12 In March 2009, a World Bank Mission was carried out to review the implementation of both the IDA project in support of the education sector in Mali (PISE 2) and the FTI CF project. The aide-memoire mentions in particular the necessity to speed up disbursements of the FTI CF project before end-2009, in order to facilitate Mali's application for a second round of funding from the Catalytic Fund.

## **Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) support**

5.13 The following EPDF activities show Mali as a beneficiary - corresponding to a total of less than 200,000 USD (mainly through regional programmes) - (EFA-FTI 2007d, 2008c) :

- Funding to support Education International, the umbrella organization for teacher unions, to support follow-up work to the November 2004 Bamako conference on "Professional Development of Non-Civil Servant Teachers"
- Funding to support the World Bank co-hosted "School Fee Abolition Initiative: Planning for Quality and for Financial Sustainability Conference" with Unicef, held in June 2007 in Bamako, Mali.
- Funding to support the organisation of the September 2007 African Ministerial Forum on Literacy in Bamako, Mali
- Funding to support Mali's participation to a Capacity Development workshop on "Country Leadership and Implementation for Results in the EFA-FTI Partnership" in Tunis in December, 2007
- 2008 support to preparation of Education Sector Plan / Catalytic Fund programme (not specified)

5.14 More recently, the possibility is also mentioned (World Bank 2009b) that EPDF funds be used to further develop the sub sector of early childhood development, through financing (i) an assessment of the sub-sector; (ii) technical support to the MEBALN team preparing the PISE III section on early childhood development; (iii) the conception of a community based early childhood development pilot project for rural areas. It is not clear whether EPDF funds were used to finance the on-going Country Status Report, which should serve as a basis for the development of PISE III and a potential future CF request from Mali.

## 6 Key Issues

### FTI and Education Policy and Planning

#### Context and non-FTI inputs

6.1 Mali had already a well developed education planning framework before FTI endorsement: the PRODEC provides the overarching strategic framework 1998-2008 (extended to 2010), while the PISE I and II provide the operational implementation plan respectively for 2001-2005 and 2006-2008. These plans were prepared in a highly participative manner (Education donors, 2006b), involving extensive consultations with civil society and development partners. The PRODEC was developed with strong support from the World Bank in 1996 and 1997.

6.2 Chapter 3 provides further details on education planning in Mali, in particular on key policy orientations of the PRODEC and PISE such as decentralisation of the education sector in particular regarding teacher management and school construction, recruitment of contract teachers and enhanced teacher training, progressive privatisation of textbook preparation and distribution, and operationalisation of the fee free education policy through increased transfers to school level.

6.3 Box 6.1 below summarises the findings of an evaluation of World Bank assistance to primary education in Mali covering the period 1990 to 2005 (World Bank, 2007b), and provides valuable background on the World Bank's contribution to the sector planning and policy, before it became the Supervising Entity for the CF funding to the country. The findings of this evaluation are particularly useful in separating the influence of the World Bank on policy discussions from the influence of the FTI, in particular on issues of teacher training, recruitment of contract teachers, teacher salaries or double shifting. It is also important to note a key issue in relation to the image of the World Bank in the education sector, which has an indirect influence on the image of the FTI in Mali since the WB is the Supervising Entity for CF funding: "The adjustment program had a very negative and pervasive effect on the opinions of Malians towards the Bank Education was a central part of Mali's Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), and related conflict with student and teacher unions resulted in violence, system-wide strikes and, in some cases, long-lasting enmity towards the Bank" (World Bank, 2007b p.3)

#### **Box 6.1 : Evaluation of the World Bank assistance to primary education in Mali**

Bank support had a strong effect on Mali's GER, which increased from 26% in 1990 to 71% in 2004. The most important activities [influenced by the World Bank] were the: (i) creation of the FAEF (Basic Education Support Fund [which contributed to the development of community schools]); (ii) introduction of double shift teaching; (iii) redeployment of teachers from administrative positions to classroom teaching positions; and (iv) emphasis on the recruitment of contract teachers. In addition, the Bank's leadership of policy dialogue in the mid 1990s encouraged new donors to contribute to the sector.

Prior to the beginning of PRODEC, the Bank was minimally involved in educational quality issues, other than its emphasis on resources for teaching and learning materials and the recruitment of pedagogic advisors. Since 1998, the Bank has contributed to improving educational quality by (i) financing textbooks, (ii) recruiting pedagogic advisors from among experienced teachers, (iii) supporting curriculum reform and associated teacher professional development, and (iv) supporting the expansion of the bilingual education reform. (p.xii)

The Bank's interventions have not been effective at improving classroom-level conditions or student learning. Investments were made in very relevant areas (textbooks, teacher education, school health), but procurement delays and the focus on the central level rather than the service delivery level have kept these investments from having a substantial impact. The efficacy of Bank support

was also lessened by contradictions in policy recommendations and project financed activities.

Structural adjustment measures reduced the number of teachers in the sector. Recruitment of contract teachers was poorly organized and their training was scarcely supported by the Bank. The Bank advised the GoM to introduce double shift teaching, which permitted rapid increases in enrolment but decreased instructional time per student, which is a major factor in student achievement. In the early 1990s, the Bank pressed the GoM to limit access to teacher education to high school graduates, but the reluctance of graduates to enter teaching resulted in the near closure of the teacher education programme. The GoM recruited contract teachers with little pre-service teacher education and struggled without Bank support to provide them with short-term training. This decreased salary expenditures, but had a major negative impact on educational quality.

Lastly, the use of national languages as a medium of instruction was supported by the World Bank in the mid-70s and then dropped until 2000. Similarly, pre-service teacher education, initially supported heavily by the Bank, went through a long period of neglect and hostility that resulted in the closing of much of the country's pre-service teacher education programme. Only under the [PISE] did the Bank begin to rethink its decisive earlier move away from pre-service teacher education; no significant reform has yet occurred. (p.xiii)

Source: World Bank, 2007b

## FTI inputs

6.4 The FTI endorsement led Government of Mali to prepare an “accelerated action plan to achieve Universal Primary Education” (GoM, 2006a). Efforts to ensure alignment with the Indicative Framework (IF) benchmarks<sup>20</sup> led to extensive discussions on issues related to teacher remuneration, teacher training, contact hours, etc. CF funding provided support focused on: teacher training, provision of textbooks, school construction and financial support to schools (see details in Chapter 4). Finally EPDF funding is expected to contribute to the PISE III, in particular through funding specific support to the Early Childhood Development section (see 5.14).

## Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency

6.5 Although the action plan for accelerating process towards UPE is based on existing documents and strategies (PRODEC, PISE, PRSP, Country Status Report), it required extensive revision of the PISE objective and financing framework. The rationale for developing a parallel strategy to existing ones is (i) to “present some elements from existing planning documents following a format that is more closely aligned to the format for the request to the FTI” (GoM 2006a – translation by author<sup>21</sup>); (ii) to ensure alignment with IF benchmarks.

6.6 The action plan for accelerating progress toward UPE (GoM 2006a) included revised objectives compared to the objectives defined in the PISE II (see Table 6.1 below). As outlined in the GoM action plan, new measures were taken in order to reach these more ambitious targets, in particular in terms of teacher training and recruitment, classroom construction, and stimulation of demand.

6.7 As outlined in the external evaluation carried out in view of the endorsement of the plan by local donors (Education donors, 2006b), this “acceleration” of PISE II objectives may have led to a lack of realism and excessive ambition compared to the PISE II objectives which had been widely shared and discussed with partners and civil society. Although the “acceleration” of objectives is in line with the IF benchmarks, with the requirement for

<sup>20</sup> Pupil–teacher ratio in publicly-financed primary schools; average annual salary of primary school teachers; annual instructional hours

<sup>21</sup> « reprendre certains de ces éléments dans une logique de présentation qui réponde le plus possible aux normes de requête de la Fast Track Initiative »

additional funds and with the definition of the financing gap, it seems that it may not be entirely relevant with the existing capacity for implementation (teacher training, school construction), nor with the alignment with existing plans and objectives. It is significant that in the letter from the education donor group to the FTI Secretariat, mentioned is made of the fact that “taking into account the reality of Mali’s situation, (...) available financing and existing capacity, the Government has set itself realistic objectives, for example achieving a Primary Completion Rate of 82% in 2015”, which is the objective of the PISE II and not of the action plan for accelerating progress towards UPE.

6.8 The fact that the objective of designing a plan to “accelerate progress towards UPE” specifically in order to support the request for FTI endorsement has led to un-realistic planning is at odds with the FTI objective to support the development of “credible plans”. It also raises key issues with regard to the understanding of the FTI objectives and requirements by the local donor group and the validity of the endorsement since the “action plan to achieve UPE” was both required and endorsed by local donors with full understanding that this plan was additional to the existing plans and was less realistic. In any case, the reference use in reviews remains the PISE II objectives and not the objectives of the action plan for accelerating progress towards UPE (even in reviews related to the FTI CF funding, for example in World Bank 2009b).

**Table 6.1 : Comparison of PISE II objectives and objectives of the action plan for accelerating progress towards UPE**

	2006 baseline	2008		2015	
		PISE II	UPE/FTI	PISE II	UPE/FTI
Gross enrolment rate	72.2%	80%	88%		105%
Access in Primary 1	67.6%	82.2%	88.9%	90%	100%
Primary completion rate	43.2%	56.4%	62.8%	82.5%	100%
Repetition rate	18.6%	13.7%	13.7%	5%	5%

*Source: Education donors, 2006b*

6.9 Discussions around the Indicative Framework benchmarks raised key issues in relation with Mali’s education policy choices. Table 6.2 below provides an assessment of Mali’s situation vis-à-vis IF benchmarks in 2004, drawn from the Country Status Report carried out in 2005 (GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006)). In grey are outlined the key areas where Mali diverges from IF benchmarks, which served as a focus for policy discussions between the World Bank and GoM since 2004: budget allocations to primary education, repetition rates, number of teachers and teacher salaries. The IF can be considered as an FTI input since it was developed in the framework of the design of the FTI. Nevertheless it should be noted that these discussions were held often before Mali sought endorsement by the FTI and not specifically in relation with the endorsement process, mainly under the leadership of the World Bank.

**Table 6.2 : Mali's situation vis-à-vis IF benchmarks in 2004**

	FTI Indicative Framework	Mali - 2004
<b>Mobilisation of domestic resources for primary education</b>		
Domestic revenue collection in % of GDP	14%	14.4%
% of domestic revenue going to education sector	20%	21.3%
% of education recurrent expenditure going to primary	50%	34.9%
<b>Organisation of education services in primary education</b>		
Repetition rate	10%	18.6%
Pupil-teacher ratio	40:1	62:1
Teacher salary (GDP per capita)	3.5	1.0 – 7.3
% of recurrent expenditure outside teacher salaries	33%	32%

Source: GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006) p.93

6.10 Other key issues discussed in the framework of the FTI endorsement include the extension of contact hours through the increased length of the school year by 3 additional weeks and the planned reduction of the repetition rate (from 18.6% to 5% in 2015). The latter involves key measures such as the suppression of repetitions within each of the two year cycles in primary; the shift to teaching in local languages in pre primary and during the first three years of primary school; and other measures related to improving quality of education, in particular in terms of pupil-teacher ratio and number of textbooks per pupil.

6.11 The recruitment of contract teachers was one of the policies aimed at reducing the average teacher salaries as a proportion of GDP per capita. Box 6.2 below provides an update on the historic of contractual teachers in Mali and on the effectiveness of this measure in terms of enrolment of additional pupils in basic education.

**Box 6.2 : The recruitment of contract teachers and the issue of teacher salaries in Mali since 1992**

In 1980, civil service teachers were earning about 13 times GDP per capita.

The recruitment of contract teachers began in 1992, and Mali currently hires three kinds of teachers: (i) contract teachers with short-term (3 months) pre-service teacher education; (ii) contract teachers with long-term pre-service teacher education; and (iii) community teachers, hired directly at school level. Contract teachers recruited were offered a salary equivalent to 2.1 times the 2000 GDP per capita.

