

Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative

Country Case Study: Nigeria

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Summary information for Nigeria

- Currency = Nigerian Naira (NGN)
- Exchange Rate (31 December 2008) USD 1 = NGN 148
- Fiscal Year = 1 January – 31 December
- School year = September-June
- Structure of education system:
 - 6 years primary + 3 years junior secondary school + 3 years senior secondary school
 - + 4 years of tertiary
- Population: 148 million
- Population growth rate: 2.83% p.a.

Acknowledgements

The team would like to thank all those in Nigeria who gave of their time and energy to help the team complete the study and collect the information needed within the tight timescale.

Findings and opinions in this report are those of the evaluation team and should not be ascribed to any of the agencies that sponsored the study.

Preface

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) is linked both to the Education for All (EFA) goals and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FTI was launched in 2002, and has now been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership has recognised the need to evaluate whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself. This country study will contribute to the overall evaluation which will provide an opportunity for reform and change if necessary.

As stated in the Terms of Reference:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels.

The evaluation will draw lessons learned from the FTI's strengths and weaknesses and make a series of recommendations to further improve future partnership programming and effectiveness. Most importantly it is hoped that, as a result of this evaluation, progress towards expanding and enhancing educational opportunities will be strengthened.

The evaluation is independent but is jointly supported by a consortium of donors. The evaluation is taking place between November 2008 and December 2009. The Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC) is made up of representatives from the donor community, partner countries and civil society. It is coordinated by Joe DeStefano (email: jdestefano@futureofschooling.org).

The evaluation team is a consortium of three companies Cambridge Education, Mokoro and Oxford Policy Management (OPM).

The evaluation includes nine country case studies in Cambodia, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen.

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For regular updates about the evaluation and the most recent outputs please refer to the evaluation website at: www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative.

This report has been discussed with the originator and checked in the light of the requirements of the terms of reference. In addition the report has been checked to ensure editorial consistencies.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

S1 This is one of nine country studies being carried out as part of the mid-term evaluation of the Education for All (EFA) Fast Track Initiative (FTI). The FTI was launched in 2002 by a partnership of donors and recipient countries to “accelerate progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015”. The FTI has now been running for half its expected lifetime. The FTI partnership has commissioned an independent evaluation to see whether it is achieving the goals it has set itself.

S2 The evaluation is taking place between November 2008 and December 2009. A Preliminary Report was made available for the FTI Partnership Meetings in Copenhagen in April 2009, and the full draft report will be circulated for comment in November 2009. A full explanation of the evaluation, its methodology and its timetable is provided in the *Evaluation Framework*, available from the study website at www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative.

The Context for FTI in Nigeria

S3 Nigeria is a Federal Republic divided into 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory at Abuja and has three tiers of government – federal, state and local. The Nigerian education system is decentralized under this Federal structure, and the 1999 Constitution assigns concurrent responsibility to all three tiers of government. The administration of the education system is shared between the Federal and state Ministries of Education as well as 21 statutory bodies referred to as Commissions and Boards. At state level State Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs), supported by 774 local government education authorities (LGEAs), are responsible for basic education. Unclear roles and responsibilities among the three tiers of government have caused confusion, duplication, and sometimes rivalry in the discharge of responsibilities. National Education Strategy is defined by the 2004 National Policy on Education, and the 2004 Universal Basic Education Act provides for a unitary basic education sub-sector of 9 years of free and compulsory basic education for all children. A 2006-7 presidential commission on education reported that the sector was in crisis and that nothing less than major renewal of all systems and institutions was required.

S4 It is difficult to provide a picture of Nigeria’s current status with respect to the EFA goals or to comment on the prospects for reaching the goals by 2015 due to the dearth of reliable education data. The 2005 school census suggests a national primary Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 95% with rates of 103% for boys and 86% for girls and a Net Enrolment Rate (NER) of 63% (68% for boys and 59% for girls). Two household surveys undertaken in 2003 and 2005 recorded overall net enrolment rates of 60% and 46%. A comparison of survey results for 1999 with those for 2006 suggests that the primary GER increased from 87% to 92% and the NER from 59% to 62%. However, all of these estimates mask significant variations across the country. Surveys suggest that whilst almost every child in the southern states enters school at some point, in some of the northern states only 30-45% do so. The 2009 EFA Global Monitoring Report reports that Nigeria has more primary age children out of school than any other country in the world and trend projections to 2015 suggest a gross primary enrolment rate of around 105% and a net enrolment rate of just over 70%. The Federal Ministry of Education (FME) estimates a GER for pre-school of 2.6% for 2005 and the World Bank states the illiteracy rate had fallen from 52% to 43% since 1991.

S5 There is little data available on learning achievement. However scores on the UNESCO/UNICEF Minimum Levels of Learning studies conducted in 2003 across four subjects range from 25% to 50% for Grade 4, whilst Grade 6 scores range from 21% to 40%.

A study reported by the World Bank found the learning achievements of students in Nigeria's primary schools to be the lowest amongst 22 countries in sub-Saharan and North Africa.

S6 Since 2003, the Federal government has taken some steps to improve public financial management, however sub-national governments are not required to inform or seek approval from the Federal Government on their budget or fiscal performance. Beyond the attempts by the Federal Government to limit the distribution of government revenues in those years when the oil price is significantly above medium term expectations, no national fiscal framework encompasses all budgets. No statutory mechanisms are in place to ensure that state plans are aligned with national goals, though some effort was made to encourage this following the successful conclusions of debt relief negotiations in 2005.

S7 Public expenditure on education in Nigeria is funded by the Federal, state and local governments. Financial responsibility for basic education is split largely between the state and local governments. A recent study, based on Federal Government expenditures and those of nine state governments and their respective local governments, estimated that total public expenditure on education was equal to between 4.7% and 5.2% of GDP, with state governments funding 43%, the Federal Government 31%, and the local governments 26%. However there are wide regional variations between states, and within states between different local government areas. Expenditure shares across education levels were roughly 32% primary, 31% secondary and 30% tertiary, with the remainder spread across other sector activities.

S8 The EFA GMR 2009 cites Nigeria as one of the countries struggling with the impact of poor governance on the education sector. Poor governance is significantly slowing progress towards EFA and undermining the quality of basic education services. Despite recognition on the part of government of the need to promote good governance, increase accountability and enhance the role of civil society, institutional arrangements remain complex and lack transparency. There is little accountability, monitoring mechanisms are weak and corruption remains a very significant problem.

S9 Apart from debt relief, total external aid to Nigeria since 1999 has been comparatively small (less than 2% of total government expenditure). Between 1999 and 2005, the average annual commitment to the education sector was USD69 million and in 2006 it was USD80 million – around just 7% of all sector allocable aid, and (very) roughly equal to just 1% of total public expenditure on education. Since 1999 the major donors, in order, have been IDA and the UK (together providing 73%) followed by the United States, Germany, France and Japan (together providing 19%). Since 1999, almost half of the aid for the education sector has been for basic education and IDA and the UK have together been responsible for over four fifths of this. Other donors to basic education include the United States (9%), Japan (4%) and UNICEF (3%). France and Germany, concentrate their education aid on scholarships for tertiary education. In all, external support for basic education in Nigeria has been very limited – less than 2% of total sub sector expenditure and among the very smallest per capita allocations across less developed countries worldwide.

The FTI in Nigeria

S10 Nigeria's formal engagement with FTI commenced in 2002 at the FTI launch in Washington. A so-called "analytical fast track" was launched to support countries that did not yet have a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or a costed Education Sector Plan (ESP). However, despite an original target date of 2008 for Nigeria to join the FTI, it has proved challenging to identify practically how the FTI can support Nigeria. Despite discussions between the FTI Secretariat and successive World Bank education task team leaders, no further tangible progress has been made towards endorsement.

S11 Over the period 1999-2005 Nigeria did, however, receive USD 1,247,000 from the Norwegian Education Trust Fund as part of the World Bank UBE project, the largest amount given to any country during this period, and a small amount of EPDF funds have been drawn

upon to finance workshops and a visit to Nigeria by a World Bank staff member to informally review three states' education sector plans.

S12 However over the last few months two meetings have been held in Abuja under the auspices of the World Bank, involving Federal and state education officials and education donors and civil society. It is understood that in principle the World Bank envisages that a small number of states could join the FTI from 2010, initially accessing EPDF funds to finance the development of costed, sector plans. Nevertheless, outstanding issues around the modality of FTI engagement in Nigeria remain unresolved.

Education Policy and Planning

S13 The National Framework for Education in Nigeria specifies a set of policies, strategies and targets that encompass the 6 EFA Goals and are consistent with the FTI objectives. A national EFA plan was published in 2007 and an EFA unit within the FME is responsible for coordinating with state level EFA offices located within the state Ministries of Education. However funding remains an issue, and the EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR) 2008 identifies Nigeria as being at risk of not achieving EFA by 2015.

S14 Government reports and interviews with key education stakeholders in Nigeria describe weak systems of planning and budgeting, with little involvement of civil society. Constitutional restrictions on the role that the FME may play in the delivery of basic education limit effective sector wide monitoring of the sector. Poor governance and corruption further undermine the effective implementation of policy at state and local levels.

S15 There is currently no costed, national education sector plan linking policy, planning and budgeting for the education sector, and there is currently no obligation upon states to produce costed sector plans, nor to report on progress towards UPC. Similarly, whilst the Federal government has established the UBE Intervention (see S18 below) to help states finance basic education, there is no requirement for funding applications to be informed by clearly set out, costed sector plans.

S16 There is no established forum for government and donors to conduct a dialogue around support for the sector, in spite of several donor efforts over time. Donor assistance over the last 10 years has been project focused, albeit with large-scale sector programmes. With donor assistance, a small number of states have produced costed education sector plans.

Education Financing

S17 A lack of accurate information on aggregate education expenditures means that no plausible estimates exist of the financial requirements – total, domestic or donor – needed to achieve universal primary or basic education across the country. To reiterate (S7), best estimates are that total public expenditure on education in Nigeria is equal to around 5% of GDP, and that state governments fund around 43% of the total, the Federal government 31% and local governments 26%.

S18 In addition to state and local government revenues, the primary education sub sector can benefit from two funds financed by the Federal Government, the UBE- Intervention Fund (UBE-IF) introduced in 2005 and the Virtual Poverty Fund (VPF), introduced following the debt relief negotiations in 2006 – plus the Education Trust Fund (ETF) which is financed by a levy on large firms. The former two require matching funds from the state governments. Currently, around USD150 million of funds allocated by the ETF have not been disbursed and of the N95 billion (USD630 million) allocated to the UBE IF between 2005 and the end of March 2008, only N43 billion had been released. The three funds, particularly the UBE-IF, can be seen as Nigeria's home grown FTI Catalytic Fund. Administrative obstacles and policy disagreements will need to be overcome before these Funds' resources are being fully utilized.

S19 External aid is, and is always likely to be, only a very marginal source of finance for public expenditures on primary education in Nigeria. Even very substantial multiples of current aid would have little impact on the gap between the current level of funding and the amount required to provide all children with a quality education. Some recent donor supported activities have resulted in some state governments producing, with external consultants, costed, education sector plans and support is on-going in several states that are attempting to improve their budget systems. Nevertheless states vary in their reform efforts with progress primarily dependent on the degree of local political commitment.

FTI, Data and Monitoring and Evaluation

S20 The lack of accurate data on basic education, nationally and at state levels, is universally acknowledged in Nigeria. All indicators of education outcomes and efficiency are estimates. There is no usable time series data and no results from the 2006 and 2007 school censuses have yet been published. Coverage of the private sector is not comprehensive nor, and of particular relevance to some northern states, is the treatment of children who are enrolled in various forms of Islamic institutions, some of which also offer conventional core primary school subjects. More importantly, the quality of basic reporting, and collating of education data is low with few incentives for their improvement.

S21 Regular data on learning achievement in the schools are not being collected. Between 2000 and 2003, three national surveys were undertaken but there have been none since. The one planned for 2009 is now not expected to take place.

S22 There is some evidence that perceptions of the need for accurate data on the education system and for some sort of monitoring system are increasing. This is the case particularly in states which give some priority to sector improvement; however it is difficult to see how the Federal Government can persuade all state governments to improve the quality of data which they collect.

S23 Donors have consistently pointed to the lack of quality data for the education system emphasising that this is an essential requirement for realistic planning and for the preparation of donor-supported programmes. Since 2003 there has been considerable donor support to strengthen EMIS systems and assistance to improve data on expenditures at Federal level and in selected states. However, it is not clear that improvements have been sustained and regular detailed monitoring of basic education is, in general, not occurring at either Federal or state level. In a situation where reliable data is likely to remain a problem in the medium term, an assessment would need to be made by the donors of what would be acceptable to trigger more large-scale support.

FTI and Capacity Building

S24 The Nigerian education sector suffers from weak capacity at the institutional, organisational and individual levels. A weak institutional framework with multiple agencies with overlapping roles and responsibilities remains unreformed despite efforts to do this in the period prior to the last elections in early 2007.

S25 Individual Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) are poorly resourced, inappropriately staffed and lack basic performance management systems to ensure the quality of services. Education administration is characterised by weak planning and budgeting, poor financial management and procurement practices and weak implementation.

S26 The quality of individual managers, education officials and teachers is generally agreed to be poor, with many un- or under-qualified for their roles. Basic education services are of low quality and learning outcomes unsatisfactory.

S27 There is no overarching capacity development strategy and no set of plans for this is in place across the education sector. However the FME is accessing the Virtual Poverty Fund

to finance a number of strategies to strengthen teacher deployment and teacher quality and to provide for the training of school-based management committees across the country. Currently the National Institute for Education Planning and Administration (NIEPA), a parastatal, is not fulfilling its mandate to train education planners and managers due to the lack of a statutory framework, limited capacity and limited resources. The states visited do not have overarching capacity development plans in place and are making very limited use of the UBE Intervention Fund resources earmarked for this purpose.

S28 Since 1999, external assistance for capacity development has been provided by a number of donor financed projects that have focused primarily on individual skills development. Efforts to build the capacity of the EMIS have had limited effect. To date, support to develop NIEPA has not produced tangible benefits. DFID's current suite of Lead State Programmes is adopting a more strategic approach in targeting sector capacity development as part of a broader strategy to strengthen governance in the public sector. However there is currently no harmonised donor approach to capacity development and limited demonstrated political will by state governments to invest the resources required.

FTI and Aid Effectiveness

S29 With a very few exceptions there has been little movement on the aid effectiveness agenda subscribed to by the FTI partnership (in line with, but preceding the Paris Declaration) in Nigeria since donors began to re-establish aid relations in 1999. The required minimum prerequisites, namely a government eager to engage with donors and to merge the activities of all stakeholders around a costed set of activities derived from a national programme do not exist. The lack of engagement partly reflects a situation in which Nigeria has never received large quantities of aid. For several decades, the Federal Government has not recognised the need for aid while it has benefited from large revenues from the energy sector and at the same time donors' have questioned the quality of governance and the Federal government's willingness to improve this.

S30 While countries such as Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Zambia and Ethiopia have been recipients of large amounts of aid and have, over time, attempted to reduce the often distorting nature of that support through discussions with donors and the development of new aid relationships and processes, Nigeria has stood apart from such dialogue, or has attempted to take a parallel track. For instance, a prerequisite for debt relief and budget support (and for FTI endorsement) since 1999 has been the preparation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Nigeria, like India, has not been willing to take this route but rather produced its own document – the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) – which in the case of debt relief the donors agreed to accept as a document around which they might harmonise and align their own support.

S31 The main attempts to harmonise donor programmes in Nigeria have occurred between the World Bank and DFID which have had a Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) in place since 2005. Most aid activities have been, and are, being delivered through traditional single-donor investment projects and there appear to be few joint donor activities – such as joint review missions – which are common in most other aid-recipient countries, but which tend to be based around support to a single government programme.

S32 At various times over the past five years, the education donor group has sought to engage with the Federal Government for the purposes of aligning donor assistance with Government priorities. However discussions have occurred only rarely and, overall, the Ministry has shown little enthusiasm for dialogue with donors as a group and none of the donors channel financial support through the budget of either the Federal Government or any state government.

S33 A significant change in donor relations over the past decade, not however directly linked to the effectiveness agenda, has been the strengthened relationship between donors and particular state governments with, perhaps, less emphasis on the donor-Federal

Government relationship. In principle, the FTI could be a vehicle for increasing Federal (or state) government ownership of plans for the education sector, and for improving both harmonisation between donors and alignment between donors and governments.

Cross-Cutting Issues

S34 Key cross-cutting challenges facing the education sector discussed in this report are equitable access, religious and private education and HIV/AIDS. Governance is an important cross-cutting issue which has been threaded throughout the report. Significant regional disparities in access favour south over north, boys over girls and urban over rural. In 2005 Nigeria missed achieving the EFA gender parity goal in primary education as agreed to at Dakar in 2000. The FME has developed a national policy on gender in basic education. Whilst the gap is reducing, it remains widest amongst the poorest and amongst children in rural areas, particularly in the North and in the Niger Delta.

S35 Current estimates suggest that there are 9,019 non-governmental schools at primary level with an enrolment of 1,578,635 children. It is estimated that 60% of these schools are commercial, 27% are owned by religious organisations and 13% are community owned. In northern Nigeria significant numbers of children attend Islamic, Tsangaya or Qur'anic (ITQ) schools and in some states efforts are being made to integrate religious and secular schools. However currently there is no strategy in place to address the challenges faced by a growing group of Muslim children in the North referred to as the "Al Majiri" children.

S36 Nigeria is estimated to have the third highest HIV case load in the world after India and South Africa: 3.7 million adults are living with the virus. However the integration of HIV/AIDS policy within the education sector is limited despite the development of a national policy on HIV/AIDS and the production of a set of implementation guidelines. This is attributed to an absence of reliable information, a culture of denial, and weak capacity within the sector to implement strategy.

S37 Development partners have supported and continue to support the Nigerian government to address the gender gap, most notably through policy dialogue and funding the Girls' Education Project in northern Nigeria. Similarly some of the donors are assisting a small number of northern states to develop policies and strategies around the integration of ITQ schools. While external assistance to address the challenge of HIV/AIDS in the education sector has been aligned with government priorities; it has not to date made a significant impact. Whilst donors emphasize the importance of good governance in the education sector, direct assistance in this area is limited to the small number of states where DFID's education and governance programmes are active.

Overall Conclusions and Reflections

S38 In the context of a non-endorsed country, the high level questions which have been formulated for the country case studies have been reframed to consider whether the objectives and approach of FTI are relevant to the priorities within the education sector in Nigeria. To the extent that they are, the report considers some of the implications for Nigeria and the FTI of working together.

S39 The Federal Government considers the EFA and MDG education goals to be one of the country's main priorities. In principle, given the high number of out of school children in Nigeria, and the relatively low levels of per capita income, aid per capita and planning and implementation capacity, the need for effective policies and additional external support is as valid for Nigeria as it is for other already endorsed countries. The main issues include whether the Federal Government is willing to be associated with the FTI; if so, what would be (and would not be) the most relevant form of external support; the modalities through which support could be offered; and the implications for the FTI Secretariat and the local (education) donor group if endorsement were to be sought.

S40 FTI has limited experience working in Federal states and so far there has been limited communication between the FTI and the Federal Government. Despite more recent, tentative plans for engagement and some limited discussions it remains unclear how Nigeria might join the FTI and seek endorsement if the Federal Government seeks to do so.

S41 Nigeria lacks a credible, costed national education sector plan. Indeed, given the strong federal nature of the country it is unclear whether such a plan covering activities across 36 states would be required or could be relevant. More manageable would be state sector plans bedded within overall state development policies and strategies. These would then be accompanied by Federal Government statements of national education policies and a detailed set of the steps that Government would be taking to support education, particularly basic education, across the states. If the focus is on state sector plans, the values of some aspects of the Indicative Framework (including the government expenditure norms) would need to be adapted. More generally, though, education sector data remains a problem and decisions would have to be taken about minimum acceptable levels of reliability.

S42 Nigeria has her own catalytic funds, most notably the UBE Intervention Fund, which is not being accessed to the extent possible by the state governments through their SUBEBs. A reduction of the administrative and policy obstacles which are limiting the usefulness of the funds need to be given priority prior to adding a further layer of available funding such as the FTI Catalytic Fund. Equally, there is an argument that the deployment of the Intervention Fund should be more clearly linked to state education sector plans.

S43 In principle FTI could play a role in helping to build capacity at both Federal and state levels utilising EPDF funds. However, given the likely overall size of the financing gap across all states and the finite resources available and given the challenges of capacity, data and weak governance, any assistance to states would need to be well targeted to those with a real and demonstrated commitment to use their own resources effectively.

S44 Furthermore, if Nigeria is to join the FTI and seek endorsement of education plans, there will be implications for both the FTI Secretariat, particularly if the process is not to be driven by only one or more of the donors, and for the local (education) donor group. Initially the FTI Secretariat may need to be directly involved in discussing/negotiating the requirements and processes. At the same time, the in-country staffing of the education donors would need to be assessed to determine whether the provision of support for the endorsement process, and subsequently for monitoring the deployment and impact of any FTI inputs across a potentially large number of states, would need to be upgraded.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|----------|--|
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| CATI | Community Accountability and Transparency Initiative |
| CESR | Country Education Sector Report |
| CF | Catalytic Fund |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| CSACEFA | Civil Society Action Coalition on Education For All |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| CUBE | Capacity for Universal Basic Education |
| CWIQ | Cluster Welfare Indicator Questionnaire |
| DFID | Department for International Development (UK) |
| DHS | Demographic and Health Survey |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECF | Expanded Catalytic Fund |
| ECCE | Early Childhood Care and Education |
| EDI | EFA Global Development Index |
| EFA | Education For All |
| EMIS | Education Monitoring and Information System |
| EOC | Evaluation Oversight Committee |
| EPDF | Education Programme Development Fund |
| EPDC | Education Policy Data Centre |
| ESA | Education Sector Analysis |
| ESSPIN | Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria |
| ETF | Education Trust Fund |
| FCT | Federal Capital Territory |
| FLHE | Family Life Health Education |
| FME | Federal Ministry of Education |
| FTI | Fast Track Initiative |
| GBS | General Budget Support |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GER | Gross Enrolment Rate |
| GEP | Girls Education Programme |
| GMR | Global Monitoring Report |
| HIPC | Highly Indebted Poor Country |
| HIV/AIDS | Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| IDA | International Development Association |
| IF | Indicative Framework |
| IFT | Initiative Fast Track |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| ITQ | Islamic, Tsangaya or Qur'anic |
| JICA | Japanese International Cooperation Agency |
| LDG | Local Donor Group |
| NACA | National Agency for the Control of AIDS |
| NGEI | Nigerian Girls' Education Initiative |
| M&E | Monitoring and evaluation |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MICS | Multi Indicator Cluster Survey |
| MIS | Management information system |
| MoE | Ministry of Education |
| MTEF | Medium-Term Expenditure Framework |
| NER | Net Enrolment Rate |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NLSS | Nigeria Living Standard Survey |
| NTEF | Norwegian Education Trust Fund |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance |
| DAC | Committee |
| OPM | Oxford Policy Management |

| | |
|--------|--|
| PAD | Project Appraisal Document |
| PCR | Primary Completion Rate |
| PEP | Primary Education Project |
| PEPFAR | US President's Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief |
| PFM | Public Financial Management |
| PLWHA | People living with HIV and AIDS |
| PRSC | Poverty Reduction Support Credit |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan |
| PTA | Parent Teacher Association |
| PTR | Pupil-Teacher Ratio |
| SACA | State Agency for the Control of Aids |
| SAGEN | Strategy for Acceleration of Girls' Education in Nigeria |
| SBMC | School Based Management Committee |
| SBS | Sector Budget Support |
| SESP | State Education Sector Project (World Bank) |
| SNDIPE | National Strategy for an Integrated Development of Early Childhood |
| SWAp | Sector-wide approach |
| UBEC | Universal Basic Education Board |
| UBEP | Universal Basic Education Project (World Bank) |
| UBE IF | Universal Basic Education Intervention Fund |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UPC | Universal Primary Completion |
| UPE | Universal Primary Education |
| Unicef | United Nations Children's Fund |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USD | United States Dollar |
| VPF | Virtual Poverty Fund |
| WAEMU | West African Economic and Monetary Union |
| WB | World Bank |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

PART A: APPROACH

1 Introduction

The Fast Track Initiative¹

1.1 The Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) is an evolving partnership of developing and donor countries and agencies. Its main objective is “accelerating progress towards the core EFA goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015.”² It was established in 2002 by 22 bilateral donors, development banks and international agencies, prompted by the 2000 Dakar World Forum on Education, which yielded both the current EFA goals and a commitment to increased financial support for basic education.³ Also, as an outgrowth of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, FTI was designed as a compact that “explicitly links increased donor support for primary education to recipient countries’ improvements in policy performance and accountability for results.”⁴

1.2 According to its *Framework* document (2004), the FTI’s major contributions to accelerated UPC would be by supporting:

- Sound sector policies in education
- More efficient aid for primary education
- Sustained increases in aid for primary education
- Adequate and sustainable domestic financing for education
- Increased accountability for sector results.

1.3 Through such contributions to country progress on EFA goals, the FTI aspired to help countries close four gaps: financial, policy, capacity and data.⁵

1.4 The 2004 FTI Framework set out the following guiding principles:

- **Country-ownership:** the FTI is a country-driven process, with the primary locus of activity and decision-making at the country level;
- **Benchmarking:** the FTI encourages the use of indicative benchmarks (the FTI Indicative Framework), locally adapted, to stimulate and enlighten debate over policies, to facilitate reporting of progress on both policies and performance, and to enhance mutual learning among countries on what works to improve primary education outcomes;
- **Support linked to performance:** The FTI is intended to provide more sustained, predictable and flexible support to countries that have demonstrated commitment to the goal of UPC, adopted policies in full consideration of a locally adapted FTI Indicative Framework, and have a need for, and the capacity to use effectively, incremental external resources;
- **Lower transaction costs:** The FTI encourages donor actions to provide resources to developing countries in a manner which minimises transaction costs for recipient countries (and for the agencies themselves);
- **Transparency:** The FTI encourages the open sharing of information on the policies and practices of participating countries and donors alike.

¹ This description draws on the Terms of Reference for the evaluation (see Evaluation Framework, Annex A).

² Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (2004), Accelerating progress towards quality universal primary education: framework, p. 3.

³ The Dakar Forum communiqué stated that “No countries seriously committed to Education for All will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources.”

⁴ EFA-FTI Framework., p.3.

⁵ See www.education-fast-track.org, “About FTI.”

1.5 In line with these principles, support for participating countries is based on the endorsement of a national education sector plan (over 30 countries have now been endorsed), with help being available during the endorsement process. Endorsement is intended to facilitate coordinated support from donors engaged in the education sector. There are also two FTI-specific instruments which can provide support at country level:

- The **Catalytic Fund** set up to provide grant financing for eligible countries. The Fund had disbursed USD 396 million to 20 countries as of November 2008.
- The **Education Program Development Fund (EPDF)** set up to provide eligible countries access to grant financing for capacity building (e.g., analytic work for planning and budgeting or training) and to support cross-country learning experiences. The EPDF had disbursed USD 28.8 million (of USD 58.5 million committed) to over 60 countries as of December 2008.

1.6 The World Bank is the trustee for both these funds, and also hosts the FTI Secretariat in Washington DC.

1.7 The FTI's management arrangements and operating procedures have evolved considerably, and are still being refined. (The timeline at Annex B of this report includes a summary of the main changes in FTI, as well as its involvement with Nigeria).

Purpose and Outputs of the Evaluation

1.8 The FTI partnership has commissioned an independent mid-term evaluation. This takes place at the mid-point between the FTI's establishment and the MDG target date of 2015. It is therefore designed both to assess progress so far and to offer guidance for the FTI's future work. According to the TOR:

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of FTI to date in accelerating progress towards achievement of EFA goals in participating countries, with particular attention to country movement towards universal primary completion (UPC). The evaluation will also assess FTI's contributions to improving aid effectiveness at both the country and global levels. The evaluation will assess the Initiative's added value, identify lessons learned from its strengths and weaknesses, and formulate recommendations for improved partnership programming and effectiveness. (TOR, ¶12)

1.9 The evaluation is being managed by an independent Evaluation Oversight Committee (EOC), and the evaluation process is meant to take account of the viewpoints of all stakeholders and encourage their involvement in debating the issues it raises. The main outputs are:

| | |
|--|---|
| Evaluation Framework (final version dated January 2009) | This describes the agreed methodology and the detailed work programme of the evaluation. |
| Preliminary Report (Made available for the Partnership Meetings in Copenhagen, April 2009) | Initial findings from the global desk analysis (Stage 1 of the evaluation), proposals for further work during Stage 2, and to promote discussion of emerging issues amongst stakeholders. |
| Country Studies (in-country research for the pilot studies in January–February; for the additional studies in May–June 2009) | Two pilot studies during Stage 1; a further seven country studies during Stage 2. Separate country reports will be published, to feed into the full report. |
| Draft Full Report (November 2009) | The main substantive report, circulated in draft form to allow extensive review and comment. |
| Final Full Report | December 2009. |

Evaluation Methodology

1.10 The biggest challenge in evaluating the FTI is to disentangle the activities and effects of FTI itself from those that would have occurred anyway. The approach adopted is *contribution analysis*. This involves a thorough review of the context and of overall results in the education sector, linked to a good understanding of what the FTI's inputs and activities were, and of the effects that they were intended to have. Available qualitative and quantitative evidence is then used to assess what contribution (positive or negative) FTI may have made to the overall results observed.

The Role of Country Studies

1.11 The work programme for the evaluation envisages nine full country case studies. According to the TOR:

Case studies are expected to be used in this evaluation as a means of developing greater insight into country-level processes, accomplishments, and problems, all in the context of each country, thus making a contribution to the lessons-learned part of the evaluation. (TOR ¶21)

1.12 The selected countries represent a range of country contexts and a range of different experiences with FTI.⁶ Each country study is a contribution to the overall evaluation. It is not a full evaluation of the education sector, nor is it linked with the FTI's processes for country endorsement and allocation of funding. However, the case studies are being conducted in close collaboration with the country stakeholders in FTI, and it is expected that their reports will be of value to the countries concerned.

1.13 The country studies take account of the different perspectives of different stakeholders and consider the different streams of effects (education policy and planning, education finance, capacity, data and M&E, aid effectiveness) which FTI is intended to have. They aim to establish outcomes ("results on the ground") and to assess whether and how FTI inputs may have contributed to those results. (See Annex A for more details on the methodology and the approach to country studies.)

The Study Process for Nigeria

1.14 The country case studies are based on substantial preliminary research, followed by a country visit, then the drafting of a country case study report.

1.15 The visit to Nigeria took place between the 16th and 30th of May 2009. The Country Study team consisted of Nick Santcross (Country Study Team Leader), Keith Hinchliffe, Anthea Sims Williams, Sulleiman Adediran and Felicia Onibon.

1.16 The team met a range of stakeholders from the government – at both Federal and state level, in particular representatives from ministries of education. The team also met with donor, NGO and civil society representatives in four selected states and at federal level.

1.17 Due to the limited time available the team focused the evaluation study in four states: Enugu, Kano, Kwara and Lagos. These states were chosen as representative of the full range of educational challenges facing the country; these states were also considered to be broadly representative of the 6 geo-political zones and to include states involved with education reform programmes and/or in receipt of development partner assistance. The chosen short list of states was shared with key stakeholders before the visit to confirm their spread. However, Nigeria is a vast and diverse country and whilst the focus at state level provides important insights of the state level processes, it cannot be assumed to be entirely representative. The team's programme, including a list of persons met, is at Annex C. A

⁶ See the Evaluation Framework (Annex A) for a full explanation of the choice of country cases.

Country Visit Note summarising the team's preliminary findings was circulated to in-country stakeholders on 8th June, 2009.

1.18 The Nigeria country case study differs from most of the other country case studies as it focuses upon a country whose education sector plan has not yet been endorsed by FTI. In light of this, the team has considered progress towards EFA (and particularly UPC) over the 10 years since the restoration of democracy in 1999, looking at both the role of government and of donors. It is important to note at this juncture that, unlike many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria has not enjoyed 25 plus years of relations with donors, nor is Nigeria an aid-dependent country. The drive towards EFA and UPE in particular has therefore been largely a country led initiative with limited financial and technical support from external partners. Any assumptions that may hold true for other countries in the region concerning aid modalities and alignment of country development policies and practices with international norms cannot be assumed to necessarily also be the case for Nigeria.

1.19 Due to this, the summary matrix used (see Annex G) has been amended to make it relevant to the considerations of external aid in general prior to FTI endorsement, and the team has focused the evaluation on level zero of the evaluation logical framework (see Annex G).

Outline of this Report

1.20 In keeping with the evaluation methodology (¶1.10 above), this report first reviews Nigeria's overall progress towards EFA objectives (Part B), then systematically considers the parts played by the external donors (Part C). Conclusions and reflections are in Part D.

1.21 Part C is structured according to the five workstreams within the overall evaluation: policy and planning, finance, data and M&E, capacity development and aid effectiveness. Each subsection addresses the context of progress towards EFA/UPE and examines the inputs and activities of external assistance, and the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (where possible) within these workstream areas. There is also a chapter on cross-cutting issues.

1.22 This country case study aims to generate discussion and debate amongst four principal audiences:

- all stakeholders in Nigeria with an interest in the education sector;
- the FTI evaluation team as they draw together findings and recommendations for the mid-term evaluation's final report;
- the EOC, who will quality-check the report on behalf of the FTI's Board of Directors (Steering Committee);
- any other interested parties.

1.23 The present version of the report is a draft. Comments are welcome and will be taken into account in the final version.

PART B: EDUCATION FOR ALL IN NIGERIA

2 Nigeria Background

Nigeria in brief

2.1 Nigeria is a country of around 148 million people, of whom an estimated 71 million live on under \$1 a day and as many as 92.4 million under \$2 a day. It is estimated that 52% live in rural areas. Average GNI per capita was \$920 in 2008 and life expectancy at birth was 46.8 years⁷.

2.2 Nigeria's economic performance in the two decades prior to its return to democracy in 1999 was generally poor. Over the period 1992 to 2002, annual GDP growth averaged about 2.25 %. With an estimated population growth of 2.8% per annum, this implied a contraction in per capita GDP over the years resulting in a deterioration of living standards for most citizens. Inflation levels were high, averaging about 40% per annum. By 1999 at the start of the first Obasanjo administration, most of Nigeria's human development indicators were worse than, or comparable to, those of any other least developed country⁸.

2.3 Since the return of democracy in 1999, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) has dominated Nigeria's political development. During his first term the President focused on building political stability, strengthening democratic practices, and tackling corruption. The second Obasanjo administration (2003 – 2007) devised and began the implementation of a comprehensive economic reform program based on a home-grown poverty reduction strategy, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS)⁹.

2.4 In October 2005 Nigeria reached an agreement with its Paris Club creditors to repurchase its debt at a discount of approximately 60%. Nigeria used part of its oil profits to pay the residual 40%, freeing up at least \$1.15 billion annually for, potentially, poverty reduction programmes. In April 2006, Nigeria paid off a further estimated \$30 billion to become the first African country to completely pay off its debt to the Paris Club.

