BOD/2020/06 DOC 02 - Annex 4
Board of Directors
June 9-11, 2020
Via KUDO
For Decision

CONSENT AGENDA

Please note: Board documents are deliberative in nature and, in accordance with the GPE Transparency Policy, are considered public documents only after their appraisal by the Board. It is understood that constituencies will circulate Board documents among their members prior to Board consideration for consultation purposes.

INDEPENDENT SUMMATIVE EVALUATION: FINAL FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommended by: SIC
Committee Consideration: During its last meeting in April, the SIC hosted a sense-making workshop around the presentation of the ISE findings, stressing the relevance of these findings to inform the Board discussion on the strategic plan. The Independent Evaluation Committee (IEC) reviewed the Final Report prior to its circulation to the SIC and the Board in May, ahead of the Board meeting in June.
Policy Reference: SIC/2020/04 DOC 04

1. OBJECTIVE

1.1 The purpose of the document is to present the final findings and recommendations of the Independent Summative Evaluation Report to inform the Strategic Plan discussions.

2. RECOMMENDED DECISION

BOD/2020/06 - Independent Summative Evaluation of the Global Partnership for Education: The Board of Directors:

1. Formally received the Independent Summative Evaluation Report at its meeting;

2. Welcomes the findings and recommendations of the Independent Summative Evaluation Report and expresses appreciation for the work completed by the Independent Evaluators and the Independent Evaluation Committee;

3. Considers that the Independent Summative Evaluation represents value for money and provides timely and relevant recommendations for consideration during the development of the Global Partnership's Strategic Plan.

3. BACKGROUND

3.1 With an aim to inform the development of GPE's next strategic plan, the initial stage (mid-August 2019 to mid-November 2019) of the Independent Summative Evaluation consisted of an elaborate desk review of the rich body of evidence available, followed by a second stage (January 2020 to April 2020), which addressed existing evidence gaps for a comprehensive assessment of GPE's performance.

3.2 The Independent Evaluation team presented its initial findings to the Board in December 2019. and subsequently to the SIC and other Committee members during the April 30 sense-making workshop. On May 6, the Evaluation team presented a set of strategic dilemmas, arising from the evaluation findings, as part of the Board webinar series dedicated to the strategic plan. The IEC, SIC, and the Secretariat reviewed the final draft report which was shared with them on May 7th. The report was finalized and submitted to the Board on May 26th, ahead of the June Board meeting. The final ISE findings and recommendations will be presented to the Board on June 3rd during a Board webinar.

ANNEX A: ISE Final Report

ANNEX B: Annexes to the ISE Final report

ANNEX C: IEC Report on the ISE Final Report



Independent Summative Evaluation of the Global Partnership for Education 2020

Final Report

AUTHORS:

Mike Zuijderduijn
Irma Alpenidze
Giorgio Ferrari
Roy Carr Hill
Olaf Kooijmans
René Vermeulen
Nadine Bergmann

MDF Training & Consultancy

Ede, May 2020

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AE	Accredited Entity
ASA	Advocacy and Social Accountability
CA	Coordinating Agency
CCM	Country Coordinating Mechanism
CL	Country Lead (in CST)
CLE	Country Level Evaluation
CSEF	Civil Society Education Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CST	Country Support Team
CY	Calendar year
DCP	Developing Country Partner
EA	Enabling Activity
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EPR	Effective Partnership Review
ESP	Education Sector Plan
ESPDG	Education Sector Plan Development Grant
ESPIG	Education Sector Program Implementation Grant
FCAC	Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries
FIF	Financial Intermediary Fund
FP	Focal Point
FSP	Full-sized Project
FY	Financial Year
GA	Grant Agent
GAVI	Gavi, the vaccine alliance
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	The Global Environment Facility
GEIA	Gender Equality Institutional Assessment
GF	the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GPC	the Grants and Performance Committee of GPE Board
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
GPR	Grant performance report
GPSP	Grant Process Streamlining project
HSCC	Health Sector Coordinating Committee
ICC	Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee
IEC	Independent Evaluation Committee
ISE	Independent Summative Evaluation

JSR	Joint Sector Review
KIX	Knowledge and Innovation Exchange
LAS	Learning Assessment System
LEG	Local Education Group
LIC	Low income countries
LMIC	Low and middle income countries
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCA	Maximum Country Allocation
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MoE	Ministry of Education
MOPAN	Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network
MSP	Medium-sized Project
NDA	National Designated Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
PDG	Program Development Grant
PEF	Partners' Engagement Framework
PIF	Project Identification Form
PR	Principal Recipient
QA	Quality Assurance
QAR	Quality Assurance Review
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
RF	Results Framework
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIC	the Strategy and Impact Committee of GPE Board
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
STAR	the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources
TA	Technical Assistance
TEP	Transitional Education Plan
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US$	United States Dollar
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VfM	Value for Money

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND APPROACH

The Independent Summative Evaluation (ISE) of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) aims to help shape the latter's post-2020 strategy by drawing lessons from its performance since 2015. In addition, the ISE is a means through which GPE aims to be transparent and accountable for its actions and results. The ISE was conducted in two stages. Stage one (August – December 2019) primarily involved a desk study into the broader development and organizational effectiveness of GPE. During this initial desk study, various evidence gaps were identified and prioritized for further investigation in stage two (January – April 2020), based on their relevance for GPE's post-2020 strategy.

This final report presents the overall ISE findings, starting with the broader stage one findings, followed by more detailed findings related to eight selected areas of further investigation. Under development effectiveness, these areas are: (i) ESP implementation, (ii) LEG effectiveness, (iii) the efficiency and use of funds in GPE's grant allocation and disbursement processes, and (iv) GPE's role in domestic and international financing for education. Under organizational effectiveness, these areas are: (i) fit-for-purpose governance and management arrangements, (ii) the overall health of the partnership, (iii) the functionality of the conceptual framework, and (iv) GPE's M&E performance,

A detailed methodological approach has been developed for each area, relying on data from available reports and interviews with a selection of GPE's diverse stakeholders at the global and country levels. The ISE also includes a systematic qualitative examination of the significance of contributing factors in key GPE performance areas such as ESP implementation and LEG effectiveness. Furthermore, the ISE includes a benchmark study among four other global funds. To link the ISE conclusions more directly to the sections of GPE's ongoing post-2020 strategy development process, these are categorized and presented below as *development effectiveness, efficiency and trends in financing,* and *organizational effectiveness.*

DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GPE has demonstrated progress towards all of its outcome- and output-level objectives as targeted in GPE's overall Results Framework (RF), although its effectiveness per objective varies. At the global level, targets for *building a stronger partnership* have been exceeded, while targets for *more financing* have been achieved although progress in *better financing* (harmonization and alignment) remains a challenge. At the country level, GPE's effectiveness has been most convincing in *creating more inclusive policy development processes resulting in ESPs/TEPs that increasingly meet GPE's quality standards*. GPE has successfully supported the financing of ESP/TEP implementation through ESPIGs that are largely on track and generally perceived to be relevant, despite covering a relatively small portion of funding for ESP/TEP implementation.

GPE's effectiveness towards ESP implementation and its subsequent contribution to more effective and efficient education systems remains a challenge. These goals reflect relatively broad sector-wide ambitions compared with other global funds. Progress towards these goals depends on the successful contribution of GPE's interventions in combination with a wide range of external factors.

A deeper investigation into internal and external factors explaining ESP implementation revealed that GPE's achievements in terms of creating better plans, more inclusive sector dialogue and monitoring processes, and financing are positively associated with ESP implementation. This illustrates the validity of GPE's ToC in the sense that this combination of GPE-supported outputs provides relevant building blocks for making progress in ESP implementation. The ISE also observes that progress in improving plans has moved at a faster pace than improvements in dialogue and monitoring, which progressed in a more modest pace, similar to that of ESP implementation. This indicates that improving sector plans may be important but on its own is insufficient to ascertain satisfactory progress in plan implementation.

At the same time, the ISE observes that higher ratings of the GPE contributions to sector planning, dialogue and monitoring are associated with lower ratings of implementation performance. This is explained by the fact that GPE support towards inclusive planning processes is adapted to support needs, which typically are highest in countries with relatively weak plan implementation capacity. Consequently, the GPE contributions should be strongest in countries where it ESP implementation is most likely to be difficult, which points to the significance of other factors that are not directly part of GPE's interventions.

Some of these factors lie within GPE's sphere of influence, relating to implementation capacity, funding, and motivation of key factors involved in ESP implementation. These factors are recognized in GPE's Theory of Change and have been confirmed to hold relevance for ESP implementation, although in practice it appears that GPE has had relatively little influence on them. A key emerging area of attention in this has been the importance of inter-government relationships and cooperation, in particular between the ministries responsible for education, the Ministry of Finance and sub-national government entities.

In addition, the ISE examined factors outside GPE's sphere of influence related to the institutional and socio-economic context, which according to literature can be expected to hold relevance for ESP implementation. From this, it appeared that the absence of conflict and fragility and the presence of rule of law are important institutional factors that facilitate ESP implementation. At the same time, socio-economic features like higher population density, and lower ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity appear to be enabling factors for ESP implementation.

At the country level, GPE depends on the LEG for advising the education policy cycle from ESP/TEP development to ESPIG application and ESP implementation. Progress in LEG effectiveness has been uneven across countries. More LEGs have been effective in discussing ESP and ESPIG development and ESPIG monitoring, and fewer in influencing ESP implementation and strategic choices.

A deeper investigation into the internal and external factors that explain differences in LEG effectiveness revealed that particular combinations of organizational and collaboration principles proposed by the Secretariat explain LEG effectiveness, although LEGs do not need to meet all principles to be effective. Mutual accountability has the closest association with LEG effectiveness. Other than that, positive cases of effective LEGs meet at least two principles. The combination of principles and contextual factors that seem most closely associated with LEG strategic effectiveness

are strong government leadership and strong LEG governance, or strong GPE initiative and influence in countries where the education sector actors have weaker capacity.

Technical capacity gaps within complex government systems for the delivery of education and data collection are an issue for all LEGs in discharging their functions, especially in closing the feedback loop between action and reflecting on what has been achieved, what has not, and why. The motivation and leverage of LEG members explain whether or not they contribute to effective LEGs.

Structural political and economic factors are associated with LEG effectiveness, including inequality (income, ethnic, and linguistic), the absence of other fora for dialogue in the education sector, limited space for civil society, and the impact of conflict and disasters. This relationship between LEGs and the structural factors that surround them can be summarized under the concept of a social contract, which influences whether inclusive dialogue on education based on accountability is possible.

LEGs struggle to find solutions that require system thinking because they imply changing the behavior of teachers and education actors, which requires exploring how their motivation, incentives, and leverage interact in principal-agent or collective action problems. Other global funds adopt a similar multi-stakeholder partnership model at the country level and show similar challenges. Compared with other funds, GPE's unique sector-wide focus requires the highest level of effort to ensure that the LEGs work as intended as country-specific multi-stakeholder platforms.

Efficiency, use of funds and trends in financing

GPE's grant allocation process from MCA to first disbursement takes more than 40 months on average, which strains the level of commitment to the process among in-country actors. The first 26 months of this period include an initial delay, as the timing of the education sector planning process is not linked to the MCA announcement. Subsequently, a significant amount of time is occupied by completing a complex sector-wide participatory analysis and plan development process. Altogether, this consumes about two-thirds of the 40 months, which differs from other global funds that have a more issue-based/thematic focus and are less demanding in term of inclusiveness and quality requirements.

Once this process is completed in line with GPE's quality standards, the application process for the implementation grant can start. This process includes a rigorous three-staged QAR process, involving external appraisals that can be lengthy and affect the sense of national ownership. GPE is taking commendable steps to address these issues through the GPSP, GPR, VfM and the EPR processes.

Grant implementation is judged to be efficient, as the majority of grants are on track, while delays in disbursements are primarily caused by operational challenges (e.g. complications in procurement), which often lie beyond GPE's scope of control. The Secretariat monitors progress in implementation and fund disbursement and undertakes regular efforts to analyze and propose options for improved efficiency. The Secretariat has grown in size during the current strategy period, mostly in response to Board decisions. Nevertheless, the costs of the Secretariat have remained within GPE's own targeted range and in line with other global funds.

Country allocations over the 2012 – 2020 period illustrate a continued focus on basic education in LICs and LMICs, with a slight emphasis on FCACs in line with GPE's MCA formula. Funds are allocated to a wide range of activities related to improving learning quality, equity and systems, reflecting a country-

level partnership consensus rather than a specific prioritization. During the 2012 – 2018 period, a relatively small proportion (5.6 percent) of ODA to education in DCPs and as much as 11.8 percent to basic education has been channeled through GPE. Since 2016, GPE has seen unprecedented funding pledges and contributions from DCPs and donor countries, albeit significantly less than what is needed to close the enormous funding gaps.

Domestic expenditure remains by far the most important source of funding for education. GPE has continuously advocated the importance of increasing domestic education budgets, although its influence is limited as domestic funding decisions are subject to many other considerations. As a result, the number of DCPs that have structurally managed to increase or sustain domestic education budgets above 20 percent of their overall government budget remains below GPE's targets as set in 2016.

Donors make deliberate choices in terms of what, where, and how they provide assistance, and many donors value having a direct relationship with the recipient country, control over the spending of aid, and the quality of accountability and governance systems. Principal reasons why traditional donors provide funding to GPE include the fact that GPE may work in countries that are not direct partner countries of the donor, as well as the possibility to participate in shaping the global education development agenda.

The global landscape for education development is becoming increasingly complex, with developing countries graduating or demoting in income status or fragility, a changing web of traditional and newly-emerging donors (e.g. private foundations, China, India, etc.), and recently-established funding vehicles such as the Education Cannot Wait and the International Financing Facility for Education. The 2015 interim evaluation already called upon GPE to consider a more specific position in the overall aid architecture for education. Since then, GPE has remained positioned as a broad and inclusive funding channel for basic education, although there has been a growing call for GPE to position itself more sharply.

Organizational Effectiveness

GPE has overachieved on its targets in *building a stronger partnership,* among others by clarifying roles, responsibilities and key operational processes, the production of knowledge products and further professionalizing GPE's risk management and fiduciary oversight. In addition, substantial progress has been made in establishing a *strategic management framework* as recommended by the 2015 interim evaluation. This includes a ToC and RF that has improved the clarity and transparency of GPE's ambitions and how it will hold itself accountable for results.

To date, GPE has primarily used these frameworks for communication and accountability purposes, and less as tools to steer and learn from its operations. The ToC and RF are aligned, and signs have been found of these frameworks being used to guide or validate operational plans, although this has not yet become common practice throughout GPE. Clear efforts have been made to translate the Gender Equality Policy into action plans, although because GPE's gender strategy followed later its specific objectives did not find their way into GPE's overall RF. This separation means that it remains difficult to observe the effects of GPE's gender strategy on GPE's core results.

M&E efforts have been successful in increasing GPE's accountability at the global level. There are convincing signs of M&E results influencing the quality of programmatic discussions by adding regular factual output-related data on key issues like progress in alignment, trends in funding, JSR application, etc. At the country level, GPE's M&E efforts primarily rely on the successful application of JSRs, which has remained a challenge in terms of meeting GPE standards despite positive feedback from DCP representatives. Despite the apparent use of available M&E information, the RF in its current shape does not sufficiently address key questions related to GPE performance, in particular related to the quality of cooperation, mutual accountability and ESP implementation at the country level.

In addition, Board members and Secretariat staff have persisting concerns about the quality of partnership dynamics and the adequacy of managerial arrangements that are not captured by the existing RF. A deeper investigation into the health of the partnership and the extent to which governance and management arrangement are fit for purpose revealed that GPE's principle of being an inclusive partnership has become an obvious part of GPE's DNA as it is reflected in GPE's structures and decision-making processes and practices. At the global level, this is visible in the composition of the Board and its five standing committees – all of which comprise the diverse constituencies of GPE – and the value placed on consensus in decision-making. It is also illustrated by the prominent role of these member bodies in decision-making related to grant appraisal and approval, financial oversight, internal practices and procedures. At the country level, it is visible in the (desired) composition of LEGs and the prominent role of this multi-stakeholder platform in the ESP development and grant application process, especially compared with other global funds.

The ISE appreciates the *benefits* of GPE's efforts to put its principle of inclusiveness in practice, as it keeps GPE together as a unique global platform on which the multiple stakeholders in the education sector work together towards a common goal. At the same time, the ISE is cognizant of the *costs* of GPE's inclusive practices and the gradual expansion of the partnership, in particular in terms of the pace and quality of decision-making in GPE's relatively heavy governance structures. This also makes it difficult to find time for joint reflection and learning on how to optimize the contribution of the existing members. Looking at how other global funds have organized themselves, the ISE believes that there is scope for increased efficiency without jeopardizing GPE's important asset of being a truly inclusive partnership.

At present, the Secretariat primarily plays a support role vis-à-vis the Board, its committees and – to a lesser extent – the LEGs. The pace of progress is often affected by the frequency of meetings of the Board (committees), whose mandates are not limited to strategic issues (the 'what' and 'why' of GPE) but also extend to more practical issues related to GPE's operations and organizational development (i.e. the how of GPE). A direct consequence of this is the recurring challenge of finding the necessary time in the agenda of Board (committee) meetings to address all of the issues on which a dialogue and decision is required. In light of this, the Secretariat spends significant time carefully preparing and framing these discussions. Indeed, this facilitates a quick yet limited reactive debate, although both Board members and Secretariat staff are critical about the current working arrangements, illustrating the need for further streamlining.

Looking at other global funds, we see diverse management arrangements, mostly reflecting less intense involvement of the Board, despite being mindful of keeping members connected on strategic

issues. For instance, their Board decides on country allocations, funding key areas/priorities, and approval for larger investments, while the Secretariat follows up on priorities within country programs and approves individual grants, usually with the help of an independent thematic expert panel. In terms of strengthening national ownership/government leadership, GPE's mechanisms are largely similar, but they stand out by having a broader and inclusive sector-wide orientation, which increases the number of actors involved and complicates partnership dynamics. In supporting ESP/TEP implementation, GPE has less diverse mechanisms for providing TA, applies a Variable Tranche modality comparable to GCF's results-based financing and stimulates joint monitoring through JSRs similar to Gavi.

Finally, throughout the ISE process, the GPE Secretariat has demonstrated itself to be alert, active and capable of identifying and analyzing tactical and operational challenges. More than 40 internal and external reviews have been undertaken during the past five years of implementing the GPE 2020 strategy, leading to new insights for improved performance on which the Secretariat could act more rapidly, if empowered to do so.

In response to its findings and conclusions, **the ISE has formulated the following recommendations:**

1. **Maintain a focus on sector-wide basic education, but concentrate on improving the ESPs/TEPs implementation by balancing the attention devoted to content and processes, as well as addressing funding, capacity and contextual constraints *(to be initiated during the first year of GPE's post-2020 strategy).***

Despite GPE's efforts to develop better and more inclusive sector-wide plans, ESP implementation remains limited. Substantial progress has been made in the quality of plans. Progress in the inclusiveness of sector dialogue and monitoring processes has also been made – albeit somewhat less quickly – while the two in combination are seen as essential stepping stones towards successful plan implementation. Besides, funding gaps, capacity constraints and contextual factors continue to affect ESP implementation. The ISE therefore recommends a 'package' of recommendations, which together are meant to strengthen the causal connection from ESP/TEP planning to implementation.

More specifically, without jeopardizing its achievements in plan development, the ISE recommends a strengthened emphasis on process-related requirements that can be expected to facilitate plan implementation like those being pursued in the EPR process. Besides, reducing the funding gap is recommended through (i) a more explicit issue-based identification of funding priorities within ESP/TEP documents, (ii) empowering LEGs to more strongly engage with the government's own policy and budgetary processes, and (iii) continuing efforts to demonstrate the effective and efficient use of funds.

N.B. Even though the effects of the Covid 19 crises are beyond the scope of the ISE, we consider it appropriate to flag the importance of carefully monitoring the likely effects of this crisis on the funding situation of GPE. These effects may include economic crises affecting overall ODA resources, a shift of resources in support of health care systems, or changing funding needs in support of distant learning systems, etc.

Capacity constraints can be addressed by using (i) a more systematic partnership capacity assessment approach using well-established diagnostic models for partnership performance, and (ii) more flexible and varied mechanisms to provide TA support in response to emerging capacity constraints.

Finally, it is suggested to tackle contextual constraints by (i) paying more deliberate attention to external factors that are known to affect plan implementation by making programmatic adaptations and including risk mitigation plans, and (ii) conscientiously capturing and sharing experiences with mitigating adaptations in response to external risks.

2. **Strengthen the effectiveness of LEGs as inclusive government-led mechanisms adding value throughout the education policy cycle (to be initiated in the first year of the post-2020 strategy).**

Varieties in national contexts explain differences in the shaping, mandate and subsequent performance of LEGs. The ISE therefore recommends continuing the EPR process to strengthen LEG effectiveness. This process should start by reconfirming the country-specific mandates and ambitions of LEGs based on the prevailing political economy and 'social contract' in a country. Subsequently, the ISE recommends stimulating LEGs to assess and address their own capacity gaps in fulfilling this mandate, followed by a periodic self-assessment of progress, reviewing the LEG's *joint accountability for results* and the *mutual accountability of its member contributions.* To make this possible, the ISE suggests to combine existing resources (e.g. Education-out-loud, ESPDG, pilot to finance CA) into one dedicated funding window for in-country partnership capacity development.

3. **Sharpen the positioning of GPE and its financing, emphasizing support for enabling factors for effective ESP implementation (as part of the ongoing strategy development process).**

The ISE recommends a sharper global positioning of GPE and its financing to more clearly articulate its added value to the sector and guide its financing priorities at country level. A more deliberate strategic focus concerning where and what to fund would help GPE to secure a more aligned and complementary position vis-à-vis other existing and emerging education funding channels, as well as helping to support partner countries in bridging the gap between different types of funding modalities and types of assistance.

Given the limited resources available to GPE compared with the overall funding needs, the ISE believes that GPE funding can add more value by being strategically selective rather than by co-financing a small part sector plan implementation (with the risk that GPE funding becomes a surrogate for funding line items in the education budget of the DCP). The ISE therefore recommends prioritizing GPE funding more sharply on improving the critical systemic conditions necessary for a government to effectively design, fund, manage, and implement education sector policies and plans.

In line with this, we recommend that ESAs already distinguish pre-conditions for effective ESP implementation (including sector accountability needs and EMIS development and operationalization) from education needs, as well as identifying quick wins. This enables introducing a sharper focus and allows accelerating funding by already addressing these pre-conditions in parallel with the broader sector planning process.

4. **Improve and complement conceptual frameworks with utility-focused management tools and learning processes (as part of, and immediately following the finalization of GPE's post-2020 strategy).**

The ISE believes that under the post-2020 strategy GPE's progress in having a strategic management framework (including ToC and RF) should be taken further. This means consolidating GPE's success in having become clearer and more accountable for its ambitions and results, while increasing the use of this framework for management and learning purposes. This includes (i) adapting the corporate ToC in GPE's post-2020 strategy to do more justice to the reality of GPE's work, (ii) developing a RF that captures complex change (i.e. less predictable and non-linear) by adding qualitative behavior-oriented progress markers to a reduced set of key indicators aligned to a revised ToC, (iii) ensuring that (gender) equality ambitions are included at the outcome and output levels of the ToC and RF, and (iv) strengthening joint learning processes at the global and country level by shaping a prioritized learning agenda, incorporating learning results in the corporate results framework and specifying the learning purpose of future M&E work streams.

5. **Implications for the Board and Secretariat to improve Organizational Effectiveness.**

The combined performance of the Board, its sub-committees, the LEGs and the Secretariat largely determines GPE's organizational effectiveness, which is a means towards achieving development effectiveness. The final ISE recommendations are therefore phrased as 'implications for the Board and Secretariat' to illustrate that these are means to enable the successful implementation of earlier-mentioned recommendations, rather than being ends in themselves.

An important implication for the Board is the need to concentrate more deliberately on the 'what' and 'why' of GPE, empowering the Secretariat to take charge of and report on the 'how'. This implies among others that the Board formulates and approves GPE's strategy – including the ToC – sets GPE's ambition level in terms of inclusiveness, determines country allocations, and is only involved in the approval of large, higher-risk grants that hold strategic importance to GPE. Another implication is that the Board sets GPE's annual learning agenda, and concentrates its involvement in revising the RF to identify the key performance questions that the framework needs to answer, while leaving the Secretariat to accelerate the implementation of the EPR process and GPSP and similar interventions.

In addition, the ISE recommends that as part of the upcoming governance review, the Board should examine the costs and benefits of having five standing committees with different and fluctuating workloads that all require regular Secretariat support. Following this, the Board may conclude that a different combination of standing committees and alternative arrangements (e.g. temporary task forces or working groups) is preferable, whereby members continue to drive GPE's response to strategic issues, while making optimal use of the Secretariat for advice and support and for dealing with operational issues.

One implication for the Secretariat is that in its current thinking about organizational reform, it re-emphasizes the centrality of supporting in-country grant management and partnership facilitation processes as its primary process, with all other processes in support of or overseeing this. In addition, we recommend that the Secretariat recognizes and organizes the distinct system and competency

requirements of its fund management and partnership facilitation functions. Besides, we suggest developing separate work streams for mobilizing new partners and optimizing the contribution of existing partners. Finally, we recommend that the Secretariat prioritizes *utility* over *specificity* in developing its guidelines and support, allowing more time and space for adaptations at the country level.

The ISE realizes that these proposed implications are more about adapting practices and behavior than procedures. Such adaptations start from deliberate decisions but require a carefully-designed and facilitated internal transition process to have a good chance of success

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND ABOUT SETUP AND PURPOSE OF GPE

The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) is the successor to the Education for All Fast Track Initiative. Established in 2002, GPE is a multi-stakeholder partnership and funding platform that mobilizes global and national support for education in developing country partners (DCPs). The vision and mission of GPE are focused on achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4.

The partnership brings together DCPs' governments, donor partners, the private sector and philanthropic organizations, as well as civil society organizations (CSOs) including teacher organizations[1]. At the global level, GPE is governed by its Board of Directors, comprising representatives across the partnership. GPE's Secretariat provides operational and administrative support. At the country level, partners come together through local education groups (LEGs, or whichever names apply in respective DCPs). LEGs are government-led and coordinated by a designated coordinating agency (CA). GPE funds are administered by a grant agent (GA). GPE's Theory of Change (ToC) and country-level planning model illustrate how the partnership's objectives and goals are achieved.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE ISE

The Terms of Reference (ToR, see Annex Ten) for the ISE of GPE 2016-2020 clearly states the purpose and scope of the ISE. The ISE will be instrumental in helping to shape GPE's post-2020 strategy and will run parallel to the latter's planning process, organized separately by GPE's Strategy and Impact Committee (SIC) on behalf of the Board. The ISE will also serve as an update to the findings of the last independent evaluation of GPE (2015) and review the extent to which its recommendations have been implemented.

The four aims of the ISE – as stated in its ToR – are as follows:


- Learning: To understand which aspects of the GPE 2020 strategy are working and which need improvement in the next GPE strategy period.
- Accountability: To determine progress towards results and whether GPE partners are fulfilling their expected roles and responsibilities effectively.
- Transparency: To communicate findings and achievements to all stakeholders.
- Effectiveness: To determine the extent to which the GPE operational model is fit for purpose.

[1] From TOR for the Independent Summative Evaluation in annex Ten

1.3 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION


The evaluation in its entirety has been structured in two stages (see Figure 1.3.1).

Figure 1.3.1 Overview of ISE stages




Stage one of the ISE was based on evaluation questions stated in the ISE ToR that related to the areas of development and organizational effectiveness (see Figure 1.3.2).

Figure 1.3.2 Scope of ISE stage one



The findings of stage one largely depended on desk review and initial interviews of Secretariat staff. During this stage, a number of issues were identified – partly from identified evidence gaps and partly from discussions with the SIC and the Independent Evaluation Committee (IEC) – that required more in-depth investigation during stage two of the ISE. These issues for further investigation are again organized under development and organizational effectiveness (see Figure 1.3.3).

Figure 1.3.3 Scope of ISE stage two



Nonetheless, the ISE acknowledges that organizational and development effectiveness are related, which means that in its final analysis of findings the ISE has regarded these issues in combination. In other words, it is acknowledged that the issues under organizational effectiveness are likely to affect those under development effectiveness (e.g. strong M&E frameworks and practices should help

ESP/TEP implementation and resource mobilization, while a healthy partnership is likely to contribute to LEG effectiveness). This interrelation is carefully considered when drawing final conclusions about the main explanatory factors for GPE's performance in achieving progress towards its objectives.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This report presents the results of both stages of the ISE process. A separate report with the elaborate stage one findings was finalized in November 2019. In this overall ISE report, the main findings of stage one are summarized in chapter 4.

As such, this final ISE report is structured as follows. In chapter 2, the methodological approach of both stages is summarized, while the core of the inception report outlining the detailed methodological approach for stage two is annexed (see Annex One and Annex Two). Chapter 3 provides a description of GPE's main conceptual frameworks (i.e. ToC and country-level planning cycle). Following chapter 4 with main findings of stage one, chapter 5 reflects the ISE findings related to the issues covered under development effectiveness. Chapter 6 has a similar setup on organizational effectiveness. Finally, chapters 7 and 8 present the ISE's overall conclusions and recommendations.

2 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

2.1 OVERALL ISE APPROACH

The ISE was conducted in two stages. Stage one consisted of an extensive desk study and initial interviews with Secretariat staff, aimed at gaining a broader overview of the overall documented performance of GPE. This revealed a number of evidence gaps and key issues for GPE's post-2020 strategy that were selected for further investigation in stage two. Below, we provide further details about the methodological approach of both stages.

2.2 APPROACH TO STAGE ONE

Stage one of the ISE took place from August to November 2019. This first stage was meant to provide initial inputs into the ongoing post-2020 GPE strategy development process based on the rich documentation available related to GPE's performance since 2015. The process of stage one comprised 1) an introduction and 'on-boarding' of the ISE team, 2) intake meetings with the IEC and the Secretariat, 3) desk study, 4) a draft interim report and presentation to the SIC and 5) the finalization of the interim report that was presented to the Board in December 2019.

The introduction and 'on-boarding' took place in mid-August 2019, whereby the Secretariat provided the ISE with an initial introduction to the goals and setup of GPE. From this moment onwards, the ISE started working out the evaluation matrix in response to the 44 questions mentioned in the ToR (see Annex Ten). At the same time, the Secretariat started sharing documentation with the ISE as inputs to the desk study.

Following an intake visit to the GPE Secretariat in Washington DC in September 2019, the ISE started an intensive desk study, reviewing the wide variety of documents made available by the GPE Secretariat (see Annex Eight). The results of this desk study have been summarized in an interim report, which – following feedback from the IEC and SIC – has been structured according to 22 key issues under the eight evaluation components (see Table 2.2.1).

Table 2.2.1 Key issues organized in eight research components

Development Effectiveness	Organizational Effectiveness
Effectiveness: 1. Achievement against GPE's Results Framework (up to outcome level) 2. Contribution and additionality of GPE 3. Analysis of what works well and less well	Governance and Management: 1. Board performance 2. Performance in convening, aligning and sustaining political will among stakeholders 3. Communication of GPE's vision and achievements

Development Effectiveness	Organizational Effectiveness
Efficiency 4. Efficient use of funds 5. Facilitators and barriers to the use of funds	Administrative Efficiency 4. Performance of the GPE Secretariat 5. Adaptations to Countries Affected by Fragility and Conflict (FCAC) context 6. Fiduciary oversight
Likely Sustainability 6. Sustaining country-level outcomes 7. Sustainability in the design of ESPs and GPE-funded interventions	Country-level arrangements and processes 7. Performance of LEGs 8. Performance of CAs 9. Effects on donor confidence and coordination 10. Perceived added value of GPE among country-level stakeholders
Relevance 8. Alignment and coherence 9. Responsiveness to country needs 10. Validity of the ToC	Monitoring & Evaluation 11. Quality and usefulness of the M&E strategy and Results Framework 12. Consistency and usefulness of the Country-Level Evaluations (CLEs)

2.3 Approach to Stage Two

In consultation with the SIC and IEC, it was agreed that stage two of the ISE would concentrate on eight more specific areas of investigation, in search for answers to the following main evaluation questions

Under development effectiveness:

1. **What explains the apparent limited ESP implementation?**
2. **What explains the differences in LEG effectiveness, in particular during ESP implementation?**

For these two questions, the ISE mapped out progress in the 28 countries/provinces covered by CLEs. Subsequently, the interrelations between this progress and a range of (assumed) internal (i.e. related to GPE interventions) and external (i.e. beyond the scope of GPE) contributing factors was examined. Factors that appeared to have a significant connection with ESP implementation or LEG effectiveness were then subjected to a further qualitative contribution analysis, using existing documentation and literature, to better understand why these connections exist (i.e. what explains the factors that appears to help or hinder).

3. **To what extent has GPE made the best use of funding at its disposal (in terms of efficient grant allocation and disbursement processes)?**
4. **What explains the main trends in international and domestic financing for education and how does this affect the role of GPE in the international aid architecture for education?**

For these questions, relevant trends in international financing for education and GPE's allocation of funds at its disposal were mapped out for the 2012-2019 period. Subsequently, the explanations behind these trends were explored through interviews and desk study. In addition, the ISE has reviewed GPE's ongoing efforts to analyze and improve the efficiency of its grant processes.

UNDER ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS:

5. How fit for purpose are GPE's current governance and management arrangements in light of GPE's likely directions under its post-2020 strategy?

The approach in response to this question primarily relied on a benchmark study of four other global funds: Gavi, the vaccine alliance (GAVI); the Green Climate Fund (GCF); the Global Environment Facility (GEF); and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF). This benchmark study has included a review of available evaluation reports related to those funds and interviews with selected staff members, including those dealing with evaluations.

6. To what extent has GPE made progress towards being a strong and healthy global partnership?

To answer this question, a variety of GPE stakeholders have been interviewed to gain insights into the existing dynamics/patterns of interaction in GPE. These findings have been analyzed using the Circle of Coherence model[2] , which distinguishes four dimensions of interaction that need to balance for a partnership to function optimally.

7. To what extent have GPE's overall conceptual frameworks (ToC, RF, Gender Strategy) served their respective purposes?
8. To what extent has GPE's M&E performance been successful in serving the purposes of the M&E strategy at the global and country levels?

Answers to these two questions have been explored by reviewing documented rationale and purposes behind GPE's conceptual frameworks and M&E strategy, while the technical quality of these frameworks has been assessed based on a limited literature study. Subsequently, the ISE has used interviews with diverse GPE stakeholders primarily at global level (see Annex Nine) to gain insights into the use and perceived usefulness of these frameworks and strategies.

Separate evaluation matrices reflecting the link between the stage one findings and stage two areas for further investigation followed by further details about the intended methodological approach were developed for each question (see Annex One and Annex Two). These matrices are documented – along with further details related to the planning and organization of stage two – in the ISE's inception report.

The approach in response to the questions under development effectiveness has largely relied on a further desk study, with particular emphasis on various internal reviews and external country-level and programmatic evaluations. Limited interviews were held, including with the evaluators involved, selected donor partners and Secretariat staff to develop a deeper understanding of why things are the way they are.

[2] Brouwer, H. and Woodhill, J., 2016. MSP (Multi-Stakeholder Partnership) Guide. Wageningen: Wageningen University & Research.

As the issues covered under organizational effectiveness have been less extensively covered by earlier reviews, the approach here has relied more on interviews with a diversity of GPE stakeholders at the global and country levels. A complete overview of the interviewees is presented in Annex Nine.

In essence, the stage two evaluation questions are meant to provide insight in more specific elements of GPE's effectiveness and relate to GPE's objectives as presented in its Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020 (Table 2.3.1).

Table 2.3.1 Matching GPE objectives with ISE evaluation questions stage two

Objectives from GPE's ToC	ISE evaluation questions stage two
GPE objective 1 (country level) – Strengthen educations sector planning and implementation	ESP implementation - question 1
GPE objective 2 (country level)- Support mutual accountability through inclusive policy dialogue and monitoring	LEG effectiveness –question 2
GPE objective 3 (country level) – Ensure efficient and effective delivery of GPE support)	Efficiency and allocation/use of Funds – question 3
GPE objective 4 (global level) – Mobilize more and better financing	Trends in financing - question 4
GPE objective 5 (global level) – Build a stronger partnership	Fit-for-purpose management and health of partnership – questions 5 and 6
GPE's overall conceptual frameworks	Questions 7 and 8

To enrich and stimulate the evaluation findings, the preliminary evaluation results were reviewed in a participatory sense-making exercise. During this event, the SIC together with additional representatives of GPE's constituencies and selected Secretariat staff members validated and assessed the main ISE findings. In addition, they engaged in a joint brainstorm session in search for creative solutions in addressing some of GPE's key challenges. Due to the Covid-19 crisis, since early March 2020, the ISE had to undertake all its activities virtually. This includes the sense-making that was organized in the shape of an interactive video-conference on April 30th, 2020.

2.4 Challenges and Limitations

The ISE faced a number of conventional challenges that can be expected in a large-scale evaluative desk study as outlined below:

1. Finding our way among the large and ever-increasing number of documents within a relatively short time frame;
2. Having to rely on existing information, without being able to assess the accuracy or validity of many of those documents, which makes it difficult to assign significance when documents offer contradictory or multi-interpretable findings; and
3. Giving a clear, accurate and agreed interpretation to complex concepts like alignment, donor confidence, government leadership or country ownership.


N.B. New and updated versions of documents continued to emerge, therefore the ISE has worked with documents that were available on April 1, 2020. Efforts have been made to the extent possible to enrich the report with findings from documents that have become available later, but these have not been reviewed in full.

Since early March 2020 however, the ISE started facing the much greater challenge of undertaking the ISE while the global COVID-19 crisis was unfolding. In particular, government officials from DCPs and donor countries suddenly had to design, implement and/or deal with a range of far-reaching measures that affected both the organization of the education sector in their countries as well as their own personal working arrangements. Understandably, this meant that their availability for interviews and other involvement in the ISE (e.g. sense-making as part of the Board retreat) were interrupted, slowing down and limiting the data collection process. This means that in particular the stage two results related to international financing and organizational effectiveness are based on a smaller and less representative sample of interviewees than anticipated, and hence they carry the risk of being somewhat biased. The ISE has obviously kept this limitation in mind when drawing and formulating its conclusions, whereby we still consider this report to be a fair and accurate reflection of GPE's overall performance.

3 GPE'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

GPE has constructed the following ToC as part of its 2020 strategy (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 GPE's Theory of Change (GPE Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020)



This ToC connects GPE's global outputs (objectives 4 and 5) to its country-level outputs (objectives 1-3). The ToC places the three country-level objectives of 1) strengthened sector planning and implementation, 2) mutual accountability and inclusive policy dialogue and monitoring, and 3) GPE financing in support of ESP/TEP implementation as complementary processes at its core. Together, these three processes serve as the main pathways towards effective and efficient education systems (goal 3 = outcome), which in turn is expected to contribute to GPE's vision of equitable and quality education (goals 1 and 2 = impact).

This ToC was approved by the Board in December 2015 and included eleven assumptions from global outputs to the impact level[3]. By referring to objectives 1 to 5 as outputs, goal 3 as an intermediate outcome, and goals 1 and 2 as impact, the ToC reflects GPE's distinction between its sphere of control (outputs) from its spheres of influence (outcome) and concern (impact). At the same time, it is understood that clearly delineating the sphere of control of a partnership is complicated, as the behavior of individual members is not controlled by the partnership but is decisive for its performance. It is furthermore acknowledged that a more detailed generic country-level ToC was developed as part

[3] As part of the inception process of the country-level evaluations, a more detailed generic country-level ToC has been worked out.

of the inception of the CLEs. This ToC distinguishes planning from implementation and incorporates 24 assumptions (17 related to country-level outputs, five to outcomes and two to impact).

The global ToC forms the basis of GPE's Results Framework, which includes 37 indicators to measure and report upon GPE's performance. Given that the ISE evaluates the partnership as a whole, its global ToC and the related Results Framework have been used as the main frame of reference in assessing GPE's development effectiveness. In line with the ToR, the ISE has undertaken an assessment up to the outcome level (goal 3), placing GPE's contribution to impact-level results (goals 1 and 2) beyond the scope of the ISE.

Another important element of GPE's conceptual framework illustrating GPE operations at the country level is GPE's planning cycle (see Figure 3.2). This picture places the LEGs at the core of GPE's activities at the country level, whereby GPE's support processes are embedded within broader government-owned sector-level planning, implementation, and evaluation processes.

Figure 3.2 GPE's country planning cycle (GPE website)




Figure 3.2 also illustrates where the various GPE grants (Education Sector Plan Development Grant (ESPDG), Program Development Grant (PDG), and Education Sector Program Implementation Grant (ESPIG)) fit within the broader government-owned process. The ISE has used this planning cycle in assessing development effectiveness and governance arrangements at the country level.

4 MAIN FINDINGS STAGE ONE

The ISE was conducted in two stages. Stage one primarily involved a desk-study into the broader development and organizational effectiveness of GPE. This initial desk-study revealed various evidence-gaps, which were prioritized for further investigation in stage two, based on their relevance for GPE's post-2020 strategy. This chapter therefore reflects the broader findings from stage one of the ISE[4], followed by an explanation of how evidence gaps from stage one led to the selection of the more specific areas of investigation in stage two.

4.1 DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS, STAGE ONE

4.1.1 Effectiveness

Under the effectiveness criterion, the ISE presents GPE performance in terms of progress towards its targets at outcome-, country- and global output level as reflected in GPE's RF, and presents likely factors contributing to observed progress as identified by the CLEs. Figure 4.1.1 presents an overview of GPE progress against the various results levels in GPE's strategic plan. This visual is based on aggregated data per results level from GPE's annual results reports[5] with the vertical axis referring to the different results levels and the horizontal axis indicating levels of progress in comparison with the 2016 baseline and targets.

Figure 4.1.1 overview of GPE progress against results



[4] The elaborate ISE findings from stage one have been reflected in a separate interim ISE report.
[5] In the figure, the bars show the same ordinal scale with values: achieving beyond target by more than 30 percent (+3), on or around the target (+2), below target but improved against the baseline (+1), on baseline (0), below baseline (-1). Each indicator in the Result Framework for which there is an aggregated value from post-2016 data is assigned one value according to the scale. Value to dimensions of progress coming from the CLEs was also assigned. In the graphic, the simple averages of all values are reported.

A more qualitative assessment of GPE's progress towards its goal and objectives is provided below.

As can be seen from this overview, GPE countries have shown signs of progress in strengthening their education systems (goal 3). However, this progress has been slower than planned, while in some countries progress has been insufficient to meet the most pressing needs in basic education. The main drivers of progress reported in the CLEs are connected to DCPs in terms of political will to achieve progress on education, country capacity, and resources. GPE has provided a small but meaningful contribution to kick-start progress on the sub-sectors of the ESP that the ESPIG was funding.

The quality of ESPs and connected strategies (objective 1) produced by GPE countries has significantly improved according to GPE's own quality standards. GPE quality assurance processes and criteria for ESPs and GPE financial and technical support – also provided by CAs and GAs – are closely associated with better quality planning. Nevertheless, country capacity at baseline still plays an important role in determining this quality. With the RF focusing primarily on progress in ESP development, progress in ESP implementation has been receiving less management attention while the on-going discussions related to the post-2020 strategy reflect a clear shift in paying heed to ESP implementation. Nevertheless, the CLEs report modest and diverse progress in ESP implementation with a range of explanations, including funding and capacity constraints.

GPE countries have progressed towards inclusive sector dialogue (objective 2), especially at the stage of plan development and in terms of ensuring the wider participation of civil society, albeit less than expected and hoped for in the following phase of dialogue on plan implementation and monitoring. The Joint Sector Review (JSR) led by the DCP government and conducted through the LEG is the model proposed by GPE for monitoring and improving sector plan implementation, though its use remains limited. Despite GPE guidance for JSRs, challenges remain related to a lack of clarity in responsibilities and the level of effort required for undertaking a JSR. A variety of issues limit the path to effective dialogue and monitoring, which ideally would lead to full and transparent mutual accountability. CLEs indicate that a weak tradition of consultations between the government and civil society, illustrated by limited history of well-established and inclusive dialogue mechanisms, hampers progress towards this objective.

ESPIGs have constituted the lion's share of GPE grant funding at the country level (objective 3) and they aim to support the implementation of parts of the sector-wide plans. They are relevant for GPE's goals, mostly on track to achieve their main outputs and objectives, and considered relevant and significant by stakeholders. As such, ESPIGs represent an effective delivery mechanism for GPE support, although they are subject to a demanding grant application process and on average only represent less than 10 percent of funding for ESP implementation.

Besides mapping documented progress at the country level, the ISE made an inventory of likely factors contributing to observed progress as identified by the CLE. An overview of these findings is reflected in the Textbox 4.1.1.

Textbox 4.1.1 GPE's contribution and additionality at the country level

The 12 CLEs reviewed in stage one include claims on GPE contribution[6] that take place in a complex context with many other contributing factors at play. GPE's contribution appear small in the bigger picture, even if contributions appear to hold strong significance to stakeholders.

- The most common contribution claim reflected in the CLEs is that GPE contributed to improving sector-wide planning.[7] However, almost half of CLEs qualified the contribution as small given that the DCP governments had a strong capacity for planning even in the absence of GPE.
- The second most common contribution claim is that GPE contributed to meeting sub-sector targets of sector-wide plans, mainly through ESPIGs.[8] Again, more than half of the CLEs qualified the contribution as moderate, reflecting the fact that ESPIGs cover only a small percentage – with exceptions – of sector plan funding.
- Half of the CLEs report that GPE contributed to improving sector dialogue and monitoring, although most of them qualified the GPE contribution as moderate.[9]
- Three CLEs report that GPE contributed to strengthening education systems (Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal) but they qualified the GPE contribution as small. Additionally, one CLE reported that GPE contributed to strengthening the country Public Financial Management system.
- Two CLEs reported that GPE contributed to improving the quality of international funding (Kenya and Senegal). The CLE for Senegal qualified the contribution as limited. The other two CLEs reported that GPE's use of an established mechanism for pooled funding contributed to strengthen it (Malawi and Mozambique).

The CLEs synthesis evaluation confirms that contribution to positive change is most evident for strengthening ESPs and least evident for more and better education sector financing beyond ESPIGs.

GPE's additionality compared with other types of funding is not clear because the CLEs review only GPE funding and do not compare it with other sources of funding. The CLEs are able to identify that the GPE support has been part of a set of causes that has been sufficient to achieve change, but they do not make claims about what would have happened in a situation without GPE support.

GPE has experienced mixed progress in raising international funding for education and aligning international funding with government systems (objective 4). GPE has demonstrated success in mobilizing unprecedented domestic and international funding pledges in recent years. In terms of better (i.e. more aligned and harmonized) funding, domestic factors such as the strength of country public finance management and the presence of established pooled funding mechanisms have

[6] Contribution claims come from a review of twelve CLEs. This analysis defines a contribution claim as a claim that something (a factor, actor, event, or event type) was causally relevant for something else. The CLEs formulated their claims based on triangulated evidence and using a contribution analysis approach, which identifies contribution factors by using a pre-defined theory to identify expected causal connection for research and then explore whether they held in practice based on data collection. Only contribution claims noted in at least three different CLEs were taken into account.

[7] Ten CLEs report that GPE contributed to improving planning (Cambodia, DRC, Guyana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, and South Sudan). Four CLEs qualify the contribution as small (Guyana, Nepal, Pakistan, and Rwanda).

[8] Eight CLEs report that GPE contributed to implementing some ESP sub-sectors (Cambodia, DRC, Guyana, Kenya, Nepal, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe). Five CLEs qualify the contribution as small (Guyana, Malawi, Nepal, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe).

[9] Nine CLEs report that GPE contributed to improving dialogue (Cambodia, Guyana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe). Five CLEs qualified the contribution as small (Guyana, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Senegal).

contributed to donors' and GPE's alignment with national systems. The effectiveness of GPE's advocacy efforts targeting donors to further align their funding and provide pooled funds remains limited.

GPE has overachieved on its targets related to building a stronger partnership (objective 5). This is i.a. reflected by improved clarity of roles, the number of knowledge products, and progress in professionalizing risk management and fiduciary oversight. At the same time, concerns remain about the quality of partnership dynamics at both the global and country level that are not captured by GPE's RF. This relates to issues such as country ownership, the complexity of effective constituency consultations, the level of delegation between the Board, its committees and the Secretariat, creating a spirit of mutual accountability, and balancing inclusiveness with practical functionality. The ongoing Effective Partnership Review (EPR) process aims to address these challenges, in particular at the country level, although its roll-out and effects takes a considerable time.

4.1.2 Efficiency

The efficient use of funds is a key aspect of country-level objective 3 in GPE's ToC, which includes efficient GPE financing. The implementation of GPE's grants in country is generally on-track according to GPE's internal monitoring reports, though subject to operational challenges and capacity constraints, especially in FCACs. The efficient use of funds is a constant point of attention for the Secretariat but is contingent upon an efficient operational environment that extends beyond fund management and includes other components of an efficient education system.

Besides, careful monitoring of progress in implementation and fund disbursements, delays in grants' approval and disbursements are currently being addressed by GPE through the Secretariat's Grant Process Streamlining project (GPSP).

4.1.3 Sustainability

Sustainability of outcomes related to improved education systems requires longer-term perspectives that exceed the lifespan of the traditional project cycle. The absence of specific sustainability criteria[10] (i.e. explicit conditions that are expected to be in place to ascertain that a particular system improvement remains may undermine ESP's sustainability of outcomes. Enhancement of DCPs' EMIS and other data-collection and reporting systems is recognized by GPE as a priority for results-tracking and sustainability. Capacity constraints of ministries of education at national and sub-national levels are a challenge in creating sustainable outcomes. Sustainability, as defined by the DAC, is not an explicit feature of GPE's ToC, though GPE's emphasis on pursuing education system-wide improvements implies a recognition of the multi-faceted change process that is needed to achieve sustainable outcomes. Having said that, operational support at present does not systematically incorporate sustainability considerations, including funding and capacity constraints.

[10] i.e. the explicit conditions that need to be in place to ascertain the continued prevalence / functioning of a particular system improvement, for instance by having budgetary provisions to cover recurrent costs, or having institutionalized competencies or procedures in place).

4.1.4 Relevance

GPE is well aligned with SDG 4's vision, targets, and indicators for basic education. GPE grants are well aligned with its higher-level goals of improved and more equitable learning outcomes and increased equity, gender equality, and inclusion in education. GPE grants are also well aligned with ESPs. Regarding needs-based funding, the GPE allocation formula prioritizes funding to FCACs, more populous countries, lower-income countries, and countries that are more vulnerable in terms of education needs. At the same time, GPE's operational model incentivizes country performance, such as the requirements of having the quality the ESP endorsed as a condition for receiving ESPIG funding, and the variable funding tranche.

The ToC in design contained in the 2020 strategy is clear in its logic, as it identifies and connects GPE's objectives and goals. It justifies the need for improved equity and quality education referring to external research and explains that these goals require an improved education system. It contains the logic that GPE's three country-level outputs will lead to this, with inclusive policy dialogue increasing the quality of policies and plans. This in turn should lead to better funding and implementation of programs for strengthening education systems. The current ToC is GPE's first and was constructed with limited available evidence, whereby it was necessary to assume many of the causal linkages. The ToC furthermore includes assumptions that partially refer to external factors for success, and partially provide an elaboration of GPE's intervention logic, illustrating significant steps from one results level to the next.

In practice, the ToC connections between GPE support and quality sector planning and ESPIG implementation appear valid under the assumption that a country is not affected by open conflict and support is tailored to country implementation capacity for sector plans. The causal connection with strengthened education systems requires effective ESP/TEP implementation, which is a different process from ESP/TEP plan development, and which has seen weaker progress than planning and ESPIG implementation. The reported evidence demonstrating the connection between GPE support and inclusive dialogue and monitoring and between GPE support and more and better financing remains limited at present.

4.2 Organizational effectiveness, stage one

4.2.1 Governance and management

The Board and its sub-committees have made deliberate intensified efforts to provide strategic direction and management oversight since 2015. These efforts contributed to a new overall strategy, expansion of GPE's policy framework, clarified roles, elaborated procedures, guidelines, and reports. In terms of resource mobilization and partner engagement, the GPE has been successful in the sense that the last few years saw unprecedented funding pledges of DCPs and Donor Partners, while signs of increased engagement of various particular constituency groups (DCPs, Private Sector, and Foundations) are reported as well. These achievements cannot be attributed to the Board alone, but have been clear Board priorities in guiding and steering the partnership and in particular the work of the Secretariat.

To make adequate follow up on Board's intensified efforts in giving strategic direction and management oversight possible, the Secretariat has been provided with additional resources to cope with increasing demands and expectations. The Secretariat has grown significantly in terms of budget, size, and responsibilities[11], although still within its own targets and reasonable when compared with other global partnerships. This growth also led to the delivery of an increasing number of outputs, many in response to Board decisions.

The Board and management have paid substantial attention to convening and aligning stakeholders. The results in convening stakeholders are primarily demonstrated in an increasing number of advocacy events and progress in the engagement of specific constituency groups. The results in aligning donors with DCP priorities, systems and procedures, however, remains an issue on which limited progress is made. The GPE Board and Secretariat have been successful in sustaining political will in financial terms, as it has secured increasing pledges from DCPs and donors. Political will as demonstrated by in-country ownership with DCP government's clearly taking the lead in ESP implementation remains a concern, that is being addressed in the EPR process.

The GPE has communicated its vision and made information about its results publicly accessible. At the same time, the GPE management has been rather self-critical about the quality of its communication and demonstrates a drive towards improvement. After having commissioned an external review, the Secretariat is now developing a new advocacy and communication strategy with the aim to further professionalize and enhance the effectiveness of its external communication.

4.2.2 Administrative efficiency

The Secretariat has managed partnerships and external relations by (a) providing extensive support to different constituent groups (in particular DCPs); (b) preparing background material and convening pre-board meetings among DCPs decisions; and (c) intensified global advocacy and leveraging its members to raise the visibility of education in the global development debate. The Secretariat has also enhanced its efforts to serve country-level processes and has shown flexibility and responsiveness in guidance for FCACs as these countries receive more, faster, and enhanced flexible funding. However, despite efforts to tailor its approach in grant application processes, it remains a challenge to make these sufficiently context-specific given the wide variety among FCACs.

The Secretariat has provided adequate attention to administrative efficiency, including GPE's results-based financing approach and budget management, with a focus on minimizing transaction costs (streamlining QA processes, developing SOPs, strengthening grant management-related information systems and operationalizing a VfM approach). The Secretariat has also given increasing attention to fiduciary oversight in the past few years and has performed satisfactorily since the baseline measurement in 2016 given that the Secretariat adequately deals with 100 percent of reported significant audit issues. The intensified fiduciary oversight required an obvious and significant increase in resources, whilst the need for this increase is less obvious given that since 2016 GPE has always met its performance targets for fiduciary oversight. At the same time, the Secretariat is developing more

[11]In 2015; 74 staff and an operating budget of US$ 20.1 million; in 2018: 108 staff and an operating budget of almost US$ 35 million.

sophisticated financial oversight and risk management systems, but their practical applicability and subsequent added value remain to be proven.

The overall increase in volume and diversity of tasks made the work of the Secretariat more complex, leading to questions about prioritization and coordination that are often not addressed in Board decisions. This potentially affects the clarity of purpose of the Secretariat's work with the risk of creating inefficiencies both at the global and country levels. The EPR process illustrates recognition of those risks at the country level and is therefore interpreted as an important and relevant undertaking in helping the GPE to refocus its efforts and address key challenges at the country level.

4.2.3 Country-level arrangements and processes

The ISE has seen ample evidence of LEGs promoting dialogue and collaboration among stakeholders, especially in enhancing the quality of ESPs/TEPs, be it that their centrality to this process is varied. At the same time, LEGs are still primarily regarded as essential consultation mechanism for the ESPIG applications with varying levels of government leadership.

Both country-level arrangements and the Secretariat support have aimed to strike the right balance between inclusion and participation in the LEG and the need for its effectiveness. At the same time, CLEs and the examination of Key Actors' Roles in GPE'S Country-Level Operational Model stress that work still needs to be done on improving the inclusiveness of LEG consultations in the area of expanding representation and deepening participation of teachers' unions and CSOs as well as on keeping the sector-wide forum active post-ESP completion, and on increasing the utility of JSRs for learning and decision-making.

There is less evidence of LEG effectiveness during the implementation of sector-wide plans. JSRs are seen as a step forward towards inclusive monitoring, but their use in compliance with GPE quality standards is still limited. The reported progress in promoting dialogue, an inclusive ESP/TEP development and the relatively positive ESPIG implementation rate have resulted in interventions that are better embedded in country plans. At the same time, the effect on donor confidence as demonstrated in their alignment to DCP's financial management and accountability systems has remained limited. It is however acknowledged that political factors in donor countries strongly influence their decisions related to funding modality, making GPE's influence on donors' alignment and harmonization relatively small.

In-country stakeholders' perceptions of in-country arrangements are generally positive while some constraints have been experienced concerning complex and time-consuming processes such as QA, and the lack of clarity regarding the role of different actors. Nevertheless, there are many and varying appreciated aspects related to in-country arrangements. Among these are: financial support from GPE to implement parts of the ESPs/TEPs, guidance in and support of collaborative sector-wide processes, the technical assistance by the CA and the GA, the inputs and insights from Secretariat in the preparation of ESP/TEP, and the constructive interaction between the CA, the GA and the Secretariat during the preparation of ESPIGs.

4.2.4 M&E performance

The Secretariat has seriously implemented the various work streams that make up GPE's M&E strategy using the global ToC and the RF as the main framework to organize M&E findings. The effective implementation of the M&E Strategy at impact level has been complicated by having to rely on data from UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS), which collects country data that is often limited and out of date. This has meant that issues like the level of violence experienced by children; and enrolment/drop out of disabled children or ethnic minorities are not (yet) part of the current RF.

Nevertheless, the RF with 37 indicators and the Results Report have resulted in a regular comprehensive and transparent overview of GPE's progress in relation to its existing ToC, including comparisons over time. At the same time, practical considerations have constrained the relevance of the RF as complex issues like progress in ESPIG implementation, advocacy, or fiduciary oversight are each captured in a single but limited indicator, which leads to the risk that decision-making is informed by relatively narrow data.

In addition, twenty summative and eight prospective have been commissioned, providing a systematic review of GPE's progress and contributions to its country-level objectives. The results of these have been synthesized, which enabled the formulation of generic lessons and recommendations that are meant to facilitate the strategic steering of the GPE.

The results of the impressive amount of M&E work[12] are publicly available, which has made GPE increasingly transparent in terms of its use of available resources, the nature and spread of its operations and its progress towards results. Generating and communicating this information to its diverse constituents according to its agreed RF, reflects GPE's progress in becoming more accountable for results, which has been one of the main purposes of GPE's M&E strategy.

Besides, the Secretariat has made clear efforts to extract lessons from the M&E work, which are then conveyed to the Board, the constituencies represented, and its sub-committees with the aim to inform global decision-making. However, whether the extent to which M&E results indeed influence decision-making and are proportionate to the level of effort and resources spent on M&E remains a question. In addition, the learning effect from M&E results beyond the Board and the Secretariat, and in particular across the partnership at the country level remains limited (partly by design).

4.3 Follow-up on recommendations from interim evaluation (2015)

In stage one, the ISE has also reviewed the extent to which the four overall recommendations from the 2015 interim evaluation have been implemented and what effect these have had on GPE's performance.

[12] Including Annual Portfolio Reviews and Results Reports, reviews of completion reports, 28 CLEs, three programmatic evaluations and six thematic reviews / studies till between 2016 and early 2020.

4.3.1 follow-up to Clarify added value and what constitutes success

For the first time in its existence, the GPE has developed and agreed on an overall ToC and RF that are both part of the GPE Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020. These frameworks are perceived as a significant step forward in clarifying GPE's ambitions, its conceptual thinking in how to pursue these ambitions and the results it wants to be held accountable for. In the past years, GPE has furthermore positioned itself as an inclusive global player contributing to SDG-4, with a clear emphasis on supporting basic education systems in a broad and expanding group of developing countries meeting GPE's eligibility criteria. This positioning has obviously impacted its funding patterns, with relatively small contributions towards a variety of activities in a large number of LICs and LMICs. This pattern illustrates the consensus of an inclusive partnership, but makes the added value of GPE in comparison to emerging funds in the education sector less clear.

4.3.2 Follow-up in developing a strategic management plan

GPE has developed an overall RF to enable systematic results-based management of its Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020. This RF reflects a partnership consensus in terms of which results will be measured and how to monitor GPE's progress and success. In line with its ToC and RF, GPE developed and implemented a deliberate M&E strategy with four work streams. The roll-out of GPE's M&E strategy included extensive internal monitoring and external evaluation efforts, which have enabled GPE to make significant progress in becoming more accountable for its overall results towards its diverse constituent groups. The effects of these M&E results on decision-making at global level is more difficult to determine, as Board decisions are often based on a variety of considerations and inputs, of which the M&E is one. Nevertheless, in comparison to the situation in 2015, the M&E efforts in the past years have ensured that decision-makers now have access to regular factual information about progress towards results.

In addition, a new Financing and Funding Framework was introduced that would allow for a broader mix of funding mechanisms, introduce more results-based financing, and facilitate additional resource mobilization from a wider range of sources[13]. The effects of this FFF have become visible in the introduction of instruments like KIX, and the Variable Tranche though it is too early to assess how these have respectively influenced knowledge sharing and ESPIG performance. Besides, the FFF has been successful in terms of generating increasing funding pledges and diversification of funding sources, although the contribution of the FFF to this will have to be regarded in combination of many other GPE efforts (e.g. advocacy, private sector engagement strategy, and so on).

4.3.3 Follow-up to clarify roles and responsibilities

Since 2015, the GPE charter articulating the role of the Board, the various constituency groups and the Secretariat has been updated. In addition, elaborate ToRs have been developed and refined outlining in detail the roles and responsibilities of each of the Board committees. Similarly, a ToR for the Secretariat's country-level role has been adopted in May 2019, along with ToRs for CAs and GAs. This means that significant progress has been made to clarify the respective roles of the diverse key entities that together determine GPE's performance.

[13] BOD/2017/03 DOC 02, March 1, 2017.

At the same time, workloads and capacities continue to evolve, increasingly burdening a.o. the GPC having to deal with a growing number of grants to be appraised and monitored, and the Secretariat facing an increasing number of tasks to be performed. Besides, concerns have been voiced about the level of delegation to the Secretariat, and whether the best use is made of the Secretariat. This illustrates that the journey towards clarified roles and responsibilities has made promising progress on paper, but in practice this continues to require regular fine-tuning and adjustment.

4.3.4 Follow-up to make GA and CA arrangements more adaptable to context

Optimizing country-level arrangements has been at the core of the on-going EPR roll-out process that following the completion of an externa review of GPE's in-country partnership arrangements in June-2018. In light of this, various efforts have been made to improve arrangements and make them more adaptable to context. This is illustrated by the earlier-mentioned ToRs for GAs and CAs, the expansion of accredited GAs (17 at present), the development of mutual accountability framework, pilots in financing CAs, other. Many of these efforts, however, remain in relative early stages, making it premature to pass judgement on their success.

The majority of these efforts do not (yet) go as far as the recommendations of the interim evaluation, in which the option of a carefully explored (gradual) transfer of responsibilities for grant supervising and coordination to DCPs is suggested. At present, GAs and CAs are still international agencies, working together with national entities to the extent capacities and resources allow. It appears that institutional constraints that follow from being a World Bank hosted trust fund complicate transferring these responsibilities to DCPs. At the same time, the lack of progress in alignment of donor funds to financial management and accountability systems of the DCPs, illustrates a hesitation to transfer fund management responsibilities as suggested in the 2015 interim evaluation.

4.4 LINKAGE TO STAGE TWO

The stage one findings related to GPE's effectiveness has revealed modest progress in ESP/TEP implementation and significant variety in LEG performance in realizing effective inclusive policy dialogue and monitoring processes. GPE's ToC assumes ESP implementation and effective LEGs to be key contributing factors towards improved education systems. The 28 CLEs and respective synthesis reports reflect an analysis of underlying factors. However, given the assumed critical importance, the ISE has conducted a more comprehensive in-depth (correlation) analysis of the contributing factors that explain ESP implementation and LEG effectiveness or lack thereof. Besides the 28 CLEs, this investigation has also considered relevant literature and GPE's programmatic evaluations (see sections 5.2 and 5.3).

Stage one has included a generic review of efficiency in the use of funds during implementation, but not a more comprehensive portfolio review that would be needed to assess the efficiency of GPE's grant allocation and disbursement processes. During stage two, this portfolio review has taken place and has also been used to assess the extent to which GPE is making the best use of the funds at its disposal (see section 5.4).

In addition, stage one findings illustrated a mixed progress towards more and better financing, with significant differences among donors and countries. Even though, it is acknowledged that GPE has limited influence over education funding decisions of donor partners and DCPs, it is important to better understand trends and determining factors in international and domestic financing. The ISE has, therefore, investigated this further in the expectation that this would lead to insights to help GPE in (a) better targeting its advocacy and fund-raising efforts and (b) informing future decisions relate to GPE's positioning in the international aid architecture for education (see section 5.5).

Besides, stage one findings related to effectiveness towards objective 5 (building a stronger partnership) demonstrated overachievement on related targets in GPE's RF, in particular in clarifying roles, responsibilities and key operational processes like shaping ESPIG applications and undertaking JSRs. At the same time, concerns were voiced about the quality of partnership dynamics that are not captured by the existing RF. This includes typical global partnership issues such as insufficient country ownership, weak mutual accountability, translating global agreements into local action, and difficulties in transitioning from plan development to implementation. Given that various other global partnerships have been facing similar challenges, the ISE has undertaken a benchmark-study among four other global funds, to generate ideas for improvement of GPE's governance and management arrangements (see section 6.2).

Other concerns, identified during the initial interviews in stage one, relate to the quality of cooperation among the various entities that make up the GPE (Board, its diverse constituency base, the various Board committees, the Secretariat and the key actors at country level: LEGs, CAs, GAs and relevant ministries). Many of these concerns have also been addressed by the EPR process, which illustrates that beyond much-needed clarity, additional measures are required to improve partnership dynamics. Contemporary theories and models[14] on building strong multi-stakeholder partnerships confirm this as they emphasize the need to also pay attention to the less-tangible elements of partnership dynamics such as vibrancy, recognition, cooperation, joint accountability, and collective learning. In stage two, the ISE has, therefore, investigated the overall health of the partnership in further depth, paying particular attention to the quality of interaction among partners throughout the GPE (see section 6.3).

Stage one findings confirmed the logic of GPE's conceptual frameworks, but also revealed concerns about their use and perceived usefulness, which was labeled for further investigation in stage two (see section 6.4). Finally, the desk study in stage one showed that GPE's M&E strategy has largely been implemented according to plan, resulting in the wealth of M&E information that the GPE Secretariat has collected and publicly reported upon. The stage one findings illustrated that GPE has made significant progress in meeting the accountability purpose of its M&E strategy. What has not become clear yet is the extent to which the provision of M&E information adequately responds to the other purposes of the M&E strategy: stimulating learning and improved performance as well as facilitating organizational decision-making. Therefore, in stage two, the ISE has been exploring GPE's performance in M&E to determine the extent to which GPE's M&E information has been used and has been perceived useful for purposes beyond accountability (see section 6.5)

[14] See a.o. GIZ's Capacity Works model (2015), the Free Actor Network Approach by E. Wielinga (2012), and the MSP Guide by Wageningen University (2016).

5 DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

Under Development Effectiveness, the ISE presents the results of an analysis of factors contributing to ESP implementation and LEG effectiveness. Subsequently, findings related to efficiency in grant-making processes, trends in fund allocation (use of funds), and trends in financing for education are presented in this chapter.

5.1 ESP IMPLEMENTATION

Core question: What explains the apparent limited ESP/TEP implementation?

Main Findings: a review of the connection of factors within GPE's sphere of control and ESP implementation shows that GPE's ToC appears to hold in the sense that a combination of good plans, inclusive dialogue and monitoring, and adequate financing is needed for successful ESP implementation. GPE's high success levels in achieving better plans alone is a good start, but not enough for ESP implementation. Besides, implementation capacity at national and sub-national level, sufficient funding and motivation are essential factors for ESP implementation but despite those factors being acknowledged in its ToC, GPE's ability to influence those factors has remained limited.

5.1.1 Introduction

The GPE ToC considers ESP implementation[15], which ESPIGs finance only in a small part, as crucial for making progress towards more efficient and effective education systems. It assumes that the combined effect of GPE contributions to sector planning, dialog and monitoring, and financing will result in connected improvements in quality and together support ESP implementation.