Between 1998 and 2002, contract teachers represented 86% of new teachers recruited. Between 1992 and 2004, Mali recruited approximately 11,500 contract teachers, which had a significant effect on increased enrolments. CONFENMEN estimates that by 2001, it had allowed the enrolment of 100,000 additional pupils in basic education. It also outlines that analyses show better achievements of pupils taught by contract teachers than pupils taught by civil servants.

At the beginning of 2002, under pressure from teacher unions and in order to avoid excessive turnover, GoM decided to increase contract teacher salaries by almost 100%. This measure resulted in a faster budgetary increase than projected for basic education, as well as a substantial increase in the funding amounts needed to reach EFA goals.

In 2004, civil servant teachers represented only 34% of teachers in basic education, and received an average salary equivalent to 7.5 times GDP per capita, while contractual teachers represent 12% of the teacher workforce in basic education and their average salary is equivalent to 4.7 times GDP per capita, and community school teachers received the equivalent of 1 time GDP per capita from the state (additional contributions coming from Parents associations) and represented more than 28% of the number of basic education teachers.

The Country Status Report outlines that Mali is one of the countries in the region where the proportion of civil servant teachers is the lowest (48% average in other countries in the region), and where both civil servant and contractual teachers' salary in terms of GDP per capita is the highest.

It is now foreseen that all new recruits (non civil servants) will be paid an average salary equivalent to 4.8 times GDP per capita until 2015 (as outlined in the 2006-2008 MTEF). It is also planned that community school teachers will receive a state contribution raised to 1.4 times GDP per capita until 2015. These measures should lead to an average teacher salary of 4.6 times GDP per capita in 2015.

The main risks as outlined by the evaluation of the request to the FTI are increased inequalities between teachers, lack of attractiveness and high turnover for community teachers. This concern led donors to suggest increasing the salaries paid by the State to community school teachers to 1.6 times GDP per capita during the discussions on the request to FTI, or to align their salaries with that of contractual teachers in the medium term (Education Donors 2006) but the choice was made to increase their salary to 1.4 times GDP per capita only.

*Source: WB 2007b; CONFENMEN 2004; Education Donors 2006 and 2007; GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006)*

6.12 FTI CF support is also relevant to the needs and objectives identified in Mali's PISE II, in particular in terms of school constructions, support to direct grants to schools (Appui Direct à l'Amélioration des Rendements Scolaires – ADARS) in order to reduce school fees, which represent one of the most important barriers to school attendance amongst the poor populations and should enhance the quality of service delivery, training of community teachers, and provision of textbooks.

6.13 In terms of what was actually achieved through CF funding, 1000 community teachers were trained in 2008 (World Bank 2009b), nevertheless, the total number of teachers trained annually still falls short of the needs identified in PISE II. With regards to direct grants to schools, weaknesses in the systems of monitoring and reporting led to delays in the funds reaching the schools and potentially higher fiduciary risks. Finally, classroom construction and purchase of textbooks to be financed by the FTI CF have not been executed as of April 2009, mainly in relation to procurement processes and failed tender procedures. This slow execution rate for key components of the project – partly related to unrealistic planning (see 5.11) and partly to procurement procedures – has hampered its effectiveness.

6.14 Key issues arise as to the potential effectiveness of the activities funded by the CF, if policy reforms on which they rely are not operational or costs were underestimated. For example, the construction by Government of the planned number of classrooms requires a significant scaling up of the annual rate of school construction by GoM, from 700 to 2350 to achieve the PISE II objectives, and up to 3000 to achieve the action plan to accelerate progress toward UPE's objectives. Main reasons invoked for the insufficient rate of classroom construction during PISE I (approximately 700 classes built per year instead of 1800 envisaged in PISE I) were high unit cost and heavy, centralised procedures. It is planned that accelerated rates should be achieved through the transfer of responsibility for school construction to the decentralised entities (communes), the provision of adequate support to communes for the management of tenders and assessment of offers, and the definition of standards for school equipment. The elaboration of school maps (*cartes scolaires*) for each commune should also contribute to an acceleration of school construction processes. School equipment is to be managed by school management committees, under responsibility of the communes. Nevertheless, as outlined in the evaluation of the FTI request (Education donors, 2006b p. 7), key issues remain in terms of heaviness of procedures, capacity of local companies to carry out the amount of work required, and high construction costs. In addition, the evaluation outlines that unit costs of school constructions have been significantly underestimated (FCFA 5m against 8m), therefore making the objective of building 3000 classes per year highly unrealistic.

6.15 Another example is the provision of textbooks. Various studies (in particular the evaluation of the World Bank support to primary education, World Bank, 2007b p.18)

highlight the fact that previous efforts by donors to support the provision of textbooks have had disappointing results, in particular due to an inefficient distribution system, and lack of teacher training and sensitization on the use of textbooks.

6.16 Regarding to the sustainability of existing efforts to accelerate progress towards UPE main risk areas include (i) inequalities created by the multiplicity of teacher statuses, potentially leading to lack of motivation or repeated strikes; (ii) lack of communication on most prominent policy decisions leading to a lack of understanding and ownership at local level (e.g. on the suppression of repetition within cycles); (iii) delays in the decentralisation process and lack of capacity at local level; (iv) lack of control of student flows at secondary level; (v) underestimation of costs for achieving the objectives (school construction, training of local administrations, teacher salaries). (Education donors, 2006b)

## **FTI and the Financing of Education**

### **Context and non-FTI inputs**

6.17 Chapter 3 presents a detailed overview of the evolution of education financing in Mali since 2000. Overall, while domestic financing has increased significantly and has increasingly been channelled towards primary education, external financing has evolved sporadically, with a strong shift towards earmarked sector budget support since 2006.

6.18 Key drivers behind this evolution include government commitment as illustrated by the PRSP, donor support and influence, and financing from the HIPC and MDRI savings starting from 2000. The evaluation of World Bank's support to primary education (World Bank 2007b p.35 and p.xii) outlines that "one of the most important outcomes of the Bank's investment in education between 1990 and 2005 was the increase in resources allocated to the education sector, especially the first cycle of basic education [...] The adjustment projects stressed increasing resources for the education sector, and especially for basic education. The Bank took the lead among donors in policy dialogue with the GoM, raising issues such as scholarships, enrolment in upper secondary and higher education, and budget increases and reallocations."

6.19 Furthermore, 42% of HIPC funds were allocated to the education sector from 2000 to 2005. Annual debt relief for 2004 and 2005 is estimated at 30.1 billion CFAF and 29.6 billion CFAF, with 30.3 billion (for both years) going to education, amounting to about 16.5% of the total education budget. (World bank, 2007b p.7)

6.20 The upcoming study on donor incentives to finance education (ODI, 2009) outlines that the main reasons for increased external funding to education – and in particular basic education include international commitments (MDGs, EFA), initial government demand based on strong plans and policies, while and the main constraints are implementation capacity in particular at decentralised level and the recent trend for government demands to shift increasingly toward secondary and vocational education.

6.21 Regarding the calculation of the financing gap, it was done in the PISE II and in view of preparing the 2006-2008 MTEF, in particular in view of mobilising sector budget support which was provided in order to fill the financing gap. "The volume of SBS funding was calculated to cover the funding gap for PISE II implementation, and the amount committed represented 14.4% of PISE II's costs according to the 2006-2008 MTEF" (ODI, Mokoro 2009). This was therefore not related at that time to FTI endorsement or application to CF funding.

## FTI inputs

6.22 FTI has contributed to increased financing of the education sector through the Catalytic Fund financing approved in 2007. This has required the calculation of the financing gap to achieve the objectives outlined in the FTI request (GoM 2006a), which is different from the financing gap calculated in PISE II. It has also provided small amounts of financing through the EPDF, and has supported a shift in domestic resources toward primary education through discussion on the IF benchmarks.

### Relevance, effectiveness, efficiency

6.23 Three financing scenarios were elaborated for the PISE II. The scenario selected was chosen because judged more realistic in terms of financing and of capacity.

#### Box 6.3 : Determination of financing gaps in Mali

The key hypothesis on which the selected scenario are based are:

- Average annual growth rate of the population 3.03% until 2015
- Average annual GDP growth 6%
- Tax/GDP ratio from 14.7% in 2006 to 15% in 2008
- Expenditure of the education sector increasing from 22.5% to 23.5% of revenue
- Gross Enrolment in P1 of 82.2% in 2008 and 90% in 2015
- Completion rate in primary of 56.4% in 2008 and 82.5% in 2015

Input from the Ministry of Finance ensured alignment of the model forecasts with existing economic forecasts, projections on teacher salaries and overall scheme for teacher recruitment and civil service.

An initial financing gap of FCFA 34.9bn was presented to development partners in March 2006, covering the period 2006-2008. Judged excessive, it was subsequently reduced to FCFA 21,6bn (approximately USD 41m) by revising teacher salary forecasts, decreasing subventions to madrasahs, reducing the foreseen increase in secondary enrolment, reducing the rate of transition to secondary, decreasing the percentage of teachers to receive in-service training each year, reducing support to non formal education and literacy.

A second scenario was elaborated taking into account enhanced support to Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET). This scenario resulted in a financing gap of FCFA 43 bn on 2006-2008, later reduced to FCFA 34.9 bn following discussions with the education donors.

A separate scenario was elaborated in the framework of the request to FTI, called the UPE scenario or the “fast track scenario”. It is based on 100% enrolment and completion rates achieved in 2015. It includes in particular an increase in the salary paid by the state to community school teacher from 1 time in 2006 GDP per capita to 3.5 times GDP per capita in 2015.

It also involves a significant increase in the number of teachers, classrooms, textbooks and non formal education as well as vocational training.

The financing need identified through this scenario is FCFA 570 bn over 2006-2008, resulting in a financing gap of FCFA 29 bn, of which a financing gap of FCFA 12.4 bn is identified for primary education (first cycle of basic education). The gap is therefore higher than the initial PISE II estimate by FCFA 8bn. It includes expected donor support, domestic financing to education, and contribution from the decentralized entities (communes).

The evaluation report carried out for the local donor group in view of FTI endorsement raises important issues with regards to the realism of the estimates: (i) school construction costs were significantly underestimated ; (ii) estimates of teacher salaries were underestimated taking into account the fact that they were calculated in the year preceding presidential and legislative elections.

The latter certainly proved right since a 5% increase in civil service wages was decided by GoM for 2008 and 2009.

Finally, a MDG scenario was elaborated by the Ministry of Finance on the basis of the “Millennium Project model”, in order to prepare the Decenal Plan for reaching the MDGs 2006-2015. (GoM

2008b). This scenario estimates the overall cost of achieving the MDGs for each sector, and therefore considers also the required contributions from families, but envisages that their contribution will decrease from 44.7% of the sector financing in 2006 to 10% in 2015. It estimates a financing need for basic education of FCFA 2,515 bn over 2006-2015 (approximately USD 5,032m).

*Source: author, based on (GoM 2006, 2006a, 2007a and 2008b), (Education donors, 2006b), IMF (2008)*

6.24 The “fast track scenario” on which the request is based is relevant in that it assesses the financing needs to achieve UPE in 2015, but the financing gap it outlines is only over 2006-2008. The calculation of a financing gap to achieve UPE (i.e. until 2015) has not fostered any improvement terms of longer term aid commitments from donors (most commitments to the education sector currently end in 2009-2010).

6.25 While the FTI CF contribution was expected to fill the financing gap for primary education of FCFA 12.4 bn over 2006-2008, the World Bank mentions that: “The remaining gap was expected to be financed largely by the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA/FTI) Catalytic Fund, which now appears unlikely in view of a change in EFA/FTI eligibility criteria” (World Bank 2007c p.7). Indeed, the CF support approved is “only” USD 8.7m as opposed to the USD23.5m requested by the local donor group (see Chapter 4).

6.26 As a result, the World Bank adopted an additional funding to its existing PISE II project of USD 15m, and the GoM sought additional support from KfW (World Bank 2007c). The FTI has therefore indirectly contributed to the mobilisation of additional donor support compared to what was expected in PISE II.