2.5 Despite being the world's sixth largest exporter of oil, Nigeria's GNI per capita of USD920 in 2008 placed the country only at the upper end of the 'low income country' classification (World Bank, 2008). In addition, income inequality is high, resulting in significant levels of poverty. Recent annual rates of economic growth have been high (2003-05, 9.1%; 2006-08, 6.1%), including for the non-oil sector, though current lower oil prices will have a short term negative effect. The fiscal balance has been positive for the past six years, as has the balance of payments and current account, and inflation rates have steadily fallen from the 40% rates of the 1990s. The country has no borrowing programme with the IMF.

2.6 85% of government revenues accrue from the oil sector and the significant income allows government revenues to be a much higher share of GDP than in most other African countries. For instance, in 2006, government revenues in Nigeria were 34% of GDP compared to 22% in Ghana and 18% in Malawi. This has led to a lower need for, and interest in, securing external aid (see chapter 3).

2.7 In April 2007 Nigeria held its third consecutive national elections, further consolidating the transition from military to democratic rule, and Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was sworn in as the country's third consecutive, democratically elected President. President Yar'Adua has committed his government to reform and his 7-Point Agenda' identifies the development of human capital; macroeconomic management; physical infrastructure, agriculture; combating corruption; security, law and order; and a focus on the Niger Delta as priorities.

⁷World Bank (2008) citing Human Development Report 2007-2008, UNDP

⁸ Okonjo Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, (2007:7).

⁹ *ibid*

Institutional framework¹⁰

2.8 Nigeria is a secular Federal Republic divided into 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory at Abuja. Under the 1999 constitution, executive power is vested in a directly-elected president who nominates a vice-president and members of the cabinet. The constitution makes provision for a bicameral National Assembly which consists of a House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representatives has 360 members, elected for a four year term in single-seat constituencies while the Senate has 109 members, elected for a four year term in 36 three-seat constituencies (for the country's 36 states) and one seat in a single-seat constituency (for the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja).

2.9 Below the Federal level there are two tiers of government namely state and local. Executive power at state level is vested with the Governor whilst state Houses of Assembly have the power to pass laws in accordance with the Constitution. The 774 local government councils are tasked with the administration and economic development of the area under their authority and receive funding directly from both Federal and state governments.

2.10 Public funds are collected into the Consolidated Revenue Fund and, following the enactment of the annual Appropriation Bill, are disbursed to Federal institutions and to each state in the Federation and then the 774 local government councils according to the agreed funding formula. All development loans are negotiated between the donor and the Federal Government: where appropriate, state governments then sign subsidiary agreements with the Federal Ministry of Finance.

2.11 Judicial power is vested in the courts at both Federal and state levels and informed by four distinct systems namely English Law, Common Law, Customary Law and in 12 northern states, Sharia Law.

National development strategy and performance

2.12 During the second Obasanjo government (2003-7), Nigeria formulated the 2020 Vision (to become one of the world's 20 most developed economies by 2020) and developed a home grown Poverty Reduction Strategy – the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). Informed by the State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS), the NEEDS focused on three pillars:

- Empowering people: health, education, environment, integrated rural development, housing development, employment and youth development, safety nets, gender and geopolitical balance, and pension reforms;
- Promoting private enterprise: security and rule of law, infrastructure finance, sectoral strategies, privatization and liberalization, trade, regional integration, and globalization;
- Changing the way the Government does its work: public sector reforms, privatization and liberalization, governance, transparency and anticorruption, service delivery, budget, and expenditure reforms.

2.13 Following election in 2007, President Yar'Adua adopted his 7-point agenda focusing on (i) Sustainable growth in the real sector of the economy; (ii) Physical Infrastructure: Power, Energy and Transportation; (iii) Agriculture; (iv) Human Capital Development: Education & Health; (v) Security, Law and Order; (vi) Combating Corruption, and (vii) Niger Delta Development. A National Council on Vision 2020¹¹, chaired by the President, is tasked with leading a process of bottom-up strategic development planning designed to ensure ownership of all stakeholders in the process.

¹⁰ Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999

¹¹ Nigeria's 2020 Vision

Quality of public financial management (PFM)

2.14 Since 2003, the Federal government has taken some steps to increase the transparency of the budget process, ensure more efficient cash management, reform the procurement process, update the legal framework for PFM, strengthen monitoring and evaluation and introduce a more strategic longer-term focus in budget management¹². However, states are reported to be lagging behind in reforms of budget formulation, procurement, debt management, and computerization. In many states, budget policy shows significant deviation between announced goals of social and economic development and actual priorities of the budget spending. The budget process is described as being excessively focused on financing individual projects rather than on improving service delivery and capital budgets are often unrealistic. A review in a sample of states revealed that execution of capital budgets commonly does not exceed 40% and in some states, that a limited number of large and politically motivated projects attract most of capital spending. Budget execution functions are excessively centralized in the governor's office, while powers of line ministries and organisations are limited. State fiscal relations with local governments are reported to be non-transparent with state governments tending to withhold a significant portion of federation account transfers to LGAs, and with weak accountability for them.


Aid relationships

ODA levels

2.15 As described in figure 2.1, apart from in 2005 and 2006 when significant amounts of debt relief were funded by bilateral donors, Nigeria's receipt of external aid since 1999 has been very low relative to the size of the economy (and was virtually non-existent through the 1990s). Aid per capita has tended to be well below that of any other African country. Debt relief was equivalent to around 4% of GDP in 2005 and 9% in 2006 but in each of the other years between 1999 and 2004 total external aid did not rise above 1% of GDP, and in 2007 it was around 1.5%. These shares compare to an average of around 5% across sub-Saharan Africa and of over 25% in some cases. The low levels of aid received over several decades have resulted partly from donors' negative perceptions of governance across all layers of government, especially in areas of public financial management. Low aid levels also reflect high shares of public revenues (funded through the oil sector) in GDP relative to those in most other low income countries. In addition, the Nigerian Government has been keen to disassociate itself from the bulk of sub-Saharan African countries which have high levels of aid dependency and have acquiesced to the requirements of the World Bank to prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRSPs) for review by the donors. Nigeria has high levels of foreign exchange and no current or planned borrowing from the IMF.

¹² World Bank, 2007 – PEMFAR, volume 2.

Figure 2.1 Aid dependency (commitments/GNI)




Source: GMR 2009 external aid database; World Bank 2008 World Development Indicators.

Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36); deflators for GDP from World Bank 2008 World Development Indicators.

2.16 Between 1999 and 2007, the main donors to Nigeria were, in order, the UK, France, Germany, IDA and Japan - see figure 2.2. The bilateral donors in this group are those countries which provided most of the debt relief in 2005 and 2006. Of the total amount of (post debt relief) aid of USD2.4 billion in 2007 – which was mainly used to directly fund development programmes - the donor composition was somewhat different. Again the UK was dominant and provided almost one quarter of the total, but the next set of important donors included IDA, the United States, Netherlands and Austria each of which contributed between 13%-16%. The EC contributed around 7% of the total sector aid and four other donors each contributed between 1%- 2%.

Figure 2.2 Share of total aid commitments by donor 1999-2007



Source: GMR 2009 external aid database.

Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

2.17 A meaningful calculation of the share of total aid going to education is again complicated by the large amounts of debt relief in 2005 and 2006. In 1999-2000, the share for education (of a very small amount of aid) was 12% and in 2006 it was 1%. Restricting the calculation to that part of aid which is for development programmes alone, in 2006 the education sector received around 7% of the total. This is a relatively small share and compares to an average of 19% across all sub-Saharan Africa countries. In all, the education sector receives a small proportion of a small amount of aid. Of this almost half has been for basic education.

Aid coordination mechanisms

2.18 Compared to most other developing countries the number of donors, particularly bilateral ones, to Nigeria is low and the number of *significant* donors is particularly low. The very limited involvement of donors in Nigeria over a long time period contrasts with the situation in many other African countries and has resulted in little movement towards the changes in government-donor behaviours currently being adopted in several countries across the region. These include a greater harmonisation of priorities, financial support and processes across donors, and a greater alignment between donors' and government priorities, programmes and financial management systems.

2.19 There has, however, been some movement. The UK and the World Bank, through discussions with the Federal Government, developed a joint Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) FY2005-09 focusing on service delivery, private sector development and improved infrastructure, and government transparency and accountability. A second CPS is currently being finalised. Some of the other donors have shown an interest in signing up to this (e.g. USAID and AfDB) but may have more problems 'committing' to multi-year spending targets. Donor representatives report that meetings between them have increased over the past 18 months with the World Bank, DFID, USAID, AfDB and UNDP at the core and others including JICA, the Swiss and CIDA also now participating. In general, donor meetings (outside of the UK-World Bank partnership) are seen largely as an instrument for helping to increase 'knowledge sharing' across donors and potentially for guiding decisions regarding the geographical (perhaps rather than sectoral) distribution of initiatives. There is also reported to be some movement by the Federal Government to formalize donor-government meetings but currently these meetings are still infrequent

3 Basic Education in Nigeria

Education System

3.1 Roles and Responsibilities: The Nigerian education system is decentralized under a Federal structure, and the 1999 Constitution suggests that all three tiers of government have joint responsibility for all levels and types of education. Public education is therefore the concurrent responsibility of the Federal, state, and local governments with the Federal government playing a dominant role in the provision of tertiary education, whilst state governments provide mainly secondary and regionally focused tertiary education, and local governments support the state government to provide basic education.

3.2 The administration of the education system is shared between the Federal and state Ministries of Education as well as statutory bodies referred to as Commissions and Boards. The Federal government, which provides policy leadership and regulatory oversight through the FME and the National Council on Education, has a total of 21 para-statals to implement its functions. Two of these, the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) and the Education Trust Fund (ETF), run vertical programs supporting state and local governments in the delivery of education. In many cases, the FME and para-statals have overlapping functions: for example, the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of UBEC, the Federal Inspectorate Service (FIS), the Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics,¹³ and the National Education Research and Development Council all have mandates to collect data. These duplications increase the number of administrative staff, create higher running costs and have created an unwieldy, costly and inefficient system of service delivery.

3.3 The leading role of state and Local Governments in the provision of basic education was reasserted by a Supreme Court ruling in April 2002 in favour of the states which had challenged the leading role played by the Federal Government in the UBE Programme. However the complex administrative arrangements in place at Federal level are mirrored at the state level where the state ministries of education have a similar proliferation of para-statals. The most significant of these in respect of basic education are the State Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs) to which the 774 local government education authorities report. Over the last ten years, these institutional relationships have become increasingly complicated for several reasons: (a) increased decentralization; (b) the creation of new agencies and other organizations, for example, UBEC and SUBEBs; (c) new policy initiatives, for example the introduction of the UBE Intervention Fund; and (d) the emergence of private education and religious schools and the lack of proper regulation of these fast growing sectors. Unclear roles and responsibilities among the three tiers of government, especially for expenditure and management, together with frequent policy changes, especially regarding basic education, have caused confusion, duplication, and sometimes rivalry in the discharge of responsibilities.

3.4 Responsibility for Adult and Non Formal education is vested with the National Commission for Mass Literacy, Adult and Non Formal Education, established through decree in 1990. The same year also saw the creation of the National Commission for Nomadic Education to look after the education of nomads and other migrant groups. However in 2007, the presidential education review committee noted the limitations of the National Policy on Education in respect of non-formal education, the narrow focus on literacy, the absence of a coordinated strategy for providing adult learners with skills to support poverty alleviation¹⁴, the lack of a regulatory framework and weak quality assurance.

¹³ In 2006 the Department of Planning, Research, and Statistics was restructured and is now called Policy, Planning, Management and Research Department.

¹⁴ FME 2007, p.18

3.5 The UBE Act (2004) made provision for every public primary school to have pre-primary school linkage to cater for children aged 3-5¹⁵ and allocated 5% of the UBE Intervention Fund matching grant to finance Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE). However prior to 2004, ECCE had not been seen as part of the public school system since private entrepreneurs are the main providers. The same 2007 presidential review committee that had noted deficiencies in the National Policy in respect of non-formal education (see paragraph 3.4. above) also noted the long neglect of ECCE by government and low GER of 3%.

3.6 Local government education authorities (LGEAs) are responsible for delivering and managing primary education and report directly to the SUBEBs and liaise with the local government area (LGAs) on administrative and financial matters. LGEAs are headed by a local government education secretary, who in most states is appointed by the Executive Governor and in a few states on the recommendation of the local government executive chairman. Local government education secretaries are political appointees, who are nevertheless required to have a professional educational background, and may serve up to two four-year terms. Local school supervisors (LSS) are employed to play a key role in the regular supervision and support of schools in their areas. In practice however limited budgets mean they have little access to transport with the result that schools receive variable and infrequent support. Primary and junior secondary school teachers are employed by the SUBEBs and the LGEAs.

3.7 Following the enactment of the UBE Law in 2004 as part of the creation of a unitary basic education sub-sector, responsibility for junior secondary education in some states passed from the state ministry of education to the SUBEB. This required the “disarticulation” of the junior from the senior secondary schools. This has proved to be problematic as many junior and senior secondary schools share physical facilities. When the UBE law shifted responsibility for junior secondary education to the SUBEB, state governments interpreted this shift in varying ways. Some states have no intention of disarticulating junior from senior secondary education; others are adding stand-alone junior secondary schools or expanding existing primary schools to house junior secondary students. However, the UBE law does not necessarily expect SUBEBs to establish new infrastructure on the same sites as existing schools. There seems to be a contradiction between the spirit and implementation of the law. Some schools have common premises but function as two schools, with duplicate administrative staff and leadership, but without adequate resources.

3.8 Financial responsibility for basic education is split largely between the state and local governments. Local governments are charged with paying the salaries of primary school teachers, but the payment of junior secondary school teachers still lies with the state governments. New school buildings, and repairs and extensions, plus learning materials are the joint responsibility of the two tiers of government but in practice most funds for these purposes derive from the state governments.

3.9 Responsibility for senior secondary education lies with state governments and in theory roles and responsibilities are less fragmented, and there are fewer overlapping functions in senior secondary than in basic education. However, as discussed above, the disarticulation of junior from senior secondary education as part of the unified system of basic education management poses a major challenge for effective service delivery.

¹⁵ Nigeria Country Profile for Education for All Global Monitoring report 2007, Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) programmes, UNESCO IBE 2006

3.10 The Nigerian public tertiary education sector is divided into Federal and state institutions. At the Federal level, most tertiary education institutions are located within the FME, coordinated through three parastatals, the National Universities Commission, National Board for Technical Education, and National Commission for Colleges of Education. In addition, several other line ministries (e.g. agriculture, health, science and technology) coordinate specialized tertiary education institutions. Mandates for different agencies vary, with duplication, compartmentalization, and overloading of some agencies and lack of inclusion of other agencies. This arrangement is overly complex and difficult to govern, resulting in planning without adequate budgeting, lack of clear roles, murky accountability, and overlapping mandates¹⁶. Most state tertiary education institutions have a high degree of autonomy, and the quality and relevance of state tertiary education are questionable.

Table 3.1: Education responsibilities of the three tiers of government

| Sub-sector | Federal | State | Local |
|--|---|---|-------------------------------|
| Basic (Early Childhood Care and Development, Primary & Junior Secondary) | (i) Policy (ii) Allocation of resources through UBEC (iii) Maintenance of standards (inspection & monitoring) (FIS) | Implementation through SUBEBs State Ministries of Education are responsible for policy formulation and inspectorate services In Kano the Sharia Commission is responsible for registering Islamiyyah Schools and will be involved in the development of their curriculum. | Management of primary schools |
| Senior Secondary | (i) Policy (i) Curriculum (ii) Inspectorate (iii) Examinations through WAEC & NECO (iv) Management of Unity Schools | (i) Policy (ii) Implementation (iii) Inspectorate (iv) Technical colleges | |
| Tertiary education | (i) Policy (ii) Universities (iii) Polytechnics (iv) Colleges of Education | (i) Universities (ii) Polytechnics (iii) Colleges of Education | |
| Adult education | Policy Co-ordination Monitoring | Implementation | Implementation |
| Special education | Policy | Implementation | Implementation |

Source: National Framework, FME, January 2007, Table 3.1, p.7

¹⁶ See World Bank 2006b

National Education Strategy

3.11 The Federal Ministry of Education has responsibility for the coherence of national policy and procedures and for ensuring that the states' policies operate within the parameters of national policy as adapted for local needs. Coordination of policy at the political level takes place at the annual National Council for Education, the highest policy making body, chaired by the Federal Minister for Education with the membership of state Commissioners for Education. The development of policy initiatives for consideration by the NCE is undertaken by the Joint Consultative Committee on Education (JCCE) consisting of Permanent Secretaries and Directors of state Ministries of Education, Chief Executives of Education Statutory Bodies (Para-statals) and Directors of University Institutes of Education. All interested education sector stakeholders may propose policy initiatives for the consideration of the JCCE, a process which is managed by the Department of Policy Planning, Monitoring and Research (PPM&R) within the Federal Ministry of Education. The JCCE is chaired by the Director PPM&R.¹⁷

3.12 National Education Strategy is defined by the 2004 National Policy on Education. This Policy evolved from a national curriculum conference in Lagos in 1969 held to review the existing educational system and to propose a better set of national goals. Recommendations arising led to the formulation of the National Policy on Education in 1977, subsequently revised in 1981¹⁸ and 1990.¹⁹ The National Policy on Education (4th Edition) was revised and updated in 2004 recognizing the importance of adapting education provision to realities on the ground and the importance of non-formal education, technical and vocational education.

3.13 The document spells out the philosophy for Nigerian education and presents the goals, purposes and orientations of various levels and aspects of the education system. The sections include: the philosophy of education in Nigeria, pre-primary education, primary education, secondary education, teacher education, technical education, higher education, adult education, special education, educational services, the administration and financing of education.²⁰ Whilst there has been no further formal amendment of the 2004 Policy a series of policy initiatives have been undertaken since 2004 and these are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Education Policy and Planning.

3.14 Soon after the establishment of the civilian government in 1999 and just prior to the Dakar World Education Forum, President Obasanjo signed an Aide Memoire with UNESCO which committed both parties to collaborate in developing education policy in the newly democratic Nigeria. The support came to be centred on the activity known as Education Sector Analysis (ESA). UNESCO programmed USD1 million (from Japanese trust funds) for capacity development and external TA whilst the Nigerian government promised over USD2 million in support. When it became apparent that the counterpart funds would not be made available, the programme of support was reorganized and the international TA component dropped. In addition to efforts to try to improve capacity at the Federal Government level, the UNESCO support was used to help design a wide range of sectoral studies - around 40 in total. Other donors, including USAID, DFID and the World Bank, also supported some of the activities associated with the ESA including financial help for the school census and study tours to India, South Africa and the UK. By 2005, the Japanese Government had expressed concern about the outputs from the programme and an evaluation was mounted. As a result, UNESCO's programme of support was wound up, with USD200,000 still unspent. During this period, the Nigerian government sent just three education sector officers for training at the UNESCO International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP).

¹⁷ Mojo, (2000)

¹⁸ FRN, 1981

¹⁹ Online Nigeria (2009)

²⁰ *ibid*

3.15 Beginning in 2003, a separate, though obviously related, set of activities was initiated through the Education For All (EFA) office located in the Presidency. This was Nigeria's attempt to be part of the overall EFA movement and was mainly UNESCO inspired. A concerted effort was made by this office to encourage state governments to prepare their own EFA plans with the intention that they could be fed into the development of an overall comprehensive national plan. The responses were patchy and the resulting consolidated document was again criticized by UNESCO which then provided some additional help for projecting the costs of the Federal Government responsibilities. A document summarizing some of the state government work and the plans of the Federal Government was eventually published in 2007. Since then, DFID-funded technical assistance provided through the Capacity for Universal Basic Education (CUBE) project has supported Kaduna, Kano and Kwara States to prepare costed education sector plans emphasizing EFA goals and the through the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN) is currently assisting Jigawa and Lagos States to also do so. At the same time, technical assistance provided through the DFID-funded Girls Education Project (GEP) has provided assistance to three states (Jigawa, Niger, and Bauchi) to produce costed education sector plans. Further DFID support is to be made available for Katsina and Sokoto to also produce costed education sector plans.

Progress towards EFA

3.16 Providing a picture of Nigeria's current status with respect to the EFA goals, and progress since 1999, and commenting on the prospects for reaching the goals by 2015 are greatly complicated by two factors. First, the almost total absence of current reliable education data, particularly of primary school enrolments, and second, the very wide variations in education coverage and achievement which certainly exist across different regions and states within the country. More details are provided in Chapter 7.

3.17 After several years when no annual school census was administered, an attempt was made to resurrect the process in 2003. Although school censuses were conducted up to 2007, the most recent collated and published results are for 2005 and these suggest a national primary GER of 95% with rates of 103% for boys and 86% for girls. The UNESCO Institute of Statistics has concluded that the enrolment data imply an overall NER of 63% (68% for boys and 59% for girls). Two household surveys which use a similar question concerning the extent to which 6-13 year old children attend school reached different conclusions - overall enrolment rates of 60% in the case of the DHS (2003) and 46% according to the NLSS (2005).

3.18 Whatever the discrepancies between the school census and the different household surveys, it is clear that, nationally, Nigeria has a long way to go before universal primary completion is reached. The EFA Global Monitoring Report suggests that Nigeria has more primary age children out of school than any other country in the world (UNESCO, 2008). Trend projections to 2015 suggest a gross primary enrolment rate for that year of around 105% and a net enrolment rate of just over 70% (EPDC 2009).

3.19 Beyond average enrolment rates, and those differentiated by gender, household surveys clearly indicate large differences between rural and urban areas and even more clearly between states. They suggest that almost every child in most of the southern states enters primary school at some point in their life compared to just 30-45% in some of the northern states.

3.20 Beyond the universal primary education and gender equality goals of the EFA, the evidence is even less clear. Data on Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) are notoriously difficult to collect due to the diversity of arrangements. However, the Ministry of Education quotes a GER for pre-school of 2.6% for 2005. Regarding adult illiteracy, the World Bank (2008), compared results from the 1991 Population Census with those from the 2006 CWIQ survey and tentatively concluded that the literacy rate had increased from 48% to 57% over the period. For the quality of schooling and the levels of pupils' learning achievement,

again few data exist. Nigeria took part in the UNESCO/Unicef Minimum Levels of Learning studies in 1996 and 2003. Across each of the three subjects tested, the average share of questions correctly answered was between 30% and 40%. Similar results were recorded in UBEC-supported studies in 2001 and 2003.

Financing for basic education

Public Finance Management in the education sector

3.21 Overall, budget predictability has improved in Nigeria (World Bank 2006). However, the recent public expenditure review of the education sector concluded that the current process of formulating and executing the budget is unreliable and poorly organized (World Bank, 2008). In general, the financing of key inputs is unpredictable reflecting a lack of clarity regarding which level of government is responsible for financing each of them. The budgets of most states are based on an outdated system: policy, programming, and budget functions are not fully integrated; there is little policy debate on spending decisions; budget execution is far from effective; budget performance is hampered by the short time horizon of the annual budget; and investment budgets are not integrated. Few states produce annual audited accounts through which the legislature or public can review expenditure against allocation. In general, state governments face an acute shortage of the technical and human capacity needed to design and implement reforms since the civil service is poorly paid and unable to attract qualified, experienced professionals. Several states (e.g. Kano, Lagos) are now attempting to improve their budget systems but, in general, efforts are dependent upon political will.

Overall education expenditure

3.22 Public expenditure on education in Nigeria is funded by the Federal Government, 36 state governments and that of the Federal Capital Territory and 774 local governments. Financial responsibility for basic education is split largely between the state and local governments. Local governments are charged with paying the salaries of primary school teachers. New school buildings, and repairs and extensions, plus learning materials are the joint responsibility of the two tiers of government but in practice most funds for these purposes derive from the state governments who also have the main responsibility for secondary education and share the responsibility for tertiary education with the Federal Government.

3.23 In spite of two major exercises since 2002 to collect and generate data on the total levels and distributions of public expenditure on education across Nigeria, only very approximate national estimates are available. This is a result of the lack of comprehensive information on state and local government expenditures.

3.24 In recent years, the Federal Government has sought to improve its capacity to monitor state government expenditures. However, since most of the funding for state and local governments comes from the Federation Account (through revenue-sharing arrangements), sub-national governments are not required to inform or seek approval from the Federal Government on their budget or fiscal performance. Beyond recent attempts to limit distributions from the Federation Account in years of high oil prices, no national fiscal framework encompasses all budgets. No statutory mechanisms are in place to ensure that state plans and fiscal arrangements are aligned with national goals. This is true in all sectors, not just education (World Bank 2006a).

3.25 The two attempts to estimate education expenditures have each been based on a relatively small sample of states. In the first, Federal Government expenditures, local government expenditures on teacher salaries, and incomplete estimates from nine (of the 36) states which were then extrapolated across the remaining states, were aggregated. On this basis, between 1998 and 2001 total public education expenditures were assessed to have increased from 14.2% to 17.5% of total public expenditures and from 2.3% to 6.2% of GDP (World Bank 2004).

3.26 In the more recent and more extensive, study supported by the World Bank and DFID, aggregate estimates of education expenditures funded by all three levels of government were based largely on a set of education public expenditure case studies in (again, but coincidentally) nine states carried out in 2006-7, using financial information to 2005. The results of this exercise, which vary according to the technique used to scale up the estimates from the nine states to all 36, included:

- total public expenditure on education was equal to between 4.7% and 5.2% of GDP;
- of total education public expenditures, the state governments funded 43%, the Federal Government 31%, and the local governments 26%;
- expenditure shares across education levels were roughly 32% primary, 31% secondary and 30% tertiary, with the remainder spread across other sector activities.

3.27 Perhaps the most important of these findings are the relatively low share which is spent on primary education and the high share spent on tertiary education.

External aid to education

3.28 Apart from debt relief, total external aid to Nigeria has been comparatively small (around 1.5% of total government expenditure). Between 1999 and 2005, the average annual commitment to the education sector was USD69 million and in 2006 it was USD80 million – around just 7% of all sector allocable aid, and (very) roughly 1% of total public expenditure on education. There was a major increase in 2007 to USD489 million – including USD249 million from IDA and USD211 million (over 6 years) from the UK.

3.29 Since 1999 the major donors, in order, have been IDA and the UK (together providing 73%) followed by the United States, Germany, France and Japan (together providing 19%). Aid for basic education is 'a small drop in the ocean'. Since 1999, almost half of the aid for the education sector has been for basic education and IDA and the UK have together been responsible for over four fifths of this. Other donors include the United States (9%), Japan (4%) and UNICEF (3%). France and Germany, concentrate their aid on scholarships for tertiary education.

PART C: THE FTI IN NIGERIA

4 Overview of the FTI in Nigeria

4.1 Nigeria's engagement with FTI commenced in 2002 at the FTI launch in Washington when five countries Bangladesh, the DRC, India, Nigeria and Pakistan, were identified as having half the world's out of school children²¹. The so-called "analytical fast track" was launched to help these countries that did not yet have a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or a costed Education Sector Plan (ESP), to "strengthen national and sub-national management capacity and data, build policy consensus around reforms in line with the Indicative Framework, and to bring countries to a point where they are ready to accelerate progress towards UPC in a sustainable financial framework and can become eligible for additional financing" (WB 2003). The original target was that these countries would have approved education sector plans by 2008.

4.2 Nigeria had in fact already launched its own Education Sector Analysis project in 2000 with support from UNESCO (utilising Japanese Trust Funds) following the signing of an Aide Memoire between Nigeria and UNESCO (see ¶3.14 above).

4.3 In June 2003, a joint paper was produced by the development partners in Nigeria, setting out requirements for EFA including the requirements for the Fast Track Initiative, with the aim of developing a partnership between government and donor agencies. The timing of the paper coincided with the start of the new government following the April 2003 general elections, and identified as its target audience government officials and policy-makers, including legislators coming into office after the elections. The paper provides a comprehensive overview of the purpose of the FTI; it describes the requirements and process for endorsement and highlights the challenges facing Nigeria's progress towards EFA in light of the indicative framework.

The Education for All (EFA) Fast-Track Initiative (FTI) is a global partnership to accelerate progress towards the goal of universal primary school completion (UPC), for boys and girls alike, by 2015, through a combination of stronger national policies, improved capacity, and incremental external support. The FTI is one element of the overall Education for All (EFA) process which was endorsed by the world community in Dakar, Senegal in April 2000.

Worldwide, 18 countries have been identified to be eligible for FTI financial support. The FTI explicitly links additional external support to country capacity and potential performance. The FTI is intended to provide more sustained, predictable, flexible and possibly enhanced financial support to countries that have demonstrated their commitment to the goal of UPC and policy reforms consistent with the indicative framework parameters, and that have a need for and capacity to effectively use incremental external resources. Conditions for inclusion in the FTI group are the existence of a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and of a credible national Education Sector Plan, of which the National EFA Action Plan is a part.

In addition, a group of five large countries (Bangladesh, DRC, India, Nigeria and Pakistan) with low enrolment, representing together about 50 million children not in school, have been identified to be part of the Analytical Fast Track countries (AFT). These large countries do not yet have a PRSP or Education Sector Plan (at present, Nigeria has only a draft of an Interim PRSP). The purpose of the analytic support through FTI is to strengthen national and sub-national management capacity and data, build policy consensus around reforms in line with the Indicative Framework, and to bring countries to a point where they are ready to accelerate progress towards UPC in a sustainable financial framework and can become eligible for additional financing. In recent international discussions between these countries, involving their governments and development partners, various options (such as the adoption of the country's existing national Development Plan for India in lieu of the PRSP) are also being explored to move these countries towards eligibility. One such example is the adoption of the country's existing national Development Plan for India in lieu of the PRSP.

²¹ EFA Progress Report 2003

Government and civil society in Nigeria, together with the development partners, need to reach agreement on the mutual commitments and reforms that will be necessary to achieve the EFA goals with external support through the AFTI. This paper identifies key issues and blockages that are facing Nigeria in achieving EFA. It also lays down recommendations for change, from the development partners' perspective, and records the agreements and commitments from both sides, necessary to achieve these changes. (IDPs, Nigeria 2003)

4.4 In the same year an evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF)²² reported that although not fulfilling the required criteria of an ESP and PRSP, two sub-Saharan countries – DRC and Nigeria – had been added to the list of first phase FTI countries due to the large numbers of out of school children. Of note is the fact that the report highlights Nigeria's key position in the sub-region as a factor for inclusion.

4.5 A subsequent NETF report in 2005²³ summarised that over the period 1999-2005 Nigeria had received USD 1,247,000 from the Norwegian Education Trust Fund, the largest amount for any country during this period, which was disbursed primarily to support the preparation studies for the World Bank Universal Basic Education Project (UBEP) 2003-06.

4.6 Meanwhile, in the 2005 EFA Global Monitoring Report, Nigeria was included in a list of countries including Kenya and the Republic of Moldova originally produced in February 2004, with potential endorsement for 2005. However no further progress was made that year.

4.7 The 2006²⁴ Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) report cited Nigeria as one of twelve countries where preparation of education sector programs was well under way with NETF support, but where further support was required under EPDF. The same report refers to "new starts" to the production of country status reports (CSR) for a number of countries, including Nigeria, where improved education statistics had become available.

4.8 In 2007, the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) for the World Bank SESP²⁵ indicates that the three beneficiary states, Kaduna, Kano and Kwara planned to "submit requests for support to the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI)". In May 2008 at the official launch of the SESP a World Bank staff member, funded by EPDF, presented a review of the Kano, Kaduna and Kwara ESPs and made specific reference to revisions that would be required if the plans were to conform to the FTI Indicative Framework requirements. No further progress was made following this meeting and a World Bank staff interviewed expressed the view that, at the time, FTI was not a priority for the states concerned.

Table 4.1 Nigeria FTI Status 2003-2008

| FTI Report | Status Description |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Stock Taking Report November 2003 | Initially invited for enhanced technical support |
| Status Report November 2004 | No mention |
| Progress Report Dec 2005 | Planned endorsement 2008 |
| Status Report Nov 2006 | Expected 2008 |
| Annual Report 2007 | Expected 2009 – 3-4 States Eligible – Other States |
| CF Status Report December 2006 | Expected 2009 – 3/4 states |
| Annual Report 2008 | No mention |

²² Finnconsult, 2003

²³ Norwegian Education Trust Fund 2005 Annual Report, World Bank Africa Region Human Development Department

²⁴ Africa Region Indicative 2006 Program Proposal for The Education Program Development Fund (EPDF) To Support Education Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

²⁵ WB State Education Sector Project Appraisal Document, March 2007

4.9 Interviews conducted with the FTI Secretariat staff confirmed that, as with other large federal countries, it has been challenging to identify how to provide support through the FTI to Nigeria. Two alternative options have been discussed; either seeking an agreement with the Federal government in order to then engage with states, or alternatively working directly with those states that already have an IDA credit in place. A joint WB/FTI Secretariat meeting that took place in September 2008 in the World Bank offices in Washington D.C produced an agreement that in principle FTI could provide support at state level from 2010. The Secretariat reported having discussed both of these options with successive World Bank country task managers without making any tangible progress. Meetings have also taken place at higher levels within the World Bank's Africa region team but without reaching resolution of the issues raised above. Given the large number of out of school children in the country, there was frustration within the FTI Secretariat at the lack of progress in these negotiations.

4.10 During the course of the country visit, the team learned that the World Bank was actively planning to engage with the Government of Nigeria. The World Bank education specialist in Abuja expressed the view that the poorer, northern states with the worst education indicators, particularly in respect of very low girls' enrolment rates, would be suitable candidates to join the FTI. (In this scenario there would first be a need to mobilise EPDF funds to provide assistance to develop credible sector plans for these states).

4.11 In April 2009 as part of the preparation for a new a 2010 Country Education Sector Status Report (CESR), the World Bank sponsored a meeting of Commissioners for Education and SUBEB Chairman from all 36 states and the FCT. Donor representatives from Unicef, CEF, USAID, JICA, and ESSPIN/DFID were also in attendance. During the course of the meeting the World Bank education specialist highlighted the Bank's criteria for engaging with states to determine future assistance for education and expressed the hope that in two or three years time a small number of states could become "models to access to EFA-FTI grants".²⁶

4.12 Following the country visit, and during the drafting of this report, it was reported that a dialogue organised by the World Bank had taken place on 11 June 2009 in Abuja involving representatives from FME and UBEC, 26 states, Civil Society - represented by Action Aid Nigeria and CSACEFA, and World Bank, DFID (and ESSPIN staff), USAID, UNDP and JICA. According to reports from the meeting²⁷ presentations on EFA-FTI were made by both WB and DFID representatives that led to "great expectations in state officials present and elicited discussions and questions particularly from states in the South West".

²⁶ Report on the proceedings of the Country Education Sector Report (CESR) meeting, 2009.

²⁷ No formal minutes have been published and this information is based on an email from a key informant in Abuja.

5 Education Policy and Planning

Context

5.1 Chapter 3 highlighted the main initiatives on policy and planning up to the enactment of the Federal Universal Basic Education Bill in 2004, which established the UBEC in Abuja and made provision for a nine-year cycle of free and compulsory universal basic education. The law also made provision for the establishment of the SUBEBs at state level, and during the course of 2005 and 2006 states within the Federation passed their own UBE Laws, thus creating a unified governance and management framework for the basic education sub-sector at state level.

5.2 The UBE law also provided for the UBE Intervention Fund (UBE-IF), a home grown catalytic fund constituting 2% of Consolidated Federal Account revenues, to provide matching grants to states to boost financing of basic education. Education sector plans at both Federal and state levels are in this way both informed by the Federal and state UBE Laws and eligible for part financing by the UBE Intervention Fund (IF). However, there is no requirement for states to produce costed plans to access the Intervention Fund and no requirement to demonstrate how the IF will help to close the funding gap at state level. To date there has been a low uptake of the fund by States, with around 52 billion naira sitting in the UBE account in Abuja at the time of this country study.