This section explores whether the country-level outputs as foreseen in GPE's ToC are effective in driving ESP implementation and in combination with which factors. In doing so, we first explain the analytical framework used, followed by a generic overview of progress in ESP implementation according to the CLEs. Subsequently, we will review the positive or negative effects of the various internal and external factors on ESP implementation.

5.1.2 Analytical Framework

ESP implementation is central to GPE's conceptual framework[16], as it forms a key causal link from GPE supported interventions to improved education systems (goal 3). GPE aims to support ESP implementation in a number of direct and indirect ways. Direct ways include (i) the development of better (i.e. more evidence-based and nationally owned) sector-plans, (ii) improved mutuality accountability and inclusive monitoring of plan implementation and (iii) financing. The ISE considers these three as the assumed key internal contributing factors.

[15] For the sake of brevity, we refer to ESP implementation meaning both ESP and TEP implementation.
[16] BOD/2015/12/DOC08-annex 1, Rev. 1

GPE also supports ESP Implementation in less direct ways. Most importantly, through its advocacy and financial support, GPE aims to influence domestic and international financing, while also implementation capacities at national and sub-national level are supported as part of the ESPIGs. In its ToC, GPE recognizes the importance of these factors (funding and capacity) but also acknowledges that these cannot be controlled but merely influenced by GPE. The ISE considers these as a first category of external contributing factors to be reviewed as part of its analysis of ESP Implementation. This implies looking at implementation capacity, motivation and funding (opportunities), which are also factors on which systematic information is available through the CLEs.

In addition and in accordance with its ToC, GPE pays particular attention to Fragile and Conflict Affected countries as they are likely to have the largest and most pressing education needs. At the same time, this particular context is likely to complicate progress in sector-plan implementation. Besides, GPE's ToC recognizes the important of cross-sectoral collaboration, which illustrates that the institutional setting in which sector-plans are to be implemented are likely to make a difference. Finally, even though not explicitly recognized in GPE's ToC, broader literature research suggests that also a range of socio-economic factors are likely to influence the implementation (see Annex Three). The ISE recognizes that these factors are outside GPE's realm of control or influence, but do reflect factors that are likely to affect GPE's effectiveness and therefore deserve attention in the design and monitoring of plans. In this light, the ISE reviews a 2nd category of external factors consisting of (i) issues related to fragility and conflict (i.e. rule of law, FCAC status, political stability), (ii) issues related to the institutional setting (i.e. relations with other ministries, number of ministries involved, level of decentralization), and (iii) selected socio-economic factors (i.e. ethnic diversity and (in-school) population density).

In summary, the ISE uses GPE's ToC as the point of departure for its analytical framework, building its analysis around the distinction between GPE's sphere of control, GPE sphere of influence, and mechanisms that are outside GPE's influence but still important in explaining ESP implementation[17]. This analytical framework therefore contains three categories of factors.

1. Internal factors, within GPE sphere of control, which relates to better plans, more inclusive dialog and plan monitoring, and better (ESPIG) financing.
2. Factors within GPE's sphere of influence but outside its sphere of control, which relates to domestic / international funding, implementation capacity at national and sub-national level, relationships between and motivation of stakeholders at the country-level
3. Factors outside GPE's sphere of influence, which relates to conflict and fragility, the broader institutional setting, and socio economic conditions (e.g. ethnic diversity and in-school population density[18]).

[17]GPE's ToC does not explicitly distinguish its spheres of control, influence and interest. For this analysis, the ISE has assumed that the GPE comprises the Board, its Sub-committees, the Secretariat and the LEGs. It is furthermore assumed that the LEGs are led, hence include, the key governmental institution(s) responsible for basic education, but not the government as a whole.

[18] The factors in this category have been chosen through a two steps approach. First, the ISE has conducted a comprehensive literature review of the factors influencing government programmes implementation in developing countries. Second, and in the absence of a unified framework, the ISE has created a long-list of factors and conducted correlation analysis to prioritize a short-list of factors with a higher potential explanatory value for the analysis.

METHODOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

The analysis in this chapter relies on a combination of tabulations, correlation analysis, thematic analysis of contribution analysis conducted at CLE level, and qualitative comparative analysis.
Tabulations and correlation analysis identified if and how the mentioned hypothetical internal and external factors appear *prima facie* associated with ESP implementation, screening the myriad of potential factors into a more limited manageable list. Thematic analysis of contribution analysis and qualitative comparative analysis have explored more deeply the causal relations, identifying potential pathways and potential configurations of factors.

The CLE judgement of overall implementation of the ESP is the major outcome measure, which is mentioned as 'Implementation Performance'. The analysis has relied on the CLEs' assessment, which is a consistent measure across CLEs. The 28 CLEs report consistent and complete information on the internal factors. The ISE has converted the CLE's rating of achievements on planning, dialogue and monitoring, and financing, and GPE contributions to these into 1-2-3 numerical ranking. These numerical ranking tracks the three scale color coding used in the CLE. Averages rankings have been used where there is more than one ranking.[19] These ratings of achievements and of contribution claims are included in Annex 5.1.4.

The only exception to using the CLE ratings is for achievements in respect of Domestic and International Financing. Here, the CLE have based their rating solely on aspects relevant to GPE such as whether or not the country met specific GPE targets or whether or not the amounts were increasing or decreasing. The ISE has preferred to use the average annual percentages of domestic expenditure on education relative to overall public expenditure. Adding to this, it also considered donor and GPE funding as percentages of the total cost of the ESP, over the review period or as closely as it could match the review period.

The second and third categories, ratings/values for external factors are interval numerical and so did not need any conversion; qualitative comments on other potential factors such as decentralization have, however, been converted similarly to a 1-2-3 ranking. The tables showing the values for all these other factors are in Annex 5.1.4. There are several sources: the 28 CLEs themselves, the 2019 CLE Synthesis Report and the 2020 CLE Synthesis Report; UIS and the World Bank global indexes. For the finance data extracted from the CLEs, it seemed more logical to prefer an estimate from the CLEs spanning the longest period within the review period rather than any point (one year) value. Given that nearly all the data is interval, correlational rather than tabular analysis is required.


5.1.3 Progress on ESP implementation

A review of the information on ESP implementation, as well as progress on other areas of the GPE model, suggests that the most frequent rating for progress in implementation performance is "modest" (see Figure 5.1.3 below).[20] When looking at the overall success in terms of progress in ESP

[19] Note that these rankings, whilst not intended to be comparative between reports but a rating for each Contribution in each country, do effectively rank countries as poor, medium, and good in respect of each rating.
[20] The CLEs report that coming to a judgement on progress in implementing ESP has been difficult, because of lack of clear data on this dimension. Often, reporting against plans was incomplete, lacking either data on higher-level results or on activities implemented. Their judgement has had to rely more than would have been ideal on the information available for the implementation of the ESPIG.

implementation, DRC, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan are rated lowest whilst Bangladesh, Kyrgyz Republic, Mozambique and Rwanda are rated highest.

Figure: 5.1.3: Ratings for achievements in respect of Planning, Sector Dialogue, Monitoring and Implementation



When looking at the achievements at the lower results levels of GPE's ToC, it becomes clear that progress has been more considerable for ESP planning than for ESP dialogue and monitoring, which appear to be more at par with the rating for ESP implementation.

5.1.4 Explanation of causal connection between internal and external factors and ESP implementation

As indicated above, the ISE has reviewed the effect of three categories of factors on ESP implementation. The specific factors under each category that were reviewed and appeared to have a significant association are summarized in table 1 below. The full range of factors originally identified as possibly affecting ESP implementation are briefly discussed in Annex 5.1.

Table 5.1.4 Factors associated with CLE rating of performance in ESP implementation


Category	Factors (nature of association)
1. Internal factors within GPE's sphere of control	• GPE contribution to ESP Implementation, i.e. ESPIG funding, including VT (positive) • Achievements in terms of improved planning, dialogue and monitoring (positive) • GPE contribution to improved planning, dialogue and monitoring (negative)
2. External factors within GPE's sphere of influence	• Motivation of governmental and non-governmental actors (positive_ • Implementation capacity at national and sub-national level, including inter-governmental cooperation • Availability of domestic financing (positive) • % of donor funding (negative)
3. External factors within GPE's sphere of interest	• Conflict and political stability (negative), and absence of violence (positive) • Institutional setting (rule of law = positive, others context specific) • Socio-economic conditions, including population density (positive), ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity (negative)

Notes: The table includes only the factors that have been found statistically significant in the correlation and that also had other supporting evidence in their favor, detailing the implementation pathways. A positive association indicates a factor that helps, while a negative association indicates a factor that hinders ESP implementation.

INTERNAL FACTORS WITHIN GPE'S SPHERE OF CONTROL

The CLEs provide assessments of different inter-related aspects of in-country GPE performance. The ISE has understood these inter-relations as follows;

Figure 5.1.4a Inter-related aspects of GPE performance



In light of this, the ISE has first conducted a correlation between ESP implementation and the preceding results / GPE contributions, as a first step to understand if and how the various ratings are linked to each other. This would provide us a set of issues for further consideration in a more qualitative analysis of CLE findings. Below are the results that emerge from these associations:

1. GPE contribution to ESP implementation is positively associated with implementation rating, which is consistent *prima facie* with the validity of GPE ToC
2. Achievements in planning, dialog and monitoring are positively associated with ESP implementation, which, again is consistent with GPE ToC. However, the analysis suggests that achievements in quality of planning is much higher than quality of dialogue and monitoring and financing. This indicates that the logic in GPE ToC has not entirely applied (below more information on this analysis).
3. The contribution of GPE to planning and Sector Dialogue and Monitoring is negatively associated with ESP implementation, which at first sight appears not consistent with GPE ToC.

GPE CONTRIBUTION TO ESP IMPLEMENTATION

A thematic analysis of CLEs and the Synthesis report suggests that ESPIG-funding constituted GPE's main and most visible contribution to sector plan implementation.[21] ESPIG effects appear disproportionally higher than their limited size because they constituted most of the resources available for capital investments in contexts where the vast majority of domestic sector financing covers recurrent costs. In Senegal, for example, the ESPIG constitutes a limited amount of total funding, but was unique in providing funding for strengthening sector governance (e.g. introduction of performance contracts, training of school-based management committees), and strengthening monitoring and evaluation systems[22].

[21] CLE synthesis Report 2020

[22] The association between ESP implementation and GPE contribution to ESP implementation suffer from a methodological limitation, as the CLE synthesis reports that due to limited data available for ESP implementation, the data available for ESPIG implementation has sometime been the back-bone of their analysis of ESP implementation, likely strengthening the relationship between these two levels of GPE ToC.


The CLEs and their synthesis reports suggest that the only other GPE mechanism with a viable contribution to ESP implementation is the variable tranche.[23] Putting in place incentives for in-country stakeholders to make efforts for reaching agreed upon targets and monitor related progress on an ongoing basis is the pathway at play.

In summary, the CLEs and the CLE synthesis confirm the importance of GPE's contribution to ESP implementation through ESPIG funding. It leaves open the possibility that providing the ESPIG without a strong support for ESP planning would have been as effective. Exploring this possibility is the next step in the ISE analysis.

From achievements in planning, dialogue and monitoring to ESP implementation

As expected in the GPE ToC, the correlation analysis suggests that progress in sector planning and sector dialogue and monitoring is positively associated with ESP implementation. However, progress in quality plans has been much more common than quality dialogue and monitoring. Figure 5.4.1b shows the difference between the rating of ESP implementation and the rating of quality planning (left), quality dialogue (center), and quality monitoring (right). The pink columns shows the number of CLEs that report that rating for quality planning, dialogue, or monitoring is higher than the rating for implementation, pointing to a situation where change at the lower level of GPE ToC has not (yet) translated into change at the higher level of the ToC. It illustrates that this situation has come about much more often for planning than for dialogue or monitoring.

Figure 5.1.4b Difference in the rating of ESP implementation and ratings of quality of planning, quality of dialogue, and quality of monitoring



It appears that more headway is made in improving the quality of plans, while progress to improve the quality of dialogue and monitoring has been more modest and in line with progress in ESP implementation. In other words, GPE has been more successful in improving sector plans than in improving dialog and monitoring. According to the logic of GPE's ToC all three are needed to realize

[23] CLE synthesis Report 2020

significant improvements in ESP implementation, hence this finding is consistent with GPE's ToC as it illustrates that improvement in sector plans alone is not enough for successful ESP implementation.[24]

Looking at how GPE contributions to planning, dialogue and monitoring correlate with ESP implementation an, initially surprising, negative connection emerges, indicating that higher scores of GPE contributions go together with lower ESP implementation ratings. Given the limited number of countries and associated methodological limitations[25], the ISE wants to be cautious with drawing strong conclusions from this. Nevertheless, a more qualitative analysis based on the CLE findings and interviews with GPE stakeholders, provides plausible explanations for this negative association.

One explanation is that the GPE allocation formula provides more funding and contribution in country contexts such as Nigeria, Pakistan, and South Sudan where achievements are very likely to be weak because the environment is less conducive to ESP implementation. Connecting to this, where the ratings of achievement are already 'good' or 'strong', then there is little space for further progress. Additionally, GPE is that much better in influencing quality planning that it achieves a good plan even in places, while influencing dialogue and monitoring and financing proves to be more complicated.

Other explanations are that the effect of GPE contributions is mediated by contextual factors, which determine what other un-intended effects GPE might have on the system apart from raising the quality of planning. The CLEs, for example, suggest that GPE planning emphasizes the importance of Ministerial direction of the MoE rather than the capacities for Regions and Districts to implement the plan and coordination with other Ministries, inter-ministerial coordination, and high-level dialogue with the MoF.[26] Additionally, it may be that efforts to increase inclusiveness and participation in developing the sector plan via the LEG detract from the capacities available to implement the plan.[27]

From this analysis of factors / mechanisms within GPE's sphere of control, the ISE concludes that the GPE ToC overall appears to be valid, but that challenges in strengthening dialog and monitoring remain important barriers in ESP implementation. The implication is not that planning in itself is bad for ESP implementation, but rather that being so much better at planning than in influencing other elements in GPE's ToC does not (yet) lead to effective ESP implementation.

External factors in GPE sphere of influence: government motivation, government capacity and funding gaps

The analysis turns to the role of contextual factors, starting from those that are closer to GPE and exploring how GPE has adapted its support to filling gaps and removing barriers when possible, and adapting when not possible. This step of the analysis relies more on the qualitative information provided by CLEs and CLE synthesis and uses the correlation analysis only for triangulation.

[24]The ISE has conducted a QCA on the five best and worst countries on the implementation rating, which supports this conclusion, whilst it also nuances it. None of the five best countries had the highest score for progress in all three dimensions of planning, dialog and monitoring, and financing, but they had in general made at least a modest progress in all three area, with the exception of Mozambique's progress in financing.

[25]The distribution of ratings of contribution to quality planning is very skewed: contribution to planning is rated Poor twice, medium 6 times and good 20 times. With such a skewed distribution, the chances of getting a skewed result increases.

[26] More information on this below

[27] However, there is little evidence supporting this possibility.

The CLEs have identified three assumption areas underlying the step between progress in planning, dialogue and monitoring and financing, and ESP implementation. These are: sufficient motivation in DCPs and country-level stakeholders, sufficient implementation capacity in DCP governments and stakeholders, and opportunities for ESP implementation, especially in the forms of available finance. Their analysis has confirmed the importance of these three factors.

For **motivation**, the CLEs and CLE Synthesis Report suggest that the degree to which all relevant government and non-government actors perceive the sector plan as being relevant to their mandate and mission is an important driver of their motivation to contribute to implementation.[28] Not ensuring motivation by all Ministries, Government agencies, and decentralized actors who share the responsibility for the education sector was an important barrier.[29] The present correlation analysis confirms the association between the presence of complex relations across Ministries and lack of empowerment of decentralized government and limited ESP implementation. One additional facet of the inter-Ministerial relationship is the relationship with the Ministry of Finance.

The CLEs and CLE synthesis provides qualitative evidence that lack of **capacity** in DCP government and stakeholders has been an important barrier to ESP implementation, suggesting which capacity gaps have constituted the largest barriers across countries.[30] Notwithstanding the list below, the configurations of capacity gaps have been unique in each country.

1. MoE coordination capacity at central level, together with lack of clear definition of responsibilities within the MoE for ESP implementation and monitoring[31]
2. Turn-over in senior MoE staff responsible for leading certain elements of sector plan implementation[32]
3. Gaps in specific technical capabilities of MoE staff. For example, specialization in statistical analysis or procurement[33]
4. Lack of technical capabilities at the sub-national level[34]
5. Absence or low quality of operational planning such as through actionable implementation plans at national and sub-national levels.[35]
6. The absence of realistic and user-friendly results frameworks to facilitate action and allow monitoring of progress in plan implementation[36]
7. Capacity to use JSR data to inform sector plan implementation[37]

[28] CLE synthesis Report 2020
[29] Bangladesh, DRC, Mali are examples where the responsibility for the education sector is shared by several ministries. DRC, Nepal, and Nigeria are examples where the responsibility is shared between decentralized level of government.
[30] CLE synthesis Report 2020
[31] CLEs for DRC, Kyrgyz Republic, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zimbabwe
[32] E.g. in the CLE for Zambia
[33] E.G Lack of skills in procurement skills have been noted in Malawi, and Mauritania. Lack in sufficient numbers of staff with adequate technical expertise and experience were noted in in several CLEs (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) as hindering country capacity to collect and, especially, conduct meaningful analyses of available data to inform decision making.
[34] E.g. in Ethiopia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mozambique, South Sudan and Zimbabwe
[35] E.G in DRC and Zimbabwe
[36] e.g. in Ethiopia, Malawi, Nepal, Nigeria and Zimbabwe.
[37] CLEs in Cambodia, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan, and Togo noted that the absence of effective monitoring paired, in some cases, with overly ambitious plans negatively influenced sector plan implementation

8. In some cases, capacity gaps interact: EMIS is associated positively with Implementation Performance. However, the quality of an EMIS is influence both by capacity gaps in statistical and monitoring skills in particular DCP governments' agencies and also by gaps in coordination as it is often the shared responsibility of different entities: agencies collecting data in the education sector, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, etc.

To further reinforce the importance of capacity gaps in DCP government, the correlation analysis has found that government effectiveness has the strongest association with ESP implementation rating, which the QCA has also confirmed.

It appears therefore that capacity gaps have been an important barrier, but the evidence does not suggest that GPE's influence in filling capacity gaps has been strong. The CLEs report positive examples, such in Senegal, Togo, and Uganda where ESPIG funds covered, amongst others, training and equipment to key government (and, in Togo, also non-government) units responsible for plan implementation at both central and decentralized levels and were credited for improving project management and financial management capacity within government, with a focus on achieving results. Besides these few examples, however, CLEs found little evidence of ESPIG-funded project or programs regularly including efforts to assess, monitor or help strengthen in-country capacity for sector plan implementation.

The CLE Synthesis also suggests that Secretariat CLs, grant agents, and coordinating agents have had limited influence on ESP implementation and that neither ESA not ESPs have conducted comprehensive capacity gaps analysis that have resulted in relevant and strong strategies for filling those gaps, pointing to a limited effect for planning in filling this key gaps.

Regarding the capacity of civil society, CSEF funding was broadly credited with having allowed recipients to strengthen their internal capacity to become more active LEG participants but without specific examples of related actions in ESP implementation.

Regarding **domestic and international financing** (= change in opportunities) **for ESP implementation**, the ISE mainly reviews the funding gaps and % of donor financing. The thematic analysis of CLEs and CLE synthesis 2020 suggests that sufficient domestic financing is a key factor for ESP implementation, which is confirmed by the correlation analysis. The thematic review furthermore shows that funding gaps have been a widespread barrier for ESP implementation with actual funding gaps ranging from 0 percent (Cambodia and Senegal), to 32 percent (Zambia) to over 70 percent (South Sudan). Significant funding shortfalls, which negatively affected countries' ability to implement planned interventions and contributed to fragmented plan implementation, were also noted in Mozambique, the Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.

The level of donor funding as a percentage of ESP total is *negatively* associated with implementation performance. This is quite surprising, but out of the twenty CLEs where annual averages could be calculated over half were between 11 percent and 18 percent, which is a small range. The three highest percentages were for Liberia, Sierra Leone (both having experienced EBOLA), and South Sudan (a civil war). This illustrates that higher amounts of donor funding were available for humanitarian reasons in a rather challenging context for ESP implementation. Furthermore, donor funding and, in

particular, GPE funding appears to have often been used in cases where there is an unanticipated shortfall so that the funding is more akin to trouble-shooting than a planned investment.

When looking at the GPE contribution to domestic financing, it appears that in only one out of 28 countries (Malawi), the GPE contribution is rated "considerable", while in 14 out 28 this contribution is rated minimal. This confirms the limited influence of GPE on domestic financing. GPE's contribution to international financing scores better with 9 out of 28 reflecting a considerable contribution, which is largely explained by the fact that ESPIG funds are part of and have helped leveraging international financing.

From its analysis of this second category of factors within GPE's sphere of influence, the ISE concludes that coordination across DCP government is a key issue for strengthening ESP implementation, both in terms of creating motivation and capacity for working together and in ensuring capacity in all the parts of the system involved in implementing ESPs. This was noted both for inter-ministerial and inter-agency coordination at the central level and coordination between decentralized levels of governments. The importance of this cross-sectoral cooperation within government was already foreseen in GPE's ToC, while the analysis shows that also cooperation of relevant government entities at national and sub-national level is a key factor for successful GPE implementation. At the same time, it appears that the extent to which this can be influenced by GPE has proved to be difficult.

In addition, the ISE observes a limited focus on filling capacity gaps for ESP implementation. This starts with a relatively weak capacity gap analysis during ESA and ESP planning, which appears to be an important missing link, partly explaining the combination of GPE's strong success in planning and its more limited success in ESP implementation.

External factors in GPE sphere of interest: Conflict and fragility, institutional setting, and socio-economic features.

Pathways related to conflict, fragility and emergencies

The country's FCAC status and indexes of conflict, political stability, and absence of violence are all associated significantly with Implementation performance in the expected directions (the first two negatively and the last two positively).[38] The ISE points out, however, issues of reliability in GPE FCAC classification, because, for example, Mozambique and Rwanda are classified by GPE as FCAC but have good scores under all other indexes of political stability and absence of violence.
In addition to fragility connected to man-made crisis, three other countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) suffered from the EBOLA outbreak, and Nepal had earthquakes.

Considering conflict and emergencies together, this means that most (16) of the countries had very problematic national circumstances to contend with; and this augmented index is strongly negatively associated with Implementation performance.

Institutional Setting

Some of the factors mentioned above (e.g. cross-sectoral collaboration) can be considered to be part of institutional setting as well, but are within the realm of GPE's influence and ambitions. In this

[38] For additional results e.g. cross-tabulations and the correlation table see Annex 5.2

section, the ISE considers additional factors that relate to the institutional framework but are not in GPE's sphere of influence.

The most remarkable factor appears to be *the rule of law*, which tracks the ability to enforce contracts in the national tribunals. This factor is associated with ESP implementation, with the pathway likely being a better ability to involve and manage service providers in ESP implementation, including from the private sector. Service providers can rely on contracts being enforced, also when the government is a contractor. For rule of law, South Sudan and Zimbabwe are rated the lowest, and Rwanda and Senegal the highest.

Besides, several CLEs further noted changes in institutional context as likely factors that – in all cases negatively – affected sector plan implementation. Examples include changes in government in Mozambique and Zimbabwe; recurrent teacher strikes in Senegal; cash shortages and reduced spending power due to a deteriorating economic situation, resulting in a lack of funding and a threat of education employee strikes in Zimbabwe; armed conflict such as in South Sudan, or political instability paired with health crises in the DRC. The regular occurrence of context-specific factors affecting ESP implementation underlines the importance of a systematic monitoring of this context, so that implementation problems can be better anticipated.

Pathways connected to the socio-economic context

The ISE reviewed the connection between various socio-economic conditions and ESP implementation (see Annex Three). Concentrating on those with the strongest link, it appeared that population density is positively associated with ESP implementation because it is, *in general*, easier to deliver services to more concentrated centers than to widely dispersed remote, rural areas. The pathway connecting the two is likely that it is more difficult to deliver good quality educational services in widely dispersed, remote rural areas. The countries with the highest population density is Bangladesh at 1,170 persons per km^2, which was more than four times the next country. The least dense were Mauritania at 4 persons per km^2 and Mali at 15 persons per km^2.

Ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity are strongly negatively associated with ESP implementation, as it is more difficult to deliver educational services to a widely diverse population (different languages, norms and habits). South Sudan and Nigeria are the most diverse and are two of the five poorest performers, Bangladesh, Rwanda and Zambia are the least diverse and the first two are among the four best performers.

Combination of factors

The ISE has conducted a QCA, looking at the five best and worst countries and searching for combination of internal and external factors associated with ESP implementation. From this, it appeared that no combination is stable across countries, suggesting that countries' experiences are largely unique, with only partial common points. The QCA does suggest cases of possible combinations, but the reader should be careful in taking these out of context.

The case of Rwanda suggests that success can be driven by strong government effectiveness and a drive to fight corruption and strengthen the rule of law. This also allows GPE to create value through ESPIGs and support for monitoring systems. The cases of Bangladesh and Kyrgyz Republic suggests

that progress in ESP implementation can be driven by rising financing for education (expenditure per student in primary school). The case of Liberia, however, which has a similar combination of positive factors as Bangladesh and Kyrgyz Republic, suggests that large gaps in DCP government effectiveness shuts this pathway down. Bangladesh and Kyrgyz Republic have an average rating for government effectiveness, suggesting that it is neither a driving force nor a barrier. The case of Gambia suggests that GPE can be a strong driving force for ESP implementation in smaller countries, where its ESPIGs is a larger minority of ESP implementation funding than in other countries.

In cases of weaker ESP implementation, external factors appears to be hindering both ESP implementation and strong progress in planning, dialog and monitoring, and financing. In cases such as Nigeria, South Sudan, and Sierra Leone, GPE is still able to influence a stronger planning, but not move forward with a similar pace on the other areas of its ToC.

The implication seems to be that the areas where GPE could make large improvements in ESP implementation are in targeting additional funding and support countries that experience large capacity gaps and weak government effectiveness but no barriers in terms of open conflict and emergencies. In countries where conflict is an issue, GPE should be modest in its expectations of the country being able to implement an ESP/TEP, and support might be better delivered through other mechanisms.

5.1.5 Overall conclusions

GPE contribution to ESP implementation is positively associated with the rating of implementation performance. Achievements related to the quality of planning, dialogue and monitoring, and financing are positively associated with the CLE's rating of implementation as well. This pattern of findings illustrates that the intervention logic in the ToC remains valid as it points out that the GPE supported building blocks (better plans, dialogue & monitoring, and financing) are all needed to make progress in ESP implementation. At the same time, the ISE observes that progress in improving plans has moved at a faster pace than progress in dialogue and monitoring, which has been more at par with the modest progress in ESP implementation. This indicates that improving plans alone has not been enough to ascertain satisfactory plan implementation.

Besides, the ISE observes that higher ratings of the GPE contributions to sector planning, sector dialogue and monitoring are associated with lower ratings of implementation performance. This negative association between GPE's contribution and ESP implementation is explained by the fact that GPE support towards inclusive planning processes is adapted to support needs, which typically are highest in countries with relatively weak plan implementation capacity. Consequently, the GPE contributions should be highest in countries where it ESP implementation is most likely to be difficult. Finally, stimulating inclusiveness implies getting more actors involved. This leads to sector plans that are more comprehensive but also more complicated as they would have to address the needs and interest of a larger group of stakeholders. Overall, this points to the significance of other factors that are not directly part of GPE's interventions.

Such other factors are partly within and partly beyond GPE's sphere of influence. Within GPE's sphere of influence, implementation capacity, funding, and motivation are all key factors for ESP

implementation and GPE has been able to influence these mainly through the ESPIGs. However, in reality it appears that large capacity and funding constraints exist, and that GPE's influence to reduce those constraints has been limited. A key emerging area of attention has been inter-government relationships and cooperation, in particular between the Ministries responsible for education, the Ministry of Finance and sub-national government entities.

The most important factors outside GPE's sphere of influence are related to the institutional and socio-economic context. Concerning the institutional context, it appears that the absence of conflict and fragility and the presence of rule of Law are positively associated with ESP implementation. In terms of socio-economic conditions, it seems that a higher population density (i.e. making it easier to reach higher numbers of students), and lower ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity (i.e. less variety in languages, cultural norms and habits to be integrated) are enabling factors for ESP implementation.

5.2 LEG EFFECTIVENESS

Core question: What explains the differences in LEG strategic effectiveness, in particular during ESP implementation?

Main findings: Progress in LEG effectiveness has been uneven across countries, but there is never only one explanation for why LEGs are successful or less successful in their core policy-dialog functions. LEG effectiveness principles are important, but LEGs do not need to meet all principles to be effective. Mutual accountability appears to have the strongest association with LEG effectiveness, but no single principle is of decisive importance, hence combinations of principles are required. Technical capability gaps among members are an issue for all LEGs, while their motivation and leverage also plays a role. Contextual factors hinders the LEGs from meeting the effectiveness principles. Weak sector governance in large, populous, diverse, and stratified societies or conflict pre-empt most LEG principles from being present. Benchmarking suggests that GPE has taken on a bigger challenge than comparator partnerships in strengthening the sector as a whole as the focus for its country-level multi-stakeholder partnerships.

5.2.1 Introduction

Efforts particularly concerning the Effective Partnership Review (EPR) have been devoted to studying the effectiveness of country-level arrangements. This has led the Secretariat to formulate a definition of LEG strategic effectiveness in terms of the LEGs discharging core policy functions where LEGs can add most value to the sector: supporting sector plan development, implementation and monitoring, addressing education financing and resource use, and promoting harmonization and alignment.[39] The Secretariat has also devoted analytical work to exploring the determinants of LEG strategic effectiveness, which led to the definition of seven enabling factors for effective LEGs, the LEG effectiveness principles (see Textbox 5.2.1).[40] This useful analytical work by the Secretariat is now

[39] Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Principles towards effective local education groups. Working paper; Global Partnership for Education (2019) What can local education groups learn from effective coordination and partnership mechanisms? Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Local education group self-assessment

[40] Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Principles towards effective local education groups. Working paper. Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Local education group self-assessment. ppt.

continuing with the on-going LEG self-assessment project, implemented in pilot countries.[41] Under this project, LEG members from volunteer countries will rate the strategic performance of the LEG and explore its determinants in view of identifying and agreeing on priority improvement areas to enhance effectiveness.[42]

Textbox 5.2.1 LEG effectiveness principles

- The mandate, functions and objectives are clear and agreed
- The partnership framework generates inclusion and engagement
- There is a clear governance structure for coordination
- Working arrangements are flexible, 'fit-for-purpose and well-communicated
- Regular monitoring contributes to learning and improved performance
- Leadership and ownership are demonstrated in practice
- Key actors contribute to healthy partnership dynamics

LEGs are central in achieving GPE's country-level objectives. Therefore, the ISE has explored in greater depth what contributes to LEG's strategic effectiveness, as well as why some approaches to working with and in LEGs have worked in some contexts but not others. The results of the analysis should be considered initial and partial, pending the more granular data from the LEG self-assessment project.

Firstly, this chapter explores LEGs' progress in discharging their core policy-dialog functions. Secondly, it explores how well the LEG principles proposed by the Secretariat – which are dimensions of organizational and collaboration quality in the LEG[43] – explain LEGs' strategic effectiveness, and considers the role and contribution of GPE to dialog and monitoring. Thirdly, it widens the perspective to include the technical capability, motivation, and leverage of LEG members, as well as other structural and education-specific factors. Finally, it brings all insights together using a system coherence model based on work by Lant Pritchett.[44]

The findings in this section rely on a combination of correlation analysis, thematic analysis of CLEs, qualitative comparative analysis, and benchmarking with other funds (see Annex 6.1). They are derived first from correlation analysis to identify areas of interest, and then supplemented with other methods for generating the actual explanations of pathways leading to LEG strategic effectiveness.

5.2.2 Progress on LEG strategic effectiveness

Textbox 5.2.2a Methodological explanation for LEG strategic effectiveness

In the Secretariat's framework of the LEG effectiveness principles, LEGs are seen to be strategically effective when country-led policy dialog contributes to accelerating progress in the planning, implementation and monitoring of a nationally owned ESP. Members are able to advance toward agreed

[41] The latest update by May 2020 reports that Cameroon, Chad, and Papua New Guinea, out of 20 pilot countries, have already used the tool and shared preliminary results.
[42] Countries have chosen multiple ways (for multiple contexts and purposes) of using LEG tools – not necessarily through rating;
[43] Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Principles towards effective local education groups. Working paper. Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Local education group self-assessment. ppt.
[44] Pritchett, Lant. Creating Education Systems Coherent for Learning Outcomes: Making the Transition from Schooling to Learning. Dec. 2015.

policy dialog objectives when sufficient organizational and collaborative capacities are in place or are being nurtured. Annex 5.2.8 includes a 2 pager prepared by the Secretariat describing the basic elements of its framework.[45]

The evaluators' analysis has adapted and used some notions of the Secretariat's framework for an analysis that has a different purpose: understanding the extent to which LEGs fulfil their core policy-dialog functions based on the information available in the CLEs, and understanding what is helping some LEGs in being more effective.

The evaluator has operationalized LEG strategic effectiveness in two measures, neither measure being perfect, but their strengths and weaknesses complementing each other.

The first measure combines country progress in dialogue and monitoring with information on how central the LEG's functioning has been to this progress (as opposed to other policy fora). The CLEs report rich qualitative information on the other dialogue bodies active in the country: their membership, functions, position in the system, as well as judgement by evaluators on duplication of dialogue and the relative importance of these bodies. The evaluator has translated the rich qualitative information in a simple three-points scale. The LEG is central if no other stronger body conducts most of its functions. The LEG is partly central if there is a partial overlap or duplication with the functions of other bodies. The LEG is not central if another stronger body conducts most of the key functions of the LEG.

This measure's strength is the consistency of data across CLEs, but its weakness is being a measure of progress, meaning that baseline conditions influence the progress that is possible.

The second measure operationalizes the definition of LEG strategic effectiveness through the concept of continuum of partnership strength, grounded in preliminary analytical work conducted by the World Bank and the German Development Institute.[46] The concept places outcome areas of aid partnership effectiveness in levels increasingly difficult to achieve, on a continuum from weaker to a stronger

[45] The key elements considered for each principle are listed here: 1) The mandate, functions and objectives are clear and agreed: a) Stakeholders have the same understanding of what the LEG should be discussing and achieving; b) captured in a TOR; c) which is realistic and in line with the ESP; d) the relationship between LEG and other dialogue fora is clear. 2) The partnership framework generates inclusion and engagement: a) Stakeholders relevant for ESP planning and implementation participate and engage; b) including those with critical perspectives and representing the constellation of Non-State actors; c) with clear membership criteria; d) and information on topics under discussion shared in advance; e) possibility for all members to insert topics on the agenda; f) and support for stakeholders who could not otherwise participate. 3) There is a clear governance structure for coordination: a) governance arrangements are capable of bringing together a variety of actors; b) make clear who has the authority over preparing LEG meetings; c) and make clear who has the authority over following up on LEG meetings; d) At least, the MoE establishes a LEG chair; 4) Working arrangements are flexible, 'fit-for-purpose and well-communicated: a) LEGs have robust working practices in organizing the dialogue; b) with is a road map guiding the dialog; c) and a stakeholder engagement plan, with procedures sharing information and participating at the right moment. 5) Regular monitoring contributes to learning and improved performance: a) participants are transparent with each other's; b) the LEG have set milestone and targets for its performance c) the LEG is self-assessing the partnership. 6) Leadership and ownership are demonstrated in practice: a) Government leads and owns the dialog ; b) leadership goes beyond high level political commitments and becomes the glue that creates cohesion among the LEG members. 7) Key actors contribute to healthy partnership dynamics: a) no undue influences, power dynamics, and pressures on the way the partners come together; b) constructive atmosphere; d) the coordinating agency galvanize enthusiasm of members without taking away the government's responsibilities.

[46] Eriksson, J. (2001). The drive to partnership: Aid coordination and the World Bank. The World Bank. And Mahn, T. (2013). Country-Level Aid Coordination at the United Nations: Taking the Resident Coordinator System Forward. Study 77. The German Development Institute.

partnerships. The present analysis has adapted the framework by placing the functions that the GPE model assigns to LEGs on this continuum. The ratings along the continuum are:

0 = The CLE reports that the LEG was only active in ESP and ESPIG development
1 = The CLE reports that LEG members have shared information on their individual activities, but not discussed coordination
2 = The CLE reports that LEG members have discussed coordination and alignment with ESP and among their programs
3 = The CLE reports that the LEG has proposed recommendations for improving ESP implementation that have been followed up on and implemented
4 = The CLE reports that the LEG has discussed strategic issues for the education sector (such as the direction of the sector) or the use of harmonized approaches with country systems.

A country is on the place corresponding to the function that its CLE reports the LEG discharging that is further along on the continuum. The evaluator has conducted a robustness check to ensure that the inconsistency in CLE reporting did not skew the analysis: in no cases, countries have been located further along in the continuum than reasonable given what their CLEs report on the other functions as well.

The measure's strength is its analytical power and ability to tease out absolute levels of performance across countries, but its weakness comes from the fact that the CLEs do not report information completely consistently.[47] For more information on the concept of continuum of partnership, see Annex Four.

First measure of LEG strategic effectiveness

A thematic review of the 28 CLEs under the first measure of LEG strategic effectiveness confirms that progress has been uneven across countries.[48] As mentioned above, the evaluator would like to flag the case of Bangladesh, where the CLE rated progress in dialog and monitoring as limited because performance was already strong at baseline.

Figure 5.2.2a First measure of LEG strategic effectiveness: country progress in dialogue and monitoring and how central the LEG's has been to this progress, by number of CLEs



[47] To mitigate this concern, the variable has been used in combination with the first measure of LEG strategic effectiveness (presented above), and the information contained in the CLE has been double-checked with the evaluators who wrote them.
[48] As mentioned above, the evaluator has used the core functions of LEGs. However, it is important to recognize that the actual functions are agreed among stakeholders and are not fixed 'by GPE model' but various across countries and contexts. -

No CLE country experienced strong progress against baseline conditions on dialog and monitoring in cases where the LEGs were not central to policy dialogue (see Figure 5.2.2a). This suggests that LEGs might be necessary for strong progress in dialogue and monitoring, but not sufficient for it, because, the LEGs are present also in situations of moderate and limited progress.


The CLEs mention the following bodies as limiting the centrality of the LEG:

1. Dialogue bodies at the basic education level
2. Program steering committees for the ESPs
3. Humanitarian education-cluster coordination fora
4. Parliamentary oversight bodies
5. Separate governmental channels for engaging CSOs in the education sector and teacher unions
6. Inter-Ministerial Task Forces on education policy
7. Education Donors Group
8. Roadmaps for consultations for higher-levels of education policy development
9. Informal Troika groupings of main donors
10. High-level Conferences of the education sector
11. Decentralized dialogue at the district level.

Second measure of LEG strategic effectiveness

The thematic review of CLEs against the second measure of LEG strategic effectiveness suggests that LEGs have been effective for discussing ESP and ESPIG development and ESPIG monitoring, but less for influencing ESP implementation and discussing strategic choices and harmonization (see Figure 5.2.2b).

Figure 5.2.2b Strategic effectiveness as measured on a continuum from left to right on the X axis between weaker and stronger partnerships (data source: CLEs, unit of measurement: based on which core functions on the continuum each CLE reports that the LEG is discharging)



This is consistent with the findings of the Result Report 2020. The report suggests that all of the 13 ESPs reviewed in 2018 and 2019 met minimum required quality standards, consistent with a strong contribution of LEGs in that area. It also suggests that the proportion of quality joint sector reviews (JSRs) increased substantially, with 71 percent meeting quality standards in 2019 versus 27 percent in 2018. About half of DCPs held a JSR in 2019.[49] This is an important sign of progress in the right

[49] GPE. 2020. Results Report 2020. Washington DC, USA: GPE; GPE. 2020

direction. The present analysis adds that CLEs suggests gaps in JSRs leading to actual follow-up actions that helped in implementation the ESP. Annex Four contains additional details, information, and sources that ground and nuance the main findings on LEG strategic effectiveness presented above, including which CLEs report the LEGs discharging which functions and in which way.

PROGRESS AGAINST THE LEG EFFECTIVENESS PRINCIPLES

The ISE has explored the lower level of strengths and weaknesses of LEGs on the organizational and collaboration dimensions included in the LEG effectiveness principles. The present section shows average and overall progress across CLEs. A later will return to the LEG effectiveness principles as determinants of LEG strategic effectiveness.

Textbox 5.2.2b Methodological explanation on using the LEG effectiveness principles

The present analysis relies on the description of the LEG effectiveness principles contained on page 14 and following of Global Partnership for Education (2019), Principles towards effective local education groups, Global Partnership for Education (2019). Each principle is described in its basic elements, which have been transformed into themes for the thematic analysis of CLEs.

The thematic analysis has yielded signs that suggested that a LEG had met or not the principle. The evaluator has coded the rich thematic information collected from the CLEs on a simple three scale judgement: "1" if the signs in the CLE suggest that the LEG fully met the principle. "0" if the signs are mixed and point to progress in some areas with remaining gaps. "-1" if the signs suggest that the LEG does not meet the principle and did not experience progress on this dimension. "Blank" if a CLE did not report information for that principle.

Therefore, Figure 5.2.2c presents average values across all CLEs for a variable that ranges from +1 to -1. The reader should interpret the value of 0 as some progress that however does not meet the benchmark for that principle. In a later section, the evaluator has used these values as independent variables for correlation with LEG strategic effectiveness, and also for the QCA.

The present review suggests that LEGs have been performing better on clear governance, DCP leadership ownership, and partnership dynamics.[50] It also suggests that working arrangements and clear mandate are areas for improvement.


Participation is an area where LEGs have improved, but still face challenges. The low score on participation is an apparent contradiction with the findings from the 2020 CLE synthesis and the GPE results report 2019, which found that LEGs have become more open to participation.[51] The findings are however consistent when considering the fact that the CLE synthesis and results report track improvements, but the present analysis looks at performance against the more demanding

[50] Principle 5, mutual accountability, is about regular review of LEG effectiveness as a body for sector dialogue and coordination – whether it does what it sets out to do; monitors its own effectiveness, and learns from it to adapt. Regular monitoring contributes to learning and improved performance

[51] GPE. 2020. Results Report 2020. Washington DC, USA: GPE; GPE. 2020. The 2020 draft result report suggests that Local education groups (LEGs) are more inclusive, with increased participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) and teacher organizations (TOs): 64% of LEGs included both, up from 59% in 2018. Teacher organizations are more likely to be left out: 66% of LEGs included TOs in 2019, while 89% included CSOs. Synthesis Study of External Evaluations of GPE conducted during the GPE 2020 timeframe. Washington DC, USA: GPE.

benchmark of the LEG effectiveness principles.[52] Most CLEs report improvements in participation, but only in few cases, these improvements reach GPE demanding principles of effective, rather than just formal, participation across key junctures in the policy cycle. The more demanding benchmark for participation includes the ability of civil society, teachers' unions, faith-based service providers, private sector, and decentralized actors (when relevant for country conditions) to participate with a voice in setting the agenda for discussions and reviewing ESP implementation.

Figure 5.2.2c Average performance against the LEG effectiveness principles, values ranging from -1 to 1. Data source: CLEs. Assessed against the LEG effectiveness principles as defined above



Four out of the 24 CLEs which report information on clear mandate suggests that a clear mandate is unequivocally in place for the LEG. Seven out of 28 CLEs do so for participation, seven out of 20 for clear governance, and six out of 26 for working arrangements. Additionally, five out of the 11 CLEs that report information on this dimension suggest that regular monitoring of the LEG functioning happens, 13 out of 24 do so for DCP leadership and ownership, and eight out of 20 do so healthy partnership dynamics.

QUALITY OF POLICY DIALOG ACROSS EDUCATION THEMES

The thematic studies prepared by the Secretariat allow a glimpse in the ability of the LEGs to connect the problems revealed by ESA and ESP planning with adequate strategies that are relevant for solving the main problems identified. A review of these thematic studies suggest that not using system-wide approaches in designing ESP and ESPIG solutions is an issue for LEGs.

Turning to the effectiveness in discussing education topics, LEGs struggle to deal effectively with certain education topics.[53] LEGs struggle to connect identified needs and relevant strategies on issues involving teachers' behavior change, expansion of the number of teachers, and teachers' allocations: the thematic studies suggest that these issues are identified as problems, but without leading to relevant strategies. LEGs more easily propose plans for providing more inputs. Similarly, connecting

[52] The LEG effectiveness principle relevant for participation requires that all relevant stakeholders participate and engage in key moments of the policy cycle (including after planning), including those with critical perspectives and representing the constellation of Non-State actors (civil society, teacher unions, faith-based actors, decentralized actors when relevant to the country context). This requires inclusive membership criteria, access to information and evidence in time for preparing meetings, the ability of all actors to put topics on the official agenda, and presence of effective support for stakeholders who could not otherwise participate.

[53] Bullard, Katy, et al. Thematic Review: Teachers and Teaching. Feb. 2020; Cameron, Stuart. Thematic Review: Equity and Inclusion. Feb. 2020; GPE Secretariat. EPL Thematic Study Gender Equality. Feb. 2020.

the barriers identified and relevant strategies and funding appears difficult for LEGs when challenges relate to socioeconomic status, ethnic groups, rural/urban areas, or language groups.[54]

STRENGHTS AND WEAKENESS IN COMPARATOR PARTNERSHIPS

After having explored key dimensions of the strategic effectiveness and strengths and weaknesses in the organization of the LEGs, the ISE turns to exploring whether similar patterns of strengths and weaknesses are also present in the country-level platforms of comparator partnerships: GAVI, GF, GCF, and the GEF. In the present section, the benchmarking focuses only on strengths and weaknesses of comparator country-level structures in discharging their core policy functions and on two dimensions that are also included in the LEG effectiveness principles: participation and country ownership. Unfortunately, the benchmarking information is not granular enough for an analysis that tracks all the dimensions of the LEG effectiveness principles.

The benchmarking with four other global partnerships suggests that the problems of country-level structures in discharging their core policy-dialog functions are common in country-level coordination structures of the partnerships, whether these are multi-stakeholder platforms or focal points.[55] Similar to GPE, the country coordination structures established by GAVI and the Global Fund are reportedly stronger at coordinating efforts in the planning stages and weaker in ensuring monitoring of grants and the sub-sectors, and in harmonizing with country systems.[56] The GCF and GEF have a different model from GPE's, relying on Focal Points inside Governments for discharging policy dialog functions: there are no LEG equivalents in these two partnerships. Their country level structures have performed well in identifying proposals for funding aligned with country priorities, and, in the case of the GCF also in harmonizing with country systems since DCPs have direct access to this Fund when accredited.[57]

Similarly, the benchmarking suggests that multi-stakeholder platforms have a different mix of strengths and weaknesses compared with alternative models (National Designated Authorities and Focal Points) in ensuring effective participation and country ownership. The available evaluation for the Global Fund suggests that their Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) have been effective in achieving CSO participation during grant planning stages by means of dedicated support for CSO participation, a story that is broadly comparable to the progress made by GPE in the same area.[58] GCF and GEF follow a different model. They facilitate participation of CSOs primarily through periodic

[54] Conversely, many ESPs propose strategies on disability, vulnerable children (such as orphans), emergency or crisis-affected areas, and remote or difficult-to-reach areas, without having identified barriers relating to these groups or areas.

[55] The analysis relies on identifying whether LEGs strengths and weaknesses in strategic effectiveness are unique or are also present in other comparator partnerships, some of which have adopted a model of country partnerships similar to the LEGs (Global Fund and GAVI) and some of which have chosen a different model of having focal points (GCF and GEF). Annex 6.1 contain the background table that grounds the analysis presented here.

[56] Theglobalfund.org. 2020. [online] Available at: https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/8792/terg_partnershipmodelreview_paper_en.pdf?u=637166002040000000

[57] Gefieo.org. 2020. Annual Performance Report (APR) 2019 | GEF Independent Evaluation Office. [online] Available at: <https://www.gefieo.org/evaluations/annual-performance-report-apr-2019 Ieu.greenclimate.fund. 2020. [online] Available at: <https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/documents/977793/1474145/FPR_countries_report.pdf/d84aa3df-2190-c99d-5272-832821142319; Independent Evaluation Unit. 2020. Performance Review Of The GCF (FPR). [online] Available at: < https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/evaluations/fpr

[58] MOPAN | Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network. 2020. Global Fund 2015-16. [online] Available at: <http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/globalfund2015-16/>

workshops for planning and monitoring the portfolio. The MOPAN evaluation of GEF found that at least 12 out of 20 cases in its sample displayed effective participatory activities or mechanisms that had achieved the buy-in of stakeholders.[59] While in GPE, in the CLEs sample, 20 out of 28 countries experienced improvements in effective participation against a much more demanding standard of permanent participation.

5.2.3 Explanatory factors for LEG effectiveness

This section discusses partial explanations for LEG strategic effectiveness. [60] For ease of exposition, it presents factors by category; i.e. LEG effectiveness principles, GPE contributions, Capacity – Motivation – Leverage of LEG members, Structural factors, and the Partnership model (through benchmarking with other Funds). [61] These categories are ordered from categories that are more closely connected to GPE (and LEGs) sphere of control, then influence, and then interest.

Before discussing each partial explanation in turn, Table 5.2.3 presents a summary of the factors according to four categories. Factors internal to GPE ToC that have worked well for LEG strategic effectiveness are in the top-left box and factors internal to GPE ToC that have not worked well for LEG effectiveness, so called bottlenecks, are in the top-right box. Below, the table presents the external factors that have enabled (left) or hindered (right) LEG strategic effectiveness.

The factors included in the table are to be understood as neither sufficient nor necessary, unless otherwise specified. In common language, they describe what worked well in enabling strategic LEG strategic effectiveness as well as the bottlenecks.

Table 5.2.3 Explanatory factors for LEG Strategic effectiveness

What worked well for LEG strategic effectiveness	Bottlenecks to LEG strategic effectiveness
1. Combination of LEG principles and context factors: Monitoring and learning; OR combining strong government ownership AND government effectiveness AND clear LEG governance; OR combining strong GPE and CA support AND weak education sectors that offered opportunities to motivated external actors. These pathways appear sufficient for LEG effectiveness (QCA) 2. Clear working arrangements within LEGs, but only together with at least other three principles (QCA)	1. DCPs preference for platforms of dialog and models of monitoring other than LEGs and JSRs (TA) 2. Donors and DCP governments inability to send senior education specialists to LEG meetings (TA) 3. JSRs leading to too many recommendations that are not prioritized or tracked (TA) 4. Trade-off between wide participation and efficiency (TA)

[59] MOPAN | Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network. 2020. 2017-18 GEF. [online] Available at: <http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/gef2017-18/>

[60] As mentioned earlier, this analysis defines LEG strategic effectiveness as the LEG discharging core policy dialogue functions and is operationalized through the 2 different measures presented in the previous section.

[61] The factors have been identified through a combination of correlation analysis, qualitative contribution analysis (QCA), thematic analysis (TA), and benchmarking. Correlation analysis is always supported by evidence coming from QCA or thematic analysis, which explains and nuances why a correlation has or has not been found. The factors identified through correlation and QCA rely on the difference in the mix of factors that are present where LEGs are more or less strategically effective. The thematic analysis of CLEs is instead relying on information that already has a causal quality: the factors have been identified through contribution analysis.

3. Effective participation, but only together with either mutual accountability or at least three other principles (QCA) 4. Secretariat advocacy (COR and TA) 5. Civil Society Education Fund (CSEF) funding for civil society (TA) 6. UNICEF in its role as a coordinating agency (TA)	5. ESP RF framework not tracking the output and outcome level (COR + TA) OR not tracking the activity-level (TA) 6. Rotation or lack of the coordinating agent (COR + TA) 7. WB and USAID as CAs (COR + TA): only in a few cases 8. LEGs not being comfortable using system-wide approaches to education system reform (TA)
Enabling contextual factors	**Hindering contextual factors**
1. Motivation of LEG members that is coherent with LEG effectiveness (COR + TA) 2. Leverage of LEG members that are motivated to support LEG effectiveness (COR + TA) 3. Donors or civil society have an interest and ability to speak with a common voice to DCPs 4. Positive change in the space for civil society in DCPs (COR + TA) 5. Absence of other dialogue fora (COR + TA) 6. Low turnover in government, donors, and CSOs (TA)	1. Conflict (absolute level) in DCPs (COR + TA) 2. Disasters (COR + TA) 3. High inequality (income, cultural, and ethnic) (COR) 4. State of dialogue being strong at baseline, preventing further progress (COR + TA) 5. CSOs capacity constraints (TA) 6. Sector hosting only few donors (TA) 7. Limited inter-ministerial coordination (TA)

THE ROLE OF THE LEG EFFECTIVENESS PRINCIPLES

QCA reveals that countries do not need to meet all LEG effectiveness principles for an effective LEG. Correlation analysis first revealed that only three out of seven LEG effectiveness principles were positively associated with LEG strategic effectiveness, namely effective participation, clear working arrangements, and monitoring and learning.[62]

Qualitative contribution analysis (QCA) has explored in depth this puzzle. It has revealed that the LEG reviewing its own performance as a multi-stakeholder platform has the closest association with LEG strategic effectiveness, meaning that the LEGs that meet this principle tends to be closer to the upper end of the continuum of policy dialog and be central to strong progress in dialog and monitoring. It is the only principle that is always present in effective LEGs with a positive contribution and seems sufficient for LEG effectiveness.[63] The implication for action is clear: this is the first dimension of LEGs that, if possible, LEGs should strengthen. The least CLEs report information on this dimension, suggesting the possibility that good performance in this dimension might not be widely shared across countries. However, the evaluator cannot exclude the possibility that good performance on this dimension is more common than found in the analysis, because the CLEs did not set out to collect information on this dimension systematically.[64]

[62] One extra principle – clear governance arrangements – is only associated with one measure of strategic effectiveness.
[63] Information on mutual accountability is only available in eleven CLEs, which leads to the need to be careful in interpreting it.
[64] 11 out of 28 CLEs report information on mutual accountability

Other than monitoring and learning, positive cases of effective LEGs meet at least two other principles, which reflects the importance of exploring combinations between them. Similarly, the cases where LEGs have been less effective in their policy functions have negative contributions under three principles or more.


QCA suggests strong government ownership where government is effective as a pathway to LEG strategic effectiveness through government establishing effective LEG governance structures. However, when effective governments[65] – such as in Bangladesh – do not buy into GPE's sector-wide approach and instead own other processes, for example at the sub-sector level, LEGs have been less effective in discharging their core functions.

Strong GPE support in countries where the education sector actors are weaker is a second pathway to LEG effectiveness and passes through strongly-motivated Secretariat CLs an CAs supporting progress on all principles, e.g. by using consultants (which might create gaps in sustainability).

In addition, the principle of participation and engagement does not appear to be a driver of LEG effectiveness, but rather an added value that requires LEGs to meet other principles to unlock its potential. However, thematic analysis reveals an additional concern here: the extent to which the CSOs and TUs that participate in LEGs actually represent their constituencies.[66]

Similarly, QCA reveals that good working arrangements are only present in positive cases together with at least two other principles, suggesting that it is a useful intermediate step on the causal chain to LEG effectiveness rather than the driving force.

Figure 5.2.5 Average level of contribution per mechanism of GPE ToC on a scale from 1 (limited contribution) to 3 (visible contribution)



[65] Effective compared with the sample of countries selected for the CLEs, meaning that their government effectiveness is substantially higher than the sample average.
[66] It was reported as a concern by the CSEF evaluation, the evaluation of GRA on teachers unions and acknowledged through interviews with Education International and UNESCO.

Weak sector governance in societies that large, populous, very diverse, and very stratified OR conflict pre-empt most LEG principles from being present, resulting in relatively weak LEGs.[67]

Correlation analysis and QCA reveal that a clear mandate and healthy partnerships have a particularly weak association with LEG effectiveness. For a clear mandate, a thematic review of CLEs suggests that it might be because mandates are not implemented, sufficiently simple, or adequate.

The lack of association between the healthy partnership principle and LEG effectiveness can be explained by the particular definition used and what information is available in CLEs. [68] A healthy partnership is defined in the LEG effectiveness principle as a collegial relationship and the absence of undue power dynamics. However, LEGs that discuss important decisions – in short, LEGs that are strategically effective because they conduct important policy dialogue functions – increase incentives for members to exercise forms of power in influencing decisions and challenging other members.[69]

THE ROLE OF GPE CONTRIBUTION TO SECTOR DIALOG AND MONITORING

The CLEs report that mechanisms in GPE's operational model that most strongly contribute to dialogue are the VT, CA, Secretariat CLs, ESPIGs, and ESPDGs (see Figure 5.2.5). By contrast, CSEF and multiplier had a more modest average contribution to dialogue and monitoring.[70]

The thematic analysis and follow-up interviews nuance these findings. On the role of the CAs, UNICEF stands out for its positive contribution, because of its ability to work in difficult contexts, coordination and facilitation are functions close to its core mandate as a neutral UN agency. Interviews with the CLE evaluators suggests that its staff dedicates more time to the CA role. According to the CLE evaluators, USAID and WB come to CAs with a more partial agenda, which is not necessarily a negative feature as country partners, but is potentially conflicted with the CA's role as facilitator and mediator.[71] However, the evidence on the latter proposition comes from only a few cases and does not allow for generalizations.

Interviews with representatives of civil society and of the current ongoing endline evaluation of CSEF and earlier evaluations[72] suggest that this form of support is highly appreciated by civil society and needed if civil society is to participate effectively. The CSEF contribution was in the form of establishing

[67] By complex society, here the analysis means:

[68] At least according to the limited information contained in the CLEs, which were not designed with the aim to collect information on dynamics inside LEGs. The analysis does not exclude that a data collection focused on exploring partnership dynamics could lead to different findings.

[69] The theory used for the organizational effectiveness part of the evaluation suggests, but this only speculative, that perhaps "healthy" should be defined in a different way, recognizing that clashing and using one's power to further legitimate goals in the partnership is part of the game, and that partnerships become unhealthy only when the distribution of power is completely unbalanced or the goals of partners at cross-purpose.

[70] The analysis has used the CLEs scoring of these mechanisms to sector dialogue and monitoring according to a three point scale: visible contribution (3), modestly visible contribution (2), and limited contribution (1). The analysis has collected the CLE rating, together with the reasons why the CLE rated contribution in a particular way, excluded the cases where the CLEs do not report information for that particular mechanism, which happens for example for variable tranches and multipliers, and reported average values for the cases where there is information on these mechanisms.

[71] Evidence comes from the Universalia's evaluators' assessment of USAID role's as CA in Bangladesh and South Sudan. The World Bank is much more commonly in the position of GA than CA. It acted as CA in Ivory Coast, where the CLE reports that that it was not effective because it came with its own agenda and also acted as GA.

[72] Oxford Policy Management (2018), Evaluation of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE)'s support for civil society engagement; Grijalva K and Izenberg M (2018), CSEF 2016-2018 Mid Term Review

in-country umbrella coalitions for civil society and strengthening the ones that already existed, for example in planning and implementing activities relavant to the GPE model, engaging their constituency, and building effective organizational structures. National Education Coalitions have been particularly active in providing independent evidence and research on education issues that are important to their constituencies.

However, bottlenecks have prevented the Coalitions from leading to effective participation, such as the limited space that government affords civil society in LEGs, limitations in the ability (and sometimes willingness) of civil society to represent its own members, and deficiencies in CSOs' capacity for understanding and adapting GPE model for their activities. [73]

According to the 2018 CSEF evaluation, the strength of the approach of building National Education Coalition is that CSOs are more likely to be heard when presenting a common front with DCP government. The weakness is that this approach has sometimes created rivalries for funds between members of the umbrella coalition, and has created consensus position that did not represent the entire constituency.[74]

Correlation analysis suggests that contribution from most GPE mechanisms is not associated with LEG effectiveness across CLEs. QCA supports this finding. E.g. in Burkina Faso, a LEG that is strategically effective (discharge important policy-dialogue functions well) exists in a situation where the CLE reports the least possible contribution from the instruments in GPE model shown in Figure 5.2.5. In South Sudan, the CLE reports strong GPE contribution in a situation where the LEG is not stratefically effective. The thematic analysis helps explain the situation: the correlation is likely generated by the fact that GPE's contribution is usually stronger where needs are greater, which are often also situations that are least conducive to effective LEGs. The evaluator interprets this finding as positive, because it suggests that GPE is targeting its support when it is needed the most.

Contributions from variable tranche (VT) and Secretariat CLs are the exception and are associated with LEG strategic effectiveness. The strong association between VT and effective dialogue is reasonable when exploring the causal pathway at play. The variable tranche provides a clear point of joint discussion, whereby stakeholders design and monitor results indicators together and have clear incentives in focusing their attention on the topics linked to those indicators.[75] The role of Secretariat CLs is through explaining GPE procedures and principles from a neutral stance, i.e. not from the interests of particular LEG members.

[73] The interview with Education International and the current ongoing CSEF endline evaluation team point to instances when government chairs of the GPE did not share information with CSOs sufficiently in advance of the meeting, which meant that they came unprepared. CSEF has helped national CSO coalitions to be ready to operate at short notice.

[74] Oxford Policy Management (2018), Evaluation of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE)'s support for civil society engagement

[75] At the same time, the variable tranche have led in some cases (for example Malawi) LEG members to focus on the topic covered disproportionately from their importance.

GPE's country model as described in corporate-level documents is not consistently applied in all countries.[76] For example, DCPs have used presentation-style conferences or regular itinerant inspection visits as main tools of sector monitoring instead of the dialogue-based JSRs. The application of GPE's model has also been modified by barriers; for example, given that donors do not always appoint education specialists to the LEGs. Finally, GPE's model does not specify what roles consultants play in supporting LEGs, what should be avoided, as well as their effect on sustainability. The thematic analysis of CLEs information on the role of consultants suggests that they have a mixed role. Consultants have been contracted for supporting plan develoment, and also for developing and implementing models of monitoring and reporting that work but do not necessarily generate knowledge owned by the country or build country systems. However, they have also been used effectively for supporting the CA in discharging its mandate in difficult situations.[77]

In summary, thematic analysis of CLEs suggests that the level of contribution to sector dialog and monitoring by GPE mechanisms within countries depends on whether a mechanism is fit-for-purpose given highly and variable contextual factors. Some mechanisms – such as VT, CA advocacy, and CLs facilitation and advocacy – are evidently more effective than others. QCA also suggests that the effect of GPE contributions on LEG effectiveness is less in the least favorable contexts and often less needed in more favorable contexts. The section now turns to these contextual factors, starting with factors associated with the individuals and entities sitting on LEGs and then on broader structural factors.

Capacity, motivation, and leverage of LEG members

Capabilities, motivation, and leverage are properties of individual LEG members, and they influence LEG performance according to the role of each LEG member.[78]

Correlation analysis shows that technical capability in DCPs is not associated with LEG strategic effectiveness.[79] Nonetheless, thematic analysis of CLEs suggests that this is not because technical capability does not matter; rather, different countries experience different capability gaps, although almost all fall short against the level of capability assumed under the GPE model. In a partnership where each member is needed for the overall country-level result, capability constraints in only a few

[76] The guidance for JSRs come with quality standards that JSRs should meet. GPE does not expect JSRs to meet all principles, but aims for them to meet enough principles, three out of five, that the model is still recognizable. GPE. Results Report 2020. Washington DC, USA: GPE.

[77] Thematic review of the CLEs. See annex 6.1 for more details.

[78] The present analysis relies on the CLEs' definition of capabilities, motivation, and leverage. The CLE synthesis report 2020 defines capabilities as: "knowledge, skills, experience", motivation as: "incentives, habitual patterns of decision making", and leverage as: "capacity to influence country-processes". The present analysis has relied on information that was already causal in nature, because the CLEs investigated capabilities, motivation, and leverage as part of a contribution analysis on the role of these factors in explaining change. The correlation analysis has translated the rich qualitative information in the CLEs into a three point scale: -1 if the CLE reports that gaps in capacity, motivation, or leverage had negative contribution to sector progress and dialog, +1 if they had a positive contribution, and 0 if the situation was mixed. The thematic analysis has then used the rich qualitative information in the CLEs, giving prominence to the facets of motivation, capabilities, and leverage that are more frequent across CLEs.

[79] As mentioned earlier, this analysis defines LEG strategic effectiveness as the LEG discharging core policy dialogue functions and is operationalized through the 2 different measures presented in the previous section.

members may seriously hinders the overall LEG strategic effectiveness. Table 5.2.6a presents an overview of the capability dimensions in which gaps are found.[80]

Table 5.2.6a Capacity dimensions in which gaps are found

Actor	Dimensions of capability in which deficiencies are found
CSOs	Capacity to communicate to the regional and global level Capacity for advocacy, in particular research skills
CSOs and TUs	Organizational capacity (HR, finance, etc.)
DCPs	Coordination capacity across government (local – central, inter-Ministerial, across agencies)
DCPs	Capacity to establish an effective system for collection and analysis of integrated, timely, and quality data
Donors	Capacity to operate in hard-to-reach environments
LEGs overall	Capacity to use system-wide analysis and strategies

Correlation analysis suggests that motivation to participate in and contribute to a sector-wide multi-stakeholder partnership is associated with LEG strategic effectiveness. Thematic analysis of CLE findings and interviews with CLE evaluators (Table 5.2.6b) provides an insight into what motivates or does not motivate LEG members. The list reports from top to bottom the themes that come back most often across CLEs. The particular mix of motivational factors will be unique to each country, with the implication that it is important to explore what motivates members of a given LEG before engaging with it. The categories in the list help in making sense of the individual case, without expecting all types of motivation to be present in each LEG.

Table 5.2.6b Motivation of LEG members

What motivates LEG members?	What does not motivate LEG members?
• For donors, development results from their own contributions • For DCPs, providing better education, enhancing transparency, expanding dialogue, if these are part of the social contract • Across government, incentives (e.g. revenue sharing) • For donors and DCPs, the opportunity to also hold bilateral discussions • For all actors, crises motivate collaboration • Media attention • For teachers' unions, teachers' salaries	• For DCP ministries, cooperating across the government • For DCP governments, being held accountable to other members in the LEGs: donors and non-State actors • For all actors, having to participate in multiple bodies with similar mandates • For donors, lack of trust in DCP systems • For DCPs and donors, implementing commitments of previous governments

Correlation analysis shows that the leverage of LEG members, the ability to put in place strategies for influencing country-level processes, is also associated with LEG strategic effectiveness. Thematic analysis helps here as well in exploring why this might be so and in identifying the most common themes across CLEs. First, speaking with a common voice and being part of an alliance grants donors and civil society increased leverage with DCPs, but at the expense sometimes of a more limited variety of views. Secondly, funding an ESPIG that is relatively large as a percentage of international donor

[80] According to the CLEs, CLE synthesis, evaluation of CSEF support, Evaluation of GRA 10 on teachers unions. The table reports only capacity gaps that have been mentioned in at least three different CLEs or sources.

funding is associated – as expected – with more GPE leverage. Finally, leverage has also been enhanced by shared values on dialogue, common standards, and evidence-based policy-making between all actors.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

The ISE has explored the relationship between the LEGs and broader structural factors that surround them.[81]
Correlation analysis suggests that the structural political and economic factors associated negatively with LEG effectiveness are inequality (income, ethnic, and linguistic), the absence of other fora for dialogue in the education sector,[82] limited space for civil society, conflict, and disasters.[83]

These factors are clearly outside of the control of GPE. The analysis considers them from the perspective of whether GPE has systematically adapted its approach to what is possible given the constraints that they pose.

A thematic analysis of CLEs content and, especially, follow up interviews with CLEs evaluators have shed some light on this. The concept of the social contract has emerged as a way to make sense of the structural constraints and opportunities that LEGs face. The social contract is an abstract contract that captures the tacit legitimacy links between governments and their constituency.[84] The interviews have suggested that the evolution of LEGs' policy functions and the shape and positioning of the LEG depends to a large extent on whether the social contract includes (a) a dialogue between goverment and society (and how hierarchical this is), (b) strong performance in delivering education, or transparency and anti-corruption being an important legitimacy source for the government, and (c) an attention for reducing inequalities across groups.