6.27 In addition, the question of the definition of the financing gap arises as SBS was initially aimed at filling the PISE II financing gap for the whole sector (USD 41m), and the FTI CF and additional WB and KfW support came in addition to finance the gap for primary education (USD 23m) based on revised objectives – in line with the IF benchmarks but judged unrealistic by most parties and determined outside the participatory process of the PISE II. Frequent revisions of the gap based on different assessments of implementation capacity and financial sustainability (PISE II initial and revised) or on IF benchmarks (FTI request) show the subjectivity of such a concept. Besides, the fact that the financing gap (on which CF allocations are based) was initially calculated initially outside the realm of FTI and access to CF funding could be one of the explanations why Mali has received from the Catalytic Fund the lowest amount per school-age child (USD 4)<sup>22</sup>. (Cambridge Education, Mokoro, OPM (2009), p.192)

6.28 Regarding the mobilisation of domestic resources, FTI had a marginal influence through the Indicative Framework (IF) benchmarks, in particular in highlighting the need to increase the share of resources going to primary education. It increased from 34.9 in 2004 to 37.6 in 2006, and is set to increase to 50% in 2015 (ODI, Mokoro 2009 p.26). This estimate is used as a basis for the calculation of the financing gap and in the dialogue between the Ministry of education and local education donors and the Ministry of Finance. Regarding the other benchmark of allocation of 20% of recurrent expenditure to education, Mali had already reached the benchmark IF value (21.3% in 2006).

6.29 The FTI CF support to Mali has taken the form of a project, in parallel to the existing World Bank project PISE II. The Project Appraisal Document (World Bank, 2007a) mentions that “the opening of a Special Appropriation Account of the Treasury (CAST/EFA-FTI) is required to ensure that the financial resources are used exclusively to fund commitments made in respect of the FTI [...] The CAST/EFA-FTI departs from certain key principles of

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<sup>22</sup> while at the other extreme Guyana has received USD 338 per school-age child from the CF

Mali's Budget Law, in particular the principle of non-appropriation of budget revenues. Indeed, the financial resources allocated to this programme are exclusively targeted to commitments made in respect of the EFA-FTI. This arrangement will be legally authorized through the relevant finance laws, thereby protecting the Donors' resource allocations from budget cuts and ensuring that the CAST/EFA-FTI resources are only used for the implementation of the EFA-FTI. This legal clause aims to allow the payment of various commitments cleared for payment during the previous year and highlights two principles: first, the CAST/EFA-FTI can be carried out only when the funds are available, and second, the CAST/EFA-FTI can be modified by simple decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance without preliminary Parliamentary authorization".

6.30 Despite the fact that the existence of CASTs is foreseen by Mali's public financial management system and is implemented through national systems (managed by the finance department of the Ministry of Education), it creates additional and parallel procedures to the national ones and is not fully aligned with national processes (for example procurement involves a priori no objection by the World Bank (GoM 2007)).

6.31 It should also be noted that CF funding does not use the "most aligned modality" since it does not flow through Treasury like existing SBS. The main reason for this seems to be that SBS funds cover the whole of the education sector (more precisely the whole of PISE II activities) and not only on primary education.

6.32 Another derogation to national procedures is linked to the choice to route funding of primary schools through the ANICT (which is also the case of the Sector Budget Support funds and WB projects) rather than entrust local communities with this responsibility in conformity with the decentralisation policy. Despite the fact that the management of primary school constructions falls under the direct budget of local communities since January 2007, CF funding are channelled through the ANICT<sup>23</sup> instead of falling under normal budgetary execution procedures. This requirement was initially aimed to circumvent possible weaknesses in local communities' financial management capacities.

6.33 The Mali case study on Sector Budget Support in Practice outlines that:

"the choice of SBS donors to use ANICT for managing primary school investment funds rather than entrust local communities with this responsibility in conformity with the decentralisation policy may be seen as holding up the build up of local authorities' capacities in budget management and as a derogation to normal budgetary discipline (the annuality rule and normal budgetary controls no longer apply). It impedes local communities gaining expertise in the financial management area. It also undermines budgetary discipline since:

One of the major features of this system of channelling funds is that the budget annuality rule ceases to apply: funds once within the ANICT can be executed over any number of years and have effectively possibly contributed to the major delays in implementation experienced in 2007 and 2008.

the funds channelled through the ANICT escape normal budgetary control procedures and have introduced a new set of procedures, that created for this purpose in the ANICT-MoE agreement.

There have been delays in the school construction programme since 2006<sup>24</sup> possibly due to (i) late disbursement of SBS funds, (ii) difficult relationships between the MoE, the ANICT and Local Authorities concerning the determination of locations and numbers of schools, information which is necessary for the ANICT to 'redistribute' the funds

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<sup>23</sup> The ANICT (National Investment Agency of the local authorities) handles the financial management function for the local authorities for school classroom construction

<sup>24</sup> Actual delays are not yet measurable for lack of information but no progress at all on school construction was reported in the MoE's 2007 report and figures for 2006 were still not available.

received<sup>25</sup>, (iii) the complex and cumbersome process of channelling funds implying transfers of funds backwards and forwards several times between the centre and the Local Authorities (see ), and (iv) Local authorities not providing the necessary counterpart funds in time to claim their share of the annual budget.” (ODI, Mokoro 2009)

6.34 Box 6.46.3 below provides a summary of the flow of funds for school construction through ANICT.

**Box 6.4 : Flow of Funds to ANICT**

- Funds are transferred to ANICT at central level;
- the ANICT waits for the MoE to inform it of the actual distribution of funds to local communities; once the information is received the ANICT informs local communities who can then start the works;
- for payments (30% advance followed by the balance for payment of services rendered) transfer is made from ANICT central to ANICT regional accounts, from there to the local community's account then to Treasury for payment to the service provider.

Source: based on ODI, Mokoro 2009

6.35 The channelling through the ANICT has also potentially affected the liquidity situation of the treasury and the economy since the monies transferred to ANICT for school construction are effectively contributing to tighten tension on the Treasury's cash situation whilst ANICT puts the monies in its commercial bank account<sup>26</sup>.

6.36 In addition, it should be noted that since PISE II concerns mainly investments, the FTI CF does not really – as it had set out to do – provide support to increase recurrent expenditure in education.

6.37 Key risks to the sustainability of the current efforts to increase financing of the education sector include lack of long term predictability (SBS and projects) and in-year predictability (projects) of aid; lack of alignment with national processes (projects and to a lesser extent SBS); potential impact of the financial crisis and underestimation of costs for school construction and teacher wages. Regarding in particular long term predictability, the upcoming ODI study on donor incentives to finance education (ODI 2009) also mentions the potential effect of the EU donor code of conduct and related requirement for donors to focus on two 'concentration sectors', which may lead some donors such as Netherlands to stop supporting the education sector in Mali, given the high number of donors already involved. While this may potentially have positive impacts in terms of transaction costs, the impact on sector financing should be carefully monitored.

## FTI and the Data Gaps

### Context and non-FTI inputs

6.38 The education partnership framework and SWAp defined a comprehensive monitoring and review process, to which all education donors participate. It includes in particular two joint missions every year:

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<sup>25</sup> Although budget lines for school construction are given in the budget, there is at that time apparently no agreement on which communities should benefit from the school and how many classes are concerned. This information is supposed to be prepared by the MoE on the basis of its school mapping system and passed on to ANICT at the beginning of the budget year but this appears not to be done in a timely fashion.

<sup>26</sup> The measure of this is actually totally unclear as ANICT claims that the Treasury transfers the SBS monies very late in the budget year (not on 1<sup>st</sup> of January as planned) whilst MoF complains about having to pre-finance its transfers to ANICT in advance of the SBS being released to it.

- In May/June, the following is reviewed (i) an assessment of the implementation of the action plan and of the recommendations made in the November mission; (ii) the education budget execution and the PISE II financial management report; (iii) the PISE II monitoring and outcome indicators and the Statistical Yearbook; (iv) the education sector Public Expenditure Review; and (v) the outline of the projected budget for the following fiscal year.
- In November, the following is reviewed: (i) the PISE II annual technical and financial implementation report; (ii) the monitoring and outcome indicators; (iii) the financial and physical audits; and (iv) the updated MTEF, the education budget and the PISE II action plan for the following fiscal year.

6.39 Five thematic commissions have been set up (basic education, secondary education, TVET, higher education and research, and management, planning and decentralization / deconcentration). The PISE Steering Committee is a consultative group chaired by the Secretary-General of the MoE and is composed of the central technical departments.

6.40 The Ministry of Education's Planning and Statistical Unit (CPS) is responsible for: (i) providing support to the Ministry of Education's technical departments, Teaching Academies and the Pedagogical Activity Centres in formulating and implementing their annual work programme, preparing and submitting progress reports, updating the Programme's performance and impact indicators and ensuring that audit reports are conducted and that recommendations are implemented; ii) coordinating the actions of donors and private and public partners; and iii) ensuring the Secretariat of the Cabinet Council and of the PISE II Steering Committee. (World Bank, 2007a).

6.41 In the context of the partner dialogue, SBS donors use a joint matrix of common performance indicators as means of monitoring sector performance. These are contained in donors' sector review aide-mémoire which give better information on achievements of the sector's programmes than the government reports, but remain silent on the financial execution aspects. As a rule financial and technical reports from the education sector exclusively focus on PISE II activities and funding and ignore the recurrent costs of the education sector (salaries and normal operating costs); it is thus very difficult to construct an exhaustive picture of financing in the sector. Unfortunately the monitoring of education expenditure and results for more recent years has become more difficult because of the budget devolution process started with the 2007 budget, and the splitting of the ministry of education (ODI, Mokoro 2009). Box 6.5 below provides a summary of existing monitoring instruments in the education sector.

**Box 6.5 : Monitoring and reporting in the education sector**

*Education statistical yearbook.* The MoE produces an annual education Statistical Yearbook for basic education. This yearbook provides a wealth of information that can be used to monitor inputs and evaluate outputs and outcomes at national and regional levels. Baseline information and key outcome indicators, including school enrolment, admission and retention rates have already been collected and reported, in disaggregated format by gender and by region in order to track disparities. The contents of this Yearbook are being extended to the secondary and higher education levels.

*Financial Monitoring Reports.* Quarterly reports are provided regarding the implementation of each component, centralized at CPS level and submitted to all technical and financial partners for discussion. The format has been agreed upon between the Government and the donors.

*Learning Assessments.* The Ministry of Education has committed to implement a Learning Assessment in basic education every two years to evaluate the improvement of the quality of teaching and learning at classroom level. UNESCO has assisted in the production of a report in 2005 [the Learning Achievement Assessment (PASEC) baseline]. A second report was conducted in 2007 and covered primary education in all regions of the country. A third report is expected to be

completed in 2009.

*Annual ESIP II technical and financial analytical report.* An annual technical and financial analytical report is being produced in the format of a Public Expenditures Review (PER) to enable the monitoring of the effectiveness, efficacy, and efficiency of the system's progress towards reaching the targeted goals. The report analyzes the system in terms of access, quality, implementation, and resource allocation. It makes use of all available documents and reports concerning the sector. Prior to 2006 reporting on the education sector was undertaken yearly in two separate reports, one for the financial status of PISE implementation and one covering activities undertaken and physical achievements of PISE. However, the monitoring of and the reporting on the sector tended to be fragmented by donor projects, thus making it difficult to establish trends of inputs and outputs and obtain an overview of the sector. In 2008 (review of 2007) for the first time the two reports have been combined into one (Rapport de Suivi Technique et Financier) thus potentially facilitating the analysis of linkages between expenditures and results.

*Technical audits and surveys.* The government and the PTFs conduct periodic studies or technical audits on an annual basis focusing on specific issues, including: school construction, textbooks, and school grants and personnel management. A tracking study of educational expenditure should be conducted at least every other year.