5.3 Having established an office for EFA under the Presidency in 2003 the EFA secretariat was subsequently re-located to the Department for Basic and Secondary Education in the FME with state level EFA offices similarly located within the state Ministries of Education. The national EFA plan however was only published in 2007. The most recent EFA (Nigeria) Report Cards points to “the reality of under-funding at all levels is resulting in enormous gaps” (2008:64) and highlights that the GMR 2008 identifies Nigeria as being at risk of not achieving EFA by 2015.

5.4 In 2006 a presidential review committee was established within the Federal Ministry of Education and undertook a Situational Analysis of the Education Sector. This led to the development of a National Framework for Education that made specific reference to the achievement of the 6 EFA Goals and a 10-Year Plan for the Federal Ministry of Education supported by a draft education reform bill to address the 2020 Vision. The Situational Analysis included a scorecard for each of the education sub-sectors that provided a damning indictment of the performance of the education sector overall.

- Goals, objectives and strategies not adequately prioritized or matched to available budgets;
- Over-bureaucratic, centralised governance and management structures leading to duplication, ineffectiveness and a lack of decisive action;
- Ineffective planning, management and monitoring due to weak systems of data collection, analysis and dissemination;
- Low levels of enrolment, completion and progression with considerable gender inequities and insufficient attention to ECCE;
- Inadequate facilities, infrastructural decay and a lack of instructional materials;
- Inappropriate teacher education at both pre-and in-service level with no effective system of staff deployment;
- An inappropriate curriculum poorly suited to the modern world;
- Badly managed education institutions providing poor quality services leading to poor quality learning outcomes that failed to provide pupils with basic numeracy and literacy skills;

- Weak quality assurance mechanisms despite a plethora of inspection services at all levels of the system
- Weak internal and external communications.

5.5 The National Framework outlined a set of policies, strategies and targets in order to address the challenges identified in the Situational Analysis, and a 10 Year Plan was drawn up and very roughly costed. An education reform bill to support the proposed reforms was then drafted. However the elections of April 2007 intervened, following which a new Federal Minister for Education with a different set of priorities was appointed. The 10-Year Plan and the Reform Bill were both dropped and no further progress was made at the Federal level. To date policy makers in Nigeria have still not taken forward these proposals with the National Planning Commission.

5.6 Similarly, the Community Accountability and Transparency Initiative (CATI), designed to involve civil society stakeholders in monitoring the performance of the education sector and in particular to improve governance, launched by the then Minister for Education in early 2007, failed to take root. Although the initiative was successfully launched at Federal level and in a number of states, and an initial report on disbursement on education was published, following the 2007 general elections and the appointment of a new Federal Minister, the initiative quietly faded away.

5.7 In January 2009 a new Federal Minister of Education was appointed and the reform process was resurrected. In March 2009 a Road Map for the Nigerian Education Sector²⁸ was published. This Road Map restates the challenges facing the education sector in Nigeria presented in the 2007 Situational Analysis (referred to above), and proposes a set of “turnaround” strategies with deliverable targets to support the achievement of the national vision on the four core areas of access and equity, standards and quality assurance, TVET and funding resource mobilisation and utilisation. To date the Road Map has not been costed and therefore there is currently no approved national framework linking policy, planning and budgeting for the education sector.

Policy Implementation

5.8 There was a broad consensus amongst those stakeholders interviewed during the country visit - officials, NGOs and Civil Society representatives alike – that education policies in Nigeria have improved since the national UBE Law was enacted in 2004. This has also been the case at state level where similar laws enacted in 2005 and 2006 have provided greater clarity and focus on priorities in the basic education sub-sector. This has proved especially true in those states that have (had) donor funded programmes and where these have led to the development of sector plans, however imperfect these might be.

5.9 However the translation of the UBE law into specific policies and plans and the budgeting *and disbursement* of the appropriate finances to support the implementation of these policies has been weak. Poor net enrolment and completion rates highlight the disconnect between policy, planning, budgeting and implementation. Furthermore, although the Federal Government takes the lead in setting policy and in financing basic education through the transfers to states, it has few powers to hold states to account for any failures in planning, budgeting or implementation. The powerful constitutional position of states in relation to the Federal Government, in effect constrains the role of the FME.

5.10 Within states interviewees identified low capacity within Departments for Planning, Research and Statistics (PRS) and in particular weak public financial management at all stages of the cycle act as major barriers to the effective implementation of policies. The limited involvement of civil society in policy and planning, often a symptom of a lack of trust between state governments and civil society organisations only compounds a lack of accountability between service providers and service users. Furthermore, the powerful role

²⁸ Federal Ministry of Education, 2009

that State Governors play in determining policy and spending priorities means that much is dependent upon the vision and drive of the Governors. Chapter 6 discusses public expenditure in more detail; however it is worth noting at this point that few states currently plan in a manner consistent with the benchmarks established in the FTI indicative framework.

Policy relating to Cross-Cutting Issues

5.11 At present at least thirteen states (Bauchi, Benue, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Enugu, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Lagos, Niger, Oyo and the Federal Capital Territory) have developed 10 Year Education Sector Plans²⁹. With technical assistance financed by DFID³⁰ Bauchi, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara and Niger States have costed these plans using the states EPSSim financial simulation model (employed for the costing of the 10-Year National Plan). It is reported that Oyo State has also produced a costed plan although one development partner who has reviewed this plan suggested that it was still not yet of sufficient quality.

5.12 The Kaduna, Kwara and Kano ESPs have been officially adopted as state plans and in Kano and Kwara the ESPs are contributing to the development of the 2009 education budgets. All 5 of the ESSPIN³¹ states (Jigawa, Lagos, Kaduna, Kano and Kwara) are currently developing Medium Term Sector Strategies (3-year rolling operation plans) in accordance with National Planning Commission guidelines on planning and budgeting. The Kaduna, Kano and Kwara ESPs are comprehensive sector plans, each of which presents a costed "optimum" scenario based upon discussions amongst stakeholders within the State. The remainder of the states listed above have un-costed/non-endorsed ESPs which do not currently inform planning and budgeting for basic education.

5.13 Official policy recognises the importance of equal access for boys and girls, but there are gross disparities in girls' enrolment in many northern states (highlighted in chapter 3) and indications of early drop out of boys across the south of the country. Poverty continues to present a significant barrier to UPC. An HIV/AIDS awareness syllabus is incorporated into the basic education curriculum however there is a lack of sufficient and appropriate instructional materials and teacher training to successfully deliver this curriculum. Apart from the KKK States (Kaduna, Kano and Kwara) there is little evidence of strategic planning and appropriate budgeting to address these challenges.

5.14 Civil Society involvement in policy and planning limited. The Civil Society Action Coalition on Education For All (CSACEFA), formed in the wake of the 2000 World Education Forum in Dakar, is an national umbrella organisation for non-governmental and civil society active in the education sector. At Federal level, CSACEFA maintains a good dialogue with government and is called upon to participate in discussions with Senate Committee on Education and other such bodies. However, at state level the situation is somewhat different and CSOs interviewed during the course of the country visit reported that they found it difficult to remain informed let alone involved with what is going on in the education sector. Some of those interviewed felt that government lack of desire to engage with CSOs was due to a fear on the part of decision makers that they will be held to account or exposed. It is uncertain to what extent the lack of engagement with CSOs at state level is also due to poor understanding of the role and benefits of CSO participation and/or due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of many of the organisations at this level.

External inputs since 1999

5.15 During the ESA period (2002-5), there was a concerted effort by donors - particularly UNESCO and the World Bank - to support the government to undertake strategic studies

²⁹ Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2000, Nigeria country case study, Theobald et al., UNESCO 2007

³⁰ Capacity for Universal Basic Education project (CUBE) and Girls Education Project (GEP)

³¹ DFID funded Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria

that would inform the development of the sector. The World Bank published a series of human development working papers including *Public Expenditures on Education in Nigeria: Issues, Estimates and Some Implications* (2002), *School Education in Nigeria: Preparing for Universal Basic Education* (2004) and *The Capacity of the Nigerian Government to Deliver Basic Education Services* (2004), each of which provides a comprehensive analysis of aspects of the education sector in Nigeria.

5.16 In 2006, DFID and the World Bank responded quickly to the appointment of a reforming Federal Minister for Education and made resources available through the CUBE project to finance both local and international technical assistance to support the Situational Analysis and the subsequent development of the National Framework and the Ten Year Plan for Education. Nine state Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) were also undertaken in 2007 and a synthesis PER was endorsed by the (then) Federal Minister of Education in 2008. Following the appointment of the latest Federal Minister for Education, DFID has financed technical assistance to the Minister (through its ESSPIN programme) to strengthen the policy and planning process and a new Federal Road Map for the Education Sector was published in March 2009.

Relevance of donor objectives to education policy and planning

5.17 Despite the relevance (and timeliness) of external assistance to the FME and support to successive Ministers in the education sector, impact at the Federal level has been limited. Although a rough costing of a national sector plan and calculation of the financing gap was produced in early 2007, this has not led to changes in policy or the deployment of additional resources for basic education.

5.18 Despite support from World Bank and DFID to the Federal Government and from other donors to individual state governments, overall the engagement of the local education donors in a policy discussion with government is virtually non-existent. Chapter 9 discusses the reasons for this in greater detail but irrespective of these reasons the net impact of donor engagement on education policy and planning at the national level is minimal.

5.19 At state level external assistance has evolved over the last 10 years. As already noted, the World Bank has supported primary/basic education since 1991 through a succession of projects that largely maintained objectives and component activities, albeit under differing institutional and implementation designs³². The focus of these projects has included support to develop EMIS to improve information for policy and planning, construction of classrooms and purchasing of instructional materials, teacher training and pupil assessment. Despite some success in these areas, and despite project designs reflecting state priorities, the lack of significant progress in increasing participation and the minimal impact on improving learning outcomes is disappointing.

5.20 From 2005 onwards, partly in response to the lack of progress on key education indicators World Bank and DFID adopted a strategy to identify so-called “Lead States”. These were to be identified by a set of benchmarks designed to highlight better governance and greater commitment to service delivery and would attract increased support for sectors programmes. Although the term Lead State has subsequently been dropped, Kano, Kwara, Kaduna, Lagos and Jigawa states are all benefiting from increased and more intensive donor assistance to support improved governance and service delivery.

³² Project Performance Assessment Report, Nigeria: Second Primary Education Project (Credit No. 3346). Universal Basic Education Project (Credit No. 3711), World Bank 2008.

Effectiveness of external support in contributing to education policy and planning

5.21 As discussed above it is difficult at least at the Federal level to identify and to attribute any long-term, sustainable improvements in education policy and implementation to external inputs. The publication of a series of World Bank studies (see paragraph 5.13 above) coincided with the period of consultation within the country for the drafting of the UBE Law (2004). It could therefore be argued that development partners made a contribution to the shaping of (basic) education policy through the process of researching the issues, meeting stakeholders and publishing the reports. It is difficult, however, to objectively verify that this is the case.

5.22 Whilst external inputs funded by Development Partners are generally in line with over-arching national policy objectives, they have tended to be project focused. At the Federal level, Nigerian officials interviewed during the country visit expressed the view on numerous occasions that whilst donor inputs were welcome and relevant, donors appeared to have their own predetermined agendas that were not always aligned with the current government priorities. This may partly be explained by the frequent changes in priorities in Nigeria due to the frequent changes in leadership that in turn – according to the donors interviewed – have created difficulties in engaging purposefully with government. However it is also pertinent to observe that whilst the Joint Consultative Committee on Education (JCCE) provides a forum to all interested stakeholders to engage with government around the policy debate, participation from donors has been extremely limited over recent years.

5.23 At state level, however, there is some evidence that where donors have targeted assistance for the development of costed education sector plans and also provided wider support aimed at improving public financial management, government capacity in this area is growing. Furthermore, the external emphasis on and support for the development of costed sector plans in some states appears to be creating demand for technical assistance from those states that have not yet produced these plans. The attendance of representatives of 26 states at the recent meeting in Abuja (¶4.11) and reports from donors in country of requests for technical assistance from states that wish to produce costed plans are indicators of this demand.

5.24 There are adequate policies in place to address equity and HIV/AIDS issues but limited follow through in terms of planning, budgeting and implementation. Exclusion, especially for girls in the north of the country, remains a major challenge. Large numbers of “Al Majiri” children in the north are also excluded from formal education for which there is yet to be a credible policy response. Both of these issues are discussed in greater detail in chapter 10.

Efficiency of external support in terms of reaching beneficiaries and improving the policy and planning process

5.25 There is little evidence to suggest that externally funded policy inputs have yet led to more efficient policy and planning at either Federal or state levels. External assistance has helped to significantly improve the quality and credibility of education sector plans however these inputs have been heavily focused on the production of plans rather than building the capacity of government officials to produce them. The impact of external assistance on the planning process is yet to be measured and coverage is limited to the 5 ESSPIN states and 4 Girls Education Project Phase 2 (GEP-II) states.

Sustainability of any improvements in policy and planning

5.26 Whilst education policy in Nigeria has evolved in a broadly linear fashion over the last ten years, to meet global norms around EFA for example, and in addressing specific challenges such as girls’ education or HIV/AIDS, the same cannot be said for the planning process at least at the Federal level. The well documented and oft discussed changes in political leadership at the Federal level have not favoured a robust or consistent approach to

planning. Thus concerted efforts to support government attempts to provide focus and clarity for education planning during the period 2006-7 produced little tangible outcome following changes in leadership after the 2007 elections. Neither FME nor UBEC has to date been able to provide clear and unequivocal guidance and support to states on how to conduct education planning. States themselves follow different procedures and the budgeting aspect of planning is particularly problematic.

5.27 Since the start of 2009, a new Federal Minister of Education has attempted to rebuild momentum for more coherent and focused education planning. Whilst it is too early to evaluate to what extent these latest efforts will prove sustainable the leadership that is currently being provided has drawn broad support and praise from those stakeholders interviewed during the country visit.

5.28 States plan and budget for basic education provision according to their own policy and budgetary priorities within the overall framework of the UBE Law. Whilst the process is generally weak, particularly at local level where meaningful education planning is virtually non-existent, there are signs that in many states (see paragraph 5.10 above) there is an understanding of and a willingness to undertake the thorough planning that is required to produce a credible, costed plan. If donors active in the education sector in Nigeria can agree on a common approach and on a common set of planning tools, and minimum data sets, there are reasons to believe that meaningful progress can be made over the next couple of years to build sustainable improvements in education planning.

FTI Prospects

5.29 FTI provides a policy and planning framework that can help develop a consensus around planning at both Federal and state level and the EPDF provides a potential source of finance to help states produce credible plans. However in considering prospects for FTI in Nigeria there are a number of key questions that need to be resolved. These relate to incentives for change, capacity amongst both donors and government to manage the FTI processes and monitor expenditure and legal issues, all of which of are discussed in more detail in chapter 12 Conclusions and Reflections.

6 Education Financing

Context

Sources and levels of finance

6.1 An understanding of education finance in Nigeria is particularly complicated by Federal fiscal relationships which result in the states having a great deal of autonomy to the extent of not being required to report budgets and expenditures to the Federal Government. As described in chapter 3 in spite of two major exercises in the past seven years to collect and generate data on the total levels and distributions of public expenditure on education across Nigeria, no plausible national estimates are available. The most recent attempt supported by the World Bank and DFID included a set of nine state education public expenditure case studies (out of 36 states). These used financial information to 2005 and resulted in partial estimates of state government and local government education expenditure for these states³³. Combining all sources, best estimates are that total public expenditure on education in Nigeria is equal to around 5% of GDP (above the median for Sub Saharan countries of 4.4%), and that state governments fund around 43% of the total, the Federal government 31% and local governments 26%.

6.2 The Federal government spends round 14% of its revenues on education and there is great variation in this share across states ranging from 15% to 27%, and even greater variation across local governments – at least between 12% and 34%. Education expenditure shares tend to be significantly higher in the southern states than in the northern states. Primary education is estimated to receive roughly 30% of total education expenditure. This compares to an average of 48% across those sub Saharan countries for which data are available. Of primary education expenditures, around 84% is from local governments' funds (all teacher salaries) with the remainder shared almost equally across the Federal and state governments. External finance for the sector is relatively small, equal to perhaps just over 1% of total sector spending and to around 1.6% of spending on primary education.

Federal Government expenditure

6.3 Federal Government expenditure on education has been increasing. In real terms, the budget for education increased by 47% between 2001 and 2006 and the sector's share of total Federal Government expenditure increased from 11.7% to 14.5%. Most expenditure is for tertiary education. However, recurrent expenditures on education increased sharply in 2005 and 2006 largely as a result of the introduction of the UBE Intervention Fund and the Virtual Poverty Fund (described in more detail in chapter 6). The allocations for these programmes represented one fifth of the total Federal budget for education in 2007. They require a matching element from the state government and their use is prescribed for particular activities.

States and local government expenditures

6.4 Variations in expenditure on education across states and local governments are very wide. With Lagos State as an exception, around 85-90% of all state government expenditures and around 90-95% of all local government expenditures are funded through transfers from the Federation Account. These allocations are distributed equally across

³³ Even this time consuming study concluded that "...comprehensive information could not be obtained in any of the nine ...states on total overhead expenditures in public primary schools." (World Bank, 2007 p. 21).

states but topped up with some allowance for factors such as differences in population and land area, and the contribution of the state to oil revenues. Among the nine states which were reviewed in the most recent public education expenditure study, per capita revenue from the transfers in 2005 ranged from a low of N 9,800 in Kano to a high of N 23,600 in Cross River. Federation Account allocations per capita across local government areas similarly vary substantially.

6.5 Between 2001 and 2005, total state education expenditures declined appreciably in real terms in eight of the nine states included in the public expenditure review. The average share of total expenditure by states and their local governments which was spent on education was 20%. But the variations across these states were very large – between 14.8% and 27.4%. Variations across local governments in these states were even wider – from 11.7% to 34.2%.

6.6 Variations in the distribution of expenditure across all levels of education by state and local government combined are also wide with primary schooling receiving between 36% and 62% of total expenditures across the nine states, with a median of 45%. Given that the Federal Government has a large programme of expenditure for tertiary education, these shares for sub national government expenditures on primary education appear to be generally low.

6.7 State and local government support for overhead and capital expenditures appears to be minimal in most states. Across the nine surveyed states, per student expenditure on instructional materials in 2005 varied from N 67 (less than USD0.5) per student in Cross River to N 675 per student in the Federal Capital Territory. Capital expenditure on education accounted for less than 10% of total capital expenditure in most of the surveyed states between 2001 and 2005.

Calculating the EFA financing gap

6.8 In addition to the lack of accurate information on aggregate education expenditures, including for primary education, it is widely agreed within Nigeria that data on the education system, including primary school enrolments, also lacks legitimacy. In addition, accurate information on the size of the school age group is not available. Altogether, this overall lack of information means that while a small number of exercises have been undertaken over time, including by UNESCO staff³⁴, no plausible estimates of the financial requirements – total, domestic or donor – needed to achieve universal primary or basic education across the country exist.

6.9 Some recent donor supported activities have resulted in state education sector plans. In the cases of Kano, Kwara and Kaduna States these plans have included some broad estimates of the financial requirements of various sets of enrolment projections, including universal primary completion. For example, the Kano case study set targets across the education system including a primary gross completion rate of 97% (grade 6 enrolments as % of 11 year old population) for 2018. Assuming a 5% annual rate of growth of state and local government revenues and an increased share of education budgets to 20%, projected costs would exceed resources by around 30%. The experiences of this particular exercise, including the discussion of the results within the state, suggest that the benefits are more the impetus the simulations give to discussions of sub sectoral trade-offs and sector balance than the absolute costings.

³⁴ An exercise undertaken in 2007 by UNESCO suggested that if the share of GDP allocated to education could be raised to 8% by 2020 it would provide around half of the resources required to reach a set of education objectives including universal basic education

Domestic mechanisms to reduce the EFA financing gap

6.10 In addition to state and local government revenues, which mainly result from the (constitutionally governed) allocations from the Federation Account, the primary education sub-sector can benefit from two funds financed by the Federal Government – the UBE-Intervention Fund (UBE-IF) introduced in 2005 and the Virtual Poverty Fund (VPF), introduced following the debt relief negotiations in 2006 – and the Education Trust Fund. The first two require matching funds from the state government.

6.11 The ETF is financed by a levy on large businesses. The amounts tend to be equivalent to around 10-15% of Federal Government education expenditure. Essentially they fund capital expenditures at all levels of education, through state bodies and directly through tertiary institutions. Between 1999 and 2007, 29% of total disbursements have been through the States' Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs). Currently, around USD150 million has been allocated by the Fund but not disbursed due largely to inertia displayed by the state bodies and institutions. In March 2009, the Fund took out newspaper advertisements to 'name and shame' and since then 109 out of 112 bodies and institutions have begun negotiations. During the country visit, the team learned that the ETF is likely to restrict future support to focus on post-basic education institutions.

6.12 The Virtual Poverty Fund, located in the Office of the President and offering assistance across the MDGs, is another potential source of funds for primary education. The Fund was initiated as part of the debt relief negotiations. The decisions of which programmes to support appear to be more centralised than those of the ETF and the recent needs assessments undertaken by the Fund suggest this centralisation will intensify. Of the 2007 programme for education (around USD110 million), over 60% funded an in-service teacher training activity and stipends for a Federal teachers corps.

6.13 The UBE Intervention Fund is potentially of significant importance for expanding primary education. It is funded through a 2% charge on Federal Government revenues. Two 'controversial' characteristics of the Fund, in the eyes of state governments, are the matching requirement from state governments and the condition that the largest portion of the Fund has to be spent on pre-determined activities (and allocated in the proportions of . 70% on infrastructure, 15% on instructional materials, and 15% teacher development). In addition, during the country visit, state government officers pointed to many organizational issues which result in difficulties accessing allocations, for example the nature of the required tendering processes. Several states, including those which receive large derivation grants and royalties, do not make the effort to apply for the funds. However, each of the four states visited on the country visit does apply for UBE funding. Substantial problems remain in the implementation of the Fund. Overall, between 2005 and the end of March 2008, the Fund had received N95 billion (USD630 million) from the Federal Government for distribution to the states, but only N43 billion had been released. In addition, a significant share of the amounts distributed remained unspent in the bank accounts of the state governments.

6.14 The three funds, particularly the UBE Intervention Fund, can be seen as Nigeria's home grown equivalent of the FTI Catalytic Fund. It is of concern that not all of these funds' resources are being utilized. In the case of the ETF the cause appears mainly to be inertia displayed by the receiving institutions. In the case of the Intervention Fund, it appears to be a mix of cumbersome administrative procedures plus the inflexibility of UBEC in prescribing the nature of, and allocations for, allowable expenditures. In addition, according to some stakeholders interviewed, the need for transparency in accounting for the use of Intervention Funds acts as disincentive for certain states. Designing and implementing measures to improve the disbursement rates from the funds would improve arguments for additional external support for education.

Financial management

6.15 The recent public expenditure review of the education sector concluded that the current process of formulating and executing budgets is unreliable and poorly organized. Overall, the financing of key inputs is unpredictable reflecting a lack of clarity regarding which level of government is responsible. The budgets of most states are based on an outdated system: policy, programming, and budget functions are not fully integrated; there is little policy debate on spending decisions; budget execution is far from effective; budget performance is hampered by the short time horizon of the annual budget; and investment budgets are not integrated. In addition, states face an acute shortage of the technical and human capacity needed to design and implement reforms partly due to problems in attracting qualified, experienced professionals. Several states (such as Kano and Lagos) are attempting to improve their budget systems but, in general, states vary in their reform efforts.

External inputs since 1999

6.16 The sources and amounts of external financing for primary education since 1999 were broadly described in chapter 3. It needs to be repeated that in terms of the basic education system as a whole, external support is relatively insignificant. The number of donors has been small – essentially IDA and DFID, followed by USAID, Japan and UNICEF - and the amounts of support involved have been equivalent to at most 1.5% of total domestic expenditures on primary education.

6.17 The modalities of external support have varied. The World Bank has financed three investment programmes for primary education since 1999 – the first (PEP2, 2000-04) for USD55 million focused largely on self help school expansion/rehabilitation schemes; the second (UBEP, 2003-06, which closed prematurely due to slow disbursements) for USD101million covered some Federal Government activities and provided small grants to 16 states; while the third (SESP), ongoing, is for USD60 million and focuses on just three states. A USD90 million project mainly for junior secondary schools has also recently been negotiated for Lagos state.

6.18 Between 2003-06, DFID financed TA and capacity building activities (CUBE - £16.5million) in the 16 states included in the UBEP project and between 2006-08 it provided support for Kaduna, Kano and Kwara states to develop education sector plans and to undertake studies to access and support the World Bank's SESP project. Since 2008, through the ESSPIN Programme (£105 million), it is financing technical assistance to five states and to the Federal government. The programme is administered by a UK consultancy firm. In addition, (through UNICEF) DFID has supported activities to increase girls' schooling in six northern states (2005-08, £25 million). USAID (again using consultancy firms) has supported capacity building programmes for several years (LEAP and COMPASS) targeted at local governments in a small number of states and JICA has focused on science and mathematics teaching (2006-09, USD1.6 million) and a school building programme in three states (2005-07, USD17 million).

6.19 Overall, the World Bank projects, particularly the current one which focuses on three states, seek to supplement domestic financing but also have selected activities aimed at improving implementation capacity and the quality of governance in the sector. DFID and USAID also concentrate resources mainly on a small set of states and/or local governments, and are more directly addressing problems of capacity deficiencies across various aspects of sector policy and planning. In DFID's case, there is some linking of their activities in the education sector to those which they are supporting more widely across state governments, including the development of medium term sector strategies (MTSS) and overall improvement in budgeting practices.

Relevance of donor objectives to education finance

6.20 The attainment of the EFA goals, and particularly the MDG education goals of universal primary completion and gender equality, which are being supported by education sector donors have been endorsed strongly at the policy level by the Federal Government and by most state governments. The best indicator of the Federal Government's commitment is perhaps the establishment by law in 2005 of the UBE IF, which is equal to around 20% of the total Federal education budget.

6.21 Over time, it could be argued that the relevance of programmes has increased as donors have begun to focus financial resources on those levels of government which deliver primary education – state and local governments. This has become easier as the Federal Government has reduced its insistence on external support being distributed equally across the country. As a result, for those (relatively few) states which have received support the level of resources is potentially significant enough to have a recognisable impact.

6.22 In addition to enabling the financing of more inputs for primary education, external support has had the objective of improving the capacity of individuals, organisations and institutions which influence the performance of the education system. The relevance of this focus was given strong support in the broad set of interviews undertaken in-country.

Effectiveness of external support in contributing to increasing funds for primary education and improving budget processes

6.23 Effectiveness of external inputs is considered in this part of the evaluation in terms of strengthening of budget processes and increasing domestic funding with the consequent decrease in the funding gap for achieving universal primary completion. Neither of these outcomes can be demonstrated for Nigeria in general or, as yet, for the states where external support is being concentrated. Some partial evidence suggests that additional state government funding for primary education may be forthcoming in project states –for instance in Kano State, funds for the construction of primary schools have increased significantly in the past two years compared to previous years. In addition, the Governor of the state has appealed to members of the state assembly to use at least 60% of their constituency budget allocations for primary education. Whilst World Bank supported reviews of public expenditures on primary education in 2002 and 2004 had pointed to different ways in which the Federal Government might provide grants to states for primary education, it cannot be concluded that these influenced the decision to design the UBE IF. More generally, with regard to the major effort made by DFID and the World Bank to undertake the education public expenditure review and to offer recommendations with respect to funding levels and distributions and to the public financial management systems, interviews with both government and donor staff suggest that the work has had limited impact.

Efficiency of external support in terms of disbursements, reaching beneficiaries and improving the predictability of domestic and external finance

6.24 The first two of the World Bank projects since 1999 have been evaluated, including for their efficiency, by the Bank's independent evaluation unit. The first of these projects, PEP2, was judged as 'moderately unsatisfactory' with regard to development outcomes, and 'modest' in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness. The second project, UBEP, had ratings of unsatisfactory, negligible and modest respectively across the three categories. All of the funds of PEP2 were disbursed while UBEP was closed in 2006, two years early, having disbursed just 64% of the credit. Only 17% of the amount available for the Federal Government was disbursed. The TA programme for the project, provided by DFID through the CUBE project was judged to have been defined too broadly and insufficiently focused on the strategic requirements.

6.25 External support has not increased the predictability of domestic or external finance, beyond the length of projects.

Sustainability of any improvements in budget processes and funding levels for primary education

6.26 Donor support has not been provided to improve the education budget process at the Federal level of Government. In the states in which donors have provided support, again little focus has been on detailed education budget processes, though the TA support funded by DFID has led to the production of education sector analyses and plans, some of which have included financial projections. However, very strong qualifications are made by the authors of these projections resulting from the generally poor quality of education finance (and education) data.

6.27 The public expenditure review suggested that state government expenditures on education 2001-05 had declined in real terms while the Federal government expenditures had increased by 47%, partly as a result of establishing the UBE-IF. State and local government expenditures are almost wholly dependent on transfers from the Federation Account (apart from Lagos State) and hence on the price and volume of oil, and on any revenue stabilisation measures which the Federal Government is able to put in place. Essentially, total revenues have a large degree of built-in instability. However, several of the states (and local governments) which are furthest from the EFA goals are the ones which currently appear to spend the smallest share of their revenues on education. The higher spending states show that greater spending is possible.

6.28 External support to primary education is provided by very few donors and no new donors appear ready to enter. DFID is at the early stages of its new six year programme which largely emphasizes TA and capacity building. JICA is considering expanding its mathematics and science teaching improvement project to additional states. USAID is also considering its future programmes. The World Bank is likely to increase support over the next few years. Preliminary thinking is around a gradual and phased expansion, to other states, of the current project which is being implemented in three states at a total cost of USD65 million over five years.

FTI prospects

6.29 External aid is, and is always likely to be, only a very marginal source of finance for public expenditures on primary education in Nigeria. Even very substantial multiples of current aid would have little impact on the gap between the current level of funding (whatever that is) and the amount required (nationally) to provide all children with a quality education in a conducive learning environment.

6.30 The coverage of primary education across individual states varies significantly as does the financial effort being made by state governments. Unfortunately, the relative effort being made in the most educationally backward states tends to be lower than in other states. Even in individual states, where education coverage is currently low, the financing gap is unlikely to be significantly reduced by external support. Only if such support could be linked both to Federal grants and to higher spending by the states would the gap be reduced. Many of those interviewed in the country visit argued that additional financial resources to directly fund education inputs should not be a priority for donor programmes to the education sector.

7 Data, Monitoring and Evaluation

Context

7.1 If planning and budgeting for primary education are to be evidence based, good quality data on the education system are needed at the state level. Such data rarely exist. The generally poor quality of raw data and of the indicators of education outcomes and efficiency for the education system in Nigeria available at all levels of government was described in chapter 3. The poorest quality is for primary education where the most recent published enrolment data are from the Federal Government's annual school census for 2005. The results imply a primary GER of 95% and a NER of 63%. There are no usable time series data for the years prior to 2005 and no results from the 2006 and 2007 school censuses have yet been published.

7.2 The lack of accurate data for the education sector, nationally and at state levels, is universally acknowledged in Nigeria and regarded as a major problem by Federal and state government officials alike. In addition, with regard to estimates of enrolment ratios and other measures of coverage there are the recurring problems relating to population figures. Most recent estimates of enrolment ratios are based on the 1991 Population Census, which was again widely regarded as unreliable at the time. The results of the Population Census conducted in 2006 have not to date been released in sufficient detail.

7.3 The Ministry of Education 'education sector analysis' reported in 2007 that '...there are serious concerns about the reliability of the underlying data upon which the system is built and there is a long way to go before numbers from the system can be trusted' (FME, 2007, p12). Similarly, the Kano State Education Sector Plan describes the education information systems in the state as being 'weak' (Kano State, 2008, p.13). To augment the results of the school census, donors have supported the collection of data on school attendance and education attainment from household surveys³⁵ but the results of these surveys are not always consistent with one another or with the school census-based EMIS. For instance, the 2005 EMIS in Kano State described a primary NER of 78% while the 2006 CWIQ household survey gave an estimate of 47%.


7.4 The reasons for this situation are said to be the politicisation of education (including through the formulas which determine the allocation of the revenues from the Federation Account across states and local governments); this produces incentives for some actors to inflate enrolments and for others to deflate them. There are also a set of capacity problems ranging from poor overall management of the annual school census process, head teachers' inability or unwillingness to complete the school census forms accurately, local and state government staff's inability to collate the information and enter it accurately, and an overall absence of the skills required for quality control. Finally, and particularly relevant to some northern states, is the treatment of children who are enrolled in various forms of Islamic institutions, some of which also offer conventional core primary school subjects, and the under-representation of children enrolled in private schools.

7.5 The only way of even tentatively assessing progress since 1999 is to compare the results of the DHS (1999) with those of the CWIQ (2006). According to World Bank, 2008, the results suggest that the primary GER increased from 87% to 92% and the NER from 59% to 62%.

³⁵ Donors have supported the collection of household data from surveys, including the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in 1999 and 2003, the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) in 1999, the Nigeria Living Standards Survey (NLSS) in 2005 and the Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ) in 2006.

7.6 However, Nigeria is a diverse, highly populated country. Average enrolment rates do not adequately describe the real situation as the results of the household surveys, even allowing for their deficiencies, demonstrate. In states in each of the three southern zones, and north central zone, enrolment rates are much higher than in states in the other two northern zones (Figure 7.1). For example, the primary attendance rate in the 2003 DHS varied from 83% in the South West zone to 42% in the North West zone. (The NLSS' attendance rates for these states were 66% and 26% respectively). The household surveys suggest that almost every child in the southern states enters primary school at some point compared to 30-45% in some of the northern states. The possibilities of these different groups of states achieving the primary schooling and gender EFA goals by 2015 are very different. The implications for education strategy of this wide diversity in access cannot be overemphasized.

Figure 7.1 Sub-national primary school attendance rates obtained from household surveys, most recent year available.



Source: DHS Dataset, 2003 – EPDC Graph produced for Evaluation Team May 2009.

7.7 Information on the number of teachers and their qualifications is more accurate. This is as a result, initially, of the substantial efforts made by the National Primary Education Commission (later the Universal Primary Education Commission) which oversaw teacher salary payments until 2004 to verify teacher salary payments and subsequently of the State Universal Basic Education Boards which took over the responsibilities for payment.

7.8 Regular data on learning achievement in the schools are not being collected. Between 2000 and 2003, three national surveys were undertaken but there has been none since, though one was planned for 2009 which, the team learned, would not now be taking place.

7.9 The general dearth of expenditure data for the education system, nationally and within states has been described in chapters 3 and 6. The education sector public expenditure review of 2007-8 particularly emphasised the lack of data on overheads – that is, on non-salary recurrent expenditures.

7.10 There is some evidence that perceptions of the need for accurate data on the education system and for some sort of monitoring system are increasing, at least in those states which have been receiving support from donors. For instance, in 2008, Lagos State decided to implement a free textbook programme. This required accurate information on each pupil in the state's public schools and a new data collection/monitoring system was established (independent of the Federal Government's EMIS). Similarly in Kano State, following the production of the education sector analysis and 10 year plan, there appears to be a growing understanding of the need for better data before expenditure decisions are made.