These findings suggest that there are no silver bullets for enhancing the strategic effectiveness of LEGs across countries; rather, the evolution of LEGs might be better served by exploring how each LEG fits

[81] The analytical framework for identifying the relevant structural factors has been a reconstruction of the core policy-dialog functions of LEGs according to the effective partnership review and GPE ToC, as well as a reconstruction of the LEGs' place in the education system. This has yielded a long list of potential structural factors. The literature was usually clear on the direction of putative causation. For example, the literature on inequality, both for the US and for the developing world, usually points out that ethnic and cultural inequality makes dialog more difficult. The correlation analysis led then to a shortlist of factors that appeared *prima facie* associated with LEG strategic effectiveness. The ISE has not interpreted these associations as being causal and direct. Rather, it has enquired with the CLE evaluators, about their opinion over whether these factors were important in the countries that they had evaluated, how, and with what implications for the LEGs. These conversations have allowed the analysis to move forward in identifying the concept of social contract as promising for making sense of the relationship between LEGs and the structural factors that surround them.
[82] The thematic review of CLEs highlights that there instances of complementary between LEGs and other dialogue fora but usually, these take the form of the LEG being used as a more task-oriented group for ESP and ESPIG development and monitoring, while larger questions and more relevant monitoring for the sector are dealt with by other bodies.
[83] The measures of inequality used are the ones commonly used in the economic policy literature as presented in James Fearon (2003). "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country". Journal of Economic Growth. 8: 195–222. doi:10.1023/A:1024419522867 and Alberto Alesina; et al. (2003). "Fractionalization" (PDF). Journal of Economic Growth. 8: 155–194. doi:10.1023/a:1024471506938. The measure of space for civil society comes from the Global Governance Index of the World Bank, values for 2015 and 2018, for conflict from the Global Peace Index of the Institute of Economics & Peace, and for disasters from the Annual Disaster Statistical Review of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).
[84] Interviews with CLEs evaluators.

in its social contract, maintaining a drive towards improvement on key dimensions, such as participation, but without expecting that each LEG will fulfill the same core policy-dialog functions in the same way.

THE COUNTRY-LEVEL PARTNERSHIP MODEL

This section explores the role of the country-level Partnership model in driving strategic LEG effectiveness. It builds on a review of what has worked well and less well in other partnerships (GAVI, Global Fund, GEF, and GCF) as inspiration for GPE. The findings rely on available evaluations and limited interviews with key informants and should be considered tentative because the available information is neither consistent nor complete.

The analysis relies on identifying key similarities and differences between GPE and comparator partnerships on dimensions connected to the mandate, models of organization, approach to support participation (especially of civil society), and available resources.

A review of mandates and models across the comparator global partnerships suggests that requiring a sector-wide focus for planning and monitoring in a multi-stakeholder partnership is a unique feature of GPE's model, and that this is the model most difficult to implement effectively. The country-level multi-stakeholders platforms of the Global Fund and GAVI focus on specific subsectors in the health sector and on reviewing the partnerships' investments rather than the subsector as a whole. GEF has a sector-wide focus for environment, but its focal points are designated representatives of governments, not multi-stakeholder fora and report only on GEF's portfolio of investments. The GCF has a cross-sectoral focus, because climate change connects issues in agriculture, forestry, land-use, industry, cities, food security, disaster management, and energy sectors (at least). But, again, its NDAs focus on GCF investments, whether they are consistent with the national framework and produce results, and are not multi-stakeholder platforms, even if they consult CSOs through country-level workshops or other fora.[85]

Similarly to GPE, all comparator partnerships provide support to civil society in a way that is relevant to the country-partnership model. GAVI and the Global Fund provide dedicated support mechanisms for effective participation by civil society in their multi-stakeholder fora, recognizing that this is a necessary condition for CSOs' effective participation. GEF finances CSOs' involvement through its enabling activities (EAs) and through the GEF CSO Network as well as provides small grants to CSOs in its Small Grant Program administered by UNDP. GCF also supports domestic CSOs to get ready for accreditation as direct access entities.

The Global Fund has a particularly strong instrument to boost participation of CSOs in designing grant applications. At least 15 percent of the Funding Agreement amounts for Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM, equivalent of GPE's LEG) has to be allocated to support constituency engagement for non-governmental sector activities, including civil society and key population groups, and to promote and improve the quality of stakeholder participation[86]. Also, the Community, Rights, and Gender Strategic Initiative provides technical assistance to support the engagement of civil society,

[85] The NDAs are also required to report climate change commitments and progress to the UNFCCC, but that is a separate obligation from the obligations they have under the GCF.
[86] https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/3266/core_operationalpolicy_manual_en.pdf

key populations, people living with or affected by the diseases, and women's networks and organizations, independently or in partnership with the CCM.

All partnerships expect the chair of the local multi-stakeholder platform, focal point, or Nationally Designated Authorities to be a senior official in the Ministry responsible for the sector. The GCF, however, grants more flexibility, with the results that there is more variation in where its NDAs are located. Some of them are located in the Ministry of Finance rather than in the Ministry responsible for environment. In all cases, the appointed senior government officials has other functions in government aside from chairing the multi-stakeholder partnership or being GCF's focal point/NDA. This suggests that this bottleneck is difficult to solve, because it comes back in different sectors and partnership models.

All partnerships seems to mix dedicated technical assistance for planning with additional technical assistance provided by other development partners, for example the German BACK UP Initiative.

Chapter 6.2 presents figures for annual disbursements between Funds. For this analysis, it suffices to say that GPE's annual disbursement figures are substantially smaller than all other comparator partnerships.

This is relevant for understanding the balance of costs and benefits in the partnership model from the perspective of country-level stakeholders. The benchmarking suggests that the GPE country-level partnership requires the most effort to work effectively in exchange for the least amount of funding. The unique sector-wide focus and high-benchmark for participation, a permanent multi-stakeholder platform that aims to include all actors State and Non-State that are relevant for ESP implementation, are the key elements that raise the effort.

5.2.4 System coherence - LEG effectiveness and related factors

This section aims to bring together the partial explanations outlined in the previous sections in a unified model. The model builds on the analysis proposed by Lant Pritchett.[87] Its main insight is that variation in learning outcomes depends by the interactions of actors in the education system and, in particular, by how coherent principal-agent relationships are to the objective of improving learning outcomes.[88] A LEG is neither principal nor agent, but principal-agent relationships exist in education systems, principals and agents sit together in the LEG, and the LEG is relevant for some of these relationships.

[87] Pritchett, Lant. Creating Education Systems Coherent for Learning Outcomes: Making the Transition from Schooling to Learning. Dec. 2015.

[88] A principal-agent relationship occurs when one person (the agent) is allowed to make decisions on behalf of another person (the principal). The premise for this analysis is that relationships of accountability in education systems are like a "principal-agent" relationship. The "principal" designs the tasks it expects the agent to conduct and the agent chosen responds to these design elements in a way that is influenced also by determinants of individual behavior other than the mandate, such as intrinsic motivations, professional norms and standards, and organizational practices.

Education policy and planning is the prerogative of DCP governments. However, LEGs are an instrument to avoid inconsistencies in the process that translates education policy into a plan.[89] ESPs balance actions that the government implementing agencies, service providers, and schools are called to implement with the available resources and assign responsabilities accordingly. They also coordinate the support provided by development partners. The participation of all stakeholders (government agencies, service providers, non-governmental agencies, final beneficiaries, and donors) should ensure that plans are more relevant, realistic, and owned. LEGs have been effective in contributing to plans that meet GPE requirements but weaker in creating plans that are rated as implementable in the budget, partly because not all stakeholders participate with the same voice and partly because of financing gaps.[90] Stakeholders participate to meet requirements rather than create the most appropriate plan, and/or high-level voices from the MoF are absent.

JSRs provide information on the extent to which agents implementing the plan – which have their own individual incentives – have performed as planned. LEGs have struggled in mitigating the inconsistencies between planner and implementer due to deficiencies in technical capability and motivation for reporting against plans.

The LEGs could in theory help to mitigate inconsistent actions across different ministries and levels of governments, although in practice they have not currently done so. Here, the relationship is not between the principal and agents, but rather *inter pares*, which creates limited incentives for ministries and government agencies other than those in charge of basic education to participate in LEGs.

The LEG has helped in partly healing the inconsistency between donors and DCPs, depending on the DCP country context. Donors are accountable to their tax payers for an international development agenda supported domestically, and to the DCPs' government and citizens for actions in their countries. LEGs reduce this inconsistency but cannot completely solve it because important decisions that shape donors' behavior happen in their capitals, and because there may not be agreement on priorities within the LEG.

The LEG cannot help much to mitigate inconsistencies connected to flaws in the balance between education policy and government budget because both – and especially the budget – are set at a higher level by the Cabinet and Ministry of Finance, also based on balancing priorities across sectors, budget constraints, and individual preferences of elites in power that may have little to do with education.
The implications that the ISE draws from the partial explanations, their combinations, and the focus on principal agent-relationship are as follow.

[89] DCP governments establish LEGs through legislation or secondary regulation, establishing their mandate and function in the national policy framework. DCP governments have assigned to them functions related to policy dialog and monitoring, rather than direct responsibility for promulgating government policy.
[90] The Annex Four contains more information on the barriers to participation posed to civil society, teacher unions, decentralized actors, and faith-based or private sector actors, which is based on the CLEs, CSEF evaluation, and interview with a representative of education international.

1. There is never only one explanation for why LEGs are successful or less successful in discharging their core policy-dialog functions. There are patterns across CLEs, but the combination of 26 main factors in 28 CLE countries leads to an enourmous amount of possible combinations
2. There are several entry points for GPE actors aiming to strenghten LEGs. These are the mechanisms that have proven more effective in carrying GPE contribution across CLEs and the organizational and collaborational dimensions of LEGs that have been found most closely associated with LEG strategic effectiveness. They offer a place to start for thinking about how to improve a LEG's strategic effectiveness, together with the overview of the most recurrent challenges in capabilities and motivation
3. Nevertheless, the focus on structural factors and system-wide principal-agent relationships brings home the point that LEGs exist in a context and that they are self-aware and also aware of that context and its changes. LEGs perceive and interpret the actions of actors aimed at influncing them and react to them. Additionally, they are themselves fora where actors negotiate different priorities. Therefore, the effectiveness of acting through an entry point cannot be assumed *a priori*, just because it has worked in the past or in (even most) other countries, but needs to be built for each case by adapting to the initial conditions, the context, and to the motivation and priorities and capabilities of LEG members
4. Finally, the benchmarking with other partnerships imply that GPE actors have taken on a bigger challenge than comparator partnerships in establishing the sector as focus for policy dialog and monitoring in country-level multi-stakeholder partnerships. They must be commended for proposing a model that pushes the envelop for what is possible in terms of effective partnership and country ownership. At the same time, they should be aware that they have taken on a unique challenge for which it is not easy to find possible solutions in the experience of other partnerships.

5.2.5 Conclusions LEG effectiveness

Progress on LEG effectiveness across the policy cycle has been uneven across countries: More LEGs have been effective for discussing ESP and ESPIG development and ESPIG monitoring, and fewer for influencing ESP implementation and strategic choices.

Particular combinations of organizational and collaboration principles proposed by the Secretariat explain LEG effectiveness, although LEGs do not need to meet all principles to be effective. Mutual accountability has the closest association with LEG effectiveness. Other than that, positive cases of effective LEGs meet at least two principles. The combination of principles and contextual factors that seem most associated with LEG strategic effectiveness are strong government leadership and strong LEG governance, or strong GPE initiative and influence in countries where the education sector actors have weaker capacity. Weak sector governance in complex societies *or* conflict pre-empt most LEG principles from being present.

Technical capacity gaps within complex government systems for the delivery of education and data collection is an issue for all LEGs in discharging their functions, especially in closing the feedback loop between action in implementing the ESP and reflection on what has been achieved, what has not, and why. The motivation and leverage of LEG members explain whether they contribute to effective LEGs or not.

Structural political and economic factors are associated with LEG effectiveness, including inequality (income, ethnic, and linguistic), the absence of other fora for dialogue in the education sector, limited space for civil society, and the impact of conflict and disasters. The relationship between LEGs and the structural factors that surround them can be summarized under the concept of social contract, which influences whether inclusive dialogue on education based on accountability is possible.

LEGs struggle to find solutions that require system thinking because they imply changing the behavior of teachers and education actors, which requires exploring how their motivation, incentives, and leverage interact in principal-agent or collective action problems. Other global funds adopt a similar multi-stakeholder partnership model at the country level and show similar challenges. Compared with other funds, GPE's unique sector-wide focus requires the highest level of effort to ensure that the LEGs as country-specific multi-stakeholder platforms work as intended.

5.3 Efficiency and Use of funds

Core question: To what extent has GPE been making the best use of the funding at its disposal?

Main findings: The ISE confirms that GPE's grant allocation processes are time consuming and a large share (GPE QAR process) takes place outside of the country at stake, affecting the sense of national ownership. Grant implementation is judged to be efficient, as majority of grants are on track. The ISE also found GPE Secretariat to actively monitor progress in implementation and fund disbursement and undertakes regular efforts to analyze and propose options for improved efficiency of processes. Funds are allocated to over 70 countries prioritizing the support of basic education in LICs and LMICs in line with GPE's mission. Funds are distributed over a broad range of activities, balancing the provision of financial support to improve learning quality, equity and systems financing, reflecting the diverse needs of countries and the varied interests of GPE's multiple constituency groups.

5.3.1 Introduction

The ISE has reviewed the (time) efficiency of GPE's grant cycle from grant application to approval and from approval to actual grant disbursements. For this part, the ISE relied largely on the Grant Process Streamlining project (GPSP) results, commenced in May 2019 by the Secretariat with the objective to streamline the process by identifying the major obstacles affecting timelines, workload, as well as identifying and recommending solutions to streamline the process and increase the Secretariat's capacity[91].

In addition, the ISE has reviewed the allocation / use of funds within the GPE's portfolio, to understand and assess patterns in fund allocation in light of GPE's ambitions. In doing so, the ISE mapped out GPE's overall grant portfolio to see how available GPE funds have been distributed in terms of country allocations (I.e. FCAC/non-FCAC, LIC/LMIC/UMIC), commitments by sub-sector (pre-primary, primary, secondary), and by thematic area (learning, equity, systems). Finally, a light benchmarking of grant application and disbursement processes of four other global funds has been undertaken to see how


[91] GPE Secretariat (2019), Project Summary for Grant Process Streamlining Project – Phase I DELIVERABLE 6-13-19.

these compare with GPE's in the expectation this might lead to further insights about how best to shape these processes.

5.3.2 Efficiency of GPE's grant application process

In undertaking this analysis, the ISE has primarily relied on the earlier work of the GPSP, which analyzed 27 ESPIG applications submitted in 2017 or 2018. This resulted in the following timeline of the ESPIG application (Figure 5.3.2).

Figure 5.3.2 Portrait of historic timeline of ESPIG application



The Figure 5.3.2 shows that the average duration of the grant application process (calculated from the announcement of the MCA to the grant start date[92]) is around 39 months, while it takes on average another three months until the moment that the first disbursement is made. This period is somewhat misleading, as the timing of the MCA process is linked to replenishments and may take place when an earlier ESPIG is still be on-going. This means that the MCA does not mark the start of a country-level sector analysis and planning process, which happens (sometimes much) later[93]. Nevertheless, the MCA is the first moment in which GPE funds are formally committed to a DCP as beginning of a process that ultimately leads to the start of a new ESPIG.

The MCA process of GPE is similar to ones of GF and GEF, whereby resources allocated to partner/recipient countries for the entire replenishment cycle[94] are calculated based on a formula[95]. *In comparison, GAVI and GCF allocate available funds among grant proposals being considered, on a first come first served basis within their overall general guidelines such as, in the case of GCF, 50/50 split for mitigation and adaptation and 50 percent of adaptation resources to Africa, LICs, and SIDS[96].*

GPE grant application process then moves to, among others, undertaking the ESA and ESP development, as necessary inputs to complete the requirements matrix, which serves as the basis for the ESPIG application. This process, on average, takes two years, making the first steps in the grant

[92] Grant start date = grant effectiveness date: the moment the grant is registered in the administration.
[93] This may still take a significant amount of time, but the GPSP report does not provide details on the average time-gap between MCA and start of the ESA process.
[94] GEF has a four-year replenishment cycle while GF has three-year one.
[95] In the case of the Global Fund, this formula takes into account disease burden and economic capacity of a country. In case of GEF, the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR) takes a combination of GEF benefits index, GEF performance index, and a social and economic index based on GDP.
[96] Small Island Developing States https://www.greenclimate.fund/document/gcf-small-islands-developing-states-factsheet

application process the longest, notwithstanding the detachment between the MCA announcement and the country-level processes.[97]

After the requirement matrix is submitted, the quality assurance review (QAR) process takes on average around ten months. Although project cycles of benchmarked partnerships do not exactly match, a comparison can be made to the average time for the GCF's projects to move from full proposal submission to the GCF Secretariat to approval by the Board, through 3-staged review processes[98], that reportedly has been reduced from eleven months in 2015 to nine in 2019[99]. GEF, with its new Project Cancellation Policy[100] has been trying to reduce the time that, on average takes a full-sized project (FSP) to move from approval of the concept note by the Council (somewhat comparable to getting to QAR 1 of GPE) to CEO for endorsement to 12 months and to actual CEO Endorsement (somewhat comparable to QAR 3 of GPE) to 18 months. GAVI and GF have different processes, especially when related to the procurement of vaccines/medicines that allows them to have reduced the time it takes from the application to disbursement to 10 months in the case of GAVI and to 9 moths in the case of GF[101]. Notwithstanding the imperfect comparisons, due to different grant processes of benchmarked partnerships, it can be inferred that ten months of GPE's review does not stand out as inefficient.

After the review processes are completed, ESPIG approval takes an additional three months and the grant start/first commitment another three months, which all together makes the overall grant application process, as presented by the ESPIG timeline, rather lengthy. Unsurprisingly, the GPSP analysis, confirmed by CLEs, has revealed that one of the main bottleneck in the protracted GPE's grant application process is the need to comply with fixed requirements (an independently appraised and endorsed quality ESP/TEP, an evidence of commitment to finance it, and the availability of/strategy to develop capacity to produce critical data and evidence for data planning, budgeting, managing, monitoring and accountability) to enter the QAR process. In particular, the perceived rigidity with which requirements related to the government's domestic financing commitment, the completion of the previous grant and the credibility of data on education have been applied reportedly led to lengthy processes.
Further, despite the earlier inference that the QAR processes are comparable with other partnerships in their length, and reported by some CLEs as reasonable (Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe), in many CLEs and

[97] "The timeline analysis done under the streamlining project does not yield information on whether the grant application process was smooth or troublesome, it only indicates the duration. The duration of time for grant application depended on many factors, including for example, whether the country was developing a new education sector plan in parallel (and not due to a delay), whereas the MCA had already been decided at a certain time (based on the inflow of funds to the Secretariat)" (Interview, Grant Process Streamlining Project Team, February 2020).
[98] 1st stage is for completeness check and preliminary review, 2nd stage is for interdivisional secretarial (technical) assessment, and 3rd – for technical assessment by the Independent Technical Advisory Panel (ITAP).
[99] Green Climate Fund. 2019. [online] Available at: <https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/documents/977793/1474145/FPR_countries_report.pdf/d84aa3df-2190-c99d-5272-832821142319>
[100] https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/Project_Cancellation_Policy_20181220.pdf
[101] MOPAN's assessment of GF's efficiency was satisfactory (a 3 on a 4-scale assessment) in 2015-16, with an emphasis on procurement rather than process of disbursement. The report highlighted significant improvements in Procurement mechanisms and Supply Chains including savings by introducing pooling procurement, etc. MOPAN | Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network. 2020. Global Fund 2015-16. [online] Available at: <http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/globalfund2015-16/>

interviews the 3-staged review has been viewed as (too) burdensome, complex and time-consuming in light of its value in improving the ESPIG application.

Finally, another set of factors identified as causing time lags in the grant processes relate to the capacity and dedication of key actors in the process (i.e. government, GA, CA, and LEG) to understand and implement the application processes expediently (see section 5.4.4).

While ISE joins the GPSP in acknowledging that GPE is subject to various external factors, it also recognizes the value of the following quick-wins and high-impact solutions suggested by the GPSP for discussion with the GPE Board (see Textbox 5.3.2). Two of the quick wins related to the pre-application stage, while an additional two relate to the QAR process and one relates to the practical handling of submissions.

Textbox 5.3.2 Selected potential efficiency improvements in the GPE grant processes

Quick wins

1. Allow ESPIGs to overlap
2. Lighten ESPDG and PDG application processes
3. Portal for grant document submission, similar to GAVI's online country portal[102]
4. Train GAs on financial requirements of ESPIG
5. Simplify/clarify QAR forms and guidance[103]

High-impact solutions for discussion with the Board

1. Meet countries where they are (analyze maturity of DCPs education sector), similar to GF's differentiation framework[104]
2. Board delegates grant approval to the Secretariat, depending on the size of the grant, similar to the GEF's medium-size project (MSPs) grant application processes[105]
3. Rolling MCAs, country chooses application and grant timing
4. Implement process portal and dashboard

Source: GPE Secretariat (2019), III Short List of Early Implementation Recommendations - Grant Process Streamlining-PHASE III DELIVERABLE and results of ISE benchmarking study, Annex 6.1

In addition, as part of the efforts to further improve the efficiency of GPE, the Secretariat has initiated a work program specifically targeted at raising awareness and action to achieve Value for Money (VfM)[106] The VfM framework identifies key entry points for strengthening GPE's VfM approach.

(i) strengthening of Local Evaluation Groups (LEGs) and Joint Sector Reviews (JSRs),

[102] Gavi's new online country portal facilitates countries having quick and easy access to up-to-date information about its portfolio of Gavi support as well as apply for new funding support

[103]With a note that GCF has been piloted and evaluated a Simplified Approval Process (SAP) to conclude that it presents no efficiency gains. SAP is an application process for smaller-scale projects or programmes with simpler documents with significantly fewer pages, easier questions and clear guidelines for more concise responses for each section, avoiding the duplication of information. More information available https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/sap

[104] GF has been organizing its support countries with the differentiated approach, particularly by reallocating Grant Management Division's (GMD) resources between Focused, Core and High Impact country portfolios. Based on the country portfolio categorization, the Secretariat has also introduced a differentiated approach to grant application, review and approval processes. Global Fund. 2017. Global Fund's Strategic Review 2017 available online https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/8343/terg_2017strategicreview_report_en.pdf?u=637166000190000000

[105]https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/EN_GEF.C.52.Inf_.06.Rev_.01_Guidelines_on_the_Project_and_Program_Cycle_Policy_0.pdf

[106] GPE Secretariat (2019), VFM Final Conceptual Framework. 30June2019

(ii) improving the sustainability and impact focus of ESPs and ESPIGs
(iii) monitoring of costing and outcome data under the ESPIGs, and
(iv) identifying greater evidence on impact and innovation, as core areas for the consistent use of VfM principles.

5.3.3 Efficiency of GPE's grant disbursement process

The efficiency of GPE's grant disbursement concerns the process from grant approval to the actual activation of the grant (i.e. the first disbursement) and the progress of disbursements throughout the implementation process.

Assessing the ESPIGs financial data recorded by the GPE Trustee for the 2012-2020 period[107] shows that the average time between grant approval and the actual grant start date is 116 days (less than four months), ranging from one day (CAR, Chad) to more than 300 days (Benin, Congo DR, Yemen). These considerable differences in observed time lag are explained by various factors:

- Different GAs adopting different administrative practices and requirements.[108] For example, the World Bank takes an average of 163 days, while UNICEF takes on average 58.[109]
- The modality of grants, with co-financed projects taking on average 170 days, while stand-alone projects and sector pooled projects take 110 and 106 days, respectively.
- The GPE strategy cycle, with significantly fewer grants approved and started in the first and final years of a strategy (2011/12 and 2015/16/17).

Overall, the average time lag of 116 days illustrates a significant improvement from the GPE Results for Learning Report 2014-2015[110], which showed a significantly higher number of average months between approval to first disbursement for the period prior to 2012 (between 11.3 and 20.6 months). When compared to for example the Green Climate Fund (GCF) – for which data is available, the GPE process from grant approval to first disbursement seems rather efficient, as the GCF reports reducing the average time from the Board approval to post-approval execution from 12.4 months in 2015 to ten months in 2019[111].

When assessing the efficiency of fund disbursements during grant implementation, from Table 5.3.3a and Figure 5.3.3 we can observe that 81 percent of the funds received were committed during the period under review, while 96.5 percent of committed funds were transferred to recipients. In particular, it took four years for cash transfers to catch up to commitments after the initial surge of paid-in contributions after FY2012.


[107] GPE Trustee financial data for 2012-2020 (up to 31 December 2019), complemented with GPE Secretariat Disbursement Data, shared by David Glass (February 2020).
[108] GPE Secretariat (2019) Annual Grant Performance Review 2019.
[109] In most cases where international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) or UN agencies are GAs, the expected start date indicated in the approved grant application form is also the effectiveness date, unless otherwise indicated by the GA. However, where the World Bank, DFID, SIDA, or AFD is the GA, regardless of what is indicated in the grant application form at approval, the grant implementation does not commence until the grant agreement has been signed between the GA and the government (source: GPE Annual Grant Performance Review 2019).
[110] GPE Secretariat (2014), Results for Learning Report 2014 – Basic Education at Risk.
[111] Green Climate Fund. 2019. [online] Available at: <https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/documents/977793/1474145/FPR_countries_report.pdf/d84aa3df-2190-c99d-5272-832821142319>

Table 5.3.3a GPE fund donor contributions, commitments and disbursements per financial year (in US$ millions)

Fiscal Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Annual									
Donor Contributions	373.9	366.5	393.4	498.5	255.7	447.1	580.8	584.9	375.7
GPE Commitments	101.0	517.9	390.3	573.4	145.8	456.4	383.6	411.1	175.6
GPE Cash Transfers	13.6	175.2	429.2	581.6	440.4	392.8	446.2	418.1	148.2
Cumulative									
Donor Contributions (cumulative)	373.9	740.4	1,133.8	1,632.4	1,888.1	2,335.2	2,916.0	3,500.9	3,876.6
GPE Commitments (cumulative)	101.0	618.9	1,009.1	1,582.6	1,728.4	2,184.8	2,568.3	2,979.4	3,155.0
GPE Cash Transfers (cumulative)	13.6	188.8	617.9	1,199.5	1,639.9	2,032.7	2,478.9	2,897.0	3,045.2
Ratios									
Commitments / Contributions	27.0%	83.6%	89.0%	96.9%	91.5%	93.6%	88.1%	85.1%	81.4%
Cash Transfers / Commitments	13.4%	30.5%	61.2%	75.8%	94.9%	93.0%	96.5%	97.2%	96.5%
Cash Transfers / Contributions	3.6%	25.5%	54.5%	73.5%	86.9%	87.0%	85.0%	82.7%	78.6%

Source: author's calculations based on GPE Fund data

Figure 5.3.3 cumulative commitments and cash transfers as percentages of paid-in donor contributions (end of each fiscal year; fy2020 to 31 December 2019 only)



Source: author's calculations based on GPE Fund data

A similar gap between donor contributions and GPE commitments is observed since 2018, when GPE received an increase in donor contributions. Because of that commitments as a share of contributions has declined in FY2018 and FY2019, but cash transfers have remained a high percentage of

commitments. This indicates that it takes some years for GPE to disburse the available funds. Overall, GPE has a relatively high percentage of commitments compared to other Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs), since the GPE, unlike other FIFs, does not commit the entire approved amount of an ESPIG grant at the time that it is approved, but only in stages, depending on progress and results in earlier stages.

GPE's Annual Grant Performance Report 2019 presents and analyzes disbursement patterns during ESPIG implementation, relating disbursement status to implementation status as follows (see Table 5.3.3b).

Table 5.3.3b List of ESPIGs by disbursement and implementation status (as of June 30, 2019)

Disbursement status FY19	Implementation status FY19	Number of ESPIGs	List of ESPIGs
On track	On track	7	Gambia, Kenya, Lao PDR, Nigeria, Pakistan (Balochistan), Somalia (Puntland), Togo
On track	Slightly behind	10	Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, OECS, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Uganda, Uzbekistan
Slightly behind	On track	1	Madagascar
Slightly behind	Slightly behind	5	Cambodia, Central African Republic, Liberia, Nepal, Zimbabwe
Delayed	Slightly behind	2	Comoros, Ethiopia
Delayed	Delayed	4	Chad, Congo DR, Lesotho, Yemen
Total		29	

Source: GPE Annual Grant Performance Report 2019

From Table 5.3.3b, a link between disbursements and implementation status can be observed, illustrating that disbursement delays are largely explained by delays in implementation. Most delays (49 percent) were caused by operational challenges (mainly issues related to more complex large-scale or international procurement; 26 percent), while 32 percent were due to unforeseen changes and external circumstances such as armed conflict, pandemics or a change of government's leadership or policies during the project cycle (see Annex 5.3.5 for a detailed overview).

The Grant performance report (GPR) also provides an analysis of disbursement patterns over the grant duration (see Annex 5.3.5), and reports on particular measures taken to address delays. Reported measures include: restructuring of the Results Framework; implementation support from the GA, LEG and Secretariat; hiring a national program coordinator to overcome coordination challenges; and better prioritization in the implementation process. Altogether, these illustrate comprehensive and thorough efforts by the Secretariat to monitor and improve GPE's efficiency in grant disbursement.

5.3.4 Role of in-country actors in grant processes

The efficiency of grant application and implementation at the country level depends on the performance and cooperation among a number for key GPE actors, notably the GA, CA, and DCP government. GPE's internal reviews (GPMP and GPR) and ISE interviews bring to light a number of actor-related issues that reportedly influence the overall grant performance.

For instance, the GPMP observes that the QAR processes do not sufficiently address governments' (implementation) capacity.[112] In particular, the number of review rounds placed a strain on already-stretched staff at the ministry involved. In addition, having several ministries involved complicates progress, while the turnover of staff at any of the organizations involved is also quoted as a factor that affects in-country collaboration.[113]

Unsurprisingly, the GAs are widely seen as a crucial actor in GPE's grant processes. GA performance is reportedly varied, reflecting earlier-mentioned differences in administrative requirements as well as capabilities and interest in working on behalf of GPE. As a result, the perceived quality of GA-Secretariat cooperation also varies from country to country. Training of GAs to improve their understanding of GPE's financial requirements may be one of the quick wins identified by the GPMP, but as long as GAs and other in-country actors still perceive GPE application requirements as overly complex in light of the size of grants, the results of such training can be expected to be limited.

CAs are important actors in coordinating and facilitating in-country cooperation between relevant government and non-government actors, which is an important factor influencing the quality and pace of policy dialogue and monitoring processes. Across countries, the absence of GPE financing for the CA role is perceived as a risk, as it limits the respective organizations' ability and willingness to facilitate sector dialogue and monitoring. This risk is also being addressed in the EPR process, which has initiated pilots to compensate CAs for their efforts.

5.3.5 GPE's use of funds


As a further measure of GPE's efficiency, trends in grant allocation by country, education sub-sector and thematic area have been mapped out and analyzed in light of GPE's ambitions.

GPE's total portfolio of commitments from 2012-2020 was US$ 3.155 billion. This includes all commitments made for country-level project grants like ESPDGs and ESPIGs, regional or global projects like CSEF, ASA, A4L, or KIX. It also comprises agency fees, supervision allocation, GPE Secretariat and trustee costs. Altogether, country-level commitments make up 90 percent of the portfolio, while 7 percent was committed to the Secretariat and 3 percent for global (or regional) grants (see Annex 5.3.6).

Overall, between 2012-2020, a total of 70 countries were supported through a total of 115 grants. Of the US$ 2.834 billion committed to country-level projects (LICs, LMICs, UMICs), 65 percent was committed to 33 LICs, 35 percent to 33 LMICs and 0.2 percent to five UMICs (Figure 5.3.5a).

[112] Universalia, (2020), CLE Synthesis Report.
[113] Oxford Policy Management (2018) Examination of key actors' roles in GPE's country-level operational model – Final report Volume I.


Figure 5.3.5a distribution of GPE commitments by operational period (in us$ millions)



Source: author's calculations based on GPE Fund data

Comparing the distribution of GPE commitments to LICs, LMICs, and UMICs as part of total GPE commitments for the GPE 2015 Strategy and the GPE 2020 Strategy operational periods, it is observed that between 2012-2015, a higher portion of the funds were committed to Low-Income Countries (63 percent of total GPE commitments) than during the 2016-2020 period (53 percent of total GPE commitments). This does not so much reflect a 'choice' of GPE itself, as commitments depends on country capacities to timely submit their applications. Besides, the status and with that the number of countries will have changed over the two strategic periods, making that the reduced share of commitments to LICs does not reflect a deliberate change in GPE's funding strategy. The share of funds committed to LMICs has increased from 29 percent (2012-2015 period) to 34 percent (2016-2020 period). This seems to contradict with the ambitions of the new MCA formula that was designed with the intention to allocate more funds to the countries that were the most in need. On the contrary, a decrease in commitments to Low-Income Countries is observed in the 2016-2020 operational period.

Figure 5.3.5b GPE commitments per FCAC/non-FCAC 2012-2020 per strategy period (in US$ millions)




Source: author's calculations based on GPE Fund data

The fourth component of the MCA formula adjusts allocation with 15 percent for FCACs, which could affect funding commitments to countries in most need. A total of 59 percent of all country-level commitments to LICs, LMICs, and UMICs is allocated to 33 fragile or conflict-affected countries (FCACs), with 24 countries categorized as LICs and nine as LMICs. The other 41 percent was thus

allocated to 38 non-FCACs, of which 24 were categorized as LMICs, nine as LICs and five as UMICs. The commitments to FCACs range from 47 percent in 2018 to 100 percent in 2012. Comparing the GPE 2015 and 2020 strategy periods shows that there are no significant differences between these periods, with nearly 60 percent of funds devoted to FCACs in both periods.

Figure 5.3.5c GPE commitments per GPE region per strategy period (US$ millions)



Source: author's calculations based on GPE Fund data

The regional distribution of commitments shows that the majority of funds were committed to Sub-Saharan Africa (76 percent), followed by commitments to South Asia (11 percent), 6.6 percent to East Asia and Pacific, 3 percent to Europe and Central Asia, 2.6 percent to Middle East and North Africa and 1 percent to Latin America and Caribbean (see Figure 5.3.5c). The regional distribution shows that GPE has expanded the allocation to the different regions over the years, although the majority of funds remained committed to Sub-Saharan Africa. Comparing the GPE strategy until 2015 and GPE strategy until 2020 shows that over two-thirds of funds committed to East Asia and Pacific and Latin America and Caribbean were prior to 2016. For South Asia, the opposite applies: three-quarters of funds were committed during the 2020 strategy period. For Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia and Middle East and North Africa, both periods account for around 50 percent of funds allocated to the region.

Among comparator partnerships, the GPE and GAVI are more focused than the others on supporting LICs and FCACs. The GEF allocates resources more broadly among all developing member countries including UMICs and HICs. The GCF gives priority to SIDS as well as Africa and LICs. The GF gives priority to high-burden countries, some of which are UMICs.

Funding priorities: Commitments per sub-sector

The Results Report 2019 includes the distribution of funds by education level for the 2004-2017 period (see Annex 5.3.8). This shows that the pre-primary level remained fairly stable at around 5 percent, while primary increased in 2008 to remain stable since then at around 65 percent. The secondary level is seen to be fairly stable, but slightly reducing to around 10 percent. Grant allocations for which the level could not be specified since 2012 have slowly grown to around 20 percent. The latter includes the allocations for system-level investments, like EMIS and teacher management. The share of funds

characterized as 'other' has reduced to 0 percent over the years. Overall, this shows that no major shifts have occurred in terms of commitments per sub-sector changes, and thus it reflects GPE's continued emphasis on supporting primary education.

COMMITMENTS PER STRATEGIC GOAL/RESULTS AREA

In order to determine the efficiency of the funds allocated by GPE, the ISE explores the funding priorities that were traceable in the Results Framework and other sources of information on GPE strategies. Evidence of investments done by GPE and the results of those investments is only partial and was not available comprehensively for the entire portfolio period.

The GPE Secretariat's Grants Performance Report 2019[114] includes an overview of the grant allocation according to the GPE 2020 Strategic Goals, based on US $ 1.4 billion in 34 grants active at end of the 2018 fiscal year.[115] Overall, grant activities related to learning (Strategic Goal 1) were allocated 40 percent of the total grant funding, while activities related to equity (Strategic Goal 2) accounted for 26 percent, and activities related to systems (Strategic Goal 3) 29 percent. The activities that receive the most funding include standards, curriculum development and learning materials / books, and teacher development (under learning), and education facilities, including school construction (under equity). These are also results areas that are explicitly mentioned in the Results Framework, which is fair since these three aspects are well measurable and use a large share of the financing. *Nevertheless, this also carries the risk that these results are being considered priorities in ESPIG development. The interviews indicate that the RF influences the thinking and design of ESPIGs*.

The grant allocation overview per strategic goal illustrates that EMIS (2.5 percent) and LAS (2.7 percent) receive relatively small amounts of funding, although these activities are part of almost all ESPIGs. It furthermore illustrates that gender equality explicitly receives 4 percent, although other typical inclusiveness-related activities (out-of-school children and children with special needs) remain limited with 1.7 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively. Finally, a relatively equal distribution can be observed for system improvements at the central, decentralized and school level.[116]

When comparing GPE's financing towards different strategic areas with literature on the rate of return for educational interventions, it indicates that there is no general consensus on what the most efficient area of investment is, given that many contextual specific factors hinder the comparison and generalization of research findings. Nonetheless, one of the aspects of consensus is that early childhood development and pre-primary education are areas of intervention that have a high return on investment.[117] In terms of types of intervention, it appears that cash transfers have positive effects on enrollment and attendance rates, with stronger effects for girls than boys, and conditional cash transfers having stronger impacts than unconditional cash transfers.[118] In addition, improving school

[114] GPE Secretariat (2019), Annual Grant Performance Report 2019.
[115] This grant allocations per strategic goal suggests a direct financing of these goals, without reflecting the interrelations between the goals (in particular goal 3 contributing to 1 and 2) as reflected in GPE's ToC.
[116] GPE Secretariat (2019), Annual Grant Performance Report 2019.
[117] Zubairi, A., and P. Rose (2018), Donor Scorecard. Just Beginning: Addressing inequality in donor funding for Early Childhood Development. REAL Centre, University of Cambridge.
[118] Marchetta, F. and Dilly, T. (2019). Supporting Education in Africa : Opportunities and Challenges for an Impact Investor [Technical Report]. FERDI - Fondation pour les études et recherches sur le développement international; I&P - Investisseurs et Partenaires.

infrastructure and building more schools leads to increased enrollment – especially for girls – and it also leads to improvements in test scores.[119] Textbooks are a cost-effective intervention, although books must be available, regularly used in class and produced in a language that is widely understood.[120] Textbooks need to be available to at least 50 percent of the students to have a positive effect.[121] Apart from qualified and committed teachers, no other input is likely to be more cost-effective than making high-quality learning materials available to all students.[122] Additionally, teacher training interventions are more effective focusing on collaborative, professional environment than individuals.[123] In summary, there is no conclusive evidence yet on what is the most efficient area for educational interventions to invest resources, although the quality and relevancy of the intervention are certainly supporting factors.[124] This reflects the broad scope of GPE's areas of intervention and calls for careful planning and close monitoring of the results of the activities conducted.

GPE currently analyses the VfM for some thematic areas. The aim of the VfM efforts[125] is to develop detailed and user-oriented guidance notes on three thematic areas: books and learning materials; education infrastructure and school construction; and teachers and teaching. This effort is commendable and could lead to a good understanding of VfM of investments in these areas that potentially steers the global debate on rate of return on educational interventions.

5.3.6 Conclusions concerning grant application, disbursement and use of funds

ON GRANT APPLICATION

GPE's grant allocation process from MCA to first disbursement takes more than 40 months on average, which strains the level of commitment to the process among in-country actors. The first 26 months of this period include an initial delay, as the timing of the education sector planning process is not linked to the MCA announcement. Subsequently, a significant amount of time is consumed to complete a complex sector-wide participatory analysis and plan development process. Altogether, this consumes about 2/3rd of the 40 months, which is different from other global funds that have a more issue-based/ thematic focus and are less demanding in term of inclusiveness and quality requirements. If only looking at grant review and disbursement parts of the application process, than GPE is more efficient than other partnerships for which the comparable data is available.

Once the sector plan development is completed according to GPE quality standards together with other funding requirements that are partly beyond the scope of control of GPE, the actual grant

[119] Plaut, D. et al. (2017). Chapter 22 : Getting to Education Outcomes : Reviewing Evidence from Health and Education Interventions. Child and Adolescent Health and Development, 3rd edition. The World Bank, Washington.
[120] Frederiksen, B., Brar, S. and Trucano, M. (2015). Getting Textbooks to Every Child in Sub-Saharan Africa : Strategies for Addressing the High Cost and Low Availability Problem. World Bank Group.
[121] Global Education Monitoring Report (2016). Every Child Should Have a Textbook [Policy Paper]. ED/GEMR/MRT/2016/PP/23 REV.
[122] Frederiksen, B., Brar, S. and Trucano, M. (2015).
[123] Kraft, M. A. and Papay, J. P. (2014). Can Professional Environments in Schools Promote Teacher Development? Explaining Heterogeneity in Returns to Teaching Experience. Educ Eval Policy Anal, 36(4), p. 474 - 500. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4392767/
[124] AIMS (2016). AIMS Institutional Model and Programs : A Value for Money Assessment [Final Report].
[125] GPE Secretariat (2019), VFM Final Conceptual Framework. 30June2019

application can start. In addition, in-country actors (DCP government, GA and CA) determine the pace and quality of these applications, each having their own capacity and/or institutional constraints affecting grant application efficiency.

Furthermore, having a three-staged QAR process outside of the country at stake leads to an external and time-consuming process that affects the sense of national ownership, shifting the focus of the LEG to being a fund applicant rather than an inclusive partnership for education. GPE Secretariat is taking commendable steps to address efficiency issues through the GPSP, GPR, VfM and EPR processes.

ON GRANT DISBURSEMENT

Overall, GPEs commitment of funds is affected by the long application process. However, grant funds that are committed are largely disbursed, although delays often occur mainly due to operational challenges during implementation. The evaluation shows large differences per grant project in getting started after obtaining approval. The differences are influenced by practices and requirements of the GA, grant modality and the phase of the GPE strategy cycle. The ways in which delays are handled illustrate comprehensive and thorough efforts by the Secretariat to monitor and improve GPE's efficiency in grant disbursement.

The role and performance of the actors involved (GA, CA, DCP government) varies widely and influenced overall grant performance. A number of factors are identified, with the most crucial ones relating to DCP government and GA capacity and motivation to work with GPE requirements, as well as CAs having limited to no resources to fulfill their role. Again, GPE is piloting suitable solutions to improve on various efficiency issues within their scope.

ON THE USE OF FUNDS

Donor contributions are largely committed, although since 2018 there is a gap between the increased donor contributions and commitments made as the process to commit funds takes time. The vast majority of funds go to LICs and LMICs with an increase of funds committed to LMIC during the 2016-2020 strategy period compared to the 2012-2015 strategy period. This shift is influenced by the timeliness of applications and changes in country status and does not reflect a deliberate strategic choice. . Additionally, the distribution of funds between FCAC and non-FCAC has remained fairly stable over the years, with a larger share to FCACs and showing no real change in prioritization since 2013 despite the MCA formula and strategic focus on disbursing to countries that are most in need.

In terms of education level, the focus was and remains on basic education, but without shifts to the pre-primary level despite progressing insights into the rate of return of investment in the pre-primary level. In addition, the share of funds allocated to system-level activities has only slowly grown over the years, not fully supporting GPEs strategy.

GPE reports on the use of funds per result area show a concentration of funds for school (re)construction, books and teacher development, areas that also happen to be the three main indicators in the Results Framework. Literature provides evidence of positive effects of these intervention areas, yet it is inconclusive of the return on investment for different areas. GPEs ongoing

efforts to analyze the VfM for these areas are promising. Funding for EMIS, LAS and equity remains relatively limited, despite also being key parts of the GPE strategy.

Overall, more than 70 countries have access to ESPIGs, through which a variety of activities are funded as proposed by the LEGs. The use of funds is in line with the strategic choices of GPE, i.e. focus on basic education, slightly more money to FCAC and actual allocation of funds left to the partnership consensus of the LEGs. We conclude that the policies of GPE are respected in how the funds are used, while efforts to connect commitments to results areas, as presented in the 2019 results report, are a good step towards better understanding GPE's value for money. The use of funds reflects an (inclusive) partnership consensus rather than an exclusive deliberate choice. Making such choices is also hampered by uncertainty about what areas of the ESP will be funded through other domestic and international channels.

5.4 The GPE's Role in International and Domestic Financing for Education

Core question: What explains the main trends in international and domestic financing for education, and what is the role of the GPE therein?

Main findings: The ISE observes that globally education-related ODA has stagnated since 2008/2009, which is partly attributed to the aftermath of the global financial crises. A myriad of existing traditional and emerging non-traditional donors, funding channels, and available lending options imply a fragmented aid landscape. The overall prominence of the GPE as a fund within the international aid architecture for education is rather limited, representing an average 5.6% of education-related ODA (and up to 11.8% relate to basic education) in GPE partner countries between 2012-2018, while the effect of the GPE's advocacy on increased public spending on education is limited. The position of the GPE within this aid landscape highly depends on strategic choices made by contributing partners, developing country partners, as well as the GPE itself.
The ISE sees scope to further strengthen the strategic focus of the GPE in terms of what, where and how to provide financing, and to pursue a more deliberate and complementary role vis-à-vis other education development funding vehicles. More particularly domestic resources mobilization advocacy efforts and GPE funding should encompass more strategic areas of support including to Public Financial Management and macro-economic dialogue.

5.4.1 Introduction

Historically, education development has played a key role in donor development assistance portfolios, as re-confirmed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (i.e. as SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning).

The GPE is an important contributor to the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development for SDG4, being a global partnership and fund, inclusive of both donors and developing country partners, designed with the sole purpose to support and empower developing countries in building stronger education systems.

However, the global financing landscape for education development comprises a fragmented web of donor agents, recipient partner countries, and different types of aid channels and aid modalities. Furthermore, it involves a fast-growing number of new actors (e.g. new non-traditional donors with substantial investment portfolios have emerged, such as China, India, or Brazil) and newly-operationalized and to be established funding vehicles (e.g. such for the education domain Education Cannot Wait and the International Financing Facility for Education). For GPE, as an enabling intermediary agent (i.e. with on the one side funding partners contributing to fund the GPE, and on the other side with the GPE enabling DCPs to access financial and technical support through the available grants as well as through leveraging support through other channels), it is critical to reflect on its role within the international financing landscape for education development. Moreover, this section analyses trends in education funding to obtain an impression of the choices made by development partners in channeling financial support.

More specifically, it takes a financial perspective[126] on development assistance globally and for education in specific, to illustrate the funding choices made by both the international donor community as well as by developing countries, and the functioning therein of the GPE within this context.

5.4.2 Facts and findings

It is important to get a picture on the level (starting with all official development support, narrowing down to assistance to education in specific) of support that is made available to developing countries, and in particular GPE partner countries, both from the perspective of funding choices made by donors, and from the perspective of whether DCPs can access sufficient funding (i.e. since Low-Income Countries, Lower-Middle Income Countries, Fragile States typically are characterized by resource constrained public sector environments).

Global ODA and Commitments to GPE DCPs

Starting from global commitments of Official Development Assistance (ODA)[127] to developing countries, we can construct a picture of how the overall level of ODA commitments has developed in the past 20 years, specified for all developing countries and for the 76 GPE partner countries in specific (see Figure 5.4.2a). Overall ODA commitments to developing countries between 2000-2018 show an increase both in absolute terms using current prices (more than triple) and in real terms using constant prices (more than twofold). The bulk of ODA commitments is targeted at developing countries in Africa and Asia. Within the global group of Developing Countries, the group of 76 GPE DCPs represents less than half of the total ODA commitments (see Annex 5.4.3)[128].


[126] By triangulation of OECD CRS data on ODA commitments, GPE Results and Evaluation Reports, interviews with Secretariat Staff and GPE donors, GPE financial data provided by the GPE Trustee, and publicly available international literature.

[127] As recorded in the OECD CRS database. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries. ODA data captures aid flows from official donors (Governments) to multilateral development agencies and developing countries. The GPE is not officially listed in the OECD CRS under donor or multilateral agency, and hence GPE contributions are accounted for in the ODA figures from individual countries.

[128] See Annex 5.4.3 for a breakdown of ODA commitments based on data extracted from the OECD CRS database.

When compared with the overall ODA commitments trendline[129], the countries marked as GPE partner countries show a similar trend, but follow a more flattened curve from 2008/2009, and even a declining trend in absolute terms (current prices)[130] since 2013/2014.This declining trend indicates that less resources are made available to the countries with the greatest need of support (since the majority of GPE DCPs constitute Low-Income and Lower-Middle Income Countries and a multitude of fragile states). This is supported by the most recent OECD data on Official Development Assistance, which indicates that, although total ODA commitments are steadily increasing overall since 2000, external finance flowing to developing countries most in need of support stayed far below the internationally agreed target of 0,7% of total GNI of OECD member countries (although a number of countries contributing to the GPE generally meet this target, incl. the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway).

Figure 5.4.2a Total ODA commitments to All developing countries and to 76 GPE partner countries



While total ODA commitments have seen a steady increase, the trendline suggests that in effect, ODA commitments to GPE DCPs have stagnated since 2009. The stagnated commitments (measured in current prices) to GPE DCPs imply that less funding is available for GPE DCPs in real terms (i.e. when measured in constant prices, corrected for inflation), in effect this means that GPE countries are supported with less funding for development.

In addition to ODA provided through traditional donors, there is now a myriad of non-traditional sources of development finance, including from non-DAC donors (e.g. China, India, and Brazil), private sector organizations, philanthropist foundations (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and social impact investors (e.g. the Lego Group). Private sector financial commitments represent a relatively small amount (approximately US$ 6.5 billion in 2018) when compared with traditional ODA

[129] The trendline included in the graph represents a polynomial fit, which is used to analyze data that fluctuates. The curve represents the best fit with the pattern of ODA commitments, and breaks from a straight linear trend.
[130] In the remainder of the section, current prices are used as a basis for comparison, since GPE financial data is presented in current prices.


commitments[131]. However, non-DAC donor countries increasingly provide significant sums of development finance, which is not accounted for in the official OECD CRS data on ODA flows. For example, China provided more than US$ 350 billion in aid to developing countries between 2000-2014, mostly addressing infrastructure-related development.[132]

The emergence and increasing significance of non-traditional sources of development finance, suggests that 'traditional' donor aid from OECD-DAC countries is becoming less important as a source of development finance. The growth of the less traditional actors within this changed context has led to changes in the global architecture in terms of reaching agreement on aid effectiveness issues. In this increasingly fragmented aid landscape, DCPs tend to make more strategic choices concerning the division of labor between different providers of development assistance (traditional and non-traditional sources), and strategically manage the overall financial envelope available to DCPs to fund development[133].

Education-related ODA and Commitments to GPE DCPs

When applying a sectoral lens[134] to ODA commitments to developing countries, it is observed that while the overall level of ODA commitments increased during 2000-2018 (*see figure 5.4.2a*), the part of ODA that is allocated to education sector development (see figure 5.4.2b) has stagnated and remained at the same level since 2009 (around US$ 13.5 billion per year), before increasing again in 2017 and 2018.

Figure 5.4.2b Total education-related ODA Commitments, split by Education Sub-Sector (current prices)



[131] See Annex 5.4.5 for contributions from non-traditional donors (e.g. foundations, private sector, etc.).
[132] Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. (2017). *Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset*. AidData Working Paper #46. Williamsburg, VA: AidData. See also: https://www.aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset
[133] Greenhill R., Prizzon A., Rogerson A. (2016). *The Age of Choice: Developing Countries in the New Aid Landscape*. The Fragmentation of Aid. Rethinking International Development series. Palgrave Macmillan, London
[134] ODA is the constructed total of cumulative aid provided to different sectors, such as Health, Education, Environment, Humanitarian Aid, Debt Relief, etc.

Following the OECD CRS construct of education ODA[135], the GPE generally funds actions in DCPs within the *a. Basic Education* and *d. Education (Unspecified)* domains, although in some instances support is also targeted at lower-secondary education programmes.

While it would be expected that the level of education-related ODA would increase (in line with the incremental increases in the total level of ODA commitments, as seen in Figure 5.4.2a) following the renewed commitments of the international development community to the 2030 Agenda and SDG4, education has become less of a funding priority for development partners during the past decade, with the share of education in total ODA gross disbursements declining from 8.9% in 2010 to 7.9% in 2018[136], indicating that considerably less attention is paid to education by OECD DAC development partners.

This picture is also confirmed by OECD CRS data on ODA *commitments*, specifically taking the GPE operational period from 2012 to 2018 (*with 2018 is the latest year where complete OECD data is available*), where it is observed that the share of education in total ODA commitments has averaged to 7.3%[137], summarized in the table below (which combines data from Figure 5.4.2a and Figure 5.4.2b)

Table 5.4.2a Education ODA commitments as a Share in total ODA between 2012-2018

US$ million (current prices)	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Average
Total ODA commitments to developing countries (DCs)	171,819	189,110	177,538	193,284	186,541	196,240	196,438	187,282
ODA commitments allocated to education	13,195	12,843	14,004	12,303	12,601	14,987	15,126	13,580
Education ODA as share of total ODA	7.7%	6.8%	7.9%	6.4%	6.8%	7.6%	7.7%	7.3%

A generally-acclaimed explanation regarding why ODA for education has stagnated (effectively since 2009 as seen in Figure 5.4.2b) is the effect of the global financial crisis in 2008[138]. In various research, it is established that aid disbursements by donors fall during recessions at decreasing rates[139], and that high public debt levels in these contributing countries are associated with a contraction in aid flows in

[135] OECD CRS education-specific ODA is comprised of four sub-sectors, including: a. Basic Education (incl. Primary Education; Basic Life Skills for Youth and Adults; Early Childhood Education; School Feeding); b. Secondary Education (incl. lower and upper Secondary Education; Vocational training); c. Post-Secondary Education (incl. Higher Education; Advanced Technical and Managerial Training); and d. Education Unspecified (incl. Education Policy and Administrative Management; Education Facilities and Training; Teacher Training; Educational Research).
[136] OECD CRS Database, official development assistance gross disbursements to developing countries (based on US$ million, 2018 constant prices). See also: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=crs1
[137] Commitments in *current prices*. Applying 2017 constant prices would result in 8.2% (2000-2010) and 7.0% (2011-2018) respectively.
[138] Dang, H.A., Knack, S., and Rogers, H. (2009). *International aid and financial crises in donor countries*. Policy Research Working Paper Series 5162, The World Bank.
[139] OECD: Aid to developing countries falls because of global recession. See also: https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.htm

the aftermath of recessions[140]. This meant that many countries in the world (and thus donors of development aid) were faced internally with increasing wealth inequalities and austerity policies. In some instances, this has manifested itself as well in a shift with the political landscape, with the rise of populistic regimes in some important donor countries and establishment of more conservative governments[141]. This has translated into declining or stagnating budgetary allocations to development aid and changes in policy priorities that emphasize national and bilateral interests over support for multilateral engagement for sustainable (education) development, or marked by a shift in funding priorities to other thematic areas.

In addition, during the past 15 years, other pressing global crises took a flight in dominating the international development debate, including global climate change, which has drawn the attention of donors and now has been mainstreamed as a priority in many development programmes[142]. The recent COVID-19 induced crisis (and potential future pandemics), will mark a major point of debate for the coming years. In this respect, *there are preliminary signs that the on-going COVID-19 crisis will have a major impact on health and education sectors, and will deeply impact the global economy. This will be reflected in ODA flows, although the direction and magnitude of change will remain speculative (see Textbox 5.4.2a).*

Textbox 5.4.2a Potential impact of the COVID-19 global pandemic

The OECD estimates that the overall direct impact of COVID-19 crisis on GDP will be between 20-25 percent in many major advanced economies[143].


Although still speculative in nature, many countries affected will enter into a period of "repairs", where at the national level significant sums of investment will be redirected to health care systems strengthening and resilience building, and absorbing the blow to their economies.

This may also affect many of the donor countries' political priorities, long-term budgets, and their foreign policies. For the GPE, this could potentially imply that less funding may be made available in the next years, as it is likely that (temporarily) more funds will flow to humanitarian aid and health sectors (including health information systems, capacity building of national health care agencies, emergency response, vaccination programmes, etc.) See also Annex 5.4.2.

During the 2012-2020 operational period of the GPE, the GPE has committed a total amount of US$ 3.155 million (i.e. representing all GPE commitments, incl. to LICs, LMICs, UMICs, Global Programmes, Secretariat and Trustee) from a total of US$ 3.876 million contributions received from donors in the same period. Based on this, the overall prominence of the GPE (as a global fund) within the global ODA landscape for education, amounts to an average of 2,7% over the 2012-2018 period[144].

[140] Dabla-Norris, E., Minoiu, C., and Zanna, L.F. (2010). *Business Cycle Fluctuations, Large Shocks, and Development Aid: New Evidence*. IMF Working Papers 10/240, International Monetary Fund.
[141] E.g. Australia, which has significantly reduced funding to the GPE in the past 10 years. See also Annex 5.4.5: Evolution and Distribution of Donor Contributions to the GPE.
[142] See also Annex 5.4.1: Education Financing Gap for Reaching the 2030 SDGs on Education.
[143] OECD (March, 2020). *Evaluating the initial impact of COVID-19 containment measures on economic activity*.
[144] 2018 is the latest year for which a complete OECD CRS ODA data set is available.

Figure 5.4.2c Prominence of the GPE within 76 GPE Partner Countries



When assessing the overall level of ODA commitment to the 76 GPE partner countries during 2012-2018, the GPE's role is significantly firmer, with GPE accounting for approximately 0.4% of the development assistance landscape in GPE partner countries. From the total level of ODA commitments, the GPE represents 5.6% of ODA allocated to education. When education-related ODA is broken down into sub-sector commitments, the GPE would constitute approximately 11.8% of ODA commitments in Basic Education[145] in the 76 listed GPE partner countries (see Figure 5.4.2c).

When split for the two operational periods of the GPE, and applying commitments to country level only, taking the 76 GPE Partner Countries as reference group, the following picture emerges:

Table 5.4.2b Prominence of the GPE within the global Education ODA landscape (2012-2015)

US$ million (current prices)	2012-2015				
	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average
Total ODA to 76 GPE DCPs[146]	78 405	89 690	78 597	84 470	82 791
Total ODA to 76 GPE DCPs allocated to Education[147]	5 798	6 005	6 078	5 301	5 796
Total ODA to 76 GPE DCPs allocated to a. Basic Education and d. Education (Unspecified)	3 045	3 046	3 053	2 551	2 924

[145] Includes ODA to Basic Education and ODA to Education Unspecified. Data transposed from overall ODA shares to education by education sub-sectors in which the GPE is primarily active: a. Basic Education (incl. Primary Education; Basic Life Skills for Youth and Adults; Early Childhood Education; School Feeding) and d. Education Unspecified (incl. Education Policy and Administrative Management; Education Facilities and Training; Teacher Training; Educational Research), and transposed to the 76 GPE DCPs as a % share based on available ODA data on sub-sector allocations.
[146] For the 2012-2018 period, the figures include 76 DCPs that are listed as GPE partner countries (March 2020).
[147] Transposed from all Developing Countries to 76 GPE DCPs, based on overall % share of ODA allocated to education (Table x: Education ODA as a Share in Total ODA between 2012-2018).

Total GPE commitments to 76 DCPs (LICs, LMICs, UMICs)[148]	96	492	335	535	365
- ***GPE as a share of total ODA in 76 DCPs***	***0.1%***	***0.5%***	***0.4%***	***0.6%***	**0.4%**
- ***GPE as a share of total ODA in 76 DCPs allocated to education***	***1.6%***	***8.1%***	***5.4%***	***10.0 %***	***6.3%***
- ***GPE as a share of total ODA in 76 DCPs allocated to a. Basic Education and d. Education (Unspecified)***	***3.3%***	***13.9%***	***12.8 %***	***22.5 %***	***13.1%***

Table 5.4.2c Prominence of the GPE within the global Education ODA landscape (2016-2018)

US$ million (current prices)	2016-2018			
	2016	2017	2018	Average
Total ODA to 76 GPE DCPs[149]	73 349	84 926	86 216	81 497
Total ODA to 76 GPE DCPs allocated to Education[150]	4 654	6 127	6 268	5 683
Total ODA to 76 GPE DCPs allocated to a. Basic Education and d. Education (Unspecified)	2 400	3 307	3 502	3 070
Total GPE commitments to 76 DCPs (LICs, LMICs, UMICs)[151]	142	385	368	298
- ***GPE as a share of total ODA in 76 DCPs***	***0.2%***	***0.5%***	***0.4%***	**0,4%**
- ***GPE as a share of total ODA in 76 DCPs allocated to education***	***2.9%***	***5.9%***	***5.5%***	***4,8%***
- ***GPE as a share of total ODA in 76 DCPs allocated to a. Basic Education and d. Education (Unspecified)***	***6.1%***	***13.4%***	***10.5%***	***10,0%***

These average shares per operational period provide ample evidence that the relatively small amount of financial resources (i.e. GPE commitments) available to the GPE is divided over a relatively large pool of partner countries. It can be induced that although on average the GPE constitutes a share of 13.1% (2012-2015) and 10.0% (2016-2018) respectively, within the ODA sub-sector niche (a. Basic Education; d. Education Unspecified), this share implies a relatively modest role for the GPE[152]. A more focused funding approach (with less DCPs) could *de facto* significantly increase the share of the GPE in education ODA in the GPE partner countries, thereby further increasing its prominence.

GPE and Domestic Resource Mobilization

It is expected that the total costs of education more than triples in Low-Income Countries[153], implying that between 2015-2030 total annual government spending on education in Low-Income Countries (excluding post-secondary education) will have to increase by at least 50 percent as a share of GDP[154], which is not a realistic endeavor.

[148] Funds committed at DCP country level, excluding Secretariat, Grant Agent, and Trustee fees (based on GPE Trustee financial data).
[149] For the 2012-2018 period, the figures include 76 DCPs that are listed as GPE partner countries (March 2020).
[150] Transposed from all Developing Countries to 76 GPE DCPs, based on overall % share of ODA allocated to education (Table x: Education ODA as a Share in Total ODA between 2012-2018).
[151] Funds committed at DCP country level, excluding Secretariat, Grant Agent, and Trustee fees (based on GPE Trustee financial data).
[152] Also note here that one of the GPE's conditions is that partner countries allocate at least 45% of their education budgets to primary education (primary education sub-sector is generally the priority of LICs and LMICs)
[153] UNESCO (2015). Pricing the right to education: The cost of reaching new targets by 2030. Policy Paper 18 for the EFA Global Monitoring Report.
[154] See also Annex 5.4.1: Education Financing Gap for Reaching the 2030 SDGs on Education.

Domestic financing constitutes by far the most important source of funding for education development, accounting for 79% of total education spending globally,[155] and mobilizing more domestic resources to address the education funding gap will remain the most critical challenge in the coming decade. In this respect, when assessing sources of *actual expenditure on education*, donors account for approximately 12% of education spending in *Low-Income Countries*,[156] implying that 88% of education spending comes from domestic and other financing sources. For the GPE, this would imply that increasing funding to LICs would potentially lead to obtaining a more prominent role within the LICs' education budget when compared with funding LMICs.

The GPE strongly advocates that partner countries increase their national education budgets, and that partner countries exert more effort in mobilizing more domestic funding for education. Domestic education expenditure targets are included as an indicator in the GPE Results Framework (under Indicator 10). The GPE domestic resource mobilization requirements target the share of public expenditure spent on education (e.g. 15-20 percent). This requirement is intended as a leverage factor to ascertain the willingness of DCPs' governments to engage in education sector improvement, and advance an open dialogue with GPE partner countries on education sector development.

However, the percentage of education public expenditure as such does not provide an indication about the "quality of domestic funding", as the share could increase even with an absolute decrease in the budget allocated to education (as it is a relative share of overall government spending). In addition, the indicator does not enable assessing sub-sector priorities and expenditure trends unless the budget is assessed and recorded in further detail and analyzed over an extended period of time.

Table 5.4.2e GPE Results Framework Indicator 10 (DCPs' public expenditure on education)


Results Framework Indicator 10	Baseline			Intermediary targets				Target
Proportion of DCPs that have: a) increased public expenditure on education; b) maintained sector spending at 20% or above;	CY:	2015		2016[157]	2017[158]	2018[159]	2019	2020
	All:	65%	Target:	76%	83%	85%	88%	90%
			Actual:	**69%**	**65%**	**70%**	-	-
	FCAC:	57%	Target:	74%	81%	82%	84%	86%
			Actual:	**60%**	**55%**	**65%**	-	-

Source: Based on the Draft 2020 GPE Results Report (detailed underlying data and by components a and b is unconfirmed)

[155] Un.org. (2019). Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2019 | Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development. [online] Available at: https://developmentfinance.un.org/fsdr2019
[156] UNESCO, Global Education Monitoring Report (2019).
[157] 2016 available data includes 43 partner countries (of which 20 FCACs), including sub-regions for Pakistan (Sindh) and Tanzania (Zanzibar), and it also includes partner countries that have not received GPE grants (e.g. Albania).
[158] 2017 available data includes 46 partner countries (of which 20 FCACs), including sub-regions for Pakistan (Balochistan and Sindh) and Tanzania (Zanzibar), and it also includes partner countries that have not received GPE grants (e.g. Albania).
[159] 2018 available data includes 33 partner countries (of which 13 FCACs).

Overall, based on the data and calculation method contained in the draft GPE Results Report 2020[160], it can be concluded that GPE partner countries have managed to either maintain or increase public expenditure on education compared to the 2015 baseline (see Table 5.4.2e). The Results Framework Indicator 10 is based on the proportion of DCPs that "comply" with the requirement (a binary method of calculation, recording either a yes or no). However if we look at actual expenditure data recorded by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics[161], a slightly less positive picture emerges.

Figure 5.4.2d Public Expenditure on Education in GPE DCPs (as % of total Government Expenditures)



Based on the UIS database containing public expenditure data recorded by country we can construct a picture (see Figure 5.4.2d) on actual government spending on education a share of total public expenditure, taking the GPE partner countries as group of analysis[162].


As can be derived from Figure 5.4.2d, a rather erratic pattern emerges on the share Education Public Expenditure. Overall it is observed that the education expenditure as a share of total public expenditure in GPE partner countries shows a decreasing trend between 2000-2018. GPE partner countries with an FCAC or LIC status tend to perform below the total average in all GPE DCPs, while LMICs perform slightly better.

The general bandwidth for all GPE DCPs (LICs, LMICs, FCACs) show that the share of education public expenditure is between 14%-17% of Total Public Expenditure for the 2012-2018 period. When split by GPE operational periods, between 2012-2015 decreases are observed in the share of education in total public expenditure for all GPE DCPs, after which an improvement is noticed during 2016-2018 (except for LMICs). Overall this implies that the GPE advocacy efforts for domestic resource mobilization have not (yet) resulted in significant increases in domestic spending in GPE partner countries.

[160] The draft GPE Results Report 2020 includes revised baseline data for RF indicator 10. The targets and milestones for were calculated using baseline data collected in 2016 on public education expenditure in 2015. Since then, Indicator 10 data were revised in 2017, 2018 and 2019 as updated information became available. Because the original baseline was higher than the revised baseline, it led to higher target-setting for later years.
[161] UNESCO Institute for Statistics (http://uis.unesco.org/), with latest update 9 April 2020.
[162] See also Annex 5.4.4: Distribution of spending on education sector by country income status.

It is therefore observed that public spending on education in GPE LICs remains a challenge. If the GPE's grant portfolio is assessed in terms of commitments per strategic operational period, it is found that indeed overall LICs are prioritized for GPE funding, although for 2016-2020 GPE commitments to LICs have decreased and GPE commitments to LMICs have slightly increased.

Figure 5.4.2e Distribution of GPE Commitments per Operational Period



The distribution of GPE's financial commitments show that overall, 58 percent of GPE commitments are allocated to Low-Income Countries (LICs), while 31 percent is committed to Low-Middle Income Countries (LMICs)s.

A very small amount of GPE commitments is allocated to a number of Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs), mainly Small-Island Developing States (SIDS) in the Caribbean and Pacific.

The principal funding modality employed by the GPE consists of stand-alone projects, representing 59% (US$ 2 billion) of the GPE's grant portfolio.

Sector pooled funding represents 24% (US$ 800 million), and project pooled funding represents 18% (US$ 607 million) of the applied funding modalities in the GPE's grant portfolio.