Source: World Bank 2007b, ODI, Mokoro, 2009

6.42 The educational statistics system was largely dependent on USAID funding from 1994 to 2000. When USAID funding ended, GoM teams were unable to take over and the system almost stopped functioning. The French Cooperation began funding technical assistance in 2001 and data became available again in 2002-2003. This funding, primarily for technical assistance, is ongoing as of 2005. Permanent technical assistance is also provided through French financing to improve the Statistical Yearbook. Beginning in 2002, the information collection system was progressively decentralized. As of 2005, statistical data were available to all services of the Ministry of education, but underused in decision-making. The statistical unit does not conduct any analysis or disseminate information. Most requests for statistical information come from donors. Statistical information is thus used mainly for post-review, not for planning purposes. There are many consequences of this lack of data use, especially in teacher deployment, school construction and textbook procurement. (World Bank, 2007b p.21)

6.43 One of the objectives of PISE II is to consolidate the various existing databases into an Education Management Information System. The methods for developing and monitoring indicators have been improved owing to the technical assistance provided for the preparation of the Country Status Report and the projection model in order to update Mali's MTEF. The PISE II World Bank project in particular currently supports the development of the EMIS (SIGE: Système Intégré de Gestion de l'Éducation) (World Bank 2009b).

6.44 At the country level, an integrated financial management information system (IFMIS) is being set up by the Ministry of Finance with a local application in each line Ministry to manage the Malian Government's internal resources. This IFMIS includes budgeting, execution and accounting functions and is operated by different participants such as the DNB, the DNTCP and the financial control department. In addition, the MEF has also set up a parallel information system to satisfy the specific needs of the PISE II in terms of financial reporting. (World Bank 2007a). Finally, a 'Schema Directeur de la Statistique' has been adopted in order to enhance the coherence and efficiency of statistical data collection, analysis and publication (GoM 2008a)

## FTI inputs

6.45 The most significant FTI inputs with regards to data and monitoring are the assessment of existing M&E in the appraisal by the local donor group, and the reporting requirements for the monitoring of the CF-funded project. Indirectly, the Indicative Framework may also have influenced the dialogue between donors and GoM even before FTI endorsement.

### Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency

6.46 The grant agreement signed between GoM and the World Bank (World Bank, 2007) states that “The Recipient shall monitor and evaluate the progress of the Program and the Project and prepare [...] Each Program and Project Report shall cover the period of one calendar quarter, and shall be furnished to the World Bank not later than one month after the end of the period covered by such report.” Indicators are detailed in Table 6.3 below.

**Table 6.3 : Performance indicators monitored for the FTI CF project**

Performance Indicators	Baseline (2006)	Target (2008)		Target (2009)	
		Without FTI	With FTI	Without FTI	With FTI
Number of teachers trained	0	2,658	3,658 (+1000)	2,658	3,658 (+1,000)
Number of textbooks and teacher guides supplied		1,115,785	1,115,785 (+0)	939,541	1,200,000 (+260,459)
Number of classrooms built	2,420	2,227	2,497 (+300)	2,689	2,689
Number of schools receiving grants	8,122	8,122	9,622 (+1500)	9,122	10,622 (+1,500)

Source : World Bank, 2007a

6.47 In addition, the Project Appraisal Document for the CF funding (World Bank 2007a) defines a series of outcome indicators to monitor sector performance. They are presented below in Table 6.4.

**Table 6.4 : Outcome indicators to be monitored for the FTI CF project**

Outcomes indicators	Baseline school year 2006	Target school year 2008-2009
Primary education completion rate	48.5%	56.4%
Boys	53.0%	55.0%
Girls	42.9%	62.0%
Primary school repetition rate	17%	13%
% of students that acquired minimum competencies in mathematics and language	50	60

Source : World Bank, 2007a

6.48 Overall, FTI and CF monitoring uses the same monitoring instruments that are used by the other financing sources, both in terms of matrix of measures and of indicators. The outcome indicators selected for CF financing are part of the overall monitoring. In addition, indicators of the IF have been included to the overall monitoring framework “in order to monitor the action plan for accelerating progress toward UPE”, i.e. the FTI request. (GoM, 2006a)

6.49 The CPS of Mali’s MoE is responsible for data collection and for the indicators. Nevertheless, due to the apparent failure of the CPS to fulfil its role, additional ad’hoc monitoring devices have recently been set up following the proposals in the aide memoire of the recent World Bank monitoring mission of the FTI CF project and its own PISE II project

(World Bank 2009b): a monthly video-conference to be held at least during three months to monitor project implementation.

6.50 Outside of this monitoring framework, the FTI has not provided significant contribution to the issue of data and M&E.

## **FTI and Capacity Development**

### **Context and non-FTI inputs**

6.51 The evaluation of the WB support to primary education outlines the institutional and systemic reasons for low capacity in the Ministry of Education:

The current low level of the Ministry of Education's institutional capacity seems due less to technical factors and more to a dysfunctional system of incentives and sanctions, which has replaced institutional incentives. Hiring and promotion are based on social connections, not regulations or performance criteria. Many Ministry employers are former teachers who no longer wanted to teach. [...] In addition, training is perceived more as a source of additional income than as a way to improve job performance. (World Bank, 2007b p.11)

6.52 Throughout the implementation of PISE I, efforts have been made to strengthen capacity at national and local level, in particular on planning, reporting, financial management and procurement, and human resource management. These efforts have allowed the operationalisation of the decentralization and deconcentration policy, and an enhanced role of local authorities on teacher management and school construction issues. At school level, school management committees have been set up and are operational in all schools.

6.53 PISE II includes a programme to strengthen institutional capacities in the Ministry of Education at central and regional level to improve human resource management and financial management. It includes transfer of human resources to the decentralised entities in line with their transferred competencies, and improved human resource management tools. This programme is coordinated with technical assistance provided mainly by France (AFD), Canada (ACDI) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to strengthen institutional and management capacities in the Pedagogical Activity Centres (CAPs), municipalities and schools at local level and to train staff. Weak capacity at local level is the most critical issue to be addressed during PISE II, along with teacher training.

6.54 Donors have provided support to capacity development in the education sector both through dedicated projects and through an increased use of country systems, in particular for donors providing sector budget support. Box 6.6 below provides an illustration of the World Bank's efforts to build capacity in the education sector, drawn from the evaluation of the WB support to primary education. Recently SBS donors have been active in the formulation of a sector-wide approach to capacity strengthening in the sector to be supported by a common fund. The proposed approach aims to improve coordination and harmonisation of institutional strengthening interventions to PISE so that funding and interventions are more efficient, effective and better aligned on PISE priorities with the view to facilitate PISE's implementation and the Ministry of Education's leadership in this implementation. The case study on Sector Budget Support in Practice in Mali outlines that "the fact that SBS donors have been particularly active in the formulation of a sector-wide approach to capacity strengthening in the sector illustrates the acknowledgement that SBS funding on its own is not likely to be sufficient to strengthen the capacity of sector institutions and systems for delivery. Indeed, the aide-mémoire from joint PISE II review missions have repeatedly highlighted the institutional weaknesses that have contributed to slow

implementation of PISE II and delayed attainment of PISE II objectives. There is concern that without parallel technical support in the form of traditional projects the responsible institutions have insufficient capacity to adequately execute their budgets and AWP, and that the shift from projects to SBS may thus in some way have been premature. This has prompted donors to engage in efforts to set up a common fund dedicated to capacity strengthening, in addition to SBS". (ODI, Mokoro 2009)

**Box 6.6 : World Bank support to capacity development in the education sector**

The Bank has supported a variety of capacity building activities since 1990, including training in school mapping, information and communications technology, procurement, budgeting, the use of software for educational planning and modelling, and a variety of technical areas such as curriculum and textbook development. However, capacity as measured by impact on the sector continues to be low. From 1990 until 1998, Bank-financed projects were implemented by the *Bureau des projets éducation* (BPE), an independent unit housed in the Ministry of Education and staffed with civil servants relieved from their usual responsibilities. The dismantling of the BPE in 2001 forced the administration to be more involved in policy dialogue and programme implementation.

The approach used by the Bank and other donors while preparing the EdSIP significantly contributed to the development of Mali's capacity in policy design. Malians developed the ten-year education policy largely by themselves, with external funding. The process ended with the presentation and defence of the programme to the National Assembly, which was a learning and legitimizing experience for the sector.

*Source: World Bank 2007b p.xii and xiv*

6.55 Regarding teacher training, there are two kinds of pre-service teacher education programmes, long-term programmes in teacher education institutions (2-4 years), and a very short-term programme for candidates hired at decentralized levels (SARPE, to be extended from 3 to 6 months). Short-term entrants are generally required to have a lower secondary (ninth grade) diploma from a general or technical/vocational school. GoM officially adopted a professional development policy in 2003. Donors supported a wide variety of such programmes such as teaching large classes, strategies for increasing girls' learning, school management, multi-grade teaching and the development of a radio-based instructional programme. The programmes are of variable quality, reach varying numbers of teachers, generally are not evaluated for effectiveness, and are not coordinated by the Ministry of Education. Participation is unrelated to promotions and pay raises. (World Bank, 2007b p15)

### **FTI inputs**

6.56 Key FTI inputs in terms of capacity building are the processes associated to the request (preparation of the request, donor appraisal, discussions on the financing gap), financial support from the EPDF, and CF funding, in particular the component in support to teacher training for community teachers.

### **Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency**

6.57 Overall, efforts to strengthen donor coordination in support to capacity development and develop a comprehensive capacity development strategy have mainly happened outside the realm of FTI. Nevertheless, the preparation of the request to FTI and associated processes can be said to have contributed to build capacity of both Government and the Education Donors.

6.58 The CF funding for teacher training for community school teachers is particularly relevant to the needs identified in the PISE II, since community school teachers receive very minimal training. The funding for teacher training is the component of the CF funded project that was executed most timely and effectively so far, allowing the training of 1000 teachers in 2008, in addition to the 2000 trained under WB funding and the training of 8000 new recruits

through Government and WB funding under the SARPE mechanism (see 4.13). (World Bank 2009b). Nevertheless these strategies highlight the failure to address the broader issue of teacher training through the mainstream system of IFM (*Instituts de Formation des Maitres*) and the remaining weakness of teacher management in Mali, despite support from various donors in particular the WB. Steps are nevertheless being taken in order to remedy this situation through the creation of a Human Resource Department in the Ministries of Education in 2009 (MEBALN and MESSRS) (World Bank, 2009b).

6.59 The Study on SBS in practice also outlines that the use of ANICT for the delivery of classroom construction has impeded the strengthening of government and Local Authorities service delivery systems. “The use of ANICT has [...] missed the opportunity to strengthen local authorities’ budget management capacities since normal budget procedures have not been used by Local Authorities to manage investment funds, whereas this is the ultimate goal of the decentralisation strategy. [...] The shift to SBS has thus missed a major opportunity here to contribute to implementing the decentralisation policy by failing to test and strengthen the LAs capacities to manage their own investment funds following normal budgetary procedures” (ODI, Mokoro 2009)

6.60 EPDF support has mainly focused on financing regional initiatives and has not had a significant impact on capacity development. Nevertheless, it can be expected that future requests to EPDF regarding the strengthening of the components of the Sector Plan on Early Childhood Development could contribute to enhanced planning capacities.

## **FTI and Aid Effectiveness**

### **Context and non-FTI inputs**

6.61 Prior to PRODEC, there were no mechanisms for formal donor coordination. Many donors undertook small-scale projects in particular areas. Ad hoc meetings were called irregularly when one or several donors thought a meeting was necessary. The advent of PRODEC and the unified financing plan of the PISE increased structured donor coordination. Fourteen donors supported GoM in the development of the PRODEC and PISE. Both the PRODEC and the PISE were elaborated in a highly participative and transparent manner, involving extended consultation at all levels.

6.62 There is now a partnership framework, with coordination meetings and a series of technical committees. The lead agency rotates among donors and is seen by donors as generally satisfactory and exemplary for the sub region. Civil society representatives and NGOs participate to the joint sector reviews. A specific agreement was signed between GoM and partners in view of the provision of SBS in support of the PISE II, in July 2006. The Netherlands were the first signatory, followed by Sweden, France, Canada and Belgium. (see Chapter 3 for more details)

6.63 However, issues of planning and short and medium-term financial management of the educational sector have been given more attention in the last four years than issues pertaining to the quality of education. Coordination has mainly been a monitoring tool for the implementation of PISE activities, and not an instrument for fostering policy dialogue with the Ministry of Education. (World Bank, 2007b p.23) While harmonization of procedures has proven elusive, the increased cooperation among donors has led to a far greater sense of shared purpose and goals among donors and government. (World Bank 2007b, p. xiii)

6.64 Finally, at country level mechanisms have been put in place to institutionalize donor coordination and efforts to enhance aid effectiveness: a Partnership Framework was signed between GoM and development partners providing General Budget Support in March

2006<sup>27</sup>. An action plan on aid effectiveness was endorsed in 2007, in line with Paris Declaration objectives, and covers 2007-2009. It is organized around five strategic areas, including: (i) developing national development strategies; (ii) aligning external aid to national strategies; (iii) utilizing common procedures and reducing the incidence of separate donor missions; (iv) implementing results-oriented framework; and (v) joint responsibility for monitoring and evaluation.