External Inputs since 1999

7.11 Donors have consistently pointed to the lack of quality data for the education system and the necessity of good data as a requirement for realistic planning in general and for the preparation of donor-supported programmes. Since 2003, external support has been provided to the Federal Government to help improve the annual school census and the EMIS. Some of the support has been of a very basic type – USAID financed the paper and printing costs of the 2003 school census, and the World Bank provided support, including for the purchase of computers and a generator when the Education Data Bank moved from Lagos to Abuja, again in 2003. However, the main vehicle of support for development of the EMIS has been through DFID's CUBE project between 2003 and 2008.

7.12 CUBE hired a full-time international EMIS specialist to develop the capacity of the Education Data Bank (subsequently called the NEMIS and Statistics) to conduct the annual schools census and to publish meaningful data sets. Alongside this support, UNICEF co-funded two national experts. With this technical assistance and USAID's financial support the FME was able to publish the results of the 2005 school census. The CUBE project completion report in 2008³⁶ noted that "long-term TA has had significant benefits in enabling better planning and implementation of the data management cycle. There is some evidence of a greater demand for data for planning." However it also noted that late distribution of school census forms and the lack of budgetary commitment on the part of Government had delayed the conduct and analysis of the 2006 and 2007 annual school census data.

7.13 In 2007 the National Council on Education approved an EMIS decentralisation policy that places responsibility for conducting the school census and processing the data with state governments. However, beyond the provision of small numbers of computers to each state no additional finance has been made available. Whilst individual states, as noted above, may see the need for better quality information there is currently no basis for supposing that this policy will enhance the ability of FME to publish better quality education data for 2008 or 2009.

7.14 A second effort by the donors to improve information on the education system has been through the attempts to collect and generate data on expenditures, described above. However, whilst a great deal of information was collated, and a detailed picture of financing and expenditures at one point in time (2005) presented for a quarter of all the states and local governments, no mechanisms exist for systematically updating the estimates. And

³⁶ DFID 2008, p.7

while there is no compulsion on state governments to regularly supply this information it is difficult to see how regular expenditure monitoring can be undertaken.

7.15 In many countries, one of the main mechanisms through which the quality of education sector data are improved and the system monitored is through yearly or twice yearly sector reviews undertaken jointly by government and donors. These require sector-wide information and indicators of change, and provide the incentive and opportunity for more detailed monitoring. Such reviews are not held in Nigeria at the Federal level and only take place on a very limited scale in those states where the World Bank and DFID conduct joint monitoring of their education support programmes.

7.16 Poor quality data are not limited to the education sector in Nigeria. Information on the health status of the population and their access to clean water is similarly limited. For this reason, as noted above, donors have supported several household surveys – e.g. DHS surveys (USAID), NLSS (World Bank), MICS (UNDP), CWIQ (World Bank). Currently an EdData survey (linked to a new DHS) is under way jointly financed by USAID and DFID.

Relevance of donor objectives to data, monitoring and evaluation

7.17 External support intended to improve the quality of education data and its monitoring is very relevant in Nigeria – at both Federal and state government levels. However, the task is an enormous one. Given the general scepticism with which state government officials regard the Federal Government's EMIS (to the extent that states are sometimes said to maintain two sets of enrolment data) it is questionable at this point in time that external support is best directed at the Federal level, as generally has been the case over recent years.

Effectiveness and efficiency of external support in contributing towards better data, monitoring and evaluation

7.18 It is not clear that the reliability and quality of education data collected by the Federal Government has improved in recent years. Over the past two-three years, the most data intensive activities in the sector (apart from the public expenditure review) have been the preparation of state education sector analyses and plans. The ESAs have been undertaken in three states and have led to costed education sector costed plans. The authors, and collaborators, have generally struggled with the data available and the better ones have supplemented government data with those from the donor-supported household surveys. While displaying some inconsistencies, these additional sources have been useful in at least demonstrating feasible ranges for key variables and indicators.

Sustainability of any improvements in data, monitoring and evaluation

7.19 That the results of the school censuses held in 2006 and 2007 have not yet been published does not augur well for the sustainability of any improvements which have been made to the process. Interviews in the states indicated a continuing scepticism about the usefulness of the national school census. On the other hand there does seem to be a movement among states either to add on their own schedules to the census or, as in Lagos State, to undertake an additional separate exercise.

FTI prospects of addressing the data gap

7.20 A national education sector plan covering all aspects of the FTI Indicative Framework could not be fully prepared for Nigeria at the moment. Too few reliable education and public expenditure data are available. The same conclusion applies to most states, with perhaps one or two exceptions. It is possible, in principle that in an individual state, the search for FTI endorsement might galvanise the government to improve the data base. However, even in those states which have been through the process of preparing (with TA support) an education sector analysis and plan, basic variables such as the gross enrolment rate vary across the different sources of data. To some extent it might be argued that whether the

NER in a particular state is 60% or 80% does not matter – even in the most positive scenario, hundreds of thousands of children would still be out of school. Efforts to identify the magnitude of the absolute number of out of school children may therefore make more sense than focusing on enrolment rates with their embedded problems of having to use contested population estimates. Overall, however, whether or not Nigeria joins the FTI donor support to individual states to improve data collection will remain relevant.

8 Capacity Development

Context

8.1 In this chapter capacity is understood to be “the ability of people, organizations and society to manage their affairs successfully.”³⁷ The chapter below starts by examining the institutional framework for the education in Nigeria, then looks more closely at the key organisations tasked with the planning and delivery of (basic) education services, after which it investigates to what extent the individuals working within the sector have the skills required to perform their roles.

8.2 The 1999 Constitution established joint responsibility amongst the three tiers of government for all levels and types of education, so that education is frequently described as being “on the concurrent list”. As far as the basic sub-sector is concerned, the Federal Government’s role in primary education was limited to the setting of policy and the maintenance of standards. This interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court ruling in April 2002. A 2003 paper produced by the education donors described the ruling as having “caused much confusion concerning the hitherto leading role of the Federal Government in the UBE Programme and the status of NPEC/UBEC.”³⁸ At the same time, this ruling reasserted the leading role of the state government in primary education.

8.3 The enactment of the Federal UBE Law in 2004 established UBEC as the Federal body with responsibility for the basic education sub-sector. Tasked with supporting the drive to achieve universal basic education, UBEC administers the Intervention Fund provided for by 2% of the consolidated revenue. The enactment of state UBE laws (mostly) in 2005 established the State Universal Basic Education Boards (SUBEBs) and the Local Government Education Authorities (LGEAs) thus completing the establishment of the legislative framework for the basic education sector.

8.4 As many reports have noted, the legal and regulatory framework for education is complicated by the existence and operations of 21 parastatal organizations which relate to the Federal Ministry of Education in various ways. At the State level the situation is similarly complex and a clear example of how this affects the delivery of education is the confusion around the disarticulation of the junior secondary schools discussed in detail in ¶ 3.7 above.

8.5 The overall picture is thus one of complex institutional relationships at both Federal and state levels that provide for a lack of clarity and transparency around the governance and management of the education sector. The lack of clarity around responsibility for education, and in particular for the division of labour between the three tiers of government, leads to a lack of proper accountability between them which in turn contributes to a broader power struggle between the States and the Federation. It is also linked with the on-going political debate concerning ‘fiscal federalism’ and ‘resource control’.

8.6 At state level, House Committees on Education have an important role to play in scrutinizing state legislation, reviewing and approving state budget for education and monitoring progress towards UPC. Little work has to date been undertaken to review the capacity of these committees to perform their roles. However, limited discussions in two states visited during this study suggest that whilst Committee Chairmen, at least, understand their roles, they may lack the core knowledge and key skills required to fulfil them.

8.7 In 2004 a World Bank report³⁹ concluded that neither Federal nor state governments were allocating sufficient financial resources to meet present or future enrolment needs;

³⁷ Guidelines for capacity development in the education sector within the Education for All Fast Track Initiative Framework, FTI Secretariat 2008

³⁸ IDPs

³⁹ The Capacity of the Nigerian Government to Deliver Basic Education Services, Africa Region Human Development Series, World Bank 2004

State Ministries, State Primary Education Boards (SPEBs) – the predecessors to the SUBEBs – and the LGEAs were “bloated with non-teaching staff” (Ibid p. 12); there were insufficient staff working in School Services Departments in the SUBEBs, and by far the largest departments were personnel departments where the bulk of Grade Level 1-6 unskilled or semi-skilled employees were placed. Poor job definitions and inappropriate work methods and procedures contributed to low motivation and the lack of funds was so severe that the shortage of material resources included basic resources such as office space, desks, chairs, filing cabinets, typewriters and electricity.

8.8 In 2008 the DFID-funded CUBE project commissioned studies in Kaduna, Kano and Kwara States on the institutional arrangements and capacity of key organisations to deliver basic education services. In the intervening years between the two sets of studies little had changed. Key findings included a lack of clear of roles and responsibilities and overlapping functions between departments; a high proportion of ex-teachers with no management training working in senior positions; no functioning appraisal or performance management system and few professional development opportunities for individuals. The Kwara report concluded that the institutional arrangements were inadequate for the efficient and effective management and administration of the education system.

8.9 At the school level demographic pressures and increased demand for primary and junior secondary education place a strain on already dilapidated schools, most of which lack proper water and sanitation facilities, and many of which lack adequate classrooms and furniture. Teacher deployment is inequitable with significant differences in teacher: pupil ratios between rural and urban areas.

8.10 Teacher quality is also a major challenge. An education donors discussion paper prepared by the World Bank in 2003 (see ¶ 4.2 above) highlighted the low quality and lack of relevance of teacher education programmes and poor teacher management. It cited a lack of a government co-ordination mechanism for managing in-service primary teacher training at the federal, state or LGA levels and the absence of a system for monitoring and evaluating teacher training

8.11 Similarly an unpublished UNICEF discussion paper⁴⁰ highlighted poor teacher competence and motivation as factors affecting enrolment, completion and learning outcomes. A detailed analysis of teacher education commissioned as part of the preparation studies for the World Bank SESP project⁴¹ highlighted the neglect of adequate teacher education for the teaching of literacy, particularly in Nigerian languages, but also in English as a second language, and concluded that the “current policies on initial preparation of primary school teachers and their upgrading and continued professional development need to be seriously reconsidered.” Most recently a study of teacher competency in Kwara State concluded that many teachers themselves lack core, basic skills⁴².

Strategies to address the challenges

8.12 Soon after the restoration of democracy in 1999, President Obasanjo signed an Aide Memoire with UNESCO that led to the launch of the ESA Project⁴³. The project had three main objectives, namely to conduct a diagnosis of the education system, assist in the formulation of medium and long term education policy and strategy, and prepare a draft national education action plan. An additional key output was to improve institutional capacity in selected Federal and state bodies to review and develop policy.

⁴⁰ Ackers, J., 2006

⁴¹ Learning and teaching in Nigeria’s primary schools: Reform strategies for the professional development of teachers, Aarons. A., 2006

⁴² An Assessment of the Development needs of Teachers in Nigeria – Kwara State Case Study, ESSPIN 2009

⁴³ Support to Education Sector Analysis in Nigeria (UNESCO/Japan FIT PROJECT 552/NIR/1010), External evaluation Report, UNESCO, 2005.

8.13 The National Institute for Education Planning and Administration (NIEPA), a parastatal sitting under the Directorate of Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PPM&R) within the FME, was established in 1992. It has a mandate approved by the National Council on Education to build the capacity of planners and managers within the education sector and to assist states to develop education sector plans. However the status of NIEPA is fragile as its mandate has never been established in law and the organisation has little funding of its own. During the period 2003- 2006 DFID supported capacity development at NIEPA (see paragraph 8.24 below). States wishing to make use of NIEPA's services must pay to do so, and whilst the UBE-Intervention Fund makes provision for states to utilise a proportion of their funds for this purpose, none of the states visited reported having done so. In one state visited the Commissioner of Education had never heard of NIEPA.

8.14 The 2005 National Council for Education approved a policy to establish a School Based Management Committee (SBMC) in every school in order to strengthen school management and community participation. State SUBEBs were tasked with overseeing the establishment of SBMCs and for training SBMC members in their roles and responsibilities. At the same time the FME has made finance available to build the capacity of SBMCs, and has commissioned Action Aid Nigeria and CSACEFA to deliver training programmes in the field. A recent (unpublished) study commissioned by the ESSPIN programme suggests that SBMCs have fulfilled their roles to a mixed extent. On the one hand local organisations and community members are willing to get involved to support schools; however a lack of skills and resources hampers the ability of the SBMCs to fulfil their roles. SBMCs are in effect the products of the environment in which they operate and are subject to many of the same constraints as other sector bodies.

8.15 Improving Teachers' Skills: In attempting to address the challenges of poor teacher quality described above, the Federal Ministry of Education is accessing the Virtual Poverty Fund to finance the Nationwide Capacity Building Programme for Primary Teachers. This programme, implemented by the National Teachers' Institute (NTI), is providing training for 145,000 primary teachers yearly in a six-day course in English Language, Mathematics, Science and Social Studies as well as School-Based Assessment, Improvisation of Instructional Materials and Computer Appreciation. To date the numbers trained are 120,000 in 2007, 155,000 in 2008 with a target of 120,000 in 2009. An evaluation of the impact of this scheme has not yet been undertaken.

External Inputs since 1999

8.16 As discussed in paragraph 8.12 above, one of the first major external initiatives in the education sector following the restoration of democracy was to address the capacity gap through the ESA project. UNESCO provided technical assistance whilst finance was provided by Japan over the period 2002-2005.

8.17 At Federal level World Bank, DFID and USAID have provided support for the development of the National EMIS in FME since 2003, and over the period 2003-2006 DFID invested in technical assistance to strengthen NIEPA.

8.18 In the states over the same period, WB, DFID, USAID, UNICEF and JICA have all funded a range of projects and programmes that have included a strong focus on addressing the capacity gap. The main focus for these efforts has been to develop the skills and capabilities of individuals at various levels; less emphasis has been given to organisational development – for example building the capacity of schools, LGEAs and SUBEBs, and very little to addressing the institutional capacity gap.

8.19 World Bank and DFID have both in recent years recognized the need to engage with education stakeholders at a more strategic level. In 2007, the WB Institute ran their "Strategic Choices for Education Reform" in Abuja financed with EPDF funds. The course offered support to the Federal Ministries of Education and Finance and the state Ministries of Education in seven Nigerian states (Cross River, FCT, Jigawa, Lagos, Kaduna, Kano, and

Kwara) to improve understanding of education systems, to analyse sector needs in order to be able to implement education reforms.

8.20 In 2008, DFID launched its suite of state programmes. ESSPIN is tasked with working in coordination with the State Partnerships for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) programme to link reform within the education sector to broader initiatives to improve public administration through improved public financial management and civil service reform. ESSPIN is also expected to work closely with the State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) to improve accountability between service providers and service users. State House of Assembly Committees of Education have a crucial role to play in this regard (see paragraph 8.6 above) and both programmes aim to work with Committee members to strengthen their capacity to monitor the delivery of basic education services.

Relevance of donor objectives to capacity development

8.21 External provision for capacity development mirrors the broader picture of donor assistance for the education sector. The scale of support has (inevitably) been small in proportion to the size of the sector and the challenges faced. In so far as the objectives of individual projects have been aligned to sector priorities, externally funded capacity development has been relevant to the needs of the education sector. For example, at state level World Bank and DFID support for the SESP/ESSPIN states has seen the development of plans to strengthen planning and management within state ministries of education and SUBEBs.

8.22 Over the coming years ESSPIN will seek to assist states to draw up comprehensive plans for sector wide capacity development and provide seed money to design specific programmes. For these programmes to be effective, however, states themselves will need to make the necessary financing available to pay for these programmes, for which the political will to allocate funds accordingly and improve the governance environment in the sector will be required.

Effectiveness of external support in terms of capacity development

8.23 Whilst support for capacity development has generally been relevant to the country's needs, the effectiveness of external interventions is varied. The final project evaluation report for the ESA project⁴⁴, in answering the question of whether the project had achieved its objectives concluded "not really". At best the evaluators concluded that they could detect evidence of nascent affective change relating to the change of mindsets as education officials started to adjust to post-military government realities.

8.24 Similarly, DFID's efforts to strengthen NIEPA were abandoned in 2006 after less than three years due to concerns about the justification for the intervention in the first place – the report⁴⁵ questioned the need for an organisation such as NIEPA in light of the many private training providers in the country and the relatively high costs of running training programmes at NIEPA. Doubts were expressed by the report's authors about the capability of NIEPA to deliver the quality of professional development originally envisaged, and questions were also raised about the lack of transparency in financial management between the Institute and its consulting arm.

8.25 The two preceding paragraphs illustrate the challenge to closing the capacity gap in the absence of an over-arching capacity development framework or strong guidance from the FME. To better illustrate this point it is worth considering that at present JICA is committed to strengthening the teaching of science and mathematics in selected states; USAID is putting in place a new programme in two different (northern) states; UNICEF continues to implement the GEP-II project in yet a third set of states, and WB is planning a

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Annex E, CUBE Output to Purpose Review, DFID 2005

new set of IDA credits for yet another set of up to three states from 2010). Doubts must be raised about the effectiveness of such a “scatter-gun” approach, without any formal system for harmonising these efforts under Nigerian leadership.

8.26 Monitoring of capacity is also weak. Periodic studies of capacity in the education sector have been produced with donor assistance, for example the 2004 WB study on capacity of the Nigerian Government to deliver basic education services, the CUBE institutional analyses conducted in Kaduna, Kano and Kwara States, and most recently the teacher assessment exercise undertaken in Kwara State. However, there is currently no extensive systematic on-going monitoring across the sector.

Efficiency of external support in terms of capacity development

8.27 It is difficult to form a judgement about the efficiency of external inputs in strengthening capacity. The dearth of credible data in the system does not help in evaluating the value of investments to date. However one indicator of the efficiency of external support would be the lack of long term improvements to NEMIS where considerable external resources have been invested.

8.28 In 2005 DFID and WB signed a joint country partnership strategy to coordinate assistance to the education sector. This has contributed to capacity development plans for the SESP and ESSPIN states. Currently negotiations are under way for the next CPS and it is anticipated that other donors will either join (ADB) or acquire observer status (USAID, JICA). Beyond the CPS, there is currently no comprehensive, overarching technical assistance plan for the sector and the CPS represents the extent of harmonisation amongst education donors in Nigeria.

8.29 The considerable investment to support capacity development at NIEPA has resulted in a small number of its staff contributing assistance to the GEP states in drawing up their sector plans (although considerable external assistance was provided for the costing exercise). NIEPA itself is talking about opening a centre in each of the six geo-political zones in order to be better able to assist states. Nevertheless, in the absence of significant tangible outputs one must question whether the investments made to date are proving worthwhile.

8.30 Within states, donor assistance has helped to highlight specific gaps in capacity and, with support from the WB funded SESP and DFID funded CUBE and ESSPIN programmes, states have developed plans for strengthening capacity at all levels. In the ESSPIN supported states restructuring of colleges of education is under way with a view to strengthening the quality of teacher training. Whilst it is too early to evaluate the economic benefits of these initiatives there are some signs that a number of years of work may be finally bearing fruit.

Sustainability of any improvements in capacity development

8.31 Over the last 10 years the institutional framework for the education sector has undoubtedly been strengthened by the UBE Law and the creation of UBEC and the SUBEBs. However there has not been a corresponding consolidation or rationalisation of organisations within the sector. The attempt to do just this in 2007 failed, partly due to the shortage of time and the over ambitious nature of the proposed reforms in the run up to the general elections that year, and partly - according to some of those interviewed - due to resistance to some of the proposed changes.

8.32 Attempts to build the capacity of the key organisations within the sector appear to have made little progress. There has not been a successful review of organograms leading to a revision of departmental roles and responsibilities, nor any modernisation of administrative procedures and practices, and only very limited introduction of improved work practices utilising ICT to streamline and quicken tasks.

8.33 The FME appears to be committed to utilising available resources for capacity development and there is also evidence of a small number of states accessing donor assistance to address the capacity gap. However a much larger number of states are yet to

do so and, given the limited capacity of FME and donors to provide support to all states in the Federation, there are risks that some states may be left behind whilst other states move forward. Other significant risks are the uncertainty of political commitment at state level, (relatively) low levels of teacher pay and the low regard for teaching as a profession, all of which militate against the creation of an effective cadre of education officials and a high quality teaching force.

FTI prospects

8.34 One obvious area where FTI could make a difference is in helping to support the establishment and roll out of a standard set of planning tools. However, in a Federal system the challenge is to find the right balance between data requirements and capacity development at each level. So on the one hand FTI might seek to support capacity building at one or other Federal level body in order that in turn support could be extended to all states. On the other hand, the FTI might adopt a strategy to directly build capacity at state and local levels as being more practical and with a greater chance of success and sustainability. The example of donor assistance for NEMIS serves, however, as a useful reminder that the success of any such initiative will not only be dependent upon the quality of technical assistance but on the commitment of government at all levels to provide appropriate leadership and make the necessary financing available.

8.35 Furthermore, given the responsibility of state governments for basic education and given the increasing willingness of donors to engage directly with state government, it may therefore be advisable to target both the Federal and state levels simultaneously in order to attempt to both strengthen the system from the bottom up as well as from the top down. This might see an approach to support those states which already have demonstrated commitment to invest in capacity development by deploying EPDF to help states to design appropriate and sustainable programmes of capacity development for both education administrators and teachers.

9 Aid Effectiveness

Context

9.1 The aid effectiveness agenda subscribed to by the FTI partnership, in line with, but preceding the Paris Declaration, encourages donors to maximise coordination, complementarities and harmonization between themselves, and to align financial support with government priorities and programmes, to use/support government systems in the delivery of aid and reduce transaction costs through activities such as joint government – donor annual reviews.

9.2 Linked to this agenda is the encouragement of sustained increases in aid for primary education through increased bilateral aid programmes and, possibly, the Catalytic Fund, in countries which can demonstrate the ability to use aid effectively.

9.3 With a very few exceptions, there has been little movement on this agenda in the education sector in Nigeria since donors began to re-establish aid relations in 1999. The minimum required prerequisites, namely a government eager to engage with donors and to merge the activities of all stakeholders around a costed set of activities derived from a national programme do not exist. The lack of engagement partly reflects a situation in which Nigeria has never received large quantities of aid. For several decades, donors' have questioned the quality of governance and the Federal Government's willingness to improve this whilst the Federal Government has not recognised the need for aid as it has benefited from such large revenues from the energy sector.

9.4 While countries such as Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Zambia and Ethiopia have been recipients of large amounts of aid and have, over time, attempted to reduce the often distorting nature of that support through discussions with donors and the development of new aid relationships and processes, Nigeria has stood apart from such dialogue, or has attempted to take a parallel track. For instance, a prerequisite for debt relief through the HIPC process and budget support (and for FTI endorsement) since 1999 has been the preparation of PRSP. Nigeria, like India, has not been willing to take this route but rather produced its own document – NEEDS – which in the case of debt relief the donors agreed to accept as a document around which they might harmonise and align their own support.

9.5 Existing aid modalities and behaviours are very conventional. Most aid activities have been, and are being delivered through traditional single-donor investment projects with distinct project units and with funds located in special accounts (the World Bank), through implementing contracts to donor-based consulting firms (DFID, USAID and JICA), or through sub-contracting to other agencies and NGOs (DFID– UNICEF). A significant change in donor relations over the past decade, not however directly linked to the aid effectiveness agenda, has been the strengthened relationship between donors and particular state governments with, perhaps, less emphasis on the donor-Federal Government relationship.

External inputs since 1999

9.6 *Harmonisation among donors.* For many years, at least since 2002, meetings have been held regularly by representatives of local donor agencies who support activities in the education sector. Currently the group is co-chaired by UNESCO and USAID and the other agencies represented are the World Bank, DFID, JICA, UNDP, UNICEF and the AfDB. Meetings focus mainly on information sharing with regard to activities of both donors and the Federal Ministry of Education. One recurring area of interest to several donors has been the need to strengthen the EMIS.

9.7 In practice, the main attempts to harmonise donor education programmes have occurred between the World Bank and DFID. As part of the UBEP project, DFID agreed to provide TA to the 16 states which were to receive investment funds from the IDA credit.

Several donor staff, and the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group, have judged this effort as not having been very successful as a result of different expectations in the two agencies and difficulties in effectively sequencing activities. Since 2006, the donors appear to have been working more harmoniously in three states (Kano, Kwara and Kaduna), first in the period of preparation for the IDA credit during which the CUBE project helped states produce education sector analyses and plans, and currently in the project implementation period through ESSPIN's set of capacity building activities.

9.8 There appear to be few joint donor activities – such as joint review missions – which are common in most other aid-recipient countries, but which tend to be based around support to a single government programme.

9.9 *Alignment with country priorities and systems:* At various times over the past six years, the education donor group has prepared documents on their current activities and on where they might contribute in the future for discussion with the Ministry of Education i.e. the Minister. However discussions have occurred only rarely and, overall, the Ministry has shown little enthusiasm for dialogue with donors as a group.

9.10 Donor staff who have worked in other sub-Saharan African countries describe the meetings of the local education donor group and the mechanisms for government-donor dialogue as ineffective and weak compared to those in other countries. There are several possible reasons why the Federal Government has not become engaged including: the main responsibility for delivering primary and secondary education lies with the state and local governments, rather than the Federal Government; donor funding is an extremely small part of total expenditures on primary education; increasingly the donors have demonstrated their interest in developing relationships and implementing programmes with state governments; and most ministers of education have remained in their position for only a short period of time. At the same time it is noticeable that neither of the two main donors at present maintains a headquarters member of staff in Abuja dedicated solely to the education sector.

9.11 None of the donors channels financial support through the budget of either the Federal Government or any state government. Nor do donors follow government procurement procedures. In the case of DFID and USAID, contracts are signed between the donor and implementing firms who are then given financial responsibilities. In the case of the World Bank, payments are made directly from special accounts.

9.12 At the 'head of agency' level, DFID and the World Bank have been attempting to work together and jointly to align their aid programmes with the priorities of the Federal Government. To this end, a four-year Country Partnership Strategy was negotiated by the two agencies with the Federal Government in 2005 and another such agreement is anticipated to be signed shortly. In addition to defining three broad areas to which assistance is to be directed, the important approach of selectivity across states has been emphasized. This emphasis on a small number of states has clearly influenced the design of the support for primary education. Additional donors, particularly the EC and USAID, but also JICA and the AfDB, have expressed an interest in being part of the discussions around the new Country Partner Strategy.

In what ways, if any, could FTI be relevant in addressing aid effectiveness?

9.13 In principle, the FTI could be a vehicle for increasing Federal and State Government ownership of plans for the education sector, and for improving both harmonisation between donors and alignment between donors and governments. If FTI endorsement were seen to be desirable this might galvanise governments to prepare, or support the preparation of realistic and costed plans and to commit to financial and other targets. The important role played by the local donor group in the endorsement process could provide the impetus to the donors to improve the quality of their engagement, including through the posting of senior staff to Abuja. Finally, the steps which would be required to lead to endorsement of a national or state plan would necessarily require a much greater degree of dialogue between

government and donors than has so far been the case. Whether governments would be both willing and able to act on the many commitments required is a major issue.

10 Cross-Cutting Issues

10.1 The following cross-cutting issues were identified not because they are the only issues that run through the education sector but due to the frequency with which they were referred to in interviews and in the literature review carried out before the country visit. Equity has also been impacted by rural-urban disparity but this was not mentioned by the majority of interviewees. Governance is a significant cross-cutting issue in Nigeria and a discussion of this has been integrated through the earlier chapters of this report. This chapter aims to bring together analysis on these key issues which may undermine Nigeria's progress towards the EFA goals.

Gender and access

10.2 In 2005 Nigeria missed achieving the EFA gender parity goal in primary education as agreed to at Dakar in 2000. Access to primary education has been consistently lower for females since 1998. Although the gap is apparently reducing it is widest amongst the poorest (NAR = 10%) and amongst children in rural areas (NAR= 9.8% in rural areas compared to 3.1% in urban areas)⁴⁶. A recent case study on Nigeria by the GMR highlighted the increase in the gender gap since 1996, reducing only slightly in 2005 to 16.2%⁴⁷. Perhaps unsurprisingly the transition of girls to secondary education is also low and declined between 1998 and 2000⁴⁸.

10.3 In 20 out of the 36 states (plus FCT) boys have a marginally lower primary survival rates (range of 41%-124%) than girls⁴⁹. This occurs as boys leave school to work, effectively becoming child labourers in communities in which the short term financial gain is considered more important than school. However, when enrolment rates and survival rates are taken into account there are many more girls who do not complete primary school. In northern states such as Jigawa completion rates for girls are as low as 7.8%⁵⁰.

10.4 The lower numbers of girls entering primary education was considered by all interviewees as being problematic and particularly so in the northern states. However, the profile of girls' education has been pushed up the political agenda due to consistent advocacy from civil society. This, combined with the work of international NGOs such as Action Aid, has led to increased demand for girls' education in six indigent states and increased provision of girls' education through focused programming and the attraction of international donor support⁵¹.

10.5 Unicef Nigeria has prioritised girls' education within its strategic plan due to the wide reaching developmental impacts girls' education can have. In December 2004 the Girls Education Project (GEP) was launched as a joint initiative between the Federal Government of Nigeria, DFID and Unicef and focused upon achieving progress on the MDG goal 3 to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education. GEP has adopted an integrated sector approach combining interventions in health, water and sanitation and income generation activities. The most recent GEP evaluation showed an overall reduction of gender gaps in the GEP focus schools from 23% in 2005 to 15% in 2007⁵². The report was unstinting in its praise for the work of the GEP "the benefits were evident, explicit and unquestionable"⁵³.

⁴⁶ DHS, 2003

⁴⁷ GMR, 2008:3

⁴⁸ Unicef, 2003

⁴⁹ GMR, 2008:10

⁵⁰ *ibid*

⁵¹ *ibid*

⁵² Chege et al, 2008

⁵³ *Ibid*:33

10.6 In 2007 the FME developed a national policy on gender in basic education which states that gender will be “systematically mainstreamed into all components of the education sector development”⁵⁴. The National Action Plan 2006 also included six objectives on gender set to reach the EFA and MDG 2015 goals. The recent Federal Road Map for the Education Sector includes gender as one of the factors that impacts upon access to schooling. The strategy aims to intensify GEP, leading to a 20% boost in gender focused enrolment by 2011⁵⁵.

10.7 Gender is also addressed in national and state planning, however there remains a disconnect between planning and implementation. The recent national meeting for the Nigerian Girls’ Education Initiative (NGEI) held in Kaduna, at which two of the authors of this paper were present, highlighted that although Nigeria was the first country in central/western Africa to establish a programme specifically for girls’ education, the country is still not on target to meet MDG and EFA equity goals.

Religious and Private Education

10.8 There are a considerable number of non-state actors in the education sector and the most recent estimates suggest that there are 9,019 non-governmental schools at primary level with an enrolment of 1,578,635 children⁵⁶.

Private Educational Institutions

10.9 Most of those interviewed both at state and Federal level acknowledged that their own children do not attend public schools. Private schools were generally considered to have superior facilities and, due to the better terms and conditions on offer, attract better teachers. The state was considered unable to match the pay teachers received in the private sector which resulted in a drain of the best teachers to the private sector. Only one interviewee refuted this claim, explaining that the quality of teachers was poor across the country and it therefore made no difference to teaching standards whether you were in the state or private sector.

10.10 The private sector is growing rapidly in Nigeria but is not yet consistently monitored, although a number of states have recently increased the Private School Directorate’s capacity to monitor private schools. The number of private schools is particularly high in Lagos state where the 43% of schools are privately registered and cater for 75% of all school children⁵⁷. Despite this the private sector is generally not included in planning processes at state level. In Lagos, although it was said that some representatives from the private sector were involved in the planning process, they had still not been involved in the development of the Lagos state 10-year education sector plan.

10.11 The burgeoning private sector in Nigeria also poses problems of equity, as those with the necessary means remove their children from the public sector. The growth of the private sector was seen, by many of those interviewed, to provide an alternative for the rich and as removing any motivation amongst decision makers to improve the public sector. A need to further regulate the private sector was also raised by several interviewees.

10.12 James Tooley’s⁵⁸ research however suggests that in the slums of Lagos (as well as in Kenya, Ghana and India) the growing private sector is in fact catering for the poor. Claims that private schools, unregulated and uncouned, were still providing a better quality education for a fraction of the teacher-salary cost have been challenged in the GMR 2009 (pp/164-169). Nevertheless the rapid growth of private provision in the basic education sub-sector in Nigeria was evident not just in Lagos but also in the other states visited; however

⁵⁴ FME, 2007:1

⁵⁵ FME, 2009

⁵⁶ FME, 2006b

⁵⁷ *ibid*:16

⁵⁸ Tooley, 2006

the impact and benefits or drawbacks are as yet imperfectly understood. There is a pressing need therefore for further research in this area.

Religious Educational Institutions

10.13 In northern Nigeria significant numbers of children attend Islamic, Tsangaya or Qur'anic (ITQ) schools. In ITQ schools the curriculum focuses to differing degrees on learning Arabic, the Qur'an, Hadith and other aspects of Islam combined with greater or lesser provision for the teaching of secular subjects. Some states, such as Kano, have recognised the importance of integrating such schools and working to help them to include core subjects into their curriculum. Not only has this policy increased the number of primary school places but it has positively increased girls' participation, as many parents appear more willing to send girls to Islamiyyah schools than to secular schools in northern Nigeria.

10.14 Interviewees spoke far more frequently about the tradition of "Al Majiri" schools. Parents send their children to these schools for a spiritual education under the guidance of an Imam. The children have classes twice a day during which they learn to recite the Qur'an. For the rest of the day they are sent out into the streets to beg alms for the school. These children are especially vulnerable due to their lack of family in the vicinity and the hours that they spend on the streets. Those interviewed found it difficult to think of a solution to this problem other than possibly diversifying the curriculum. Attendance at such schools was considered in some communities to be a kind of rite of passage and it was said that any attempt to ban such schools would lead to public outcry.

10.15 Awareness of the need to work with religious leaders was shown amongst those working in the FME and there was evidence of increased dialogue and an acceptance that change must be brought about in different ways in the varied groups and communities⁵⁹. Through a partnership with Arewa House Kaduna, the Education Trust Fund (ETF) is funding some model integrated ITQ schools in Borno, Katsina, Kano, Bauchi and Yobe states. The UBEC has also developed an integrated curriculum for such integrated schools in northern Nigeria⁶⁰.

HIV/AIDS

10.16 Nigeria is reported to have the third highest HIV case load in the world after India and South Africa with around 3.7 million adults living with the virus. It is estimated that 800 deaths occur daily in Nigeria as a result of AIDS-related illnesses⁶¹. The National Action Committee on AIDS (NACA) was established in 1999 and in 2007 it became the National Agency for the Control of AIDS. Its status as an agency enabled it to become a larger and more independent body. It is the NACA that coordinates the response to HIV/AIDS supported by State Agency for the Control of Aids (SACA) at state level.

10.17 In April 2002 there was a Presidential directive to address HIV/AIDS and each line Ministry at Federal level was asked to establish an HIV/AIDS unit. The FME has a deputy director for HIV/AIDS who sits within the Department for Basic and Secondary Education. In 2003 a memo was presented to the National Committee on Education requesting that all states create a position or unit to focus upon HIV/AIDS in education at state level. There is also an HIV/AIDS desk in SUBEB. A national plan for HIV/AIDS written with the technical assistance of DFID, UNICEF and UNFPA was published in December 2006.