Source: Reconstructed from GPE Trustee financial data

Generally, poorer countries prioritize education more in their public expenditure on a percentage-wise basis (due to the relatively low levels of GDP and the corresponding low level of tax revenues). However, when comparing *spending per pupil in primary education*, a vast funding gap is visible between low-income (i.e. less than US$ 100 per pupil per year according to some CLEs) and high-income countries (approximately US$ 8,000 per pupil per year). For GPE, this would imply that allocating more of GPE's funding to LICs would potentially result in a higher gain in spending per pupil in primary education in LICs compared with increasing funding to LMICs. In addition, Low-Income Countries may have less access to funding from global lending facilities compared to Lower-Middle Income and Middle Income Countries (due to lower credit ratings tied to income status). Supporting system level change in LICs and supporting the conditions for effective implementation of education sector policies, would also increase the potential for LICs to source additional funding from international and domestic markets, including from development partners.

For LICs and LMICs to increase their tax revenues and increase domestic public spending on education, strong administrative and policy reforms[163] are required.[164] In order to increase the prospects of achieving the global goals for education, effective, good quality education policies, strategies and programs must be in place (as advocated through GPE's commitment to high-quality ESP development and implementation). However, the scale of the required investments in education in low-income developing countries is a challenge that necessitates support from all stakeholders, including the private sector, development partners, philanthropists, and international financial institutions.

It is within this sphere of support where development partners such as GPE can play a key role (i.e. continue the forging of long-standing partnerships at the country level through the LEGs, and supporting systemic reform aimed at building systems' resilience). In this respect, in addition to the current advocacy efforts, the GPE could engage in strategic dialogues with DCP Ministries of Finance on issues around taxation and revenue collection, debt management, austerity, macro-economic policies, public sector wage bills (i.e. focus more on Public Financial Management aspects in DCPs that directly affect the level of resources available to a government to spend on public sectors).

Complementarity and Funding Channels


Taking a global perspective, in order to address the existing and foreseen financing gaps in education, one of the many potential responses could be to advocate for a more balanced use of funds between multilateral and bilateral channels, as well as improving and increasing the use of partnerships and innovative funding mechanisms[165] (e.g. such as the Global Partnership for Education, Education Cannot Wait, and the recently-established International Finance Facility for Education) to channel and concentrate funds on education in developing countries as opposed to increasing funding through bilateral channels, which would lead to a more fragmented education aid landscape.

In this respect, selection decisions made by donors to provide aid to developing partner countries based on rational criteria are widely assumed to contribute towards aid effectiveness. Generally, aid effectiveness is thought to be enhanced if aid is provided to the poorest countries (in terms of targeting development needs) and better-governed countries (in terms of aid being well spent). Recent studies show that donors apply certain filters (e.g. governance criteria, systems capacity) when deciding how to fund specific sectors, and through which channels (i.e. bilaterally or multilaterally), and they consider what level of control is desired regarding the spending of aid.

These considerations may also be present for donors contributing to GPE, as can be shown in the rather fragmented and erratic pattern of contributions received by GPE during 2012-2020 (see also Annex 5.4.5). GPE relies on a number of "staple" donors such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and the United States that have provided a more or less "reliable" stream of contributions, while other countries have scaled back financial support in recent years (e.g. Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain).

[163] For instance, strengthening macroeconomic management, combating corruption and improving governance, strengthening transparency and accountability.
[164] Gaspar, V., Amaglobeli, D., Garcia-Escribano, M., Prady, D., and Soto, M. (2019). Fiscal Policy and Development: Human, Social, and Physical Investment for the SDGs. IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/19/03, January 2019.
[165] Gulrajani, Nilima (2016). Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Channels: Strategic Choices for Donors. Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Figure 5.4.2f Distribution of Contributions to the GPE between 2012-2020



First of all, donors make a choice on what type of channel to use for their development assistance (i.e. through multilateral agencies, or through their own bilateral channels). For donors, thinking strategically about the choice of what, where, and how to provide aid is becoming increasingly important. Donors use bilateral channels (i.e. prefer direct relationships with recipient country) when motivated by the need to control, account and be visible, while multilateral channels are opted for when motivated by the donor imperative of pooling and advancing a common global cause[166].

Thematically, donors may not necessarily have the same education priorities as GPE for their education spending of ODA, which do not necessarily align with the goals and objectives of GPE. For example, Germany – which is a large donor of global ODA – prioritizes technical and vocational education programs, a sub-sector that is not the core focus of GPE. In addition, donors only tend to opt for bilateral channels to invest in primary education when the recipient country can demonstrate a strong control of corruption.[167]

Funding through bilateral channels appears to display a greater selectivity of recipient countries based on institutional quality, while multilateral channels rather emphasize the needs of the recipient country.[168] In addition, multilateral channels appear to be less politicized, more demand-driven, more selective in terms of poverty criteria and they provide a better conduit for global public goods. Bilateral

[166] Result of interviews conducted with several GPE Board Members representing GPE Donor constituencies, and confirmed in international literature.
[167] Christensen, Z., Homer, D. and Nielson, D.L. (2011). Dodging Adverse Selection: How Donor Type and Governance Condition Aid's Effects on School Enrolment? World Development 39(11): 2044-2053. Available at: http://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.018
[168] Gulrajani, Nilima (2016). Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Channels: Strategic Choices for Donors. Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

channels emerge as more politicized, more selective on governance criteria, having slightly lower administrative costs and being much more fragmented. Indeed, this finding is supported by interviews with various donors to GPE. For example, although the European Commission is a large contributor to GPE (US$ 301 million since 2017), it prefers to maintain more direct bilateral relations with recipient countries over providing increasing support through multilateral channels.

Second, if donors choose a multilateral channel, several funding vehicles for education development co-exist (for example, GPE, Education Cannot Wait, and the International Financing Facility for Education), each with different priorities and scope.

In this respect, a comparison is made between GPE, the International Financing Facility for Education (IFFEd), and Education Cannot Wait (ECW) (see Annex 5.4.6 and 5.4.7). Although each financing vehicle has its own characteristics and specificities, there are similarities and overlapping areas in their overall goals (commitment to reaching SDG 4), scope (geographical, recipient income level status), and the donor base of each vehicle. While GPE and ECW operate as grant mechanisms, the IFFEd is designed to operate as a loan vehicle (i.e. backing up loan operations of multilateral development banks to recipient countries). GPE and ECW have active grant operations in the same type of countries (both operate in the same FCACs and LICs). The IFFEd intends to target lower-middle income countries, potentially the same LMICs that are eligible for GPE funding. The most significant difference is observed in the condition that GPE DCPs are required to spend at least 45 percent of public education spending on primary education, while IFFEd and ECW do not necessarily apply a sub-sectoral focus.

Overall, as a fund GPE is larger in size compared with the ECW (with GPE averaging US$ 308 million in commitments per year during 2012-2020, and ECW around US$ 85 million in annual disbursements in partner countries), although the number of countries in which ECW is currently active is much smaller (33 active countries). As the ECW just started operations, for the years to come the ECW might grow as a stronger competitor for funds, as the ECW will experience a learning curve by both donors and partner countries. The start-up capital that is currently put into the IFFEd amounts to more than US$ 600 million (with the UK and the Netherlands as principal donors), which is expected to leverage US$ 2 billion in loans to LMIC developing countries.

Based on the above, for GPE this implies that in order to mobilize more funds from its respective donor base and profile itself as “the” channel for funding education in developing countries, it may need to show donors that its contributions provide the value for money in their choice to spend their education ODA compared with existing bilateral options. Hence it is worthwhile for GPE to consider cost reduction strategies to minimize administrative and managerial costs (including Secretariat, trustees, grant agent fees, costs associated with chosen funding modality for grants), compared to the lower costs associated with bilateral channels[169], and improve the existing conditionality principles in relation to recipient countries (or direct some of the GPE efforts towards funding system-level interventions that address governance).

[169] Gulrajani, Nilima (2016). Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid Channels: Strategic Choices for Donors. Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Furthermore, as the ECW and the IFFEd aim to work on opposite sides of the education development spectrum (i.e. from direct emergency support to provision of more advanced loan opportunities to fund education) with the GPE in between these two funding vehicles (focused on systems strengthening), the GPE could aim to increase alignment efforts with the ECW and the IFFEd and further solidifying their niche position within this spectrum; for example, by focusing more on Low-Income Countries taking over where the ECW scope of work stops (system building), and by prioritizing funding in Lower-Middle Income Countries aimed at improving education system resilience and geared towards eliminating systemic barriers to education development, so that these LMICs' readiness and eligibility for more advanced lending options through the IFFEd improves.

Textbox 5.4.2b Examples of Education Sector Systemic Barriers

Examples of system level bottlenecks, that affect overall sector accountability and the "fundability of a sector", and that need to be addressed to shape the conditions for more effective and efficient education service delivery (ESP implementation).

Key to the effective formulation of education policies as well as to planning and corresponding funding of education service delivery, is the availability of facts-based information, statistics, and financial data (both quantitative and qualitative) on the state of education, starting with the organization and collection of information at school level, decentralized level (provincial MoE departments), and at central level MoE. At each level the corresponding capacities are needed to effectively collect, organize, process, and analyze information and utilize it in the appropriate setting. Well-functioning EMIS, HRMIS, and FMIS are needed to analyze policy options and the results of policy implementation, support decision-making, and increase accountability of the sector.

Another barrier towards effective resource allocation and management in education to enable education service delivery, encompasses the country's and the sector's full spectrum of financial management capacities, finance and budget systems, and linked strategic functions. Financial resources made available to the sector require sufficient absorption capacity, i.e. capacities and transparent systems are needed to procure, manage and implement education service delivery (i.e. textbook procurement, school feeding programmes, teacher salary management) and to design and implement specific projects (i.e. school construction). Improvement of Public Financial Management and Processes increases internal accountability within the education sector (at central MoE level as well as at decentralized level provincial MoE departments and schools) and overall external accountability. Improved linkage of budgeting and expenditure management with the sector planning process increases the ability of the MoE and the Ministry of Finance to effectively plan and adapt for the needs of the sector at all levels.

5.4.3 Conclusions related to GPE's past and current role in the domestic and international financing for education

Inequalities in ODA commitments remain prevalent, partly caused by changes in the status of ODA recipient countries (e.g. countries may promote in income level or fragility status), and shifts in donor priorities on how, where, and what to fund. The attainment of the 2030 Agenda and the work on the SDGs – including SDG4 on education – are threatened by large gaps in required funding. For education development, the estimated annual funding gap amounts to US$ 39 billion during 2015-2030 for reaching universal pre-primary, primary and secondary education of good quality in low and lower-middle income countries.

Bilateral relations remain the most important channel for donors to support partner countries in education development and commit ODA. From a financial perspective, the prominence of GPE within the overall aid landscape is rather modest. GPE funding averages between the range of 5.6% (of total education ODA) to 11.8% (of ODA specified for the basic education subsector) committed to the 76 GPE DCPs. When comparing GPE funding relative to ODA allocated to education sub-sectors Basic Education, the GPE constitutes on average around 11.8% of the ODA education share annually in the 76 partner countries.

Domestic revenue mobilization is one of the most critical development priorities for the coming decade, as it is essential to financing sustainable development investments. Since 2000, overall, a decrease can be observed in education spending by GPE partner countries (measured as a share of their total public expenditure). Although GPE has actively advocated developing partner countries to increase their national education budgets, despite unprecedented pledges in 2018, the results of GPE's advocacy for structural increases in domestic education remain below the targeted amounts.

The total funds contributed by donors to GPE amount to US$ 3.9 billion during 2012-2020 (US$ 1.6 billion during 2012-2015; US$ 2.2 billion during 2016-2020). However, GPE's donor base is rather narrow (20 sovereign countries but only a handful major contributors, and five foundations) and it relies on several "staple" donors, while GPE's recipient base is rather wide in scope (76 DCPs). On the contribution side, this results in an erratic pattern of donor contributions, while on the recipient side scarcely-available resources have to be divided among a large group of DCPs. The donor base of GPE mostly comprises traditional donors, which also provide significant sums of development assistance through bilateral relations as their preferred channel due to the higher level of control over spending and the greater quality of diplomatic relations associated with bilateral finance options. Principal reasons why traditional donors provide funding to GPE include the notion that GPE may work in countries that are not direct partner countries of the donor, and the possibility to participate in shaping the global education development agenda.

There is a considerable potential overlap in the geographic scope (LIC, LMIC, FCAC) of GPE compared with ECW and the IFFEd (currently under establishment), although GPE can be a complementary funding vehicle when strategically positioned and aligned with ECW and IFFEd. Donors that fund ECW and IFFEd also provide funding to GPE.

6 ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

Under Organizational Effectiveness, the ISE presents the results of a benchmark study among four other global funds as basis for reviewing Fit-for-Purpose governance and management arrangements of GPE. Besides, findings related to the overall Health of the Partnership, the Functionality of GPE's main conceptual frameworks and its M&E performance are presented in this chapter.

6.1 FIT-FOR-PURPOSE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Core question*:* how do GPE's governance and management arrangements compare with others?

Main findings: The ISE observes GPE standing out in following principles of country ownership, through LEGs, financially supporting the preparation of sector-wide plans and capitalizing on existing sector-wide monitoring and promoting mutual accountability through JSRs. The ISE sees scope in diversifying ways to support technical assistance, especially during grant implementation and in pursuing more collective action in monitoring and learning.

6.1.1 Introduction

The ISE has been expected to assess GPE's current governance and management arrangements as a basis for providing inputs to GPE's post-2020 strategy development process. Previous chapters have shown how GPE faces typical partnership challenges at the global and country levels in translating its strategy into a fit-for-purpose structure (i.e. its aspiration to become a country-focused, agile partnership adapting its operations to different country contexts). To complement ongoing efforts to address these challenges through the EPR process, the ISE has undertaken a systematic benchmarking exercise of four other global partnerships: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF), the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and Green Climate Fund (GCF). These four have been selected from a wider range of global partnerships[170] based on the criteria of being comparable in scale and maturity, dealing with similar partnership challenges, bringing together multiple constituencies, having different hosts, using different governance models, and the availability of recent external evaluations. This benchmarking study provides insights into how GPE's governance arrangements compare with others in dealing with the typical global partnership challenges/issues outlined below:

A. Strengthening country ownership/government leadership;
B. Translating global arrangements/principles into effective local structures;
C. Organizing supporting structures/arrangements to bring about effective implementation; and
D. Motivating collective action and mutual accountability.

The chapter starts with basic facts about the four comparator partnerships and then proceeds with sections on each issue, presenting a description of the ways in which the partnerships address each

[170] The ISE acknowledges that the pool of global partnerships is large, making it impossible to systematically review the entire pool as a basis for selection. Instead, known global partnerships have been compared with the selection criteria to derive a small sample that is sufficiently comparable with the GPE to serve as a benchmark.

particular challenge. Each section also contains selected relevant lessons from recent evaluations and ends with an account of how the comparator partnerships' arrangements are similar to and different from GPE's. A concluding section suggests how these findings are relevant for GPE. Annex 6.1 provides greater detail on all aspects of the comparator partnerships' management and governance arrangements discussed in this report.

6.1.2 Overview of benchmarked global partnerships

GAVI, GF, GEF, and GCF are mature global partnerships with significant fund management responsibilities. GF's annual disbursements are the largest of the four at US$3.5 billion in 2019, while GAVI's and GEF's are around US$2.0 billion and GCF's is under US$ 1.0 billion in the same year. By comparison, GPE's annual disbursements in 2019 were US$418 million. These partnerships are comparable with GPE in terms of maturity, with GEF being the oldest and GCF the youngest.

GAVI, GF, and GCF are independent legal entities in their own right, although GAVI and GF were initially housed/serviced by UN organizations[171]. GEF's secretariat – like the GPE's secretariat – is housed in the World Bank, which has its advantages and disadvantages[172]. The GF has the largest secretariat (over 700 staff), followed by GAVI (over 300), GCF (240), GPE (108) and GEF (71). While the sizes of the secretariats differ, the ratios of the administrative costs to annual disbursements are comparable. None of the partnerships have country offices since they view themselves as financial mechanisms, not implementing entities. The donors have supported the establishment of these partnerships to provide additional funding in their respective areas, but have opposed setting up new multilateral implementing organizations like the MDBs and UN agencies that do have staff located in DCPs.

GPE is the only partnership that is focused on a particular economic or social sector. GF and GAVI are focused on strategic public health issues, namely, controlling three major infectious diseases and expanding childhood vaccinations. GEF and GCF are focused on environmental issues such a climate change and biodiversity conservation that cut across many sectors.

The essential voting representation on all five boards are sovereign nations (both donors and recipients). GAVI, GF, and GPE have extended their voting representation to other constituencies such as CSOs and the private sector. While GEF and GCF have not done this, probably due to their mandates to assist signatory countries in meeting the objectives of international environmental conventions, CSOs and the private sector are active observers at GCF Board meetings and GEF Council meetings.

As financial mechanisms, the partnerships rely mostly on accredited implementing entities to carry out the projects that they fund. While these projects/programs are typically executed by government agencies, the accredited entities are ultimately responsible for both programmatic and fiduciary

[171] GAVI was initially housed in UNIECF (from 2000–2008) and GF had an administrative services agreement with WHO (from 2002 to 2008) under which WHO provided a range of administrative and financial services, including human resources, finance, administration, procurement, and IT services.

[172] Elaborating on pros and cons of being housed in the World Bank is not within the mandate of this ISE. For further reading on the Bank's recent guidance on facilitating its engagement in global partnerships and financing mechanisms through Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs) like GPE refer to World Bank document (2019): *Financial Intermediary Fund Management Framework*. [online] Available at: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/286451569595398435/Financial-Intermediary-Fund-Management-Framework>

oversight of implementation and results. GAVI is an exception since it provides direct access to funding for governments to purchase vaccines. Other exceptions include some of GF's principal recipients (PRs) and GCF's accredited entities (AEs), which may be government agencies in certain instances. The GEF and GPE mostly operate through accredited implementing entities.[173] More detailed information on governance, administration, and grant processes of these partnerships can be found in Annex 6.1, Tables 6.1a-6.1d.

6.1.3 Issue A: on strengthening country ownership/government leadership

This section explores the execution of grants, application for grants through government-led structures, alignment with national priorities, and seeking co-financing as defined by each of the partnerships.

Table 6.1.3 Overview comparison of main ways to strengthen country ownership

Ways to strengthen country ownership	GPE	GAVI	GF	GEF	GCF
DCP executing grants[174]	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grant application through government-led structures	Government-led multi-stakeholder forum - LEG	Similar to GPE's LEG, multi-stkh forum	Similar to GPE's LEG, multi-stkh forum	Different - through government representative	Different - through government representative
Alignment with national priorities assessed by MOPAN	Highly satisfactory	Highly satisfactory	Highly satisfactory	Highly satisfactory	N/A
Domestic co-financing	"Hard" requirement	"Hard" requirement	Incentive	No requirements	No requirements

Overall, all four partnerships promote country ownership/government leadership in similar ways. The first and clearest manner is by having governments execute most of the funded projects/programs.

Many of the additional ways to galvanize such government leadership and country ownership are focused on the grant preparation phase. One is to require grant applications to be endorsed by government focal points (FPs)[175] or government-led multi-stakeholder platforms. In the cases of GEF and GCF, member countries designate government officials as FPs for fund-related activities; and in the cases of GAVI and GF, member countries establish multi-stakeholder forums similar to the LEG in GPE.

Another way in which these partnerships promote country ownership during grant preparation is by ensuring that funding applications/requests are aligned with the national priorities. For this purpose, GAVI and GF employ requirements similar to GPE, namely having a credible strategic plan to qualify for ESPIG. In the case of GAVI, it is a condition for funding that a country application for new vaccines is reflected in its multi-year national immunization plan, and in the case of GF, funding requests must be strategically focused and aligned with existing national plans.[176] Other partnerships – GEF and

[173] There are a few exceptions, such as direct access to up to 500,000 US$ for EAs of the GEF.
[174] In most cases, for largest grants
[175] GCF works through National Designated Authorities (NDA) or FPs. The GEF works through operational and political FPs.
[176] https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/6385/trp_whattechnicalreviewpanellooksforinconceptnote_report_en.pdf?u=637166000630000000

GCF[177] – strive to ensure funded projects are based on the national priorities through building this into the responsibilities of the FPs.

The partnerships use the mechanisms of both external and domestic co-financing to ensure country ownership during the grant preparation phase, albeit in different ways. Similar to GPE's grant requirement that DCPs commit to a minimum of 45 percent of the sector funding allocation to primary education, GAVI has formalized "hard" requirements for recipient governments. GAVI's (domestic) co-financing policy requires them to pay an increasing part of the vaccine price as their ability to pay grows, as determined by their GNI per capita. By contrast, GF uses (domestic) co-financing more as an incentive: it typically makes 15–30 percent of the fund's country allocation accessible when the government invests additional domestic resources to the same cause. By contrast, GEF and GCF do not impose minimum thresholds and/or specific types/sources of (external) co-financing in their project/program reviews; instead, they recommend seeking co-financing on a case-to-case basis.

Finally, some partnerships also employ incentives to increase national efforts, similar to GPE Multiplier, but do so in targeted focal areas such as the GEF's impact programs on sustainable cities and sustainable forest management. Countries that allocate a portion of their quadrennial GEF allocation to these impact programs receive additional matching funds at a ratio of 2:1. GF uses catalytic investments, 7 percent of overall resources, to catalyze the use of country allocations to increase impact and the use of available funds to accelerate the end of the epidemics[178] for priority issues e.g. finding missing TB cases.

In its institutional assessment reports of GAVI, GF, and GEF, MOPAN[179] rated strengthening ownership by these partnerships as "highly", as measured by the alignment of project/programs with national priorities (3–4 points on a four-point scale). MOPAN also assessed their adherence to the Busan[180] commitment of using country systems with the highest score. While there is no MOPAN assessment of GCF, GCF's recent Forward-Looking Performance Review[181] (2019) similarly concluded that the fund has been supportive of country ownership by working through a National Designated Authority (NDA)/FP in every country and that it has been strengthening this ownership through a wide variety of activities.

Nonetheless, despite these favorable assessments, recent evaluations have found that partnerships face challenges in fostering certain aspects of country ownership. The GF grants showed uneven alignment with national systems, with funded programs that moved toward transition from GF

[177] The GCF uses country ownership as an investment criterion. The latest evaluation recommends abandoning country ownership as an investment criterion (a prioritization tool), but rather using it as a minimum standard (eligibility). https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-b25-03.pdf

[178] Catalytic investments are based on identified priorities determined through a prioritization approach in consultation with partners and under the oversight of the Strategy Committee, per strategy period. The mentioned example of priority - finding missing TB cases – was for 2017-2019 period. More can be found in the detailed explanation of the allocation methodology https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/5642/fundingmodel_allocations2017-2019detailedexplanation_report_en.pdf?u=637182418540000000

[179] MOPAN 2015-16 Assessment: Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (The Global Fund) http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/globalfund2015-16/; MOPAN 2015-16 Assessment: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/gavi2015-16/index.htm MOPAN 2017-18 Assessment: the Global Environment Facility (GEF) http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/gef2017-18/

[180] In full: the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

[181] GCF's Forward-looking Performance Review 2019 https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/evaluations/fpr

support demonstrating greater use of country systems.[182] The GEF's 2019 Annual Performance Report found insufficient government commitment during implementation to be a common factor in underperforming projects.[183] The GCF's recent Forward Looking Performance Review revealed weak ownership by non-government entities, caused by the focus on alignment to government priorities instead of also enabling broad-based stakeholder involvement.[184] In response to a 2015 evaluation finding of weak country capacity coupled with poor planning,[185] GAVI has introduced a Joint Appraisal, has streamlined its Health System Strengthening (HSS) guidelines, and has adjusted HSS grant design to an iterative country dialogue between the government, GAVI, and other in-country stakeholders. In addition, GAVI has increased support to governance structures, including the Health System Coordinating Committees (HSCCs), on country leadership, management, and coordination.

In conclusion, GPE's mechanisms for promoting ownership are largely similar to other partnerships in executing grants by governments, grant application through government-led structures, aligning grants with national priorities and seeking domestic and external co-financing. GPE is ahead of the curve in terms of using government-led structures for boosting ownership during grant application, as CLEs report on broader participation of CSOs and TUs in LEGs. GPE seems unique in providing funding to support the development of credible national sector plans and making them a prerequisite for its main grant, the ESPIG. However, this has had costs in terms of delays in project preparation, as indicated in section 6.1.4. Furthermore, apart from GAVI, GPE differs from the other partnerships in requiring that DCPs commit certain domestic funding to education, and for countries that have not reached Universal Primary Education, an additional commitment to the sub-sector of primary education. Section 6.1.5 further expands on mechanisms to strengthen government ownership during implementation.

6.1.4 Issue B: on translating global arrangements into effective local structures

This section explores further the role that local structures play in grant-related decisions such as applying for and appraising/endorsing grants, nominating implementing entities and developing proposals. Moreover, it explores mechanisms for engaging non-governmental actors in these structures.

Table 6.1.4 Overview comparison of main ways to translate global arrangements into local structures

Mandates of local structures	GPE => LEG	GAVI => ICC	GF => CCM	GEF => FP	GCF => NDA/FP
Applying for and endorsing grants	LEG prepares and submits grant proposal, no formal endorsement	ICC endorses Joint Appraisals on which funding requests are based	CCM prepares and submits funding request	FP endorses the funding proposal prepared by GEF Agency	NDA/FP endorses the funding proposal prepared by

[182] The Technical Evaluation Reference Group (TERG)'s Thematic Review on Sustainability, Transition and Co-Financing Policy (2020) https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/updates/other-updates/2020-01-31-technical-evaluation-reference-group-thematic-review-on-sustainability/

[183] GEF's Annual Performance Report 2019 https://www.gefieo.org/evaluations/annual-performance-report-apr-2019

[184] GCF's Forward-Looking Performance Review 2019 https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/evaluations/fpr

[185] The updated meta-review published in 2019 analyzes six additional evaluations of HSS support completed in 2016-2017. "Update to the 2015 Meta-Review of Gavi HSS Evaluations." GAVI Evaluation Team, 2018. https://www.gavi.org/library/gavi-documents/evaluations/gavi-hss-meta-review--update/.

					Accredited Entity
Local structures nominate/select implementing entities	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
Engaging non-governmental actors in local structures	Central to LEG, guided by minimum standards	Central to ICC, guided by requirements and recommendations	Central to CCM, strengthened by minimum operating standard, and Eligibility and Performance Assessments	Degree of engagement left up to FP	Degree of engagement left up to FP

As indicated in section 6.1.3, all four partnerships – similar to GPE – require grant-related decisions to be endorsed by multi-stakeholder platforms or FPs (both interchangeably referred to in this chapter as local structures). However, it should be noted that FPs can be rather different from multi-stakeholder platforms. It is up to a FP to organize multi-stakeholder platforms to inform its decision-making, which some do more than others. Having said that, taking a closer look at the decisions that each partnership requires from these local structures reveals that their authority applies to different aspects of grant-making, depending on the partnership's policies and procedures.

The GEF and GCF make the endorsement of project proposals a core function of FPs. The GEF Operational FPs endorse full-sized project (FSP[186]) proposals as well as the medium-sized project (MSP)[187] proposals and enabling activities (EAs)[188]. GCF's National Designated Authorities/FPs endorse projects proposals prepared by Accredited Entities by signing a no-objection letter to each proposal. Both partnerships make such endorsements a prerequisite for the funding proposals to be reviewed.

GF has an arrangement similar to GPE, whereby it requires funding requests to be prepared and submitted by the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM). In the case of GAVI, where governments have direct access to funding for vaccine support, the coordinating forums – Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (ICC)/Health Sector Coordinating Committee (HSCC) – play a role in processing annual requests for renewing support. These endorse the full Joint Appraisals (JAs) on which such requests are based. Like GPE, the local structures of the other three partnerships that work with implementing entities (i.e. GF, GEF and GCF) nominate/select them. However, except for the CCM of GF, an implementing entity takes the lead in developing funding proposals/request, with the local structures playing more of a consultative role. By contrast, the CCM of GF is responsible for preparing the grant proposal and getting it approved before nominating a Principal Recipient.

[186] More than US$ 2 million, implemented through GEF Agencies.
[187] Up to US$ 2 million, developed by a wide range of stakeholders.
[188] Up to US$ 1 million, accessed by countries GEF agencies directly.

In the case of GPE, there is no formal endorsement of an ESPIG application by the LEG, although its mandate includes developing an ESPIG as well as an ESPDG or PDG applications and organizing ESP/TEP endorsement[189] by partners.

The extent to which partnerships promote the engagement of non-governmental actors highlights an exception in the case of GF, which has mandated eligibility requirements and minimum operating standards for CCMs (as of 2015) as well as imposing accountability measures for such requirements. According to GF, the "minimum standards" for CCMs include having balanced representation of men and women, a minimum of 40 percent representation from national civil society actors, and sharing oversight results quarterly with the Global Fund Secretariat and in-country stakeholders. These standards have helped to support stakeholder representation in the CCMs, notably civil society, vulnerable groups and marginalized populations. Based on its experience, GF believes that CCMs have performed best when they are adequately staffed and equipped and have transparency and accountability measures in place. Therefore, the fund provides grants (ranging from USD 15,000 to USD 200,000) for a three-year period to cover the operational costs of a CCM and its secretariat. Funding for a CCM is linked to its performance.[190] GF has recently further worked on strengthening CCMs through a CCM Evolution project that adopts a differentiated approach based on a CCM's level of maturity.[191]

Of the five partnerships, GEF and GCF have had a more hands-off approach to local structures – NDAs/FPs — with a smaller number of required responsibilities and a list of recommended best practices, including engagement with non-governmental actors. However, like GPE, they have instituted specific grants for preparing funding proposals with the broader participation of stakeholders, such as GEF's Project Preparation Grant[192] and GCF's Project Preparation Facility.[193] Further, GEF – similar to GPE's Education Out Loud fund – finances CSOs' involvement through its EAs and through the GEF CSO Network[194] as well as providing small implementing grants to CSOs in its Small Grants Program administered by UNDP. GAVI supports CSOs by allocating grants in the framework of health systems strengthening (HSS) grants and strengthens CSOs' capacity and engagement in immunization through its Partners' Engagement Framework (PEF). Among other activities, GF allocates at least 15 percent of the CCM Funding Agreement to support constituency engagement for non-governmental sector activities and to improve the quality of stakeholder participants, including civil society and key population groups.[195]

[189] The term endorsement in all GPE documentation means offering public support. It does not imply formal approval or decision-making. GPE Charter https://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-gpe-charter_0.pdf
[190] https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-b25-03.pdf
[191] https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/country-coordinating-mechanism/evolution/
[192] Unlike the other partnerships, the GEF Council approves project proposals at the Concept Stage. After Council approval, the GEF Agency (equivalent of GPE's GA) receives 40% of the budget to prepare the project, and the remaining 60% after the project has been CEO-endorsed.
[193] Reported as having been underutilized in improving the quality of FPs and balancing the portfolio (https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/documents/977793/1474145/FPR+Final+Report/5c2929d3-ccc3-0b70-ca39-42e4a54110db)
[194] An independent global alliance of CSOs working to address global environmental challenges in areas linked to the six GEF focal areas dates back to 1995. In November 2017, the GEF Council approved an Updated Vision to Enhance Civil Society Engagement with the GEF (https://www.thegef.org/council-meeting-documents/updated-vision-enhance-civil-society-engagement-gef)
[195] https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/3266/core_operationalpolicy_manual_en.pdf

In conclusion, LEG's mandate in grant-related decisions is similar to that of the other partnerships in nominating implementing entities. In terms of a LEG's composition, it is most comparable with GAVI's ICC/HSCC and GF's CCM. In terms of applying and appraising/endorsing grants and developing proposals, LEG's mandate is more active: instead of endorsing a grant, LEG's mandate includes developing grants (ESPIG, ESPDG, and PDG), albeit without having a separate budget to cover operational LEG costs. These arrangements contribute to fulfilling GPE's ambition of having credible multi-annual sector plans promoting education system-level improvements as a basis.

6.1.5 Issue C: on support during grant implementation

This section explores the arrangements concerning technical assistance through grants and multilateral and bilateral partners support, performance-based financing, and additional programming support during grant implementation.

Table 6.1.5 Overview comparison of main ways to support local structures during grant implementation

Ways to support local structures during implem.	GPE =	GAVI => ICC	GF => CCM	GEF => FP	GCF => NDA/FP
TA as part of main grants	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
TA through multilateral and bilateral partners support	-	*One TA:* funding to multilateral partners	*Bilateral 'Set-Asides* and funding technical partners as part of *Strategic Initiatives*	-	-
Performance-based financing	Variable tranche	-	Annual assessment of country program and conditional disbursement	Taking into account the terminal evaluation results of previous GEF projects in the next country allocation	Results-based payments in the specific area of reducing deforestation
Additional programming support during grant implem.	-	-	Funding *special initiatives*	-	-
Other	-	-	Institutional partnerships come up with innovative solutions to long-standing problems	-	-

To ensure that sufficient technical assistance (TA) is available during implementation, the partnerships encourage applicants, through their secretariats during the proposal development/grant application process, to include TA in the grant proposal. Therefore, support for TA is most commonly part of a

core grant and overseen by an implementing entity. This is true for this type of support provided by GEF, GCF and GF, as well as GPE.

Meanwhile, GAVI supports TA by providing funding to multilateral partners (primarily WHO and UNICEF) to support implementation: so-called *One TA* as part of its PEF.[196] '*One TA*' is based on the demand and needs identified by the countries themselves and it mainly comprises staff who are permanently based in partners' country offices (WHO and UNICEF) to support countries' immunization programs. GF makes use of a comparable arrangements, albeit like in case of without direct funding, i.e. through so-called *bilateral 'Set-Asides'*[197] - a partnership of GF with bilateral government donors where they channel a proportion of their total contribution (usually 5 percent) directly to country partners (including WHO, Roll Back Malaria Partnership to End Malaria, STOP TB, UNAIDS and others) to be used alongside Global Fund-managed programs. GF does financially support provision of technical expertise under the Strategic Initiatives: agreements with technical partners such as WHO and StopTB, for example, for Finding Missing TB Cases.

Other ways to support TA without grant or direct monetary contribution include GF's institutional partnerships with global health organizations, policy, and academic groups and countries, termed by the ITAD evaluation[198] as *technical support enhancing model*. This refers to a practical partnership formed and based on comparative advantage and forged to come up with innovative solutions to long-standing problems such as specific dimensions of health system strengthening or development approaches, creating opportunities for GF to link its disease focus to global health goals. However, promoting implementation through such arrangements requires increased involvement in the continuous monitoring and boosting of outcome-level achievements in addition to reporting based on agreed M&E data from grant implementation. GF has an additional mechanism – *special initiatives* – not to improve grant implementation per se but to achieve impact at the outcome level. GF's Secretariat funds global health/other intergovernmental organizations for centrally-managed approaches that cannot be addressed solely through country allocations but are critical to delivering against GF's strategy.

Partnerships use grant-level M&E to incentivize the implementation through performance-/results-based funding, albeit in different ways. GF considers the whole country allocation as the main incentive, assesses and grades grants annually, automatically disbursing "A" grants and disbursing below "A" grants along with agreements to address shortcomings. GCF utilizes results-based payments in the specific area of reducing deforestation as part of (the final phase in) REDD+. The GEF incorporates performance aspects differently by taking into account the terminal evaluation results of previous GEF projects: a project's high/low performance has consequences for the next cycle of country allocations as one of the indexes in GEF's STAR[199] allocation formula. GAVI used to have a similar incentive but halted its use of performance-based funding to support HSS, after an evaluation

[196] The support under PEF is divided into three areas: targeted country assistance (so-called One TA), strategic focus areas and foundational support.
[197] Set Aside funding being used to fund UN agencies (including WHO, Roll Back Malaria Partnership to End Malaria, STOP TB, UNAIDS and others) to provide specific capacity building support.
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/8792/terg_partnershipmodelreview_paper_en.pdf?u=637233413210000000
[198] https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/8792/terg_partnershipmodelreview_paper_en.pdf?u=637166002040000000
[199] The System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR) that GEF Secretariat uses to allocate resources in an indicative way to its eligible countries in a replenishment period.

concluded that PBF was not useful in adding value to the projects.[200] Instead, GAVI organizes JAs – comparable to JSRs in GPE – that formalize regular (annual) participatory reviews of implementation. More on this can be found in section 6.1.6.

In conclusion, GPE's most similar arrangement to promote implementation is including support for TA in ESPIGs. In using performance-based financing, GPE's arrangement of the variable tranche as a results-based financing incentive is most similar to GCF's deforestation results-based payment for REDD+. GPE's JSRs are similar to GAVI's JA in enhancing implementation through regular participatory review, although GAVI's focus is on its own contributions to improved immunization outcomes while JSR's focus is placed on the wider sectoral level (beyond ESPIG). To draw inspiration from other ways of promoting implementation through supporting TA, Annex 6.2 provides selected lessons and recommendations from recently-conducted evaluations that might resonate with GPE's challenges.

6.1.6 Issue D: on motivating collective action and mutual accountability[201]

This section considers arrangements that partnerships employ at the global and local levels to promote collective action and mutual accountability. At the global level, this focuses on the Board's involvement in resource allocation and grant approval and at the country level on joint reviews.

Table 6.1.6 Overview comparison of main ways to motivate collective action and mutual accountability

Ways to motivate coll. action and mutual account.	GPE	GAVI	GF	GEF	GCF
At global level: boards role in country allocations	Board approves country allocations	Boards approve policies for resource allocation	Board approves country allocations	Board approves country allocations	Boards approve principles for resource allocation
At global level: boards role in grant approval	Board approves ESPIGs/Multiplier grants of more than US$10 mln, the rest - delegated to Secretariat	Board delegates to Secretariat allotting funding to individual programs	Board issues no-objection to disbursement-ready grants	Board only approves Full-Sized Projects at the concept stage, the rest is delegated	Board approves the reviewed (full) proposals
At local level: local structures involvement in joint monitoring and reporting	Mandate of LEG plus additional guidance and support of JSRs	Through guidance and support of participatory Joint Assessments	CCMs oversee the grant implement-tation	FPs provide feedback on GEF activities	NDAs/FPs participate in M&E
At local level: guidance to promote mutual accountability	Guidance for JSRs to boost sector-wide dialogue during sector plan implementation	Accountability framework to clarify the roles and respons. of funding channeled through partners	-	-	GCF emphasize the participatory monitoring approach

[200] Specific lessons in the Review of GAVI's Performance-Based Funding (PBF) Component of its Health System Strengthening (HSS) Support.
[201] Mutual accountability is defined, in accordance to the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness, as donors and partners accountable for development results (with specific indicator measuring regular reviews assessing progress in implementing aid commitments.

Common ways in which the collective action is promoted at the global level include making collective replenishment efforts and deciding on the resource allocations among countries and grant proposals. Setting aside how the boards assign voting seats, the boards are involved in defining country eligibilities for funds/allocations and approval of funding in some way.

GF Board and GEF Council, similar to GPE Board, approve country allocations for the entire replenishment cycle[202]. These allocations are calculated based on a formula, which in the case of GF is predominantly based on each country's disease burden and economic capacity and in the case of GEF on a combination of an environmental benefits index, GEF performance index, and a social and economic index based on gross domestic product. Boards of GAVI and GCF do not establish country allocations but rather define frameworks and principles/policies to be used for resource allocation. The GAVI Board approves the scope and approach of GAVI's engagement with different country groups as part of its five-year strategy as well as the GAVI Programme Funding Policy and – from time to time – a financial forecast. The GCF Board has decided to keep the business model of resource allocation theme/activity-based, i.e. allocating GCF resources to adaptation, mitigation, and the Private Sector Facility as well as a special focus on African countries, low-income countries, and Small Island Developing States.[203]

Further, partnership boards participate differently in grant approvals. GCF's Board meets several times a year to approve the proposals reviewed (at the full proposal stage) and recommended by the GCF Secretariat, using the independent Technical Advisory Panel's (ITAP) assessments. The GF Board usually issues no-objection to disbursement-ready grants presented by the Grant Approvals Committee. GF relies on its management team for grant-making processes including the recommendations from the Technical Review Panel (TRP) and the Grant Approvals Committee of the Secretariat. The GEF Council also makes use of the non-objection mechanism, although the GEF Council only approves FSPs at the concept stage as part of the entire Work Program comprising PIFs pre-screened by the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP).[204] The GEF Board delegates the approval of MSPs to its CEO. The GAVI Board – similar to GF – delegates allotting funding to individual programs based on approved financial forecasts. The GAVI Secretariat does so by ranking country proposals for New Vaccine Support recommended by the Independent Review Committee (IRC). The CEO of GAVI also approves vaccine support renewal and extension requests based on recommendations of the High-Level Review Panel (HLRP).

In addition to country allocations and grant approval decisions, the key moments of collective action at the global level are the discussion, update and approval of key strategies, policies and plans and following up on recommendations of partnership-wide/strategic evaluations. This is regularly undertaken by all partnerships[205].

[202] GEF has a four-year replenishment cycle while GF has three-year one.
[203] https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-handbook.pdf
[204] However, this approval is still subject to endorsement by the CEO at the full proposal stage. It has to be mentioned, that STAP's influence is relatively small in comparison to the GEF Secretariat's in the reviewing and screening process.
[205] As mentioned in section 6.5, when it comes to carrying out comprehensive evaluations, GAVI is an exception as they stopped with comprehensive evaluation and focused their attention to two streams of evaluations: so-called decentralized (program team/country-led) and centralized (evaluation unit-led) evaluations at multiple country/strategy/policy level.

The partnership efforts stimulating collective action at the country level during planning/grant application processes are described in section 6.1.2. In terms of the collective action during the implementation, as mentioned in section 6.1.5. GAVI is among the exceptions in making an explicit effort to promote participatory JAs, similar to GPE's efforts to capitalize on existing sector-wide dialogue through JSRs. GAVI's JA is as an annual, in-country multi-stakeholder review of the implementation progress and performance of GAVI support to the country, as well as its contribution to improved immunization outcomes, and it should not be viewed as a review of the national immunization program. In addition, GAVI has also put in place the Alliance Accountability Framework to clarify the roles and responsibilities of funding channeled through GAVI partners, namely WHO and UNICEF. Other partnerships rely on local structures described in section 6.1.4 for such accountability, whereby some like GCF emphasize the participatory monitoring approach and encourage NDAs/FPs to organize country portfolio reviews.

In conclusion, GPE's arrangements to motivate collective action and mutual accountability at the global level in terms of the Board's involvement in strategy and resource allocation are similar to those of GF and GEF, as the MCA is based on a formula and approved by the Finance and Risk Committee of the GPE Board. However, in terms of reviewing project proposals, the GPE stands out as the only partnership that draws solely on its Secretariat for quality assurance; all the other partnerships make use of independent expert panels. When it comes to approving project proposals, GPE Board practices are more similar to those of GCF and GEF, except that the GEF Council approves projects at the concept stage. GPE's newly-introduced practice of delegating ESPIG/Multiplier grant approval of up to US$10 million to the Secretariat is similar to the case of GEF's Medium-Sized Projects. In terms of stimulating collective action and mutual accountability at the local level, GPE's JSRs stand out as an attempt to achieve this at the sectoral level. This closes the circle as GPE starts with investing in sector-wide plans and then attempts to encourage country stakeholders to be mutually accountable for their efforts at the sector level. GPE seems to be ahead of the curve in this respect.

6.1.7 Conclusions fit-for-purpose governance and management arrangements

Having reviewed the benchmarked partnerships, we have observed that the challenges faced by GPE are shared by others, despite having somewhat different governance and management arrangements and business models. Having said that, it has to be noted once more, that comparisons are not easily drawn because of the unique combinations of such arrangements in line with their purpose and scale. Acknowledging that benchmarking does not offer easy and immediately applicable solutions to GPE's challenges, the following conclusions may still be drawn.

In comparison to others, GPE stands out in following principles of country ownership, especially on sector-wide participatory consultations. During the grant application process, GPE is making progress in strengthening this ownership through LEGs, financially supporting the preparation of sector-wide plans and lifting their importance by making ESP a prerequisite for its main grant, the ESPIG. Although ESPs face implementation challenges and a prerequisite is not uniformly welcomed, potentially impacting effectiveness, GPE's persistent efforts in getting relevant stakeholders together under government leadership to agree on long-term sector-wide direction is commendable. GPE is also ahead of the curve in capitalizing on existing sector-wide monitoring and promoting mutual accountability - through JSRs - to boost sector-wide dialogue during sector plan implementation. Here,

too, as the quality of JSRs has been flagged as an issue, GPE continues to work on ways to promote and demonstrate concrete achievements from participatory approaches in sector-wide processes. The mutual accountability process through EPR has also been an exceptional practice.

GPE could learn more from other partnerships in terms of diversifying the ways in which it could support TA during implementation. Arrangements by GF and GAVI could be especially relevant, such as framework agreements/collaboration with multilateral and bilateral partners, financial support to the coordination function (equivalent of CAs) as well as additional – special initiative – grants for emerging areas of TA.

To promote mutual accountability at global level, GPE has organized its governance and management of grant allocation and disbursement, similar to GEF and GCF[206], with more involvement of the board. Possibly to balance out the power of consensus derived from reaching joint agreements in such multi-stakeholder settings with efficiency concerns, GF and GAVI have delegated more authority to their secretariats, including – in the case of GF – maximum use of overall funding as an incentive to scale-up impact in targeted healthcare areas. By recently-introduced practice of delegating ESPIG/Multiplier grant approval of up to US$10 million to Secretariat GPE seems to have embarked on the way of seeking balance between high legitimacy of grant-making (through direct representation of DCPs in its processes) and efficiency (through delegation of some of it to the Secretariat).

6.2 HEALTH OF THE PARTNERSHIP

Core question: to what extent the GPE has made progress towards being a strong and healthy global partnership?

Main findings: The ISE observes a positive balance between the costs and benefits of being part of GPE for most partners, while significant, and maybe too much, progress has been made in clarifying structures and systems, making the partnership document-heavy. The ISE sees scope to further strengthen the health of the partnership, in particular in stimulating and challenging existing members to optimize their contribution, in balancing attention for structure and content, and in pursuing more collective action in monitoring and learning.

6.2.1 Introduction

Since 2015, both the GPE Board and Secretariat have intensified efforts to build a stronger partnership. GPE's annual results reports illustrate that progress towards building a stronger partnership (objective 5) has exceeded beyond its targets. This progress is tracked by indicators in the RF that measure progress through clarifying roles and responsibilities, the number of knowledge products generated, advocacy events undertaken and audit issues addressed, as well as the proportion of Secretariat time spent on country-facing functions, and the number of results and evaluation reports published. Altogether, this indicates significant transformation in the functioning of the Board, its sub-committees and the Secretariat, particularly in steering and managing the performance of GPE at the global level.

[206] Although resource allocation is also similar to the Global Fund's.

Notwithstanding the importance of the aforementioned achievements, Board members and Secretariat staff have also raised concerns about partnership issues that are not captured by the existing RF, many of which are also reflected in EPR-related documents. These concerns relate to more intangible partnership dynamics within GPE, like the quality of cooperation (being document-heavy and with slow decision-making) and the level of delegation to the Secretariat, the optimal use of complementary qualities within the partnership, the complexity of sound and timely constituency consultations, etc.

Therefore, the ISE has taken stock of the actual status of these less tangible elements related to partnership dynamics, to find a broader answer to the question *"to what extent the GPE has made progress towards being a strong and healthy global partnership?"*

To answer this question, we describe the current partnership dynamics using the four patterns of interaction distinguished by the Circle of Coherence model,[207] which together determine the vital space and energy that drives the performance of the partnership (see Annex Two for more details on the methodology). This description and analysis is primarily based on interviews with Board (committee) members, in-country stakeholders (GAs, CAs, Government Focal points in selected countries), and Secretariat staff and the virtual sense-making workshop in late April 2020[208].

6.2.2 Partnership dynamics in patterns of interaction

Based on interviews and supported by EPR documentation, the ISE describes and assesses the balance of four patterns of interaction, which together have an important influence on the overall partnership dynamics and performance. These are summarized in Figure 6.2.2 and described, in turn, below.

EXCHANGE


The dimension of exchange refers to the (perceived) balance between give and take in taking part in GPE. In other words, how do different constituencies assess the cost-benefit ratio of their GPE membership, with costs relating to investments in time, money and energy or in sacrificing autonomy. Benefits relate to the extent to which the expectations of being part of GPE are indeed being met.

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[207] Exchange, challenge, structure, and dialogue see Wielinga E. (2014), *Network Dynamics*, available at: www.toolsfornetworkers.nl.

[208] Due to the Covid-19 crisis, we have not been able to interview as many stakeholders as hoped for. Ultimately, we have managed to interview 14 global stakeholders (5 DPs, 3 DCPs, 2 CSOs, 2 MLAs, 1 private sector, 1 private foundation representatives, and 2 external consultants), 16 in-country stakeholders (4 Government, 9 CAs, and 3 GAs) and around 25 Secretariat staff.

Figure 6.2.2 Summary of patterns of interaction



At the Board level, GPE comprises a broad range of different stakeholders within the educational sector, including DPs, DCPs, CSOs, private sector actors, private foundations, and multilateral agencies. The majority of the Board members interviewed indicated that they appreciate their involvement in the partnership as this allows them to contribute to a cause in which they believe, as well as offering useful first-hand information on developments within the sector and possibilities for mutual learning among partners. More specifically, for DPs, being part of the GPE Board increases their reach and provides the possibility to influence different actors within the education sector, irrespective of the size of their contribution.

Most interviewed board members from DPs and MLOs consider the GPE an important platform for setting the international education agenda, whereas CSOs appreciate the platform for having their voices heard (i.e. their points are considered and – if necessary – put up for debate) and gaining knowledge about global-level GPE processes and decisions to support communication with constituency groups at the country level. Finally, DCPs see strong potential for the partnership in terms of sharing experiences, taking their responsibility in the global community and accessing funds, even though this is limited relative to total education costs.

In terms of 'costs', Board members confirm investing a considerable amount of time and energy in the partnership, not only through attending Board meetings but also in preparing for these meetings in advance and reviewing the many documents disseminated by the Secretariat. Despite this considerable time investment, most of the Board members interviewed still confirm to find a positive balance between what they get out of the partnership (e.g. contributing to a cause, increased reach, influencing other actors, access to information, having their voice heard) and what they invest in it.

At the same time, many Board members express that they see room to further improve this balance, in particular by getting things decided and done more quickly, delays being partly caused by the drive for consensus in the Board and partly by limitations in follow-up that largely depend on the Secretariat

Similarly, at the country level, GPE's different stakeholders recognize the added value of the partnership, albeit more critically. For example, several GAs, CAs and government officials have stressed the added value of the LEG in improving sector dialogue. They highlight GPE's potential to make global education knowledge and expertise available in different countries and appreciate initiatives like KIX but claim that this potential remains insufficiently tapped, making the 'cost-benefit ratio' less positive than it could be. In addition, country-level actors critically comment on time-consuming procedures to meet requirements for a relatively modest grant, while global actors comment on the rather diverse performance of LEGs and GAs in complying with grant application and management processes.

CHALLENGE

The dimension of challenge refers to the recognition and use of the diverse complementary qualities that different members bring to the table.

In GPE's Charter, the different roles and responsibilities of the various constituencies are recognized in light of their respective positions in the education sector. However, the interviewees generally agree that these complementarities are insufficiently called upon. Interactions are mostly described

as polite and respectful, seeking consensus rather than constituencies constructively challenging each other's contributions. This is said to be illustrated by all constituencies being part of all Board Committees without their nominations ever being challenged. Others observe that constituencies use GPE more as a platform for advocating their own interests, while there is felt to be insufficient space to for using 'grass-root' experiences of CSOs, in particular teacher organizations, to inform policy decisions. Another observation relates to GPE being more preoccupied with expanding the partnership rather than getting the best out of the existing partnership. In this connection, the interviewees refer to the increasing number of DCPs, the drive for donor diversification and having the number of LEGs with CSOs as an indicator of success. A final example relates to the Secretariat calling upon external expertise to support the implementation of the gender strategy rather than mobilizing this expertise from within the partnership.

At the same time, some DCP representatives express the sentiment that they, rather than the in-country partnership as a whole, is held accountable for country-level results. In line with this, DCP representatives experience a diminishing yet noticeable 'donor-recipient' accountability dynamic. This sentiment is reinforced as they see insufficient diversity in terms of country representation among senior Secretariat staff. Nevertheless, clear appreciation of the Secretariat staff's performance remains. They certainly acknowledge efforts of the Secretariat and the chair of the Board to stimulate a more prominent recognition and contribution from DCP representatives (e.g. through pre-Board meetings and deliberate efforts to create more space for the voice of DCPs), which most interviewees agree is achieving an effect.

The ongoing EPR roll-out process is making progress in addressing similar challenges at the country level, and it has been pushing for a stronger demonstration of mutual accountability. Some interviewees comment on the challenge of mutual accountability in connection with strong donor coordination, where donor countries tend to take a joint and – by definition – powerful position before engaging with other stakeholders in the LEG. Given that the EPR roll-out is still in its early stage, the effects of this process are not yet clear.

Finally, the mere fact that GPE brings together all key stakeholders in education is one of the main reasons for many actors wanting to be part of GPE. In other words, GPE's (aspired) inclusivity is one of its main strengths. Many respondents believe this strength can and should be used more prominently, for example, in accessing or leveraging funding, or using expertise present among partners. This requires deliberate leadership and action.

STRUCTURE

The dimension of structure refers to the balance between efforts to establish clear and transparent structures and systems, and the need to retain flexibility and freedom to adapt to different and changing circumstances.

In terms of putting clear and transparent structures in place, extensive Terms of Reference exist that elucidate the roles and responsibilities of partners operating at the global and country levels. However, many Board and Secretariat interviewees feel that there is room for improvement in terms of better alignment and workload distribution among the Secretariat, Board Committees, and Board members. Board members indicate that although discussions and sector-wide consultations at Board

meetings are appreciated, they are time-consuming and focus more on discussing guidelines and processes rather than content (i.e. how best to put GPE's Theory of Change in practice). At the same time, interview respondents see improvements in the rearrangement of work among Board Committees (at the outset of the current strategy) and transferring responsibilities to the Secretariat (e.g. the delegation of approval of grants up to US$ 10 million, as decided during the Board meeting in December 2019).

Similarly, at the country level, partners have to deal with an elaborate set of rules and procedures in the grant application and implementation process, which leaves limited room for creating better partnership dynamics. Country-level partners repeatedly report that stringent rules and procedures of the GPE hamper implementation and have not been supportive of partnership dynamics. As also found in the CLEs, partners indicate that GPE rules and procedures allow for limited flexibility to align with the reality on the ground (e.g. the disconnect between the financial management systems used by the World Bank and those used by governments).

Whereas about half of the DCPs express their appreciation for flexible funding mechanisms of the GPE (e.g. variable tranche) as well as no-cost extensions that were considered based on the country context, they also express criticism related to GPE's stringent rules and procedures. For example, CAs consider the process of identifying stretch indicators as time-consuming and undermining the partnership with the government, as a lot of back-and-forth communication is needed for revision and quality assurance by the Secretariat. Therefore, the Grant Streamlining Project is considered highly relevant for improving the effectiveness of the partnership.

Generally, most interviewees see 'structure and systems' as dominant factors in global partnership interaction, making GPE 'document-heavy' in the eyes of many. This is partly explained by GPE's rapid expansion since 2012, as well as partly by the Secretariat giving thorough follow-up to an increasing number of Board decisions, as evidenced by the expanding set of documented tools, guidelines, and operating procedures. A further contributing factor is that GPE originated – and is still primarily seen – as a global fund, requiring clear and transparent funding requirements, accurate financial administration, and sound risk/fiduciary management. Besides, an increasing recognition of and attention to facilitating partnership dynamics has recently been demonstrated, among others by the EPR process, the establishment of the Governance team, initiatives like the pre-Board meetings of DCPs, and ideas to more clearly distinguish fund management and partnership facilitation functions in a possible restructuring of the Secretariat.

Dialogue

The dimension on dialogue refers to the extent to which there is willingness and effort to undertake collective action that is jointly monitored and learned from.

As mentioned earlier, global GPE interactions are perceived to be dominated by creating clear and transparent systems and structures, while interview respondents from Board Committees and the Secretariat both comment on the limited time for joint reflection. Indeed, one respondent refers to Board discussions as a "ticking the box" exercise when working through agenda points rather than exchanging views. Others comment that the GPE Board often does not take a joint position on issues in the international debate on good and equitable education (e.g. referring to the right to education

for all, irrespective of disability, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual orientation, etc.). They see this as a missed opportunity because a common position by GPE would carry a lot of weight due to being inclusive and relatively free from cultural bias. Especially, since GPE also represents the voice on non-governmental actors, whereas UNESCO can only play such a 'normative' role on behalf of governments.

Nevertheless, several findings are supportive of the notion that learning is increasingly facilitated through the partnership. One such positive example is found in the fact that the GPE has set up the Knowledge and Innovation Exchange (KIX) fund to support sharing of evidence-based solutions and building capacity to produce, integrate and scale knowledge and innovation in GPE partner countries. Moreover, a government official indicated how regional DCP meetings facilitated by the Secretariat are appreciated for their contribution to learning and exchange at the regional level. Furthermore, at the country level, various interviewees refer to JSRs as useful joint reflection processes, even though GPE's results report and the CLEs refer to many of these JSRs as not meeting GPE's quality standards.

6.2.3 Conclusions concerning health of the partnership

When assessing the health of the partnership based on the extent to which GPE has found a good balance in the four key patterns of interaction, the ISE concludes the following:

At the global level, there is a positive balance between the time, resources and energy invested in the partnership, and the benefits that it provides. GPE is the only global partnership in the sector that is composed and jointly led by a range of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, which makes it a unique and valuable platform for partners to exchange views, exert influence and stay informed about the international agenda for education. Nevertheless, this balance requires continued attention, in particular in terms of pace in decision-making and action, for instance related to the EPR process.

At the country level, the majority of GPE's stakeholders see the potential of the partnership but remain critical about the extent to which the partnership aspect is achieved. For many, the 'costs' of meeting funding and partnership requirements still outweigh the benefits realized, which leads to the widely-agreed notion that this needs to be one of GPE's key priorities for the coming years. Several interventions are already ongoing, like the EPR and the Grant Process Streamlining project, pursuing specific and practical improvements, although these have taken time to unfold with the risk of losing energy and interest.

GPE is recognized and appreciated for having an inclusive and diverse constituency-base, although it has not yet found the suitable balance in terms of using the partners' complementary qualities. There is little evidence of partners being challenged and called upon to make their best possible contribution, aside from DCPs being held responsible for country-level progress. However, this takes place in the absence of a functioning mutual accountability system, which reduces the sense of GPE being a genuine partnership. At present, GPE focuses more on expanding the partnership than getting the best out of the existing partners. At the country level, the EPR has aimed to improve mutual accountability and thus optimize the use the diverse qualities of GPE's constituency groups, although it is too early for this process to demonstrate results.

Structure and systems play a dominant role in GPE's interactions, which is partly understandable given its history as a global fund and its rapid expansion as a global partnership. At the same time, these have made GPE processes document-heavy with (too) little flexibility to adapt to the different and changing circumstances of its many DCPs, and (too) little time to reflect upon and discuss the content of GPE's core business of improving education systems. Both the Board and the Secretariat recognize this in their deliberations, in the EPR and in the proposed strategic shifts for the post-2020 strategy. As a result, there is (too) little time for joint monitoring, reflection and learning, especially when judged against GPE's own quality standards. Besides, GPE takes too little advantage of its unique position as a global inclusive partnership in education, for example, by agreeing to a joint normative position on good and equitable education. At the same time, it can be argued that UNESCO should be the appropriate UN-organization to do so, but since UNESCO is an inter-governmental organization, GPE's representation of non-governmental actors is stronger and therefore its voice therefore carries a different weight.

In summary, the ISE observes a positive balance between the costs and benefits of being part of GPE for most partners, while significant, and maybe too much, progress has been made in clarifying structures and systems. The ISE sees scope to further strengthen the health of the partnership, in particular in stimulating and challenging existing members to optimize their contribution, in balancing attention for structure and content, and in pursuing more collective action in monitoring and learning.

6.3 Functionality of Conceptual Frameworks

Core question: to what extent have GPE's overall conceptual frameworks (ToC, RF and Gender Strategy) served their respective purposes?

Main findings: Even though there is scope for technical improvement in presenting more comprehensive pathways of change or in delineating GPE's sphere of control, the GPE has made significant progress since 2015 in the elaboration of its conceptual thinking in a range of frameworks that have improved the clarity and transparency of GPE's ambitions, the rationale behind its interventions, and how it will hold itself accountable for results. So far, the GPE has used these frameworks primarily and successfully for communication and accountability purposes but less as tools to steer and learn from its operations.

6.3.1 Introduction

GPE's overall conceptual thinking is reflected in its 2016 - 2020 strategy, which summarizes GPE's guiding principles and way of working, and presents its global ToC[209] and Results Framework (RF) that were developed in response to the interim evaluation in 2015. The GPE 2020 strategy is supplemented by various more specific or thematic strategies like the gender strategy, strategies for engagement with foundations and the private sector, the M&E strategy, etc. This has resulted in an extensive and complex constellation of policies and strategies that are meant to provide direction to the different aspects of GPE's work.

[209] https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/gpe-2020-theory-change

The intended purposes and logics of these frameworks and policies are reflected in respective Board documents. In this chapter the ISE assesses the functionality of GPE's conceptual frameworks, focusing on the question *to what extent have GPE's overall conceptual frameworks served their respective purposes?*

For this exercise, the ISE selected the overall ToC and the RF as they form the core of GPE's Strategic Plan 2016-2020, and the Gender Equality Policy and Strategy 2016-2020[210] as equity and gender equality has been a critical component of GPE's Strategic Plan.

6.3.2 Functionality of GPE's overall ToC

In December 2015, the Board approved GPE's first overall ToC[211] with the objectives (1) to visualize how GPE will deliver value to all of its partners, (2) to show how inputs generated at the global level are to support a stronger country-level operational model and how country-level outputs are to support stronger and more efficient education systems, in turn leading to impact in the area of equity and learning, and (3) to highlight where GPE's existing grants feed into its overall intervention logic.

All partners are referred to as the intended users of the ToC, although it is left open what is expected in terms of use beyond being informed. Looking at actual use, the visualized ToC extensively features in external and internal communications (website, strategy documents, and publications). This contributes to a broader clarity and common understanding of GPE's intended pathways towards its ambition of improved and more equitable education. In terms of program design, the ToC is used as the basis for structuring GPE's RF and through this its annual results reports. In addition, we observe the ToC being further refined in a country-level ToC for the CLEs. In terms of learning, the R&P team at times reflects on the ToC and discusses gaps and scope for improvement, although no regular (e.g. annual) or systematic review of the ToC is evident, apart from ongoing efforts in preparation of the post-2020 strategy.

At the country level, some interviewees (e.g., in Cambodia and Afghanistan) refer to the use of the ToC to align their ESPIG applications, to either frame (i.e. using ToC as the starting point) or verify their ESPIG design (i.e. checking afterwards whether and how the ESPIG fits with GPE's overall conceptual framework).

It is also apparent that communication and facilitating accountability have been the ToC's primary intended purposes and use when assessing the technical design of the ToC based on selected current literature. The ISE furthermore sees strong features in the ToC as it comprehensively covers GPE's intervention logic from global funding to impact at the country level, and provides a relatively straightforward and logical overview of GPE's aspirations. Another strong point is that the ToC reflects a formally approved consensus among GPE's diverse constituency groups regarding what GPE is supposed to be about. These strengths ensure that the ToC is easily communicable as a legitimate reflection of GPE's conceptual thinking.

[210] https://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/2017-05-gpe-gender-equality-at-a-glance.pdf
[211] GPE, 2015, BOD/2015/12/DOC08-annex 1.

At the same time, development practitioners and academics consider ToC as a potentially useful tool for program management,[212] while suggesting a variety of design features to ascertain the usefulness of a ToC. These include caution against oversimplification to avoid significant gaps in the pathways of change, recognizing the capacity needs for actor-specific behavioral change, distinguishing the sphere of control from the sphere of influence and concern, and using assumptions explaining why (based on which evidence) causal linkages can be expected to occur. The ISE observes that a number of these design features are missing from GPE's ToC, while some (e.g. assumptions reflecting why a causal relation is expected to hold) were present in earlier versions of the ToC design,[213] which were revised following feedback from Board members. Interview findings and the CLE final synthesis report refer to similar shortcomings related to gaps in the intervention logic (e.g. no reference to capacity and behavioral change), and oversimplification (e.g. combining planning with implementation).

Following this, Secretariat staff from the external relations and results & performance teams perceive the ToC as useful in helping to shape advocacy and M&E efforts. Board members and in particular donor partners consider having a ToC as a step forward in reflecting the joint ambitions of GPE's partners. At the same time, no explicit use of the ToC in the Board's steering of the 2020 strategy implementation is reported (e.g. formal adaptation of GPE's intervention logic based on progressive insights), except in the ongoing development of the post-2020 strategy. At the country level, occasional usefulness is confirmed when the ToC has been used as a tool to align the ESPIG application with GPE's overall ambitions. Finally, thematic strategies/policies do not consistently align with the overall ToC, while the CSEF evaluation acknowledges that the extent to which the ToC is understood remains limited.

In conclusion, given that this is the first time that the GPE has used a ToC approach to guide their 5-year strategy, positive aspects as well as several shortcomings can be observed. The ISE observes that the ToC has served its purpose as a communication tool and enabled improved accountability for results towards GPE's multiple stakeholders, although its potential as a management tool has remained underutilized. This means that the ToC has certainly proven to be a step forward in clarifying GPE's purpose and ambitions, while scope for improvement remains in terms of technical quality and utility focus, especially if the ToC is to serve as a management tool during the next strategy period.

6.3.3 Functionality of GPE's Results Framework

GPE's RF was adopted in December 2015 as part of the GPE 2016-2020 Strategic Plan with the purpose of (1) measuring progress towards the goals and objectives of GPE 2020, (2) holding all members of the partnership accountable, and (3) testing the effectiveness of GPE's operating model and the validity of the ToC.[214] Adopting this first RF was recommended by the 2015 interim evaluation, and in particular donor partners encouraged a framework that clarified what GPE wants to achieve and how it will be accountable to justify continued funding. In response, the RF was designed primarily to serve a global accountability purpose. The M&E strategy adopted in 2016 – with reporting on the RF as one

[212] E.g. John Mayne, 2015, Useful Theory of Change Models, Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation; Dr. Dana H.Taplian a.o., 2013, Theory of Change Technical papers, ActKnowledge.
[213] GPE, 2015, BOD/2015/10 DOC 04
[214] GPE Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020, Improving learning and equity through stronger education systems.

of its four workstreams – has explicitly added a learning and steering purpose to GPE's M&E efforts (see also section 5.3).

As a tool, the RF is meant to hold all members of the partnership accountable, although it does not explicitly state to whom. Given that mutual accountability is one of GPE's guiding principles, it is assumed that the RF is meant as a tool to help ensure accountability across the partnership (i.e. all members are accountable to each other). According to interview respondents, the RF is primarily meant to ensure accountability to the global board as other processes are in place (notably JSRs) that serve accountability at the country level.

Looking at the actual use of the RF, the GPE Secretariat has clearly used this framework to structure its internal and external communication about results, with the annual results reports as its centerpiece. In the design of the 37 indicators that make up the RF, deliberate efforts have been made to link up with reporting systems of other global education actors (UNICEF and UNESCO). Reference to use of the RF in Board or committee meetings among interview respondents is mixed, ranging from claims of a "massive improvement" to being "limited at most". It is difficult to attribute managerial decisions directly to the results reports, but these reports address many key performance issues that are regularly debated in the Board and the Secretariat, such as funding requirements, the availability of reliable education data and learning assessment systems, alignment, and the use of JSRs. Having these issues covered in the RF means that relevant factual and regular data related to output-level results is available to inform these debates.

At the same time, interviews with Board members and Secretariat staff have raised issues that are missing in the RF, which thus reduces its (perceived) usefulness. Such issues include the quality of cooperation at the country level, the performance of GAs, and progress in ESP implementation. In addition, in many instances a more fundamental concern was raised about the lack of mutual accountability within GPE,[215] which is not addressed by the indicators of the RF.

When assessing the technical quality of the RF based on prevailing M&E insights and interview responses, one of the RF's strengths is that it comprehensively covers the different results levels in GPE's ToC. The Secretariat made extensive efforts in close consultation with the Board to design a RF that was meant to be practical, relevant and transparent, maximizing the use of existing data and reporting systems. The majority of indicators meet all or most of the SMART criteria and in particular they are change-oriented at the impact and outcome level. In addition, methodological notes have been developed for all 37 indicators to enhance the transparency and rigor of the RF.