### **FTI inputs**

6.65 The preparation of the request to the FTI has been the main FTI input in terms of aid effectiveness. CF funding has also been an element of the aid effectiveness discussions in Mali.

### **Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency**

6.66 Given the highly participative process for the elaboration of the education sector plans (PRODEC, PISE), the fact that the request to FTI defined and proposed a different set of objectives and associated strategies has not contributed significantly to ownership, and in particular to the transparency and participatory nature of the planning process.

6.67 The Catalytic Fund funding is integrated in the existing donor coordination mechanism. For example, school construction programmes are co-financed by the World Bank through its investment project, and by the Netherlands, Sweden, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the French Development Agency (AFD) through Sector Budget Support. CF funding – along with other donors’ – is implemented by way of transfers to the Territorial Authorities through the ANICT. The management of support to schools in nomadic areas is to be carried out as a complement to the Unicef Initiative. The purchase of textbooks complements the financial support received from IDA, CIDA and the Netherlands/Sweden in this area. Grants to schools complement ongoing IDA and National Budget funding. Training of community teachers is to be carried out based on the relevant national policy and based on the ongoing Program Implementation Manual, and complements the funding received from IDA and CIDA. The CF funding therefore mainly increases funds for activities already carried out.

6.68 In terms of **aid modality**, CF funding has not contributed significantly to strengthening or enhancing existing aid effectiveness since it has not used the “most aligned aid modality”. Nevertheless, it has not used the “least aligned modality” either: it is provided in the form of a project, but funds are disbursed through a CAST. The use of a CAST (see 6.29) was a compromise between the procedure used for the on-going WB project (using a special account held at a commercial bank and managed by the Ministry of Education) and the requirement for World Bank prior ‘no objection’ on procurement above certain thresholds (in particular for textbooks and school construction in the CF-funded project).

6.69 The main justification for the CF funding to be provided through project modality is provided in the CF project appraisal document (World Bank 2007a) “Sector budget support. This option is not used since the sector budget support is for the entire sector and the CF needs to target basic education in this operation. In addition, the procurement assessment is not conclusive enough to recommend full use of national procedures”. Nevertheless, it can be noted that other countries have received non-earmarked sector budget support with CF funding, and various donors had started providing Sector Budget Support to Mali before it was endorsed by the FTI.

6.70 In terms of **alignment**, the use of the WB as supervising entity for the CF required the preparation of an environmental assessment and a Resettlement Action Plan in order to comply with WB procedures. A consolidated environmental and resettlement action plan

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<sup>27</sup> Signed by AfDB, WB, EC, Canada, France, Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium

specific to the PISE II program was developed by the Ministry of Education to address safeguard issues identified and to provide guidelines for the contractors involved in the construction of schools. Overall, several risk mitigating measures ('avis de non objection') have resulted in derogations from mainstream national processes (transfer through the ANICT, contracting of international audit firms for external audits) and from existing donor processes (World Bank avis de non-objection) which involve significant transactions costs.

6.71 Although aligned with existing plans and strategies (PISE, PRODEC), the FTI inputs have not provided a push for moving towards a more comprehensive sector-wide approach, i.e. covering the whole of the education expenditure and not only investment expenditure.

6.72 Finally, neither the FTI nor the CF funding have contributed to enhanced long term **predictability** of aid, since the commitment provided was only until 2008. Commitments by most other donors end along with PISE II (2008/2009), and longer term commitments are dependent on the definition of the PISE III. Regarding in-year predictability, it has improved significantly with the introduction of SBS. Nevertheless, project aid to education remains volatile as shown in 2007 when only 10% of committed project support was disbursed, and only 25% of CF funding was disbursed within the expected timeframe (although mainly due to unrealistic planning).

## Cross-Cutting Issues

### Context and non-FTI inputs

6.73 **Gender issues.** Enrolment varies significantly by gender. Girls' enrolment rates are significantly lower than boys' in all areas outside Bamako. Families are "less willing to pay to send girls to school, less willing to forgo girls labour, think that the curriculum is less relevant for girls and are more reluctant for girls to walk long distances to school". Sexual harassment by teachers and other students also reduces girls' enrolment and participation. (World Bank 2007b p.25). In 2005, 75.6% of boys had access to school against only 59.8% of girls, and 52.7% of boys against 33.8% of girls reach the last year of primary. In addition, progress in terms of enrolment and completion over the recent years does not seem to have fostered a reduction in gender disparities: while the primary completion rate increased from 25% in 1996 to 42% in 2003, the difference between boys and girls has increased from 15 to 18 points. The primary completion rate of 14% for poor girls living in rural areas compares to 84% for affluent boys living in urban areas. (Pole de Dakar, 2007)

6.74 A Ministry of Education report states that: "Enrolment of girls has been included in the major goals of PRODEC, but plans and specific measures to boost enrolment and keep girls in school have made very little progress and will not be enough to achieve the stated goals. The situation must be looked at again and concrete steps proposed, (both plans and activities) so as to reduce the educational gender gap and achieve PRODEC's goals". In response to this criticism, the government drew up an action plan (2003-04) on How to Speed Up Enrolment of Girls (SASCOFI). The creation of a Ministry of Women, Children and the Family in September 1997 also raised hopes for more attention to such issues. (Lange, 2003 p.13)

6.75 PISE II aims to reduce the gap between boys and girls, in particular in rural areas, through a financial support to poor families to enrol girls in school, a strategy to build separated latrines for boys and girls, and a positive discrimination towards women in the recruitment for the teacher training centres. Focus will also be put on making vocational training more attractive to girls.

6.76 **HIV/AIDS.** End 2003, HIV prevalence in the 15-49 population in Mali was estimated at 1.9% by UNAIDS. This is relatively low, but it is estimated that this could increase to 4 to 6% in 2015, following existing trends in the region. There are estimates that in 2004, 1.1% of 7-12 year old children (23,000 children) would be orphaned of both parents due to HIV/AIDS. (GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006))

6.77 PISE II strategy to address HIV/AIDS focuses on a revision of the curricula and inclusion of health issues in new textbooks, integrating an AIDS prevention programme in Primary 5, and enhancing teacher training on health and HIV/AIDS issues.

6.78 Donor support to school health issues takes multiple forms, with a multitude of weakly coordinated activities supported by donors and NGOs and weak coordination between the Ministries of Health and Education. Many NGOs are also involved in HIV-AIDS education-related activities, but there is a lack of supervision and follow-up by the Ministry of Education (World Bank 2007b p.20)

6.79 **Geographic inequalities.** In 2003, the gross enrolment ratio in primary ranged from more than 100% in Koulikoro and Bamako regions, to less than 50% in Tombouctou, Kayes and Mopti regions. Similarly, the retention rate in 2004 ranged from 31% in Tombouctou region to 99% in Koulikoro. Access to the first year of primary and primary completion in urban areas are significantly higher than in rural areas (respectively 89.5% against 61.1%, and 64.2% against 35.6% in 2005). These inequalities are even higher in higher levels of education. The distribution of Mali's population across its territory and high variation in population density, as well as the need to cater for nomadic populations constitute a major challenge in increasing school enrolment, by increasing costs (small classes, need for school feeding, transport costs). Studies have shown that low enrolment rates in some regions (Gao, Kidal), as due not only to supply (existence of a school less than 15min away, availability of a school covering the whole of primary education), but also to demand issues. Overall, the 2005 Country Status Report (GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006)) shows that geographic and revenue disparities are much higher than gender disparities, raising the need to tackle the question of disparities as a whole.

6.80 PISE II strategies to fight against these inequalities include increasing the number of school feeding programmes (*cantines scolaires*), focusing in particular on schools in the regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal, where a significant proportion of children live more than 3km away. Deconcentration of teacher recruitment at the regional level and local recruitment of teacher for basic education are also part of the strategy.

### **FTI inputs**

6.81 FTI inputs related to cross cutting issues include in particular the appraisal of the request in 2006, and the financing from the Catalytic Fund.

### **Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency**

6.82 The appraisal highlighted that the existing strategy to fight against HIV/AIDS focuses more on prevention than on support to HIV/AIDS orphans or pupils and teachers affected by HIV/AIDS. The evaluation of the request also underlines that gender issues have been adequately addressed, in line with the National Policy on Girl Education, but that attention should be given to actual implementation of the commitments. Finally, the evaluation (Education donors, 2006b) raises the issue of "talibé" children<sup>28</sup>, not adequately addressed in existing education plans, but which would require a strong inter-sectoral coordination.

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<sup>28</sup> In parts of urban West Africa, Talibes (or *Talibé*, Arabic for *students*) are religious students or followers of specific religious sect or teacher. In contemporary Senegal, Mali and Guinea, these are

6.83 The Catalytic Fund support has focused on inequalities through support to training of community school teachers, mainly in rural areas, and enhancing the provision of textbooks and school construction.

6.84 Overall, it is not clear whether the influence of the FTI on cross-cutting issues goes beyond the rephrasing and re-organisation of the PISE II to produce the FTI request following a format more adequate to the FTI, i.e. among other things giving more prominence to cross-cutting issues. It has for example failed to raise the issue of nomadic children and their inclusion in regular monitoring systems and Education Sector Plans and policies, although their number was estimated in 2000 at 187,000 by the UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

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often children living with a Marabout religious teacher in order to pursue a free religious education. Most Talibes are well treated and very respected for their education and hard work. They are usually housed with families in good conditions and can leave the Marabout's home whenever they wish. Some urban teachers have taken advantage of this traditional education to exploit children. Young boys who are seen begging for food or money many urban areas are often Talibes, sent from their rural homes to urban areas by their parents in order to pursue an Islamic education. Usually their parents are very poor and frequently are unable to provide paid education for their children. These talibes are reputed to be kept against their will, unfed, and forced to stay with the Marabout until the age of fifteen or more

## 7. Conclusions

**7.1 High Level Questions 1: Is what FTI aims to accomplish consistent with current needs and priorities of FTI client countries?** Given Mali's situation in terms of literacy, school enrolment and completion, FTI's objectives to accelerate progress towards UPC were clearly relevant. In particular, the objectives to ensure more efficient and sustained increase in aid for primary education as well as adequate and sustainable domestic financing for education were relevant. However, it is not clear that the design of FTI's support to Mali was fully relevant to the country's needs or to the FTI objectives: it led to the definition of an overly ambitious plan, additional to the existing sector plan. Issues raised by the discussion around the IF benchmark were relevant, but were already developed by other donors before FTI endorsement – in particular by the World Bank. CF funding through project modality did not contribute to enhanced aid effectiveness or predictability, and involves significant derogations from national processes and from the existing most aligned aid modalities.

**7.2 High Level Questions 2: To what extent is the FTI accomplishing what it was designed to do, namely, accelerating progress on EFA?** The contribution of the FTI in Mali has been through the IF benchmarks which were used in policy dialogue and in the design of the action plan to accelerate progress toward UPE. Nevertheless, the acceleration has mainly been restricted to revising upwards the objectives of the existing strategy. Key issues constraining the acceleration of progress toward UPE have either not been addressed, been addressed inefficiently, or been addressed but through measures taking more time than expected to become operational. CF funding for classroom construction and procurement of textbooks has taken longer to implement than foreseen in the highly unrealistic initial forecast, mainly due to procurement delays. Funds to be transferred to schools did not reach them entirely or in time mainly due to weak monitoring and reporting systems. CF funding for teacher training did contribute to strengthening the training of community teachers but falls short of supporting a more comprehensive and systemic approach to teacher training and management.