10.18 Nonetheless the integration of HIV/AIDS policy within the education sector is limited. A national policy on HIV/AIDS for the Education Sector in Nigeria was produced by FME in September 2005. Two years later in September 2007 the implementation guidelines were published. The policy had input from a variety of stakeholders over the period from 2005-7 and is an ambitious planning document with a long list of objectives. It was followed in

⁵⁹ GMR, 2008

⁶⁰ NERP, 2005

⁶¹ FME, 2006:1

December 2006 by the National Education Sector HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan (2006-2010) which notes that HIV/AIDS “has the potential to destroy gains made in education...in terms of access, quality and achievement and in the supply and quality of teachers”⁶².

10.19 The FME acknowledges that data is scarce and that the “culture of silence, secrecy and denial” surrounding HIV/AIDS makes data collection about the number of school children or teachers affected very difficult⁶³. Despite the existence of a detailed strategic plan the FME admits that funds to implement it are short. The plan is not costed and lacks sufficient data to give a clear picture of the baseline from which its objectives start. HIV/AIDS was not raised as a challenge in the education sector by any of those interviewed (except the Director in FME responsible for HIV/AIDS).

10.20 There has definitely been some political pressure at Federal level, but this has not percolated through to the states. Even when the message has reached states many Governors are reluctant to admit the size of the problem and concerns cannot be backed up with data. Interviewees explained how any data on the number of PLWHA produced at state level is often censored due to its political sensitivity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the numbers of teachers with HIV/AIDS is increasing as is the number of deaths and the number of AIDS orphans who do not attend school.

10.21 Education is key to preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and reducing the stigma and discrimination associated with it. The HIV/AIDS Department in FME has recently reviewed the Family Life Health Education (FLHE) curriculum with senior religious leaders to ensure that themes of HIV/AIDS protection and prevention are interwoven. However the long (and thus far unsuccessful) process of getting the FLHE integrated into the school curriculum illustrates the need for a change of mindsets at all levels.

10.22 Despite the lack of data, donors are engaging with HIV/AIDS issues. The largest amount has been provided by the US President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) Nigeria received over USD1097.2 million between 2004 and 2008. In 2009 DFID started a £100 million programme called “Enhancing Nigeria’s Response to HIV and AIDS”. This programme will last for six years and will aim to reach 27 million young people with its safer sex message and provide 1.2 billion condoms in order to slash the number of new infections by 50,000 every year. UNESCO has also put \$20,000 into HIV/AIDS education⁶⁴.

10.23 There was a feeling, even at FME level, that despite the significant impact the epidemic is likely to have on the education sector, HIV/AIDS was not being prioritised by the Government. From 2002 until 2006 the HIV/AIDS Unit within the FME was dependent upon funding from development partners as the Ministry paid only its staff salaries. The Unit was given its first budget allocation of 2 million naira in 2006.

Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency of donor inputs

10.24 Out of all the cross-cutting issues gender has perhaps best illustrated the potential for impact when civil society, donors and government work together. The relevance of the GEP and work done by Action Aid has been affirmed by the decision to expand this programme with Government funds described in the FME roadmap. The Government’s willingness to roll out similar initiatives in other states is an indication of the project’s relevance and effectiveness. This is a cross-cutting issue where tentative successes are being realised however, the question remains as to whether such initiatives can be scaled up to make a positive impact on gender disparity.

10.25 The objective of donors and Federal and state governments to integrate religious schools seems to be both a relevant and effective approach. To date, however, the picture is one of patchy initiatives across some of the northern States. However the “anti-Western education violence” perpetrated by alleged Islamic extremists reported in northern Nigeria in

⁶² FME 2006:2

⁶³ FME, 2006:5

⁶⁴ GMR, 2008:16

late July 2009 as this report is being finalised, adds pertinence to the need for the establishment of a more effective dialogue between state government, civil society and religious leaders to address the integration of so-called western and Islamic schools.

10.26 Currently policy and planning seems to ignore the rapidly growing private sector which is likely to have an ever increasing impact on the equity of schooling in Nigeria. States need instead to more carefully monitor the private sector and use them to help reach EFA goals. Care needs to be taken to ensure equity of access especially in states such as Lagos where private schools are so numerous. Donor inputs have largely ignored the private sector.

10.27 Donors working in HIV/AIDS are aware of the issues but questions could be asked about the degree to which they are working with and supporting country systems. Attitudes towards HIV/AIDS sufferers and a culture of silence threaten to undermine the support provided. FME commitment to making a difference on this cross-cutting issue is undermined by a lack of funds and this is even more significant at state level. HIV/AIDS needs to be better mainstreamed and integrated into the education sector; the revision of the curriculum will go some way towards this but more is needed in terms of support to school children and teachers suffering with HIV/AIDS.

FTI prospects:

10.28 The FTI's Indicative Framework currently addresses both HIV/AIDS and gender disparity and there is no doubt that particularly at state level Nigeria might be able to benefit from these guidelines and from the examples of other countries. However, impacts would be limited without capacity building support at state level and this would need to be over a long time period in order for sustainability to be achieved.

10.29 Although the UNGEI at international level is currently leading an initiative to develop a tool to enable the FTI to better address equity this is not yet part of either the FTI guidelines or the IF. Addressing inequity is essential for Nigeria to reach UPC and remains an issue upon which it could do with support.

PART D: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11 Conclusions on the FTI in Nigeria

Introduction

11.1 Since Nigeria is not an FTI endorsed country, not all of the three high level evaluation questions which guide the conclusions for most country studies are relevant. This chapter, rather, begins by asking the overall question ‘Are the objectives and approach of FTI relevant to the priorities within the education sector in Nigeria?’ and to the extent that they are, it considers some of the implications for Nigeria and the FTI of working together. It then provides a *summary* of the conclusions for each of the work streams which have been considered in the broader context of external aid for basic education as a whole. The summary matrix (in Annex G) identifies the external inputs and assesses their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

The High Level Evaluation Questions

Is what the FTI aims to accomplish consistent with the current needs and priorities of Nigeria?

11.2 The central objectives of FTI are to encourage governments to develop sound sector policies, to encourage donors to provide sustainable increases in their support and to improve the quality, or effectiveness, of that support. Nigeria is described as having more primary school age children out of school than any other country in the world (EFA- GMR, 2008); the per capita income of Nigeria places the country just within the ‘low income country’ grouping; overall levels of aid per capita and the level of aid dependency are well below average for sub Saharan Africa; and the Federal Government considers the EFA and MDG education goals as one of the country’s main priorities. On all these counts the need for effective policies and for additional external support is, in principle, as necessary and justified for Nigeria as for already endorsed countries.

11.3 Whilst funding is not the central issue, sustained capacity building to improve data collection, and planning and implementation processes is crucial. The situation is complicated by the high level of government income as a share of GDP which has historically enabled the Federal Government not to rely on aid and to distance itself from the influence of institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. In addition, years of military rule and isolation from the international community in the 1990s have contributed to the general scepticism of donors with respect to the quality of governance in the country, resulting in a reluctance to offer large quantities of aid. It is not at all clear that the Federal Government would currently be willing to become involved in the FTI processes nor that donors would be inclined to offer more grants to Nigeria through these processes.

Could the approach used by FTI work in this context?

11.4 The first in the set of FTI objectives and requirements is the development of a credible, costed education sector plan in line with the Indicative Framework. The plan must specify targets, including those of resources committed by the national government. This plan is required as the basis for both additional resources from existing or new donors, or from the Catalytic Fund and for improvements in aid effectiveness with regard to alignment of government and donor priorities and the harmonisation of practices across donors.

11.5 The FTI does not have much experience working with federal countries and an initial question is whose plan is to form the basis of any engagement? Would a Federal, national plan be sufficient to take forward the endorsement process or would it be more appropriate to consider individual state plans given that the locus of responsibility for basic education, including its funding, lies at state and local government levels? In addition, given the great

diversity between states in Nigeria with regard to primary enrolment and completion ratios, for instance, a national plan is unlikely to be sufficient for the endorsement process

11.6 However, the Federal Government would not be irrelevant in the process for two reasons: first, this level of government has responsibility for setting policy and monitoring outcomes; and second it funds discretionary transfer schemes such as UBE-IF. It is likely that if the FTI process in the future allows for the endorsement of state government plans, these will still need to be assessed within the context of national programmes.

11.7 As chapter four describes, there has to date been very little direct communication between the FTI and the Federal Government. Similarly, whilst Nigeria has frequently been identified as a target country for FTI, again there has been limited engagement by the relevant parties – namely the FTI Secretariat, the local donor group, the Federal Ministry of Education and Civil Society. Interviews conducted during the course of the country visit highlighted this limited contact, as few of those interviewed were familiar with the details of the FTI, or had considered the requirements for endorsement. This suggests that more extensive discussions are required involving all those concerned in order to determine whether or not there is a real basis for discussion and the necessary commitment on the part of all those who would need to be involved.

Which ‘gaps’ in meeting the UPC/EFA targets could FTI help to address?

11.8 **Policy and Planning:** the FTI provides a policy and planning framework that could help in the development of a more coherent planning environment at both Federal and state levels. This was highlighted by the frequent references made by interviewees to the disconnect between policy, planning and budgeting. In particular, the EPDF could in principle be deployed to strengthen capacity at the Federal level, within either the FME or UBEC, to support states to develop credible, costed sector plans. Further, if it were possible to link the disbursement of the UBE Intervention Fund to the production of approved, costed state education plans this could play a significant part in addressing the planning and budgeting gap. However, for this to happen it is likely that a change in legislation would be required. Given the high levels of autonomy enjoyed by states, a history of states resisting efforts by the Federal Government to impose processes upon them, and the weak capacity in both FME and UBEC to strengthen states’ delivery of basic education, such a course of action must be viewed as unlikely to succeed in the short to medium term. Therefore, a strategy of engaging directly with states and possibly simultaneously with the Federal level is more likely to produce results. In this case, a set of (transparent) criteria for determining priority states would need to be developed and agreed upon by government and development partners.

11.9 **Finance:** while there are significant variations across Nigerian states with respect to levels of primary education coverage, and reliable estimates of both current expenditures and projected requirements remain absent, it is clear that in several states there is a gap between what state and local governments will be able to allocate in the short and medium terms and what would be required to fund UPC of acceptable quality. However, with regard to additional external finance which may be generated through the FTI process, two issues arise. First is the absorptive capacity (discussed briefly below in 11.11). Second, and related, is the existence and operation of the Federal Government-financed UBE-IF and the ETF. Neither of these is being accessed to the extent possible by the SUBEBs and other bodies which may access (ETF) funds. In some sense, the UBE IF can be regarded as Nigeria’s domestic Catalytic Fund. It will be important to fully understand the obstacles which are limiting the utilisation of these funds and to reduce them prior to considering a further layer of available funding for the states.

11.10 **Data:** The gaps in data on the primary education system in Nigeria – from enrolments to population estimates to public expenditures - are very large, as all stakeholders agree. Few of the estimates of the variables and indicators incorporated in the FTI’s Indicative

Framework are reliable. It is not clear for how many states data of a quality normally required for sector plan endorsement exist. Decisions would need to be taken as to the level of acceptability and perhaps of alternative measures. On the positive side, plans have been produced with external consultants' help in a small number of states and these are a reasonable starting point. This could be an entry point for EPDF activities.

11.11 **Capacity:** Again through EPDF funded activities, FTI could in principle play a role in helping to build capacity at the Federal level, particularly in the areas of planning and budgeting, EMIS and quality assurance – as these are the core responsibilities of Federal institutions in the basic education sub-sector. At state level there are capacity gaps at all levels of the system and the challenges of addressing these are large. Assistance to address the capacity gap would have to (i) be well targeted to those states with a real and demonstrated commitment to use their own resources to support capacity development; (ii) focus on helping states to design appropriate and sustainable programmes of capacity development for education administrators; and (iii) emphasize building the capacity of teachers to teach core skills effectively so as to provide pupils with essential learning skills. Several of the people interviewed in Nigeria stressed that potential positive outcomes of Nigerian states striving to have their plans endorsed by FTI would include the creation of an improved discipline in planning. Some interviewees also felt that there would be benefits for the country as a whole resulting from being involved in international development activities. Nevertheless, until and unless the institutional challenges and organisational weaknesses discussed in chapter 8 are addressed they will continue to act as a constraint on the efficacy of other efforts to build capacity.

How would FTI need to be adapted to be most useful in this context?

11.12 One of the reasons why efforts were not made to draw Nigeria, together with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the DR Congo into the FTI process initially was the challenge in terms of the number of out of school children, and the consequent concern that the active involvement of any of these countries would absorb all the resources in the Catalytic Fund. At the same time, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were expected to continue to be recipients of large bilateral and multilateral aid programmes for primary education. This has proved to be the case. These countries, particularly India, have also been major users of the EPDF (though without this leading to the plan endorsement process). Several years later, it is clear that Nigeria, for whatever reason, has not received similar treatment.

11.13 So far FTI has not engaged in the planned endorsement process in a country like Nigeria in which the states are so independent from the federal government. However, it is not clear that this arrangement poses problems since in principle particular state plans could be the focus. This however might require some thought about changes to some of the indicative framework indicators. For instance, the 'required' share of state government expenditure on education might be raised above that of a unitary government since the latter has more responsibilities, such as defence and foreign affairs.

11.14 If Nigeria is to join the FTI and seek endorsement of education plans, there will be implications for both the FTI Secretariat, particularly if the process is not to be driven by one or more of the donors, and for the local donor group. Essentially, at least initially, the Secretariat may need to be directly involved in discussing/negotiating the requirements and processes. At the same time, the in-country staffing of the education donors would need to be assessed. At present neither the World Bank nor DFID has a headquarters member of staff resident in Abuja who is dedicated solely to the education sector. The provision of support for the endorsement process and subsequently for monitoring the deployment and impact of any FTI inputs may need to be upgraded.

11.15 Furthermore, in all cases each of the current set of donors has programmes in only a few states. If FTI activities in Nigeria were to be state focused, only one or at the most two

donors are likely to be involved in that state. Local donor group knowledge therefore would be limited and might need to be augmented in some way.

11.16 During the country visit there were clear indications that the World Bank is actively seeking to promote the FTI in Nigeria. If the Bank makes progress here, and if concerns about the ability of the FTI to mobilise sufficient funds for Nigeria can be addressed, then it appears as if there is a basis for engaging with both Federal and state governments to discuss the issues raised in this report.

12 Reflections

12.1 The purpose of this final chapter is to reflect upon the findings of the country study presented above and in doing so to consider what wider lessons about FTI may be drawn from Nigeria's experience. Whilst this country report is not the place to make generalised comments about the FTI (as these will be presented in the final evaluation synthesis report), it is appropriate to consider the extent to which the design and functioning of the FTI has enabled or hindered Nigeria's progress towards endorsement and to highlight specific, relevant factors.

12.2 Given FTI's declared purpose of ensuring accelerated progress to UPC everywhere, and given the early recognition of the need to address the challenges of significant numbers of out of school children in Nigeria – and the other “analytical fast track” countries – the lack of tangible progress in Nigeria indicates that that something has gone awry with the endorsement progress. Put simply, FTI has not, to date, worked for Nigeria.

12.3 At a global level it appears that relatively little effort has been made to get to grips with the specific issues of engaging with large countries or with Federal states. Whilst there has been considerable effort within the FTI to address the challenges of working with fragile states for example, no such similar effort appears to have been undertaken to analyse and tackle the obstacles to engaging with large/federal ones. The net result has been that none of the “analytical fast track” countries has so far been endorsed.

12.4 At country level the dependence on the local donor group appears more likely to work effectively in small countries, where the task facing the few in-country education donor representatives is a manageable one; it is hard to see how the very small number of in-country personnel could cope with such a role in a country the size of Nigeria – especially if the plan endorsement process was to be multiplied across many states. This is one aspect of an apparent aid bias against larger countries which continues to act as hindrance to progress in Nigeria.

12.5 In Nigeria donor efforts at harmonisation and alignment with government have been extremely limited and not terribly effective. When the donors produced a strong, joint discussion paper in 2003, government was not sufficiently responsive. Similarly whilst World Bank and DFID have implemented their Country Partnership Strategy since 2005, other development partners have not joined. When a reform minded Federal Minister of Education was in post 2006–2007 neither in-country donors nor the FTI Secretariat made a concerted effort to engage on FTI endorsement despite Nigeria being a key target country.

12.6 When successive World Bank Task Team Leaders in Nigeria have attempted to drive forward the FTI agenda they have been faced with a largely uncoordinated donor group and a largely unresponsive Federal government. At the same time it does not appear as if the TTLs, or for that matter any other of the significant donor representatives, have had sufficient influence to successfully champion the cause of FTI in Nigeria. The lack of clear leadership and responsibility for FTI in Nigeria has been a problem and this needs to be resolved before further progress can be made.

12.7 In the absence of strong leadership or pressure from donors within the country, there has been very little capacity at the Secretariat level to take things forward; one of the costs of the "light touch" secretariat in this case appear to have been that the FTI Secretariat seems to have had very little staff time engage with the case of Nigeria. Related to this, it seems that the inclinations of WB TTLs have been the strongest influence on whether

interest is shown in FTI, with the risk that FTI is seen as (just) an adjunct of WB strategy. This point is well illustrated by the latest FTI initiative in Nigeria, where it is the World Bank senior education specialist who is attempting once more to move things forward and has called a series of meetings with Federal and state government and co-opted support from some of the other donors.

12.8 With respect to the financing of FTI, Nigeria received over 1 million dollars from the Norwegian Education Trust Fund over the period 1998–2005. These monies were largely used to support the production of a Country Status Report and to fund the preparation studies for the World Bank Universal Basic Education Project (UBEP). However following the merger of the NETF with the EPDF, the country has received no further support from this source. A consideration, therefore, of how the EPDF might be used in the future for the purposes of analysis and capacity development needs to ask where ownership of the EPDF lies. If it is only used as an adjunct to World Bank initiatives, then its potential use is limited to those initiatives supported by World Bank and excludes the possibility of other donors and the Nigerian government having a say and a stake in any future EPDF programme.

12.9 The Nigeria government equally has not itself played an active role in seeking to join the FTI. This may reflect the fact that there are sufficient internally generated resources for education for the Federal Ministry of Education not to regard FTI as a priority. Equally it may reflect a lack of awareness about FTI on the part of Government; and indeed, based upon the interviews conducted in country, very few people had heard of the FTI and even fewer were able to describe its purpose. This was especially the case in the states. Better marketing of the FTI needs to take place in Nigeria, at Federal and particularly state levels, to raise awareness of the initiative and encourage greater ownership by Nigerians. Given the size and complexity of the country, if FTI is to engage in a meaningful way then a considerable effort will need to be made in this respect.

12.10 Thus, the possibilities outlined in Chapter 11 for future FTI engagement with Nigeria cannot be taken forward without addressing some of the weaknesses highlighted above. To reiterate the main points again: Where would the necessary expertise come from if not available from the in-country donors? If more is expected from the FTI Secretariat, how is the secretariat itself to be capacitated? Can the respective roles of the WB and FTI be delineated in a constructive way? How to engage with government in Nigeria – at what levels and with whom?

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Annex A– A Note on Methodology

1. The methodology for the mid-term evaluation of the Fast Track Initiative is fully described in the *Evaluation Framework* (Cambridge Education, Mokoro and OPM, January 2009), available from the study web-site at:


www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative.

2. The *Evaluation Framework* includes a detailed programme theory for FTI. This describes the hypotheses to be tested by the evaluation, and guides the evaluators on the questions to be considered, the likely sources of evidence, and the contextual factors and assumptions that need to be taken into account. The figure overleaf provides a snapshot of the programme theory; for the full details see the *Evaluation Framework (Annex E)*. The same theory is being tested at both global and country levels (the detailed framework indicates which questions and sources are most relevant to the country level).

3. The approach to the country studies is spelt out in Chapter 4 of the *Evaluation Framework*. Interviews with country stakeholders are an important part of the research. However, each team undertakes a thorough review of available documentation prior to the visit. It aims to engage with a full range of stakeholders while minimising the transaction costs of their involvement. A country visit note, shared soon after the visit, enables interviewees and others to comment on preliminary findings, and the draft country report will also be available for discussion and comment before it is finalised.

4. Each country study includes a summary matrix which relates overall findings and findings against each workstream to the logical framework for the evaluation. (see Annex G.)

Figure A.1 – Concise Logical Framework for the Mid-Term Evaluation of FTI



Source: Evaluation Framework, Figure 3A.

Annex B – Timeline of FTI Events

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|-------|---|---|---|----------------|----------------------|
| 1960s | <p>Since this has no direct educational relevance why start here in the 1960s isn't the 1970s enough?</p> | <p>Pre-Independence</p> <p>First Republic</p> <p>1960 – Independence from Britain under Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The nation's leadership in the several decades following independence was determined by coup, not by election, and by military, rather than civilian, government.</p> <p>1966 January - Balewa killed in coup and is replaced by Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi who was killed in a counter coup in July of that year and in turn replaced by Gowon. The Gowon regime is ruled by decree. The Gowon regime came under fire because of widespread and obvious corruption at every level of national life. Inefficiencies compounded the effects of corruption. Crime also posed a threat to national security and had a seriously negative impact on efforts to bring about economic development.</p> | <p>(i) January 1955-Free, Universal Primary Education (UPE) launched in Western Region of Nigeria by the Government of Chief Obafemi Awolowo</p> <p>(ii) January 1957 Lagos City Council launched its version of Free, Universal Primary Education</p> <p>(ii) February, 1957, The government Eastern Region of Nigeria led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe launched the universal primary education scheme</p> <p>(iv) 1962- Arising from The Oldman Commission Report of 1962, the Northern Nigeria Government passed an Education Law establishing partnership between and voluntary agencies to develop a public system of primary education with the Minister of Education having the overall responsibility for the promotion of primary education</p> | | |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|-------|-----------------------|--|---|----------------|----------------------|
| | | <p>1967- The declaration of independence by the Eastern Region. Three eastern states secede as the Republic of Biafra, sparking bloody civil war. An estimated 1 to 3 million Nigerians died from hostilities, disease, and starvation. More than 3 million Igbo became refugees. The economy of the region was shattered.</p> | | | |
| 1970s | | <p>1970- Oil boom, the economy expanded and with it came rapid growth and development of the education sector.</p> <p>1970 - Biafran resistance collapse and Biafran leaders surrender, former Biafran regions reintegrated into country.</p> <p>1975 political atmosphere deteriorated. Gowon is deposed in a bloodless military coup in July. He is succeeded by Murtala Muhammad, who is assassinated a year later. Muhammad was succeeded by Obasanjo. Under Obasanjo's leadership, Nigeria adopted a constitution based on the Constitution of the United States that provided for a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The country was now ready for local elections, to be followed by national elections that would return Nigeria to civilian rule.</p> | <p>1976: the Federal Government of Nigeria launched the Universal Primary Education (UPE) Scheme. Primary education would not only be free but also universal in all the then nineteen states of the federation. Government planned that it would be compulsory from 1979. But scheme abandoned midway. It considered to be ambitious and whimsical without reference to availability of resources (financial and human), planning data and scope of implementation.</p> <p>1977: National Policy on Education (NPE) document of 1977 (last revised in 1990). The policy document addresses the issues of imbalance in the provision of education in different parts of the country with regard to access, quality of resources and girls' education.</p> | | |

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|-------|-----------------------|--|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| 1980s | | <p>1979-83 The Second Republic</p> <p>1979: Alhaji Shehu Shagari is elected as President following elections. This is the start of Nigeria's' second republic. Oil prices were high, and revenues were on the increase and good prospects for development is possible for Nigeria.</p> <p>1981: Oil boom over and an impending recession puts severe pressure on the country. The decline in the real gross domestic product in the 1980's and 1990's was estimated to be 6%</p> <p>1983: Shagari re-elected amid accusations of irregularities. Mid 1983, Major Buhari seizes power in a coup. Buhari secured public support by reducing the level of corruption trimming the Federal budget.</p> <p>1985 - Ibrahim Babangida seizes power in bloodless coup, curtails political activity.</p> <p>1986: FGN implement SAP and associated austerity measures. Despite USD4.2 billion of support from the World Bank and the rescheduling of foreign debt, the recession led to a decline in real income, and rising unemployment during the second half of the 1980s.</p> | | | |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|-------|--|-----------------|---|----------------|---|
| 1990s | <p>March 1990 World Conference on Education for All, in Jomtien, Thailand adopted the World Declaration on Education for All, which stated that all have a right to education. The conference recognised the setbacks experienced in the 1980's by many South nations and made a commitment to meeting basic learning needs of every citizen.</p> | | <p>1990: The establishment of the National Commission for Mass Literacy, Adult and Non-Formal Education, through Decree 17 of 1990 was part of a national drive to eliminate illiteracy in Nigeria. The Commission is charged with the responsibility to develop strategies for the eradication of illiteracy, to coordinate programs for the implementation of a National Mass Literacy Campaign, to monitor and promote literacy and post literacy programs, to organize in service training for staff, and to develop and disseminate teaching materials.</p> <p>1990: the establishment of the National Commission for Nomadic Education in 1990 to look after the education of nomads and other migrant groups</p> <p>1992: Situation and Policy Analysis of Basic Education in Nigeria (SAPA). This study was conducted in cooperation with UNICEF. The study was undertaken to analyze the factors that inhibit access to education and factors that affect the quality of education.</p> <p>1992: The introduction of the nine-year schooling programme (re-launched as an aspect of the Universal Basic Education (UBE) Scheme in 1999). It covered primary education and junior secondary education. The main objective of the program was to ensure that there was a smooth transition from primary education to junior secondary school. It also aimed at ensuring that learners remain in school long enough to acquire basic and life skills.</p> | | <p>It would be interesting to compare present day levels of educational indicators from this region with the rest of the country.</p> |

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------|--|----------------|----------------------|
| | | | <p>1992: The “Operation Save Our Schools” programme launched to mobilise and involve civil society in the planning, management, monitoring and funding of schools.</p> <p>1992: First Primary Education Project (PEP I 1992 - 2000) PEP I had an IDA budget of USD120m with a further USD34.4m to be contributed by FGN. It aimed to provide support to the first phase of FGN's programme of primary education improvement through a focus on upgrading the quality of primary education; improving resource allocation; strengthening institutions; and facilitating future planning. The project began in 1992 and at the planned end of project in 1997 only about 10% of the USD120m IDA credit had been disbursed and few activities had taken place. To address this problem the project was extended to June 2000</p> | | |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|-----------------------|---|---|----------------|----------------------|
| | | <p>1993: November - General Sani Abacha seizes power and suppresses opposition.</p> <p>By 1994, the central bank of Nigeria reported that the money supply, particularly by way of deficit financing, had increased tremendously in a period of ten years. By 1995 the value of the Naira had fallen from a USD ratio of 1:1 in 1985 to one of 85:1. For budget purposes the rate used at present is N100: USD1. The rate of inflation remained high and this had a negative impact on the education sector as well. Funding responsibilities during the crisis were transferred from one level of government to another, as well as to families, to help subsidize education through fee payments at secondary school and in higher education.</p> | <p>1993: Revival of the National Primary Education Commission (NPEC), State Primary Education Boards (SPEBs) and Local Government Education Authorities (LEAs) through Decree 96 of August 1993 leading to improvements in provision of teacher remuneration, infrastructure and learning materials.</p> | | |

Annex B: Timeline of FTI Events

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|----------|-----------------------|---|--|----------------|---|
| pre 1999 | | <p>In 1995, as a result of various human rights violations, the European Union, which already had imposed sanctions in 1993, suspended development aid, and Nigeria was temporarily expelled from the Commonwealth.</p> | <p>1993 The Education Trust Fund (ETF) was established, in which companies with more than 100 employees contribute 2% of their pre-tax earnings to the Fund. On receipt of money the Board of the Fund meets to allocate the money according to prescribed parameters. Roughly 40% goes to primary education. ETF funds are used to finance capital expenditures for education. It should be noted that the definition of capital expenditures has been made quite broad to accommodate such items as in-service training of teachers and purchase of teaching materials. But there is instability of the ETF's funding as taxes on profits are notoriously sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. This therefore creates difficulties for institutions and the and planning bodies</p> <p>1996: Nigeria Community Education Program introduced in 1996 is aimed at addressing the needs of rural communities in three states of the Federation, namely, Abia, Bauchi, and Akwa-Ibom and to meet the needs of the nomadic communities in the North Eastern part of the country. The objectives of these initiatives are to increase equality and access for women and girls in the targeted communities.</p> | | <p>Primary education has in the past also received funds from the Petroleum Trust Fund for capital expenditure and provision of instructional materials. The Fund is currently defunct.</p> |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|--------------------|---|--|---|----------------|---|
| | | <p>Start of civilian rule</p> <p>1998 - Abacha dies, Parliamentary and presidential elections take place. Olusegun Obasanjo sworn in as president in 1999. His party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), won a majority of the seats in both the Senate and House of Representatives, amidst ever-present allegations of election irregularities. Fifteen years of military rule had come to an end, and Nigeria entered the longest period of civilian rule since independence.</p> | <p>In 1999: September launch of the Universal Basic Education Programme which covers both primary and junior secondary schooling. It makes education universal, free. The objective of the programme is to achieve Education for All by 2015 with the main areas of support focusing on the strengthening of management and administrative systems, development of human capacity at all levels, including communities and schools and the provision of infrastructure, teaching and learning resources.</p> <p>One of the key elements is for individual states in the federation to develop their own programs of UBE implementation, responsive to the needs and conditions of that state. An increasing number of states are strongly committed to these goals and, in addition to the Federal-level funds; states are also deploying funds from their Federation allocation to provide further public funds for education.</p> | | <p>COMMENT: Universal Basic Education has been supported by three projects funded with IDA credit through the World Bank, these are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First Primary Education Project (PEP I) 1992 – 2000 (see above) • Second Primary Education Project (PEP II) 2000 – 2004 (see below) • Universal Basic Education Project (UBEP) 2003 – ongoing (see below) |
| <p>1999</p> | <p>Education For All (EFA) Assessment 1999-2000, involving six regional conferences revealed that the EFA agenda had been neglected.</p> | | | | |

Annex B: Timeline of FTI Events

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|---|--|---|----------------|--|
| 2000 | <p>United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, 189 world leaders signed up to try and end poverty by 2015 when they agreed to meet the Millennium Development Goals.</p> <p>World Education Forum, 164 governments, adopted the Dakar Framework for Action in which they promised to commit the necessary resources and effort to create a comprehensive and inclusive education system for all.</p> | <p>In 2000 religious tensions spiked following the imposition of Sharia, or Islamic law, in 12 northern, predominantly Muslim states.</p> | <p>2000: Second Primary Education Project (PEP II 2000 - 2004): Aims to assist UBEP through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • strengthening human resource capacity; • creating an environment conducive to effective teaching and learning; • improving the availability of quality instructional materials; • developing an enhanced information base for decision-making for UBE; and • increasing national awareness about HIV/AIDS. <p>2000 Following the 2000 Dakar World Education Forum, Nigerian civil society has actively promoted the six EFA goals through policy dialogue and advocacy to enhance access to free, compulsory and qualitative education for all. Its efforts are coordinated by the Civil Society Action Coalition on EFA (CSACEFA), a national coalition established in 2000 and supported by Action Aid and the Commonwealth Education Fund. CSACEFA, with a current membership of 350 CSOs, aims to monitor government inputs and spending on education through budget tracking by its members at local, state and national levels. Though limited, the budget tracking process notes and highlights concerns of over pricing of projects and too much emphasis by politicians on construction/rehabilitation of classrooms and procurement to the neglect of quality issues including teacher development, quality assurance, information management systems etc</p> | | <p>The initial years of PEP II coincided with the change from military to democratic rule. This resulted in many changes of staff at political and administrative levels, including within the Federal Ministry of Education and state Ministries of Education, which hindered planning, decision-making and implementation.</p> |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|---|-----------------|---|----------------|----------------------|
| | | | Consistent advocacy on education of girls and gender-based budgeting has led to increased provision and demand for girls' education in six indigent states, and expansion of international donor support (NGEI 2006). | | |
| 2001 | G8 Meeting - Genoa, Italy. July 2001 : G8 countries establish an EFA Task Force, to be led by Canada | | | | |

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|--|-----------------|-----------------------------|---|--|
| 2002 | <p>G8 Washington, DC USA. April 2002: The Development Committee endorses the proposed EFA Action Plan and approves the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), amid overwhelming support from the international community.</p> <p>Education for All (EFA) Amsterdam, Netherlands. April 2002: Developing countries and their external partners agree at a Dutch-World Bank sponsored conference on broad principles for scaling up EFA efforts; the Netherlands commits 135 million Euro to set the process in motion.</p> <p>G8 Kananaskis, Canada. June 2002: agreement to significantly increase bilateral assistance for the achievement of EFA and to work with bilateral and multilateral agencies to ensure implementation of FTI.</p> <p>EFA Global Monitoring Report was established to monitor progress towards the six EFA goals.</p> | | | <p>Given its population size, Nigeria is clearly important in achieving regional MDG targets. Nigeria is different from other FTI countries in the sense that it could be the first Federal state to join the FTI Partnership without the primary objective of seeking catalytic funding. Therefore, it could be the first case for demonstrating the value-added of FTI beyond the direct support from the catalytic fund.</p> <p>2002 May: Nigeria writes letter for inclusion into FTI</p> | <p>But in Nigeria the Federal system with 36 states and highly fragmented and politicised funding system makes a functional national education system difficult.</p> |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|--|----------------------|
| 2002 (cont) | | | | <p>2002 June: Nigeria is included in a special category (so-called second tier of the EFA Fast Tracking Initiative) under the EFA program. Which means additional work needs to be done to meet the common conditions established for access to the grant financing provided under the program (i.e. prioritized primary education in their spending plans, implementation of nationwide policies to improve the quality and efficiency of primary education systems, and must have completed a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). Therefore Nigeria invited to receive technical and analytical assistance to help create an enabling environment (policies , capacity) for scaling up EFA efforts</p> | |

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|---|--|---|----------------|----------------------|
| 2003 | <p>Rome Declaration on the harmonisation of aid, Rome, Feb 2003. The development community committed to work towards aligning its assistance around country development priorities and to harmonize donor policies and priorities around country systems</p> <p>FTI Donors Meeting - Paris, March 2003: Donors agree on modus operandi for FTI that is country driven, secure funding for the seven countries and agree on an operating framework for FTI.</p> <p>The FTI Catalytic Fund (CF) was established. It aims to provide transitional grants over a maximum of 2-3 years to enable countries lacking resources at country level but with FTI endorsed education sector plans to scale up the implementation of their plans.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting Oslo Meeting, November 2003: Ministers and senior officials from the first FTI countries, Civil Society and donors meeting together for the first time. Discussion of the definition, modalities, instruments, and governance of the FTI partnership. Agreement that FTI should be opened to all low-income countries.</p> | <p>2003 19 April - First civilian-run presidential elections since end of military rule. Olusegun Obasanjo elected for second term with more than 60% of vote</p> | <p>2003 : Universal Basic Education Project (2003 - 2008)</p> <p>Universal Basic Education Project aims to support the Government of Nigeria implement a program to achieve universal basic education (UBE), by increasing the capacity of states, and local governments to manage, and implement it effectively. It will significantly to enable Nigeria in achieving the Education for All (EFA) goals. The project is funded with IDA Credit of USD101m of which USD20m is allocated to Federal Government and USD5m to each of the 16 participating states over a five-year period.</p> <p>DFID is supporting capacity building with a grant of £11.8m managed by Capacity Building for Universal Basic Education (CUBE). The Federal component of the project supports programme management and monitoring, policy development, and systems support. At state level the project supports the following components</p> <p>Compulsory Components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • strengthening the organisational, managerial and operational capacity of the states and LGAs; • support for EMIS development • project management and monitoring and evaluation of the project | | |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|-----------------------|-----------------|--|----------------|----------------------|
| | | | <p>further components are as follows</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical infrastructure (maximum of 60% of funds requested for the five components): renovation, construction, furniture • Teacher support: teacher training programmes to upgrade existing teachers, teacher training programmes to support teachers with ongoing professional support, incentive schemes for teachers in remote areas • Teaching materials: school libraries, training of teacher librarians, library books and supplementary readers; textbooks and instructional materials • Measures to increase access: programmes for strengthening community support, incentive schemes for disadvantaged groups | | |