At the same time, a comprehensive review of all RF indicators by the R&P team of the Secretariat in combination with interview findings brings to light a number of critical observations. For instance, some interviewees point out that impact indicators have to rely on international sources like the UIS which in turn depend on country-data that is often incomplete and of varying reliability especially on out-of-school numbers, while important results that feature in many ESPs are not captured, e.g. non-formal education, provisions for children with special needs, the employability of school leavers, the

[215] This concern is also regularly documented in EPR-related documents and a key element in the strategic shifts proposed by the Secretariat during the Board meeting in December 2019.

inclusiveness of the system in terms of disabled and ethnic minority children and the psycho-social well-being of children over five.

Donor partners in particular are critical about the inability to attribute changes at the outcome and impact level to GPE's efforts, which in itself is accepted as inherent to the complexity of GPE's ambitions. This then suggests that spending time on data collection at these levels of the RF holds limited use for accountability and learning. The RF design is primarily based on formulating SMART indicators, although these assume a quantifiable and logical predictability of the results, as they do not fully capture qualitative, non-linear and unforeseen progress. Furthermore, the RF measures progress in grants but does not cover progress in ESP implementation, nor monitor factors that are likely to influence ESP implementation like the quality of cooperation at country level. Finally, several indicators related to the objectives at the country level and related to building a stronger global partnership are activity- rather than change-oriented (e.g. # of knowledge products developed versus member satisfaction with these products), thus reducing their relevance in measuring what they are supposed to measure.

In terms of (perceived) usefulness, the ISE notices and supports the consensus that this first RF is an improvement compared with the earlier situation without the RF. The RF is seen to have helped GPE in becoming more accountable for results in its thinking, framing of programmatic discussions and its reporting. The RF has also helped in providing factual data to inform many of these discussions, although its use and perceived usefulness have remained largely limited to accountability at the global level. In light of the EPR and proposed strategic shifts to place country processes at the core of GPE, there is scope to make the RF more relevant, complex-aware[216] and adaptable to country-specifics: in other words, making the RF more learning- and steering-oriented, including at the country level.

6.3.4 Functionality of Gender Equality Policy and Strategy 2016-2020

GPE has had girls' education as one of its five objectives in the 2012-2015 Strategic Plan. Moreover, a Gender Equality Institutional Assessment (GEIA) completed in September 2015 has highlighted the need for GPE to work more broadly on gender equality, beyond its focus on girls' education. The GEIA has also pointed at strengthening efforts and engaging in integrated approaches to gender mainstreaming across all of the work of the partnership, as well as developing a more robust institutional approach for the Secretariat.[217] Building on the recommendations of the GEIA, the first and current Gender Equality Policy and Strategy 2016-2020 document has been developed. The way in which the policy and strategy have been presented (i.e. within one document) might give the impression that the Gender Equality Policy (the Policy) needs to be periodically renewed while it has been developed to be evergreen (i.e. never to expire). Meanwhile, the Gender Equality Strategy (the Strategy) has been made for the 2016-2020 period and it sets out core output areas to frame and focus resources and efforts for the duration of the GPE Strategic Plan for the same period. In other words, the Strategy outlines the aspiration and intention of how the Policy will be put into practice over the period of the GPE Strategic Plan.

[216] For instance, being able to capture the unpredictable and non-linear progress that is typical in the social change process.
[217] Gender Equality Policy and Strategy 2016-2020.

Upon first glance, the Strategy provides a comprehensive overview of how the policy is envisioned to be operationalized for the 2016-2020 period. To set the direction and focus for implementing the Policy during its first strategic planning cycle (2016-2020), the Strategy identifies six core output areas, which are aligned with the key components of the Policy. These six core output areas are:

1. mainstreaming gender equality into GPE operations and frameworks;
2. strengthening the capacity of the Secretariat, Board, and Committees to lead on gender equality;
3. gender-responsive sector analysis, planning, and implementation;
4. coordinating across sectors to advance gender equality in education;
5. monitoring and reporting on gender equality results; and
6. knowledge production, exchange, and management on gender equality.[218]

Next, for each output area, the Strategy sets out the main deliverables, the party or parties leading and the reporting mechanisms. Furthermore, it generally describes the roles and responsibilities for each actor group[219] and which resources are required for successful implementation of the Strategy. Although the Strategy sets out roles and responsibilities and identifies a leading party, it does not further specify this beyond the actor group (e.g. Secretariat, DCPs). This might limit the leadership of members of actor groups over an action or deliverable as roles and responsibilities are not appointed to people specifically. Moreover, further specification of the deliverables and how these (jointly) contribute to achieving results within the six output areas is not present.

This brief description of roles and responsibilities and deliverables can be explained by the fact that further operationalization of the Policy and Strategy has taken place through an Annual Report and annual action plan. The Annual Report includes a review of planned activities and deliverables, an overview of the progress on the six output areas of that year as well as an analysis of issues, challenges, and opportunities, recommendations, and key priorities going forward. On the other hand, the action plan presents a costed and prioritized set of key activities and deliverables. Both documents are prepared by the Secretariat. The 2019 Annual Report clearly outlines the progress on deliverables and the planned deliverables for the 2020 financial year. However, there is limited information on how the efforts under the output areas are aligned to jointly contribute to achieving progress, as well as who is responsible for the specific deliverables. Similarly, in the 2018 Annual Report and 2016 annual action plan responsibilities are only identified at the level of the actor group.

This reporting – along with interviews held – convinces us that the first steps towards more broadly addressing gender equality at GPE have been made and are illustrated by – for example – "Guidance for Developing Gender-Responsive Education Sector Plans" jointly published by UNGEI and GPE, as well as the roll-out of a series of regional workshops. Moreover, the 2019 Annual Report on the Strategy states that the Secretariat has started several activities, including advocacy and communication activities (e.g., production of report to support policy advocacy around the G7 Women Deliver Summit), a review of GPE's operational frameworks and documents to propose revisions for including gender-responsive elements (i.e. identifying key leverage points where a gender perspective could be strengthened within indicators, guidelines, standards and HR processes), capacity-

[218] Ibid.

[219] Actor groups include i) Secretariat (i.e. Gender and Equity/Inclusion Staff and Other Teams), ii) Board of Directors, iii) Board Committees, iv) Developing Country Partners, v) Grant Agents, Coordinating Agencies and other Local Education Group members, and vi) other partners.

strengthening activities for GPE Secretariat, Board, and Board Committees (e.g., draft for design of online training modules on gender equality under internal review, institutional capacity and awareness built on prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment), and knowledge production (e.g., production of concept note and discussion paper for the Gender Equality theme under KIX, two analytical studies on the costs of gender equality and not educating girls completed). In other words, clear signs of progress have been reported upon, but many of the intended strategy outputs are still under review or redesign, have been repurposed, or are experiencing delays.

One explanation for this can be found in the Strategy itself, which stresses that implementation of the Strategy and annual action plans will require leadership, commitment, and participation across GPE and at all levels, identifying roles and responsibilities not only of Secretariat – specifically Gender and Equity/Inclusion – staff, but also other actor groups, such as the Board of Directors, Board Committees, DCPs, GAs, CAs, LEG members, and other partners. Involving as well as sensitizing multiple actors at different levels is understandably more time-consuming and could partially explain the delays.

Besides, in the Strategy, the Secretariat has been identified as a leading party on five out of the six core output areas, while DCPs are leading on one: gender-responsive sector analysis and planning. This fact coupled with ISE interviews leads us to conclude that the main implementers of the Strategy are the Secretariat staff rather than the partnership as a whole. It is also observed that the responsibilities for implementing the Strategy have largely been delegated to the Gender Equality thematic lead.[220] The fact that this position carries limited authority and decision-making power made it more difficult to achieve progress on the Strategy implementation, which thus helps to explain the delays. Furthermore, changes in decisions on the higher management level that affected the continuation of the process have also contributed to the delay in Strategy implementation.

Nevertheless, ISE interviews revealed that gender has recently been gaining increasing attention at the management level. This is seen through the fact that the oversight on the implementation of the Gender Strategy has been put to GPE's CEO office. Action on the Gender Strategy is quarterly reported to the CEO based on an internal action plan that exists next to the annual action plan. Nonetheless, working towards gender equality is felt to mostly lie with GPE Secretariat and Board Committees, with limited involvement of country-level partners in working on core output areas other than sector analysis and planning.

Nevertheless, at the country level progress is still being made in terms of achieving gender equality, with GPE's 2018 Annual Portfolio Review[221] noting that 31 out of 37 ESPIGs are investing in gender equality. Moreover, GPE's 2019 Results Reporting shows improving gender parity between boys and girls though it is difficult to clearly attribute progress at this level. Besides, US$372.8 millions of GPE's funding is allocated to activities specifically promoting equity, gender equality and inclusion.[222] As discussed earlier, the work on gender at the country level is supported by the Secretariat's efforts

[220] During the time that the ISE interviews were held, the position of Gender Equality thematic lead was combined with the Early Childhood thematic lead. Along with this combined position, additional resources were allocated to cover the Early Childhood portfolio and cover the gender portfolio through consultancy hours and time from the Chief Technical Officer. A new full-time thematic lead started mid-April 2020.
[221] https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/2018-annual-portfolio-review
[222] https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/results-report-2019

through – for example – the publication of "Guidance for Developing Gender-Responsive Education Sector Plans". Moreover, financial resources are provided through grant financing (from the Children Investment Fund Foundation funds) in support of UNGEI and the Gender at the Center Initiative to advance gender equality at country level.

At the same time, however, it remains unclear to which extent the supportive work of the Secretariat and these financial resources have promoted country-level partners to prioritize efforts to work towards gender equality. Since the efforts at the country level seem to be mainly driven by country-level partners (e.g. government officials and DPs recognizing and advocating the importance of working towards gender equality), but are varying strongly per country, this could also indicate that the work towards gender equality is advancing due to other factors outside of GPE's involvement. Whilst this finding underlines GPE's country-driven approach, this, along with ISE interviews, also indicates room for improvement in coordinating efforts at global and country level to jointly advance GPE's work on gender.

In conclusion, GPE has made comprehensive efforts to translate its Gender Equality Policy into its Strategy and further into annual action plans but the overall RF has remained unchanged, keeping the results monitoring and reporting of the gender strategy separate from GPE's core M&E efforts. Although, the Policy and Strategy show the strong commitment of GPE towards gender – highlighting that the Policy is vital for realizing GPE's mission, strategic goals, and objectives – the translation of this ambition is not yet convincingly seen in practice. This is due to the fact that the amount of resources allocated to implement the Strategy was limited up until recently when the work on gender equality gained increased attention.

Moreover, despite visible efforts and subsequent progress towards gender equality at the country level, it remains unclear to which extent this is a result of coordinated efforts from the Secretariat (and other partners). This gives the impression that there is room for the Secretariat to involve country-level partners increasingly to learn from current best practices and advance the work on gender equality beyond gender-responsive sector analysis and planning. The ISE concludes that although strategies and plans towards gender equality have been developed and communicated as part of GPE's strategic ambitions, operationalization of the strategies and plans, in particular at the country level, are only at an early stage considering the fact that results are most clearly visible in the preparation of documents and workshops.

6.3.5 Conclusions concerning Functionality GPE's concept frameworks

Even though there is scope for technical improvement in presenting more comprehensive pathways of change or in delineating GPE's sphere of control, the GPE has made significant progress since 2015 in the elaboration of its conceptual thinking in a range of frameworks that have improved the clarity and transparency of GPE's ambitions, the rationale behind its interventions, and how it will hold itself accountable for results. So far, the GPE has used these frameworks primarily for communication and accountability purposes and less as tools to steer and learn from its operations. The ToC and RF are clearly aligned, and initial signs have been found of these frameworks being used to guide or validate operational plans, but this has not yet become common practice throughout GPE. Clear efforts have

been made to translate the Gender Equality Policy into action plans, but the extent to which this is reflected in GPE's RF and can be seen to have an effect on GPE's overall performance remains limited.

6.4 M&E PERFORMANCE

Core question: to what extent GPE's M&E performance has been successful in serving its intended purposes beyond the already confirmed accountability purpose?

Main findings: the significant investments in GPE's M&E function since 2015 have certainly improved GPE's M&E performance. More systematic information related to GPE's progress towards intended results has become available and has helped to improve the quality of programmatic discussions both within the Secretariat and the Board. At the same time, the perception that despite these efforts, M&E information does not sufficiently answer the right questions makes that the cost-benefit ratio of GPE's M&E efforts requires continued attention.

6.4.1 Introduction

GPE's M&E strategy has largely been implemented according to plan, resulting in the wealth of M&E information that GPE has collected and publicly reported. This means that the four workstreams of the M&E strategy – (1) results monitoring, (2) grant monitoring, (3) evaluation, and (4) dissemination of results – have extensively covered the Board's demand for M&E information, largely meeting its accountability purpose. The ISE sees GPE's RF as a carefully-considered product of a challenging process to reach a widely-agreed measurement framework for GPE's achievements.

In addition to accountability, GPE's M&E strategy serves the purposes of (a) stimulating learning, (b) improving performance and (c) facilitating decision-making among Board, Secretariat and national stakeholders. The ISE has therefore explored the question to *what extent GPE's M&E performance has been successful in serving its intended purposes beyond the already-confirmed accountability purpose.*

For this purpose, the ISE has collected additional evidence concerning the use of M&E information, and its perceived usefulness for set purposes. The ISE has also collected information about M&E approaches of other global partnerships, which has been used to enrich the assessment of GPE's M&E performance (further details about the methodological approaches can be found in Annex Two).

6.4.2 M&E purposes and deliverables

In 2016, GPE adopted a new M&E strategy with three purposes, namely, to strengthen the accountability of GPE's work, stimulate learning and improved performance across the partnership, and facilitate organizational decision-making by the Board, Secretariat, and national stakeholders. The four workstreams of the global M&E strategy have resulted in a wealth of M&E information primarily targeted at the global level, including:

- Annual Portfolio Reviews, providing a factual update of the composition and performance of the GPE grants portfolio;
- Review of 2016-2018 completion reports, providing a review of project outcomes (improved learning, equity or systems) and lessons from GPE projects;

- Review of Value for Money practices in closed GPE grants over the 2016 – 2018 period;
- Annual Results Reports, providing a systematic (analytical) overview of trends and progress towards the 37 indicators of GPE's RF;
- Twenty Summative and eight Prospective country-level evaluations, providing an overview of progress and GPE contribution towards country objectives and goals;
- Three programmatic evaluations, examining the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of specific GPE grants or instruments; and
- Six thematic reviews/studies reflecting an analysis of GPE's coverage and performance in key thematic areas.[223]

At the country level, GPE has stimulated the use of Joint Sector Reviews as a key M&E process, although these are not considered as part of GPE's corporate M&E strategy. According to the 2019 Results Report, 26 out of 61 countries have undertaken a JSR, with only seven countries (i.e. 27%) meeting GPE quality standards. The draft 2020 results report[224] reflects a significant improvement with 20 out of 28 JSRs (i.e. 71%) meeting three or more quality standards.

6.4.3 Use and usefulness of M&E information

All mentioned M&E deliverables have been made publicly available, providing transparency and accountability to the wider public regarding GPE's achievements. Within GPE, the diverse M&E deliverables have primarily targeted global audiences (i.e. the Board and the constituents that it represents, specific Board Committees and/or the Secretariat). Looking at the use of M&E information in GPE's documentation and according to interviewees, the ISE observes the following:

First, unsurprisingly, different audiences at the global level use different parts of the M&E information. For example, the GPC is particularly interested in GPE's annual portfolio overviews. Board members report a stronger use of the Annual Results Reports, selecting issues that hold particular interest to them. Among the Board members interviewed, only donor partners referred to the use of evaluation reports, although they have different views on their usefulness and are largely critical about the cost-benefit ratio of all such evaluations. The Secretariat – in particular the R&P team – seems to be the most intensive user of evaluation findings, reportedly using these findings in its own analysis, the annual results reporting and in shaping their thoughts for the post-2020 strategy. In this way, M&E results reach and influence the Board, albeit in a less direct and obvious way. The Secretariat's Country Support Team primarily refers to the use of the more project-specific information (e.g. completion reports) and less to the use of broader M&E results, indicating that they lack the time for regular and broader reflection and learning from M&E results.

Second, most country-level interviewees claim to have made little use of M&E deliverables that are not specifically directed at them. They express reasonable satisfaction with JSRs and are positive in particular about opportunities for peer exchange with other countries, which seems to contrast with the quality of JSRs as presented in the CLEs and Results Reports.

[223] Data, Early Childhood Care and Education, Equity and Inclusion, Gender Equality, Learning Systems, Teachers and Teaching.
[224] Draft Results Report 2020 – version April 22nd, 2020.

Third, when reviewing in further depth how M&E results influence programmatic discussions, it appears unlikely that M&E results have steered the nature of discussions, but they have influenced their quality. Interviewees with Board members and R&P staff state that many issues would have also been discussed without many of these M&E deliverables. Examples of such issues include funding requirements, alignment and harmonization, the need for better data and learning assessment systems, and the quality of JSRs. However, having these issues included in the RF and addressed in various M&E products has added more regular and factual information, which has helped to sensitize Board members and management in raising the quality/evidence base of their discussions.

Nonetheless, the majority of interviewees within and outside the Secretariat express the sentiment that GPE's current M&E efforts are beyond what can be processed and absorbed. In addition, various interviewees from partner countries indicate that the M&E information is not answering the appropriate questions to perform better at the county level (e.g. level of ESP implementation, quality of LEG performance, and quality of the GA). Besides, a number of interviewees representing global partners question the extent to which particular external evaluations provide information that is not already known by country-level actors. At the same time, multiple Board documents include references to external studies (e.g. EPR and CLEs) as 'objective' justifications and explanations for the need to debate and take action on issues like mutual accountability, alignment, adaptability to the country context, etc.

6.4.4 M&E in other global funds

The ISE has mapped how other global funds (GAVI, GEF, GCF, and GF) have organized their M&E function (see details in Annex 6.1). Looking at the most remarkable differences and similarities with GPE, the ISE observes the following:

- GPE appears to have been one of the first to adopt a ToC. GCF has a fund-related ToC that features less prominently in its external communication, GAVI has only recently started using ToCs at the country level and working towards developing a ToC approach as well as a broader ToC to show how GAVI intends to achieve its strategy 5.0, while GF and GEF do not have an overall ToC.
- Similar to GPE, all partnerships work with (strategic) RFs and use a set of indicators to measure progress. GEF has recently simplified its framework to eleven core indicators, while GCF tracks 43 indicators, aggregating results from grant projects that report on four to six selected indicators.
- All funds have separate systems for grant-specific and corporate reporting. The GEF has three levels of reporting (grants, country and corporate). GCF has aligned its reporting systems by having its corporate reporting aggregating grant-specific results.
- GF subcontracts external fiduciary monitoring at the country level to a Local Fund Agent, separate from the Principal Recipient, the latter being the GF equivalent of the GPE's GA.
- Like GPE, all funds rely on a combination of different evaluation efforts, including prospective, retrospective, thematic (cross-country), country-level and performance/corporate evaluations. GEF also undertakes separate impact evaluations. GAVI, exceptionally, has stopped commissioning comprehensive evaluations after receiving several confirmations that its model works. Purposeful deliberations on the usefulness, quality, and independence of evaluations led GAVI to focus on usefulness and quality principles whereby the former is ensured by the GAVI

Secretariat proposing and leading the evaluations and the latter - quality of evaluations- is overseen by the Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC) peer reviews.

- In particular, GAVI has shifted its evaluation efforts towards undertaking more targeted reviews and fewer overall comprehensive evaluations as the results of these evaluations were considered lacking specificity for learning on how to effectively operationalize a confirmed model.
- The independence of the evaluation function of GEF and GCF is more strongly secured by having an independent evaluation office/unit that reports directly to the Board.
- GPE's M&E Strategy is most similar to that of the GEF, whose Independent Evaluation Office prepares an Overall Performance Study every four years timed to influence the objectives of next replenishment cycle. The IEO lays out a program of evaluations to contribute to the Overall Performance Study, much like GPE's M&E Strategy did.

Within the limitations of the acquired data, it is clear that all global partnerships face a similar challenge of finding practical ways to collect relevant corporate M&E information that serves both learning and accountability purposes. For the grant level, this seems to be less of a challenge. All funds are seen to use a combination of different M&E processes, which are subject to regular updates based on progressing insights. The remarkable trend in this continuous streamlining process is the aim to reduce the number of indicators while allowing country-specificity. There are examples – albeit in a nascent stage – of making M&E more participatory and learning-oriented. This increased emphasis on learning and strengthening the independence of the evaluation function may be worthy of further consideration by GPE.

6.4.5 Conclusions concerning GPE's M&E performance

In line with its M&E strategy, GPE's M&E efforts are concentrated at the global level, designed and successfully implemented in meeting its accountability purposes. At the same time, there are convincing signs of M&E results influencing the quality of programmatic discussions by adding regular factual data on key issues related to GPE's overall performance like progress in alignment, trends in funding, JSR application, etc. However, a deliberate learning agenda or convincing signs of GPE using M&E results for collective learning remain limited. The volume of this information is however not easily absorbed nor discerned from other inputs, which explains the mixed perspectives concerning the usefulness of M&E findings.

Despite the apparent use of M&E results, overall M&E information in its current shape does not sufficiently address key questions related to GPE performance, in particular related to the quality of cooperation and ESP implementation at the country level. Various Board members have clear and strong ideas about how to improve this, albeit which have not (yet) found their way into GPE's RF. In line with this, current M&E information holds limited use for steering, learning and mutual accountability at country level, which are key elements for the success of the ongoing EPR roll-out process. At the country level, GPE's M&E efforts primarily rely on the successful implementation of JSRs, which reportedly remains a challenge in terms of meeting GPE standards despite positive feedback from DCP representatives.

Monitoring information reflected in portfolio and grant performance reviews holds particular use for the GPC and the CST, although both have insufficient time to systematically reflect on and learn from

this information given existing grant management-related workloads. The learning effects of the extensive external evaluation efforts are visible in the Secretariat but are not as obvious to many Board members.

Finally, GPE's M&E function is not fundamentally different from other global funds, with all funds facing similar challenges and demonstrating efforts towards constant improvement. It would be premature to draw specific lessons from other funds, although their efforts to emphasize learning and bring the M&E function closer to the Board to have more impact on decision-making are at least worthy of further consideration.

Overall, the significant investments in GPE's M&E function since 2015 have certainly improved GPE's M&E performance. At the same time, the perception that despite these efforts, M&E information does not sufficiently answer the right questions makes us also conclude that the cost-benefit ratio of GPE's M&E efforts requires continued attention.

7 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Being strategic in nature, the ISE has reviewed both the development effectiveness and organizational effectiveness of GPE, looking at eight strategic areas of investigation and presenting its findings and conclusions for each specific issue. At the same time, we recognize that all of these issues are inter-related and in combination reflect the overall performance of GPE. In this penultimate chapter, the ISE presents its overall conclusions related to development effectiveness, efficiency and trends in financing and organizational effectiveness.

DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

GPE has demonstrated progress towards all its outcome- and output-level objectives, but its effectiveness per objective varies. At the global level, targets for *building a stronger partnership* have been exceeded, while targets for *more financing* have been achieved although progress in *better financing* (harmonization and alignment) remains a challenge. At the country level, GPE's effectiveness has been relatively convincing in *creating more inclusive sector plan development processes resulting in ESPs/TEPs that increasingly meet GPE's quality standards*. GPE has successfully supported the financing of ESP implementation through ESPIGs that are largely on track and generally perceived to be relevant, despite covering a small portion of the total funding requirements for ESP implementation.

GPE's effectiveness towards ESP implementation and its subsequent contribution to more effective and efficient education systems remains a challenge. These goals reflect relatively broad sector-wide ambitions when compared with other global funds. Progress towards these goals depends on the successful contribution of GPE's interventions in combination with a range of factors at the country level, including funding abilities, implementation capacity, institutional setting, conflict and fragility, and socio-economic conditions that are partially and sometimes completely beyond GPE's sphere of control.

A further analysis of contributing factors revealed that GPE's achievements in terms of creating better plans, more inclusive sector dialogue and monitoring processes, and financing are positively associated with ESP implementation. This illustrates the validity of GPE's ToC in the sense that the combination of GPE-supported outputs are relevant building blocks for making progress in ESP implementation. The ISE also observes that progress in improving plans has moved at a faster pace than improvements in dialogue and monitoring, which progressed in the same more modest pace as ESP implementation. This indicates that improving sector plans may be important but on its own is insufficient to ascertain satisfactory plan implementation.

At the same time, the ISE observes that higher ratings of the GPE contributions to sector planning, dialogue and monitoring is associated with lower ratings of implementation performance. This is explained by the fact that GPE support towards inclusive planning processes is adapted to support needs, which are typically strongest in countries with relatively weak plan implementation capacity. Consequently, the GPE contributions should be highest in countries where it ESP implementation is

most likely to be difficult. Finally, stimulating inclusiveness implies getting more actors involved. This leads to sector plans that are more comprehensive but also more complicated as they would have to address the needs and interests of a larger group of stakeholders. Overall, this points to the significance of other factors that are not directly part of GPE's interventions.

Some of these factors lie within GPE's sphere of influence, and relate to implementation capacity, funding, and the motivation of key factors involved in ESP implementation. These factors are recognized in GPE's ToC and have been confirmed to hold relevance for ESP implementation, although in practice it appears that GPE has had relatively little influence on them. A key emerging area of attention in this has been the importance of inter-government relationships and cooperation, in particular between the ministries responsible for education, the Ministry of Finance and sub-national government entities.

In addition, the ISE examined factors outside GPE's sphere of influence related to the institutional and socio-economic context, which according to literature can be expected to hold relevance for ESP implementation. From this, it appeared that the absence of conflict and fragility and the presence of rule of law are important institutional factors that facilitate ESP implementation. At the same time, socio-economic features like higher population density (i.e. making it easier to reach higher numbers of students) and lower ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity (i.e. less variety in languages, cultural norms and habits to be integrated) are enabling factors for ESP implementation.

At the country level, GPE depends on the LEG for advising the education policy cycle from ESP/TEP development to ESPIG application and ESP implementation. Progress in LEG effectiveness has been uneven across countries. More LEGs have been effective for discussing ESP and ESPIG development and ESPIG monitoring, and fewer for influencing ESP implementation and strategic choices.

Particular combinations of organizational and collaboration principles proposed by the Secretariat explain LEG effectiveness, although LEGs do not need to meet all principles to be effective. Mutual accountability has the closest association with LEG effectiveness. Other than that, positive cases of effective LEGs meet at least two principles. The combinations of principles and contextual factors that seem to be most strongly associated with LEG strategic effectiveness are strong government leadership and strong LEG governance, or strong GPE initiative and influence in countries where the education sector actors have weaker capacity.

Technical capacity gaps within complex government systems for the delivery of education and data collection is an issue for all LEGs in discharging their functions, especially in closing the feedback loop between action in implementing the ESP and reflecting on what has been achieved, what has not, and why. The motivation and leverage of LEG members explain whether or not they contribute to effective LEGs.

Structural political and economic factors are associated with LEG effectiveness, including inequality (income, ethnic, and linguistic), the absence of other fora for dialogue in the education sector, limited space for civil society, and the impact of conflict and disasters. This relationship between LEGs and the structural factors that surround them can be summarized under the concept of a social contract, which influences whether inclusive dialogue on education based on accountability is possible.

LEGs struggle to find solutions that require system thinking because they imply changing the behavior of teachers and education actors, which requires exploring how their motivation, incentives, and leverage interact in principal-agent or collective action problems. Other global funds adopt a similar multi-stakeholder partnership model at the country level and show similar challenges. Compared with other funds, GPE's unique sector-wide focus requires the highest level of effort to ensure that the LEGs work as intended as country-specific multi-stakeholder platforms.

Efficiency and Financing

GPE's grant allocation process from MCA to first disbursement takes more than 40 months on average, which strains the level of commitment to the process among in-country actors. The first 26 months of this period includes an initial delay, as the timing of the education sector planning process is not linked to the MCA announcement. Subsequently, a significant amount of time is devoted to completing a complex sector-wide participatory analysis and sector plan development process. Altogether, this consumes about two-thirds of the 40 months, which differs from other global funds that have a more issue-based/thematic focus and are less demanding in term of inclusiveness and quality requirements. Once this process is completed in line with GPE's quality standards, the actual grant application can start. The application process includes a rigorous three-staged QAR process outside the country at stake, which can be lengthy and affect the sense of national ownership. GPE is taking relevant steps to address these issues through the GPSP, GPR, VfM and the EPR processes.

Overall, grant implementation is judged to be efficient, as the majority of grants are on track. Delays in grant disbursements are primarily caused by operational challenges (e.g. complications in procurement), which often lie beyond GPE's scope of control. The Secretariat monitors progress in implementation and fund disbursement and undertakes regular efforts to analyze and propose options for improved efficiency. The Secretariat has grown in size during the current strategy period, mostly in response to Board decisions. Nevertheless, the costs of the Secretariat have remained within GPE's own targeted range and in line with other global funds.

Country allocations over the 2012-2020 period illustrate a continued focus on basic education in LICs and LMICs, with a slight emphasis on FCACs in line with GPE's MCA formula. Funds are allocated to a wide range of activities related to improving learning quality, equity and systems, reflecting a country-level partnership consensus rather than a specific prioritization. During the 2012-2018 period, a relatively small portion (5.6 percent) of all education-related ODA commitments to GPE DCPs has been channeled through GPE, and as much as 11.8 percent of ODA commitments to GPE DCPs when considering basic education as a sub-set of ODA. Since 2016, the GPE has seen unprecedented funding pledges and contributions from DCPs and donor countries, albeit far from what is needed to close the enormous funding gaps.

Domestic expenditure remains by far the most important source of funding for education. GPE has continuously advocated the importance of increasing domestic education budgets, although its influence is limited as domestic funding decisions are subject to many other considerations. Although a number of DCPs have structurally managed to increase or sustain domestic education budgets above

20 percent of their overall government budget, since 2000 the share of education spending within total public expenditures by DCPs has continued to decline.

Donors make deliberate choices in terms of what, where, and how they provide development assistance, with a preference for direct relationships with the recipient country, control over the spending of aid, and the quality of accountability and governance systems. Principal reasons why traditional donors provide funding to GPE include the fact that GPE may work in countries that are not direct partner countries of the donor, as well as the possibility to participate in shaping the global education development agenda.

The global landscape for education development is becoming increasingly complex, with developing countries graduating or demoting in income status or fragility, and a myriad of traditional and newly-emerging donors (e.g. private foundations, China, India, etc.), and recently-established funding vehicles such as the Education Cannot Wait and the International Financing Facility for Education. The 2015 interim evaluation already called upon GPE to consider a more specific position in the overall aid architecture for education. Since then, GPE has continued to be positioned as a broad and inclusive funding channel for basic education, although the call on GPE to position itself more strategically has been growing.

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

GPE has overachieved on its targets for its global objective of *building a stronger partnership,* among others by clarifying roles and responsibilities, producing knowledge products and further professionalizing GPE's risk management and fiduciary oversight. In addition, substantial progress has been made in establishing a *strategic management framework* as recommended by the 2015 interim evaluation. This includes a ToC and RF, which has improved the clarity and transparency of GPE's ambitions and how it will hold itself accountable for results.

To date, GPE has primarily used these frameworks for communication and accountability purposes, and less as tools to steer and learn from its operations. The ToC and RF are aligned, and signs have been found of these frameworks being used to guide or validate operational plans, although this has not yet become common practice throughout GPE. Clear efforts have been made to translate the gender equality policy into action plans, although because GPE's gender strategy followed later its specific objectives did not find their way into GPE's overall RF. This separation means that it remains difficult to observe the effects of GPE's gender strategy on GPE's core results.

M&E efforts have been successful in increasing GPE's accountability at the global level. There are convincing signs of M&E results influencing the quality of programmatic discussions by adding regular factual output-related data on key issues such as progress in alignment, trends in funding, JSR application, etc. At the country level, GPE's M&E efforts primarily rely on the successful application of JSRs, which has remained a challenge in terms of meeting GPE standards despite positive feedback from DCP representatives. Despite the apparent use of available M&E information, the results framework in its current shape does not sufficiently address key questions related to GPE

performance, in particular related to the quality of cooperation, mutual accountability and ESP implementation at the country level.

In addition, concerns remain about the quality of partnership dynamics and the adequacy of managerial arrangements (e.g. governance structure, level of delegation and efficiency of decision-making processes) that are not captured by the existing RF.
GPE's principle of being an inclusive partnership has become an obvious part of GPE's DNA as it is reflected in GPE's structures and decision-making processes and practices. At the global level, this is visible in the composition of the Board and its five committees – all of which comprise the diverse constituencies of GPE – and the value placed on consensus in decision-making. It is also illustrated by the prominent role of these member bodies in decision-making related to grant appraisal and approval, financial oversight, internal practices and procedures. At the country level, it is visible in the (desired) composition of LEGs and the prominent role of this multi-stakeholder platform in the ESP development and grant application process, especially when compared with other global funds.

The ISE appreciates the *benefits* of GPE's efforts to put its principle of inclusiveness in practice, as it keeps GPE together as a unique global platform on which the multiple stakeholders in the education sector work together towards a common goal. At the same time, the ISE is cognizant of the *costs* of GPE's inclusive practices and gradual expansion of the partnership, in particular in terms of the pace and quality of decision-making in GPE's relatively heavy governance structures. This also makes it difficult to find time for joint reflection and learning on how to get the best out of the experience, knowledge, and capacities of existing members. Looking at how other global funds are organized, the ISE believes that there is scope for increased efficiency without jeopardizing GPE's important progress in becoming a truly inclusive partnership.

In terms of management arrangements, the Secretariat primarily plays a supporting role vis-à-vis the Board, its committees and – to a lesser extent – the LEGs. The pace of progress is often affected by the frequency of meetings of the Board (committees), whose mandates are not limited to strategic issues (the 'what' and 'why' of GPE) but also extend to more practical issues related to GPE's operations and organizational development (i.e. the 'how' of GPE). A direct consequence of this is the recurring challenge of finding the necessary time in the agenda of Board (committee) meetings to address all of the issues on which a dialogue and decision is required. In light of this, the Secretariat spends significant time carefully preparing and framing these discussions. Indeed, this facilitates a quick yet limited reactive debate, during which Board (committee) members are expected to reach the same level of insight as the Secretariat, albeit in much less time. Both Board members and Secretariat staff are critical about the current working arrangements, illustrating the need for further streamlining.

Comparing other global funds, we observe diverse management arrangements, mostly reflecting less intense involvement of the Board, despite being mindful of keeping members connected on strategic issues. For instance, their Boards decides on country allocations, funding key areas/priorities, and approval for larger investments, while the Secretariat follows up on priorities within country programs and approves individual grants, usually with the help of an independent thematic expert panel. In terms of strengthening national ownership/government leadership, GPE's mechanisms are largely similar but stand out by having a broader and inclusive sector-wide orientation, which increases the

number of actors involved and complicates partnership dynamics. In supporting implementation, GPE has less diverse mechanisms for providing TA to respond to unforeseen emerging capacity needs, applies a Variable Tranche modality comparable to GCF's results-based financing and stimulates joint monitoring through JSRs similar to Gavi.

Finally, throughout the ISE process, the GPE Secretariat has demonstrated itself to be alert, active and capable of identifying and analyzing tactical and operational challenges. More than 40 internal and external reviews have been undertaken during the past five years of implementing the GPE 2020 strategy, leading to new insights for improved performance on which the Secretariat could act more rapidly, if empowered to do so.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

In response to our findings and conclusions, and taking into account the results of the sense-making workshop, the ISE recommends the following:

1. Maintain a focus on sector-wide basic education, but concentrate on improving the ESPs/TEPs implementation by balancing the attention devote to content and processes, as well as addressing constraints in funding, capacity, and contextual factors *(to be initiated during the first year of GPE's post-2020 strategy).*

Despite GPE's efforts to develop better and more inclusive sector-wide plans, ESP implementation remains limited. Substantial progress has been made in the quality of plans. Progress in the inclusiveness of policy dialogue and monitoring processes has also been made – albeit it somewhat less impressively – while the two in combination are seen as essential stepping stones towards successful plan implementation. Besides, funding gaps, capacity constraints and contextual factors continue to affect ESP implementation. The ISE therefore recommends a 'package' of recommendations, which together are meant to strengthen ESP/TEP implementation.

1.1 Match progress in the quality of implementable plans with the quality of the process

GPE has made demonstrable progress in improving the technical quality of plans (i.e. meeting at least five of the seven quality criteria), including a significant improvement in the achievability of plans. On this aspect, GPE outperforms its other country-level ambitions, but apparently this is insufficient to ascertain successful ESP implementation, which remains to be challenged by a variety of internal and external factors. This does not mean that the ISE argues against the need of having a good plan, but it recommends placing a strengthened emphasis on the process-related requirements that can be expected to facilitate effective plan implementation. In practice, this means elevating the 'achievability' criterion to be treated as crucial precondition, and reinforcing/accelerating the ongoing EPR efforts in realizing more inclusive policy dialogue and monitoring processes at the country level.

1.2 Reduce the funding gaps by adapting the ESP content and process.

ESPs are sector-wide national plans reflecting a wide range of education needs as identified by inclusive LEGs. The important GPE achievement of creating better sector plans deserves continuation, albeit with a stronger eye for fund mobilization. This could be helped by ensuring that future ESP/TEP documents are encouraged to include a more deliberate identification of funding priorities. This in the expectation that it will help DCPs and the LEGs to mobilize resources when being more specific about the issues to be funded first. More clearly identifying funding priorities will also facilitate connecting to donors that have more specific funding interests.

Most ESP/TEP development processes are not strongly linked to national budgetary processes, while relations with Ministries of Finance are important but generally weak. In theory, the sector plan development process goes through a few iterations with the Ministry of Finance to arrive at a plan that is fully funded, although in practice this appears to be challenging. As a result, ESP/TEPs are treated more as a requirement for ESPIG funding than a government-owned national education plan. Therefore, to strengthen linkages with national budgetary processes and

increase attention to domestic resource mobilization, the ISE recommends that the Board should encourage and enable LEGs – with the help of the Secretariat – to intensify engagement with Ministries of Finance (and possibly other relevant ministries) and more deliberately seek connection with the government's own policy and budgetary processes. Such engagement could include strategic dialogue around taxation and revenue collection, austerity, public sector wage bills, etc. (i.e. focusing more on public financial management aspects in DCPs that directly affect the level of resources available to education).

In this context, LEGs and the Secretariat will need to be encouraged to continue strengthening the credibility of appeals for more domestic or international funding by demonstrating the effective and efficient use of funds. The ISE therefore recommends continuing ongoing efforts to strengthen GPE's ability to measure value-for-money convincingly and capture this in GPE's corporate results framework (e.g. by identifying trends over time of VfM for selected investment cases) with the deliberate purpose of resource mobilization.

N.B. Even though the effects of the Covid 19 crises are beyond the scope of the ISE, we consider it appropriate to flag the importance of carefully monitoring the likely effects of this (health and economic) crisis on the funding situation of GPE. These effects may include reduced overall level of available ODA resources, a shift of resources in support of health care systems, or changing funding needs in support of distant learning systems, etc.

1.3 Strengthen national and sub-national implementation capacity.

In most countries, GPE focuses on formulating national education plans in which capacity constraints are identified and reflected in different ways but often insufficiently addressed and funded, in particular at the sub-national level. The ISE therefore recommends that the Board – with the help of the Secretariat – deliberately stimulates the inclusion of a more systematic capacity assessment approach as part of the ESA process, not by imposing such an assessment but rather by providing suggestions and guidance in the use of well-established partnership capacity assessment models[225].

At the same time, we recommend that GPE should stay alert to capacity constraints that may emerge or become apparent during implementation. In line with this, we suggest introducing, testing and optimizing more flexible and varied mechanisms to provide TA support in response to emerging capacity constraints. Similar to other global funds, this can be supported by creating an implementation support fund, as well as by the Secretariat playing a more pro-active role in connecting GPE members that can help each other in addressing capacity constraints by exchanging knowledge, expertise and experience.

1.4 Adopt lessons to better adapt to the complexity of the institutional context.

A range of contextual factors beyond GPE's control influence progress in ESP/TEP implementation. The ISE recommends regularly adapting – starting in the current strategy development process – the overall ToC to provide experience-based guidance in identifying and managing the effects of contextual factors in ESP/TEP development. This can be further

[225]E.g. GIZ's Capacity works model or ECDPM's 5C framework.

supported by including a political economy analysis as part of the ESA process, as well as by having categories of such factors recognized in GPE's corporate ToC. For instance, in practice this could mean that in cases where the involvement of multiple ministries complicates ESP/TEP implementation, plans are adapted by including action to facilitate inter-ministerial cooperation or developing sub-sector plans that better fit the institutional setting.

GPE supports ESP/TEP implementation in over 70 countries, which places GPE in the unique position to capture and share experiences with such mitigating adaptations if the Secretariat – and in particular the CST and R&P team – are tasked to include this as part of their monitoring and support efforts.

2. Strengthen the effectiveness of LEGs as inclusive government-led mechanisms adding value throughout the education policy cycle (to be initiated in the first year of the post-2020 strategy).

Varieties in national contexts explain differences in the shaping, mandate and subsequent performance of LEGs. The ISE therefore recommends continuing the EPR process to strengthen LEG effectiveness, starting from a country-specific reconfirmation of the mandate and ambition of the LEG to a periodic self-assessment of its performance.

2.1 Reconfirm country-specific mandates and ambitions of LEGs based on the prevailing political economy including the existing 'social contract'.[226]

The GPE regards LEGs as government-led, inclusive in-country mechanisms to add value throughout the education policy cycle. The shaping and functioning of LEGs is adapted to the country context, which is understandable and useful if their essence of being a relevant inclusive coordination and advisory mechanism for better (basic) education systems is secured. The Secretariat has identified and communicated a number of LEG principles, which in combination would help LEGs in delivering on their functions. Besides, more actor-specific features like the leverage, capacity and motivation of LEG members have proved to hold relevance. Given the multitude and complexity of factors influencing LEG performance, the ISE recommends a more systematic country-specific approach to optimize LEG effectiveness. In this respect, we recommend undertaking a political economy analysis inclusive of the roles and responsibilities of sector stakeholders as part of the ESA process (guided as needed by the Secretariat), in which the existing 'social contract' is mapped out, along with the prevalence of LEG principles and key features of the (potential) LEG members. Based on this analysis, the country-specific mandate and ambitions of the LEG can be reconfirmed, taking into account the context and existing coordination mechanisms in the education sector.

2.2 Assess and address LEG (member) capacity

It is clear that establishing a LEG does not automatically translate into its effective functioning. The ISE therefore recommends that upon reconfirmation of the LEG's mandate, the LEG should assess and address its main performance challenges in meeting this mandate, which are likely to be a combination of resources, capacity and motivation. Particular attention in this should be paid to the LEGs' capability to adapt (ability to deal with changing circumstances), connect (ability

[226] A social contract refers to the tradition of dialogue between government and civil society, including the existence of dialogue mechanisms.

to engage and draw in other key partners) and contribute in the design, implementation, and evaluation of system-wide education reform.

2.3 Stimulate regular self-assessment and improvement of LEG performance

The Secretariat has already introduced a self-assessment guide for LEGs to facilitate them in reviewing their own collective performance. The ISE supports this initiative as a regular (annual) exercise, in which LEGs (as needed with Secretariat support) first address their *joint accountability for results (i.e. what results have been achieved together)* and second their *mutual accountability (i.e. member contributions to those results).* Ideally, such a periodic participatory review would also include an update of the political economy analysis, resulting in an action plan with clear priorities for improvement.

2.4 Allocate resources to in-country partnership development and facilitation.

The ISE sees a reinvigoration of efforts to strengthen in-country partnerships as an important precondition for strengthening LEG effectiveness. Such efforts would be country-specific and could include strengthening LEG capacity in negotiating for domestic and international funding (in line with GPE's advocacy for domestic resource mobilization), or the capacity of individual members to take part in and effectively contribute to policy dialogue or monitoring. However, all such efforts require resources for their implementation. In part, these resources are already available through the Education Out Loud fund, the pilot to finance CAs, and the program development grant. These resources could be combined in a dedicated in-country partnership development fund (with country allocations) offering more flexible funding at the country level. These funds would be under the purview of a GA, to be called upon by the LEG as a whole, and they possibly could also cover secretarial support arrangements (for example, housed within the government or the CA).

3. Sharpen the positioning of GPE and its financing, emphasizing support for enabling factors for effective ESP implementation.

The GPE is widely recognized as the leading entity in supporting the development of quality education sector plans that meet globally-accepted standards. However, when it comes to supporting overall education sector development in GPE partner countries, GPE funding plays a moderate role (GPE constitutes an average of 5.6 percent of total education-related ODA commitments in GPE partner countries, and as much as 11.8 percent of ODA committed support for the *basic* education sub-sector). At the same time, the international education aid architecture has become increasingly complex with newly-emerging initiatives and funding channels. The ISE therefore recommends a more strategic positioning of GPE and its financing to more clearly articulate its added value to the sector and guide its financing priorities at the country level.

In line with this, and given the limited resources available to the GPE in comparison with overall funding needs, the ISE believes that GPE funding can add more value by being strategically selective rather than by co-financing a small portion of education sector plan implementation. The ISE therefore recommends prioritizing GPE funding more strategically on improving critical systemic conditions necessary for a government to effectively design, fund, manage, and implement education sector policies and plans. Accordingly, GPE would secure a more aligned and complementary position vis-à-vis other existing and emerging education funding channels, and support partner countries in bridging

the gap between different types of funding modalities and types of assistance. More specifically, this would entail the following:

3.1 More deliberately position GPE vis-à-vis other (emerging) funds in the education sector *(as part of the ongoing strategy development process).*

GPE should clearly position itself to complement the support provided through other global education funds; for instance, by extending the emergency type of support provided by Education Cannot Wait and increase support towards enhancing system resilience in partner countries (especially in low-income countries and FCACs). Alternatively, support in lower-middle-income countries could be specifically directed to further strengthen and build accountability systems and governance processes, which would be critical elements for the graduation of funding modalities (i.e. from smaller grants to larger loans with more favorable low interest rates; for instance, facilitated through the future IFFEd), available to partner countries in their quest to access and mobilize more resources for education sector development. By filling the gap between emergency support, system reconstruction, system strengthening, and increased sector accountability, the GPE can play a bridging role between various available funding mechanisms and channels available to partner countries.

3.2 Identify bottlenecks and barriers to change during the ESA process (to be initiated as part of new ESA processes under the post-2020 strategy).

The ESA is the basis for ESP development and ultimately ESPIG application. The ESA should include an analysis of the institutional and system-level context/enabling environment in which the sector plan is to be implemented. This analysis would identify system bottlenecks and barriers to change, and distinguish pre-conditions for effective ESP implementation (including sector accountability needs and EMIS development and operationalization) from education needs.

Based on this analysis and prioritization of the identified strengths and weaknesses, quick wins can be identified for accelerated financing, and a portion of the maximum country allocation can be directed to finance system-level improvements in parallel with ESP/TEP development. This has the added advantage of reducing the time between ESA and actual funding, which helps in maintaining commitment to the overall process among country actors. Furthermore, embedding such a provision could also enable mobilizing and fast-tracking support for emerging TA needs and supporting periodic country-level monitoring processes as proposed under recommendation 2.

3.3 Prioritize (part of) GPE funding for removing system barriers in support of effective ESP implementation (as part of the ongoing strategy development process).

It is recommended to concentrate (part of) available GPE funding on addressing system bottlenecks for ESP implementation, as well as helping to build core strategic functions of the Ministry of Education. Critical elements necessary for education policy formulation and effective sector plan implementation include national and sub-national planning capacity, policy development capacity (incl. policy research, M&E), public financial management systems (incl. sectoral budgeting, expenditure management, procurement), governance and accountability processes, and national teaching force capacity.

3.4 Prioritize thematic areas for GPE support before selecting a grant agent (to be initiated as part of new ESA processes under the post-2020 strategy).

The ESP/TEP development process should be completed by a process of prioritization, in which LEGs jointly agree on the priority education needs and challenges to be addressed through a GPE grant application, keeping in mind the strategic focus of the GPE. Following this prioritization, it should be determined which grant agent has the most natural fit with this thematic area and is therefore best positioned to add value and support the partner country by overseeing the grant process, while respecting the prioritization of the partnership as a whole.

4. Improve and complement conceptual frameworks with utility-focused management tools and learning processes.

Following the 2015 interim evaluation, GPE has introduced a strategic management framework comprising a ToC and corporate RF, which have helped GPE in becoming clearer and more accountable for their ambitions and results. The ISE believes that these efforts should be taken further under the post-2020 strategy, drawing upon the success and lessons of the past. This leads to the following more specific recommendations:

4.1 Adapt the corporate ToC to reflect lessons from the past strategy period *(as part of the post-2020 strategy development process).*

The existing global ToC was GPE's first. It presents a clear and relatively straightforward logic from GPE's global efforts to improved learning outcomes and equity in education, which have served the purpose of communicating GPE's ambition and approach. Nevertheless, internal reviews and external evaluations – including this ISE – have revealed scope for further improvement that would do more justice to the complexity of GPE's work and could help in making the ToC more useful as a management tool. As such, the ISE recommends adapting the corporate ToC, taking into account the following insights gained over the past years:

- Distinguish planning from implementation, whereby implementation represents a higher results level to which inclusive monitoring and financing also contribute.
- Fill the apparent gap in GPE's causal logic between inclusive planning and implementation by referring to changes in capacity and motivation driving the behavioral change of key actors[227].
- Similarly add a results level related to public service delivery, making it easier to measure progress from system improvement (goal 3) to learning outcomes and equity (goals 1 and 2).
- Recognize and distinguish GPE's spheres of control, influence and concern to better articulate what GPE itself is accountable for and what it aims to contribute to, as this determines the nature of remedial action that GPE can take. In particular, we recommend clearly articulating the government branch that leads the LEG, which is then by definition part of GPE (as opposed to other government branches that may not be part of the LEG and within GPE's sphere of influence).
- Be more explicit about where the different GPE constituencies fit in, which can help in sharpening mutual accountability frameworks.
- Incorporate assumptions related to known relevant contextual factors and how the effects of these factors will be mitigated or monitored to enable integrating better risk management in programmatic oversight.

[227] In line with the COM-B ToC model as introduced by Mayne, J., 2016.

4.2 Develop a more complex-aware RF aligned with a revised ToC *(immediately after finalizing the post-2020 strategy).*

Although the existing RF of the GPE 2020 strategy has enabled significant progress in GPE's accountability for results, important results are not sufficiently captured by the framework. These primarily concern qualitative results like the quality of cooperation at the country level, the quality and performance of grant agents, progress in mutual accountability and progress in ESP/TEP implementation, which are not easily measured by pre-set SMART indicators. To better capture these more complex qualitative results, the ISE recommends that the Board tasks the Secretariat with developing an adapted RF that better captures the complexity of GPE's work. This can be achieved by introducing more complex-aware M&E methods like outcome mapping/harvesting, which would lead to a combination of behavior-oriented progress markers to measure changes in capacities and motivation, with a (reduced) number of key indicators. Obviously, a revision of the RF has to follow and be aligned with the revised ToC.

4.3 Ensure that GPE's (gender) equality ambitions are integrated at the operational levels of the corporate ToC and RF *(as part of the post-2020 strategy development process).*

At present, GPE's gender equality policy is reflected in a separate strategy document and its intended outcome and output-level results are not included and measured as integrated part of GPE's RF. This separation does not help the implementation of the gender strategy as part of GPE's core strategy. The ISE therefore recommends that the Board considers any 'equality' related strategy as an integrated part of its new post-2020 strategy. Following this, we would recommend integrating relevant (gender) equality results at the outcome and output level in the RF to ensure that progress towards these results is tracked and reported upon as part of GPE's core results.

4.4 Strengthen joint learning processes at the global and country level *(to be initiated in the first year of the post-2020 strategy).*

GPE's M&E strategy aims at stimulating *learning and improved performance* across the partnership as one of its three purposes. Improved performance requires new insights to be translated into practice, although many of the valuable M&E insights have not (yet) been translated into action due to time constraints or because this was not deliberately aimed for. The ISE therefore recommends that a future M&E strategy is more explicit about the specific learning purpose of its diverse M&E interventions. In addition, it is suggested to agree upon a more deliberate periodic reflection and learning process at both the global and country level to ensure that the benefits of GPE's extensive M&E efforts are fully utilized throughout the partnership.

For such learning processes to be effective, a deliberate prioritized learning agenda needs to be set, reflecting the learning interests of the targeted 'learners' and audience. The available M&E results – as reflected in the annual results reports, the CLE synthesis report and this ISE report – provide ample information to set such a prioritized agenda.

Finally, the ISE recommends that the Board treats learning results as core element of GPE's achievement, which means incorporating learning results in terms of changed practices and procedures in the corporate RF.

5. Implications for the Board and Secretariat to improve Organizational Effectiveness.

In the ToC, GPE primarily pursues organizational effectiveness under the global objective of building a stronger partnership on which GPE has overachieved according to its own targets. At the same time, it is recognized that these targets do not sufficiently cover the qualitative aspects of the partnership's cooperation and performance, and hence scope for improved partnership management arrangements remains. Organizational effectiveness is largely determined by the combined performance of the Board, its sub-committees, the LEGs and the Secretariat, which are the means towards development effectiveness. These final ISE recommendations are therefore phrased as 'implications for the Board and Secretariat' to illustrate that we consider these as means to enable the successful implementation of the earlier-mentioned recommendations.

5.1 Implications for the Board (to be initiated as part of the upcoming governance review and ongoing post-2020 strategy development process).

The ISE recommends that the Board concentrates more deliberately on the 'what' and 'why' of GPE, empowering the Secretariat to take charge of and report on the 'how'. This implies among others that the Board should formulate and approve GPE's strategy – including the ToC – sets GPE's ambition level in terms of inclusiveness, determine country allocations, and only be involved in the approval of large higher-risk grants that hold strategic importance to the GPE. Furthermore, this would imply a continuation of the already-initiated process of delegating grant approval to the GPC and the Secretariat, with the aim of gradually freeing up time in the GPC to reflect on grant performance rather than grant approval.

This also means that the Board's involvement in revising the RF is focused on the formulation of key performance questions that this framework needs to help answer. In addition, the Board would have to use emerging M&E information to prioritize GPE's learning needs in the shape of a periodic (annual) learning agenda. Besides, the Board would empower the Secretariat to ensure the accelerated implementation of the EPR and GPSP and similar interventions, which address many of the operational challenges that the GPE is facing.


As part of the upcoming governance review, the ISE also recommends that the Board reviews the costs and benefits of having five standing committees that have rather different and fluctuating workloads but all regularly meet and require frequent Secretariat support. Following this, the Board may conclude that a different combination of standing committees and ad-hoc working groups is advisable. In this, it remains important that competent constituent representatives address emerging issues of strategic importance, advised and supported by Secretariat staff as needed.

5.2 Implications for the Secretariat (to be initiated as part of the upcoming governance review process).

In the light of the Secretariat's current thinking about organizational reform, the ISE recommends explicitly reconfirming the centrality of supporting in-country grant management and partnership facilitation processes as the Secretariat's primary process, with all other processes in support of or overseeing this. In line with this, we recommend that the Secretariat recognizes the distinct system and competency requirements of its fund management (e.g. financial administration, risk and compliance) and partnership facilitation functions (e.g. country support, partnership management,

governance) and organizes itself accordingly. In addition, we suggest developing and managing separate work streams for mobilizing new partners and optimizing the contribution of existing ones. Finally, we recommend that the Secretariat prioritizes *utility* over *specificity* in developing its guidelines and support, allowing more time and space for adaptations at the country level.

The ISE realizes that these proposed implications are more about adapting practices and behavior than about procedures. Such adaptations start from deliberate decisions but require a carefully-designed and facilitated internal transition process to have a good chance of success.



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Independent Summative Evaluation of the Global Partnership for Education 2020

Annexes to the Final Report

AUTHORS:

Mike Zuijderduijn
Irma Alpenidze
Giorgio Ferrari
Roy Carr Hill
Olaf Kooijmans
René Vermeulen
Nadine Bergmann

MDF Training & Consultancy

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Annex One: Methodological approach for Development Effectiveness

Under development effectiveness, the following issues will be subjected to further investigation:

- ESP implementation
- LEG effectiveness
- GPE's role in domestic and international financing for education
- Efficiency in the allocation and use of GPE grant funds

ESP implementation

The interim report showed that GPE support has helped countries to achieve good progress in ESP plan development, although ESP implementation remains a serious concern and it has been hampered by a range of contextual factors.

A further country-level evaluations (CLEs) synthesis even more recently summarized what is known about the generic factors that appear to have affected ESP implementation, positively when present and adversely when absent. These factors include:[1]

- Alignment behind ESP
- Sufficiency of funding for ESP
- Quality of coordination at the central level
- Realistic results framework
- Sense of relevance of ESP
- Implementation capacity

In theory, there might be other education sector-specific factors that explain relatively slow progress towards more efficient and effective implementation. It could be the case that some parts of the education system are more difficult to reform, some interventions more difficult to implement, and some reforms not appropriate to the context and generating a push back. Education-specific factors include the number and geographical distribution of primary schools (service delivery points), the number of pre-schools, the appropriateness of the general curriculum for the population, the inclusiveness of education policy, the strength of teachers' unions, the culture of learning and specifically the influence of language and religion, the comprehensiveness and quality of teacher training, the reliability of EMIS, and cultural norms.

The GPE ToC considers ESP implementation, of which only a small part is financed by education sector program implementation grants (ESPIGs), as crucial for making progress towards more efficient and effective education systems. Therefore, the ISE intends to explore the determinants of ESP implementation beyond the six factors already identified, as well as exploring which combinations of factors have contributed to successful ESP implementation in which contexts.

[1] Marie-Hélène Adrien, M. (2019). GPE Country Level Evaluations 2017-2020 - Years 2 and 3 Strategic Learning Workshop to inform the final Synthesis report & discuss implications for the new GPE Strategic Plan.

Text box 1 presents first insights generated by a review of the literature that the Results & Performance team of GPE considered most relevant for setting an analytical framework exploring ESP implementation. The ISE will follow up on this in phase 2 with a more extensive review of the academic literature.

Textbox 1. A quick glance at the recent literature on the effectiveness of education sector reforms

A new insight has recently emerged that given the strong heterogeneity of results of meta-analyses of educational interventions, impacts of education interventions cannot be generalized, and researchers should focus on investigating the sources of this heterogeneity rather than trying to identify which interventions work.[2] In recognition of this, the literature has shown an interest in understanding the operation of the education system as a functioning whole of interconnected parts. Pritchett (2015)[3] focused on the four design elements of accountability (delegation, financing, information, and motivation) to emphasize that effectiveness in promoting learning requires systems of education that are coherent both among the four elements and among the different actors involved, rather than single interventions.

In terms of diagnostic of education systems, three leading methodologies are available internationally that provide sector-wide data and have been objects of benchmarking: the Education Sector Analytical Guidelines (ESA), General Education Quality Analysis Framework (GEQAF), and the Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER).[4] Most (all) of these tools review the state of the education system or the quality of education policies and framework, with a "missing middle" in between. Tools that review policy quality stop short in reviewing how the policy was implemented and tools that review the state of the system do not focus on the process of how these changes were made possible through the (selective) implementation of policy and plans.

ESP implementation is a primarily government-led and public policy process that concerns the capacity of the Ministry of Education to obtain the resources included in the sector-wide plan from the Ministry of Finance, prepare the regulatory and managerial changes called for by the plan, manage executing entities and service providers in executing actions that require building infrastructures or procuring inputs (public contracting authorities, private companies implementing parts of the plan, etc.) and facilitating front-line providers (teachers, principals, and headmasters) in adopting the actions and

[2] See for example: World Bank (2018). World Development Report 2018 - LEARNING to Realize Education's Promise. [online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2018 and RISE (2015). CREATING EDUCATION SYSTEMS COHERENT FOR LEARNING OUTCOMES. RISE Working Paper. [online] Available at: https://www.riseprogramme.org/publications/rise-working-paper-15005-creating-education-systems-coherent-learning-outcomes Masset W. (2019) Impossible generalizations: meta-analyses of education interventions in international development RISE Conference

[3] Pritchett, L. (2014). The Risks to Education Systems from Design Mismatch and Global Isomorphism. Center for International Development (CID) Working Paper No. 277. [online] Center for International Development at Harvard University. Available at: https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1044

[4] For a study that benchmarked the three frameworks, see: Faul, M., Savage, L. and Martinez, R. (n.d.). Education System Diagnostics - What is an 'education system diagnostic', why might it be useful, and what currently exists. SABER: Eliriqsousi, M. and Eliriqsousi, M. (2020). SABER Systems Approach for Better Education Results - Home. [online] Saber.worldbank.org. Available at: http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm GEQAF: International Bureau of Education. (2020). General Education Quality Analysis Framework (GEQAF) Initiative. [online] Available at: http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/activity/general-education-quality-analysis-framework-geqaf-initiative ESA: Globalpartnership.org. (2020). Methodological Guidelines for Education Sector Analysis. Volume 1. [online] Available at: https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/methodological-guidelines-education-sector-analysis-volume-1

reforms included in the plan. Connected to this, implementing an ESP does not involve implementing any useful action in reforming education systems, but rather implementing the actions called and budgeted for in the ESP.

The ISE will capture the results of ESP implementation in consideration of the following questions:

- How many of the actions included in the plan have been executed?
- Was the plan executed on time?
- Which parts of the plan have been executed?
- With what quality were such parts implemented?
- By whom was it implemented?

The ISE will follow up exploring which factors contributed to the particular level of achievement in ESP implementation and/or prevented a higher level of achievement. The proposed analytical framework makes sense of different contributing factors to ESP implementing, which ensures capturing GPE's contribution as well as most other factors in the wider national, regional, local, and education sector context.

First, the evaluation team will look at **GPE contribution and other donors' contributions** (to the extent that the CLEs report this information). The evaluation will explore the extent to which ESPIGs and other GPE interventions helped/hindered ESP implementation. The evaluation team will take into account the fact that ESPIGs are a very small part of total financing for education in many cases, and that GPE routinely employs a broader array of instruments (in partial combination), including advocacy, support for civil society, participation in dialog, and technical capacity building. The ISE will not be able to capture contributions from other donors unless these are already captured in the CLEs or programmatic evaluations.

Second, the evaluation team will look at the **other factors influencing ESP implementation at the levels of the state (cabinet/inter-ministerial), sector ministry, executive agencies of the ministry, and front-line implementing actors**. These factors include proximate causes of ESP implementation, in the sense that they reflect direct causes for why parts of the ESP have been implemented or not (availability and use of finance, technical capacity, leadership, information sharing, capacity to contract and manage executing agencies, unexpected events, etc.). They will also include the political economy determinants of ESP implementation, such as the structural factors that contribute to the actors in the system having this specific implementation capacity, resources, and willingness to implement with, include and collaborate with other actors (such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, decentralized bodies, cabinet, teachers, teachers' unions, contractual authorities In the government, private sector, etc.).

Third, the evaluation team will explore **the possibility that the overall coherence of the system rather than specific contributing factors explains ESP implementation**. Following recent literature, if the system for implementing government policies and plans is not functioning as a whole, then additional individual interventions might be ineffective.

The ISE will employ an analytical approach to identify incoherencies in the system that RISE originally developed bearing in mind changes in learning outcomes, which will be re-focused to explaining

outcomes in terms of ESP implementation.[5] Table 1 below presents the sub-questions to be addressed under this area of investigation along with the essentials of our methodological approach.

Table 1. Issue 1 - ESP Implementation

What explains the apparent limited ESP implementation? Links to objective 1 – 3 of GPE's ToC	
Sub-questions	Essential methodological approach and data collection
1. What explains the geographic variation in ESP implementation? 2. How do success/fail factors play out in different contexts? 3. What is needed to put these key success factors in place?	The evaluation team will use the 28 CLEs, programmatic evaluations, and wider academic literature on ESP implementation as the main sources of information. For each country, the evaluation team will reconstruct the following: (a) Level of implementation of the ESP, capturing information on what has been achieved, by whom (which of the actors), and how (fully achieved, partially achieved, and additional information on quality when available) for all 28 CLEs. (b) Contribution factors to ESP implementation, using CLEs, programmatic evaluations, and the broader academic and practitioner literature: • Factors connected to the GPE intervention, such as the role of the ESPIG and other GPE interventions (support for civil society, advocacy, technical capacity, contribution to dialog and monitoring of the plan). • Other factors that the sources claim to have influenced ESP implementation. The factors will be organized as belonging to the different levels and interactions: state (cabinet and inter-ministerial level), sector ministry, executing agents of the ministry, and the front-line implementing actors'. The academic sources will help us to explore the political and economic determinants of the proximate causes of ESP implementation. • Factors related to system coherence (the extent to which the system is wired towards the effective implementation of government education policy and plans). The evaluation team will conduct interviews with all relevant country lead evaluators in the Universalia consortium. It will explore whether the lead evaluators recognize the main explanations emerging from the desk review and if they wish to add or rectify the information. The evaluation team will conduct additional remote interviews with additional stakeholders only for those cases in which findings are very surprising and potentially useful. In this case, it will contact interviews with GPE country leads (and/or other Secretariat staff who might be relevant by topic), the partner government focal point (or other relevant key stakeholders such as the Directorate of Basic Education or the Education Planning Department), the coordinating agency (or the grant agent, as a representative of the international actors), and a representative of civil society. The ISE will conduct a contribution analysis to explain what contributed to ESP implementation in a particular country, triangulating all sources (or using sources already containing triangulated information).

[5] RISE (2015). CREATING EDUCATION SYSTEMS COHERENT FOR LEARNING OUTCOMES. RISE Working Paper. [online] Available at: https://www.riseprogramme.org/publications/rise-working-paper-15005-creating-education-systems-coherent-learning-outcomes [Accessed 15 Jan. 2020].

	It will then summarize the contribution analyses in a table for a cross-case comparison of country-level contribution stories. This will enable proposing conclusions about why certain GPE interventions worked in some cases and not in others, and report which combination of GPE and non-GPE contribution factors have been associated with success/failure across countries.

LEG effectiveness

The inception report found that LEGs have been particularly instrumental in stimulating a more inclusive dialog during ESP development and the ESPIG application process, which have influenced the quality of the resulting planning documents. However, it also reports that maintaining the LEG as an active and effective partnership platform during ESP implementation has proven more difficult.

The inception report also found that LEGs appear in many different shapes and perform with different levels of success. Efforts particularly concerning the Effective Partnership Review (EPR) have been devoted to studying the effectiveness of country-level arrangements, which has led to the formulation of LEG self-assessment guidelines and seven LEG principles[6]. These principles constitute dimensions that capture whether LEGs are functioning well or not:

- LEGs have a clear mandate and function
- Relevant stakeholders participate and engage
- LEGs have clear governance arrangements
- LEGs have robust working practices
- Participants are mutually accountable based on transparency
- Government leads and owns the dialog
- The LEG hosts healthy partnership dynamics

LEGs are central in achieving GPE's country-level objectives. Therefore, the ISE intends to explore in greater depth what contributes to LEG's performance, as well as why some approaches to working with and in LEGs have worked in some contexts but not others.

The proposed framework captures contribution factors to LEG performance:

- **Proximate reasons for LEG performance being (or not) in line with the seven principles of LEGs performance** (for example, the fact that the coordinating agent employed an education expert rather than a generalist staff). **This also includes the contribution of GPE own interventions**
- **Reasons for LEGs performance that are connected to the ecosystem in which they operate.** For example, many countries have had coordination mechanisms that precede their engagement with GPE. It becomes important to understand the extent to which GPE has imposed something from outside to meet its requirements rather than utilizing, building on, or adapting something that already existed. Alternatively, in some countries the space for civil society is limited.

Table 2 presents the sub-questions to be addressed under this area of investigation, along with the essentials of our methodological approach.

Table 2. Issue 2 - LEG Effectiveness

What explains the difference in LEG set-up, operations and reported performance and how does this influence LEG effectiveness in particular during ESP implementation? Links to objective 2 of GPE's ToC	
Sub-questions	Essential methodological approach and data collection

[6] Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Principles towards effective local education groups. Working Paper. Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Local education group Self-assessment. ppt.