**7.3 High Level Questions 3: Has the FTI helped mobilize domestic and international resources in support of EFA and helped donor agencies to adopt more efficient development assistance strategies based on Paris Declaration ideals?** CF funding and indirect effect on other donor funding contributed to increased external funding to primary education, and the discussion on IF benchmarks may contribute progressively to an increased share of the domestic education budget going to primary education. Nevertheless, donor support to the education sector in Mali remains fragmented despite the strong increase in sector budget support. CF funding did not make use of the most aligned aid modality (SBS), and long term as well as short term predictability remain limited.

**Box7. 1 Analytical Summary Matrix**

**SUMMARY – MALI**

**Context: *What was the situation at level zero? What was happening in country before FTI?***

- Education Sector plans already in place (Ten-Year Program for the Development of Education (PRODEC), Education Sector Investment Program (PISE))
- Significant increase in domestic funding for primary education
- Existing mechanisms for donor coordination, joint reviews and monitoring
- PISE II includes strategies to strengthen capacity, address cross cutting issues
- Donor support to education evolving toward Sector Budget Support (SBS), but no significant increase over the past years. Lack of coordination on capacity development and statistics issues

**Inputs: *What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?***

- Fast Track Initiative (FTI) request and appraisal process
- Catalytic Funds (CF) funding and Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) funding
- IF benchmarks and associated dialogue

<b>SUMMARY – MALI</b>		
<b>Relevance - Were the objectives of FTI support relevant? Was the design appropriate?</b>	<b>Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy expenditure and service delivery)</b>	
	<b>Effectiveness – To what extent did FTI contribute to improving education sector policies, planning, data, budgeting, level of finance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation and aid effectiveness?</b>	<b>Efficiency - How economically was FTI support translated into results?</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall FTI objectives were particularly relevant in Mali, given its needs and situation in terms of literacy, school enrolment and completion, and status of donor support</li> <li>• The objectives defined in the action plan for accelerating progress towards Universal Primary Education (UPE) are in line with the Indicative Framework (IF) benchmarks (100% enrolment and completion in 2015) but are judged unrealistic and were not discussed in a transparent and participative manner as were the PRODEC and PISE</li> <li>• Issues raised by discussion around IF benchmarks, although not specifically due to FTI but also to overall donor dialogue and World Bank, were relevant to the issues in the education sector in Mali</li> <li>• CF funding targets key issues identified in PISE II</li> <li>• The “fast track scenario” on which the request is based outlines a financing gap only over 2006-2008</li> <li>• FTI support on the issue of data is not particularly relevant to the needs identified</li> <li>• EPDF support so far not relevant to the needs identified, mainly focused on financing conferences and regional level activities</li> <li>• CF support part of the overall aid coordination mechanism and carried out in close collaboration with various donors but not through most aligned modality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discussion around the salary of teachers in proportion of GDP per capita led to the introduction of contractual teachers and community school teachers. Studies show that this has allowed a higher enrolment rate and that these teachers have higher performance</li> <li>• CF funding has not filled the financing gap (use of step down formula) and has not provided the amount identified in the request.</li> <li>• Other donors have nevertheless stepped in to fill the gap and provided additional support as a result (WB, KfW)</li> <li>• Discussions around the IF benchmarks – mainly under the leadership of the World Bank – have led to a target for increasing in funding for primary education as a proportion of funding to education.</li> <li>• Regarding Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, the CF funding has led to numerous derogations to good PFM principles through the creation of a CAST (compte d'affectation special du trésor).</li> <li>• IF indicators integrated in regular monitoring framework</li> <li>• Use of National Investment Agency of Territorial Authorities (ANICT) to channel funds for school construction may have diverted capacity building efforts away from local authorities</li> <li>• CF funding has not contributed to enhancing aid effectiveness. Reasons for not joining SBS funding is the requirement to earmark FTI support to basic education.</li> <li>• No positive impact on aid predictability (long term and short term) or on alignment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The requirement to develop an action plan to achieve UPE, in addition to existing plans (PRODEC, PISE) and with revised objectives and strategies involved significant transactions costs, is judged by many as unrealistic</li> <li>• The push towards recruitment of contractual teachers, indirectly linked to discussions around the IF, has led to numerous strikes and tensions between GoM and teacher unions</li> <li>• The preparation of the request involved a recalculation of the financing gap compared to the PISE II calculation, which is judged in the donor appraisal as based on less realistic objectives</li> <li>• FTI-specific requirements aligned with existing monitoring framework</li> <li>• The requirement to prepare a request to FTI in addition to the existing planning documents may have contributed negatively to transparency and participatory planning</li> <li>• Use of WB procedures required additional ex ante assessments</li> <li>• CF funding has been significantly delayed in disbursements and has therefore not reached its objectives.</li> </ul>

**SUMMARY – MALI**

**Outcomes:** What has been the effect on quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education?

- Overall positive progress on enrolment and completion has taken place in parallel with donor shift to SBS and increased focus on primary education in the past years

**Sustainability:** Are the changes that took place in policy and planning, finance, capacity, M&E and aid effectiveness interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?

- Major risks involve potential strikes and tensions with teacher unions; lack of communication on major policy decision and lack of understanding at local level; delays and weaknesses in the devolution & decentralisation process; lack of control of student flows at secondary level, underestimation of costs to achieve the objectives, in particular on teacher salary and school construction issues
- Lack of predictability of aid both in the long term (potential impact of EU code of conduct) and in the short term, lack of alignment with national processes and underestimation of costs to achieve objectives are the main risks faced by the education sector in terms of financing
- Need for increased donor coordination and results-based management in the Ministry of Education, support to M&E remains weakly coordinated and embedded in national processes
- Key issues to ensure sustainability of efforts to increase aid effectiveness include increased use of national processes, move towards a real sector wide approach covering the whole sector

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning		
Context and non FTI inputs		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) adopted in 2002 (2002-2006) and second PRSP (CSCR) covers 2007-2011</li> <li>PRODEC – decenal plan adopted in 1998 (1998-2008) and operational plans (PISE I 2001-2005 and PISE II 2006-2008)</li> <li>Support from other donors to the development of the PRODEC, dialogue through the joint sector reviews</li> </ul>		
FTI Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Endorsement process, discussions around IF benchmarks, CF funding</li> <li>The request involved the preparation of the “action plan for accelerating progress towards UPE” (GoM 2006a)</li> </ul>		
Relevance - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to policy and planning relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	Effectiveness – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to developing quality education plans encompassing UPC targets? To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of sector policies?</i>	Efficiency - <i>How economically was FTI support to country level policy and planning translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FTI’s overall objective to strengthen sector planning was relevant in Mali, nevertheless, the specific actions of FTI in this areas were less relevant overall</li> <li>The objectives defined in the action plan for accelerating progress towards UPE are in line with the IF benchmarks (100% enrolment and completion in 2015) but are judged unrealistic and were not discussed in a transparent and participative manner as were the PRODEC and PISE</li> <li>Issues raised by discussion around IF benchmarks, although not specifically due to FTI but also to overall donor dialogue and World Bank, were relevant to the issues in the education sector in Mali</li> <li>CF funding targets key issues identified in PISE II</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discussion around the salary of teachers in proportion of GDP per capita led to the introduction of contractual teachers and community school teachers. Studies show that this has allowed a higher enrolment rate and that these teachers have higher performance</li> <li>CF funding has been significantly delayed in disbursements and has therefore not reached its objectives. Initial evaluations of the FTI request had raised issues of lack of realism and need for further strengthening of the local administrations to manage the proposed increase in school construction and provision of textbooks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The requirement to develop an action plan to achieve UPE, in addition to existing plans (PRODEC, PISE) and with revised objectives and strategies involved significant transactions costs, is judged by many as unrealistic</li> <li>The push towards recruitment of contractual teachers, indirectly linked to discussions around the IF, has led to numerous strikes and tensions between GoM and teacher unions</li> </ul>
Sustainability: <i>Are the changes that took place in policy and planning interventions likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Major risks involve potential strikes and tensions with teacher unions; lack of communication on major policy decision and lack of understanding at local level (suppression of repetition within cycles); delays and weaknesses in the devolution &amp; decentralisation process; lack of control of student flows at secondary level, underestimation of costs to achieve the objectives, in particular on teacher salary and school construction issues.</li> </ul>		

STREAM 2: Finance		
<b>Context:</b> <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to education finance? What was happening in country before FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Significant increase in domestic financing for education and primary education</li> <li>• Sporadic increased in foreign aid to education; strong shift toward earmarked SBS since 2006</li> <li>• Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) resources earmarked on education and health since 2000</li> <li>• PISE II involved calculation of financing needs and financing gap over 2006-2008</li> </ul>		
<b>Inputs:</b> <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Catalytic Fund support (USD 8.7m for 2007-2008)</li> <li>• EPDF support (USD 200,000 since 2006)</li> <li>• Calculation of financing gap in the request (action plan for accelerating progress towards UPE)</li> </ul>		
<b>Relevance</b> - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to education finance relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	<b>Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes:</b> <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	<b>Effectiveness</b> – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to a stronger education budget process? To what extent did FTI contribute to the increase in total funds for primary education?</i>	<b>Efficiency</b> - <i>How economically was FTI support to country level finance for education translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The overall objective of the FTI in terms of fostering sustained increase in aid for primary education and adequate domestic funding were relevant</li> <li>• The “fast track scenario” on which the request is based is relevant in that it assesses the financing needs to achieve UPE in 2015, but the financing gap it outlines is only over 2006-2008</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CF funding has not filled the financing gap (use of step down formula) and has not provided the amount identified in the request.</li> <li>• Other donors have nevertheless stepped in to fill the gap and provided additional support as a result (WB, KfW)</li> <li>• Discussions around the IF benchmarks have led to the targeted increase in domestic funding for primary education as a proportion of funding to education.</li> <li>• Regarding PFM systems, the CF funding is being provided in the form of a project despite the existence of SBS to the education sector. This has led to numerous derogations to good PFM principles through the creation of a CAST (compte d'affectation special du trésor). In addition, like the existing SBS in Mali, it uses the ANICT, a special agency to support school construction, instead of transferring money to the local authorities in charge of school construction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The preparation of the request involved a recalculation of the financing gap compared to the PISE II calculation, which is judged in the donor appraisal as based on less realistic objectives</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place in the education budget process and the level of finance for primary education likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of predictability of aid both in the long term (potential impact of EU code of conduct) and in the short term, lack of alignment with national processes and underestimation of costs to achieve objectives are the main risks faced by the education sector in terms of financing.</li> </ul>		

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation		
<b>Context and non FTI inputs</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existing education sector review and monitoring process</li> <li>Reporting and monitoring instruments include statistical yearbook, annual financial and technical reports, joint matrix of performance indicators</li> <li>In PISE II, Government has committed to carry out a learning assessment in basic education every two years following international standards</li> <li>Donor support includes funding to the Ministry of Education's planning and statistics unit (CPS), production of the statistical yearbook, and development of an EMIS</li> <li>National efforts to develop a Schema Directeur de la Statistique (2008) and an integrated financial management information system</li> </ul>		
<b>FTI Inputs: <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i></b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Appraisal of the request by local donors</li> <li>Reporting requirements for monitoring of the CF-funded project</li> </ul>		
<b>Relevance</b> - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support relevant to data and M&amp;E needs? Was the design appropriate?</i>	<b>Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes:</b> <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	<b>Effectiveness</b> – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to improved collection of data and better information services? To what extent is there better use of data to inform policy and funding?</i>	<b>Efficiency</b> - <i>How economically was support to country data and M&amp;E translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FTI support on the issue of data is not relevant to the needs identified</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IF indicators integrated in regular monitoring framework</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FTI-specific requirements aligned with existing monitoring framework</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place data and M&amp;E management likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Need for increased donor coordination and results-based management in the Ministry of Education, support to M&amp;E remains weakly coordinated and embedded in national processes</li> </ul>		