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|--|---|--|--|----------------------|
| 2004 | <p>Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) was established in November 2004 as a funding window under the FTI to support low income countries improve the quality and sustainability of their education sector planning and program development.</p> <p>FTI Partnership Meeting, Nov 2004, Brasilia, Brazil, third meeting of the FTI partnership. There was agreement on the FTI Framework document and the need for more formal Assessment Guidelines.</p> | <p>2004-2007: implementation of a national framework for reform, growth and poverty reduction known as National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). The purpose of NEEDS was to raise the country's standard of living through a variety of reforms, including macroeconomic stability, deregulation, liberalization, privatization, transparency, and accountability. NEEDS sought to address basic deficiencies, such as the lack of freshwater for household use and irrigation, unreliable power supplies, decaying infrastructure, impediments to private enterprise, and corruption. The government hoped that NEEDS would create 7 million new jobs, diversify the economy, boost non-energy exports, increase industrial capacity utilization, and improve agricultural productivity. A related initiative on the state level is the State Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS) which complements NEEDS. Based on this strategy, the World Bank and DFID have prepared a joint Country Partnership Strategy in May 2005(CPS) whose aim is to assist Nigeria in the implementation of NEEDS by boosting growth and helping achieve the MDGs.</p> | <p>2004 May The Universal Basic Education Law. The Act makes provision for the UBE programme that provides free, compulsory and continuous 9-year education in two levels: 6 years of primary and 3 years of junior secondary education for all school-aged children.</p> <p>Law was enacted by FGN in recognition of the fact that state and local government have insufficient to finance the recurrent and capital expenditures to the sector, resulting in rapid declines in quality and enrolment ratios. FGN makes a provision of 2% of its share of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) to finance the implementation of the UBE Program.</p> <p>The UBE Intervention Fund is, in general, to be used "for the purpose of broadening access, improving quality and ensuring equity in basic education, but not for teachers' emoluments and overhead costs" (UBEC, p. 5).</p> | <p>2004: SIDA and USAID write an official letter to the MoE about FTI and its potentials benefits. It also encourages Nigeria to join following the completion of a sound education sector plan</p> | |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|--|--|--|----------------|----------------------|
| 2005 | <p>March 2005, Paris Declaration, was endorsed by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials. They committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in the harmonisation, alignment and management aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators.</p> <p>UN World Summit New York, September 2005: delegates were accused of producing a 'watered-down' outcome document which merely reiterates existing pledges.</p> | <p>2005 October - Paris Club of rich lenders agrees to write off two-thirds of Nigeria's \$30bn foreign debt. As part of the deal, the FGN agreed to spend the debt relief gains (DRGs) – the debt service payments that will no longer need to be made – as additional funding for projects and programmes that are geared towards achieving the MDGs. The resources freed-up by the agreement have been valued at USD1 billion a year, out of which, the Federal Government's share of USD750m is allocated to a "Virtual Poverty Fund" (VPF). Education received 21% of the Fund in 2006 & has been allocated 16% for 2007.⁶⁵ (See Annex 1 Initiatives in the Approved Budget for Education Funded with Debt Relief Gains in 2006)</p> | <p>2005 JICA funded the construction of additional classrooms in three states together with head teachers' offices and stores, toilets and boreholes. A total of 490 classrooms, 13 head teachers' offices; 382 toilets (191 for girls and 191 for boys) and 19 boreholes are being constructed and 11,270 desks and chairs and 490 chalkboards are being supplied to the project schools. Technical guidance and training on maintenance of the facilities is also being provided to schools (teachers and students), community, LGEA and SMoE staff.</p> <p>The programme is being implemented state by state over a period of three years: 78 classrooms in 12 schools in Niger State during 2005/2006; 147 classrooms in 26 schools in Plateau State during 2006/2007 and 265 classrooms in 32 schools in Kaduna State during 2007/2008.</p> <p>The total programme is 1.6 billion Japanese Yen, approximately 14 million US dollar (\$2.7 million in Niger State during 2005/2006; \$4.4 million in Plateau State during 2006/2007 and \$ 6.9 million schools in Kaduna State during 2007/2008).</p> | | |

⁶⁵ EFA GMR 2008 Nigeria case study

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|--|---|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| 2006 | <p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (41st session), Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>Educational Roundtable, held during World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, September 2006, Singapore. The meeting focused on the progress that Finance Ministers from developing countries have made in preparing long term plans to achieve the education millennium development goals.</p> <p><i>FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee meeting</i> that took place in <i>Cairo</i> on the 12th of November 2006. In this meeting the eligibility criteria regarding accessing the Fund were changed, allowing countries with large number of in-country donors, such as Mozambique, to qualify. **</p> | <p>2006 May - The Senate rejects proposed changes to the constitution which would have allowed President Obasanjo to stand for a third term in 2007.</p> | | | |

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| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|--|---|-----------------------------|--|----------------------|
| 2007 | <p>Committee on the Rights of the Child (45th Session).</p> <p>Keeping our Promises on Education, May 2007, Brussels, organised by the EC, the UK and the World Bank. The objective was to seek concrete proposals and commitments for action to deliver on the promise to give all the world's children a full primary education by 2015.</p> <p>In Oct 2007, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development organised an international forum on "Capacity Development for Education for All: Putting Policy into Practice." Participants recommended more strategic use of the EPDF to support capacity development activities, and to harmonise and align donor support for technical assistance and capacity development in all low-income countries.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Bonn, Germany, on May 23, 2007: CF funding for Mozambique approved</i></p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Dakar, December 10 2007</i> (see annex D for details)</p> | <p>2007 April - Umaru Yar'Adua of the ruling People's Democratic Party is proclaimed winner of the presidential election.</p> <p>2007: Vision 2020 to transform Nigeria into one of the world's top-20 economies by 2020. Vision 2020 envisaged the enactment of a "Seven Point Agenda," consisting of the following points: power and energy infrastructure; food security and agriculture; wealth creation and employment; mass transportation; land reform; security (including bringing stability to the Niger Delta); and education.</p> | | <p>2007: EPDF assisting 13 countries including Nigeria to finish ESP. Three states prepare credible and costed state education strategies for eventual EFA-FTI endorsement.66</p> | |

Annex B: Timeline of FTI Events

| Date | International Context | Nigeria Context | Education Policy in Nigeria | FTI in Nigeria | Comments & questions |
|------|---|--|--|---|----------------------|
| 2008 | <p>September 2008, Accra summit on aid effectiveness, donor countries have agreed to end the fragmentation of aid.</p> <p>Donors agreed to donate half of aid directly to governments of low-income countries, rather than to individual projects.</p> <p>Donors have also agreed to coordinate aid better.</p> <p><i>Catalytic Fund's Strategy Committee meeting, Tokyo, April 22, 2008</i></p> | <p>2008 October - The government announces major budget cuts following steep falls in the price of oil.</p> | <p>2008: The Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN) is a six-year programme established by the Nigerian Government in partnership with the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) to support Federal and state Governments to make sustainable improvements in basic education services.</p> <p>ESSPIN will operate at federal, state, school and community level. Initially working in five states (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara and Lagos) ESSPIN will work hand in hand with government and civil society to improve the capacity to reform education services and develop best practice solutions to be delivered in schools.</p> | | |
| 2009 | | | | <p>2009: 3-4 states expected to be endorsed.</p> | |

⁶⁶ EPDF interim progress report: may 2007

Annex C – List of persons met

| Organisation | Surname | First name | Function | Stakeholder Category |
|---|------------|------------|---|----------------------|
| FTI Secretariat | Prouty | Bob | Deputy Head of FTI Secretariat | |
| DFID | Donnelly | Emma | Ex DFID Nigeria now head of Strategy Unit, DFID | |
| DFID | Shooter | Rob | Ex. Human Development Programme Manager, DFID in Nigeria | |
| World Bank | Garcia | Marito | Country Representative Nigeria, World Bank | |
| Action Aid | Menkiti | Azuka | Education Team Leader, Action Aid | |
| Development Studies Institute | Odiadi | Jacqueline | Executive Director, Development Support Institute (Lagos based NGO) | |
| Federal Ministry Education | Okafor | Stella | Assistant Director for Gender, Federal Ministry Education | |
| World Bank | Adekola | Tunde | Senior Education Specialist, World Bank | |
| ESSPIN | Feese | Nguyan | Education Specialist, ESSPIN | |
| Lagos | | | | |
| Lagos State Government | Azeez | Ronke | Special Advisor to Deputy Governor, Lagos | |
| Lagos State Ministry of Education | Erogbogdo | Lara | Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, Lagos | |
| Lagos State Ministry of Education | Olaogun | Toun | Director, Basic Education, Ministry of Education, Lagos | |
| Research and Statistics | Onifade | Mr. J.O. | Director, Planning, Research and Statistics, Lagos | |
| Lagos State Government | Olatunji | Abisola | Senior Special Advisor to Governor, Basic Education | |
| Lagos SUSEB | Daodu | Gbolahan | Chairperson, Lagos State SUBEB | |
| Lagos SUSEB | Oluseye | Mrs. I.T. | Secretary SUBEB, Lagos | |
| Lagos SUSEB | Adebiyi | Mr. O.O. | Director, School Services, Lagos State SUBEB | |
| Lagos SUSEB | Adefuye | Mr. O.A. | Director, Social Mobilisation, Lagos State SUBEB | |
| Lagos SUSEB | Shobowale | Mr. A. | Director, Planning, Research and Statistics, Lagos State SUBEB | |
| New Oko-Oba Primary School, Lagos State | Shadare | F.K. | Ifako Ijaye, New Oko-Oba Primary School, Lagos State | |
| Ikeja LGEA, Lagos State | Alh Shittu | R.B. | Education Secretary, Ikeja LGEA | |
| Ikorodu LGEA, Lagos State | Oredein | S. Ayo | Education Secretary, Ikorodu LGEA | |
| AUI Primary School, Ijede, Ikorodu LGEA | Yinusa | E.O. | Headteacher, AUI Primary School, Ijede, Ikorodu LGEA | |
| A.U.D. Primary School, Surulere | Ribadu | A.O. | A.U.D. Primary School, Surulere LGEA | |
| Ojo LGEA | Jimoh | T | Education Secretary, Ojo LGEA | |
| Community Primary | Afeniforo | G.D. | Headteacher, Community Primary | |

Annex C: Interview Schedule

| Organisation | Surname | First name | Function | Stakeholder Category |
|--|----------------|------------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| School, Ajangbadi, Ojo LGEA | | | School, Ajangbadi, Ojo LGEA | |
| Lagos Island LGEA | Giwa | S.T. | Education Secretary, Lagos Island LGEA | |
| Zumratul/Islamiyyah, Lagos Island, LGEA | Ayoola | O.G. | Headteacher | |
| St Peter's Anglican Pry School, Alausa, Ikeja LGEA | Oludare | I.O. | Headteacher | |
| Ifako/Ijaiye, LGEA | Ipaye | Dr. W.A. | Education Secretary | |
| Lagos State | Ahmed | Abdufatah | Honourable Commissioner for Finance, Lagos State | |
| Lagos State | Ayo | Mr. O. | Lagos State | |
| Lagos State | Ogoke | Pascal | Executive Director, Foundation for Civic Advocacy in Africa + representatives of five other CSOs, Lagos State | |
| Abuja | | | | |
| Federal Ministry of Education | Abdullahi | Mrs. Hindatu | Director Special Needs, Federal Ministry of Education | |
| Federal Ministry of Education | Bello | Alhaji | Director of the Department for Basic and Secondary Education, Federal Ministry of Education | |
| Save The Children | Evans | Deanne | Education Officer, Save The Children, Nigeria | |
| CSACEFA | Onibon | Felicia | President of CSACEFA, Director of Change Managers | |
| Assistant to President | Ibrahim | Amina | Senior Special Assistant to the President, MDGs | |
| VSO | Gupta | Liz | Education Programme Officer, VSO | |
| MDG | Ahmad | Fatima, Jiddum | Education Desk Officer, MDG | |
| Federal Ministry of Education | Makoju | Gladys | Former Acting Director Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Research (PPM&R) Department, Federal Ministry of Education | |
| JICA | Suwa | Naoi | Project Formulation Advisor, JICA | |
| JICA | Kola | Ayandele M | Education Expert, JICA | |
| Federal Ministry for Education | Momodu | Mrs. Zualakatu, Usaman | Deputy Director HIV/AIDS, Federal Ministry for Education | |
| Federal Ministry for Education | Nnoromon | Mrs. Kemi | Head of Policy and Planning, HIV/AIDS, Federal Ministry of Education | |
| EFA | Momoh | Mrs. | Deputy Director EFA | |
| DFID Nigeria | Miller | Jane | Senior Health/Education Advisor, DFID Nigeria | |
| DFID Nigeria | Attfield | Ian | Education Adviser Northern Nigeria, DFID | |
| DFID Nigeria | Cassidy | Eamon | Head of DFID Nigeria | |
| Independent Consultant | Okoro | Dennis | Ex. Head of Inspectorate now independent consultant, Denneli Education Consultancy Services | |
| Action Aid International | Igbuzor | Otive | International Head of Campaigns of Action Aid International | |
| University of Abuja | Gidado | Prof. Tahir | Former Executive Secretary UBEC, | |

| Organisation | Surname | First name | Function | Stakeholder Category |
|--|------------|--------------------|--|----------------------|
| | | | now Professor in Education at the University of Abuja | |
| UBEC | Moldibo | Dr. M | Executive Secretary UBEC | |
| UBEC | Onocha | Prof Charles. | Deputy Executive Secretary, Technical, UBEC | |
| UBEC | Suleman | Ibrahim | Social Mobilisation Director, UBEC | |
| UBEC | Toluju | Mr. J.O. | DD Social Mobilisation, UBEC | |
| UBEC | Zakari | Wada | Director Academic Services, UBEC | |
| UBEC | Alabi | Dr. Tony | Director Planning, Research and Statistics, UBEC | |
| UBEC | Ubani | Dr. Chima | Director Quality Assurance, UBEC | |
| UBEC | Edeghere | Francesca | DD Academic Services, UBEC | |
| UBEC | Umar | Iro | Assistant Programme Director, UBEC | |
| UBEC | Kagara | Bello | Project Coordinator, UBEC | |
| Vision 2020 Working Group | Munzali | Jibril | Basic Education Sub Group for the Vision 2020 Working Group | |
| ESSPIN | Martin | John | Team Leader ESSPIN | |
| Committee of Education | Lawal | The Hon. Farouk M. | Chairman Committee of Education House of Representatives, Abuja | |
| Nigeria Union of Teachers | Obong | Mr. Obong Ikpe J. | Secretary General, Nigeria Union of Teachers | |
| Enugu | | | | |
| CSACEFA | Agujiobi | Dr. Betty | CSACEFA State Coordinator, Enugu | |
| Committee on Education | Onyeze | Hon. Nze | Chairman House Committee on Education, Enugu | |
| Committee on Education | Amu | Hon. Felix | Member House Committee on Education, Enugu | |
| Committee on Education | Nwoke | Hon. Okechukwu | Member House Committee on Education, Enugu | |
| State Ministry of Education | Eze | Mr. Eze O. | Permanent Secretary, Enugu State Ministry of Education | |
| State Ministry of Education | Ogbodo | Mr. Onagu TZ | EFA/UBE Desk Officer, Enugu State Ministry of Education | |
| Planning Research and Statistics | Eneje | Mr. | Director Planning Research and Statistics, Enugu State Ministry of Education | |
| State Economic Planning Commission | Onyishi | Nnanyelugo Dan | Executive Secretary, Enugu State Economic Planning Commission | |
| Director of School distance learning and Education | Ogili | Dr. | CSACEFA member/Director of school Distance learning and Education, Enugu | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Ezeabasili | Mrs. Ethel Nebo | Chair ESUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Odugu | Dr. B. U. | - | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Ijeoma | Mrs. Nnaji | Permanent Member 1, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Eneh | Chike C. | Permanent Member 11, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Okechukwu | A.A. | Permanent Secretary, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Dennis | Arc. O. | Permanent Member 111, Enugu SUBEB | |

Annex C: Interview Schedule

| Organisation | Surname | First name | Function | Stakeholder Category |
|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| Enugu SUBEB | Ezeoha | Elder Charles | Permanent Member 1V, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Odoh | Mr. P.O. | Head of Department TTCD, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Ugwu | Chris | Director A&S, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Ugwueze | Dr. Mrs. C O | Head of Department PRS, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Iloekwenie | H.A. | Head of Department Social Mobilization, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Ani | Mr. J.E. | Head of Department SSME, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Chigbo | Anthonia C. | Deputy Director Audit, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | Anyaji | Okey | Head of Unit Legal, Enugu SUBEB | |
| Enugu SUBEB | - | - | Head of Unit Public Relations, Enugu SUBEB | |
| COPSHON | Ugwoke | Comrade Joseph IK. | State Chairman of COPSHON, Enugu | |
| - | Nzeakor | Comrade Cletus C. | - | |
| COPSHON | Nwobodo | Comrade Simon N. | Financial Sec State COPSHON, Enugu | |
| COPSHON | Odo | Chief Comrade Michael E. | State Treasurer COPSHON, Enugu | |
| COPSHON | Ekeowa | Comrade Augustine | 2nd Vice Chairman COPSHON, Enugu | |
| COPSHON | Ude | Comrade Obed O. | State COPSHON Secretary, Enugu | |
| Ministry of Education | Okwo | Sam | Udi LGA. Education Secretary | |
| Ministry of Education | Okeke | J.A. | Uzouwani LGA , Education Secretary | |
| Ministry of Education | Nnukwu | Mrs. B. | Enugu South LGA, Education Secretary | |
| Ministry of Education | Lawrence | Barrister | Nkanu West LGA, Education Secretary | |
| Ministry of Education | Ugwu | - | Oji River LGA, Education Secretary | |
| Ministry of Education | Ugwu | Timothy Umeh C. O. | Isiuzo LGA, Education Secretary | |
| SPARC | Stewart | Martin | SPARC Enugu State Team Leader | |
| Kano | | | | |
| Kano SUBEB | Usman | Mohammed Lawan | Acting Executive Chairman and Directors, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Lawan Usman | Malan Muhammed | Permanent Member 1, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Inuwa | Alhaji Bala Muhammed | Permanent member 2, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Abubakar | Alhaji Usman A. | Secretary to the Board, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Gwarzo | Malam Bello Usman | Director, Primary Schools, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Ibrahim | Malam Kabiru | Director, Junior Secondary Schools, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Waziri | Alhaji Mustapha Isa | Director, Finance and Supply, SUBEB Kano | |

| Organisation | Surname | First name | Function | Stakeholder Category |
|---|--------------------------------|------------------------|---|----------------------|
| Kano SUBEB | Baffa | Alhaji Audie A. | Director, Nomadic Education, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Indabo | Alhaji Usman | Deputy Director, Primary Schools, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Umar | Amina | Assistant Director, Public Relations, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Yola | Rabi Mansur | Coordinator, Girl Child Education, SUBEB Kano | |
| Kano SUBEB | Tofu | Alhiji Abdullahi Idris | Director, Personnel Management, SUBEB Kano | |
| Committee on Education | - | - | Chairman, House Committee on Education, Kano | |
| Commission for Education | Salihu | Musa | Honourable Commissioner for Education, Kano State | |
| CSACEFA | Abdu + 3 other members of CSOs | Abdulrahman | CSACEFA Kano Focal Person | |
| Commission for Planning and Budget | Hanga | Nour Sani | Honourable Commissioner for Planning and Budget | |
| LGA | Wudil | Ali Umar | Education Secretary | |
| SBMC | Dahiru | Galadima J | SBMC Chairman | |
| Kano school | Yakubu | Muhammad | Head Teacher | |
| Kano school | Aliyu | Zubairu | Head Teacher | |
| PTA | Idris | Danmallam | PTA Chairman | |
| LGA | Maigoro | Ado | Kumbotso LGA | |
| Ministry of Education | Dandago | Abdullahi Muhammad | Education Secretary | |
| Ministry of Education | Abdullahi | Hussaini | Education Secretary | |
| SBMC | Ibrahim | Tasiu | SBMC Chairman | |
| PTA | Na'ila | Abba | PTA Chairman | |
| SBMC | Ibrahim | Tabiu | SBMC Chairman | |
| Kano school | Alitu | Babandi Isa | Head Teacher | |
| SBMC | Abbati | Sayyadil Khair | SBMC Treasurer | |
| SBMC | Muhammad | Sabo | SBMC Chairman | |
| Ministry of Education | Ishak | Haladu B | Education Secretary | |
| SBMC | Bala | Ibrahim | SBMC Secretary | |
| SBMC | Danyaya | Usman Ibrahim | SBMC Chairman | |
| - | Garba | Salamatu MN | Permanent Secretary | |
| Kwara | | | | |
| Commission for Finance and Economic Development | Ahmed | Abulfatah | Hon Commissioner for Finance and Economic Development Kwara State | |
| Commission for Education | Bolaji | Alahaji Abdullahi | Commissioner for Education Kwara State | |
| State Ministry of Education | Adetunji | Mr. Fagbemi | Permanent Secretary State Ministry of Education | |
| SUBEB | Mohammed | Aliyu | Executive Secretary, SUBEB Kwara | |
| SUBEB | Marcus | Ojo | Director PRS, SUBEB Kwara | |
| SUBEB | Adeniyi | Afolagboye Jimoh | Director Social Mobilisation, SUBEB Kwara | |


| Organisation | Surname | First name | Function | Stakeholder Category |
|--|-------------|---------------------|--|----------------------|
| LGEA | Ayegun | Mallam Jimoh | HOS; PR&S- Ilorin East LGEA | |
| LGEA | Yusuff | Mall Salami Kehinde | Headteacher, Ilorin East LGEA | |
| PR&S- IloOFFA | Oladipo | Mrs. Grace O. | HOS; PR&S- IloOFFA | |
| IloOFFA | Bisi | Ibrahim M. | Headteacher, IloOFFA | |
| Patigi LGEA central | Taye | Olaosebikan R | HOS; PR&S- Oyun Ile Mona | |
| LGEA | Baiwa | Alh Muhammed D | Headteacher, Patigi LGEA central | |
| Moro Mosankore LGA | Adeniyi | Eunice | Headteacher, Moro Mosankore | |
| LGEA | Awojobi | Pastor S.O. | HOS; PR&S, Patigi LGEA | |
| Oyun LGEA | Ilufeye | J.A. | Headteacher, Oyun LGEA | |
| Ilorin West LGA | Hassan | Mall. M.K. | HOS; PR&S, Ilorin West | |
| Ilorin West Primary School | Abdulraheem | Busari O. | Headteacher, Ilorin West | |
| Bode Sa'adu LGA | Balogun | Salisu O. | HOS; PR&S, Bode Sa'adu | |
| Committee of Education | Idris | Suleiman Sunoboro | Chairman Committee of Education House of Assembly, Kwara State | |
| CSACEFA | Joseph | Bamidele | CSACEFA Kwara | |
| Living Affairs Foundation | Adeyemi | Adeyemo | Living Affairs Foundation | |
| Hill Top Foundation | Crossley | Janet | Hill Top Foundation | |
| CSACEFA | Bodunde | Ade | VSO volunteer working with CSACEFA | |
| Trois Human Development Foundation | Olusesam | Adewoye | Trois Human Development Foundation, Living Care Foundation | |
| FOMWAN | Ijaiya | Alhaja A.D | Federation of Muslim Women's Associations (FOMWAN) | |
| Life Preservation Centre | Casaji | Rev. Jacob O. | Life Preservation Centre | |
| Heritage Foundation | Sogunro | Mr. Soji | Royal covenant Heritage Foundation | |
| Agent and Change Development Initiatives | Adeleke | Toni | Agent and Change Development Initiatives | |
| FOMWAN | Sanni | Alhaja R.O. | Zonal Coordinator FOMWAN | |
| Shonga Emirate | Yahaya | HRH. Dr. N. | Emir of Shonga | |
| Central School, Shonga | Muhammad | Idris Nma | Area Headteacher | |
| Gboro, Shonga Primary School | Muhammad | Ladan S. | Zonal Headteacher | |
| Shonga Primary School | Abubakar | Mohammad B | Headteacher | |
| Shonga Primary School | Shonga | Aliyu Ndadoko T | Ogudu, Shonga | |
| Budofu LGEA School | Rafi | Abdullahi | Headteacher | |
| Primary school, Tada | Swaliyu | Saidu Tsangi | Headteacher | |
| Akerebiata Primary School | Jogbojogbo | Asunmi W. | Headmaster, also rep for Ilori East NUT | |
| JSS Mamenete School | Akala | Bello Ibraheem | Teacher, Vice-Principle, Publicity Secretary | |
| PTA | Oniye | Alh Ibrahim | PTA Chairman, Kwara State | |
| Abuja | | | | |
| NPTAN | Adewumi | Mrs. Iyabo | National Coordinator Parent Teacher Association of Nigeria (NPTAN) | |
| Education Trust Fund (EFF), Abuja | Yakubu | Professor Mahmoud | Executive Secretary, ETF | |

| Organisation | Surname | First name | Function | Stakeholder Category |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|--|----------------------|
| ETF | - | - | Director, Administration, ETF | |
| ETF | - | - | Director, Operations, ETF | |
| CSACEFA, Abuja | Erinle | Arc.(Mrs)Tayo | Founder and Executive Director. | |
| CSACEFA, Abuja | Chikodi | Mr. Opara | CSACEFA member | |
| CSACEFA, Abuja | Cunmi | Tabita | CSACEFA member | |
| UNESCO | Keynan | Hassan | Education Expert, UNESCO | |
| UNESCO | Awuzie | Ngozi | Programme Assistant, UNESCO | |
| AfDB | ASSAH | Herve | Resident Representative AfDB Nigeria | |
| AfDB | Ugonma | Pat | Education Expert, AfDB | |
| AfDB | Alolo | Namawu Alhassan | Economist, AfDB | |
| USAID | Oleksy-Ojikutu | Sandy | Team Leader, Education – USAID | |
| NIEPA | Ajaiyi | Prof Taiwo | Executive Director, NIEPA | |
| CSACEFA | Samuel | Wale | Policy Advisor CSACEFA, Abuja | |
| CSACEFA | Adeagbo | Rufus | Member CSACEFA, Abuja | |
| CSACEFA | Osho | Babatunde | Member CSACEFA, Abuja | |
| CSACEFA | Monye | George | Member CSACEFA, Abuja | |
| ESSPIN | Baines | Steve | Technical Head ESSPIN, British Council | |

Annex D – Basic Education Indicators

This annex aims to bring together indicators on the status of basic education in Nigeria. The graph in Figure D.1a.i.1.a.i. Figure D.1 shows an overview of the primary school system by measuring access, retention, learning, efficiency, and resources for primary schools. The indicators have been drawn from different sources and years as data sets are not consistent across the time period. The most recent year of available data is shown for each indicator.

Figure D.1 Overview of the primary school system



Source: As indicated above, graph produced by EPDC, 2009.

Figure D.1 illustrates the disparity between girls and boys in primary education. However it also shows that those girls that make it into school tend to survive until Grade 5. The number of repeaters is very low as in Nigeria children tend to automatically pass through the years in primary school.

Estimates as to how many children are out of school in Nigeria range from 7-9million. It is therefore important to look at what factors affect access to primary school in Nigeria. Both gender and geography seem to be important, girls from rural areas being least likely to be in school.

Table D.1 Basic education indicators for Nigeria compared to elsewhere

| Indicator for 2006 | Nigeria | World | Developing Countries | Sub-Saharan Africa |
|--|--------------|----------|----------------------|--------------------|
| New entrants Primary(000) | 4430.5* | 135339.9 | 120588.9 | 23636.5 |
| GIR in primary education (%), Total | 107.5* | 111.1 | 112.4 | 111.4 |
| GIR in primary education (%), Male | 116.3* | 113.6 | 115.2 | 116.2 |
| GIR in primary education (%), female | 98.5* | 108.5 | 109.5 | 106.4 |
| NIR in primary education (%), Total | 67.1 **a | 67.8 | 66.4 | 52.1 |
| Total school life expectancy (expected # of years of formal schooling) | 8.3 **a | 10.8 | 10.2 | 8.2 |
| NER in primary education (%), Male | 68.1 *a | 87.8 | 86.9 | 72.9 |
| NER in primary education (%), Female | 58.6 *a | 84.9 | 83.6 | 67.3 |
| Out-of-primary-school children (000), Total | 8096.8 *a | 75177.3 | 71910.9 | 35155.9 |
| Male out-of-primary-school children (000) | 3549.7 *a | 33988 | 32179 | 16006 |
| Female out-of-primary-school children (000) | 4547.2 *a | 41189.7 | 39732.1 | 19150 |
| Enrolment in secondary education, Total (000) | 6398* | 513261 | 401618 | 33071 |
| Female enrolment in secondary education (000) | 45* | 47 | 47 | 44 |

| Indicator for 2006 | Nigeria | World | Developing Countries | Sub-Saharan Africa |
|--|---------|-------|----------------------|--------------------|
| % Trained teachers, primary, Total ⁶⁷ | 50* | - | 85 | 85 |
| Pupil/teacher ratio, primary ⁶⁸ | 37* | 25 | 28 | 45 |

Notes:


*Data are for the school year ending 2005

**Data are for the school year ending in 2004.

a = UIS estimation

Source: GMR 2008

Figure D.2 Who is not in school in Nigeria?




Source: Gender UIS 2005, Urban/Rural, DHS, 2003 - graphs produced by EPDC, 2009

Figure D.3 shows historical trends of primary and secondary school attainment, as well as a trend line to 2020. The historical estimates are based on the education attainment of adult age-cohorts. The projection trend is based on a regression of the historical data and the assumption of some attenuation as full enrollment is approached. The data from 1940-1980 are from 10-year age groups, resulting in a smooth line, whereas the data from 1990 on are single-year data and show random fluctuations caused by small sample sizes.

⁶⁷ Data on trained teachers (defined according to national standards) are not collected for countries whose education statistics are gathered through the OECD, Eurostat or the World Education Indicators questionnaires.

⁶⁸ Based on headcounts of pupils and teachers


Figure D.3 School entry trends 1950-2025



Annex E Nigeria external aid data⁶⁹

Total aid flows

Figure E.1 Total aid commitments (constant 2007 US\$bn)




Source: Table E.3

Total aid commitments to Nigeria remained at similar levels between 1999 and 2004. In 2005 there was a tremendous increase in total aid commitments of over USDbn 5.76 with a further increase of USDbn 6.02 in 2006 mainly due to an increase in contributions from bilateral donors. In 2007, however, bilateral aid commitments decline substantially, with total aid commitments amounting to just over USDbn 2.41. The share of multilateral aid in total aid presented a significant variation, with its peak at 76% in 2001 and its trough at 6% in 2006.

⁶⁹ The following charts and tabulations rely on the data used in the 2009 GMR (which cover the period 1999-2007 in the case of commitments and the period 2002-2007 in the case of disbursements, in constant 2007 USD). The original source of these data is the OECD-DAC creditor reporting system (CRS). The multilateral data in the GMR external aid database is incomplete because the EC was the only multilateral agency reporting data on disbursements to the OECD-DAC secretariat (although IDA provided unofficial data). For this reason disbursements are not reported on here.


Figure E.2 Aid dependency (commitments/GNI)



Source: Table E.3

Aid dependency initially remained at similar levels over the period but rose sharply in 2005 and 2006, increasing from near zero levels in 1999 to 8.7% in 2006 due to the general increases in aid volumes from bilateral donors in the two previous years. In 2007, however, aid dependency significantly dropped substantially to 1.5%. Cumulative real GDP growth over the period was 17.1%. Average growth per annum was 1.77% (Table E.4).


Figure E.3 Share of total aid commitments by donor 2007



Source: Table E.6

The biggest donor to Nigeria in terms of total aid commitments in 2007 was the United Kingdom. IDA, the Netherlands, the United States and Austria fill out the remaining top five donors, making similar levels of contribution. Over the period 1999-2007 the most significant donor was the United Kingdom, followed by the France and Germany.


Figure E.4 Share of total aid commitments by donor 1999-2007



Source: Table E.6

E.1 Aid to education⁷⁰

Figure E.5 Total commitments to education and basic education (constant 2007 USD millions)




Source: Table E.5

⁷⁰ The following figures show total (rather than just direct) aid flows to education and basic education. These broader definitions include assumptions about the use of aid flows that are not strictly assigned to education or basic education (following the convention adopted by the GMR): Total aid to education = Direct aid to education plus 20% of direct budget support; Total aid to basic education = Direct aid to basic education plus 10% of direct budget support plus 50% of direct aid to education not specified by level.


Aid commitments to education and basic education have risen sporadically over the period 1999-2007. In 2007, bilateral and multilateral aid commitments to education have peaked at USDm 238.96 and 251.47, respectively. There has also been an unsteady increase in the ratio of multilateral to bilateral aid. The share of aid to basic education in total aid to education has risen from 23% to 33% over the period, but only erratically; the highest peaks were in 2002 and 2004 when the share of basic education in total aid to education amounted to 88% and 81% respectively, with significant troughs of 22% in 2003 and 21% in 2006.

Figure E.6 Share of multilateral aid in aid to education and basic education, and of aid to basic education in total aid to education, 1999-2007



Source: Table E.5

Figure E.7 Share of total commitments to education by donor 2007




Source: Table E.5

The most significant donor in terms of aid to education in 2007 was the United Kingdom with a share of 51%, closely followed by IDA with a share of 43%. The Netherlands, the United

States, and Austria also featured in the list of top five, making similar levels of contribution. Over the period 1999-2007, IDA was the most significant donor with 45% of the share, followed by the United Kingdom. These two donors have made sporadically yet significant contributions (the United Kingdom has made commitments in 2000, 2004, and 2006, and IDA in 2000, 2002, 2006, and 2007) while Germany, the United States and France's contributions have been spread out more consistently across the years.


Figure E.8 Share of total commitments to education by donor 1999-2007



Source: Table E.7


The United Kingdom commanded a significant 65% share of aid to basic education in 2007. IDA also features as a prime donor in 2007, followed by the United States, France, and UNICEF. Over the course of the period 1999-2007, however, IDA becomes the primary donor to basic education, followed by the United Kingdom. However, the size of the contributions made by these donors has been sporadic, with the most significant commitments amounting to 62% (2002) and 54% (2007) of each country's total commitments respectively. The United States has also made to the list of top five donors with commitments been spread out more evenly across the years.