1. How relevant is the LEG in the ecosystems of dialog on education? 2. Which factors explain the diversity in LEG performance? Do these confirm those that are already established and what causes such factors? 3. How do LEGs compare in shaping and performance with country-level multi-stakeholder platforms of other global partnerships?	First, we will reconfirm what GPE considers as the main purpose of the LEG, and what it ideally looks like and delivers. This will entail systematizing the findings and definitions contained in the ERP and the LEG effectiveness principle into a working framework.[7] Second, the ISE will collect information on which other education sector fora exist in the country and what makes them different/similar to the LEG (who participates, with what aims, when, etc.). Third, the ISE will collate information on the LEG's performance in each country using the 28 CLEs, reporting information against the LEG principles (to the extent that such information is available). Fourth, the ISE will collect the claims about contribution to LEG performance from CLEs and the wider academic literature. It will classify contributions as: • Contribution connected to GPE intervention (the Secretariat, coordinating agency (CA), etc., and what they did to contribute). • Other proximate determinants to LEG performance around the seven principles of LEG effectiveness. For example, the personal quality of some LEG participants, the resources available for participating, or the procedures and rules adopted for the LEG. • Other political and economic determinants of LEG performance. The ISE will complement the desk research with interviews with all relevant country lead evaluators from the Universalia consortium, exploring whether the lead evaluators recognize the main explanations emerging from the desk review and if they wish to add or rectify the information. The ISE will conduct additional remote interviews with additional stakeholders only where initial findings are very surprising and potentially useful. In this case, it will contact the GPE country leads (or other Secretariat staff who might be relevant by topic), the partner government focal point (or other relevant key stakeholders such as the Directorate of Basic Education or the Education Planning Department), the CA (or the grant agent, as representative of the international actors), and a representative of civil society. The analysis will include: • A contribution analysis to explain what contributed to LEG performance in a particular country, triangulating all sources (or using sources already containing triangulated information). • Tabulating summary information from the contribution analyses for a cross-case comparison of contribution stories. This will enable proposing conclusions about why certain GPE interventions worked in some cases and not in others, as well as reporting which combination of GPE and non-GPE contribution factors have been associated with success/failure across countries. • Benchmarking the experience of LEG performance with the performance of other country-level multi-stakeholder platforms (using the information collected under section 3.4 later and the benchmarking approach explained there).

[7] Oxford Policy Management. 2018. Examination of Key Actors' Roles in GPE'S Country-Level Operational Model. Final Report Volume I – Main Report. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management, and Global Partnership for Education (n.d.). Principles towards effective local education groups. Working Paper.

GPE's role in domestic and international financing for education

The GPE 2019 Results Report indicates that national budget commitments remained stable between 2015 and 2017, while international funding has increased again since 2016 after years of decline. During the Dakar financing conference, developing country partners (DCPs) as well as an increasingly diverse group of donors made pledges for the 2018-2020 period that are larger than ever before.

However, sizable education funding gaps still remain, while a significant number of donors have reduced funding. Furthermore, achieving alignment and harmonization of funding remains a challenge, together with minimizing the risk of fungibility, substitution, and diversion of funds to unintended purposes. Several GPE reports provide information about the range of funding trends and further insights concerning the amount, diversity, alignment, and harmonization of financing.

The ISE intends to explore in further depth the factors affecting these education funding trends from 2011 onwards (i.e. to gain a comprehensive picture as from the year that EFA-FTI transitioned to GPE), considering the broader global aid architecture in the education sector. A better understanding of the factors behind the observed funding trends may help in finding ways to reinforce positive trends and counter negative trends, and particularly clarify the role that GPE can play in the international aid architecture for education. Table 3 presents the sub-questions to be addressed under this area of investigation, along with the essentials of our methodological approach.

Table 3. Issue 3 – GPE's Role in Domestic and International Financing for Education

What explains the main trends in international and domestic financing? Links to objective 4 of GPE's ToC?	
Sub-questions	**Essential methodological approach and data collection**
1. What are the main trends in both the volume and 'quality' of funding since 2011 in domestic and international financing for the education sector and GPE?	Comprehensive mapping of funding commitments made to education development from the international development partner community and domestic/national financing sources. The trend analysis will draw from available literature and information (e.g. OECD, UNESCO) and synthesize GPE Results Reports, CLEs and GPE financial data to map out and confirm key trends and establish a factual basis of GPE receipts and contributions to DCPs.
2. What causes DCPs to commit more or less domestic financing to education? 3. Why are traditional donors committing more or fewer funds to education as a whole and GPE in particular? 4. What level of non-traditional sources of funding, e.g. from the private sector and philanthropic organizations, has been made available to GPE?	The trend analysis provides a starting point to further assess the 'quality' of funding and reasons for DCPs, traditional donors and non-traditional donors to increase or reduce their educational financing. This assessment includes trend analysis of GPE's funding streams per donor, by drawing on information contained in GPE Replenishment Reports, GPE Portfolio Reviews (2016-2019), and interviews with GPE Secretariat's staff (e.g. external relations team) to understand GPE's role and contribution regarding the trends.
5. To what extent is the GPE complementary to other multi-donor education funding mechanisms?	Subsequently, we conduct an analysis of GPE's complementarity within the overall aid architecture to education through a mapping study of different education development funds and major donor agencies.

	Based on publicly-available information about strategies, policies, programs from selected funds and donor agencies (e.g. ECW, WB, EU, ADB), we review the role of GPE in the international aid architecture for education by assessing of areas of overlap and complementarity (e.g. countries coverage, priority sub-sectors, or development context) between GPE and other major donors and funding mechanisms.
6. Why does the alignment and harmonization of funding in education remain a challenge?	Desktop study on international aid architecture to education, and the harmonization and alignment of funding. The observations from previous steps will be synthesized and triangulated with results from a literature review about the key challenges in harmonizing and aligning funding of education.
7. To what extent and how can GPE influence those explanatory factors and to what extent is this in line with GPE's current advocacy efforts for more and better financing?	Finally, to determine the potential role of GPE for more and better financing, we will conduct a qualitative contribution analysis of GPE's advocacy efforts and funding-related decision-making of donors and DCPs, including the leveraging of funding by GPE. Interviews are foreseen with GPE Secretariat staff (e.g. external relations team). The findings will be analyzed in light of GPE's advocacy efforts for resource mobilization over the past three years to determine the (strength in) causality between GPE's advocacy efforts and funding-related decision-making of donors and DCPs, including the leveraging of funding by GPE.

Efficiency in the GPE grant allocation and disbursement process

Stage 1 of the ISE did not yet include a comprehensive portfolio review, whereby we mapped the use of GPE funds in terms of DCP distribution, distribution among sub-sectors, the time lapse from identification to grants' application preparation and submission, appraisal, actual commitment and disbursement, and fund allocation versus ESPIG implementation rate.

Mapping out GPE's portfolio in this way as a basis for an input-output, cost-effectiveness and/or value for money analysis provides a solid foundation to assess whether the overall GPE grant application and grant disbursement process enable GPE to make the best use of the funds at its disposal. Table 4 presents the sub-questions to be addressed under this area of investigation, along with the essentials of our methodological approach.

Table 4. Issue 4 - Efficiency in the GPE Grant Allocation and Disbursement Process

To what extent has GPE been making the best use of the funding at its disposal?	
Sub-questions	**Essential methodological approach and data collection**
1. What are the differences in the timeframes between DCPs' grant applications, approval and actual disbursements by GPE, and what explains these differences?	To assess the efficiency of the GPE grant application and disbursement process, we start with a mapping of the portfolio of commitments in terms of country allocations (e.g. maximum country allocations), types of grants, grant agents (GAs), and status of implementation of the ESP development grant or ESP implementation grant (i.e. to link country performance to country allocation). The core of the analysis will take the form of a review to track the grant (management) process efficiency from the moment grant application until actual disbursement of the funds and use for a particular education development issue. This will include a process analysis of GPE grant applications, grant approval, and grant disbursement process, resulting in an assessment of the timing and intervals of DCP grant applications, grant approval, and actual grant disbursement. Based on this assessment, we

	construct a time lapse for selected DCPs to explain differences in processing. The main information sources used for this analysis include GPE financial data on grant applications and disbursement, GPE Country Level Evaluation Reports, GPE Grant Performance Reports, documented experiences and interviews with GPE staff engaged in the Grant Streamlining Project. A particular topic of interest will be analyzing experiences in relation to the results-based disbursement of grant allocations.
2. What is the role of the GAs in facilitating the development and implementation of ESPDGs and ESPIGs?	Assessment of the role of GAs in facilitating the grant application process, country allocation, and actual grant disbursements. For the assessment, we draw on information contained in the GPE Country Level Evaluation Reports, the GPE Financing and Funding Framework (incl. results-based component), Grant Streamlining Project, and interviews to be conducted with GPE Secretariat staff (e.g. country support team).
3. To what extent do other entities (such as LEGs, CAs, beneficiary governments, or civil society organizations) facilitate the grant development and implementation process?	Assessment of the role of LEGs, CAs, country governments, and civil society in facilitating the grant application and implementation process. For the assessment, we draw on information contained in the GPE Country Level Evaluation Reports, the GPE Financing and Funding Framework (incl. results-based component), Grant Streamlining Project, and interviews to be conducted with GPE Secretariat staff (e.g. country support team).
4. How do procedures and practices of other global funds for allocating and disbursing grants compare with GPE and what can be learned from this for GPE?	Drawing from available literature and evaluation studies about comparable partnership funding arrangements and donor agencies, and a review of the mechanics included in the recently-adopted GPE Financing and Funding Framework (incl. results-based financing component), we conduct a comparative desk study on grant application, grant approval, and grant disbursement procedures of other major global funds (for example, Education Cannot Wait, International Financing Facility for Education, or other thematic funds such as Green Climate Fund or the Global Environment Facility, where appropriate). The findings will be complemented with interviews with GPE Secretariat staff (e.g. Grant Streamlining Project, Finance team).

Annex Two: Methodological approach for Organizational Effectiveness

Under organization effectiveness, the following issues will be subjected to further investigation:

- The functionality of GPE's conceptual framework
- GPE's performance in M&E
- Fit-for-purpose governance and management arrangements
- Overall health of the partnership

Functionality of GPE's conceptual frameworks

GPE's conceptual thinking is reflected in a number of frameworks and models, most notably in its global[8] ToC and its operational model, the Country Planning Cycle[9]. While the intended purpose and logic of these frameworks have become clear, ISE stage 1 could not (yet) ascertain the extent to which these purposes were actually being met. In addition, equity and gender equality has been positioned as a critical component of the GPE's Strategic Plan 2016-2020 and translated into the Gender Equality Policy and Strategy 2016-2020[10]. Therefore, ISE stage 2 will have to reflect on how this strategy have been supportive of the aforementioned frameworks mainstreaming gender issues and the extent to which this has been achieved.

In addition, as captured in the interim report, it is recognized that achieving an agreement in the Board about these conceptual frameworks has required a challenging multi-stakeholder process, which has not necessarily led to the best framework but rather one that is a widely-accepted compromise. The ISE has been requested by IEC (in an earlier round of comments) not only to review the perceived usefulness and use of the frameworks but also to share its own expert opinion about their quality. While commenting on ToC, the ISE intends to rely on the publication of Mayne (2015)[11] outlining models for ToCs and their development, which have proven useful for both straightforward and more complex interventions. For assessing the Country Planning Cycle and the Gender Equality Policy and Strategy 2016–2020, ISE phase 2 will draw heavily on the opinions of GPE stakeholders about their usefulness for the intended purposes.

Table 5 presents the sub-questions to be addressed under this area of investigation, along with the essentials of our methodological approach.

Table 5. Question 5 - Functionality of GPE's Conceptual Frameworks

To what extent have GPE's conceptual frameworks (notably Global ToC, the Country Planning Cycle) served their purpose? In other words, what can be said about the quality, use and usefulness of these frameworks for the intended users?	
Sub-questions	Essential methodological approach and data collection
1. What purposes do GPE's conceptual frameworks	The desk study part of ISE phase 2 will start to reconfirm the formal intended purposes and main users of the ToC and operational model.

[8] https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/gpe-2020-theory-change
[9] https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QPLIke8xa1oJ:https://www.globalpartnership.org/what-we-do/education-sector-planning+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=nl&client=firefox-b-e
[10] https://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/2017-05-gpe-gender-equality-at-a-glance.pdf
[11] Mayne, John. (2015). Useful Theory of Change Models. Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation. 30. 10.3138/cjpe.30.2.142.

serve and to what extent are these purposes clear to the intended users? 2. To what extent do these frameworks reflect the latest insights in terms of partnership design? 3. To what extent have these frameworks been used by the intended users, and considered useful in light of their intended purposes?	Subsequently, we will interview these users about their understanding, use, perceived usefulness, and user-friendliness (incl. perceived cost benefit) of these frameworks. At the same time, interviewees will be asked for suggestions for improvement. In addition, the ISE will review the frameworks based on their own expertise and experience with ToC development, which is intended to be more than a results framework but rather reflects the 'mental model' of an organization,[12] taking into account the nature and complexity of GPE's ambitions[13]. In terms of data collection, this implies a short desk study and interviews with designers and intended users, including Board (all constituencies), Secretariat (all teams), and selected GAs/CAs. Structured findings combined with the ISE's own analytical observations will serve as an input for a participatory sense-making workshop (April 2020), whereby Secretariat staff and SIC members can jointly validate and analyze findings, aiming to derive specific, prioritized, and widely-supported ideas for improvement. The interviewees will be selected as the result of the process whereby the ISE team requests from the Secretariat lists of users of GPE conceptual frameworks and upon their receipt makes a selection to ensure equal representation of key stakeholder groups in the final list of respondents. This will be done in consultation with IEC team.

GPE's performance in M&E

The deskwork in stage 1 of the ISE showed that GPE's M&E strategy has largely been implemented according to plan, resulting in the wealth of M&E information that GPE has collected and publicly reported upon. This illustrates that the four workstreams of the M&E strategy have been implemented to extensively cover the demand for M&E information, largely meeting its accountability purpose, namely (1) results monitoring, (2) grant monitoring, (3) evaluation, and (4) dissemination and learning. The ISE interim report furthermore recognized the carefully-considered constellation of GPE's results framework, as the product of a challenging process to reach a widely-agreed measurement framework for GPE's achievements. The ISE has also made a number of observations related to the quality of this results framework and its 37 indicators as well as country-level evaluations (CLEs). Finally, the ISE phase 1 has recognized the importance of GPE M&E information, particularly in terms of the Secretariat offering an analysis of progress and achievement to the Board and its sub-committees to inform their decision-making.

[12] This includes reasoning backward from desired long-term goals, outlining the organization's conceptual thinking in terms of causal changes resulting in outcome pathways starting from the organization's interventions (within its sphere of control) to its long-term goals (sphere of concern). The ToC framework illustrates the logical relationship and expected chronological flow of changes that are required for the longer-term goals to be realized. The ToC is also explicit about its key assumptions, illustrating why (based on what logic and evidence) the organization believes that A indeed will contribute to B.

[13] Anticipated results can be of varied levels of complexity. Complex results relate to changes that are difficult to predict in terms of how, when and where they will manifest themselves, and often they will not follow from a singular linear process. This unpredictability and non-linearity pose challenges for the M&E framework, which needs to be sufficiently flexible to capture relevant changes that matter, even if they were not foreseen or manifest themselves at an unforeseen time or scale.

What has not become clear yet is the extent to which the provision of M&E information adequately responds to the needs for M&E information. For example, do the M&E efforts result in information that is of sufficient quality (i.e. valid, timely, understandable, and comprehensive) to meet the information needs of its intended users at both the global and country level? Therefore, ISE stage 2 intends to further explore the extent to which the M&E strategy has in particular served its intended purposes of (a) stimulating learning, (b) improved performance and (c) facilitating decision-making among Board, Secretariat and national stakeholders.

For this purpose, this investigation will search for additional evidence of M&E information being utilized by its intended users at the global and country levels and their perception of M&E information usefulness for set purposes: GPE's learning, improved performance and decision-making. ISE will further assess the underlying factors that explain the degree of usefulness of GPE's M&E information (e.g. high/low quality of design, implementation, user-friendliness of reporting, etc.).

Table 6 presents the sub-questions to be addressed under this area of investigation, along with the essentials of our methodological approach.

Table 6. Issue 6 - GPE's Performance in M&E

To what extent has GPE's M&E performance served the purposes of its M&E strategy at the global and country level[14] by providing timely, sound, reliable and utility-focused insights into GPE's progress towards providing quality and equal education in line with its 2020 strategic plan?	
Sub-questions	Essential methodological approach and data collection
1. To what extent do GPE's M&E frameworks reflect the latest insights in terms of M&E framework design and implementation? 2. To what extent has M&E information been used by its intended users and considered useful in light of its intended purposes? 3. What causes explain the (lack of) use and level of satisfaction with the current M&E result? 4. How does GPE's M&E performance compare with that of other global partnerships?	The ISE will first define the criteria against which the GPE's results framework (including indicators) will be looked at. To define these criteria, the ISE will conduct a short desk study to compile latest standards outlined by recognized relevant international organizations such as OECD (e.g. Handbook for Internationally Comparative Education Statistics), UNESCO IIEP (e.g. a brief on developing a monitoring framework[15]) and others. Once the criteria are agreed, the interview questions will be designed and interviewees will be selected. The ISE will start with interviews with key people involved in the design and implementation of the results framework and other tools to obtain M&E information most relevant to the education sector, and M&E experts in the education sector. Subsequently, the ISE will undertake interviews with intended users including the Board (all constituencies), Secretariat (beyond R&P teams), selected GAs and CAs, and educational policy experts to assess the demand, reach and use of M&E information at the country level. This will be undertaken by workstream/tool: (1) results reports, (2) grant reporting, (3) CLEs, thematic and programmatic evaluations, and (4) other evaluation products and information generated through M&E activities for learning purposes. Finally, the ISE will conduct benchmarking (desk study of published M&E plans and reports and interviews with M&E officers) with comparable partnerships on the shaping and use of their M&E frameworks, devoting due attention to the difference between the education sector and other sectors.

[14] Accountability, learning and facilitation of decision-making of Board, Secretariat and national stakeholders.
[15] Learningportal.iiep.unesco.org. (2020). Developing a monitoring framework | Unesco IIEP Learning Portal. [online] Available at: https://learningportal.iiep.unesco.org/en/issue-briefs/monitor-learning/developing-a-monitoring-framework-0 [Accessed 15 Jan. 2020].

Fit-for-purpose governance and management arrangements

The ISE is expected to assess GPE's current governance and management arrangements as a basis for providing inputs to GPE's post-2020 strategy development process. As structure follows strategy, in Stage 1 the ISE recognized the GPE's proposed strategic shifts, whereby GPE aspires to become a country-focused, agile partnership adapting its operations to different country contexts.

In doing so, GPE faces typical partnership challenges at the global and country level that are partly being addressed through the EPR process. These include bridging the gap from planning to implementation caused by insufficient country ownership, weak mutual accountability, collective action problem, linking global to local partnership, high transaction costs, combining fund management with partnership facilitation, etc.

To complement ongoing efforts, the ISE intends to undertake a systematic benchmarking exercise with four to five other global partnerships. This benchmarking will help to generate insights into how GPE's governance arrangements compare with others in dealing with the aforementioned typical global partnership challenges. Table 7 below presents the sub-questions to be addressed under this area of investigation, along with the essentials of our methodological approach.

Table 7. Issue 7 - Fit-for-Purpose Governance Arrangements

How fit for purpose are GPE's current governance arrangements in light of its future strategy of being an agile, flexible, evidence-based and contextually relevant partnership?	
Sub-questions	Essential methodological approach and data collection
1. How do other comparable global partnership organize themselves in dealing with typical global partnership challenges (incl. bridging from planning to implementation, country ownership, mutual accountability, combining fund with partnership management)? 2. How does this affect their performance and what lessons can GPE draw from the practices of other global partnerships? 3. To what extent do these arrangements fit GPE and the education sector? 4. What lessons can GPE draw from the arrangements and experiences of others that	In consultation with the IEC, four international partnerships have been selected for this benchmarking exercise: 1. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), 2. Global Environment Facility (GEF), 3. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund), 4. Green Climate Fund (GCF) These four have been selected from a larger range of global partnerships[16] based on the criteria of comparable in scale and maturity, dealing with similar partnership challenges (notably combining fund management with partnership dynamics), bringing together multiple constituencies, having different hosts, having a sector focus, using different governance models, and the availability of recent external evaluations. GCF, Gavi, GEF and the Global Fund are mature global partnerships with significant fund management responsibilities that are comparable to GPE in terms of age and scale. The constituency base of GEF and GCF in terms of voting Board representation is different as it is limited to the member states. The Global Fund and Gavi are more issue- rather than sector-based. These partnerships all face governance challenges similar to GPE but are sufficiently diverse to provide insights into relevant alternative governance arrangements. The ISE will now have to ascertain the willingness of the other partnerships to be included in this benchmarking exercise. Once agreed, the benchmark study will start with a desk study, particularly reviewing

[16] The ISE acknowledges that the pool of global partnerships is large, making it impossible to systematically review the entire pool as a basis for selection. Instead, known global partnerships have been compared with the selection criteria to derive a small sample that is sufficiently comparable with the GPE to serve as a benchmark.

may inspire its own governance arrangements at the global and/or country level?	publicly-available documents including charters, conceptual and M&E frameworks and evaluation reports. In doing so, the ISE will in particular look at their global- and country-level governance arrangements (linked to Issue 2 on LEG effectiveness). In addition, we will map how they address typical partnership challenges, such as: • Stimulating government ownership/leadership. • Moving from policy-making to implementation. • Motivating collective action and mutual accountability. • Translating global arrangements/principles into local structures and action. • Combining solid fund management with creating a vibrant partnership. This mapping is combined with an assessment of what appears to work well and less well (i.e. effect on their performance), what is context- and sector-specific and what is not. This in turn will help to identify relevant lessons for GPE, ideally leading to a range of options/scenarios that could be applied to GPE (with pros and cons), which can be reviewed during a sense-making exercise. Following the desk study, a range of interviews are foreseen with key staff of those partnerships, including Secretariat staff (M&E officers) and Board members representing different constituencies. These interviews are meant to complete the mapping and add depth to the desk study findings. The findings would then be subjected to a sense-making workshop with the participation of SIC members, selected Secretariat staff and the IEC. Together they would validate/decontextualize findings, reflect on and prioritize options for improved governance arrangements, taking into account the specifics of the education sector.

Overall health of the partnership

Since 2015, both the Board and the Secretariat have engaged intensified efforts to build a stronger partnership. The results reports illustrate that GPE has progressed beyond its targets, based on its results framework that measures progress by looking at the clarification of roles, the number of knowledge products generated and advocacy events organized, audit issues and the proportion of Secretariat time spent on country-facing functions.

On paper, this means that significant change occurred in the functioning of the Board, its sub-committees and the Secretariat, particularly in steering and managing the performance of GPE at the global level. As described in chapter 5 of ISE's interim report, at the country level the roles of LEGs, CAs, and GAs have been clarified, a broader range of GAs have been accredited, and specific guidance has been provided to support processes at the country level. At the same time, the ongoing EPR process also demonstrates that optimizing country-level arrangements remains a work in progress, although clear efforts are being devoted to persuading GPE's diverse membership to agree and commit to a clarified and streamlined cooperation.

Clarifying roles and streamlining functions throughout the GPE is certainly important. In stage 2, it is therefore important that the ISE takes stock of the actual status of these processes, in particular assessing the extent to which suggested improvements are put in practice and produce the desired results.

At the same time, the Board committee members and the Secretariat raise concerns in the EPR assessment report about issues that are not captured by the existing results framework but relate to more intangible GPE's partnership dynamics. These include issues related to cooperation and the level of delegation between the Board, its committees, and the Secretariat, the optimal use of complementary qualities within the partnership, the complexity of sound and timely constituency consultations, and others.

Various contemporary theories and models[17] related to building strong multi-stakeholder partnerships emphasize the less tangible elements related to partnership dynamics, such as vibrant space, cooperation, joint accountability and learning. The ISE therefore intends to review GPE's efforts towards building a stronger partnership using a dedicated set of tools and instruments, specifically designed to assess the overall health/vibrancy of the partnership in respect of those features. This is expected to lead to new and broader insights into GPE's strengths and weaknesses that can inspire future partnership-building efforts. Table 8 below presents the sub-questions under this area of investigation, along with the essentials of our methodological approach.

Table 8. Issue 8 - Overall Health of the Partnership

Issue 8: Overall Health of the Global Partnership What have been the effects of the Board and Secretariats intensified steering, monitoring and control efforts on building a stronger global partnership? Links to objective 5 of GPE's ToC?	
Sub-questions	Essential methodological approach and data collection.
1. What are the expectations concerning GPE being a stronger global partnership (objective 5 of GPE's ToC) as reflected in GPE's results framework? 2. What efforts have been made and are ongoing to strengthen the partnership and what results/progress have they accomplished? 3. To what extent do the efforts towards and reported results to strengthen the partnership address the diversity of tangible and less tangible causes for creating a strong partnership? 4. How do key GPE stakeholders describe and perceive the overall	The ISE intends to start by reconfirming what is understood by GPE being a strong and healthy partnership at the global level. Subsequently, the ISE will take stock of the progress of ongoing efforts to strengthen the global partnership (notably the EPR process). This will be largely based on the desk study of the latest reports and interviews with the responsible staff within the Secretariat. In addition, the ISE will collect evidence to determine the strengths and weaknesses of GPE at the global and country levels, using a Free Actor Network approach[18], which includes instruments specifically designed for partnership assessments. Among others, the ISE will use the Circle of Coherence looking at patterns of interaction and the Spiral of Initiatives looking at the evolution/maturity of GPE. Using such tools will enable a more comprehensive description and assessment of the GPE in which both the formal and informal features of the partnership are covered. Following a joint analysis of these findings during the sense-making exercise, this will enable a participatory assessment of the overall health of the partnership and the identification of areas of strength (to be consolidated) and weakness (to be improved). Accordingly, the ISE aims to generate new ideas about how to proceed and measure progress towards building a stronger partnership in the education sector.

[17]See a.o. GIZ's Capacity Works model (2015), the Free Actor Network Approach by E. Wielinga (2012), and the MSP Guide by Wageningen University (2016).


[18] H. Brouwer and Jim Woodhill, The MSP (Multi-Stakeholder Partnership) Guide, Wageningen University, The Netherlands (2016)

	health of the partnership? What do they see as the main areas of progress and what key challenges remain in creating a healthy partnership?	Data collection will primarily take place through (distant) interviews with representatives of the Board, Board committees and secretariat to map and categorize patterns of interaction at the global level. The findings will be structured using the earlier-mentioned tools (Circle of Coherence and/or Spiral of Initiatives) to map the current GPE dynamics. This mapping will be presented during a sense-making event to the SIC, selected Secretariat staff and IEC members for joint reflection and the identification of (new) ideas/options to build a stronger GPE.
5.	What are alternative ways of pursuing improved partnership dynamics?	

Instruments for partnership assessment[19]

We will use the Circle of Coherence as a framework to assess the dynamics (vibrant space) that exists within the partnership (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1 The circle of coherence




This framework guides us in assessing the extent to which the interactions taking place within the partnership optimize the 'vibrant space' (i.e. the ability and willingness of partners to actively contribute to and invest time and energy in the partnership). In doing so, we will examine whether interactions within the partnership reflect balanced attention for dialogue (efforts to learn from each other), exchange (efforts to ensure balance between giving and taking), challenge (efforts to stimulate contributions), and structure (efforts to ensure clarity of tasks, rules and agreements). The model assumes that an imbalance (i.e. too much or too little of any such efforts) leads to behavior that is counterproductive and reduces the partnership's vibrant space (fleeing, fighting, freezing or flocking). Using this model requires gaining insight in the nature and intensity of interaction among partnership members and having interviews with representatives of the diverse constituents of the partnership to gauge their perception of the current 'balance' in interactions.

[19] These instruments can be found in the MSP guide: how to design and facilitate multi-stakeholder partnerships https://edepot.wur.nl/358948

In assessing the evolution of the partnership, we aim to map its journey in the past years using the Spiral of Initiative model (see Figure 2). This model distinguishes different phases that a typical partnership initiative goes through before the initiative is fully embedded (institutionalized in policies and practices). Each phase can be recognized by typical activities, which allows us to place key activities of the partnership in this spiral. This will enable an assessment of where the partnership comes from and currently stands in its own evolution, whether 'earlier' phases are sufficiently covered and what type of follow-up actions would logically be needed to stimulate its further development. Applying this model means getting an overview of (trends) in key actions that will enable us to 'fill' the model, so it becomes a useful tool for joint reflection and learning during the sense-making exercise.

Figure 2 Spiral of Initiative



Annex Three: Additional Information to Report Section 5.1

5.1.1 Approaching the question

Given that one focus of the question is on assessing the contribution of GPE, we have separated out the presentation into 'internal' factors – those related to GPE – from all the others which are called 'external' factors. Each of the four relevant GPE contribution claims are considered together

- GPE support and influence contribute to the development of government owned, credible and evidence-based sector plans
- GPE support for inclusive sector planning and joint monitoring contributes to mutual accountability for education sector progress
- GPE advocacy and funding requirements contribute to more and better domestic and international financing for education
- GPE support and influence contribute to more effective and efficient implementation of sector plans

It should be emphasized that the CLE rating of achievement in respect of the sector plans, mutual accountability, financing or efficiency of sector plans and of overall performance does not necessarily bear any relationship to the CLE rating of the achievement of the corresponding contribution claim.

Methodology

Much of the data for the factors is already quantitative. For the others, numerical ratings, or scores have been assigned, where possible, to the CLE qualitative ratings and other potentially contributing factors. Clearly these ratings cannot be considered definitive, but it was considered the best way to approach the problem of assessing which are the most important factors in affecting the differences between countries in their implementation of the Education Sector Plan.

The potential influence of the factors on the level of ESP implementation are considered as hypotheses; and, where there are sufficient number (>10) of reports with adequate data on the factors, Spearman Rank Correlations have been calculated between them and the CLE overall judgement of ESP Implementation performance, using a one tailed test and a 10% significance level. The size of the correlation coefficient measures *the strength of association* between two variables; it *does not necessarily describe a causal relationship*. The statistical significance is a measure of the likelihood of a high value occurring by chance. The typical value is 5% but given the small number of cases, a 10% level has been used. The raw data of the external factors, the scores assigned to the CLE qualitative ratings and full analysis is in Annex 5.1.

Given the relatively small number (28) of CLEs it will not be possible to carry out breakdowns for example between FACA states and others. But after transforming the ranked scales into binary variables, a regression analysis to identify which are the most important factors among all those that appear to be significant will be carried out.

5.1.2 Review of challenges of delivering any national programme in developing countries

Any five-year plan in any sector and in any country is potentially vulnerable to events beyond the sector's including:

- Political instability in the country; there a number of possible indexes in the World data Bank which can be used in addition to the FCAC status
- Changes in the Government priorities on which the plan depends. These can occur when the party in power changes or under the same party;
- Economic disruptions and pressures from, for example, teachers' unions that undermine the Government's funding base for the plan; and often lead to Government funding cuts
- Changes in donor priorities that undermine the projected funding contributions for the plan.

This is consistent with the CLE synthesis report (2020, section 3.5), which also indicated that ESP implementation has been hampered by a range of contextual factors, positively when present and adversely when absent. According to the two syntheses reports (2019, 2020; and especially Figure 3.5 of the 2020 report), these include (they are not intended to constitute a comprehensive list):

- Quality of coordination at central level: although these are difficult to assess, a rough proxy has been introduced in terms of the number of Ministries involved in education[20]
- Other Stakeholders having the opportunity and motivation to align behind the plan (ditto);
- Sufficiency of funding for ESP: the issue of funding gaps is nearly always raised (see below);
- Realistic results framework: the CLEs report on the extent to which data is collected for the country Results Framework but the emphasis tends to be on outcome and impact rather than the achievement of targets or the completion of activities, which are our concern in this chapter; however, there is information from SABER on the quality of the EMIS and the capacities available to collect and analyze the data;
- Alignment of other donors behind ESP: the CLEs report systematically on the alignment of GPE with the ESP but only sporadically on the alignment of other donors so these cannot be included in the analysis;
- Sense of relevance of ESP
- Implementation capacity: there are systematically comments on capacity limitations but without any quantitative assessments, so it could not be included in this analysis.

These are explained on the basis of an examination of the literature in more detail below.

General Problems

Nearly fifty years ago, Rondinelli (1976) identified a checklist of problems that occur the most often with development projects: ineffective project planning and preparation; faulty appraisal and selection processes; defective project design; problems in start-up and activation; inadequate project execution, operation and supervision; inadequate or ineffective external coordination of project activities; deficiencies in diffusion and evaluation of project results and follow-up action. Thirty years

[20] A distinct Ministry of Higher Education has been excluded as only limited coordination is required in terms of the mode of transition from the top grade of secondary to tertiary institutions)

later, Makinde (2005) produced a similarly extensive but different list: corruption, lack of continuity in government policies, inadequate human and material resources, all of which often lead to implementation gap, i.e. the widening of the distance between stated policy goals and the realization of such planned goals. Policies are rolled out regularly in developing nations but, most of the time, without achieving the desired results (Makinde, 2005).

Similarly, Essilfie-Baiden (2019) Reasons projects fail: corruption, war, drought, government political priorities, economic uncertainty, lack of institutional capacity and trained personnel, lack of awareness of the benefits of project management, lack of user consultation. There are several similar articles in the literature, leading to the conclusion that there is no agreed framework for analyzing the implementation of national programmes.

The purpose of this section is to identify the set or sets of factors that will be examined as potential barriers or enabler for ESP implementation Ideally, the analysis here would have been guided by a strong theoretical framework which would define the types of and even the specific factors to be considered. However, the literature on this topic is inconsistent and inconclusive in proposing an adequate theoretical framework for the implementation of sector-wide plans. There are many reasons why that is the case but probably the simplest is that circumstances and contexts shift in ways that cannot easily be captured by a set of independent factors. One explanation of those kinds of changes was by Wolin (2004) in demonstrating that political theory went through a series of changes, rather like those shown by Kuhn (1962) in the history of science, in which successive elaborations to the dominant political theory were made in accounting for political activity until the whole edifice breaks down with a shift in political structure in the world out there as well as a re-structuring of political theory.

Instead, we set out to develop an inventory of factors that might be determinants of the performance of national plans and programmes; and, given that we only have 28 observations, we can realistically only assess the strength of the association of each of the factors with implementation performance, rather than any more complex analysis.

Education-specific contextual factors possibly affecting implementation

The CLEs indicate that ESP implementation has been hampered by a range of contextual factors, but the CLE synthesis Report (2020, section 3.5) also highlights other more generic factors that appear to have affected ESP implementation, positively when present and adversely when absent. These include:

- Alignment behind ESP: the CLEs report systematically on the alignment of GPE with the ESP but only sporadically on the alignment of other donors so this is not included as an important factor
- Sufficiency of funding for ESP: the issue of funding gaps is nearly always addressed (see below)
- Quality of coordination at central level: difficult to assess except where there are flagrant breaches
- Realistic results framework: the CLEs report on the extent to which data is collected for the country Results Framework but the emphasis tends to be on outcome and impact rather than the achievement of targets or the completion of activities
- Sense of relevance of ESP: there are qualitative comments, but these cannot easily be translated into ratings. and
- Implementation capacity: there are, systematically, comments on capacity limitations but without any quantitative assessments so it has not been included in this analysis.

The literature suggests several issues in implementing any national level programme, common across sectors, as well as specific issues for the education sector.
These factors mostly operate at the central level; but of course, education programmes -and especially at the primary and basic levels which are GPE's focus - are delivered nationwide.

Other Education-Specific Issues Likely to Affect Implementation

- Pressure to Introduce Learning Assessments: Since the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement set up by Thorsten Husen and Neville Ppostlethwaite in Stockholm in 1967, there have been a range of international educational assessments: for example TIMMS (Trends in Maths and Science Studies carried out approximately every four years since 1995), PIRLS (Progress in Reading Literacy Study carried out approximately five years since 2001) and IALS (Intenrational Adult Literacy Studs carried out between 1994-98, 2003, 2006-08). OECD entered the market in 2000 with PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) focusing only on 15 year olds and their likely contribution to economic growth) carried out approximately every 4-5 years. It now covers abot 80 counries includng a small number of Lower Middle Income Countries. It has not been without its vritics (see Kotthoff et al, 2011 and Open Letter, 2014). Besides consuming considerable resources, the results are frequently used to call into question national policies; however, although attention is devoted to the issue in the CLEs (especially in Chapter 5 on Impact), there is no information on costs or on how the assessments are being used by the Ministries of Education in these countries.
- Distributed Service Delivery: Number and geographical distribution of primary schools (service delivery points) as compared to other sectors: e.g. the number of primary schools is more than 6 times the number of health facilities (hospitals and health centres) in the countries origingally chosen for case studies for Stage 2, during Stage 1 of ISE (see Table A.1).
- School Readiness: Number of pre-schools (pre-chool increases likelihood of child entering and staying in primary school and also improves learning in primary - e.g. UNICEF, 2012). The indicator should be the ratio of the number in the final year of pre-primary to the number in the first year of primary, but those data are not easily available; instead we have used the estimated GER In pre-primary (estimated sometimes from the totals enrolled in pre-primary and primary adjusting for sie of age group)
- Revision of general curriculum to make more appropriate to changing cultural and socio-economic conditions). Four possible indicators are the historical culture of the country (in terms of its colonial history), an index of cultural diversity from Fearon (2003) an index of ethnic diversity from Alesina et al. (2003). and the proportion of each religion in the population (Wikipedia, 2019).
- Inclusive education policies require special arrangements and efforts to be made for the disabled, orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) and for those out of school (Price, 2018). The existence of a policy and a designated budget would probably be the best indicators, but only tangential reference is made to those issues in the CLEs' discussion on implementation.
- Strength of Teachers' Union: stronger unions are likely to lead to more pressure on the Ministry to increase teachers' salaries (e.g. in Togo, primary school teacher salaries are double the salaries in Chad and Burkina Faso and three times the salaries in Guinea-Bissau and the Democratic Republic of Congo. (RESEN 2019, pp. 93) and therefore a reduction in the finds

available for investment. The strength would have to be assessed in country; a telepone all would only tell us the membership.

- Culture of learning/ schooling and specifically the influence of language and religion. Among the 28 CLE countries, there are 10 ex-British colonies, 9 ex-French colonies, 4 ex-Latin country colonies, 2 with sustantial Indian Influence, 1 Arab and 1 USSR. In terms of religion, there are eight mainly Muslim, ten mainly Christian and four mainly Buddhist or Hindu.
- Teacher training: the simplest remote indicator for teacher training can be the proportion of qualified teachers in primary education), and how the teaching profession is organized and governed (the organizational structures around the qualification, registration and training could possibly be obtained remotely, but the comprehensiveness and implementation of the terms of employment for teachers by the respective Ministries could only be investigated on site).
- Cultural norms such as perception of girls' education and the right of teachers to punish corporally, which affect enrolment and learning outcomes. (Gebrezgabiher and Hailu, 2017).
- Reliability of EMIS, how well has it been designed, piloted etc. (Tanzania, 2005).

Additionally, the literature identifies barriers specific to the education sector (see Annex 4.2.1). Some parts of the education system are more difficult to reform, some reforms are not appropriate to the context and generating a push back, the high number and geographical spread of education service delivery points (in this case, primary and pre-primary schools), and the strength of teachers' unions. The pupil-teacher ratio and reliability of EMIS are also intervening factors that make ESP implementation more difficult.

Developing a set of external and education-specific factors to examine

Essilfie-Baiden (2019) argued that success and implementation of projects in developing countries depends more on external environment than internal environment → project management needs to focus more on managing externalities or project environment. The choice of factors to examine in this chapter has been based on specific evidence about what matters in understanding the success of programmes – and specifically education programmes - at different levels from documentation of indexes of the economic and social context, the external funding available via the central Ministerial (funding) decisions to the schools.

Global Indexes

The World Bank compiles and updates annually a Data Bank of Indexes with values for each country in the world. We have selected those relevant for assessing possible barriers and enablers to the implementation of a national education programme, viz Absence of Violence and Political Stability, a Conflict Index, an index of Voice and Accountability (to monitor general level of social participation) and the Transparency Index (to monitor perceived trustworthiness of officials and organizations.

National Characteristics

Demography, Geography and Distributed Service Delivery

The number of primary schools is more than 6 times the number of health facilities (hospitals and health centres) in the countries originally chosen for case studies for Stage 2, during Stage 1 of ISE (see Table A.1). In addition, districts will find it more diffiult to deliver services in a spasely populated area especially if thy lack either or both of human capacity and material resources (transport and fuel). In contrast, service delivery may also be more difficult in overcrowded urban centres. These issues can

be proxied by popultion density per sq kilometer, Children of school going age per sq km, and in-school enrolment density, altough the issue of overcrowding would require sub-national statistics; another useful indicator would be the density of primary schools per 1,000 sq km but that was not avilaable.

Culture of learning

Culture of learning/ schooling and specifically the potential influence of colonial historylanguage and religion. Among the 28 CLE countries, there are 10 ex-British colonies, 9 ex-French colonies, 4 ex-Latin country colonies, 2 with sustantial Indian Influence, 1 Arab and 1 USSR. In terms of religion, there are eight mainly Muslim, ten mainly Christian and four mainly Buddhist or Hindu.

External Funding

International ODA

The proportion of ODA going to education has been slowly declining over the last few years; and, with a series of epidemics, a pale anticipation nf our current COVID-19 situation, often been diverted to deal with humanitrian issues. But it still represents a signifcant percentage of the funds needed for a country's ESP.

GPE Funding

GPE funding is significantly smaller but as it is often targetted on pre-primary and primary, it can represent a significant proportion of the coresponding funds available. Also GPE devotes quite some effort – although I'm not quite sure how as they do not have any in-country representation – to the quality of intenational finance in terms of alignement with government priorities and non-duplication between donors. But thre was no obvious way of developing a metric for that.

Ministerial Level Considerations and Decisions

Number of Ministries

In some countries there is more than one Ministry of Education (excluding those where there is a separate Ministry of Higher Education, because the overlap with the other Ministries is restricted to the procedures, protocols, regulations for passing from the end of Secondary into Tertiary), and the combination of different Ministries dealing with the same sector may cause difficulties of coordination and therefore of implementation. The number of Ministries was available from nearly all CLEs.

Relations between Ministry(ies) of Education and other Ministries and Presidential Office, with Coordinating Agent (CA) and Grant Agent (GA)

These relationships could be an important set of issues. On the one hand without good relations between the Ministry(ies) of Education, the Ministry of Finance or the Treasury and the Presidential Office, funds might be delayed, diverted or withdrawn, but this is not discussed very often in the CLEs. On the other hand, the relations between the Government (Ministry(ies) of Education) and the CA and/or GA are frequently referred to in the CLEs but mainly in the context of the effectiveness of the Local Education Group (see Chapter 5.3)

Regularity and Reliability of EMIS data

A well designed EMIS which has comprehensive coverage and regularly reports will obviously be very useful for Monitoring and Reporting; there are SABER ratings of whether or not the country has a functioning EMIS system and there is in-country capacity to collect and analyze data.

Curriculum

Revision of general curriculum to make more appropriate to changing cultural and socio-economic conditions). Four possible indicators are the historical culture of the country (in terms of its colonial

history), an index of cultural diversity from Fearon (2003) an index of ethnic diversity from Alesina et al. (2003). and the proportion of each religion in the population (Wikipedia, 2019).

Domestic Expenditure on Education

The GPE target is that 20% of all public expenditure should be devoted to education; and the CLEs rate the countries according to whether they have met or are moving towards that target. DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Mozambique, Senegal and Zimbabwe are at 20% or more, notably Ethiopia (25%) and Senegal (26%), but the CLEs rate ten (35%) of countries (including Cambodia, Tajikistan and Togo) as at or moving towards that target; although the movement is sometimes very small (e.g. from 15% to 16% over 5 years).

Decentralization

Decentralization to sub-national levels is now recognized as an important step in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations, although there are warnings about the possibility of corruption and elite capture (Koppen et al, 2012). Decentralization was mentioned only briefly in 15 CLEs with reports of only modest or poor or slow progress of decentralization in Cambodia, Togo, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone. In contrast, Mozambique was reported as being highly decentralized with, for example, allocations at a district level being adjusted for distance; and Zambia simply reported 'Achieved'.

District and School Level

Teacher training:

The simplest remote indicator for teacher training can be the proportion of qualified teachers (in primary education), and how teaching profession is organized and governed (the organisational structures around the qualification, registration and training could possibly be obtained remotely, but the comprehensiveness and implementation of the terms of employment for teachers by the respective Ministries could only be investigated on site).

Strength of Teachers Unions

Without fieldwork this was impossible to assess; but we can, for most countries, obtain data from the CLEs on the percentage of recurrent spend in total ESP spend and, sometimes on the percentage of that which is spent on teachers salaries

Inclusive education.

Policies require special arrangements and efforts to be made for the disabled, orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) and for those out of school (Price, 2018). The existence of a policy and a designated budget would probably be the best indicators, but only tangential reference is made to those issues in the CLEs' discussion on implementation.

Active Parent-Teacher Associations and School Management Commiteess

It is recognized by most donors and developing countries that active Parent-Teacher Associations and School Management Committees are important. Whilst only three CLEs mention them, 13 of the ESPs include them in their development of the ESP.

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Table 5.1.1 Comparison of education and health numbers of personnel

	N of primary Schools	'000s pupils in primary (CSchoolAge)	N primary Teacher	Population ('000s)	Health facilities per 100,000	N of health facilities	N health personnel per 100,000	Number of community clinics/posts
Bangladesh	82,000	17.6m	366,000	163,046	6.4 (HBD 80)	10,430	47 D + 31 N	10,723
Cambodia	7,716	2,163	45,836	16,487	7.9 (HBD 80)	1,300	17 D + 95 N	132
Mauritania	4,271	0.63m	17,000	4,526	16.5 (HBD 40)	740	18 D + 99 N	524
Mozambique	21,104	6.1m/CSA 6.0m	117,000	30,366	(HBD 70)		7 D +44 N	652
Rwanda	2,880	2.5m/ CSA 1.9m	44,000	12,627	(HBD 160)		13 D + 83 N	680
South Sudan	4,000 + 1,250 AES	1,9m /CSA 3.7m	28,000	11,062				
Togo	7,460	1.22m / CSA 1.55m	18,127	8,082	11.5 (HBD 70)	930	5 D + 30 N	960
Zambia	8,800	4,319/7,448	78,099	17,861	10.0 (HBD 200)	1,780	9 D +91 N	1,780

Sources: World Average of Land Area per capita '000s sq m per capita 20.3 sq m;
https://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Bangladesh/Health/Health-services; Global Heath Observatory

5.1.3 Data used in Section 5.1 and statistical analysis

Table 5.1.3a Values of global indexes for each country

Country	Conflict, Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Peace, Rule of Law						Participation Indexes	
	FCAC status	*Augmented FCAC*	*Absence of Violence*	*Government Effectiveness*	*Global Peace*	*Rule of Law*	*Voice & Ac-countability*	*Transparency Index*
Bangladesh	0	0	-1.1		101	-0.6	-0.7	26
Burkina Faso	1	1	-1	-0.7	104	-0.45	0	40
Cambodia	0	0	+0.1	-0.6	89	-1.1	-1.2	20
Cote d'Ivoire	0	0	-0.9	-0.6	107	-0.6	-0.2	35
DRC	1	1	-2.1	-0.7	155	-1.8	-1.5	18
Ethiopia	0	0	-1.3	-0.6	92	-0.4	-1.2	37
Gambia	1	1	0	-0.6	131	-0.4	-0.2	37
Guinea	0	1	-0.9	-1	62	-1.2	-0.75	29
Guyana	0	0	-0.2	-0.3	100	-0.3	-0.3	
Kenya	0	0	-1.2	-0.4	92	-0.4	-0.4	
Kyrgyz Rep.	0	0	-0.6	-0.6	119	-0.9	-0.4	40
Liberia	1	1	-0.2	-1.3	95	-1	0	28
Malawi	0	0	-0.3	-0.7	59	-0.4	-0.1	30
Mali	1	1	-2	-1	40	-0.8	-0.3	28
Mauritania	0	0	-0.7	-0.7	145	-0.7	-0.85	31
Mozambique	0	0	-0.8	-0.9	122	-1	-0.5	29
Nepal	0	0	-0.6	-0.9	94	-0.5	-0.1	28
Nigeria	1	1	-2.2	-1	76	-0.9	-0.4	26
Pakistan	1	1	-2.3	-0.6	148	-0.7	-0.8	34
Rwanda	1	1	0.1	+0.2	153	0.1	-1.1	26
Senegal	0	0	-0.1	-0.3	153	-0.2	-0.2	32
Sierra Leone	0	1	0	-1.1	79	-0.8	-0.2	32

South Sudan	1	1	-2.4	-2.45	58	-2	-2	53
Tajikistan	0	0	-0.7	-1	52	-1.3	-1.7	45
Togo	0	0	-1	-1.1	161	-0.6	-0.7	33
Uganda	1	1	-0.7	-0.6	105	-0.3	-0.7	12
Zambia	0	0	-0.1	-0.6	100	-0.3	-0.3	25
Zimbabwe	1	1	-0.9	-1.2	105	-1.3	-1.1	
	Spearman Rank Correlation of Factor with CLE judgement of ESP Implementation performance							
Correlation	-0.255	-0.423**	0.359*	0.430**	0.206	0.288*	0.032	0.339*

Sources: Columns 1 and 2 Fragile and Conflict Affected States as classified by GPE website

Columns 3, 4, 6 and 78 From World Global Index, www.govindicators.org (see Kaufmann et al for methodology). Used data from 2016 being, roughly the midpoint of most of the ESP implementation schedules.

Column 5 for 2016 from Institute of Economics and peace (2016)

Column 8 for 2016 from Corruption Perceptions Index

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GPI%202016%20Report_2.pdffrom

Methodological Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings Institution Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, World Bank September 2010

Table 5.1.3b Specific characteristics of the national context

Country	Land Area (th. per sq km)	Population (million)	Pop. Den-sity/ Km^2	Colonial History	Religion	Ethnic Fractionalization Index	Cultural Diversity Index	N of Minis-tries	Relations DP/GA /CA/Government
Bangladesh	130.2	164.7	1,116	India		0.223	0.141	2	good
Burkina Faso	273.6	20.9	77	French	Muslim	0.704	0.534	3	Nothing
Cambodia	176.5	16.7	92	French	Buddhist	0.186	0.150	2	collegial
Cote d'Ivoire	318	26.4	82	French	Buddhist	0.784	0.557	3	Poor WB-Gvt
DRC	2,267.1	89.6	38	Belgian	Christian	0.933	0.628	4	Nothing
Ethiopia	1,000	115	115	Italian	Christian/ Muslim	0.760	0.562	2	Nothing
Gambia	245.9	12.8	52	British	Muslim-Christian	0.764	0.548	2	Nothing
Guinea	215	0.79	4	French	Christian	0.669	0.490	3	productive
Guyana				Spanish		0.620	0.460	1	Strong
Kenya	1,104	117.1	104	British		0.852	0.601	1	Trust rebuilt
Kyrgyz Rep.	580.4	52,6	91	USSR	Christian	0.679	0.624	1	Nothing
Liberia	200	6.4	33	Ameri-can	Muslim	0.899	0.644	1	Nothing
Malawi	111.4	4.94	45	French	Christian	0.829	0.294	1	Nothing
Mali	118.5	18.6	161	French	Muslim	0.754	0.590	3	Nothing
Mauritania	1,240.2	19.71	16	Spanish	Muslim	0.625	0.272	2	Nothing
Mozambique	1,030.2	4.5	5	Portuguese	Christian	0.765	0285	1	weakened; key staff left
Nepal	801.6	30.4	39	Indian	Hindu	0.677	0.542	3	Nothing
Nigeria	786.4	28.6	198	British	Muslim	0.805	0.660	1	Difficulties
Pakistan	143.3	29.1	223	British	Muslim	0.532	0.289	1	Noting
Rwanda			250	French	Muslim	0.180	0.000		

Senegal	26.3	12.3	492	French	Muslim	0.727	0.402	1	Strong
Sierra Leone	196.7	16.3	85	?	Muslim?	0.764	0.534	1	Nothing
South Sudan	71.7	7.8	111	Arah	Folk	0.708	0.698	1	Relied on national officials
Tajikistan	619.7	11.1	18	USSR	Muslim	0.513	0.492	1	No change
Togo	143.1	9.3	67	French	Christian	0.883	0.602	4	collegial
Uganda	56.8	8.1	146	British	Christian	0.930	0.647	2	collegial
Zambia	250.6	44.3	189	British	Christian	0.726	0.189	2	Deterioration
Zimbabwe	752.6	17.9	24		Christian	0.356	0.141		
	Spearman Rank Correlation of Factor with CLE judgement of ESP Implementation performance; one star significant at 10%; two stars significant at 5%								
	0.274	0.282	0.027	0.221		-0.512**	-0.466**	-0.083	-.081

Notes For Analysis Colonial History: British = 1; French = 2; Belgian, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish = 3; Other = 4. Religion: Christian = 1; Muslim = 2; Buddhist, Folk, Hindu = 3. Relations: Deterioration, poor, weakened = 1; No discussion/mention, Nothing = 2; Good, Productive, Strong = 3

Sources: for Columns 1,2 and 3 Wikipedia List of countries by population density; for Columns 6 Fearon (2003), for column 7, Alessina et al (2003); for Columns 8 and 9, CLEs

Table 5.1.3c Percentage ESP budgets allocated to each sub-sector

Country	Pre-Primary	Access-sibility	Primary	Lower Secondary	Upper Secondary	All Secondary	TVET	Teacher Training	Higher	Adult Non-Formal	Admin-istration
Bangladesh											
Burkina Faso	0	0	66.1	0	0	11.7	1.8	0			
Cambodia	6.8		46.2	21.4	11.1				11.7	1	
Cote d'Ivoire	1.80		38.4	13.00	11.90		8.10		19.5		
DRC	0	0	42	0	0	32	0	0	26		
Ethiopia	3	0	25			11	17	2	34	3	7
Gambia	0.5	98.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.1	0.5	
Liberia	17.8	0		12.4	5.5	0	0	0	0	17.8	
Malawi	7.9	0	49.3	0	0	15.9	2.6	4.9	12.1	7.9	7.4
Mozambique	0	0	49.1	12.3	7.6	0	4	0.7	18.5	1	
Nepal	3.8	0	54.7	0	0	25.4	0	0	0	0	
Rwanda	0.4	0	36.7	18.1	13.3	0	13.6	1.3	16.3	0.2	
Senegal											
Sierra Leone	0	0	61.3	26.7	12	0	0	0	0	0	
South Sudan	0.7	0	1.3	0	0	12.2	1.3	0			
Tajikistan	0.4	0	36.7	18.1	13.3	0	13.6	1.3	16.3	0.4	
Togo	2.3	0	53.3	15.6	10.1	0	0	0	19.7	1.3	
Uganda	0	0	61.3	26.7	12	0	0	0	0	0	
Zambia	0	0	46	0	0	36	3	1	5	0	
	Spearman Rank Correlation of Factor with CLE judgement of ESP Implementation performance										
	-0.156		0.188	0.072	0.134	0.106	0.493**				

Table 5.1.3d Domestic and international funding, % ESP spending on basic and primary, primary spend per student, recurrent, teachers' salaries

Country	Agreed ESP annual $m budget	Donor Fun-ding as % ESP ann. average	GPE Fun-ding % ESP	% annual Funding Gap	Domestic Funding ann. av. as % of Public Exp./ GDP	% ESP on Basic	% ESP on Primary	Primary Spend / Student	All Recur-rent ann. av. % of ESP	Teachers' Salaries as av. % Recurrent
Bangladesh	$5,550 '15- '19	$499 '15-'17 11%	$100 '15-'17, 2.2%	$50.7m gap met '14	12.3% av '15-'19 (BES)/ 2% GDP		44.2	1y, $86; 2y $77	72.5%	
Burkina Faso	$460 '10-'15	$69m '12-'16 12.7%	$15 '12-'16	16.2% '13-15 PDSEB	16.5% '12-'15		60% '12-'17	c$250 1y, '09-'16	87.1% '12-'15	61% of all educ.spend
Cambodia	$525m an	$96m, 18.3%	$26m, 1.2%	$150m, 5%	12.1% av '14-'19	74%	45%		82% ('17-'19)	66% ('17-19)
Cote d'Ivoire	$41.9m, '12-'17	$46.4m/yr '12—'17	$5.9m/yr	Init. 90.9% then met	22.5% '12 to '16	51.1% '12-'15	35.7% '12-'15		95% domes-tic/recurrent	66% of ALL spend
DRC	$807.1m SSEF '16-'25	$82.3m SSEF 7% '13-'15	1.2% SSEF; 17.8%/donor	$54.4m	14.% '16; 8.3%-11%., '13-'15/ 2%	74% (pre-1y-all 2y)	42% (inc. pre-1y)		48% (fn 53)!?	94% of all ESP spend '13-'15
Ethiopia	ESDPV, '13-'; 18	$85m	2%ESDPV/1.2% Basic 11.4%	17.5%	25%			$69 1y, $145 L 2y,	60% domes-tic/recurrent	42% of domestic
Gambia	ESMTP '14-'17 $92m	$13m	$9m in donor	25% '14-'17 $22.4	19.6% budget, actuals 10%-15%		75%? #56		92.5%	80% down to 70% of all
Guinea	$258m	39.9 15.4%	4.3% 12.6	<5 at start	14.6%;/2.4% of GDP	52.9	41.5	$53 (11%)	92.3% '15-'18	59.4 '15-'18

Guyana	$265m ann	Av '15-'17 $5.5, 2.1%	$1.7, 0.64%	10% av	20% '14-/16	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Kenya	NESP '13-'18	In '16 $251m	5% of NESP	Av 3% '13-'18	26% '02-05 18.5% '10-'15	46.8% (Fig 3)**	37.3% (Fig 3)**	$283 '12-'15	93%-95%	no data
Kyrgyz Rep.	Total 353'ESP' 446	~6% of all spend	~0.8% of all spend	$61 m/ year	19.6%/ ESP is 6.1% GDP	59% 1y & all 2y		$251??	86% '13 to '16	
Liberia	$190.1m, '17-'21	$60m, 31.6%	$11.9m, 6.3%	$47.6m, 25.6%	13% av	68	40	$72 1y, $79 2y	97%	81% of all
Malawi	$294m (gvt) '13' to '18'	$39.7m 13.5%	2.6%		21.7% '15-'18/EE is 4.9% of GDP	47.8% '18-'19	59.3% '18-'19	$83 av '10='15	87%	74% of total spend
Mali	$775m '17	$139, 17.9% '17 (65%act.)	1.5% but 4.5 % of action		19.9% '17		42	$200, '09-'16	50% 'cos RF did it; 86%	55
Mauritania	$148m av ann '12-'16		$15.2m,'12-'18	764B '12-'18; 30% disbursd	10.2% 12-16/ 2.8%	76.5%, 1y & 2y				69
Mozambique	$9,000m '12-'19	$1,475m '12-19 16.9%	$124m'12-'15 +$57.9m, 2%	$235m'15-'19, 8.4%	19.1% '12-'15/ 6.2%	64.8, '12-'14	45.2, '12-'14	$91	93%, '13 80% '17	
Nepal	SSDP'16-'21 $1,292m		0.13%	$272– 3.7% $93m JFPs*	20.4% '16-10.6% '19 ('quakes)?	54.7% #31			99% in '17-'18	68.7% ESP '12-'17
Nigeria		CAN'T	BE	CALCU	LATED					
Paki-stan		$1,127 S; and B $205m			20% S, 18.5% B	Est'd 77% S, 66% B	82.8% B 71.3% S		94% S 87% B	

Rwanda	$1,656, ’12-‘17	$570m,’’12—'17	3.2% $711m 12-17’ 4.3%	9.2% fn45	14.1%	68.9	38.718.7	$38	82.5% av	48% of recurrent
Senegal	$3,305m, ’13 -’15;E $6,786	$130.7,11.5% overall	1.3% $86.7m ’12-’18; 1.3%	5?/?/?	23.5% av ’13-’16/ 6.8%	68.8	38.8	Est’d $300	84%	66.2 '13-'15
Sierra Leone	ESP ’14-’18 $114.2	$25.7 ’16-‘19	42.9m ’16-‘19	15% ’14 to 33% ‘16	17.5% ’14 to ’16; 15% eest’d’18-‘20	See note	42% bud.; 60%spend	$39/yr $33/yr	95%	75% of recurrent
South Sudan	’11,14-16, $175m	$449, ’11-‘17	$39.1m	34% ’18-‘21	2.7%/1.05%	58%		$47		
Tajiki-stan	$970m ’12-‘17	$90.5m ’12-17	$20m ’12-‘17	18.6% /year	16.4%/ 4.6%	E. 62% ’12-‘17				
Togo	$147m av annual	$21.7m ’12-’17 ann av	16.3%$72.7m ’10-‘14	21.8%	17.3% '10 - '17	75.3 1y and 2y	52.3		98.4%	81.6%
Uganda	$732m av ann estd	$104m av ann ’08-‘17	1.08%$87m ’14-‘19	8.2% ’10 ESP,57% ’17 ESP	11.9%/2.6% GDP	70.1 1y and 2y	54.3		90%	73
Zambia	$4,449m ’13-‘15	$280m ’11-‘17	0.65%$55.2m	32% ’13-’15;	16.9%	50.6% ’11-‘16	Act. Based-output bud	$69 '11 $171 '16	86% ’12-‘16	68% ’12-15 82% ’16 of all
Zimbabwe	MOPSE $903m	$61m, 7% of MOPSE	$9.6m ’14-‘19		19.5% ’14-‘19	60% (81% ODA)			99% MPPSE ’15-‘19	98.5 '18
	Spearman Rank Correlation of Factor with CLE judgement of ESP Implementation performance									
		-0.087	0.335*		0.034	-0.303*	0.024	0.172	0.722**	-0.053

Sources: Country Level Evaluations, and 2020 Country Level Evaluation Synthesis Report, Vol I, Tables 3.3, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.12; Vol ii, table 5.2

Sierra Leone 56% of donor funding is for junior secondary $88.6m ’16-’18 Table 3.3. compared to $13m available for secondary in ’14-’18 according to fn 100.