<b>STREAM 4: Capacity</b>		
<b>Context:</b> <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to capacity? To what extent was the capacity adequate for EFA and UPC targets?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weak capacity overall, worsened by the decentralisation process</li> <li>• Lack of coordination of donors support to capacity</li> <li>• Government efforts within PISE II to focus on capacity development at local level and on enhanced teacher training</li> </ul>		
<b>Inputs:</b> <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FTI request and appraisal process</li> <li>• CF funding and support from EPDF</li> </ul>		
<b>Relevance</b> - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to policy and planning relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	<b>Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes:</b> <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	<b>Effectiveness</b> – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of measures to strengthen capacity? To what extent was quality capacity created to implement policy and services?</i>	<b>Efficiency</b> - <i>How economically was FTI support to country level capacity building translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EPDF support not relevant to the needs identified, mainly focused on financing conferences and regional level activities</li> <li>• CF funding of teacher training for community teacher relevant to needs and objectives of the PISE II, but fails to address wider systemic teacher management issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of ANICT to channel funds for school construction may have diverted capacity building efforts away from local authorities</li> <li>• CF funding resulted in training of 1000 community teacher</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of parallel mechanisms than mainstream national budget mechanisms by both SBS and CF (and other projects) (for ex ANICT)</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place in capacity likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of ANICT by SBS and CF may contribute negatively to the sustainability of efforts to strengthen local authorities capacity</li> </ul>		

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness		
<b>Context:</b> <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to aid effectiveness? What was happening in the sector before FTI? To what extent was aid for education efficiently &amp; effectively provided?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existing mechanisms for donor coordination include joint sector review, thematic working groups</li> <li>SBS provided by several donors and signed partnership agreement for SBS</li> </ul>		
<b>Inputs:</b> <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preparation of request</li> </ul>		
<b>Relevance</b> - <i>Was FTI support to aid effectiveness relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	<b>Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes:</b> <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery)</i>	
	<b>Effectiveness</b> – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to more international aid, and to aid that is better, coordinated and more coherent with domestic efforts in the sector?</i>	<b>Efficiency</b> - <i>How efficiently was aid delivered?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CF support part of the overall aid coordination mechanism and carried out in close collaboration with various donors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CF funding has not contributed to enhancing aid effectiveness. Reasons for not joining SBS funding is the (misunderstood) requirement to earmark FTI support to basic education.</li> <li>No positive impact on aid predictability or on alignment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The requirement to prepare a request to FTI in addition to the existing planning documents is high in transactions costs and revised targets not used as a reference in subsequent reviews</li> <li>Use of WB procedures required additional ex ante assessments</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place with respect to aid effectiveness likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key issues to ensure sustainability of efforts to increase aid effectiveness include increased use of national processes, move towards a real sector wide approach covering the whole sector (and not only investment).</li> </ul>		

<b>STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, equity and exclusion)</b>		
<b>Context:</b> <i>What was the situation at level zero with respect to cross-cutting issues? What was happening in country before FTI?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issue of inequality (gender, geographical and revenue) have remained stable despite the increasing enrolments over the last decade</li> <li>• HIV/AIDS prevalence low but potentially increasing</li> <li>• Strategies in PISE II to address these issues</li> </ul>		
<b>Inputs:</b> <i>What did FTI do? What problems did it identify and how did it address them?</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Appraisal of FTI request by local donors</li> <li>• CF funding</li> </ul>		
<b>Relevance</b> - <i>Were the objectives of FTI support to cross cutting issues relevant? Was the design appropriate?</i>	<b>Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes:</b> <i>What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector planning and implementation with respect to cross-cutting issues)</i>	
	<b>Effectiveness</b> – <i>To what extent did FTI contribute to improved strategies to address cross cutting issues? To what extent did FTI contribute to implementation of these strategies?</i>	<b>Efficiency</b> - <i>How economically was FTI support to cross cutting issues translated into results?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The appraisal raised questions on the way the HIV/AIDS and inequality issues have been addressed in PISE II</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CF funding provides support to training of community teachers, which should contribute to enhanced quality of education in rural areas</li> </ul>	
<b>Sustainability:</b> <i>Are the changes that took place in the manner in which cross-cutting issues are addressed likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</i>		



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## Annex A – Timeline of FTI Events

Date	International Context	Mali Context	Education Policy in Mali	FTI in Mali
1960-1980		<p><b>1960</b> - Mali becomes independent with Modibo Keita as president. It becomes a one-party, socialist state and withdraws from the Franc zone.</p> <p><b>1968</b> Military coup d'etat by Moussa Traore'</p>	<p>At independence, in <b>1960</b>, 7% of Mali's population had been through the formal French education system, while 93% were classified as uneducated.</p> <p>Mali's first president, Modibo Keita, declared education as a national priority in <b>1960</b>. According to him education had to teach Mali's cultural values and 'decolonize the spirits'. In <b>1962</b> a new law founded Mali's educational system, aiming at constructing schools, recruiting teachers and providing educational equipment. At the end of the 1960s some 20% of children were educated.</p> <p>The military coup d'etat carried out in <b>1968</b> by Moussa Traore' inverts the positive process. The function of teachers is devalued and the teachers' union is shut down.</p>	
1980-1990		<p>In <b>1982</b>, Mali became unable to pay its foreign debt or its wage bill.</p> <p>In 1982, the GoM launched a structural adjustment program to improve conditions for economic growth and restore macroeconomic equilibrium. The program included measures related to the development of a market economy and aimed to reduce budget deficits, wastage in public enterprises and the size of the administration.</p>	<p>Budget restrictions imposed by the World Bank and IMF also cut funds available for education. There was a drop in the number of teachers of over 10% between <b>1985 and 1990</b>.</p> <p>Between <b>1968 and 1989</b>, the schooling rate fell from 29% to 22%.</p> <p>Large student revolts in <b>1970</b> and <b>1972</b>, and again in <b>1976/77</b> and <b>1980</b> were repressed by the government.</p>	

Date	International Context	Mali Context	Education Policy in Mali	FTI in Mali
1990-1999	<p><b>March 1990</b> World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopted the World Declaration on Education for All, which stated that all have a right to education. The conference recognised the setbacks experienced in the 1980's by many South nations and made a commitment to meeting basic learning needs of every citizen.</p>	<p><b>1992</b> - Alpha Konare wins multiparty elections to become Mali's first democratically-elected president (beginning of the 'Third Republic').</p> <p><b>1994</b> – Devaluation of the FCFA</p> <p><b>1995</b> - Peace agreement with Tuareg tribes leads to return of thousands of refugees.</p> <p><b>1997</b> - President Konaré was elected to a second five-year term.</p>	<p><b>1992</b> With the election of Konare', education is once again a national priority.</p> <p><b>July 1994</b> Private education is recognized by the government, in an effort to provide a widespread supply of education within the country.</p> <p><b>The years 1991-1994</b> were characterized by strong social protests, led by the AEEM, and rebellion by the Touareg ethnic group in the northern part of the country. AEEM leaders demanded increases in student scholarships from 1992-94, calling violent strikes that closed the school system for months at a time and caused the 1994 school year to be cancelled.</p>	
1999	<p>Education For All (EFA) Assessment <b>1999-2000</b>, involving six regional conferences revealed that the EFA agenda had been neglected.</p>		<p><b>28 December 1999</b> <i>Education Orientation Law</i>. The initial <i>Ten-Year Program for the Development of Education</i> (Programme Décennal de Développement de l'Education-PRODEC) is developed for the period 1998-2008 in order to implement this law.</p>	
2000	<p>United Nations Millennium Summit in <b>2000</b>, 189 world leaders signed up to try and end poverty by 2015 when they agreed to meet the Millennium Development Goals.</p>	<p><b>2000</b> February - Konare appoints former International Monetary Fund official Mande Sidibe prime minister.</p>	<p>In <b>2000</b>, the government of Mali set forth its vision and strategy for the country's education sector in the 10 year <i>PRODEC</i> which lays the groundwork for promoting the universal completion of primary education. <i>An Education Sector Investment Program (ESIP or PISE)</i> in three-phases was conceived to help Mali achieve this program.</p> <p>The first phase of ESIP/PISE is known as ESIP I/PISE I (<b>2000-2004</b>)</p>	

Date	International Context	Mali Context	Education Policy in Mali	FTI in Mali
2001	<p>G8 Meeting - Genoa, Italy.  <b>July 2001:</b> G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada</p>	<p><b>2001</b> December - Manantali dam in southwest produces its first megawatt of hydro-electricity, 13 years after it was completed.</p>		
2002	<p>G8 Washington, DC USA.  <b>April 2002:</b> The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI).</p> <p>Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands.  <b>April 2002:</b> Developing countries and their external partners agree at a Dutch-World Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits 135 million Euro to set the process in motion.</p> <p>G8 Kananaskis, Canada.  <b>June 2002:</b> agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of FTI.</p> <p>EFA Global Monitoring Report was established to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.</p>	<p><b>May 2002</b> <i>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (also known as Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté - CSLP)</i>. Strategic pillars:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) accelerated and re-distributive growth;</li> <li>(ii) promote institutional development while improving governance and participation;</li> <li>(iii) develop human resources and improve access to quality basic services;</li> <li>(iv) develop basic infrastructure and productive sectors.</li> </ul> <p><b>2002</b>, Mali begins to receive funds from the HIPC initiative</p> <p><b>2002</b> September - France says it will cancel 40% of debts owed to it by Mali, amounting to some 80m euros (\$79m, £51m).</p> <p><b>2002</b> October - Government resigns, without public explanation. New "government of national unity" is unveiled.</p> <p><b>2002</b> Mali elected its first president from the opposition.</p>		

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2003	<p>Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome, <b>Feb 2003</b>.</p> <p>FTI Donors Meeting - Paris, <b>March 2003</b>: Donors agree on modus operandi for FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for FTI.</p> <p>The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) was established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of 2-3 years to enable countries lacking resources at country level but with FTI endorsed education sector plans to scale up implementation of their plans.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, <b>November 2003</b>: Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors meeting together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that FTI should be opened to all low-income countries.</p>	<p>Mali became the seventh country to reach the completion point within the HIPC framework (Highly Indebted Poor Countries). In <b>2003</b>, Mali's entire eligible debt was cancelled by the Paris Club. The amount of HIPC resources awarded in 2003 was CFAF 19 billion, compared to CFAF 24.5 billion specified in the PRSP for 2003, for a 78 percent implementation rate.</p>	<p>The relative share of basic education in overall budget expenditures has grown from 6.68 percent in 2001 to 10 percent in <b>2003</b>, a rate of increase of nearly 50 percent.</p> <p>The Gross School Attendance Rate (TBS) also rose from 64.3 percent in 2002 to 67 percent in <b>2003</b></p>	

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2004	<p>Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) was established in <b>November 2004</b> as a funding window under the FTI to support low income countries improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and program development.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting, <b>Nov 2004</b>, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines.</p>	<p><b>2004</b> and early 2005 were difficult periods due to a terms of trade shock and the effects of drought and a locust invasion <b>2004</b> September - Agriculture minister says severe locust plague has cut cereal harvest by up to 45%.</p> <p>At the macroeconomic level, the GDP growth rate plummeted from 7.4 percent in 2003 to 2.2 percent in <b>2004</b>, compared to an initial forecast of 4.7 percent. This sharp decline is attributable to a drop in 2004-2005 cereals production and a drop in gold production in 2004. Despite this state of affairs, the government of Mali remains determined to pursue budgetary discipline by maintaining the budget deficit in line with PRGF targets.</p> <p>Partners at the Donor's Roundtable (Geneva, <b>March 2004</b>) confirmed their intention to increase their grants of assistance for development in Mali. For the three years of the period 2004-2006, the Roundtable posted declarations of intent totalling around US\$ 2.4 billion (CFAF 1,276 billion).</p> <p>In <b>May 2004</b>, a second round of local elections was held and 63% of seats went to new candidates.</p>	<p>The <i>share of Mali's GDP dedicated to education</i> rose from 3.02 percent in 2000 to 3.24 percent in <b>2004</b>. This share is comparable to the average for low-income African countries but below the 3.8 percent of GDP average of the best performing African countries.</p>	<p><b>December 22 2004</b> FTI sends invitation letter to Mali MoD to participate in FTI</p>
2005	<p><b>March 2005</b>, Paris Declaration, was endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials. Who committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and</p>	<p>Economic situation betters slightly: Mali's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by about 6 percent in 2005 (year on year)</p> <p><b>2005</b> June - World Food Programme warns of severe food shortages, the result of drought and locust infestations in 2004.</p>	<p>The <b>2005 Learning Achievement Assessment (PASEC)</b> shows that just 51.5 percent of the students in grade 2 in Mali achieved the average score in language, and 48.5 percent of students the average score in mathematics. Among students in grade level 5, only 43.1 percent received an average score in language and 42.5 percent received an average score in</p>	