Figure E.9 Share of total commitments to basic education by donor 2007



Source: Table E.8

Figure E.10 Total commitments to basic education by donor 1999-2007



Source: Table E.8

E.1.1 Direct aid to education

As elaborated in footnote 2, total aid to education and basic education are calculated according to the GMR conventions that apportion certain amounts of General Budget Support (GBS) and aid to education that is not specified by level. Table E.1 below details the breakdown of aid to education by category, as well as presenting the figures for General Budget Support and total aid to education and basic education.

Table E.1 Direct aid to education (constant 2007 USDm) – commitments

| Category | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Education unspecified | 2.49 | 79.41 | 0.57 | 8.72 | 6.82 | 0.73 | 1.10 | 15.15 | 230.98 |
| Basic education | 3.80 | 49.19 | 16.60 | 142.87 | 1.44 | 63.55 | 6.80 | 10.54 | 48.18 |
| Secondary education | 4.83 | 2.67 | 2.89 | 5.01 | 3.43 | 5.44 | 0.88 | 49.67 | 105.98 |
| Post-secondary education | 11.50 | 11.31 | 9.99 | 8.88 | 10.51 | 9.63 | 9.63 | 10.83 | 104.31 |
| General Budget Support | 4.89 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 8.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 10% GBS | 0.49 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 20% GBS | 0.98 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.61 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Total aid to education | 23.60 | 142.59 | 30.04 | 167.09 | 22.20 | 79.36 | 18.42 | 86.18 | 489.44 |
| Total aid to basic education | 5.54 | 88.90 | 16.88 | 148.04 | 4.85 | 63.92 | 7.36 | 18.12 | 163.67 |

Notes: total aid to education = all direct aid to education + 20% GBS; total aid to basic education = direct aid to basic education + 50% Education unspecified + 10% GBS.

Table E.2 Bilateral and multilateral aid commitments 1999-2007 (constant 2007 USDbn)

| | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Bilateral | 0.1182 | 0.735825 | 0.203281 | 0.368139 | 0.337261 | 0.601152 | 6.679286 | 12.53658 | 1.693263 |
| Multilateral | 0.090594 | 0.371911 | 0.652649 | 0.750318 | 0.465144 | 0.963038 | 0.651645 | 0.821389 | 0.726209 |
| Total | 0.208793 | 1.107736 | 0.855931 | 1.118458 | 0.802405 | 1.564189 | 7.330931 | 13.35797 | 2.419472 |
| Share of multilateral aid in total aid (%) | 0.433892 | 0.33574 | 0.762503 | 0.670851 | 0.579688 | 0.615678 | 0.08889 | 0.061491 | 0.300152 |

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table E.3 Aid dependency ratio (commitments/GDP constant 2007 USDm)

| | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Bilateral | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 5% | 8% | 1% |
| Multilateral | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 0% |
| Total | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 5% | 9% | 1% |

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database; World Bank 2008 World Development Indicators. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36); deflators for GDP from World Bank 2008 World Development Indicators.

Table E.4 GDP (current and constant 2007 USDm) and GDP deflator

| | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| GDP (current USDm) | 34776 | 45984 | 48000 | 59117 | 67656 | 87845 | 112249 | 146867 | 165469 |
| Inflation (annual %) | 12.2865 | 38.1688 | 10.7376 | 31.4739 | 11.1955 | 20.7277 | 19.7607 | 19.5583 | 5.0556 |
| GDP Deflator (1=2007) | 0.25 | 0.34 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.66 | 0.80 | 0.95 | 1.00 |
| GDP (constant 2007 USDm) | 141264 | 135191 | 127435 | 119377 | 122865 | 132139 | 140988 | 154292 | 165469 |
| Real GDP growth (%) | | -4.3% | -5.7% | -6.3% | 2.9% | 7.5% | 6.7% | 9.4% | 7.2% |
| Cumulative GDP growth over the period 1999-2007 | 17.1% | | | | | | | | |
| Average annual growth over the period 1999-2007 | 1.77% | | | | | | | | |

Source: World Bank 2008 World Development Indicators.

Table E.5 Total aid to education and basic education (constant 2007 USDm)

| | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Total aid to education | | | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 23.57634 | 62.52579 | 23.33302 | 24.7211 | 22.19558 | 77.80917 | 16.54531 | 29.44389 | 237.9651 |
| Multilateral | 0.028507 | 80.06415 | 6.707032 | 142.3687 | 0 | 1.546917 | 1.878883 | 56.74096 | 251.4795 |
| Total | 23.60485 | 142.5899 | 30.04005 | 167.0898 | 22.19558 | 79.35609 | 18.42419 | 86.18485 | 489.4446 |
| Aid to basic education | | | | | | | | | |
| Bilateral | 5.515589 | 47.22542 | 10.17333 | 5.670461 | 4.847614 | 62.36821 | 5.476289 | 13.12662 | 119.1182 |
| Multilateral | 0.022039 | 41.67249 | 6.707032 | 142.3687 | 0 | 1.546917 | 1.878883 | 4.991391 | 44.55368 |
| Total | 5.537628 | 88.89791 | 16.88036 | 148.0392 | 4.847614 | 63.91513 | 7.355172 | 18.11801 | 163.6719 |
| Share of multilateral aid in total aid to education (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| | 0.12% | 56.15% | 22.33% | 85.20% | 0.00% | 1.95% | 10.20% | 65.84% | 51.38% |
| Share of multilateral aid in aid to basic education (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| | 0.40% | 46.88% | 39.73% | 96.17% | 0.00% | 2.42% | 25.55% | 27.55% | 27.22% |
| Share of aid to basic education in total aid to education (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| | 23.46% | 62.35% | 56.19% | 88.60% | 21.84% | 80.54% | 39.92% | 21.02% | 33.44% |

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table E.6 Total aid commitments by donor (constant 2007 USDm)

| donor | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | Total aid commitments 1999-2007 |
|-------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------------------------------|
| AfDF | 0 | 36.82079 | 7.477107 | 63.39054 | 60.61654 | 12.24045 | 9.508345 | 47.84645 | 33.66488 | 0.271565 |
| Australia | 0.002546 | 0.240298 | 0.094039 | 0 | 0.005595 | 0.076999 | 0.100125 | 0.348771 | 0.573271 | 0.001442 |
| Austria | 1.567736 | 2.506244 | 2.732899 | 3.345819 | 5.531761 | 11.4932 | 7.296227 | 0.654471 | 321.2435 | 0.356372 |
| Belgium | 0.564687 | 0.450579 | 0.768739 | 0.677062 | 0.888896 | 1.356436 | 162.7934 | 219.4714 | 0.903686 | 0.387875 |
| Canada | 8.10323 | 11.31021 | 6.425279 | 37.57653 | 60.39383 | 17.15231 | 31.18828 | 13.35707 | 15.59535 | 0.201102 |
| Denmark | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 284.7562 | 1.085878 | 0.285842 |
| EC | 54.49691 | 113.1768 | 112.1545 | 14.64262 | 31.01436 | 431.8076 | 109.3921 | 130.1694 | 168.7118 | 1.165566 |
| Finland | 0 | 0.403055 | 0.287836 | 0.512358 | 0.116592 | 0.205145 | 0.397859 | 0.380702 | 0.605691 | 0.002909 |
| France | 4.349524 | 9.970013 | 23.66365 | 8.635229 | 5.015173 | 5.920689 | 1665.338 | 2276.804 | 13.18277 | 4.012879 |
| Germany | 14.15703 | 20.93166 | 28.36578 | 82.67023 | 20.1971 | 32.1415 | 1339.78 | 2069.794 | 32.08747 | 3.640125 |
| Global Fund | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 34.89093 | 47.11331 | 0 | 77.84648 | 54.07529 | 0.213926 |
| Greece | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.105979 | 0.454774 | 0.611633 | 0.763799 | 0.280159 | 1.912608 | 0.004129 |
| IDA | 0 | 195.4485 | 446.1529 | 617.4009 | 295.6671 | 431.7918 | 489.7905 | 479.4876 | 370 | 3.325739 |
| IFAD | 30.92292 | 0 | 43.79648 | 21.14387 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29.89683 | 43.158 | 0.168918 |
| Ireland | 0 | 1.216933 | 1.784717 | 2.094659 | 2.927514 | 2.029543 | 2.146875 | 2.573953 | 2.136118 | 0.01691 |
| Italy | 0.095097 | 1.686387 | 1.786357 | 1.622477 | 0.066782 | 1.052857 | 609.4904 | 852.8256 | 3.808462 | 1.472434 |
| Japan | 0.645647 | 12.72614 | 8.613759 | 30.84867 | 2.578325 | 5.726106 | 101.5262 | 2166.412 | 29.69847 | 2.358775 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.01904 | 0 | 0.023983 | 0 | 4.3E-05 |
| Netherlands | 0.224518 | 0.236971 | 6.363869 | 1.157806 | 7.29628 | 0.469734 | 1.172994 | 10.81465 | 344.145 | 0.371882 |
| New Zealand | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.067082 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.096671 | 0.083707 | 0.000247 |
| Norway | 1.342454 | 0.377278 | 1.794629 | 4.053179 | 9.090713 | 6.07675 | 4.214446 | 2.410166 | 1.821722 | 0.031181 |
| Portugal | 0 | 0 | 0.000593 | 0.004715 | 0 | 0.005208 | 0.016826 | 0.121711 | 0.071555 | 0.000221 |
| Spain | 0.659512 | 0.397155 | 0.781659 | 0.800675 | 0.571458 | 0.685833 | 2.184765 | 153.7037 | 0.313512 | 0.160098 |
| Sweden | 0.101138 | 0.499296 | 1.860603 | 1.836912 | 0.071118 | 0.39243 | 1.133158 | 0.493794 | 1.188605 | 0.007577 |

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|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Switzerland | 0 | 0.580792 | 0.087304 | 0 | 0 | 0.005133 | 53.30508 | 53.79161 | 0.155859 | 0.107926 |
| UNAIDS | 0 | 0 | 1.615503 | 0.38809 | 1.095406 | 0 | 1.247574 | 0.904286 | 1.150608 | 0.006401 |
| UNDP | 5.174023 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.728703 | 9.327092 | 15.25848 | 15.58484 | 0.049073 |
| UNFPA | 0 | 0 | 8.12373 | 7.525263 | 13.1905 | 6.366586 | 6.154968 | 6.092565 | 6.006586 | 0.05346 |
| UNICEF | 0 | 26.46512 | 33.32927 | 25.82697 | 28.6696 | 29.9891 | 26.22422 | 33.8865 | 33.8574 | 0.238248 |
| United Kingdom | 44.53563 | 559.2996 | 13.41013 | 71.14316 | 121.8186 | 383.2336 | 2545.406 | 3611.453 | 580.6833 | 7.930983 |
| United States | 41.85081 | 112.992 | 104.4595 | 120.9868 | 100.2359 | 132.4976 | 151.0307 | 816.0111 | 341.9669 | 1.922031 |
| Total | 208.7934 | 1107.736 | 855.9308 | 1118.458 | 802.4049 | 1564.189 | 7330.93 | 13357.97 | 2419.473 | 28.76589 |

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table E.7 Total commitments to education by donor, 2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

| donor | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | Total commitments to education 1999-2007 |
|-------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|
| AfDF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 47.84645 | 0 | 0.047846 |
| Australia | 0.002546 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.005595 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8.14E-06 |
| Austria | 1.156823 | 1.130141 | 0.781603 | 0.657579 | 0.631427 | 0.535131 | 0.546715 | 0.604371 | 0.521584 | 0.006565 |
| Belgium | 0.193675 | 0.146673 | 0.119242 | 0.137749 | 0.431112 | 0.230478 | 0.361974 | 0.552919 | 0.246579 | 0.00242 |
| Canada | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.20405 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.000204 |
| EC | 0 | 0 | 1.389934 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00139 |
| Finland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.070768 | 0 | 0.042464 | 0.035225 | 0 | 0.307187 | 0.000456 |
| France | 10.55896 | 4.862785 | 5.876196 | 6.249238 | 4.160783 | 6.178216 | 1.597068 | 3.293512 | 5.667315 | 0.048444 |
| Germany | 7.173684 | 6.558678 | 6.296679 | 6.908384 | 7.489646 | 7.143338 | 6.92987 | 7.317722 | 5.476696 | 0.061295 |
| Greece | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.177778 | 0.43469 | 0.441216 | 0.236847 | 1.78757 | 0.003078 |
| IDA | 0 | 76.78333 | 0 | 142.3687 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7.806243 | 249.75 | 0.476708 |
| Ireland | 0 | 0.332823 | 0.276735 | 0.38018 | 0.943049 | 0.578703 | 0.563849 | 0.870327 | 0.651023 | 0.004597 |
| Italy | 0.002172 | 0.138992 | 0.123372 | 0.012505 | 0.002366 | 0.149151 | 0 | 0 | 1.300361 | 0.001729 |
| Japan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.608713 | 1.33236 | 5.932049 | 4.915773 | 8.07855 | 0.826109 | 0.022694 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.023983 | 0 | 2.4E-05 |
| Netherlands | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.888288 | 1.629255 | 0.38587 | 0.002903 |
| New Zealand | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.096671 | 0.083707 | 0.00018 |
| Norway | 0 | 0.026466 | 0 | 0.032904 | 0 | 0 | 0.025761 | 0.094901 | 0.044551 | 0.000225 |
| Portugal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.004715 | 0 | 0.005208 | 0.016826 | 0.113782 | 0.065316 | 0.000206 |
| Spain | 0.044628 | 0.335929 | 0.263682 | 0.632844 | 0.455988 | 0 | 0.217623 | 0.098805 | 0.030207 | 0.00208 |
| Switzerland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.005118 | 0 | 0 | 5.12E-06 |
| UNDP | 0.028507 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2.85E-05 |

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|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| UNICEF | 0 | 3.280825 | 5.317098 | 0 | 0 | 1.546917 | 1.878883 | 1.088269 | 1.729502 | 0.014841 |
| United Kingdom | 0 | 33.44252 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56.36805 | 0 | 0 | 211.963 | 0.301774 |
| United States | 4.443854 | 15.55078 | 9.595509 | 8.025525 | 6.565475 | 0.00765 | 0 | 6.43225 | 8.608 | 0.059229 |
| Total | 23.60485 | 142.5899 | 30.04005 | 167.0898 | 22.19558 | 79.35609 | 18.42419 | 86.18485 | 489.4446 | 1.05893 |

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Table E.8 Total commitments to basic education by donor, 2007 (constant 2007 USDm)

| donor | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | Total commitments to basic education 1999-2007 |
|----------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|
| Australia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.005595 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5.59E-06 |
| Austria | 0 | 0.016867 | 0.005529 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.01425 | 0.013501 | 0.006982 | 5.71E-05 |
| Belgium | 0.096838 | 0.072163 | 0 | 0 | 0.001121 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00017 |
| Canada | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.102025 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.000102 |
| EC | 0 | 0 | 1.389934 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.00139 |
| Finland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.035384 | 0 | 0.021232 | 0.017613 | 0 | 0.153593 | 0.000228 |
| France | 1.140456 | 0.062299 | 0.15599 | 0.198534 | 0.033833 | 0.037184 | 0.106652 | 1.27516 | 2.59466 | 0.005605 |
| Germany | 0.322267 | 0 | 0.116149 | 0 | 0.001092 | 0.26826 | 0.833215 | 0.426006 | 0.346129 | 0.002313 |
| Greece | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.088889 | 6.39E-06 | 0 | 0.002112 | 0 | 9.1E-05 |
| IDA | 0 | 38.39166 | 0 | 142.3687 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.903122 | 43.425 | 0.228088 |
| Ireland | 0 | 0.165438 | 0.219862 | 0.212084 | 0.85685 | 0.404786 | 0.404505 | 0.629141 | 0.497672 | 0.00339 |
| Italy | 0.001086 | 0 | 0.000447 | 0.006253 | 0.001183 | 0.030708 | 0 | 0 | 0.339346 | 0.000379 |
| Japan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.804356 | 0.576314 | 5.132133 | 4.082971 | 7.513921 | 0.405265 | 0.018515 |
| Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.011991 | 0 | 1.2E-05 |
| Netherlands | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.192935 | 0.000193 |
| Spain | 0 | 0.075855 | 0.07984 | 0.34368 | 0 | 0 | 0.014526 | 0.038665 | 0 | 0.000553 |
| Switzerland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.002559 | 0 | 0 | 2.56E-06 |
| UNDP | 0.022039 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2.2E-05 |
| UNICEF | 0 | 3.280825 | 5.317098 | 0 | 0 | 1.546917 | 1.878883 | 1.088269 | 1.128678 | 0.014241 |
| United Kingdom | 0 | 31.28202 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56.36805 | 0 | 0 | 105.9736 | 0.193624 |

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| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| United States | 3.954943 | 15.55078 | 9.595509 | 4.07017 | 3.282738 | 0.003825 | 0 | 3.216125 | 8.608 | 0.048282 |
| Total | 5.537628 | 88.89791 | 16.88036 | 148.0392 | 4.847614 | 63.91512 | 7.355172 | 18.11801 | 163.6718 | 0.517263 |

Source: GMR 2009 external aid database. Notes: deflators for resource flows from DAC donors (2008 OECD report annex table 36).

Annex F– Progress towards EFA

Provision of access to functional quality primary education is enshrined in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Accordingly, one of the national education policy objectives is to ensure provision of universal access to primary education for all children of school going age (6-11 years) under the compulsory 9 years of formal schooling under the Universal Basic Education Programme. Achieving universal primary education (UPE) has been the prime target of educational endeavours of regional governments since 1957 when the then Western region and the Lagos territory introduced UPE in the south western part of the country and the Eastern region in 1958. National level attempts were first made in 1976 when the then Military Government launched the Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme. However, despite concerted efforts by governments over the years to actualise this vision, Nigeria is yet to attain Universal Primary Education and disparities in educational development continue to exist between and within states in terms of access to education and coverage of school age population throughout the cycle. 9 years of formal schooling under the UBE programme is one of the latest attempts to universalise access and participation in basic education in Nigeria with an extended scope to include the first three years of Junior Secondary education.⁷¹

Enrolment data are unreliable. There are several factors that may affect them. The first is the perception that enrolments are tied to funding and thus should be inflated. The second regards previous years' data. For the first time, in 2005, schools were flagged with a unique code and can now be tracked year by year. However in previous school census' there was no similar system. Therefore different school censuses have captured different subsets of the school system. The FME EDB, after analysing the 2005 data, does not believe that the current school census captures all basic and senior secondary education facilities. It is estimated that coverage is 20% higher than previously.

Pre-primary Education enrolment⁷²

In spite of private sector control of this sector, there appears to be a growing awareness of its impact in the lives of children as shown in the increase in the number of children 0-5 enrolling in such centres - a 47% increase from 44,743 in 1999 to 84,340 in 2003 in the 36 states and FCT.

As shown in Table F.1, Oyo and Lagos States record the highest enrolments while Bayelsa and Rivers States post the least. In all the States except Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Ebonyi, Imo, Osun and Oyo States, more boys than girls are enrolled. This is even more glaring in the Sokoto figure. It needs to be pointed out that Qur'anic and Islamiyyah schools cater to the needs of many children at this age in the Northern region.

⁷¹ FME, "Nigeria Education Sector Diagnosis, May 2006, p. 51

⁷² FME, "Nigeria education Sector Diagnosis, May 2006, p. 37

Table F.1 Enrolment in Formal Pre-Primary Schools by States⁷³

| State | M | F | Total | %F Enrol | State | M | F | Total | %F Enrol |
|-------------|--------|--------|---------|----------|--------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|
| Abia | 47,517 | 47,082 | 94,599 | 49.77 | Kano | 22,237 | 21,675 | 43,912 | 49.36 |
| Adamawa | 10,809 | 10,108 | 20,917 | 48.32 | Katsina | 5,545 | 4,695 | 10,240 | 45.85 |
| Akwa Ibom | 30,866 | 32,097 | 62,963 | 50.98 | Kebbi | 5,946 | 4,624 | 10,570 | 43.75 |
| Anambra | 58,610 | 56,863 | 115,473 | 49.24 | Kogi | 15,972 | 14,927 | 30,899 | 48.31 |
| Bauchi | 14,973 | 12,715 | 27,688 | 45.92 | Kwara | 18,303 | 16,929 | 35,232 | 48.05 |
| Bayelsa | 4,625 | 4,523 | 9,148 | 49.44 | Lagos | 71,038 | 69,192 | 140,230 | 49.34 |
| Benue | 17,867 | 17,010 | 34,877 | 48.77 | Nasarawa | 13,419 | 12,282 | 25,701 | 47.79 |
| Borno | 13,926 | 10,728 | 24,654 | 43.51 | Niger | 30,035 | 25,764 | 55,799 | 46.17 |
| Cross River | 48,865 | 49,463 | 98,328 | 50.30 | Ogun | 50,992 | 49,143 | 100,135 | 49.08 |
| Delta | 31,896 | 30,821 | 62,717 | 49.14 | Ondo | 41,138 | 41,037 | 82,175 | 49.94 |
| Ebonyi | 7,931 | 7,700 | 15,631 | 49.26 | Osun | 33,595 | 32,837 | 66,432 | 49.43 |
| Edo | 19,701 | 19,294 | 38,995 | 49.48 | Oyo | 96,903 | 96,719 | 193,622 | 49.95 |
| Ekiti | 11,967 | 11,825 | 23,792 | 49.70 | Plateau | 15,859 | 15,476 | 31,335 | 49.39 |
| Enugu | 32,855 | 32,104 | 64,959 | 49.42 | Rivers | 6,380 | 6,056 | 12,436 | 48.70 |
| FCT | 1,465 | 1,340 | 2,805 | 47.77 | Sokoto | 41,095 | 24,046 | 65,141 | 36.91 |
| Gombe | 11,159 | 10,780 | 21,939 | 49.14 | Taraba | 12,595 | 10,854 | 23,449 | 46.29 |
| Imo | 57,685 | 56,129 | 113,814 | 49.32 | Yobe | 5,105 | 4,319 | 9,424 | 45.83 |
| Jigawa | 5,551 | 4,328 | 9,879 | 43.81 | Zamfara | 4,269 | 2,762 | 7,031 | 39.28 |
| Kaduna | 37,781 | 35,549 | 73,330 | 48.48 | Total | 956,475 | 903,796 | 1,860,271 | 48.58 |

Source: FME 2006

Primary Education Enrolment⁷⁴

Table F.1 indicates that, on average, at national level, both the absolute intake and gross intake rates (GIR) fluctuated widely over the period 1998 to 2005 under review according to the official enrolment figures. The GIR was 87% in 1998 and increased to 93% in 1999 before dropping to 65% in year 2000. It then increased to 80% in 2001 and peaked at 128% in 2002 before it dropped with 2 percentage points to 126% in 2003 and continued on a downward trend until it was 107% in 2005.

Table F.2 Gross Intake Rate in primary education (National), 1998 to 2005

| Years | Total Grade 1 intake | Total | Male | Female | Gender Gap | Gender Parity Index (GPI) |
|-------|----------------------|-------|------|--------|------------|---------------------------|
| 1998 | 3,255,098 | 87 | 98 | 75 | 23 | 0.77 |
| 1999 | 2,213,633 | 93 | 105 | 81 | 24 | 0.77 |
| 2000 | 2,398,693 | 65 | 74 | 56 | 18 | 0.76 |
| 2001 | 3,038,561 | 80 | 91 | 68 | 23 | 0.75 |
| 2002 | 4,988,441 | 128 | 141 | 115 | 26 | 0.82 |
| 2003 | 5,029,294 | 126 | 137 | 114 | 23 | 0.83 |
| 2004 | 4,388,645 | 108 | 116 | 99 | 17 | 0.85 |
| 2005 | 4,438,205 | 107 | 115 | 98 | 17 | 0.85 |

Source: EDB/EMIS DIVISION FME, Abuja

⁷³ FME, "Nigeria Education Sector Diagnosis, May 2006, p. 37⁷⁴ FME, "Nigeria Education Sector Diagnosis, May 2006, p. 51

Table F.3 presents the primary level gross enrolment rate between 1998 and 2005. In absolute terms, enrolment increased overall during this period by 37% from 16,045,567 pupils in 1998 to 22,044,792 in 2005. However, the annual reported variations are extreme. The drop in enrolment to 10,591,247 in 1999 reflects a decrease in participation of 5,454,328 pupils. Enrolment then increased to 11,450,262 in 2000 and continued in an upward trend till it peaked at 22,675,040 in 2003, then decreased to 21,140,282 in 2004 and again increased to 22,044,792 pupils in 2005. Putting these enrolment data together with population estimates indicates that the GER was 76% in 1998, varied considerably over the following years and was 95% in 2005. The same trend was observed for both male and female categories but with lower rates for females all through the period under review.

Table F.3 GER in primary education (national) from 1998 to 2005

| Years | Total Enrolment | Total | Male | Female | Gender Gap | Gender Parity Index |
|-------|-----------------|-------|------|--------|------------|---------------------|
| 1998 | 16,045,567 | 76 | 85 | 66 | 19 | 0.78 |
| 1999 | 10,591,247 | 92 | 98 | 85 | 13 | 0.87 |
| 2000 | 11,450,262 | 57 | 66 | 48 | 16 | 0.72 |
| 2001 | 13,163,034 | 63 | 72 | 54 | 18 | 0.75 |
| 2002 | 18,210,575 | 85 | 93 | 77 | 16 | 0.83 |
| 2003 | 22,675,040 | 102 | 113 | 92 | 21 | 0.81 |
| 2004 | 21,140,282 | 93 | 101 | 85 | 16 | 0.84 |
| 2005 | 22,044,792 | 95 | 103 | 86 | 17 | 0.83 |

Source: EDB/EMIS DIVISION FME, Abuja

Annex G - Analytical Summary Matrix

SUMMARY – Nigeria

Context: *What is the situation in country within the education sector (level zero)?*

Despite the 2004 Universal Basic Education Act Nigeria is not on track to meet the UPC or EFA objectives. A 2006-7 presidential commission on education reported that the sector was in crisis and a major renewal of all systems and institutions was required. Lack of up to date and reliable data makes it very difficult to assess how close Nigeria is to reaching the EFA goals. The 2005 school census suggests a national primary GER of 95%, with a net enrolment rate of 63% (68% for boys and 59% for girls). Household surveys suggest net enrolment is at 60% (DHS) or 46% (NLSS). There is significant variation across the country, with lower levels of participation in school in the north. The 2009 EFA GMR suggests that Nigeria has more primary age children out of school than any other country. Inequitable access is a problem; gender, religion and geography all seem to influence children's access to primary schooling. The gender gap is the widest amongst the poorest and amongst children in rural areas. Issues of gender disparity are being addressed through the FME's policy on gender in basic education. Programmes focused on girls in northern states aim to increase enrolment in these areas.

The National Framework for Education in Nigeria has a set of policies and targets that encompass the EFA goals and are consistent with the strategies of FTI. A national EFA plan was published in 2007 and there is an EFA unit within the FME responsible for coordinating with state level EFA offices. There have been some significant changes in education financing since 1999, the Education Trust Fund and the UBE Intervention Fund were both introduced in 2005. Following debt relief negotiations in 2006 the Virtual Poverty Fund (VPF) was introduced. However, there is a big problem with fund disbursement: USD150million allocated by ETF have not been disbursed and of the N95billion (USD630million) allocated to the UBE fund between 2005 and March 2008 only N43billion has been disbursed to states. In terms of data collection between 2000 and 2003 three national surveys of schools took place but there have been no such surveys since. With no compulsion on state governments to regularly supply information it is difficult to see how regular monitoring could be undertaken. There has been considerable support by donors to EMIS since 2003 however there is no government/ donor review or detailed monitoring process. There is no shortage of plans in Nigeria but implementation at state level is patchy and depends largely upon the vision and motivation of the state governor.

External Inputs: *What external inputs have there been into the education sector? To what extent did these inputs focus on UPC?*

Nigeria is not endorsed by FTI and formal engagement with the FTI has been limited to an initial invitation to the Federal Government in 2003. Nigeria did however between 1999-2005 receive funding from Norwegian Education Trust Fund (NETF), USD1,247,000, the largest amount made available to any country during this period. In addition some EPDF funds were used, by a World Bank staff member to visit Nigeria and informally review three state's education sector plans. Over the last couple of months the World Bank has organised two meetings to bring together Federal and State officials, education donors and civil society to start a process by which a small number of states could join FTI in 2010 and access EPDF funds to fund the development of costed education sector plans. Apart from debt relief external aid to Nigeria has been relatively insignificant (around 2% of total government expenditure). Since 1999 the major donors have been IDA and the UK (together providing 73%) followed by the United States, Germany, France and Japan (together providing 19%). Since 1999 almost half of the aid for the education sector has focused on basic education.

Annex G: Analytical Summary Matrix

| SUMMARY – Nigeria | | |
|---|---|---|
| Relevance - Were the objectives of external inputs relevant (Federal and state level)? Was their design appropriate? | Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes of inputs: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? | |
| | Effectiveness – To what extent have external input contributed to improving education sector policies, planning, data, budgeting, level of finance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation and aid effectiveness (Federal and state level)? | Efficiency - How economically are current inputs turned into results (Federal and state level)? |
| <p>External inputs have been relevant and overall have focused efforts on basic education. However, they are limited (2% of total government expenditure) as a result donors do not have the influence or voice that they may be used to having elsewhere. Close working with Federal and state government is difficult and lacks formal structure. Therefore there was a disconnect in some areas between donor programming and government planning.</p> | <p>There has been increased interaction with civil society at Federal level and this has had a positive impact upon education sector policies.</p> <p>External inputs are increasingly focusing on improving planning, data and budgeting however external aid provides an insignificant amount of funding for it to be truly effective in influencing national indicators.</p> <p>Although there are attempts at aligning aid, e.g., the Country Partnership Strategy between DFID and the World Bank. Most aid is still delivered through traditional single-donors project orientated activities. However, where donors have engaged directly with particular state governments, with perhaps less focus on the donor-Federal government relationship there has been some progress.</p> <p>Total government expenditure on education is around 5% of GDP, although there was talk amongst some senior decision makers of increasing the allocation to education this has not yet happened.</p> <p>Access to key data seems to have got worse; the national survey has not taken place since 2003 and that planned for 2009 is now not expected to happen.</p> <p>Capacity development is much needed but lacks any overarching strategy or set of plans in the education sector. NIEPA is not fulfilling its mandate to train education planners and managers and no alternative has been found.</p> | <p>There were complaints that money accessed at state level is not always spent efficiently. Problems raised were poor quality infrastructure, due fraud resulting in not enough money being left for the building. Lack of prioritisation of education at state level leads to the matching funds not being allocated which means that drawing down UBEC funds is impossible or endlessly delayed.</p> <p>External inputs also suffer from the lack of capacity at all levels, although some efforts are being made to build capacity in government and civil society.</p> <p>HIV/AIDS is likely to further undermine the efficiency of the education sector, although this is recognised by the Federal Government there does not seem to be a sufficient level of urgency.</p> |

SUMMARY – Nigeria**Outcomes:** What is the status of the quantity, quality, access and sustainability of primary education?

Sustainability is limited as the extent of reform within the primary education is shallow. However, there is growing demand for primary education and civil society is becoming more organised and mobilising more effectively. This demand for access and quality has been shown to impact government policy in the area of girls' education and it is this that is likely to have positive effects on both the availability and the sustainability of primary education provision.

Improvements in learning outcomes are recognised as essential but have not yet been an outcome.

FTI prospects: Are the objectives and approach of FTI relevant to the priorities within the education sector and the country as a whole?

The approach used by FTI would need to be modified to fit the Nigerian context where the implementation of education sector plans is focused at state level. It is not clear that there has been much thinking within the FTI about how FTI could be adapted to work in federal states. Nigeria does not currently have a credible, costed sector plan developed in line with the Indicative Framework and there are questions as to whether such a plan at Federal level would be relevant.

Given the large numbers of children out of school, low per capita incomes and the low level of aid per capita additional external support would be very relevant for Nigeria. There is no doubt that Nigeria has a funding gap, however Nigeria also has her own "catalytic funds" through the UBE Intervention Fund and this is not being fully accessed by the States at present. Lessons need to be learnt as to why this funding is not being disbursed before an additional funding sources is added.

In principle FTI could help to build capacity at Federal and state levels. However, in order to be effective such assistance would need to be well targeted to states which demonstrate commitment to reform and are willing to also use their own resources. The capacity of in country donors to support the FTI process and monitor the spending of funds would also be an issue that would need investigation.

If the FTI is looking to endorse Nigeria it is recommended that the Secretariat and local education donors commission a feasibility study to look at the options for addressing the challenges that would arise.

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning**Context:** *What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to policy and planning?*

There is a costed Federal Ministry of Education ESP (2007) and costed ESPs for Kaduna, Kano and Kwara States produced in 2007. The Federal ESP covers only the direct responsibilities of the FME and does not therefore cover basic education which is the responsibility of state and local government. The Kaduna, Kwara and Kano ESPs have been officially adopted as state plans and in Kano and Kwara the ESPs have informed the 2009 education budgets. They are also the basis for the development of Medium Term Sector Strategies (MTSS). A number of other states have un-costed/non-endorsed ESPs which do not currently inform planning and budgeting for basic education. How comprehensive are the education sector plans? To what extent do they guide priority setting?

The Federal and state UBE Laws make statutory provision for nine years of free and compulsory basic education and to achieve the EFA Goals. The UBE Intervention Fund, constituting 2% of Consolidated Federal Account revenues, is available on a matching grant basis to states to support basic education, 5% of which is earmarked for ECCE. The National Education Policy recognises the importance of non-formal and adult literacy education and a National Mass Literacy Commission, Adult and Non Formal Education is tasked with providing services for the estimated 52 million illiterate Nigerians. What strategies are in place for ensuring EFA and achieving UPC? What have been the key political and policy decisions related to EFA and UPC? Nigeria established an office for EFA under the Presidency in 2003 and a national EFA plan was published in 2007. At Federal level the EFA office is now located within the Department for Basic and Secondary Education in the FME and at state Level there are EFA offices located within the state Ministries of Education. However at state level funding for EFA is limited and the effectiveness of the units highly constrained. In reality they are playing a limited role in the drive towards UPC.

Official policy recognises the importance of equal access for boys and girls however there are gross disparities in girls' enrolment in many northern states and indications of early drop out of boys across the south of the country. Poverty continues to present a significant barrier to UPC. An HIV/AIDS awareness syllabus is incorporated into the basic education curriculum however there is a lack of sufficient and appropriate instructional materials and teacher training to successfully deliver this curriculum. Apart from the KKK states there is little evidence of strategic planning and appropriate budgeting to address these challenges. Planning and budgeting is limited in the main to government officials at both Federal and state levels. In the states visited civil society plays little or no role on the planning process.

External Inputs: *What external inputs have there been? What problems were identified and how did it address them?*

Under the World Bank/DFID Joint Country Partnership Strategy state Public Expenditure Reviews were undertaken in 2007 and a synthesis PER presented by the Federal Minister in Education in 2008. This has had limited impact upon education policy and planning. State Education Sector Reviews are planned from 2009 onwards but to date none have taken place.

-DFID funded technical assistance has:

-Supported the FME to produce a costed Federal Ministry of Education 10-Year Education Sector Plan

- Supported Kaduna, Kano and Kwara states to prepare costed ESPs under the CUBE project

Supported 6 Girls' Education Project states in the north of the country to develop draft ESPs. Have there been any inputs directly or indirectly linked to the FTI?