Definition of Basic 164 OECD's definition of basic education only includes ECE, primary education and "basic life skills for youth and adults," and as such differs from GPE's definition of the term in that it does not include lower secondary education. OECD CRS data only provides information on secondary education as a whole and does not provided data specifically on lower secondary education. Cambodia ?? ; Malawi says = primary
Household Spending: Bangladesh $6.1/child/month growing at 9% per year; DRC households spend $43 /child/yr; Mozambique $2.40/ann/child '08 to $23/ann/child; Zambia 6.3% of ac hhd expend to education in 2015; Zimbabwe: average day school hhd $285 1y, $370; gvt $390 1y $619 2y
Guyana: aid trough regional Caribbean projects not reflected
Kenya #90 says 17.8% basic '16-'18 but excludes 51% to TSC
Budget Absorption is low: Malawi Budget utilization by projects ranged from 11 to 70 percent (including construction of teacher training colleges, girls' hostels, primary and secondary schools, science laboratories and libraries). Disagreements Gvt and Civil Society Education Coalition analysis
Nepal: federalization is expensive, I presume because most of money 92% in '18-'19 is transferred downwards. Nearly half of education expenditure (from primary to tertiary levels) is borne by families. Households are funding school fees as well as additional costs such as uniforms and textbooks. There is no data on what share of basic education expenditure is covered by families.
Sierra Leone: Relative to neighbors: adjusted for purchasing power parity, Sierra Leone had a 2013 primary budget per student of US$106. This is lower than any of the following other countries to be reviewed for this evaluation: Burkina Faso, $272 (2015); Côte d'Ivoire, $464 (2015 estimate); Liberia, no data; Gambia, $166 (2013). Teachers' Salaries: 122 Primary teacher salaries are double the salaries in Chad and Burkina Faso, and three times the salaries of teachers in Guinea-Bissau and the Democratic Republic of Congo. (RESEN 2019, pp. 93).
Zimbabwe: #121 bureaucratic inefficiencies and procurement delays within MOPSE

Table 5.1.3e Other factors from CLEs

	Domestic Expenditure on Edu-cation as % Public Expenditure	% ESP on Basic education	% ESP on Primary Education	Donor Funding as % ESP	% Annual Funding Gap
Bangladesh	3	3	2	2	2
Burkina Faso	2	2	3	2	2
Cambodia	2	2	3	2	2
Cote d'Ivoire	2	2	3	3	2
DRC	1	1	3	1	1
Ethiopia	2	2	3	2	2
Gambia	2.5		3	3	2
Guinea	2	2	3	2	2
Guyana	2		3	1	1
Kenya	2	2	3	3	2
Kyrgyz Rep.	3	3	0	2	2
Liberia	1	2	3	2	2
Malawi	2	2	2	2	2
Mali	2	2	3	2	2
Mauritania	2	2	3	2	2
Mozambique	3	3	3	2	3
Nepal	2	2	3	2	2
Nigeria	1	1	2	1	1
Pakistan	1	1	3	2	2
Rwanda	3	3	3	2	3
Senegal	2	2	3	2	2
Sierra Leone	1	1	3	2	2
South Sudan	1	1	3	1	2
Tajikistan	2	2	3	2	2
Togo	2	2	3	3	2
Uganda	2	2	2	3	2
Zambia	2	2	3	2	2
Zimbabwe	2	2	2	3	2

Table 5.1.3f District and school-level factors ('RATING'. 'IN SCHOOL POP DENSITY, PTR AT START of ESP). PTA &/OR SBMC

Country	Decentralization	Rating	Children of School Age (million)	Pop. Density per km² CSA	Children in School (million)	In-school Pop. Density per km²	Pupil-Teacher Ratio at Start	PTA &/or SMC
Bangladesh	limited	2	30,750 th 6-15	213.5	26.2m	181.9	('15) 28	(SLIP)
Burkina Faso	Modest	3	6,905th 3-16yos/728?	25.5?	3.358m	12.4	('17) 41.6	PTA
Cambodia	Slower than expected	2	3,090th 6-14 yos PB	30.6	2.600 m	25.7	('14) 40	0
Cote d'Ivoire	Distance; plan exists	2	5,562th 3-15yos	17.8	4.112m	13.1		Both
DRC	Mixed success; elite capture	3	n.a	n.a.	n.a	n.a.	('18) 38 1y 20 2y	0
Ethiopia	Decentralized	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a	n.a	n.a	PTA
Gambia	Partially; but not teacher recruitment	2	4,72th 7-15	44.1	0.5m	46.8	32	PTA National SMC?
Guinea	distance/ teacher recruitment centralized	2	3,140 th 6-15 yos	12.7	2,350 th	9.6	('15) 43	0
Guyana	Poor communi-cation, remote	2	5-16		175 th		('14) 30/ 19?	Both
Kenya	n.i.		n.a.	n.a	n.a.	n.a.	42	0
Kyrgyz	Decentralized then reversed	3/4	873	?	884 th	?	('12) 13	0

Liberia	Started ’10; good progress	4	1,294 th (3-14)	13.3	1.1m	11.3	(’10) 41 1y	Both
Malawi	policy ’98. Quite advanced Poor roads/lack funds	2		15.5	5,787 th 6-17	48.8	(’17) 72	Both
Mali	Recurrent spen-ding. Distance	2	1,724th 3-17 yos 9	14.5	1,468	1.2	38 1y, 17 2y	0
Mauritania	?	/.	1,150 th 3-15yos	4.3	0.805m	0.78	(’11) 46	0
Mozambique	highly funding	4	4.6m, 7-15yos	57.9	3,200	4.0	(’12) 69	0
Nepal	High: distance is allocation factor	5		12.0	6,900 th	9.2	(’17) 32	Both
Nigeria	Decentralized	4	11,091, 2-15yos	14.1			57?	0
Pakistan			30%<14yo; ’18		8,323	58.1	32	0
Rwanda	Decentralized to districts	4	2,400 6-15yo)	91.3	2.45m	93.2	(‘13) 80 1y, 40 2y	PTA
Senegal	Decentralized	4	**3,430 th CSA 6-15**	17.4	2.5m	12.8	(’12) 32 1y	SMC
Sierra Leone	Little Progress	1	4,486th '17 in school				32	PTA

South Sudan	Counties respon for implement	3	2.8 m, CSA 6-17yos	4.3	1.3m	18.1	('12) n.a.	0
Tajikistan			6,165th, 3-18	43.1	3,374	23.6		0
Togo	MESP Recent; but pc financing	3	1.8m CSA 6-15 yos	31.8	1580	27.9	79 ('14)	SMC
Uganda	Centralized	1	1,800 th 6-17yos; 60% OOS	7.45		26.1	42	0
Zambia	Since 2014; lack capacity	3	4,600th 7-18 yos	6.1	3.500	4.7	46 (11)	0
Zimbabwe	Some degree but not teacher recruitment	2/3	5,175 th 6-18 CSA	13.2	3,750	9.6	44	SMC
				Spearman Rank Correlation of Factor with CLE judgement of ESP Implementation performance				
	-0.105			0.396**		-0.374**	0.306*	

Source: Country Level Evaluations, except for PTA/SMC from Government ESPs

KR: 873 pre-schools with 88,000 kids plus tale of indicators. 4 languages Kyrgyz, Russian, Uzbek, Tadjik; Mali GER '17 GER 68 1y, 46.8 2y

Table 5.1.3g GPE Assessments

Country	Gvt Ownership	ESP Implementation Progress	Results Frame-work	GPE Contribution to Sector Planning	GPE Contri-bution to Monitoring	GPE Contribution to Financing	GPE Contri bution to Imp lementation
Bangladesh	4.00	5.00	4.60	2.00	3.40	1.50	2.00
Burkina Faso	4.60	3.00			4.50	2.00	3.70
Cambodia	3.00	4.00	4.00	3.00			3.00
Cote d'Ivoire	4.60	3.00		4.60	3.50	3.00	4.00
DRC	1.00	1.00	5.00	4.00			2.00
Ethiopia	4.00	3.00	3.60	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00
Gambia	5.00	3.00		4.60	5.00	3.00	4.60
Guinea	1.50	2.00	4.20				2.70
Guyana	4.10	2.00		4.10	3.10	1.00	2.40
Kenya	4.50	4.00		3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00
Kyrgyz Rep.	2.00	5.00	3.00				3.70
Liberia	4.60	1.00		4.00	4.00	1.00	2.20
Malawi	4.00	2.00	2.80	4.20	4.00	4.00	2.30
Mali	4.00	2.00	1.80	3.00	2.00	2.00	
Mauritania	5.00	2.00		4.00	3.00	1.70	5.00
Mozambique	4.00	5.00	5.00	3.00	4.50	3.20	3.00
Nepal	4.00	4.00	4.00	5.00	4.00	2.30	3.00
Nigeria	3.10	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.50	1.70	3.00
Pakistan	4.00	2.00		4.60	3.00	3.00	3.00
Rwanda	5.00	5.00		4.60	4.10	1.70	3.00
Senegal	3.00	3.00	3.70	4.00	2.00	3.00	4.20
	4.60	1.00		46.00	4.00	2.00	2.70
Sierra Leone	4.20	1.00	4.00		1.00	2.00	2.40
South Sudan	3.00	4.00	2.30	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00

Tajikistan	2.00	2.00	3.10		3.50	2.70	
Togo	2.50	4.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.30	4.00
Uganda	3.50	3.00		4.00	3.00	1.00	2.00
Zambia	3.00	4.00	3.60	4.20	3.00	3.70	4.00
Zimbabwe	4.00	5.00	4.60	2.00	3.40	1.50	2.00
	Spearman Rank Correlation of Factor with CLE judgement of ESP Implementation performance						
	-0.085		0.084	-0.336*	0.306	0.297	0.305

Table 5.1.3h GPE Assessments

	Functioning EMIS	Improvements in Capacity to Collect and Analyze Data	Changes in Empowerment of District/ Regional Officer	Household Expenditure per child per year
Bangladesh	2	0	1.3	$73.2 per child pe year
Burkina Faso				Nothing
Cambodia	3	3	3	Av. Annual $185/child
Cote d'voire				Nothing
DRC	1	1	1	
Ethiopia	2	1	1	
Gambia				Nothing
Guinea	2	2	1.75	HHd $52.3 vs Gvt $37.5/primary student
Guyana				Nothing
Kenya				
Kyrgyz Republic	1	1	1	Nothing
Liberia				48% of primary in private
Malawi	2	1	1	
Mali	2	3	1	
Mauritania	1.5	3	1.75	Nothing
Mozambique	3	3	3	$106/ hhd; $23/child '15

Nepal	3	1	2	Parents contributing 44% to 48 to 48%
Nigeria	1	1	2	
Pakistan				
Rwanda	1.5	0	3	Hhds contribute 4% of income
Senegal	3	3	3	2.8% of all hhd expenditure
Sierra Leone				
South Sudan	2	0	1	Estimate of 50% of gvt finance
Tajikistan	3	3	1	
Togo	2	2	1.75	Nothing
Uganda	1	1	1.75	
Zambia	1	1	1.75	6.3% hhd expenditure on education '15
Zimbabwe	3	2	1	Hhd expend 2.66*Gvt in 1y, 1.89*Gvt in 2y
		Spearman Rank Correlation of Factor with CLE judgement of ESP Implementation performance		
	0.168	0.032	0.297	

5.1.4 Cross-tabulations and correlations

Table 5.1.4a Cross tabulations of Achievement in Planning, Sector Dialogue and Monitoring with ESP Implementation

	Implementation Rating			
Quality of Plan	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	Total
1 Poor	2	0	0	2
2 Medium	1	3	2	6
3 Good	2	15	2	19
Rating of Sector Dialogue	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	Total
1 Poor	3	1	0	4
2 Medium	2	12	4	18
3 Good	0	5	1	6
Rating of Monitoring	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	Total
1 Poor	2	1	0	3
2 Medium	3	17	3	23
3 Good	0	0	2	2
Total (for all sub-sections of the table)	5	18	5	28

Cross tabulations of GPE Contributions to Planning, Sector Dialogue, Monitoring, Domestic and International Finance with ESP Implementation

Table 5.1.4b Comparing GPE Contribution Claims with ESP Implementation Achievement

	Implementation Rating			
GPE Contribution to Planning	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	Total
1 Poor	0	0	2	2
2 Medium	1	5	0	6
3 Good	4	13	3	20

GPE Contribution to Sector Dialogue	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	Total
1 Poor	2	2	2	6
2 Medium	1	9	3	13
3 Good	2	7	0	9
GPE Contribution to Monitoring	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	Total
1 Poor	2	1	2	5
2 Medium	0	12	3	15
3 Good	3	5	0	8
GPE Contribution to Domestic Finance	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	Total
1 Poor	3	8	3	14
2 Medium	0	3	2	5
3 Good	0	1	0	1
No Rating	*2*	*6*	*0*	*8*
GPE Contribution to International Finance	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	Total
1 Poor	2	5	1	8
One 'Poor', One 'Medium'	*2*	*6*	*1*	*9*
2 Medium	0	0	2	2
One 'Medium', One 'Good'		*6*	*1*	*7*
3 Good	1	1	0	2
GPE Contribution to ESP Implementation	1 Poor	2 Medium	3 Good	
1 Poor	2	1	0	3
2 Medium	3	13	3	19
3 Good	0	4	2	6
Total (for all sub-sections of the table)	**5**	**18**	**5**	**28**

Note: Italicized rows are exceptions to the 1-2-3 rating rule: there are eight cases with No Rating for Domestic Finance; and GPE Contribution to International Finance often received two separate ratings

Table 5.1.4c External factors associated with CLE rating of performance in ESP implementation, direction of effect and their statistical significance

GLOBAL INDEXES			
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONING	SIG	SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	SIG
Government Effectiveness	99 Pos	Political Stability & Absence of Violence	90 Pos
Rule of Law	90 Pos	Conflict Index	90 Neg
FCAC status	95 Neg		
Augmented FCAC I	95 Neg		
SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATIONAL CONTEXT			
MINISTERIAL ORGANISATION AND DECISIONS		SOCIAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	
Relations between DP/GA/CA and Government	80 Pos	Ethnic Fractionalization Index	95 Neg
Functioning EMIS	80 Pos	Cultural Diversity Index	95 Neg
		CSA Pop. Density/sq km	95 Pos
FINANCING AND GPE			
FUNDIN ISSUES		OTHER FINANCIAL ISSUES	
Donor Funding as % of ESP budget	85 Neg	Primary Spend per student	95 Pos
% Annual Funding Gap	95 Neg		
% agreed ESP on Basic	80 Neg		
Government Funding Cuts	90 Neg		
DISTRICT AND SCHOOL LEVEL FACTORS			
DISTRICT LEVEL		SCHOOL LEVEL	
Empowerment of District/Regional Officers	90 Pos	In School Population Density	85 Pos
		Pupil-Teacher Ratio at Start of ESP	80 Pos

Notes: 1. Explanations of why all of these factors might have an effect on the implementation of an ESP is included in Annex 5.2.1. Commentary on the statistically significant factors and the implications for GPE's future strategy is provided in this chapter. 2. The entries in the Significance column show whether the factor is significant at the 99%, 95%, 90%, 85%, 80% level (higher values are more significant); and, where the factor is significant – at any of those levels - the direction of that potential effect, either Pos(itive) or Neg(ative) Factors potentially contributing to ESP implementation at the different levels. Non-significant factors are not discussed in this chapter.

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Annex Four: Additional Information to Report Section 5.2

This annex presents the data and analysis that sustain the findings chapter 5.2 on LEG effectiveness.

It presents additional methodological grounding, provide more qualitative details and explanations from the thematic analysis, and present background tables with country scores.

Additionally, the annex contans a summary table of correlations up front.

5.2.1 Correlation table

Table 9 presents the correlation values for correlation between the two measures of LEG strategic effectiveness and each of the variables considered throughout the analysis. The table presents Pearson values at 5% / 10% level of significance and highlights the relationships that have been found significant at the corresponding level. Footnotes provides information on the data source for each variable.

Table 9 Correlation table

Factors	Correlation on progress in sector monitoring / dialogue and LEG centrality	Correlation on functions that the LEGs discharges	Pearson value at 5% significance[21]
	R value	R value	
LEG Principles (correlation at 5%)[22]			
Clear Mandate	-0.13	-0.25	0.4
Participation	0.44	0.49	0.37
Clear Governance	0.37	0.22	0.44
Working arrangements	0.44	0.55	0.39
Monitoring and learning	0.72	0.56	0.60
Leadership and ownership	0.27	0.29	0.40
Healthy Partnerships	0.20	0.15	0.43
GPE contribution (correlation at 10%)[23]			
ESPIG as a prospect	-0.10	-0.17	0.34
ESPIG	0.14	0.14	0.33
ESPDG	0.39	0.38	0.41
CSEF	0.42	0.40	0.36
Secretariat (advocacy and facilitation)	0.41	0.55	0.34
CA (advocacy and facilitation)	-0.01	0.09	0.34
Variable Tranche	0.43	0.17	0.54
Capacity, Motivation, and Leverage[24]			

[21] In general, a R value implies that the correlation is significant if it is higher than the Pearson value for that significance level. The Pearson value already takes into consideration the number of observation in the dataset.
[22] The sources of the data used for the correlation is explained in table 1 of this annex.
[23] The sources of the data used for the correlation is explained in table 3 of this annex.
[24] The sources of the data used for the correlation is explained in table 5 of this annex.

Technical capacity to collect data	0.08	-0.03	0.32
Technical capacity to analyze data	-0.02	-0.09	0.37
ESP result framework tracking outputs	0.47	0.58	0.49
ESP result framework and JSR model is too complex	0.24	0.20	0.67
Motivation	0.40	0.34	0.34
Leverage	0.35	0.46	0.36
Structural factors (10% significance)			
Existence of another body of dialogue[25]	-0.72	-0.64	-0.32
Conflict (change in)[26]	-0.16	-0.11	-0.36
Conflict (absolute level of)[27]	-0.20	-0.43	-0.32
Disasters[28]	-0.13	-0.39	-0.36
Voice and accountability (space for civil society) (change 2015-2018)[29]	-0.13	-0.39	0.36
Voice and accountability (space for civil society) absolute[30]	0.05	0.22	0.34
Political stability (change 2015-2018)[31]	-0.21	-0.15	-0.34
Political stability (absolute level)[32]	0.19	0.30	0.34
Government effectiveness (change 2015-2018)[33]	-0.08	0.06	0.34

[25] The source for this variable is the qualitative information contained in the CLEs
[26] The source of this information was the change between the 2015 and 2018 values of the Global Peace Index: http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/
[27] The source of this information was the 2015 values of the Global Peace Index: http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/
[28] The data source comes from the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disasters, which publishes annual reports on the top 10 countries that have experience disasters for that year. The variable took the value of 1 if the country had been in the top 10 in one of the years between 2015-2018 and 0 otherwise.
[29] The source of the data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
[30] The source of the data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
[31] The source of the data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
[32] The source of the data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
[33] The source of the data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/

Government effectiveness (absolute level)[34]	0.26	0.14	0.34
Control of corruption (change 2015-2018)[35]	-0.07	0.03	0.34
Control of corruption (absolute level)[36]	0.26	0.21	0.34
Complexity of system management[37]	-0.17	-0.26	0.32
Effect of decentralization – capacity at the decentralized level of government[38]	0.25	0.15	0.32
Effect of decentralization – involvement of the decentralized level in LEGs and dialog[39]	0.17	0.32	-0.03
Effect of decentralization (interaction)	0.22	0.00	0.22
GPE leverage (ESPIG $ per person)[40]	0.15	0.17	0.32
GPE leverage (date of joining GPE)[41]	0.07	0.09	0.32
GPE leverage (interaction of the previous two variables)	0.14	0.18	0.32
Ease of dialogue	0.24	0.25	0.32
Strains in the education system[42]	-0.16	-0.13	0.32

[34] The source of the data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
[35] The source of the data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
[36] The source of the data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank: https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
[37] The complexity of the education system was connected to service provision involving public and private, central and decentralized actors, religious and secular service providers, and across Ministries responsible for sub-sectors. The measure relied on the qualitative information contained in the CLEs on the importance of actors other than central government in education service delivery.
[38] Data source is the qualitative information contained in the CLEs on whether gaps in capacity at the local level have prevented progress in sector dialog and monitoring
[39] Data source is the qualitative information contained in the CLEs on whether decentralized actors have been involved in sector dialog and monitoring
[40] Collation of quantitative information on ESPIG size contained in the CLEs and census data on country population in 2018
[41] The variable takes the value +1 if the country has joined GPE earlier than the average for CLE countries or -1 if it has joined GPE later than the average for CLEs countries
[42] The strains of education system was a composite indicator including changes in the proportion of people below 15, change in population growth, and change in the education budgets' cuts.

External dependency (financial markets and ODA)[43]	-0.12	-0.20	0.32
External dependency (% of capital expenditure of ESPs covered with donors)[44]	0.14	0.18	0.32
Inequality[45]	0.32	0.24	0.32
Level of development[46]	0.06	0.15	0.32

5.2.2 Additional qualitative information on LEG strategic effectiveness

LEG strategic effectiveness: first measure

Chapter 5.2 reports Figure 3, which presents country performance against the first measure of LEG strategic effectiveness, the CLE's judgement of country progress in dialog and monitoring and how central the LEG was to this progress. The annex complements the chapter by adding qualitative information on what progress countries have experienced.



Figure 3 Number of countries by progress on baseline conditions

6 countries have made strong progress in dialog or monitoring in a situation where the LEG was central for country processes. "Strong progress" does not mean necessarily that the country situation meets the idea scenario of LEG effectiveness according to GPE principles.

1. In Burkina Faso, progress involved increasing the importance of the LEG for the Government and using the LEG to find solutions helpful for implementing the ESP[47]

[43] The variable take the value + 1 if the percentage of external debt and ODA on government revenues (average) is higher than the average for the CLEs' countries and -1 otherwise. Data on external debt, ODA flows, and government revenues provided by the World Bank

[44] The data source is the qualitative information contained in the CLEs on the % of ESP budget that is dedicated to capital expenditures, crossed with CLE information on the % of ESP funding that donors have provided, under the assumption that donor funding is not likely to be used for covering recurrent costs. The variable take the value of + 1 if the CLE report that donors have funded capital expenditure to an extent above the average for CLE countries, and -1 otherwise.

[45] Combination of GINI coefficient provided by the World Bank and measures of ethnic and cultural fractionalization provided by James Fearon (2003). "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country". Journal of Economic Growth. 8: 195–222. doi:10.1023/A:1024419522867 and Alberto Alesina; et al. (2003). "Fractionalization" (PDF). Journal of Economic Growth. 8: 155–194. doi:10.1023/a:1024471506938

[46] Human Development Index

[47] Every time that country information is report, and unless specified otherwise, the reference is to corresponding CLE

2. In Guinea, LEG progress involved broadening the spectrum of issues discussed in the LEG past ESP and ESPIG to include content issues, sector-wide alignment, coordination, and harmonization. The LEG also became more organized and inclusive, and met more frequently
3. In Palikistan-Balochistan, the newly established LEG increased its influence in decision making on specific thematic technical issues and discussed sector-wide coordination
4. In Rwanda, the LEG shared information on its members' activities, coordinated them, and was particularly strong in monitoring the ESP
5. In Togo, the LEG was restructured in 2017, improving substantially from a low baseline. Since then, the LEG has discussed alignment and technical issues, but not harmonization or financing, and has had a central role as the only forum for sector monitoring
6. In Zimbabwe, LEG members discussed a common sense of direction in the education sector. Starting from a low baseline, the LEG acquired a stronger role on monitoring, especially on operation aspects of plan implementation (rather than broader questions of service delivery). Donors managed to use the LEG to increase government accountability.

6 countries have made limited progress in dialogue or monitoring in a situation where LEG is not central to country processes (Bangladesh, DRC, the Gambia, Guyana, Nigeria, South Sudan). Limited progress does not mean that dialogue is necessarily weak.

1. In Bangladesh, dialogue and monitoring happens at the sub-sector level of basic education, which is not consistent with GPE's sector-wide approach. Dialogue processes are strong independently from GPE and did not show marked change, apart from a decrease in CSO inclusion
2. In the DRC, the LEG had met only sporadically after ESP planning and its members are not informed of what is happening in the sector. The absence of monitoring data has constrained the ability of the LEG to influence ESP implementation
3. In The Gambia, the mechanisms for dialogue, of which the LEG is only one and not the most important, have not changed since 2014.
4. In Guyana, the LEG is still to be established and partners have met ad hoc for approving ESP and ESPIG
5. In Nigeria, the LEG was disbanded after ESPIG approval
6. In South Sudan, it was unclear which body constituted the LEG and the LEG was not able to share information and coordinate the sector. Additionally, the sector split according to the development-humanitarian divide.

The remaining 16 countries are in an intermediate position:

- 6 countries have made moderate progress in dialog and monitoring in a situation where the LEG is central to country processes (Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Uganda) or strong progress in dialog or monitoring in a situation where LEG is partly central to country processes (Mozambique).
- 10 countries have made at best moderate progress in dialog and monitoring with LEGs not at the center of dialogue (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Kirgiz Republic, Liberia, Mauritania, Nepal, Zambia) or limited progress with LEG at the centre of dialogue (Malawi, Sierra Leone).

LEG strategic effectiveness: second measure

Chapter 5.2 presents Figure 4, with the summary on number of CLEs that report LEGs discharging core policy dialog functions on the continuum between weaker and stronger sector-wide partnership.

The annex complements the chapter by providing information on which CLEs have reported signs that the LEG discharged a particular policy function effectively.




Figure 4 Number of CLEs that report discussions taking place in LEG

Only 4 CLEs have reported that the LEG has discussed harmonization (Guinea) or strategic sector issues, such as the direction of the education sector in Zimbabwe, the direction of plan implementation in Burkina Faso, and the shaping of the education sector in Balochistan.

8 CLEs report that LEGs proposed recommendations as a consequence of JSRs and discussions that were followed up during ESP implementation. These CLEs are Burkina Faso, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan (Balochistan), Rwanda, and Togo. However, in some cases, the CLEs report that the scope of the recommendations had been limited to operational issues (Liberia, Malawi, and Mali).

19 CLEs report that LEGs discussed coordination and alignment. This include all the CLEs already mentioned and also Cambodia, Cote D'Ivoire, Kenya, Kyrgiz Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, Pakistan (Sindh), Senegal, and Tajikistan.

22 CLEs report that LEGs shared information on what was happening in the sector. This include the CLEs already mentioned and also Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Zambia.

The remaining 6 CLEs report that LEGs were mainly active in ESP and ESPIG development, with limited follow-up activities at the sector level. These CLEs are DRC, the Gambia, Guyana, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Uganda.

5.2.3 LEG effectiveness principles

This section complements the main chapter by providing further methodological explanation, information, and country score for LEG strategic effectiveness and LEG effectiveness principles.

Methodological guidance on LEG effectiveness principles

Table 10 Methodological explanation

The present analysis relies on the description of the LEG effectiveness principles contained on page 14 and following of Global Partnership for Education (2019), Principles towards effective local education groups, Working paper, Global Partnership for Education (2019). Each principle is described in its basic elements, which have been transformed into themes for the thematic analysis of CLEs (see below in this box).

The thematic analysis has yielded signs that suggested that a LEG had met or not the principle. The rich thematic information collected from the CLEs has been coded on a simple three scale judgement: "1" if the signs in the CLE suggest that the LEG fully met the principle, "0" if the signs are mixed and point to progress in some areas with remaining gaps, "-1" if the signs suggest that the LEG does not meet the principle and did not experience progress on this dimension. If a CLE did not report information for that principle, the value has been left blank. The value of 0 should be interpreted as some progress that however does not meet the benchmark for that principle.

The basic elements considered for each principle are:

1. The mandate, functions and objectives are clear and agreed:
    a. Stakeholders have the same understanding of what the LEG should be discussing and achieving
    b. The common understanding is captured in a TOR
    c. The mandate contained in the TOR is realistic and in line with the ESP
    d. The relationship between LEG and other dialogue fora is clear
2. The partnership framework generates inclusion and engagement
    a. Stakeholders that are relevant for ESP planning and implementation participate and engage
    b. Including those with critical perspectives and representing the constellation of Non-State actors
    c. Membership criteria are inclusive
    d. Information and evidence on the topics under discussion is shared in advance
    e. All members can put topics on the agenda according to an official calendar
    f. Stakeholders who could not otherwise participate are supported.
3. There is a clear governance structure for coordination.
    a. LEGs have governance arrangements capable of bringing together a variety of actors
    b. LEGs have governance arrangements that make clear who has the authority over preparing LEG meetings
    c. LEGs have governance arrangements that make clear who has the authority over following up on LEG meetings
    d. At least, the MoE establishes a LEG chair.
    e. The above mentioned LEG governance arrangements are clear to all participants.
4. Working arrangements are flexible, 'fit-for-purpose and well-communicated.
    a. LEGs have robust working practices in organizing the dialogue
    b. There is a road map guiding the dialogue

   c. There is a stakeholder engagement plan, with proper procedures that allow all actors to receive information and participate at the right moment in the road-map.
5. Regular monitoring contributes to learning and improved performance
   a. Participants are transparent with each other
   b. The LEG have set milestone and targets for its performance
   c. The LEG is self-assessing the partnership.
6. Leadership and ownership are demonstrated in practice
   a. Government leads and owns the dialog
   b. Leadership goes beyond high level political commitments and becomes the glue that creates cohesion among the LEG members
7. Key actors contribute to healthy partnership dynamics
   a. There are no undue influences on the way the partners come together
   b. There is a constructive atmosphere
   c. There are no power dynamics and pressures
   d. The coordinating agency galvanize enthusiasm of members without taking away the government's responsibilities).

Table 11 Scores for LEG strategic effectiveness and LEG effectiveness principles

Country	LEG strategic effectiveness (1st measure)[48]	LEG strategic effectiveness (2nd measure)[49]	Clear mandate	Participation	Clear governance	Working arrangements	Regular monitoring	Leadership and ownership	Healthy Partnership dynamics
Bangladesh	1	1	-1	0		-1		0	-1
Burkina Faso	4	4		1	0	1		1	1
Cambodia	2	2		0	0	0		1	0
Cote d'Ivoire	3	2	1	1		1	1	-1	1
DRC	1	0	1	-1	0	-1			-1
The Gambia	1	0	1	1	-1	-1		-1	
Guinea	4	4	-1	0	-1	0	1	0	0
Guyana	1	0	1	-1	0			1	0
Ethiopia	2	1	0	0	1	1		0	
Kenya	2	2	1	0		0		1	1
Kyrgyz Republic	2	2	-1	0		0		0	1
Liberia	2	2.5	-1	0	0	1			0
Malawi	2	2.5	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	1	-1
Mali	3	2.5	0	1	-1	-1		1	
Mauritania	2	1		-1	0	-1	-1	0	
Mozambique	3	2	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1

[48] 4 = the CLE reports that the country has experienced strong progress on dialog or monitoring AND the LEG was central to the progress; 3 = the CLE reports that the country has made moderate progress in dialog and monitoring AND the LEG has been central to that progress; OR the CLE reports that the country has experienced strong progress in dialog or monitoring but the LEG was only partly central center to this progress; 2 = the CLE reports that the country experienced moderate progress in dialog and monitoring AND the LEG was partly central to this progress; OR that the country has experienced limited progress in dialog or monitoring AND the LEG was central to that progress; 1 = the CLE reports that the country experienced limited progress in dialog and monitoring AND the LEG was partly or not at all central for the progress

[49] 4 = the CLE reports that the LEG was involved in strategic discussions or discussions on harmonization; 3 = the CLE reports that the LEG proposed recommendations for improving ESP implementation that have been followed up on; 2 = the CLE reports that the LEG members discussed coordination among each other's and alignment with ESP, 1 = the CLE reports that the LEG members only shared information on the sector, 0 = the CLE reports that the LEG was only active during ESP or ESPIG planning

Country	LEG strategic effectiveness (1st measure)[48]	LEG strategic effectiveness (2nd measure)[49]	Clear mandate	Participation	Clear governance	Working arrangements	Regular monitoring	Leadership and ownership	Healthy Partnership dynamics
Nepal	2	3	0	-1		1			1
Nigeria	1	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	
Pakistan	4	2.5	-1	0	1	0		1	0
Rwanda	4	3		0	1	0	0	1	0
Senegal	3	2	0	0	0	0	1		0
Sierra Leone	2	2	-1	1	1	-1		0	
South Sudan	1	0	-1	-1	-1	-1		-1	-1
Tajikistan	3	2	0	-1		-1		0	1
Togo	4	4	1	1	1	1	0	1	-1
Uganda	3	2	0	-1		-1		1	1
Zambia	2	1	1	0	1	0	-1	1	0
Zimbabwe	4	4	-1	1			1	0	-1
Information available for N countries			24	28	20	26	11	24	20

Qualitative comparative analysis of LEG effectiveness principles

Table 4 presents the background data supporting the qualitative comparative analysis of combinations of LEG effectiveness principles presented in chapter 5.2. Table 12 highlights in blue where a CLE suggests that a country meets a principle and in pink where the CLE suggests that the country does not meet the principle.

Table 12 Qualitative Contribution Analysis

Country	Outcome	Clear Mandate	Participatio	Govern	Working Arrang	Mutual	Govern Leads	Health Partnershisp
Burkina Faso	1		1		1		1	1
Guinea	1	-1		-1		1		-1
Pakistan Bal	1	-1		1		1		
Rwanda	1			1			1	
Togo	1	1	1	1	1		1	-1
Zimbabwe	1	-1	1			1		-1
Bangladesh		-1			-1			-1
DRC		1	-1	-	-1			-1
The Gambia		1	1	-1	-1		-1	
Guyana		1	-1	-1	-1		1	
Nigeria		-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1
South Sudan		-1	-1	-1	-1		-1	-1

Best cases

Burkina Faso: PART AND WA AND OWN AND HEALTHY

Guinea: NO CM AND NO GOVER AND MUTUAL AND No HEALTHY

Pakistan Bal: NO CL AND GOVER AND MUTUAL

Rwanda: GOVERN AND OWNER

Togo: CL AND PART AND GOVER AND WORK AND OWN AND No Healthy

Zimbabwer: NO CM AND PART AND MUTUAL and No Healthy

Average: positive = 2.7 principles are positive.

Worst cases

Bangladesh: No clear mandate AND No work AND no Healthy

DRC: CM AND No PART AND No work AND No Healthy

The Gambia: CM AND PART AND No Govern AND No Work AND No Own

Guyana: CM AND OWNER AND No Part AND No Gov AND no Worki AND No Mutual account

Nigeria: All Nos

South Sudan: All Nos

Average: positive = 0.8. None of them had more than 2 positives and one of the positives was the clear mandate. Average negative = 3.6. You need to avoid having more than 2 principles in a negative state.

Box 1 Qualitative comparative analysis

Additional qualitative information on LEG effectiveness principles

Principle 1 - Clear mandate

Clear mandate of the LEG is not associated with LEG strategic effectiveness**.** QCA confirms this finding because it shows that the best performers report on average a less clear mandate than the worst performers do. The pathways driving this relationship are:

- Mandates that are clear on paper are not be implemented (DRC and Guyana).
- Formal TORs that are comprehensive of a LEG's mandate might not be understood by LEG members, which, however, still able use LEGs for what they need (Pakistan Balochistan).
- Formal TORs call for a complex structure that is difficult to implement effectively (Senegal)
- A clear mandate contains the mandate that LEG focus on ESP development and ESPIG development rather than monitoring (the Gambia).
- The LEGs that are most strategically effective might evolve to take on more authority rather than limiting itself to their original mandate (Guinea and Zimbabwe).

- Underlying power dynamics might render the mandate irrelevant, such as Troika groupings making actual decisions in Kenya, Mozambique, and Rwanda, which might make the LEG strategically effective in discharging its functions (at a cost of effective participation)

In the cases where the lack of clear mandate was detrimental for LEG strategic effectiveness, the CLEs report that confusion in mandate had arisen when a country takes positive steps in establishing other domestic *fora* for dialogue, for example at the legislative level (Kirgizstan and to some extent Mozambique) or at the sub-sector of basic education. It had also arisen when two bodies are created that are supposed to do the same thing but the LEG is a smaller body that allows task-oriented and consensus-based decision-making (Liberia and Nepal). In yet another case, confusion was linked to the multiplicity of fora across the development – humanitarian divide that creates the confusion (South Sudan)

Principle 2 - effective participation

The data collection and coding discounted the cases where formal participation did not translate into actual participation: these cases were scored as if there was no effective participation.

Thematic analysis of the CLEs and interviews with Universalia evaluators suggest that culture and power matter in shaping participation. For example, interviews with Universalia evaluators revealed that in Bangladesh and Kirgizstan authority figures are expected to sit down for dialogue with civil society, but not necessarily to accept suggestions. In Kenya, a standing invitation to the LEGs coexist with the Troika of donors making decisions.

This relationship coexist with and keeps into consideration the fact that there are substantial capacity constraints to CSOs umbrella organizations and TUs (Ethiopia), and that relationship between TUs and government can be conflictual (Guinea). These cases have also been coded as not being fully participatory.

The association presented here miss however the concerns coming from some CLEs, interviews with Education International, and the evaluation of CSEF support around the internal democracy of some LEG members, such as CSOs umbrellas and TUs, and how well they represent their members.[50]

Gaps in participation can be about any LEG members, with LEGs sometimes not being attended by senior government staff (Mozambique, Malawi, and Kyrgyzstan). Other times it is other actors relevant for ESP implementation that are missing, such as the private sector, religious actors, and decentralised actors. The context will clarify which of these actors are relevant, because, for example, they have important roles as managers or service providers in the education system (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and Togo).

The GPE model does not have a clear position on the size of the LEGs and trade-off between participation and effectiveness. The thematic analysis of CLEs suggest that in some countries, the education sectors host only a few donors which makes attending the LEG useless, fragile to just one donor defecting, or not-interesting (Ivory Coast, Guinea, Guyana, Togo). Sometimes, the forum of discussion is so large that it becomes ineffective or includes actors in conflict of interest with policy

[50] CSEF evaluation

setting, such as actors delivering education participating in establishing rules that are meant to regulate their behaviours (Cambodia, Senegal, and Liberia).

Principle 3 - clear governance

Clear governance structure is associated with LEG strategic effectiveness, when considering the gap between governance on paper and in practice, and, therefore, discounting the cases where governance structures are established on paper but not applied in practice. This is the case of DRC, Guyana, Togo, where Presidential Decrees establish the governance structure for the LEG, but have not been applied. The CLE for Guinea suggests that clearer governance that make transparent the criteria for decisions might also make more transparent conflicts that exist in other LEGs in a more subterranean fashion.

The thematic analysis reveal what gaps in governance the LEGs face:

- In Malawi and Cambodia, the absence of criteria for deciding who should attend the LEGs, which make the process seems unfair to the stakeholders excluded from the LEG
- The CLEs for Liberia, Mali, and Mauritania report confusion over roles and responsibilities for follow up, especially if implementing follow-up actions involve additional costs not budgeted for as part of ESPs
- In Nepal, the lack of replication of dialogue mechanism at the appropriate decentralised levels, whereas this was done well in Pakistan
    - Lack of anchoring of the JSRs in the government policy cycle (Rwanda).

Some instruments of clear governance have an ambigous relationship with LEG strategic effectiveness: they worked well in some cases and less in others, pointing to the importance of fitting the context. In particular,

- The use of technical working groups. The information contained in the CLEs suggests that there are two models of technical groups inside LEGs: thematic working groups devoted to discussing education issues and task-forces devoted to discharging specific tasks. The CLE for Senegal reports that the LEG had too many sub-groups and also a plenary assembly that was too large for being effective. The consequence was that decision-making remained with the Central Committee and its limited membership. In Guinea, the LEGs established working groups as an opportunity for broader participation, but these working groups did not actually meet. The CLEs for Mozambique and Bangladesh reported that the LEG deleted working groups and replaced them with task-oriented consultants, clearly because the working groups were perceived not to work. The CLEs however do not report the effect that this substitution had on LEG strategic effectiveness. The CLE for Burkina Faso reports that some of the LEG's thematic working group were effective and some not. However, the CLEs for Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Rwanda report that thematic and working groups were effective for stakeholders' coordination. The CLE for Sierra Leone reports that issue-specific working groups worked well during Ebola as task forces. In Zambia, the LEG's sub-committees did not deal with educaction issues, like the cases just outlined, but with tasks such as procurement.
- The CLEs for Cambodia, Mali, Mauritania, and Kenya report that LEGs used co-chairing or rotating chairing arrangements inside Government, between donors, and mixed Donors and Government.

They suggest that the main reason for adoption of this structure is sharing the burden of leading and coordinating the LEG, but are not clear if this leads to improvements of LEG strategic effectiveness

- The CLE for Senegal suggests that constituency based representation in LEGs can create tensions inside stakeholder groups which share a representation in LEGs, for example inside umbrella organizations for CSOs and TUs organizations.

Principle 4 – fit-for-purpose working arrangements

Clear working arrangements are associated with LEG effectiveness, and the thematic analysis presents some of the pathways that might connect the two variables.

The absence of a standing calendar and agenda for meetings is associated with LEGs meeting only when a need arises (Bangladesh, the Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia). Some LEGs have an agenda, which they follow irregularly (Sindh, Tajikistan, Uganda). When the LEGs have a clear calendar, they meet more often, between once per month in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, and once per quarter in Cambodia. The calendar of LEGs meetings is sometimes influenced by the ESP or ESPIG development which requires more frequent meetings (Balochistan). Sometimes, technical working groups are used to meet more often (Rwanda and Senegal), especially when meeting in the plenary has cost-implications for the government.

Some LEGs have weak procedures for information sharing in advance and after meetings (DRC, the Gambia, Malawi). The CSEF evaluation suggests that this is especially the case for sharing information with civil society.

An aspect on which the CLEs are silent is the presence of procedures or facilitation techniques during LEG meetings that ensur that all LEG members have a voice in it. Follow up interviews with the CLEs evaluators have yielded anedoctial evidence that during LEG meetings the most senior government official speaks the longest, donors also have a voice, but CSOs mainly ask questions rather than contributing their views in discussions between equals (Cambodia).

The CLEs suggest that short meeting times (1.5 – 2 hours) do not allow to properly discuss the sector (Mali, Sierra Leone). They also suggest that sessions for JSRs of 1-2 days might be too short for reviewing the sector (Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan). The consequence of rushed-through processes is that stakeholders feel like they are only validating decisions already taken, rather than having a real advisory function.

Plugging the LEG in the government systems as the expanded form of internal government working groups seems to have worked in Mozambique.

Principle 5 – monitoring and learning on the partnership

The present analysis defines mutual accountability as the extent to which the LEGs monitor its own practice with a view in improving it. The CLEs contain more limited information on this dimension, only 11 CLEs report on this dimension, which suggests that it has not been a wide-spread practice during the review period.

This is already changing thanks to the self-assessment project launched by the Secretariat in 20 volunteer LEGs, which are given tools for self-assessing their expertience as LEGs. Three countries have already used the self-assessment tool and generated preliminary results.

Mutual accountability for LEG functions has taken different forms in the countries that have made progress on it. JSRs have been used for changing LEGs practices in Ivory Coast, but not as a widespread practice. Zimbabwe's ESP result framework contains targets for the regular functioning of the LEG, which the LEG monitors. Having and monitoring a list of follow-up actions from meetings (Guinea) helps in ensuring that the LEG members are accountable also for the way that they organise their work. Consultants can be used as impartial and neutral instrument to revise the LEGs tools and working practices (Togo).

Sometimes, the CLEs for Malawi and Zimbabwe report that DCP governments have felt that the reciprocity in the mutual0 accountability relationship was off-balancem, because the DCP government had felt that it was held to account much more than donors and other development partners were.

Principle 6 – DCP leadership and ownership

The high score on government ownership is driven by the fact that LEGs are most often chaired by the government, with remaining gaps reported in some CLEs. 4 LEGs are still chaired by the DPs (South Sudan, the Gambia, Ivory Coast, and Tajikistan) and other LEGs are co-chaired with DPs (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi). In some cases, the unit responsible for monitoring the ESPIG is a programme implementation unit dedicated to donors' projects rather than the standing unit for ESP implementation (Mauritania, Guinea). In only one CLE did respondents describe the country partnership as the GPE (Uganda).

The lack of association with LEG strategic effectiveness highlights that the definition of real ownership and leadership is more nuanced and difficult to measure, involving a subjective sense of urgency in meeting LEGs tasks and agency, which the CLEs have not reported on consistently.

The thematic analysis of the CLEs suggest the main pathways that underly the lack of association.

Ownership by a Ministry does not mean ownership by the whole of DCP Governments (the CLEs for Bangladesh, Senegal, Guinea, Nigeria). LEGs sometimes recognise this and establish co-chairing arrangements between Ministries.

Formal chairing is not the same as effective leadership (as in the case of Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia). Lack of proper staffing in government prevents Ministries for Education from being effective in leading, because staff attending the LEG is not senior enough for decision-making (Mozambique, Nigeria). Interviews with Universalia evaluators reveal that in some cases donors try to balance respecting government ownership and leadership with trying to direct tactfully the leader.

In some cases, DCP governments own processes that they have tailored to their preferred policy models, which are not consistent with GPE model of LEG strategic effectiveness. As an example, the monitoring model adopted in Cambodia is not necessarily consistent with GPE principles of two-way mutual accountability, but is owned by Government.

Elections can change the level of Government ownership (Guyana) as does turn-over of senior staff in the Ministry of Education.

Principle 7 – contribution to healthy partnership dynamics

The CLEs were not designed to pick up systematically dynamics of partnerships, which cautions the reader in using the findings in this section as preliminary only, pending the richer information from the self-assessment project.

The thematic analysis suggests the pathways underlying the lack of association between the information contained in the CLEs on healthy partnership dynamics and on LEG strategic effectiveness.

Firstly, the definition of healthy partnership in terms of collegial relationship that is not accompanied by undue influences connected to power-dynamics might not be realistic. Tensions might arise on specific important issues, such as the choice of the GA, that can then blow over. This tends to happen more in LEGs that are more involved in decision-making (Malawi with the variable tranche and Guinea with the choice of the GA).

The thematic analysis also suggest the driving factors for the health of the partnership:

- A country's tradition in dialogue or SWAPs arrangements. The constructive atmosphere is inherited from previous cooperation (Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Nepal, Uganda)
- Generosity of the CA in expending time and resources in coordinating LEGs
- Openness to reform in the MoE which wants the same as the donors (Cambodia)[51]
- Conflict of interest create tensions in the partnership (such as the WB assuming a dual GA and CA role in Ivory Coast)
- The role of the GA can create problems, both when it is absent from meetings (such as the WB in DRC and Togo) and when it takes on a role that is closer to that of the CA (Kenya)
- Troika systems create in-group / out-group systems that make the in-group happy and the out-group unhappy (Rwanda)
- LEG members have felt that dialogue was redundant and heavy when they have to attend many other fora (Liberia and Mozambique) or useless if the dialogue is not sustained by a proper format and data (South Sudan, Zambia, Ethiopia).
- The LEG is a space for growing familiarity between people involved, but this mechanism is made ineffective by strong turn-over (Kirgiz Republic).

[51] Even though it is remarkable that Cambodia does not show the same openness to its civil society. In 2012, the Cambodia Independent Teachers Association (CITA) through Education International has filed a complaint against Cambodia's non-compliance with the 1966 ILO–UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Teachers. he submission by CITA in essence alleges that there was a lack of a consultative framework for teachers and teachers' organizations to participate in the development of education policies.

5.2.4 GPE contribution

This section provides sources and details on the contribution of mechanisms in GPE model to sector dialog and monitoring, focusing on the pathways connecting GPE contribution to LEG strategic effectiveness and to the drivers of GPE contribution.

Methodological explanation

The analysis relies on the CLEs' judgement, which is on three-point scale of contribution being "modest", "modestly visible", and "visible". The CLE find a basis for this judgement in the contribution analysis they conducted at the country-level based on triangulated information and primary data collection.

Additionally, the thematic analysis of the CLEs yielded additional information that links parts of GPE model to LEG strategic effectiveness, which has been collected and aggregated across CLEs, reporting themes that are reported in three CLEs or more.

Additional qualitative information

Coordinating Agency

The thematic analysis of CLEs suggest that CAs contributed to LEG strategic effectiveness by ensuring regular and well-organized meetings (Guinea, Mali, Senegal), with a special mention for UNICEF role in challenging environments (Kirgiz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, South Sudan). In other cases, the CA contribution was in creating a common voice among donors, thereby increasing their leverage with government (Tajikistan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe).

The level of effort for the CA depends on the context. Some countries have education sectors more complex, and therefore difficult to coordinate (see for example the difference in terms of number and spread of relevant actors in DRC and Nigeria and countries compared to Guyana and Togo). In challenging environments, donors have in some cases divided the CA role in rotating arrangements.

CA effectiveness is facilitated by the presence of full time education advisers (Zambia).

Variable tranche

The variable Tranche supports dialogue in offering clear discussion points. Stakeholders can design and monitor together results' indicators (Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, , and at the decentralised level in Nepal) and attract attention to selected key topics (for example, teachers' training in Mozambique, decentralization in Nepal). However, the fact that these discussions involve money sometimes lead to an amount of discussions disproportionate to the importance of the topic (Cambodia, Malawi). In other cases, discussions are rushed through if there is not enough data for actually monitoring the varibale trache (DRC).

Secretariat country leads

During the strategy period, secretariat country leads had a more visible role in country because of the demands posed on them by GPE new quality assurance process for ESP and JSRs.[52] The thematic review of CLEs suggest that the contribution of Secretariat CLs was in facilitating and explaining GPE

[52] CLE synthesis 2020

model and its processes to country-level stakeholders (Cambodia, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), with a weaker role in participating in and supporting the LEGs. Another important role was that of advocate for broadening participation in LEGs but with mixed effects. The CLEs for Bangladesh, Guyana, Malawi report that the advocacy was without effect, the CLEs for Burkina Faso, Guinea that it had a limited effect, and the CLEs for Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone that it was effective.

The strenght of the CL's role, compared to the CA and other LEG members, is its neutrality because CLs are not based in the country and are perceived as not having individual interests. However, this features is also a weakness, because it limits their influence on country processes.

Additionally, Secretariat staff in the policy team had a role in conducting follow-up activities and reflection on the role of the LEG, through a process kick-started by the EPR. The process has led to launching the LEG self-assessment tool, discussing the introduction of a compensation for CAs and incentives for JSRs.

In this process, the Board also had a role in providing overall direction, such refusing to approve minimum standards for LEGs and moving the discussions towards principles instead.

ESPIG funding

A thematic analysis of the CLEs suggest that ESPIG funding contributed to strenghtening sector monitoring by funding DCP governments' data collection and analysis, without the funding being sufficient in ensuring that data quality meets GPE standards for JSRs (Burkina Faso, Cambodia, the Gambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Kirgiz Republic, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and Togo).

ESPIGs have in a limited number of cases funded data collection at the decentralised level (Guinea).

Other channels for contribution have been re-building the trust of donors in working with DCP governnments after scandals in the use of donor funds (Kenya and Malawi) or motivating the establishment of coordination structures when provided as a sector pooled fund or budget support (Senegal, Uganda).

The CLEs also suggest that planning for the ESPIG is a good reason for LEGs to meet when there are no other reasons connected to the sector (Bangladesh,Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tajikistan), but in general the ESPIG is often not a of large enough to sustain sector dialogue.

ESPDG funding

The thematic analysis of the CLEs reports that going through the process of planning helps in making country stakeholders understand that GPE is not a bilater donor but a partnership interested in the sector (Bangladesh).

The ESPDG's contribution has commonly been in the form of establishing the evidence for the ESP through the Education Sector Analysis (Guinea, Rwanda, South Sudan, Togo, Uganda).

CSEF funding

The contribution of the CSEF was in the form of establishing umbrella coalitions for civil society and strenghtening the ones that already existed in activities they implemented. This is important because CLEs have identified that capacity constraints for CSOs impeded their participation to JSRs and meetings in at least in 6 countries (Guinea, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tajikistan). The limited effect of this form of support is due to the national CSO beneficiary not being able to participate in the LEGs (Kirghiz Republic), not being present in the LEGs with an effective voice, or because of perduring capacity gaps (Rwanda).

Multiplier

The multiplier does not seem to lead to meaningful and transparent conversation around additionality of funds (such was the case of Senegal, for example).

Models alternative to GPE model

The thematic analysis of the CLEs suggest that some countries prefer dialog platforms and monitoring models different from GPE's principles for LEGs and JSRs. In 7 CLE countries, the Government had prioritized conducting monitoring with other platforms and models rather than LEGs and JSRs, such as presentation-style conferences where interaction between presenter and participant is limited (Cambodia, Guyana, the Gambia, Guinea Ethiopia, Senegal, and Togo). For example,

- In Ethiopia and Cambodia, the preferred model of monitoring was a presentation-style conference
- In Guyana and the Gambia, the government established a travelling inspection forum to inspect local schools in different parts of the country
- Senegal prioritized tracking a presidential initiative that was wider than education but included only 3-4 key indicators for education.
- Guinea conducted dialogue on teachers' strikes with the involvement of the Presidency, outside of the LEGs and the ESP planning proces
- In other 3 CLE countries, there are reports that the JSR model is too expensive or heavy in terms of effort for the resources of the Government (Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania).

The role of consultants in GPE model

The role of consultants for dialog and monitoring inside the GPE TOC is not regulated in the GPE model. The use of consultants for monitoring was negative in Nigeria and Kirgiz Republic because it generated knowledge and capacity that is not shared with the country stakeholders. It was positive in Togo in creating a working system that could be accepted by all LEG members, but with problems of sustainability. It was also positive in Nigeria in terms of supporting the CA capacity for coordination. The knowledge embodied in the CLEs also by and large remains with the Secretariat rather than country-level stakeholders.

The role of the result framework for ESP

The thematic analysis of CLEs suggest that ESP RFs have seldom found a balance between monitoring at the outcomes level and monitoring at the outputs / activity level. When one of the two levels was absent, the CLEs report challenges in combining information on results effectiveness for stronger education systems with accountability on whether the results are due to the good implementation of the ESP against what planned.

The analysis conducted above relied on the simple aggregation of contribution statements in CLEs. However, correlating the CLEs contribution scores with LEG effectiveness show that higher GPE contribution is not associated with LEG effectiveness for most of the GPE mechanisms.

Qualitative comparative analysis of GPE contribution

Qualitative comparative analysis (Table 13) shows that GPE contribution is not necessary for a strategically effective LEG (cases of Burkina Faso and Pakistan Balochistan). It can be sufficient in some cases, such as Togo where the use of external consultants strenghtened the monitoring function of the LEG, but not in others, such as South Sudan, where the context was particularly challenging.

LEGs that are strategically effective cases have an higher average number of GPE mechanisms providing visible contribution, compared to cases where LEGs are not strategically effectiveness (0.7).

Piecing all together, the QCA suggests that GPE contribution is helpful for LEG strategic effectiveness, but is often blocked in the least favourable contexts and sometimes not necessary in the best favourable contexts.

Table 13 Qualitative comparative analysis of GPE contribution

Country	Outcome	ESPIG prospect	ESPIG	ESPDG	CSEF	Secr. Advocacy	CA Advocacy	VT	MT
Burkina Faso	1	1	1						
Guinea	1	1	3	3		2	2		
Pakistan Bal	1	1		1	2	2			
Rwanda	1	2	1	2	1	1	3		
Togo	1		3	3	3	3	2		
Zimbabwe	1	1	1		3	3	2	1	
Bangladesh	0	3	1		1	1	2		
DRC	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
The Gambia	0	1	1			1			
Guyana	0	1	1			1			
Nigeria	0			1	1	1	1		
South Sudan	0	2	2	3	2	3	3		

5.2.5 Capability, motivation, and leverage of LEG members

Methodological explanation

The analysis relies on the qualitative information reported consistently in the CLEs on the contribution of technical capability, motivation, and leverage to progress on sector dialog and monitoring.

This rich qualitative information is already causal in nature because the CLE evaluators' have judged whether capability, motivation, and leverage has had a role as contributing factor or barrier to progress to dialog or monitoring, and how this has impacted the GPE TOC.

The present analysis has translated the rich qualitative judgement into a three-point scale: -1 if the CLE reports that gaps in capability, motivation, or leverage had negative contribution to sector progress and dialog, +1 if they had a positive contribution, and 0 if the situation was mixed. It has considered separately three dimensions of capacity: 1) technical capacity for collecting data; 2) technical capacity for analyzing the data; and 3) general information about government bodies being under-resourced.

Alongside, this coded information, the analysis has also relied on a thematic analysis of the dimensions of technical capacity, motivation, and leverage that the CLEs have mentioned more frequently. This second type of analysis has allowed to fit additional categories of technical capacity based on what the CLEs mentioned more often.

The analysis has conducted firstly a correlation between this measure of contribution of capacity, motivation, and leverage to sector progress and dialog with LEG strategic effectiveness. However, the actual findings rely on the thematic analysis of CLEs for explaining the pathways at work behind the simple correlation, with the results that the findings presented in the chapter rely much more on the thematic analysis than on the correlations.

Table 14 Country scores - Capability, motivation, and leverage of LEG members

Country	LEG strategic effectiveness (1st measure)[53]	LEG strategic effectiveness (2nd measure)[54]	Technical Capacity to collect data	Technical Capacity to analyze data	Under resourcing government bodies	Motivation	Leverage
Bangladesh	1	1	-1	-1		-1	-1
Burkina Faso	4	4	-1	-1		1	1
Cambodia	2	2	-1	-1		-1	
Cote d'Ivoire	3	2	-1	-1	-1	-1	1
DRC	1	0	-1	-1		-1	-1
The Gambia	1	0	1	1		1	
Guinea	4	4	-1			0	
Guyana	1	0	1	1		-1	-1
Ethiopia	2	1	-1	-1	-1	0	
Kenya	2	2	-1			0	1
Kyrgyz Republic	2	2	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Liberia	2	2.5				1	1
Malawi	2	2.5	0	0		0	1
Mali	3	2.5	-1	-1	-1		-1
Mauritania	2	1	-1			-1	1
Mozambique	3	2	1	1		1	0
Nepal	2	3	1	1	1	0	1

[53] 4 = the CLE reports that the country has experienced strong progress on dialog or monitoring AND the LEG was central to the progress; 3 = the CLE reports that the country has made moderate progress in dialog and monitoring AND the LEG has been central to that progress; OR the CLE reports that the country has experienced strong progress in dialog or monitoring but the LEG was only partly central center to this progress; 2 = the CLE reports that the country experienced moderate progress in dialog and monitoring AND the LEG was partly central to this progress; OR that the country has experienced limited progress in dialog or monitoring AND the LEG was central to that progress; 1 = the CLE reports that the country experienced limited progress in dialog and monitoring AND the LEG was partly or not at all central for the progress

[54] 4 = the CLE reports that the LEG was involved in strategic discussions or discussions on harmonization; 3 = the CLE reports that the LEG proposed recommendations for improving ESP implementation that have been followed up on; 2 = the CLE reports that the LEG members discussed coordination among each other's and alignment with ESP, 1 = the CLE reports that the LEG members only shared information on the sector, 0 = the CLE reports that the LEG was only active during ESP or ESPIG planning

Nigeria	1	0	-1	-1		-1	-1
Pakistan	4	2.5	1	1		1	0
Rwanda	4	3	1	1		1	0
Senegal	3	2	1	-1		0	0
Sierra Leone	2	2	-1			0	1
South Sudan	1	0	-1			0	
Tajikistan	3	2	0	0		0	1
Togo	4	4	-1	-1	-1		1
Uganda	3	2	-1	-1		0	1
Zambia	2	1	-1			-1	1
Zimbabwe	4	4	-1	-1	-1	-1	0

5.2.6 Additional qualitative information

Motivation

Interviews with Universalia evaluators point to motivation by DCP governments being driven by the social contract in the country, a fictional contract that embodies what the government is expected to provide to its citizens if they are to consider it legitimate. If the government, which is the embodiment of the social contract, does not see value in dialog, transparency, or a strong performance in delivering education, then a dialog as expected in GPE mode, on education and focused on accountability and transparency, will not happen.

The CLEs' evaluators suggest that GPE can find signs that the social contract has space for the LEGs that are strategically effective lie in the country scores on transparency, democracy, and individual freedom and in the reciprocity between society and government: what the government provides, including education, to the citizens in exchange for their broad acceptance of the legitimacy of the political system that produced the government.

The thematic analysis of the CLEs also suggest that the assumption in GPE TOC that government will be open for dialogue and that LEG members, especially CSOs, will have the freedom to operate is not always true.[55] The evaluation of CSEF support has found that NECs are able to partly navigate around some of this bloackages.

The fact that the LEGs often operates at the technical rather than the political level also helps, because it allows mid-level civil servants to continue dialogue possible in challenging political environments (Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, Bangladesh).

The thematic analysis of the CLEs and the CSEF evaluation also suggests that the assumption in GPE model that CSOs and TUs will be representative of the needs of their constituent is also not always true.[56] The evaluation of the CSEF support and the summative evaluation of the Global and the evaluation of the project "Improving Teacher Support and Participation in Local Education Groups (LEGs)" found that governments tend to favour participation by CSOs and TUs that already endorse the Government.

The CLEs suggest the presence of lack of motivation in government staff to cooperate across departments as they prefer to protect their areas of responsibility and of their dedicated funds. This happens inside the between the Ministries and Agencies responsable basic and secondary education and also across sectors and levels of government (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal).

The CLE also note that the lack of motivation of government staff is also connected to the accountability focus of dialog in LEGs (Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Kirghiz Republic, Mozambique, Nepal, Tajikistan, Uganda).

[55] Oxford Policy Management. EVALUATION OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EDUCATION (GPE)'S SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT. 2018.
[56] Ockham IPS. Summative Evaluation of the Project "Improving Teacher Support and Participation in Local Education Groups (LEGs)." 2018.

The CLEs also report cases where development partners are primarily interested in documenting and discussing their own results, rather than discussing sector progress and coordination (Cambodia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia).

The presence of other strong dialogue bodies, for example at the sub-sector level, limit the motivation of LEG members to participate in yet another dialogue forum (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kyrghiz Republic, Rwanda, Zambia, Zimbabwe).

Government staff feel motivated to participate in dialogue when a strong performance in providing education is part of the social contract (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Pakistan, Rwanda). In some of these governments, citizens see education as important is Similarly, social contracts might commit the government to dialog (Mozambique, Pakistan, Senegal) or to transparency in government action (Rwanda and Senegal).

Incentives and disincentives for collaborating are sometimes a source of motivation for Government staff (Mauritania, Nepal, Senegal). For example, in Senegal, LEG members felt that the CA did not have the right incentive for discharging its coordination function, because it had an interest in favouring one side in the discussions. In Cote d'Ivoire, mixing the CA and GA role in the WB generated a perceived conflict of interest, which again prevented the WB from being an effective facilitator. Resource sharing was an important explanation for presence or lack of cooperation in Mauritania and Nepal. In Mauritania, the CLE suggests that the lack of collaboration between Ministries under GPE model was connected to the fact that only one of the Ministries responsible for education received funding from GPE. In Nepal, the CLE suggests that a fund sharing agreement between central and local government motivated the local government in collecting education data needed by central governmnt.

Governments have also been interested in maintaining bilateral discussions, alongside multilateral ones (Cambodia), which have limited its motivation for participating in sector wide dialogue.

Change in Government or reshuffling of education Ministers change the interest in implementing decisions made by previous Governments (Guyana).

The presence of a crisis, such as Ebola in Liberia, motivated LEG members to connect more.

Media attention have also been a potent motivation factor for effective dialog and monitoring in Liberia, where the JSR was object of strong media coverage.

GPE Leverage

Leverage of actors inside the LEGs is associated with LEG strategic effectiveness, as a contributing factor when leverage have been in actors aligned with GPE model.

The thematic analysis of the CLEs suggest that leverage have been driven by:

- For donors and civil society, being able to speak with a common voice and being part of a Global movement
- For GPE, a large size of the ESPIG as a % of international donor funding

- For all actors involved, using ESPIG dialogue as a topic of discussion to revitalise dialogue that had left good impressions in the past but had run out of steam at the political level (Uganda)
- For GPE, if the government had bought in the sector-wide, common standards, and mutual accountability premises of GPE model. In situations where the DCP government had not bought into elements of this mode, GPE has found its leverage limited, for example in Bangladesh, Kirghiz Republic, and Nigeria
- For GPE, an effective CA is an additional source of leverage,
- For GPE, the DCP government sitting on the GPE Board has been an element of leverage, (Kenya).

Technical capacity

The thematic review of the CLEs, the CSEF evaluation, thematic papers prepared by the Secretariat, and the evaluation of GRA 10 suggest the capacity gaps that different actors have experienced.

All LEG members have experienced gaps in the capacity for communicating and sharing information across the global, regional, and local level

TUs and CSOs have experienced gaps in organizational and technical capacity. Sometimes CSOs have had to be established from scratch. Sometimes, proficiency in English was a problem (Nepal). In other cases, the organizational capacity gap was in the ability of existing umbrella organizations in financing its activities and manage its members (Rwanda)

CSOs have experienced gaps in their capacity for advocacy, because donors do not traditionally fund this type of activities. This limited the presence of strong research skills in CSOs.[57]

DCP governments have experienced gaps in their coordination capacity because of heavy workloads, staff turnover, and staff attrition, including:

- Gaps in the capacity of the central level to coordinate, lead, and facilitate decentralised actors (Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan)
- Gaps in the capacity of the department chairing the LEG for inter-ministerial coordination (4 – Bangladesh, Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal).

DCP governments have experienced gaps in establishing a system for monitoring. Data quality, data coverage, data accuracy, and data reliability have been the biggest challenges in the system, driven by:

- Logistical challenges to nation-wide monitoring connected to transport and IT infrastructure to communicate timely (DRC, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kirghiz Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe).
- Lack of technical capacity in in the government agency that collects statistics for the education sector at the outcome and impact level (Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).

[57] Oxford Policy Management. EVALUATION OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EDUCATION (GPE)'S SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT. 2018.

- Lack of a data quality assurance system (DRC, Malawi, Kenya for the school level, Nigeria, Uganda) and concerns about the census data used as a denominator (Guinea, Kenya).
- Lack of coordination between parallel EMIS (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kirghiz Republic, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia).
- In some cases, the gap is not on the collection, but rather on the analysis of the data (such as Senegal).
- Lack of capacity for turning JSRs findings into a limited number of realistic recommendations (Sierra Leone and Senegal)
- Absence of a dedicated unit focused on monitoring the sector plan in the government system (Kirghiz Republic and Tajikistan), and reliyng on ad hoc structures funded by donors (Guinea, Mauritania).
- Turn-over had also been recognised as a source of capacity gaps (Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Togo).
- Lack of supporting legal framework and financial resources for the EMIS (Kyrghiz Republic, Mali).
- The security situation can hamper the capacity to move around for participating to meetings: Pakistan for the WB in Balochistan and USAID in South Sudan.
- Gaps on data collected on vulnerable groups of learners (Ethiopia and Senegal).

Structural Factors

This section provides additional information on some of the structural factors for which the CLEs report qualitative information.

Presence of other fora for dialogue in the education sector

Another dialogue body that had similar composition and dialog focus existed in 17 of the 28 CLEs, and often more than one such bodies existed (for example, Mozambique and Kirgiz Republic). The thematic analysis of the CLEs has suggested that the other bodies could be classified as:

- Dialogue bodies at the basic education level (Bangladesh)
- Program steering committees for the ESPs (Bangladesh, Mauritania, Nigeria, Zambia)
- Humanitarian cluster bodies (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Myanmar, and South Sudan)
- Parliamentary oversight bodies (Kyrgiz Republic, South Sudan
- Separate bodies for engaging CSOs and TUs, sometimes held by Government (Guinea, Kyrgiz Republic, Liberia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and sometimes by donors (Cambodia)
- Inter-Ministerial Task Forces (Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Pakistan
- Education Donors Group (DRC, Guyana, Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe)
- Roadmaps for consultations for higher policy development (Ethiopia,
- Informal Troika groupings of important donors (Kenya, Rwanda)
- High-level Conferences(Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nigeria)
- Decentralised dialogue at the district level (Rwanda).

Education system factors

The CLEs did not track systematically the impact of specific education issues on dialogue. Instead, regression and QCA analysis have been replaced here by thematic analysis of the patchy information

provided by the CLEs and of the more complete overview provided by the thematic studies of GPE portfolio conducted by the Secretariat on teachers, gender, and equality and inclusion.[58]

Based on thematic analysis of CLEs and thematic studies, discussions about teachers' salaries creates tensions between Teachers' Unions and Government, at least when teachers' unions were not affiliated with Government. However, the CLEs report that discussions on teachers' salaries do not usually happen in the LEGs, despite the importance of the teachers' salaries for government budgets and plans.[59]

The teachers' thematic study suggests that discussions around complex issues involving teachers' behavior change during service provision, expansion of the number of teachers, and their allocation on the territory are more difficult than discussions on providing inputs for teaching, yet also more rewarding.[60]

The teachers' thematic study found that ESPs and ESPIGs are likely to identify shortages of teachers, problems with teaches being actually in the classrooms, and low levels of learning time as important challenges, but less likely to propose matching activities. Instead, they propose strategies related to more inputs, such as better curriculum, teacher's guides, and pre-service and in-service training, even when these are not identified challenges. These interventions that GPE funds most frequently – such as textbooks, teachers' guides, and pre-service training – draw from weak or mixed evidence bases. Approaches for which the evidence of success is stronger usually require a broader systemic responses.

The thematic studies on equality, inclusion, and gender also report disconnects between challenges identified in ESPs and proposed strategies in ESPs and ESPIGs. Many countries which identify barriers relating to socioeconomic status, ethnic group, urban areas or language groups are not proposing activities explicitly for the benefit of these groups. Conversely, many ESPs propose strategies on disability, vulnerable children (such as orphans), emergency or crisis-affected areas, and remote or hard-to-reach areas, without having identified barriers relating to these groups or areas.

One possible reason for disconnect is that the first category include in-group / out-group divisions based on status, ethnic group, and language, whereas the second group cuts across politically salient groups. The political science literature has identified forms of group instinct as important predictor of difficulties in dialogue, because dialogue is easier with members of the in-group, which are peers, than with members of other groups.[61] The situation is more nuanced in the case of refugees. Refugees are often the quintessential alien group for which governments feel limited responsibility. However, the international framework for the protection of refugee is relatively strong, connected to an

[58] Bullard, Katy, et al. Thematic Review: Teachers and Teaching. Feb. 2020.
Cameron, Stuart. Thematic Review: Equity and Inclusion. Feb. 2020.
GPE Secretariat. EPL Thematic Study Gender Equality. Feb. 2020.
[59] Interviews with UNESCO and Ockham IPS. Summative Evaluation of the Project "Improving Teacher Support and Participation in Local Education Groups (LEGs)." 2018.
[60] Bullard, Katy, et al. Thematic Review: Teachers and Teaching. Feb. 2020.
[61] Chua, Amy. POLITICAL TRIBES : Group Instinct and the Fate of Nations. Penguin Press, 2018.

international convention and a dedicated UN agency, UNHCR, and, recently, also to a Fund that has education for refugees as priority, Education Cannot Wait.

Inequalities in access or outcome between public and private schools, EEC, and changes to teacher allocation are also areas where barriers related to equity and inclusion are identified in a large number of countries without specific activities being proposed to address them.

5.2.7 Model of country partnership

Table 7 summarizes the bench-marking information used in the chapter. The table relies on identifying areas relevant for the discussions on LEG strategic effectiveness for which information is available for comparator Partnerships. It then explores if GPE is unique in displaying a central traits, and which comparator partnerships report similar and divergent experiences. The analysis follows the same procedures for dimensions of country-platform models that might be relevant for explaining differences in strategic effectiveness

Table 15 Benchmarking comparison

Dimension	Is GPE special?	Similar	Different
Information at the level of strategic effectiveness			
Weaknesses in functions other than grant application phases?	No	GAVI groups also had the issue that the group was weaker in monitoring. Global Fund also identified in 2018 bottlenecks that were making the CCMs not work as expected, and decided to simply rules and add flexibility There is some evidence of a commitment to joint assessments, but documentation reviewed finds limited evidence of actual participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments. The FYE found that the CCMs were successful in mobilizing domestic and international partners for submission of grant proposals to the Global Fund and in enabling CSOs and affected communities to participate in the proposal preparation process. CCMs were ill-equipped to provide adequate oversight of grant implementation. This Review found little improvement since 2007e, because they generally lacked the authority and the resources to do so effectively. Inadequate management of the inevitable conflicts of interest that arise in bodies such as the CCMs also hindered effective oversight in some countries.	

Challenges in harmonization?	No	GAVI has also had challenges with weaknesses in partners final management capacities that have led it to channel funds through int. agencies	Direct access by government (GCF) supports use of government systems, but may reduce responsiveness by Government to other actors
Information at the level of determinants of LEG strategic effectiveness			
Requiring sector-wide plans as requirement?	Yes	Country comprehensive multi-year plan in GAVI, but it is at the sub-sector level. For HSS (Health System Strengthening) applications, the National Health Sector Plan (NHSP).	Only aligning the funding proposals with framework (GEF and GCF) In the report on country ownership, many of the strategies developed as part of countries commitments to the environmental conventions (through EA grants) have provided an opportunity for donors and follow-on GEF activities to support particular parts of those strategies, rather than adopting sector-wide approaches which are more common mainstream development aid (e.g., assistance to education and health systems, among others). In other words, through an EA grant, strategies or plans can be developed that then include other GEF activities/projects.
Presence of permanent multi-platforms?	No	Inter-agency Coordinating Committee (ICC) or Health Sector Coordinating Committee (HSCC) in GAVI Coordination Forums should bring together governments and other relevant key immunization stakeholders in a participatory and transparent manner	Government focal points in GCF and GEF
Mutual accountability as a key function of the country-level platform?	Yes / No	GAVI and Global Fund also conducts Joint Reviews, but they are limited only to reviewing GAVI and Global Fund support. Both of them have mutually accountability frameworks at the corporate level. The GCF wants the focal points to review the country portfolio	
Strong achievements in ensuring participation by CSOs?	No	Global Fund also achieved this in providing support for CSOs during grant application stages	GCF and GEF do not have a strong requirements for participation by CSOs.