Date	International Context	Mali Context	Education Policy in Mali	FTI in Mali
	<p>management aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.</p> <p>UN World Summit New York, <b>September 2005</b>: delegates were accused of producing a 'watered-down' outcome document which merely reiterates existing pledges.</p> <p><i>Meeting of the Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee Beijing (China)</i> on <b>December 2, 2005</b></p>		<p>mathematics.</p> <p>During <i>ESIP I (Education Sector Investment Programme, also known as Plan d'Investissement Sectoriel de l'Education. PISE i) (2001-2005)</i> most objectives related to increasing access to education and decentralizing the management of Mali's education sector have been achieved. In addition, the country's education budget remained within agreed-upon Medium- Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), and every year, more than 95 percent of the education budget has been implemented.</p>	
2006	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>Educational Roundtable, World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, <b>September 2006</b>, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education MDGs</p> <p><i>FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee meeting</i> took place in <i>Cairo</i> on the <b>12<sup>th</sup> of November 2006</b>. In this meeting the eligibility criteria regarding accessing the Fund were changed, allowing</p>		<p><b>2006 PISE II (2006-2009)</b> is developed through a series of wide consultations with experts, development partners, civil society, etc.</p>	<p>In <b>August 2006</b>, the Government of <i>Mali</i> requested the endorsement of its <b>2<sup>nd</sup> phase of Mali Universal primary plan (PISE 2)</b> by FTI.</p> <p>The in-Country FTI Partners assessed and endorsed the implementation strategy for Mali's ten-year FTI plan in <b>November 2006</b>.</p> <p>In <b>December 2006</b> the Head of FTI Secretariat sent an official letter to endorse the country plan.</p> <p>A Partnership Framework was signed by most major donors, including the French, Canadians, Germans, UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Bank, and monthly coordination meetings are hosted by Mali's Ministry of Education (MOE).</p> <p><i>Estimated &amp; confirmed funding gap: USD 29.5 million over the three-year period 2007-2009</i></p>

Date	International Context	Mali Context	Education Policy in Mali	FTI in Mali
	countries with large number of in-country donors to apply.			<i>Allocation recommendations:</i> USD 8.7 million over the three-year period 2007-2008 from the FTI Catalytic Fund.
2007	<p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session).</p> <p>Keeping our Promises on Education, <b>May 2007</b>, Brussels, organised by the EC, the UK and the World Bank. The objective was to seek concrete proposals and commitments for action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Bonn, Germany, on <b>May 23, 2007</b></i></p> <p>In <b>Oct 2007</b>, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organised an international forum on "Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice." Participants recommended more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting , Dakar, <b>December 10 2007</b></i></p>	<p><b>2007</b> April - President Toure wins a second five-year term in elections.</p> <p><b>2007</b> July - The ruling coalition, Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP), strengthens its hold on parliament in elections.</p>		<p>Allocation of \$8.7 million approved at the CF Strategy Committee meeting, which took place in Bonn Germany on <b>May 23, 2007</b>.</p> <p>Letter informing of grant allocation sent to Mali on <b>June 25 2007</b></p> <p><b>July 3 2007</b> letter from FTI Secretariat to Mali requesting to commence dialogue with the country and local coordinating partners to finalize the objectives and activities to be financed under the FTI grant</p> <p><b>November 8 2007</b> World Bank Project Appraisal Document for the \$8.7 million loan.</p> <p><b>November 23 2007</b>, technical discussions in Bamako with FTI representatives to establish disbursement date. First tranche of \$2.7 million fixed for 15 January 2008.</p> <p><b>November 30 2007</b> Completion of Grant Document Preparation</p> <p><b>4 December 2007</b> Grant Agreement Signed and Finalized.</p>

Date	International Context	Mali Context	Education Policy in Mali	FTI in Mali
				<p><b>December 10 2007</b> <i>Dakar CF meeting</i> Among the six new recipients approved in Bonn, only Mali had signed its grant agreement.</p>
<p><b>2008</b></p>	<p><b>September 2008</b>, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries have agreed to end the fragmentation of aid. Donors agreed to donate half of aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects. Donors have also agreed to coordinate aid better.  <i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Tokyo, April 22, 2008</i></p>		<p><b>2008</b> Seven months of secondary teacher strikes in the country. Teachers are asking the government to give them a US\$142 housing allowance, calling for contract teachers' salaries to be increased and for salaries to go up year on year as teachers remain in the system.</p>	<p><b>FTI CF</b> Disbursement of USD 2.2m in 2008</p>

## Annex B – Evolution of Service Delivery Inputs, Outputs and Outcomes over Time

	1996	99/2000	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
classroom construction			2810 (6000 planned)							
GER (1st cycle)										
all	43,0%	56,6%		64,3%	67,0%	70,5%	74,0%	75,0%	75,6%	78,2%
girls	34,0%	46,0%		53,7%	56,4%	59,9%	63,4%	67,0%	68,7%	71,1%
boys				75,3%	77,9%	81,3%	85,0%	81,5%	82,8%	85,6%
Completion rate class 6										
all						41,6%	43,2%	48,5%	53,2%	53,3%
girls								38,4%	42,9%	44,1%
boys								58,7%	63,9%	62,7%
pupils obtaining average marks in reading class 2							51,0%			49,6%
pupils obtaining average marks in maths class 2							48,0%			41,8%
pupils obtaining average marks in reading class 5							43,0%			
pupils obtaining average marks in maths class 5							42,0%			
Repetition rate 1st cycle:										
all		22,0%	17,6%	19,5%	19,8%	19,0%	18,6%	17,0%	15,0%	14,2%
girls				20,0%	20,0%	19,3%	18,9%	17,3%	15,5%	14,4%
boys				19,2%	19,6%	18,7%	18,4%	16,7%	15,2%	14,0%
Ratio school books French, 1st cycle	1/3			1/3						
Ratio school books maths, 1st cycle				1/2						
Ratio school books 2nd cycle						2,5	2,5	2,9	3,1	3,94
Ratio pupils/teachers, 1st cycle	78			73		57	54	53		65
Nb of additional communaute teachers trained							200			2050
Percent teachers having recieved initial 6 months training						28,0%	35,0%	36,7%	40,0%	40,9%
Transition rate basic/general secondary						40,2%	32,7%	30,7%	40,2%	37,3%
GER 2nd cycle										
all							38,0%	41,5%		
girls							28,5%	31,1%		
GER secondary							30,0%	32,0%		
GER higher							4,6%	5,1%		
Literacy rate > 15 years old					22,9%	24,0%	25,1%	26,3%		
Literacy rate women				15,9%	16,7%	17,6%	18,5%	15,9%		
Education share in budget				11,8%	14,1%	15,4%	15,1%	17,0%		
Education share in recurrent budget				29,2%	30,7%	30,0%	30,3%	30,1%		
Vocational training										
number of schooled and non schooled youngsters trained								790	2636	3234
number of centres equipped								3	(100 planned)	
number of trained CED finalists								2938	(53% planned)	
nubre of young non schooled trained								2929	(11% planned)	
								3408	(15% planned)	

Source: ODI, Mokoro 2009 p.7

## Annex C - Regional disparities in the education sector in Mali

Source: RESEN - GoM, Pole de Dakar, World Bank (2006)

**Table C1: Gross Enrolment Rate in Primary (fondamental I) according to gender and region (2004/05)**

	TBS Garçons (%)	TBS Filles (%)	TBS Ensemble (%)	Indice de parité filles/garçons
Bamako	114,7	97,5	105,5	0,85
Gao	100,2	87,8	94,1	0,88
Kayes	62,5	37,5	49,5	0,60
Kidal	76,1	44,7	59,8	0,59
Koulikoro	118,6	95,3	107,8	0,80
Mopti	49,8	50,8	50,3	1,02
Ségou	77,6	45,4	59,9	0,58
Sikasso	98,4	69,4	83,7	0,71
Tombouctou	46,1	46,3	46,2	1,01
<b>Ensemble</b>	<b>82,9</b>	<b>61,9</b>	<b>72,2</b>	<b>0,75</b>

**Table C2: Access, retention and completion in Primary according to gender and region (2004/05)**

Région	Enseignement fondamental 1											
	Taux d'accès en 1 <sup>ère</sup> année du cycle				Taux d'achèvement du cycle				Taux de Rétention ZZ			
	Garçons	Filles	Ensemble	F / G	Garçons	Filles	Ensemble	F / G	Garçons	Filles	Ensemble	F / G
Bamako	99,6	84,8	91,7	0,85	92,0	73,8	82,3	0,80	89,4	93,6	91,5	1,05
Gao	102,8	98,7	100,8	0,96	33,9	21,1	27,7	0,62	39,2	34,5	37,4	0,88
Kayes	55,5	38,3	46,6	0,69	31,3	13,9	22,3	0,44	85,8	60,5	75,4	0,70
Kidal	106,3	62,7	83,7	0,59	26,0	18,5	22,1	0,71	37,0	54,4	43,0	1,47
Koulikoro	108,2	91,9	100,6	0,85	84,6	58,8	72,6	0,69	103,1	92,9	98,9	0,90
Mopti	44,5	49,3	46,8	1,11	30,0	22,8	26,6	0,76	69,6	62,3	66,5	0,89
Ségou	72,0	46,3	57,9	0,64	50,7	24,9	36,5	0,49	79,1	64,7	72,9	0,82
Sikasso	90,7	65,6	78,0	0,72	61,2	37,2	49,0	0,61	75,1	67,2	71,9	0,89
Tombouctou	43,9	46,7	45,2	1,06	19,8	14,4	17,3	0,73	35,1	26,6	31,3	0,76
<b>Ensemble</b>	<b>75,6</b>	<b>59,8</b>	<b>67,6</b>	<b>0,79</b>	<b>52,7</b>	<b>33,8</b>	<b>43,1</b>	<b>0,64</b>	<b>80,5</b>	<b>71,4</b>	<b>76,6</b>	<b>0,89</b>

**Table C3: Access, retention and completion in Secondary (fondamental II) according to gender and region (2004/05)**

Régions	Enseignement fondamental 2											
	% transition fondamental 1-2				% d'accès en 1 <sup>ère</sup> année du cycle				% d'achèvement du cycle			
	Garçons	Filles	Ensemble	F / G	Garçons	Filles	Ensemble	F / G	Garçons	Filles	Ensemble	F / G
Bamako	95,4	87,4	91,6	0,92	68,4	52,9	60,3	0,77	55,5	45,2	50,2	0,82
Gao	88,4	60,5	77,3	0,68	47,6	22,6	35,4	0,48	41,1	21,6	31,5	0,53
Kayes	72,2	67,9	70,8	0,94	30,9	12,9	21,7	0,42	21,7	7,4	14,3	0,34
Kidal	77,1	66,1	73,3	0,86	36,9	16,8	26,9	0,45	31,7	16,4	24,2	0,52
Koulikoro	83,3	76,4	80,8	0,92	57,5	29,0	42,9	0,50	37,3	15,7	26,2	0,42
Mopti	83,3	75,9	80,4	0,91	27,4	15,1	21,0	0,55	17,6	8,0	12,6	0,45
Ségou	81,1	76,9	79,6	0,95	34,3	20,4	27,5	0,60	26,0	14,3	20,4	0,55
Sikasso	66,8	56,7	62,8	0,85	35,1	19,7	27,4	0,56	30,0	13,1	21,6	0,44
Tombouctou	75,8	69,4	73,4	0,92	30,7	14,5	22,1	0,47	23,3	8,8	15,4	0,38
<b>Ensemble</b>	<b>80,5</b>	<b>74,1</b>	<b>78,0</b>	<b>0,92</b>	<b>41,8</b>	<b>24,6</b>	<b>33,1</b>	<b>0,59</b>	<b>31,8</b>	<b>17,3</b>	<b>24,5</b>	<b>0,55</b>