-Studies conducted as part of the ESA project (2001-5) were financed with support from the Norwegian Education Trust Fund

-An informal presentation on FTI was made at the World Bank SESP project launch in Kwara State in May 2008 funded through EPDF

-In June 2009, following the country mission, a meeting involving representatives from 26 states, FME and UBEC and from civil society represented by Action Aid Nigeria and CSACEFA took place. WB, DFID, USAID, JICA, UNDP were present and an extensive presentation about the EFA-FTI was made. However no formal contact has yet taken place between the FTI Secretariat and the GoN.

| STREAM 1: Policy and Planning | | |
|---|--|---|
| Relevance – How relevant have external inputs to strengthen policy and planning been)? | Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery) | |
| | Effectiveness – To what extent did inputs in the education sector contribute to developing quality education plans encompassing UPC target? | Efficiency - How economically have inputs into Federal and state level policy and planning translated into results? |
| <p>Were the objectives of support to policy and planning in the sector relevant to the priorities of the sector and of the country? Support provided during the ESA period (2001-5) and subsequently under the DFID-funded CUBE project has aimed to provide strategic assistance for developing 10-year plans in accordance with official government policy on education. Was the manner in which the support was provided appropriate to the needs and the context? The limited support for sector planning and budgeting has been heavily dependent upon inputs from external consultants, in part due to weak capacity within the ministries concerned.</p> | <p>It is difficult to identify long-term, sustainable improvements in education policy or planning as a result of external inputs. This reflects the frequent changes in political leadership and the consequent lack of continuity around policy priorities. External inputs funded by Development Partners are project focused and in line with over-arching national policy objectives. However, education policy in Nigeria changes frequently and government led activities in the sector reflect these frequent changes.</p> <p>There is limited formal stakeholder participation outside of the JCCE/NCE process. Civil Society is represented by various organisations of which the Civil Society Action Coalition on Education for All (CSACEFA) is the largest and most representative nationally,</p> <p>There are adequate policies in place to address equity and HIV/AIDS issues however limited follow through in terms of planning, budgeting and implementation. Exclusion, especially for girls in the north of the country, remains a major challenge. Large numbers of “Al Majiri” children in the north are excluded from formal education for which there is yet to be a credible policy response.</p> | <p>There is little evidence to suggest that externally funded policy inputs have yet led to more efficient policy and planning at either Federal or state levels.</p> <p>External assistance has helped to significantly improve the quality and credibility of education sector plans; however these inputs have been heavily focused on the production of plans rather than building the capacity of government officials to do so. The impact of external assistance on the planning process is yet to be measured and coverage is limited to the 5 ESSPIN states and 4 GEP-II states.</p> |

STREAM 1: Policy and Planning

Sustainability: *Are the changes that have taken place in policy and planning since 1999 likely to survive (Federal and state level)? How resilient are the benefits to risks?*

External assistance plays a minimal role in policy and planning of education in Nigeria. Furthermore, external inputs to support policy development since 1999 are only as durable as the policies that they have helped to develop. Frequent changes of personnel and policies undermine the quality and impact of education sector policy and planning.

At various times since 1999 at Federal level and in individual states there have been examples of good leadership in respect of education sector policy and planning. However continuous changes of leadership at both Federal and state levels, the top-down nature of policy and planning in the country and the perceived lack of commitment to allocate sufficient available resources to education makes it difficult to identify any meaningful long-term or sustainable improvement

There is no overarching education planning process in Nigeria as responsibility for basic education lies concurrently with Federal, state and Local governments. At the Federal level the government makes provision through the UBE Intervention Fund for 2% of consolidated government revenue to support basic education in the states. Each state plans and budgets for basic education provision according to its own policy and budgetary priorities within the overall framework of the UBE Law. Central government is attempting to get states to produce sector specific medium term rolling plans (MTSS), however there is no legal requirement on states to do this and limited uptake. Within states local level education planning is virtually non-existent with the role of local government mostly constrained to the employment of teachers with limited resources for other activities.

Risks include:

Any interventions in the education policy and planning process are subject to the risk that political support may not be sustained. Furthermore, with different donors targeting their support at different states, with weak donor coordination and the absence of commonly agreed planning processes, there is a significant risk to the sustainability of any interventions in this area.

FTI prospects: In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing the policy/planning gap (at Federal or state/provincial level) in the future? The FTI provides a policy and planning framework that could help in the development of a more coherent and cohesive planning environment at both Federal and state levels. In particular, if EPDF were mobilised to strengthen capacity at the Federal level within either the FME or UBEC to support states to develop costed sector plans this could make a significant contribution to building capacity and strengthening the sustainability of policy and planning across the country. In particular if it were to prove possible to link the disbursement of the UBE Intervention Fund to the production of approved, costed state education plans this might play a significant part in addressing the policy and planning gap. However for this to happen a change in legislation would be required. Given the high levels of autonomy enjoyed by states and a history of states resisting efforts by the Federal government to impose processes upon them such a course of action must be viewed as unlikely to succeed in the short to medium term.

STREAM 2: Finance**Context:** *What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to education finance?*

The lack of data on state and local governments' public expenditures for primary education is a major problem in Nigeria. Best estimates of total public expenditures are based on data collected in just 9 of the 36 states. On the bases of these, total expenditures are estimated to be 5% of GDP, with just less than one third being used for primary education. Local governments are responsible for teachers' salaries and contribute around 84% of all expenditures with the remainder shared equally between the Federal and state governments. Shares of total expenditure spent on education varies widely across states and local governments. In some states the levels of expenditure are likely to be sufficient to meet UPC and other EFA goals but in others they are not. External financing of primary education is insignificant at less than 2% of the total.

Because of the important data problems, major national education plans have not been costed. For a small number of states (3?), attempts have been made by consultants to cost education sector plans – gaps in information on expenditures, enrolments and population size impede these estimates.

The PFM system is not very strong. Since 2003, the Federal government has implemented some partial reforms but the states in general are reported as lacking behind in these. The DFID/World Bank education sector public expenditure review (2008) concluded that budget processes are weak in the education sector.

Inputs: *What external inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?*

External inputs to the education sector have not been directed towards support in these areas. DFID has some programmes in a few states which aim to improve PFM in general.

The first (post 1999) attempt by the Federal government to plan for education was around the 'Education Sector Analysis' (ESA) which was initially supported by UNESCO (Japanese trust funds) including through some financial projections training. One activity linked to ESA was the re-activation of the annual school census from 2003, which was initially supported by USAID and the World Bank. Beyond this, the Federal government has not sought support for its own planning efforts but donors have supported planning efforts, including costings, in some states

Only the World Bank has provided investment funds. DFID, the other major donor, and USAID have mainly provided technical assistance. In all, financial support is too low to say that it supplements domestic financing, though in the three states covered by the current World Bank project (supplemented by DFID support) it is less marginal.

Annex G: Analytical Summary Matrix

| STREAM 2: Finance | | |
|---|--|---|
| Relevance - Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to education finance)? | Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery) | |
| | Effectiveness – To what extent have inputs into the education sector contributed to a stronger education budget process? And to an increase in total funds for primary education? | Efficiency - How economically has donor support to country level finance for education translated into results? |
| <p>Were the objectives of external support for education finance aligned with the country's overall development strategy and education sector strategy (if one was in place before FTI)? The Federal government has supported the EFA goals and the MDGs in its overall development strategies since 1999. A detailed national education strategy has proved more difficult to develop but the EFA goals are referred to constantly as an objective. DAC statistics imply that around half of total aid to education has been for the primary sector – this is a higher share than the share of total domestic education expenditure devoted to primary education. Were the externally supported finance activities appropriate (likely to meet the objectives) given the context? External finance for primary education has taken two forms over the past few years – investment lending by the World Bank, increasingly focused on a few states and TA/capacity development support such as that provided by DFID and USAID. World Bank projects to 2006 were not rated as satisfactory (by the institution itself) in terms of their development outcomes. It is also not clear that advisory activities - such as the public expenditure review - have had a major impact.</p> | <p>There is no evidence that external funds have been catalytic in increasing domestic expenditures. While Federal government education expenditure has increased in real terms since 1999, the public expenditure review concluded that state expenditures had fallen in real terms.</p> <p>No plausible funding gap has been calculated. If it is the case that state government education expenditures have been decreasing in real terms then it is unlikely that the 'gap' will be closing.</p> | <p>There has been limited support for improved financial planning beyond the public expenditure review and support for state plans. State official stress that the plans are having an effect on the budget (not necessarily budget process) but evidence is limited.</p> <p>External aid does not flow through government budgets. In some cases, disbursements are handled by consulting firms, in others through special accounts, and in others through grants to implementing organisations. The first World Bank project in the relevant time period disbursed 97% of its funds, the second 64% before it was prematurely closed.</p> <p>The funding of teacher salaries is essentially a first charge on federation account source of income for local governments and is relatively strongly predictable. State government and Federal government expenditures on education are not predictable in the medium term. The education public expenditure review showed that non salary budgeted expenditures often differed significantly from actual expenditures. However, the new UBE Intervention Fund (2% of Federal Consolidated Fund) does provide some medium term predictability. Overall however, government revenue in Nigeria is highly dependent on the price and volume of oil, and of any fiscal stabilisation measures which the Federal government is able to implement.</p> |

STREAM 2: Finance

Sustainability: *Are any improvements that took place in the education budget process and the level of finance for primary education likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?*

It is not clear that there have been recent improvements in the education budget process.

As noted above, the possibility of increases in domestic financing for education depend to a significant extent on the revenues of the federation account and the price and volume of oil. The prospects are favourable. In addition, the wide variations in the share of state and local government expenditures allocated to primary education suggest that there is the potential for expansion in many states.

It appears likely that the World Bank would be willing to increase lending. In the near future if sufficient commitment from state governments can be assured.

Risks include: It is not clear that any improvements in the budget process for primary education in the states has occurred in recent years. However, the major change over the 1990s of regular teacher salary payments appears to have been sustained and not at risk. Similarly the new UBE IF, funded by the Federal government is not at risk – though the lack of its utilisation constitutes a risk to its effectiveness. Risks to further World Bank support for primary education would arise if the current project for three states and the newly negotiated one for Lagos state are not effectively implemented; and if states are not prepared to make the commitments to policies and targets required.

FTI prospects:

External aid is, and is always likely to be, a very marginal source of finance for primary education for governments in Nigeria. Even very substantial multiples of aid would have little impact on the gap between the current level of funding (whatever that is) and the amount required (nationally) to provide all children with a quality education in a conducive learning environment. For individual states, the situation may be slightly different, in principle.

The coverage of primary education across individual states varies significantly. And so does the financial effort being made by state governments. Unfortunately, the relative effort being made in the most educationally backward states tends to be lower than in other states. In individual states, where coverage is currently low, the financing gap is unlikely to be significantly reduced by external support. Only if such support could be augmented by both Federal grants and higher spending by the states would the gap be reduced. A large majority of those interviewed in the country visit argued that additional financial resources to directly fund education inputs was not a priority for donor programmes to the education sector. Support for a wide variety of capacity development efforts were seen to be more relevant. The experiences in the three states which receive World Bank investment support and are also receiving significant amounts of TA from DFID's programme will be important for judging the feasibility and effectiveness of further external support.

STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation [NB all questions should be considered at federal and at state/province level]**Context:** *What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to data and M&E? Is quality data used to monitor the needs of the education strategies?*

Problems in collecting, collating and analysing education sector data in Nigeria are significant. The process of administering the annual school census was resurrected in 2003 and the latest available figures are for 2005. There is widespread opinion within Nigeria that the primary enrolment data, in particular – and hence the student flow and completion indicators rates – are unreliable. Data were also collected in 2006 and 2007 but have not yet been released. Household survey data provide some alternative sources of data on enrolment and attainment. Aspects of the public expenditure data are similarly unreliable and best estimates of national education expenditures and their distribution and composition are based on records of 9 (out of 36) states. Some states which have recognised the need for accurate school data for planning purposes are implementing initiatives outside of the national EMIS.

The national EMIS is the monitoring tool in place (see above). School achievement surveys were undertaken in 1996 and 2003 (UNESCO/UNICEF) and by UPEC in 2001 and 2003. Interviews in some of the state visits described the existence of a school inspection system but could not be confirmed.

No evidence was gathered from interviews that the EMIS processes are directly linked to key moments in educational planning. Available data are used in more ad hoc ways when the need is seen to arise.

At the Federal level data are used during the formulation of major policy statements. The Federal government's UBE IF allows equal access to funds by all states, and is not enrolment driven. At the state level, the impression gained is that when precise data are required – e.g. for a textbook distribution policy – the government makes a specific effort to obtain them and does not rely on the data forwarded to the Federal government for the national EMIS

None of the FIT Indicative Framework indicators are being monitored explicitly.

Inputs: *What external inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?*

- Activities to strengthen the scope and processes of data (e.g. setting up/strengthening EMIS) Both the World Bank and USAID provided support for the resurrection of the EMIS in 2003. DFID, through the CUBE project, provided sustained TA support to the federal government for the EMIS from 2004 to 2008. The World Bank and USAID have supported household surveys – e.g. DHS, NLSS, CWIQ over the past decade.
- Activities to strengthen monitoring & evaluation processes (e.g. Joint Annual Reviews, commissioning of key studies) The World Bank supported studies on education finance, institutional analysis, and teachers across several states 2002-2004 resulting in a Bank Country Status report (World Bank, 2004). DFID and the World Bank promoted a more comprehensive public expenditure review of the education sector 2006-08.
- Activities to improve linkages between the data and monitoring & evaluation processes and the planning processes in the sector. The public expenditure review and the state education sector analyses and plans have discussed the need for such improvements but themselves have not influenced them. UNESCO through IIEP have attempted to highlight these issues.
- Activities to ensure data and monitoring & evaluation processes included key cross-cutting issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, equity and exclusion) The Girls Education Project (DFID, UNICEF) includes monitoring and evaluation activators. Household surveys, supported by donors, provide data on exclusion.
- Activities to ensure inclusion of the IF indicators in the endorsed plan and in mechanisms for subsequent monitoring of its implementation. Not applicable – no preparation of a plan to be endorsed through FTI.

Which if any of these inputs were directly or indirectly linked to the FTI? None.

FTI Mid-Term Evaluation – Nigeria Case Study

| STREAM 3: Data and Monitoring & Evaluation [NB all questions should be considered at federal and at state/province level] | | |
|--|--|---|
| Relevance - Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to data and M&E needs? | Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery) | |
| | Effectiveness – To what extent did inputs contribute to improved collection of data and better information services? To what extent is data being used to inform policy and funding? | Efficiency - How economically was support to country data and M&E translated into results? |
| <p>Were the objectives of support to data and monitoring in the sector relevant to the priorities of the sector and of the country? This objective was highly relevant to sector and country priorities</p> <p>Was the manner in which the support was provided appropriate to the needs and the context? Given the overall small size of the aid programme support for a dedicated EMIS specialist working at the Federal level for over 3 years was appropriate. (Comment separately on any FTI inputs)</p> | <p>The data from the 2005 school census is generally judged to be more accurate than those from the censuses of the previous two years and before that no data had been collected for several years. No data more recent than 2005 have been published. In those states in which education sector analyses and plans have been prepared, data have been disseminated more widely than in the past but state based interviews indicated that access to them is very limited. LEA officers complain that there is no feedback on the data collected.</p> <p>Is data being better used to inform policy making, planning processes and funding decisions? Minimal change – see Context</p> <p>There is some evidence that some individual decisions are informed by data, but not consistently.</p> <p>No FTI contribution so far. For future possibilities, see 'FTI prospects' below.</p> | <p>Systems at each level of government do not appear to be efficient in collecting and managing education data and they are not widely used for performance monitoring.</p> |
| <p>Sustainability: Are the changes that took place data and M&E management likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</p> | | |
| <p>The prospects for sustainability are not good. Incentives for improvement at most levels of the data collection, collation, analysis and reporting are small. At the state level, prospects might improve if improved processes were required, in some ways, for donor support of if Ministries of Finance were determined to require medium term sector strategies for budget determination.</p> <p>The small improvements may be durable – processes have been learned and equipment has been procured at the federal levels and those states which are recipients of donor support from the World Bank and DFID in particular have had some sensitisation to the importance and use of quality data. In addition, it is not clear to what extent some states have data sets separate from those which are submitted to the federal level, for their own use.</p> | | |
| <p>FTI prospects: In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing data gaps (at federal or state/provincial level) in the future? The FTI indicative framework could not be fully prepared for Nigeria at the moment. Too few reliable education and public expenditure data are available. The same conclusion applies to most states, with perhaps just one or two exceptions. It is possible, in principle that in an individual state, the search for FTI endorsement might galvanize the government to improve the data base but even in those states which have been through the process of having had an education sector analysis and plan prepared basic variables such as the net enrolment rate varies across the different sources of data. In a situation where reliable data is likely to remain a problem in the medium term, an assessment would need to be made by the donors of what would be acceptable</p> | | |

STREAM 4: Capacity

Context: *What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to capacity? To what extent was the capacity in the education sector adequate for EFA and UPC targets?*

There is weak institutional, organisational and individual capacity at all levels of the education sector. Complex institutional relationships at both Federal and state levels provide for a lack of clarity and transparency around the governance and management of the education sector. State Ministries of Education, SUBEBs and Local Government Education Authorities all lack sufficient basic adequate administrative resources and sufficient, trained staff to fulfil their responsibilities. Colleges of education are not producing graduates with sufficient skills and there are grave concerns about the poor quality of teaching and learning particularly in primary schools. Leadership and management by head teachers and principals is weak as is monitoring and quality assurance by local school supervisors and inspectors. Learning outcomes are amongst the poorest in Africa.

Whilst effective policies for achieving UPC are in place at Federal and state levels, weak planning and budgeting, poor financial management and procurement practices and little oversight or accountability means that policy implementation is largely ineffective. Demographic pressures and increased demand for primary and junior secondary education place a strain on already dilapidated schools, most of which lack proper water and sanitation facilities and many of which lack adequate classrooms and furniture. Teacher deployment is inequitable with significant differences in teacher: pupil ratios between rural and urban areas. There continue to be large numbers of under or unqualified teachers particularly in the north of the country and evidence to suggest many teachers themselves lack core, basic skills and this militates against effective teaching and learning classrooms. Those programmes of CD in place are focused primarily on pedagogy and curriculum delivery. They do not cover cross-cutting issues.

The Federal Ministry of Education is utilising debt relief funds to run programmes of professional development for teachers and the third cohort of 100,000+ teachers will participate in this training in 2009. In those states visited there was no evidence of any systematic plan for capacity development for teachers or education sector officials. None of the states visited were making use of the services of NIEPA. As noted above the Federal Ministry of Education is using finance from the Virtual Poverty Fund the fund a primary teacher upgrading scheme, At state level there is little evidence that the 15% of UBE Intervention Funds earmarked for capacity development are being fully accessed to develop and implement comprehensive capacity development programmes for teachers. States visited appear not to be utilising available resources to send education administrators to the National Institute for Education Planning and Administration (NIEPA).

There is no evidence of systematic monitoring of capacity development within the basic education sub-sector.

Inputs: *What external inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?*

How have external inputs contributed to: Mention the Norwegian Trust Funds?

DFID and more recently UNICEF have supported capacity development of NIEPA so that it in turn can provide training to education planners and managers. Three Nigerian government officials have attended training at IIEEP Paris over the last 10 years. DFID, USAID, UNICEF and WB funded projects and programmes in selected states have variously funded capacity development for planning and budgeting, EMIS, quality assurance and teacher development and continue to do so. These interventions have been project specific and are not directly related to a sector wide strategy for capacity development as such strategies have not until recently existed. Recent interventions by the DFID-funded ESSPIN programme are seeking to support programme states to establish comprehensive capacity development programmes designed to strengthen the delivery of state education sector plans,

The 2004 World Bank study on the Capacity of the Nigerian Government to deliver Basic Education provided a comprehensive analysis of the capacity constraints within the sub-sector. Further consolidation of core findings were reflected in the Institutional assessment studies carried by the CUBE project in 2006-7 that have informed the design of capacity development components of the World Bank funded state Education Sector Project in Kaduna, Kano and Kwara States. Work undertaken through the DFID funded state and Local Government project (SLGP) and its successor SPARC seeks to identify mechanisms for reform and strengthening of the civil service in states.

What FTI-specific inputs have there been?

NETF financed support for conducting 39 studies under the ESA project (2003-2005). There is no record of access to EPDF finances in Nigeria for the period 2005-7. A small amount of EPDF financing was used to pay for a WB staffer to visit Nigeria in 2008 and make an informal presentation about FTI at the official launch of the World Bank state Education Sector project (SESP).

There is currently no further evidence available of any further interventions that may be linked to FTI.

| STREAM 4: Capacity | | |
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| Relevance - Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to capacity development needs (Federal and state level)? | Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery) | |
| | Effectiveness – To what extent did donor inputs contribute to implementation of measures to strengthen capacity? To what extent was quality capacity created to implement policy and services (Federal and State level)? | Efficiency - How economically has support to country level capacity building been translated into results (Federal and state level)? |
| <p>External provision for capacity development has been extremely limited, as detailed above, and for the most part focused on specific project related training. In so far as project objectives have been aligned to national sector priorities, externally funded capacity development has been relevant. There has been extensive external assistance (DFID, USAID, WB, and UNICEF) for the development a National EMIS that has been properly aligned with government systems. However the weakness of government commitment and systems has undermined these efforts.</p> <p>There have been no FTI related inputs.</p> | <p>As detailed above, donor inputs for capacity development have been primarily focused on project specific activities at state level. At Federal level donor assistance for developing the NEMIS has been effectively coordinated. At state level, weak donor coordination and donor assistance for different states In 2005 DFID and WB signed a joint country partnership strategy to coordinate assistance to the education sector. This has contributed to capacity development plans for the SESP and ESSPIN states. Currently negotiations are underway for the next CPS and it is anticipated that other donors will either join (ADB) or acquire observer status (USAID, JICA). Beyond the CPS, there is currently no comprehensive overarching technical assistance plan for the sector following the country study visit a meeting between Federal institutions, state and donors has taken place to initiate such discussions.</p> <p>There is weak capacity for effective planning, management and delivery of basic education at all levels. The scale and scope of donor assistance for the education sector is limited and it has played only a very limited role in developing capacity in the sector. Periodic studies of capacity in the education sector have been produced with donor assistance. The last major study was published by the WB in 2004. There is no systematic on-going monitoring of a capacity across the sector.</p> | <p>There is widespread acknowledgement within the education sector in Nigeria of the need to strengthen capacity in all areas. Donor assistance for capacity development at the Federal/national level has focused on building capacity for EMIS and in strengthening NIEPA. Despite considerable investment of resources the NEMIS is still ineffective in producing timely and accurate information that can be used to inform policy and planning decisions.</p> <p>Investment to strengthen capacity at NIEPA has led to the involvement of staff in supporting GEP states undertake sector planning and the development of plans to open centres in each of the six geo-political zones. A bill to formally establish NIEPA as a parastatal and secure financing for the organisation is currently going through the final approval stages in the Senate.</p> <p>At state level donor assistance has helped to highlight specific gaps in capacity and, with support from the WB funded SESP and DFID funded CUBE and ESSPIN programmes, states have developed plans for strengthening capacity at all levels. In the ESSPIN supported states restructuring of colleges of education is underway with a view to strengthening the quality of teacher training.</p> <p>Whilst it is too early to evaluate the economic benefits of these initiatives there are some promising signs that a number of years of work may be finally bearing fruit.</p> |
| <p>Sustainability: Are any improvements in capacity likely to survive? How resilient are the benefits to risks?</p> | | |
| <p>Given a history of frequent changes in leadership within the sector it is difficult to assess the real durability of achievements in addressing the capacity gap. The FME is demonstrating a commitment to utilise available resources for capacity development and there is also evidence of a small number of states accessing donor assistance to address the capacity gap. However there is a large number of states that are yet to do so. Given the limited capacity of FME and donors to provide support to all states in the Federation, there are risks that some states may be left behind whilst other states move forward. Other significant risks are the uncertainty of political commitment at state level, the relatively low levels of teacher pay, and the low regard for teaching as a profession, all of which militate against the creation of an effective cadre of education officials and a high quality teaching force.</p> | | |
| <p>FTI prospects: FTI could in theory play a role in helping to build capacity at the Federal level, particularly in the areas of planning and budgeting, EMIS and quality assurance – as these are the core responsibilities of Federal institutions in the basic education sub-sector. At state level there are capacity gaps at all levels of the system and the challenges of addressing these are enormous whilst external funds are limited. Therefore any donor assistance to address the capacity gap would have to be (i) well targeted to those states with a real and demonstrated commitment to use its own resources to support capacity development; (ii) focus on helping states to design appropriate and sustainable programmes of capacity development for education administrators; and (iii) emphasize building the capacity of teachers to teach core skills effectively so as to provide pupils with essential learning skills.</p> | | |

STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness

Context: *What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to aid effectiveness? To what extent is aid for education efficiently & effectively provided?*

Again important to note that the number of donors to primary education is small and the total level of aid relatively very small. The dominant modalities are individual conventional investment projects (World Bank) TA and capacity building delivered through consulting firms (DFID and USAID) and grants to organisations (DFID, JICA).

An education sector donor group meets fairly frequently currently chaired by UNESCO and USAID. This is mainly concerned with information sharing. There is no mechanism in place for government-donor dialogue in the sector. The pattern is that meetings have been requested from time to time by donors and these have or have not been agreed to.

At least partly because Nigeria, in general, receives very little aid per capita and because the state governments have constitutional responsibility for implementing many development programmes, the Paris agenda of aid effectiveness does not appear to be given high priority (at the sector level) by the Federal government. The overall joint Country Partner Strategy negotiated with the World Bank and DFID is an exception to this.

Processes to improve aid effectiveness in the education sector are linked to other processes going on in the country to the extent that efforts by the World Bank and DFID to strengthen the reform process in PFM at the federal level and in those states in which they have education programs will be successful in strengthening government systems which could then be used by donors.

Inputs: *What inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?*

How have donor inputs aimed to improve aid effectiveness:

-Harmonization of mechanisms across the education sector; an education sector donor group has existed since 2002 – currently chaired by UNICEF and USAID and with World Bank, DFID, UNESCO, JICA and the AfDB. Essentially the focus is on information sharing. Attempts have been made to link World Bank project inputs and DFID TA inputs in particular states. There are initial problems but some signs of increasing effectiveness. Joint donor ‘position papers’ have been produced over time but government has shown little interest. There have been a limited number of joint review processes.

-Harmonization of financing mechanisms. None.

-Predictability and accountability of funds. DFID has just begun a new six year project and the World Bank, USAID and JICA have signalled that new projects and additional funding could be made available in the near term. Overall, the joint World Bank and DFID Country Strategy Paper outlines a long term commitment to Nigeria, and specified broad areas for which support could be provided.

-Use of government planning, financial, disbursement, reporting, and monitoring & evaluation systems. Very little use of government systems is made by donors, except in terms of monitoring the VPF. DFID’s current suite of new programmes emphasise this. The state education sector plans which have been encouraged and supported by donors have the potential to influence donor supported programmes now (in Kano, Kaduna, Kwara, and Lagos) and others in the future.

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| STREAM 5: Aid Effectiveness | | |
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| Relevance - Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to aid effectiveness relevant? | Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector policy, expenditure and service delivery) | |
| | Effectiveness – To what extent have donor inputs contributed to more and better international aid that is coordinated and coherent with domestic efforts in the sector? | Efficiency - How efficiently is aid delivered? |
| Apart from the initiatives leading to the joint donor Country Strategy Paper, the existence of donor sector groups including in education and the encouragement of state governments to prepare sector plans there is little evidence of the Paris/Accra principles influencing aid management and delivery. | <p>There are no mechanisms for sector dialogue at the Federal level. At the state level, donor-government relations are bilateral.</p> <p>The Country Strategy Paper which includes human development as a priority gives some small measure of predictability for future external support to the education sector. DFID's ESSPIN programme is for 6 years – longer than normal. The introduction of the UBE IF has increased the predictability of some incremental funding from the Federal government.</p> <p>There has been some improvement in the quality of aid to the sector. The World Bank's own judgements on its PEP2 and UBEP projects and on the harmonisation of DFID's CUBE project with the latter were broadly negative. Interviewees suggested that there is some improvement in the current projects.</p> | It is not clear whether the lack of sector dialogue between the Federal government and donors in general (policy dialogue, sector monitoring and review etc) is a result of low efficiency of the inputs and efforts or a result of factors such as the high Ministerial turnover and relatively small donor financial support. |
| Sustainability: Are the changes that took place with respect to aid effectiveness likely to survive (Federal and state level)? How resilient are the benefits to risks? | | |
| There has been little achievement in the aid effectiveness agenda in the sector which might be sustained, outside of the few supported states. It is likely that the few donors active in the education sector will continue to provide support and that some funds will be available for those states which demonstrate (in a variety of ways) their own commitment to the sector. | | |
| FTI prospects: In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing aid effectiveness (at federal or state/provincial level) in the future? In principle, the FTI could be a vehicle for increasing country (or state) ownership of plans for the education sector, and for improving both harmonization between donors and alignment between donors and governments. The lure of FTI endorsement <i>might</i> galvanize governments to prepare, or support the preparation of, realistic and costed plans and to commit to financial and other targets. The important role played by the local donor group in the endorsement process could provide the impetus to the donors to improve the quality of their engagement. Finally, the steps which would be required to lead to endorsement of a national or state plan would necessarily require a much greater degree of dialogue between government(s) and donors than has so far been the case. Whether government(s) would be both willing and able to act on the many commitments required is a separate issue | | |

STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, private/religious schooling, governance) *[consider federal and state./province dimensions]***Context:** *What is the situation (at level zero) with respect to cross-cutting issues?*

The following cross-cutting issues affect the achievement of UPC and EFA goals: gender, HIV/AIDS, household income (possibility of private education), religion (some Muslim parents prefer to send their children to ITQ schools), governance within the education sector.

Amongst those children out of school, 57% are estimated to be girls (UIS, 2005) girls are kept out of school generally for cultural/religious reasons. Household data shows that 51% of women have had no schooling (DHS, 2003). As a result educated female role models especially in the northern states are few. In the Southern states there is evidence that boys are taken out of school early in order to enrol them in apprenticeships. In 2005 Nigeria missed the achievement of the EFA gender parity goal in primary education as agreed to at Dakar 2000 (FME, 2006).

Over 80% of the school aged population in Kano attends some form of Islamic, Tsangaya or Qur'anic (ITQ) school (Bano, 2008), a figure that is likely to be representative in other predominantly Muslim states. According to the ESA study 11.4% of the sample of schools was private. The private sector is largely unregulated by Government and therefore of varying quality. In some states such as Lagos the number of children being educated in the private sector is on the increase, nationwide it is an equity issue as children from richer families are taken out of the public schools. Federal and state sector plans tend not to include the private sector nor are actors from the private sector involved in the planning process.

Nigeria has the third highest HIV case load in the world after India and South Africa; 3.7 million adults are living with the virus (FME, 2007). It is estimated that 800 deaths occur daily in Nigeria as a result of AIDS-related illnesses (ibid). Although there has been strong leadership at federal level this is not the case at state level where the scale of the problem is hard to quantify and a culture of silence means that the issue is neither monitored nor addressed.

CSOs have been most active on the issues of HIV/AIDS and gender disparity. There have been attempts (e.g. KATI) to involve civil society in pushing for better governance but these have not reached fruition.

Inputs: *What inputs have there been since 1999 and what problems did they seek to address?*

Strategy for Acceleration of Girls' Education in Nigeria (SAGEN) was launched by UNICEF and the Federal Ministry of Education in July 2003. This was followed by Girls' Education Project (GEP) a joint project with DFID, which was launched in December 2004. Both of these projects sought to address the low number of girls in school in the northern states.

Federal level planning has integrated HIV/AIDS and gender into both the planning process and created distinct positions within the FME to address cross-cutting issues. There is currently a director for gender, special needs and HIV/AIDS. A comprehensive Federal plan for HIV/AIDS in education has been produced in collaboration with CUBE and UNFPA.

How have donor inputs aimed to address the cross-cutting issues:

There have been significant inputs from donors in the area of HIV/AIDS (USAID via PEPFAR, DFID)

Donors have also rallied round on the issue of girls' education (Unicef, DFID, World Bank) targeting girls in the northern states.

There have been no inputs linked to the FTI.

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| STREAM 6: Cross-Cutting Issues (HIV/AIDS, gender, private/religious schooling, governance) <i>[consider federal and state./province dimensions]</i> | | |
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| Relevance - Were the objectives of donors and government initiatives relevant to cross cutting issues (Federal and state level)? | Immediate effects and intermediate outcomes: What were the effects and intermediate outcomes on the sector in terms of effectiveness, and efficiency? (Immediate effects refer to processes, intermediate outcomes refer to changes in sector planning and implementation with respect to cross-cutting issues) | |
| | Effectiveness – To what extent did donor and government inputs contribute to improved strategies to address cross cutting issues (Federal and state level)? | Efficiency - How economically did donor and government support to cross cutting issues translate into results (Federal and state level)? |
| Inputs by donors on cross-cutting have largely been relevant although some donors continue to overlook issues of sustainability. | <p>There are adequate policies in place to address equity and HIV/AIDS issues however there is limited follow through in terms of planning, budgeting and implementation. Exclusion and equity remain significant challenges especially for girls and the large numbers of “Al Majiri” children in the north. There is yet to be a credible policy response for “Al Majiri” children. Those suffering from HIV/AIDS and their children are also likely to be excluded and policies are yet to be implemented to address this.</p> <p>Capacity has definitely improved through the GEP and through donor projects focused on HIV/AIDS – however mainstreaming this will be challenging.</p> <p>Data is scarce particularly on the HIV/AIDS situation and there is no sign that it is being generated by Government. The GEP project has generated good data but it is limited to GEP states.</p> <p>Capacity concerning developing and encouraging good governance is limited and initiatives in this area are limited. DFID is targeting this as a priority but other donors although they consider it a priority have limited themselves to state or even school specific inputs.</p> | A recent evaluation of the GEP found this to be a very efficient use of the funds made available. The vast scale of Nigeria and the depth of the problems within the education sector mean that in terms of the cross-cutting issues inputs are never enough. However, the impact seen in the GEP when donors, CSOs and Government have worked together indicates the importance of coordination to increase efficiency. |
| Sustainability: Are the changes that took place in the manner in which cross-cutting issues are addressed likely to survive (Federal and state level)? How resilient are the benefits to risks? | | |
| <p>Leadership and capacity in the areas of girls’ education and HIV/AIDs have improved but the extent to which this new capacity has been integrated into Government structures is limited.</p> <p>Risks include: salaries are low in the public sector as is motivation; there is a need to continue to drive the key cross-cutting issues forward as there is still much progress to be made. Distraction by other issues or a project- orientated approach so all inputs end when the funding is finished are real risks. Some areas are yet to be tackled substantively (e.g. governance) positive steps forward in any one cross-cutting area could easily be undermined by neglect of another.</p> | | |
| FTI prospects: In what ways, if at all, could FTI be relevant to addressing cross-cutting issues (at federal or state/provincial level) in the future? | | |
| FTI could provide leadership and direction for inputs on cross-cutting issues bringing them together in a planning exercise. However, there are already many plans on cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS the issue seems to be implementing the plans and getting states to own and drive them. States with a reform agenda like that of Kwara are rare. Care would however, have to be taken to ensure that the FTI did not become just another donor initiative, which lacks in local ownership and is discarded when the money runs out. | | |