			The participatory monitoring approach encourages the National Designated Authorities (NDAs) or Focal Points to organize country portfolio reviews involving project beneficiaries and communities affected by the GCF financed activities locally. The GCF is very explicit in calling for CSO involvement in participatory monitoring and has created some enabling environments for that. The GCF Private Sector Facility (PSF) provides entry level for private sector organizations (PSOs) to be involved in participatory monitoring of activities funded through the facility. The GCF, through the Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) and Environmental and Social Safeguards (ESS), is one of the rare climate finance delivery channels that encourages participatory monitoring. GEF organizes annual national workshops (called Expanded Constituency Workshop (ECW)) with GEF agencies, governments and CSOs on GEF assistance. CSOs have also become GEF agencies (grant agents) because in FAC contexts traditional GEF agencies could not work while INGOs do.
Level in Government where the country-level platform is located	No	Guidance on ICC for GAVI states that, typically, coordination should reside at a level in the health ministry with the authority to link to the broader national health planning and financing system, and authority relative to immunization. At a high level the common responsibilities of Coordination Forums should include ensuring strategic direction and oversight on key strategic topics. Senior government official should chair the coordination structure of the Global Fund.	Where the NDA/FP is located (i.e. which ministry), staffed, and how the NOP consultation is organized, is different per country as GCF leaves it up to the country to decide how to institutionalize these positions and processes. : it can be a one-person team or a unit within a ministry, working part-time or full-time. The focal point itself is sometimes high ranking (a Minister) and sometimes a more operational person. But in all cases, focal points have other tasks and duties within


			the government. Despite the guidelines, countries generally have to decide where to locate the NDA and whether they should have financial or environmental competencies. Most NDAs rarely have both. In most of the countries visited, the NDA was located within the Ministry of Environment, although in some countries like Bangladesh and Mauritius, the NDA is within the Ministry of Finance.
Approach to building capacity	No	The Global Fund has several framework agreements with technical and development partners through which technical assistance has been provided at the country level. It has also coordinated collaboration with other development partners in the provision of technical assistance (e.g. USG 5% TA, Expertise France, German BACKUP Initiative), joined the Global Health Cluster with observer status, and specifically entered into Cooperation Agreements with several technical assistance partners. During 2014, for example, World Health Organization (WHO) reported 236 requests for technical collaboration from 73 countries during the development of concept notes, and UNAIDS assisted over 40 countries with 83 technical support requests. With regard to country-level results, the extent of TA support correlated positively with fewer concept note iterations; but analysis found that it did not support capacity building for recipient countries to develop funding requests without future TA, which was a missed opportunity. The Enabling Activities grants can be accessed to support planning exercises. For example, reviewing, revising and developing National Strategies and Action Plans (e.g., National Implementation Plans, National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)). Also, national communication can be supported through EA.	Gavi relies on its core partners (WHO, UNICEF, CDC4 and the World Bank) and expanded partners (including local institutions) to support countries in planning and implementing Gavi grants. Gavi supports these partners through the Partners' Engagement Framework (PEF). Central to this process is the 'One Technical Assistance (TA) plan' for each country that lists the support that partners are planning to provide in a given year. If countries are planning to apply for or implement Gavi support in the near future, they are encouraged to ensure that the One TA plan includes specific support from partners to do so. Countries are encouraged to indicate in this plan local institutions through which TA can be leveraged. All recipient countries can access GEF resources, up to $30,000, to undertake, on a voluntary basis, National Portfolio Formulation Exercise (NPFE). These will serve as a priority setting tool for countries and as a guide for GEF Agencies as they assist recipient countries. Undertaking a NPFE is not a requirement or pre-requisite for requesting GEF grants.

Secretariat support to the country-level partnerships	No	On GAVI, Joint Appraisal Analysis Guidance is available to clarify the types of suggested analyses for countries to prepare and bring to the discussion as part of the Joint Appraisal.	On GAVI, pre-JA analyses are also prepared by the Gavi Secretariat M&E and broader Country Teams. These represent a core, minimum set of analyses focusing on grant performance that should be covered as part of any Joint Appraisal, looking across reporting completeness to target achievement across activities to outcomes, as well as compliance with Gavi's data quality and survey. GCF has Regional Advisers (RAs) and Country Dialogue Specialists that liaise with the country governments/NDA/FPs to overcome difficulties related to, for example, tax regulations with local agencies, prescribed payment channels, bureaucratic delays, contractual and legal issues, institutional rivalries, and understaffed NDA/FPs.
Dedicated instruments for supporting civil society	No	HSS: Gavi grants can be allocated to CSOs working in partnership with implementing countries. PEF: Gavi provides support through PEF to increase capacity and strengthen civil society engagement in immunization. The Community, Rights and Gender Strategic Initiative to provide technical assistance to support the engagement of civil society, key populations, people living with or affected by the diseases, and women's networks and organizations, independently or in partnership with the CCM.	
Model of country ownership	No	Government leads the multi-stakeholder partnership with has an advisory role to government processes	According to GCF, seven attributes: National Designated Authority (NDA)/Focal Point (FP) is established and functional; Stakeholder consultations are organized by the NDA/FP; A no-objection procedure (NOP) is established and is operational;

			A country programme has been developed and includes a pipeline of concrete projects that has been agreed upon with major stakeholders; One (or more) Direct Access Entities (DAE) has/have been accredited 6One (or more) DAE has/have submitted Funded Project proposals and/or seen it/them approved; and Progress on National Adaptation Planning (NAP) planning and completion. Proposals fit in the framework for climate action developed at the country level.

5.2.8 Two-page overview of LEG effectiveness

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP for EDUCATION



Principles toward effective local education groups

The principles and related tools facilitate reflection and actions for optimizing the potential of sector dialogue and coordination mechanisms. The underlying rationale is that partners achieve more through cooperation, mutualizing resources and complementary efforts than individually.

Why guiding principles?

The importance of multi-stakeholder dialogue and coordination in supporting sector outcomes is widely recognized and a direct objective of GPE's Effective Partnership Roll-out. However, the performance of local education groups (LEGs) (and their sub-groups) as country-led dialogue platform has been marked by mixed results and, until recently, there was little reflection on the conditions that influence LEG effectiveness.

As with partnerships in other sectors, GPE recognizes that education coordination structures face many challenges. To that end, the Partnership is interested in supporting country partners to understand:

- **What is the added value of LEGs to sector dialogue and coordination?**
- **What works well, what works less well, within countries' LEGs?**
- **What do partners want to see improved?**

The guiding principles were developed to empower national teams to reflect, self-assess, identify gaps, build capacities set improvement agendas and agree on actions. This includes greater clarity of roles, responsibilities and mutual accountabilities to learn and adapt towards achieving LEG effectiveness.

What do we mean by LEG effectiveness?

Based on research across a range of disciplines and fields of application on what makes multi-stakeholder coordination and partnerships effective, we consider effectiveness through three inter-connected pieces: An effective LEG requires: i) clear and agreed functions; ii) to be fit-for-purpose and iii) committed stakeholders:



A LEG is *strategically effective* when it leverages country-led, inclusive policy dialogue around shared priorities to accelerate progress towards education results. LEG members are able to advance towards agreed objectives when both *organizational and collaborative capacities* are in place or being fostered.

Principles towards effective local education groups outline possible core **functions** of effective policy dialogue and coordination, common **challenges** to realizing these functions, and **seven guiding principles** as foundations for success.

LEG self-assessment and performance feedback tools can be used together with the principles, or independently, to facilitate reflection on the purposes and quality of policy dialogue and agree on improvement areas.

What are the core functions?

The functions performed by local education groups vary across countries. Strategic effectiveness is reflected in the LEG's success in:

- Supporting plan development, implementation and monitoring
- Addressing education financing and resource use
- Promoting harmonization and alignment; and
- Fostering mutual accountability

Optimizing these core functions - on a spectrum from information sharing, joint planning, shared resources to joint action - is dependent on enabling arrangements and healthy partnership dynamics. It is these elements that the principles toward effective LEGs seek to address.

What are the principles?

Reflecting organizational and collaborative capacities, the seven guiding principles can be understood as the foundation of a well-functioning dialogue and coordination mechanism, but do not imply "minimum standards":

1. **The LEG mandate, functions and objectives are clear**
   A clear mandate and core policy dialogue functions are agreed by country education stakeholders, based on a shared understanding of focus areas the sector dialogue can add most value. Specific objectives are aligned to the whole policy cycle, with partners regularly reviewing key priorities.

2. **The partnership framework generates inclusion and engagement**
   The LEG engages stakeholders at key junctures - including plan development, joint review and monitoring of sector progress and key reform areas, evaluation and learning - with different forms of targeted engagement linked to partner interests, capacities and resources.

3. **There is a clear governance structure for coordination**
   The governance arrangements clarify relationships between the LEG and other bodies (including with other sectors), recognizing authorities over different types of policy dialogue and decision-making and establishing clear leadership roles and responsibilities.

4. **Working arrangements are flexible, 'fit-for-purpose', and well communicated**
   The working arrangements for core and technical working groups are flexible, adapted to context, and fit for taking priorities forward. They are also well communicated to ensure that members are informed about LEG activities, wider modalities for collaboration, roles and responsibilities.

5. **Regular monitoring contributes to learning and improved performance**
   The LEG has clear milestones for what it wants to contribute to the sector through policy dialogue. Review arrangements look at whether sector dialogue and partnership dynamics are getting stronger over time and support adaptive learning in the partnership.

6. **Leadership and ownership are demonstrated in practice**
   Leaders, decision makers and education champions demonstrate a willingness to support participatory policy dialogue through active participation in the LEG and communicate clearly on the level of stakeholder engagement expected.

7. **Key actors contribute to healthy partnership dynamics**
   The partnership is built on a genuine willingness and commitment of all partners to cooperate in accelerating education sector progress, with recognition of the influence of healthy partnership dynamics on LEG performance and realistic strategies for overcoming obstacles.

Annex Five: Additional information to Section 5.3

5.3.1 Tables grant application process

Table 5.3.1 Calculated historical cycle times of ESPIG applications

Span	Time (months)	Notes
***from* MCA *to* Grant Start/Effectiveness**	Average: 37.6	• THIS IS THE OVERALL PROCESS
***from* MCA *to* 1st Commitment**	Average: 40+ Median: 41 Range: 23-53	• *Countries not defined*
***from* MCA *to* Grant Approval**	Average: 37 Median: 39 Range: 13-51	• 14 is Guinea-Bissau for 4.7M • 44 is Sierra Leone for 17.2M, and Zimbabwe for 8.82M
***from* MCA *to* Requirements Matrix Submission**	Average: 26 Median: 28 Range: 0-40	• 4 is Comoros for 2.3M • 32 is Bhutan for 1.8, and Sierra Leone for 17.2
***from* Requirements Matrix Received *to* QAR 3 Review Meeting**	Average: 10 Median: 10 Range: 4-18	• *Countries not defined*
***from* Requirements Matrix Submission *to* Grant Approval**	Average: 13 Median: 13 Range: 6-20	• 5 is Liberia for 11.9M • 16 is Somalia-Puntland for 5.6M
***from* QAR 3 Review Meeting *to* Grant Approval**	Average: 3 Median: 2 Range: 1-5	• *Countries not defined*
***from* GPC Meeting Date *to* Grant Approval**	Average 1.4 Median 1 Range 1-3	• For Grants that went to Board for approval -all but 1 • Not surprising with quarterly meetings
***from* Grant Approval *to* Grant Start/Effectiveness**	Average: 3 Median: 2 Range: 1-12	• *Countries not defined*

Source: adapted from GPE Secretariat (2019), *Streamlining the GPE Grant (ESPIG) Application and Approval Process*, Phase II = Deliverable Proposed Solutions to Streamline the Current Process (29-08-2019)

5.3.2 Grant disbursement data

Table 5.3.2 Analysis of timeframe between Grant Approval Date and Grant Start Date, based on GPE Secretariat Disbursement Data

	Criteria	Average # days Grant Approval date[62] to Grant Start date[63]	Without grants pre-financed[64]	Number of grants[65]
Overall	Average	116	127	115
FCAC	FCAC	112	120	68
	non FCAC	122	137	47
Region	South Asia	121	186	10
	Sub-Saharan Africa	109	116	83
	East Asia & Pacific	125	125	9
	Europe & Central Asia	149	149	5
	Middle East & North Africa	160	160	4
	Latin America & Caribbean	152	152	4
GA	World Bank	163	171	57
	UNICEF	58	69	33
	DFID	108	108	2
	SIDA	108	108	5
	Save The Children	37	37	2
	Save The Children UK	102	102	1
	Save US	34	65	4
	AFD	82	103	5
	UNESCO	90	90	3
	Belgium	210	210	1
Modality	Stand-alone	110	119	73
	Project pooled	170	170	20
	Sector pooled	106	142	15

Source: based on GPE Secretariat (2020), *Grants Disbursement Data until 31-12-2019*. Received February 2020.

62 This date refers to the approval of the application by the appropriate committee. This could be the GPC, the Board, or the Secretariat (based on the amount).
63 This date is often different than the approval date, but it depends on the GA's policies, and oftentimes differs even then. Generally, as a rule of thumb, it means the date the grant is activated and is able to receive/spend/commit funds from the GA's side.
64 GAs are able to "pre-finance" grants in advance of an approval date. However, they are doing so at their own risk in the event that a grant is not approved (this has not yet happened). Often, they do this when there are activities that are time sensitive and cannot wait the normal approval process and generally don't represent a large amount of the allocation.
65 This includes 115 grants with different modalities: additional financing, accelerated funding, ESPIGs, multipliers and variable grants. The grants were approved since December 2011 until 31 December 2019.

5.3.3 GPE Contributions, Commitments and Disbursement 2012-2020

Source for all tables: World Bank (2020), *GPEF Financial Tables until 31-12-2019*.

Table 5.3.3a Overview of total donor contributions, commitments and disbursement of GPE funds 2012-2020 per year in US$ (millions)

In US$ millions	FY2012	FY2013	FY2014	FY2015	FY2016	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020	Grand Total
Contributions	374	366	393	499	256	447	581	585	376	3,877
Commitments	101	518	390	573	146	456	384	411	176	3,155
Cash Transfers	14	175	429	582	440	393	446	418	148	3,045

Table 5.3.3b Overview of donor contributions, GPE commitments and disbursement of GPE funds per GPE Strategy period (In US$ Millions)

In US$ millions	FY2012-FY2015	FY2016-FY2020	GPE Strategy 2015	GPE Strategy 2020
Contributions	1,632	2,244	42%	58%
Commitments	1,583	1,572	50%	50%
Cash Transfers	1,199	1,846	39%	61%

Table 5.3.3c Cumulative contributions, commitments and disbursement FY 2012- FY 2020 in US$ Millions

Cumulative In US$ millions	FY2012	FY2013	FY2014	FY2015	FY2016	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020
Contributions	374	740	1134	1632	1888	2335	2916	3501	3877
Commitments	101	619	1009	1583	1728	2185	2568	2979	3155
Cash Transfers	14	189	618	1199	1640	2033	2479	2897	3045

Table 5.3.3d Cumulative Ratios for commitments and disbursement

Ratios (cumulative figures)	FY2012	FY2013	FY2014	FY2015	FY2016	FY2017	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020
Commitments/Contributions	27.0%	83.6%	89.0%	96.9%	91.5%	93.6%	88.1%	85.1%	81.4%
Transfers/Commitments	13.4%	30.5%	61.2%	75.8%	94.9%	93.0%	96.5%	97.2%	96.5%
Transfers/Contributions	3.6%	25.5%	54.5%	73.5%	86.9%	87.0%	85.0%	82.7%	78.6%

5.3.4 GPE Portfolio actual disbursement

Table 5.3.4a GPE expenses per year per recipient for Project Grants, Supervision fees and Administration fees in US$ Millions

Use Code Desc	Grant Agent	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	Total	%
Administrative Budget	Asian Development Bank	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.01	0.02	-	-	0.06	0.0%
	Agence Francaise De Developpement	-	-	0.07	1.16	-	0.55	-	0.38	1.46	3.61	0.1%
	Belgian Development Agency	-	-	0.50	-	0.07	-	-	(0.05)	-	0.53	0.0%
	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.03	0.45	-	0.48	0.0%
	UNICEF	-	2.93	5.30	3.21	2.83	5.20	2.30	3.90	1.06	26.73	0.9%
	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	0.30	3.45	13.28	7.59	3.64	2.57	1.67	5.70	0.90	39.10	1.3%
	IBRD As Administrator	4.40	17.16	20.13	32.30	(3.18)	31.11	35.41	35.68	20.00	193.01	6.3%
	IBRD As Trustee	0.36	0.53	0.79	0.28	0.45	0.40	0.44	1.33	-	4.57	0.2%
	International Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.39	-	0.39	0.0%
	Islamic Development Bank	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	Oxfam IBIS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.65	0.33	0.98	0.0%
	Save The Children Federation Inc	-	-	-	-	-	0.15	0.54	-	0.14	0.83	0.0%
	The Save The Children Fund	-	-	-	-	0.03	-	-	0.01	(0.00)	0.04	0.0%
	United Nations Organization For Education, Science	-	1.02	1.20	0.37	0.05	0.03	0.21	0.80	0.10	3.78	0.1%
Administrative Budget Total		**5.06**	**25.09**	**41.28**	**44.90**	**3.92**	**40.01**	**40.62**	**49.24**	**23.99**	**274.11**	**9.0%**
Project Supervision Fees	Agence Francaise De Developpement	-	-	-	0.20	-	0.10	-	-	-	0.30	0.0%
	Belgian Development Agency	-	-	0.28	-	0.25	-	-	(0.08)	-	0.46	0.0%
	Department For International Development	-	-	0.10	0.10	0.47	-	-	0.04	-	0.71	0.0%
	UNICEF	-	-	1.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.80	0.1%
	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	0.01	4.44	5.23	5.40	2.11	2.65	1.43	9.54	1.77	32.57	1.1%
	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	-	-	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.80	0.0%
	United Nations Organization For Education, Science	-	0.32	0.32	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.65	0.0%
Project Supervision Fees Total		**0.01**	**4.76**	**8.54**	**5.70**	**2.84**	**2.75**	**1.43**	**9.50**	**1.77**	**37.29**	**1.2%**

Projects	Asian Development Bank	-	-	-	-	0.44	0.20	0.49	-	(0.00)	1.12	0.0%
	Agence Francaise De Developpement	-	-	29.45	25.96	-	25.10	8.11	11.66	13.85	114.14	3.7%
	Belgian Development Agency	-	-	28.60	-	4.20	-	-	(2.60)	-	30.20	1.0%
	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.40	6.45	-	6.85	0.2%
	Department For International Development	-	-	-	9.66	21.60	7.64	8.97	-	0.22	48.09	1.6%
	Global Campaign for Education	-	-	-	-	6.89	5.93	12.58	3.37	3.86	32.62	1.1%
	UNICEF	-	42.76	66.94	51.57	38.90	65.24	29.10	54.56	15.07	364.14	12.0%
	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	8.50	92.73	204.92	403.11	359.82	225.05	317.71	267.28	75.79	1,954.92	64.2%
	International Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.61	-	5.61	0.2%
	Islamic Development Bank	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.19	0.19	0.0%
	Oxfam IBIS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.54	7.94	9.48	0.3%
	Save The Children Federation Inc	-	-	-	-	-	1.70	3.92	(0.01)	4.17	9.78	0.3%
	The Save The Children Fund	-	-	-	-	0.48	-	(0.00)	0.13	(0.01)	0.61	0.0%
	THE SWISS AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT	-	-	-	-	0.43	-	-	-	(0.03)	0.40	0.0%
	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	-	-	30.90	32.51	0.19	18.42	20.58	(0.03)	-	102.57	3.4%
	United Nations Organization For Education, Science	-	9.84	18.56	8.13	0.66	0.80	2.29	11.37	1.42	53.08	1.7%
Projects Total		**8.50**	**145.33**	**379.37**	**530.95**	**433.61**	**350.08**	**404.14**	**359.33**	**122.47**	**2,733.79**	**89.8%**
Grand Total		**13.57**	**175.18**	**429.19**	**581.55**	**440.36**	**392.84**	**446.19**	**418.08**	**148.23**	**3,045.19**	**100.0%**

Source: adapted from World Bank (2020), *GPEF Financial Tables until 31-12-2019*. Received from GPE Trustee in February 2020.

Table 5.3.4b GPE expenses per recipient for Project Grants, Supervision fees and Administration fees in US$ Millions

Recipient	Project Grants	Supervision fees	Administration fees	Fees	Total Grants + fees	Share of fees
Asian Development Bank	$ 1.12		$ 0.06	$0.06	1.17	4.8%
Agence Francaise De Developpement	$114.14	$0.30	$ 3.61	$3.91	118.06	3.3%
Belgian Development Agency	$30.20	$0.46	$ 0.53	$0.99	31.19	3.2%
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.	$ 6.85		$ 0.48	$1.19	8.04	14.8%
Department For International Development	$48.09	$0.71		$0.71	48.80	1.5%
Global Campaign for Education	$32.62			$ -	32.62	0.0%
UNICEF	$364.14	$1.80	$26.73	$28.53	392.67	7.3%
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	$ 1,954.92	$32.57	$39.10	$71.67	2,026.59	3.5%
IBRD As Administrator			$193.01	$ 193.01	193.01	
IBRD As Trustee			$ 4.57	$4.57	4.57	
International Development	$ 5.61		$ 0.39	$0.39	6.00	6.5%
Islamic Development Bank	$ 0.19		$ 0.00	$0.00	0.19	1.7%
Oxfam IBIS	$ 9.48		$ 0.98	$0.98	10.45	9.3%
Save The Children Federation Inc	$ 9.78		$ 0.83	$0.83	10.61	7.8%
The Save The Children Fund	$ 0.61		$ 0.04	$0.04	0.65	6.6%
THE SWISS AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT	$ 0.40			$ -	0.40	0.0%
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	$102.57	$0.80		$0.80	103.37	0.8%
United Nations Organization For Education, Science	$53.08	$0.65	$ 3.78	$4.42	57.50	7.7%
Total	**$ 2,733.79**	**$37.29**	**$274.11**	**$ 312.11**	**3,045.90**	**10.2%**
Average per grant agent						4.9%

Source: calculated from World Bank (2020), *GPEF Financial Tables until 31-12-2019*, Received from GPE Trustee in February 2020.

5.3.5 Disbursement and implementation challenges


Table 5.3.5a Factors contributing to disbursement delays, FY14-FY19[66]

	Issue types	Times reported	Percent of total
Internal	**1. Program design issues**	**2**	**3%**
	2. Pre-implementation challenges	**14**	**18%**
	3. Operational challenges		
	3.1. Contractor compliance and quality issues	2	3%
	3.2. Coordination challenges	4	5%
	3.3. Procurement challenges	21	26%
	3.4. Project management, government	12	15%
	Operational challenges: subtotal	**39**	**49%**
	Internal factors: subtotal	**55**	**69%**
External	**4. Unforeseen changes and external circumstances**		
	4.1. Change in government policy	2	3%
	4.2. Escalation of project cost	3	4%
	4.3. Change in government leadership	4	5%
	4.4. Inaccessibility	12	15%
	4.5. Others (Unforeseen changes and external circumstances)	4	5%
	Unforeseen changes and external circumstances: subtotal	**25**	**32%**
Total number of issues reported		**80**	**100%**

Source: GPE Secretariat (2019), *Annual Grants Performance Report 2019*, p 21.

[66] The table captures issues reported as delay factors for the grants that were rated as delayed in their disbursement during FY14 to FY19.

Table 5.3.5b Average percentage disbursed by grant duration[67]



Source: GPE Secretariat (2019), *Annual Grant Performance Report 2019,* p 18

[67] Some grants disburse a small amount during the grace period (generally up to six months after the closing date for grants supervised by the World Bank and up to a year for other GAs). For example, there is a low disbursement (one percent) for the 4th year for the grants of a duration more than/equal to 1.5 years and less than 3 years. The graph does not include ESPIGs with a duration of less than 2 years (17 grants out of 106 total in the sample, of which five grants had a duration of less than 1 year). These grants show a different and very distinct distribution pattern disbursing most of their grant amount (median value of 70 percent) during their first year of implementation, and they include accelerated funding. (GPE Annual Grant Performance Report 2019).

5.3.6 GPE Grants portfolio commitments per country category 2012-2020

Source for all tables: World Bank (2020), *GPEF Financial Tables until 31-12-2019*.

Table 5.3.6a GPE portfolio commitments per activity 2012-2019 in US$ Millions

Commitments	In US$ million
Country	$2,834
Global	$103
Secretariat	$213
Trustee	$5
Total	$3,155

Table 5.3.6b GPE Commitments per country income level per year 2012-2020 in US$ Millions

Income Distribution	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total	Share of subtotal	Share of total
LIC	54.55	296.88	301.61	349.09	44.65	304.04	180.44	195.44	114.75	1,841.46	65%	58.4%
LMIC	41.65	195.08	33.07	184.47	96.29	78.46	186.90	122.72	47.27	985.91	34.8%	31.2%
UMIC	-	-	-	1.46	1.32	2.55	0.25	0.79	0.16	6.52	0.2%	0.2%
Subtotal (LIC, LMIC, UMIC)	96.20	491.96	334.68	535.01	142.26	385.05	367.59	318.96	162.18	2,833.89	100%	89.8%
Global	-	8.08	34.56	5.35	6.89	5.82	17.10	11.97	13.40	103.17		3.3%
Trustee	0.36	0.71	0.60	0.76	-	0.81	-	1.33	-	4.57		0.1%
Secretariat	4.40	17.16	20.41	32.30	(3.32)	64.70	(1.10)	78.82	-	213.37		6.8%
Total	**100.96**	**517.92**	**390.26**	**573.42**	**145.82**	**456.38**	**383.59**	**411.07**	**175.58**	**3,155.00**		**100.0%**

Table 5.3.6c GPE commitments per FCAC / non-FCAC per year 2012-2020 in US$ Millions

FCAC Distribution	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total	Share of subtotal	Share of total
FCAC	96.20	305.05	199.21	262.21	78.07	246.08	174.20	199.97	99.20	1,660.20	58.6%	52.6%
Non-FCAC	0.00	186.91	135.47	272.81	64.18	138.96	193.39	118.99	62.98	1,173.69	41.4%	37.2%
Subtotal	96.20	491.96	334.68	535.01	142.26	385.05	367.59	318.96	162.18	2,833.89	100.0%	89.8%

Table 5.3.6d GPE Commitments country level grants per FCAC (LIC/LMIC) and non-FCAC (LIC, LMIC, UIMC) per year in US$ Millions

Category	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	Total
FCAC	96.20	305.05	199.21	262.21	78.07	246.08	174.20	199.97	99.20	1,660.20
LIC	54.55	292.36	197.47	217.66	29.09	209.33	101.73	127.83	84.35	1,314.37
LMIC	41.65	12.70	1.74	44.54	48.98	36.76	72.47	72.14	14.85	345.83
Non-FCAC	-	186.91	135.47	272.81	64.18	138.96	193.39	118.99	62.98	1,173.69
LIC	-	4.52	104.14	131.43	15.56	94.72	78.71	67.61	30.40	527.09
LMIC	-	182.39	31.33	139.92	47.31	41.70	114.43	50.59	32.42	640.08
UMIC	-	-	-	1.46	1.32	2.55	0.25	0.79	0.16	6.52
Total	96.20	491.96	334.68	535.01	142.26	385.05	367.59	318.96	162.18	2,833.89

5.3.7 GPE commitments per region per year 2012-2020

Source for all tables: World Bank (2020), *GPEF Financial Tables until 31-12-2019*.

Table 5.3.7a Regional distribution of commitments (GPE categorization of regions) (US$ Millions)


GPE categorization	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
East Asia & Pacific	0	87	11	26	11	0	7	39	5	187
Europe & Central Asia	0	1	7	33	17	8	13	4	0	84
Latin America & Caribbean	0	0	0	23	6	2	0	1	0	32
Middle East & North Africa	0	11	28	0	0	22	12	0	0	73
South Asia	0	0	0	81	36	32	76	41	41	307
Sub-Saharan Africa	96	393	289	371	72	320	260	235	116	2,151
Total	**101**	**518**	**390**	**573**	**146**	**456**	**384**	**411**	**176**	**3,155**

Table 5.3.7b GPE Commitments per region per GPE strategy period (in USE$ Millions)

GPE regions	2012-2015	2016-2020	2015 strategy	2020 strategy
East Asia & Pacific	124.68	61.90	67%	33%
Europe & Central Asia	40.70	43.17	49%	51%
Latin America & Caribbean	23.26	9.03	72%	28%
Middle East & North Africa	38.51	34.00	53%	47%
South Asia	81.84	225.51	27%	73%
Sub-Saharan Africa	1,148.88	1,002.43	53%	47%

5.3.8 Grant allocations per GPE 2020 strategic goals


FIGURE 5.5.



Source: GPE Secretariat (2019), *Results Report 2019,* p. 100.

FIGURE 5.6.

GPE IMPLEMENTATION GRANTS FOCUS ON PRIMARY EDUCATION.
Implementation grant allocations by education level, 2004-2017



Source
Source: GPE Secretariat.

Note
"Level unspecified" refers to allocations that cannot be attributed to a specific level but support general system-level investments such as teacher management or EMIS.

Source: GPE Secretariat (2019), *Results Report 2019,* p. 101.

Annex Six: Additional Information to Report Section 5.4

5.4.1 Education Financing Gap for Reaching the 2030 SDGs on Education

Historically, education development has played a central role in donor development assistance portfolios. This central role has been re-confirmed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (i.e. as SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning). Notwithstanding this re-affirmation, over the past decade, education has become less of a priority for development partners, with the share of education falling from 8.8% of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2010, to 7.1% in 2017[68].

In retrospect, a lack of adequate finance was among the major obstacles to achieving the Education for All (EFA) goals. In 2010, it was estimated that the *financing gap amounted to US$ 16 billion per year[69] – equivalent to 1.5% of GDP – for the 46 poorest countries to achieve universal primary education between 2008 and 2015*.[70] When including universal lower secondary education, the financing gap would amount to US$ 24 billion per year over the same period.

In order to achieve the globally agreed post-2015 education targets, significant resources are required to remain on track.[71] Even when a reasonable increase in domestic spending on education is secured, the *annual financing gap* over 2015-2030 for reaching universal pre-primary, primary and secondary education of good quality in low and lower-middle income countries would amount to *US$ 39 billion*.[72]

It is estimated that between 2012-2030 the average annual total cost of achieving universal pre-primary, primary and secondary education in low and lower-middle income countries is projected to *increase from US$ 149 billion in 2012 to US$ 340 billion in 2030*. According to another UN commissioned report prepared for UNCTAD[73], the projected *capital investments* required to reach the SGDs for education in developing countries amount to US$ 330 billion in education capital investments, annually between 2015-2030 (using constant prices, accounting for inflation rates). The estimated financing gap in 2015 between current education capital investments (US$ 80 billion) and the required US$ 330 billion was US$ 250 billion[74].


Even if sufficient resources would be mobilized to finance all education needs, developing countries are constrained in utilizing these funds effectively for sustainable development, mainly due to weak absorptive capacity of the country (e.g. capable private sector and government institutions, appropriate regulatory frameworks and governance systems, and stakeholder engagement).

According to a recently published IMF Discussion Note[75], achieving the SDG agenda will require additional spending in 2030 of US$ 0.5 trillion for Low-Income (Developing) Countries and US$ 2.1 trillion for emerging

[68] United Nations (2019). ***Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2019***. Report of the Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, United Nations, New York, 2019. Available from: https://developmentfinance.un.org/fsdr2019
[69] UNESCO (2010). ***EFA Global Monitoring Report 2010***: Reaching the Marginalized.
[70] 46 low-income countries were included in the EFA costing exercise, projecting annual funding gap to reach the EFA goals in 2015 starting from 2008.
[71] See annex 4.4.1: Global Financing Gap for Reaching the SDGs.
[72] UNESCO (2015). ***Pricing the right to education: the cost of reaching new targets by 2030***. Education for All Global Monitoring Report: Policy Paper 18.
[73] United Nations (2014). ***World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan***. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations publishing, Geneva, Switzerland.
[74] United Nations (2014). ***World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan***. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations publishing, Geneva, Switzerland.
[75] Gaspar, V., Amaglobeli, D., Garcia-Escribano, M., Prady, D., and Soto, M. (2019). ***Fiscal Policy and Development: Human, Social, and Physical Investment for the SDGs***. IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/19/03, January 2019.

market economies. This translates to an average additional annual spending required in 2030 of 15% of GDP for the average low-income developing country (while some individual LICs and LMICs will require more than 15% of GDP in public spending on SDGs).

Figure 5.4.1a Estimated Annual SDG Financing Needs for Developing Countries by thematic area (2015-2030)




Annual estimated financing needs in Developing Countries for capital investment in key SDG sectors between 2015-2030, using 2014 constant prices.

In 2014, current capital investments in education in Developing Countries were estimated at US$ 80 billion, resulting in a financing gap of US$ 250 billion.

Source: United Nations UNCTAD World Investment Report (2014)[76]

Figure 5.4.1b Additional spending requirements for Low-Income Countries to reach the SDGs in 2030



Even if low-income countries succeed in increasing their tax revenues (with combined needs amounting to half a trillion, or 0.5 percent of global GDP) in an effort to raise funds to increase public spending, the extra tax revenues—if successfully realized—could only finance one-third of the total additional needs resulting in a gap of 0.3 percent of global GDP.

Source: Gaspar et al. 2019

[76] Based on table IV.2 from the World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs.

5.4.2 Foreseen potential impact of the COVID-19 global outbreak

The impact that the COVID-19 global outbreak in 2020 will have on national economies will be severe according to estimations of the OECD[77], for the current year and the years to come in dealing with the aftermath of the pandemic. According to the OECD, the magnitude of the observed direct impact would far outweigh anything experienced during the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. The primary concern of Governments is the health and well-being of their population. However, the measures (including country-wide lockdowns, closing of businesses, scaling down of public services) that Governments have taken to contain the spread of the virus and reduce its impact on national health system, have both wide-ranging direct and indirect consequences for the economy.

The UN warns that the COVID-19 crisis will lead to unprecedented economic damage in developing countries, with two-thirds of the world's population living in developing countries (impact estimated to be more severe than the 2008/2009 financial crisis). The UN calls for donor countries to ring-fence their Official Development Assistance (ODA) as ODA remains a vital source of external financing for the poorest of developing countries, and suggests that a "Marshall Plan for Health Recovery" would be a fitting way to demonstrate the international solidarity needed to mitigate the crisis in developing countries[78].

Depending on the magnitude and duration of national shutdowns, reduced consumer demand, and the fiscal and monetary measures taken by Governments, it is estimated that the overall direct initial hit to the level of GDP would be between 20-25% in many major advanced economies[79]. This estimate does not cover any additional indirect impacts that may arise that may be much wider in range (for instance impact on labor productivity, increased unemployment rates, bankruptcy of many small-and medium-sized entrepreneurs, large corporations providing essential public / economic related services requiring Government support, the mental health and well-being of workforce, learning gaps of children and students who cannot attend school for several months, impact on informal economy and jobless workers, etc.).

The direct impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on education systems globally extends beyond sickness of teachers and students. Since March 2020, 185 countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North America and South America have closed schools and universities, impacting more than 1.54 billion children and youth[80]. The education gap will further increase for countries with education systems and learners that do not have the resources and ability to use digital learning opportunities and technologies.

As a response, UNESCO has launched the ***Global Education Coalition***[81] that seeks to facilitate inclusive learning opportunities for children and youth during this period of sudden and unprecedented educational disruption. The coalition brings together multilateral, private sector, and philanthropic partners to support global distance learning. The main focus is on mobilizing investments in remote learning that should both mitigate the immediate disruption caused by COVID-19 and establish more holistic approaches to develop more open and flexible education systems for the future.

The Education Cannot Wait (ECW) facility is responding to the COVID-19 crisis with the activation of a *First Emergency Response* funding window to redirect current funds as well as raise additional funds to support

[77] See also: https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/
[78] UN / UNCTAD (March, 2020). ***The Covid-19 Shock to Developing Countries***: Towards a "whatever it takes" programme for the two-thirds of the world's population being left behind. Trade and Development Report Update. UNCTAD/GDS/INF/2020/2.
[79] OECD (March, 2020). ***Evaluating the initial impact of COVID-19 containment measures on economic activity***.
[80] HundrED and OECD (April, 2020). ***Quality education for all during Covid-19 crisis***.
[81] See also: https://en.unesco.org/covid19/educationresponse/globalcoalition

education during COVID-19. The principal aim of the new emergency response is to ensure learning continuity, and support initiatives in accelerated learning, distance learning, COVID awareness, WASH services, and health and protection-related efforts.


Although still speculative in nature, many countries affected by the COVID-19 outbreak will be required to enter into a period of "repairs", where at national level significant sums of investment will be redirected to health care systems strengthening and resilience building, and to absorbing the blow to their economies. This may also impact on many of the donor countries' political priorities, long-term budgets, and their foreign policies. Although not all countries will proportionally redirect budgets from their international development budgets, some donor countries may do so, resulting in declining or stagnating budgetary allocations for Development Assistance, including shifts in thematic priorities (e.g. preserving more ODA funding to global health and food security)[82].

For the GPE, this may imply that less funding may be made available to the GPE in the next years, as it is likely that (temporarily) more funds will flow to humanitarian aid and health sectors (including health information systems, national health care agencies, emergency response, vaccination programs, etc.). On the other hand, globally the need to invest in distance learning systems, eLearning tools, digital classrooms, and ICT4E (ICT for Education) will become more recognized, to ensure continuity in education provision in times of crisis, and to invest in education system resilience to cope with shifts in financial resources available to the sector. The GPE as a partnership would be well-positioned to lead this global discussion, and push for more sustainable solutions in education service delivery in developing countries.

[82] See also: https://www.cgdev.org/blog/how-are-international-donors-responding-education-needs-during-covid-pandemic

5.4.3 Trends in historic development assistance

Figure 5.4.3a Total ODA commitments and ODA commitments to GPE partner countries, 2000-2018 (2017 constant prices)




Source: Reconstructed from OECD CRS Data, using https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE3A

Global ODA Commitments (2000-2018)
Total Official Development Assistance commitments from Official Donors split by region, and Total ODA commitments to GPE Partner Countries, in US$ million (2017 constant prices)

ODA to countries in which the GPE is active constitutes the largest share of ODA, and follows the trendline for Africa (since the majority of the GPE partner countries are located in Africa).

Figure 5.4.3b Regional breakdown of ODA commitments between 2000-2018 (current prices)



Source: Reconstructed from OECD CRS Data, using https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE3A


Global ODA Commitments (2000-2018)

Total Official Development Assistance commitments from Official Donors split by region, and Total ODA commitments to GPE Partner Countries, in US$ million (current prices)

ODA commitments to 76 GPE Partner Countries constitutes the largest share of ODA, and follows the trendline for Africa (since the majority of the GPE partner countries are located in Africa).

Official donors include DAC Countries, Multilaterals, Non-DAC Countries. Does not include donor countries that are not registered in the OECD CRS database, such as China.

Figure 5.4.3c Total ODA commitments by region between 2000-2018 (2017 constant prices)



Source: Reconstructed from OECD CRS Data, using https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE3A

Evolution of ODA commitments between 2000-2018


Total Official Development Assistance from Official Donors and Total ODA committed to GPE Partner Countries, in US$ million (2017 constant prices)

Total ODA commitments to 76 GPE partner countries show a flattening trend since 2009 (global financial crisis).

The proportion of ODA commitments to the 76 GPE Partner Countries remains relatively stable at around 45% of total ODA commitments.

Official donors include DAC Countries, Multilaterals, Non-DAC Countries. Does not include donor countries that are not registered in the OECD CRS database, such as China.

Figure 5.4.3d Total ODA commitments and ODA commitments to GPE partner countries, 2000-2018 (current prices)



Source: Reconstructed from OECD CRS Data, using https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE3A

Evolution of ODA commitments between 2000-2018

Total Official Development Assistance from Official Donors (DAC Countries, Multilaterals, Non-DAC Countries), and Total ODA committed to GPE Partner Countries, in US$ million (current prices)


The trendline curve for ODA commitments to 76 GPE partner countries is flattening since 2009, and shows a decreasing trend since 2014.

In effect this means that GPE countries are supported with less funding for development, while resource needs are increasing.

Official donors include DAC Countries, Multilaterals, Non-DAC Countries. Does not include donor countries that are not registered in the OECD CRS database, such as China.

5.4.4 Distribution of spending on education sector by country income status

Figure 5.4.4a Public Expenditure on Education in GPE DCPs (as % of total Government Expenditures)



Source: Reconstructed from UNESCO Statistical Unit Data avaiable from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.CTOT.ZS

Evolution of the share of education spending in total Government Expenditure in GPE Partner Countries, by country income status and fragility.

The distribution shows an overall decline in education spending as % share of total Government expenditures considering all GPE partner countries (blue trend line) since 2000. FCACs and LMICs have performed significantly worse over time, while LICs maintained education spending close to 16% of total Government expenditure.


For the GPE operational period 2012-2015 a slight decrease is observed for LICs, LMICs, and FCACs.

For the GPE operational period 2016-2018, a small improvement is noticed for FCACs and LICs when compared to the previous operational period (2012-2015).

Table 5.4.4a Public Expenditure on Education in GPE DCPs (as % of total Government Expenditures)

% share	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total Average % GPE DCPs	**15,82**	**17,39**	**16,87**	**18,40**	**15,76**	**16,79**	**17,17**	**16,84**	**16,67**	**16,10**	**15,66**	**15,30**	**16,33**	**16,15**	**16,18**	**16,32**	**15,75**	**16,19**	**16,15**
DCPs with data available	38	32	35	28	39	33	31	29	38	35	44	41	40	44	45	42	40	44	40
Total Average % GPE LICs	**15,79**	**16,40**	**15,02**	**16,03**	**14,43**	**15,11**	**15,35**	**16,81**	**15,71**	**16,15**	**15,42**	**15,36**	**16,25**	**15,46**	**15,56**	**15,87**	**14,89**	**15,82**	**16,20**
LICs with data available	18	16	15	12	17	16	14	13	18	16	21	20	20	22	21	19	18	20	19
Total Average % GPE LMICs	**15,76**	**18,51**	**18,37**	**20,48**	**16,94**	**19,02**	**19,36**	**17,54**	**17,79**	**16,43**	**16,25**	**15,62**	**16,95**	**16,97**	**16,93**	**16,82**	**16,60**	**16,45**	**16,11**
LMICs with data available	19	15	17	13	20	15	15	14	19	17	21	19	18	21	22	21	20	23	20
Total Average % GPE FCAC	**16,67**	**18,31**	**16,48**	**18,65**	**14,71**	**14,98**	**15,54**	**17,77**	**16,02**	**15,78**	**14,11**	**14,53**	**16,05**	**14,94**	**15,33**	**14,60**	**14,00**	**14,48**	**14,44**
FCACs with data available	17	14	14	9	15	13	11	11	17	14	19	20	19	21	20	18	17	20	18

Figure 5.4.4b Public Expenditure on Education in GPE DCPs (as % of GDP)



Source: Reconstructed from UNESCO Statistical Unit Data avaiable from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS

Evolution of the share of education spending in as percentage of GDP in GPE Partner Countries, by country income status and fragility.

The distribution shows that between 2000-2018, education spending as % share of GDP in GPE partner countries (blue trend line) has remained between 4%-4.5%.

- *LMICs declined from 5% to approximately 4.5%*
- *LICs significantly improved from 3% to 4%*
- *FCACs show a relatively stable trendline of close to 3.5%.*


For the GPE operational period 2012-2015 an increase is observed for all GPE DCPs (LICs, LMICs, and FCACs).


For the GPE operational period 2016-2018, a small decrease is noted for LMICs, when compared to the previous operational period (2012-2015).


Table 5.4.4b Public Expenditure on Education in GPE DCPs (as % of GDP)

% share	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total Average % GPE DCPs	**4,12**	**4,40**	**4,15**	**4,41**	**3,93**	**4,22**	**4,22**	**4,00**	**4,00**	**4,16**	**4,00**	**3,68**	**3,97**	**3,95**	**4,11**	**4,53**	**4,19**	**4,29**	**4,24**
DCPs with data available	39	34	36	29	39	33	31	29	38	35	44	41	40	44	45	42	40	45	39
Total Average % GPE LICs	**3,34**	**3,58**	**2,78**	**2,75**	**2,94**	**2,99**	**3,18**	**3,43**	**3,37**	**3,55**	**3,51**	**3,47**	**3,71**	**3,51**	**3,66**	**3,84**	**3,54**	**3,78**	**4,07**
LICs with data available	19	17	15	12	17	16	14	13	18	16	21	20	20	22	21	19	18	20	18
Total Average % GPE LMICs	**4,67**	**5,03**	**4,71**	**5,03**	**4,65**	**5,23**	**5,10**	**4,51**	**4,57**	**4,70**	**4,50**	**3,92**	**4,30**	**4,41**	**4,50**	**5,13**	**4,69**	**4,64**	**4,31**
LMICs with data available	19	16	18	14	20	15	15	14	19	17	21	19	18	21	22	21	20	24	20
Total Average % GPE FCAC	**3,67**	**4,08**	**3,22**	**3,59**	**3,31**	**3,16**	**3,40**	**3,69**	**3,34**	**3,41**	**3,25**	**3,11**	**3,47**	**3,12**	**3,46**	**3,60**	**3,62**	**3,60**	**3,78**
FCACs with data available	17	14	14	9	15	13	11	11	17	14	19	20	19	21	20	18	17	20	17

Figure 5.4.4c Snapshot of distribution of spending on education by country income status (2014)







Source: Reconstructed from UNESCO, Global Education Monitoring Report (2019)


Low-Income Countries (LICs) *spent a total of US$ 22 billion on education development in 2014, of which 59% was provided by the Government, 29% was contributed by households, and* ***12% was received as donor support in development assistance***

Low-Middle Income Countries (LMICs) *spent a total of US$ 281,3 billion on education development in 2014, of which 73% was provided by the Government, 24% was contributed by households, and* ***only 2% was received as donor support through development assistance***

This shows that Low-Income Countries in comparison to Lower-Middle Income Countries have more difficulties in mobilising resources for education development, whereas at the same time these countries are faced with severe system level challenges in education and the performance of the sector overall.

Considering the above, this implies that the ***GPE funding in LICs would be more impactful*** *(at least budget-wise, on available financial rerourses for education development in LICs) than provision of funding Lower-Middle Income Countries.*

Figure 5.4.4d Snapshot of the distribution of public spending on education by country income status (2010 and 2016)



Source: Reconstructed from UNESCO, Global Education Monitoring Report (2019)

% distribution of public expenditure on education by sub-sector, by country income status.

The distribution shows that in Low-Income Countries, education spending is focused on primary education, while countries with a higher income status tend to spend more on secondary education and post-secondary / tertiary education.


***Pre-primary education in Low-Income Countries receives very limited attention through the public budget available for education**, indicating a relatively under-developed sub-sector, and service gap that may be provided by the private sector and paid through individual households budgets.*

Thematically, primary education is the principal focus for GPE supported interventions, but as can be seen from the distribution of education public expenditure, pre-primary education is a heavily under-resourced sub-sector, especially in Low-Income Countries.

*This implies that if GPE would increase funding to LICs and increase attention to pre-primary education and its connection to primary education, theoretically **GPE funding would be more impactful at the level of the pre-primary sub-sector.***

5.4.5 Evolution and Distribution of Donor Contributions to the GPE

Figure 5.4.5a Annual contributions received by the GPE by source, between 2012-2020 (in US$)



Source: Reconstructed from GPE Financial Data received from the GPE Trustee at the World Bank (Fiscal Years 2012-2020, until 31 December 2019)

The evolution of donor contributions (received) to the GPE shows an erratic pattern, where some countries skip a year, then reduce or increase for several consecutive years.


Contributions are received from various sources, mainly through sovereign countries (21 Governments, plus the European Commission) and five foundations.

The total level of funds provided by donors seems to follow a cyclical pattern aligned with the GPE Strategic Periods, i.e. 2012-2015 and 2016-2020.

Total contributions amount to:

- *2012-2020: US$ 3,876,581,274*
- *2012-2015: US$ 1,632,366,947*
- *2016-2020: US$ 2,244,214,326*

Figure 5.4.5b Total contributions received by the GPE by source and period, between 2012-2020 (in US$)



Source: Reconstructed from GPE Financial Data received from the GPE Trustee at the World Bank (Fiscal Years 2012-2020, until 31 December 2019)

The GPE's donor base consists of a few large "staple" traditional donors such as the United Kingdom (largest GPE donor), Norway, Denmark, Australia, USA, Sweden, and the Netherlands, all contributing more than US$ 200 million between 2012-2020.

Australia significantly reduced their contributions to the GPE, from US$ 330 million for the 2012-2015 to US$ 58 million for 2016-2020 period[83].


The European Commission is a new donor, and partnered up with the GPE since 2017, instantly becoming an important contributor to the GPE.

Romania provided a one-time contribution in 2012 of US$ 130,650.

Five foundations (Rockefeller, Benevolentia, Children's Investment Fund, Dubai Cares, Alliance for Open Society International) together contributed a total amount of US$ 13,050,000

[83] Australia has been a long-time partner of the GPE, and is ranked in the top 4 contributors to the GPE between 2012-2020. Education and Health together form one of Australia's six development investment priorities. In 2016, Australia spent US$40 million of ODA to education through multilateral channels, constituting 15% of Australia's overall education ODA. Overall, this was below the average share of other DAC countries (30%) in 2016. Most of Australia's multilateral education ODA was channeled as part of core contributions to the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA; 53%). Other significant shares went to the Asian Development Fund (ADF; 34%) and the World Food Programme (WFP; 7%). Australia reports support to GPE to the OECD as bilateral ODA. However, in February 2018, Australia pledged A$90 million (US$69 million) for the funding period 2018 to 2020, a significant reduction compared to the previous pledges to GPE. According to Australia's FY2019/20 budget, education ODA is expected to be A$619 million (US$474 million), a decrease from A$637 million (US$488 million) in FY2018/19. This overall trend (decrease in ODA commitments) is partly attributed to changes in the political structure in Australia, and is likely to remain flat or to further decrease due to the cap placed on the Australian ODA budget. See also https://donortracker.org/australia/education.

Figure 5.4.5c Relative size of contributions received by the GPE by source, between 2012-2020 (in US$)



Source: Reconstructed from GPE Financial Data received from the GPE Trustee at the World Bank (Fiscal Years 2012-2020, until 31 December 2019)

5.4.6 Complementarity and Overlap between the GPE, IFFEd, and ECW


	Global Partnership for Education (GPE)	International Financing Facility for Education (IFFEd)	Education Cannot Wait (ECW)
Goal	Mobilize global and national efforts to contribute to the achievement of equitable, quality education and learning for all, through inclusive partnership, a focus on effective and efficient education systems and increased financing.	Accelerate progress towards SDG 4: the provision of inclusive and equitable quality education and promotion of lifelong learning opportunities for all.	Ensure continuous access to quality learning for children and families affected by conflicts, natural disasters and displacement
Host	Secretariat: World Bank Trustee: World Bank	Secretariat: tbd Trustee: World Bank	Secretariat: UNICEF Trustee: UNICEF
Type	Grants	Loans/Grants	Grants
Geography	Currently 76 Developing Country Partners (DCPs): - 33 Low-Income Countries (LICs). - 33 Low-Middle Income Countries (LMICs). - 5 Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs). - 33 Fragile or Conflict Affected Countries (FCACs).	Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs)	Emergency and Crisis Situations in 33 countries A total of 25 countries identified for Multi-Year Resilience Programmes between 2019-2021 (*Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine/West Bank and Gaza, Somali, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Yemen*)
Principle	Being a partnership and a fund: - GPE gives partner countries the tools and support they need to strengthen planning, policy dialogue and monitoring, and help them achieve their education goals. - GPE works with partners in local education groups, promotes aligning external support to a country's priorities and systems. - Grant applications prepared at country level (through Government, LEGs, support by Grant Agents / Coordinating Agents) - Grants carried out through Grant Agents (World Bank,	- Vehicle aimed at unlocking affordable financing (i.e. loans with favorable conditions) for education for Lower-Middle-Income Countries through multilateral development banks (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and African Development Bank). - Focus on access to education and education quality (i.e. infrastructure, upgrading facilities, etc.). - Soften loan terms to make loans more accessible, affordable, manageable for educational investment. - Works through backing up loans with Guarantees from donor countries.	Education in Emergencies: - Finance comprehensive education programmes for children and youth affected by conflicts, natural disasters and displacement, right from the onset of crisis through recovery phases. - Inter-agency coordinated proposal aligned with inter-agency planning and resource mobilization strategies, such as Flash Appeals and Humanitarian Response Plans. - Prepared at the country-level (LEG, Cluster, WG) - Grants carried out through UN Agencies, and NGOs (international & local).

	Global Partnership for Education (GPE)	International Financing Facility for Education (IFFEd)	Education Cannot Wait (ECW)
Conditions	1. DCPs need to demonstrate their commitment to a credible, endorsed Education Sector Plan, including a costed multi-year implementation plan. 2. DCPs to demonstrate government commitment to fund the education sector (maintenance / increase % public expenditures on education), target 20%. Within education spending, at least 45% of the education budget needs to be allocated to primary education. 3. DCPs need to avail of a suitable data collection strategy and monitoring system to track education sector outcomes and financial data.	1. Beneficiary country must have a **strong national education sector plan** or other credible strategic framing document that demonstrates a commitment to SDG4. 2. Beneficiary country must be committed to improving education opportunities for marginalized children and youth consistent with the principle of "leave no-one behind". 3. Beneficiary country must demonstrate a **commitment to increase or maintain its domestic education budget** in line with international standards. 4. Financing must be **results-based and aligned with nationally owned targets** (consistent with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness).	1. Eligibility for funding will be triggered through existing classifications / standards on emergencies, the ECW will use the IASC L3 classification or UN and non-UN emergencies level, incl. UNICEF and UNHCR's lists for L1 and L2 classifications. 2. Assessment of Needs, Gaps in Support, ECW Value Add, Alignment with ECW Strategic Priorities
Fund Size	2012-2015 → US$ 1.632 million mobilized 2016-2020 → US$ 2.244 million mobilized	Current more than US$ 600 million mobilized (UK & NL) → expected to leverage more than US$ 2 billion 2020-2024 → Aim to raise US$ 1 billion contingent and US$ 1 billion grants, which leverages a total of US$ 5 billion in financing through MDBs. The grants are used to soften the loan financing terms.	2017-2020 → US$ 614 million mobilized 2017-2019 → US$ 255 million disbursed
Mechanics	- Education Sector Plan Development Grants (ESPDGs) - Programme Development Grants (PDGs) - Education Sector Plan Implementation Grants (ESPIGs)	Loan Approval by MDBs applying own processes and use own systems, IFFEd is no direct point of contact for Developing Countries	- First Emergency Response (FER) - Acceleration Facility - Multi-Year Resilience (MYR)
Donor Base	- Five foundations (incl. Rockefeller, Dubai Cares, Benevolentia, Alliance for Open Society, Children's Investment Fund) - Traditional Donor Countries (DAC)	- United Kingdom (US$ 350 million) - Netherlands (US$ 250 million) - European Commission (EUR 6.5 million)	- Four foundations (LEGO, Dubai Cares, Theirworld, Porticus) - Traditional Donors (DAC)

	Global Partnership for Education (GPE)	International Financing Facility for Education (IFFEd)	Education Cannot Wait (ECW)
Other	Weight distribution in committed investment portfolio GPE: - 33 Low-Income Countries (LICs) → US$ 1,841,462,773 in commitments (58% of total GPE commitments 2012-2020). - 33 Low-Middle Income Countries (LMICs) → US$ 985,907,273 in commitments (31% of total GPE commitments). - 5 Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs) → US$ 6.517.888 (0% of total GPE commitments, 2012-2020). - 33 Fragile or Conflict Affected Countries (FCACs) → US$ 1.660.200.612 in commitments (53% of total GPE commitments, 2012-2020).	Not yet operational	- One major difference between the GPE and the ECW, is the speed of grant application process and disbursement. - ECW's aim is to ensure that funds get as quickly as possible to implementing organizations so that interventions can be started with minimal delays, in order to minimize the disruption to children and adolescents' education. - Estimated time delay for a First Emergency Response Grant is about **five weeks** from the date of announcement to the date of signing a grant agreement and disbursement of funds. - Acceleration Facility focus is to provide a flexible financing mechanism to fund strategic initiatives which will tackle a prioritized subset of these systemic barriers (insufficient funding; weak political will, policies and programmatic guidance; the lack of up-to-date quality data and analysis; and inadequate capacities). - MYR window supports collaborative education responses in protracted crisis countries shifting the focus to joint analysis, multiyear-planning and joint-programming (bridging the humanitarian relief - development gap).

5.4.7 Size, Geographic Scope, and Donor Base of ECW

Figure 5.4.7a Education Cannot Wait total investments by partner country (total 2017-2019, in US$)



Source: Education Cannot Wait (https://public.tableau.com/views/EducationCannotWaitBarChart/Sheet1, last update December 2019)

The ECW facility provides funding for emergency education and resilience programmes in countries affected by crises, including natural and humanitarian disasters (e.g. education support to refugees).


Currently the ECW provides support to 33 countries, affected by a crisis situation, with the majority of the countries located in Africa.


All ECW countries except Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Greece, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Ukraine also received grant funding through the GPE during previous years.

Total ECW commitments to end of 2019:

- *First Emergency Response: US$ 89,249,263*
- *Initial Investments: US$ 55,000,000*
- *Multi-year Resilience Programmes: US$ 97,377,937*
- *Regional Response: US$ 376,700*

Figure 5.4.7b Education Cannot Wait received contributions by source (total 2017-2020)





Source: Education Cannot Wait (last update March 2020)

There is a significant overlap between the ECW and the GPE donor base:

- *Total contributions and pledges received by ECW between 2017-2020: US$ 615 million*
- *The ECW's donor base consists of several traditional donors such as the United Kingdom (largest contributor), Norway, Denmark, Germany, USA, and Canada, all contributing more than US$ 50 million between 2017-2020.*
- *Four foundations (incl. Dubai Cares, LEGO, Theirworld, and Porticus) together contributed a total amount of US$ 25.6 million*

Annex Seven: Additional information to Section 6.1

6.1 Benchmarking information, per section

Table 6.1a General information

Acronym	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Full name	Global Partnership For Education	**Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance,** previously the **GAVI Alliance**, and before that the **Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization**	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	Global Environment Facility	Green Climate Fund
Website	www.globalpartnership.org	https://www.gavi.org	www.theglobalfund.org	www.thegef.org	www.greenclimate.fund
Type of organization	Global partnership	Independent legal entity: Non-profit foundation within the meaning of the Swiss Civil Code.	Independent legal entity: Non-profit foundation under the laws of Switzerland and recognized as an international organization by various national governments.	Global partnership	International organization
Location	World Bank, Washington, DC	Geneva, Switzerland	Geneva, Switzerland	World Bank, Washington DC	Songdo, South Korea
Start date	2002	2000	2002	1991	2011

Table 6.1b Governance

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF

Governing body member-ship	**Board of Directors** (38 seats)
	• 12 developing country representatives
	• 12 donor representatives
	• 6 multilateral agency/regional bank representatives
	• 6 CSO representatives
	• 2 private sector/foundation representatives
		GAVI Board (28 seats)
		• 1 representative each of WHO, UNICEF, World Bank, Gates Foundation
		• 5 developing country representatives
		• 5 donor country representatives
		• 1 representative each of the vaccine industry in industrialized countries, the vaccine industry in developing countries, civil society, and technical/health research institutes
		• 9 unaffiliated individuals appointed in their personal capacity
			Global Fund Board (28 seats)
			• 7 representatives from developing country constituencies
			• 8 donor representatives
			• 5 civil society and private sector representatives:
			  • 1 developing country NGO
			  • 1 developed country NGO
			  • 1 commercial private sector
			  • 1 private sector foundation
			  • 1 NGO representative living with AIDS/ tuberculosis/ malaria
			• 8 ex-officio non-voting members:
			  • Board Chair, Vice-Chair, Executive Director, and Trustee (World Bank)
			  • WHO, UNAIDS, and Partners constituency
			  • Swiss citizen as required by Swiss law
				GEF Council (32 members)
				• 16 members from developing countries (Africa - 6, Asia and Pacific – 6, Latin America and Caribbean 4)
				• 14 members from developed countries
				• 2 members from the countries of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
				
				The GEF Assembly meets every 3-4 years and is attended by high-level government delegations of all 182 GEF member countries
					Board (24 members)
					• 12 developing country members, as follows:
					  • 3 from Asia-Pacific
					  • 3 from Africa
					  • 3 from Latin America and the Caribbean
					  • 1 small island state
					  • 1 least developed country
					  • 1 developing county member not included in the above groups
					• 12 developed country members
					• 4 active observers:
					  • 2 CSO and 2 private sector representatives, one each from a developing and developed country
					• Other observers invited by the Co-Chairs such as party or observer states to the UNFCCC, UN Agencies, MDBs, IFIs, regional institutions, and NGOs

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Chair	Selected by the Board through an open competitive process for a three-year term. May be extended for only one additional three-year term.	The Chair and Vice-Chair are selected by the Board from its own voting members for two-year terms and may be reselected for a single term. The CEO is an ex-officio non-voting member of the Board.	The Chair and Vice-Chair are selected by the Board for two-year terms. The Chair and Vice-Chair alternate between the following two voting groups: • 8 donor seats, private sector, and private sector foundation • 7 developing country seats and 3 NGO seats	Each meeting of the Council elects a co-Chairperson (along with CEO) from among its Members, that alternates between the recipient and non-recipient Council Members. There is no co-Chairperson in between Council meetings.	Two co-chairs elected by Board members for one-year terms — one from a developed country and one from a developing country
Board committees	• Coordinating Committee • Finance and Risk Committee • Governance and Ethics Committee • Grants and Performance Committee • Strategy and Impact Committee	• The Programme & Policy Committee • The Governance Committee • The Investment Committee • The Audit and Finance Committee • The Market-Sensitive Decisions Committee • The Evaluation Advisory Committee	• Strategy Committee • Audit and Finance Committee • Ethics and Governance Committee	• Selection and Review Committee • Ethics Committee	• Budget Committee • Ethics and Audit Committee (EAC); • Investment Committee; • Performance Oversight Committee; • Risk Management Committee.

Table 6.1c Administration

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Secretariat	Located in the World Bank, and called the GPE Secretariat.	Independent legal entity called the GAVI Secretariat.	Independent legal entity called the Global Fund Secretariat.	Located in the World Bank, supported administratively by the World Bank, and operating in a "functionally independent" manner from the World Bank.	Independent legal entity called the GCF Secretariat.
Head of the Secretariat	**Chief Executive Officer**, recruited for three years through a competitive process agreed between the Board and the host organization (World Bank). May be renewed for one more term.	**Chief Executive Officer,** appointed by GAVI Alliance Board to renewable terms of four years. Ex-officio non-voting member of the GAVI Alliance Board and the Executive Committee	**Executive Director,** selected by the Board for a term of four years. Ex-officio non-voting member of the Board.	**Chief Executive Officer/Chairperson of the Facility,** appointed by the Council for four-years, and may be reappointed by the Council for one additional term.	**Executive Director,** selected by a merit-based, open and transparent process and appointed by the Board.
Secretariat Staff	108	Over 300[84]	Over 700	71	240
Administrative costs, USD	35.7 million	110 million	Around 300 million	23,5 million	70 million

[84] 280 in Geneva and 25 in Washington

Table 6.1d Allocation and disbursement of grants

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Annual disburs. in 2019, USD	418 million	1.75 billion	3.51 billion[85]	2.1 billion	0.9-1.0 billion[86]
Types of key grants/ support	1. **Education sector plan development grants (ESPDG)** to develop a solid education sector plan/improve on an existing one. 2. **Education sector program implementation grants (ESPIG)** to support the implementation of the education sector plan. 3. **Knowledge and Innovation Exchange** (KIX) - over US$75 million fund solely dedicated to meet global public good gaps in education, covering six thematic areas.	1. **Support** for global **vaccine** stockpiles. 2. **Health system strengthening** (HSS) support to strengthen the capacity of integrated health systems to deliver immunization programs. Part of this is **funding support to CSOs** working in partnership with implementing countries 3. Investment with countries in the purchase, deployment, and installation of modern, high performing **cold chain equipment optimization platform** (CCEOP). 4. **Targeted country assistance (TCA)** through its core partners (WHO,	1. Main grants to countries based on an **allocation-based approach** within each disease funding envelope. For 2020-2022 US$12.71 billion overall[87] 2. Catalytic investments • **Matching funds** – designated US$317 million for 2020-2022 to incentivize the programing of country allocations **- Multi-country funding** - Competitive grant application process to address critical, global multi-country challenges **- Strategic initiatives** - US$343 million to provide funding during 2020-2022 for initiatives that are	1. **Full-sized projects (FSPs)** - more than USD 2 million) -implemented through GEF Agencies. 2. **Medium-sized projects (MSPs)** - up to USD 2 million - aimed at being simpler and quicker than FSPs, developed by a wide range of stakeholders. 3. **Small grants program (SGP)** - maximum grant of USD 50,000 (paid in 3 installments) and USD 150,000 for strategic projects that allow for scaling up. Funding and technical support provided to communities and CSOs. Aimed at mobilizing bottom-up actions and supporting	1. Main grants 2. Through Readiness and Preparatory Support Program (RPSP): **- Up to USD 1 million per country per year** – within this amount, NDAs/FPs may request up to USD 300,000 per year for establishing/ strengthening of NDA/FP. A maximum of USD 100,000 can be used for NDA-led stakeholder meetings **- Up to USD 3 million per country for NAPs** – up to USD 3 million per country is available for the formulation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and/or other adaptation planning processes by NDAs or focal points.

[85] https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/financials/

[86] https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-b23-10.pdf

[87] First, the formula allocates funding within each disease funding envelope based on each country's disease burden and economic capacity (measured by GNI per capita). Second, allocations determined by the formula are then reviewed in a qualitative adjustment process, which considers other contextual factors, such as the needs of key and vulnerable populations in HIV, risks of malaria resurgence and coverage gaps in prevention and treatment of all three diseases. For 2020-2022, US$12.71 billion available for country allocations is distributed to each disease's funding envelope according to the Board-approved global disease split: HIV/AIDS –50%; Tuberculosis –18%; Malaria –32%. https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/9226/fundingmodel_2020-2022allocations_faq_en.pdf

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
	4. Through Education Out Loud up to US$55.5 million for national and international CSOs and networks to support their advocacy and social accountability work in 2019-2024.	UNICEF, CDC, and the World Bank) and expanded partners.	critical to support the success of country allocations but cannot be funded through country grants.	community-led initiatives. 4. **Enabling Activities (EAs)** - up to USD 1 million – accessed by countries and GEF Agencies directly. Mostly used to support countries to report on their obligations under the signed conventions.	**- Funding for national/ regional organizations** (Direct Access Entities) that are nominated by their local NDAs to enhance the ability of an entity to seek accreditation with the Fund, including for the fast-track accreditation process (pre-accreditation support).
Specific focus on countries (in addition to main grants)	Countries affected by fragility and conflict, low- and lower-middle-income countries with high levels of out-of-school children.	Priority countries (20), 50% facing the most severe immunization challenges and 50% - facing severe inequities or crises.	With the allocation model GF drives more resources to the highest burden and lowest income countries and focuses funding in countries where progress is most critical to increase impact, including the 13 adolescent girls and young women (AGYW)-priority countries, the top 20 priority countries for finding missing people with TB and the 10+1 high burden to high impact malaria countries. Within the Catalytic investment => strategic initiatives every 3 years there is focus on an issue that might be region-specific[88].	Countries that are especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, through the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF).	GCF aims at least 50% of the RPSP going to particularly vulnerable countries, including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the African States. GCF also aims for 50% of support for mitigation and 50% for adaptation.

[88] For instance, among the strategic initiatives supported in 2017-2019 was one on contributing to the development of an updated WHO policy recommendation on the use of the RTS,S/AS01 malaria vaccine in young children in sub-Saharan Africa (https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/9012/fundingmodel_2017-2019strategicinitiatives_list_en.pdf?u=637122775300000000)

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Project preparation support	**Program development grants (PDG)** for the design of an education program to implement the national sector strategy.	No specific support other than secretariat's guidance	No specific support other than secretariat's guidance	**Project Preparation Grant** (PPG) to support **the preparation** of a full-sized **project** (FSP) or medium-sized **project** (MSP).	Through the **Project Preparation Facility (PPF) -** up to USD 1.5 million for each application to the PPF - financial and technical assistance support for the preparation of project and program funding proposals.
Grant requirements in terms of domestic financing/co-financing	• The commitment of the government for reaching or maintaining the 20% of national budget target stated in the Education Sector Plan • If the country has not reached Universal Primary Education, an extra commitment to allocate at least 45% of the education budget to primary education	Gavi's co-financing policy divides countries into 3 groups, based on their ability to pay, as determined by GNI per capita. • In the **initial self-financing** phase, the government's contribution is a flat amount: USD 0.20 per dose of any Gavi-supported vaccine • In **the preparatory transition** phase, the government's contribution increases by 15% of the price of vaccines per year. • In **an accelerated transition**, the government's share of vaccine costs increases from the level it had reached during the previous phase to 100%	Global Fund uses co-financing as an incentive. Typically, 15-30% of the Global Fund country allocation is provided as a co-financing incentive which is accessible when the country invests additional domestic resources.	• An ambition for the overall GEF portfolio is to reach a ratio of at least 7:1 (co-financing to project financing), and for the portfolio of projects and programs approved in Upper-Middle Income Countries and High-Income Countries that are not Small Island Developing States or Least Developed Countries to reach a ratio of at least 5:1 (investment mobilized to GEF financing)[89]. • The Secretariat does not impose minimum thresholds and/or specific types or sources of Co-Financing or Investment Mobilized in its review of individual projects and programs.	• There is no minimum amount of co-financing required for a Funded Activity, and no specific sources of co-financing that must be complied with. • However, whenever possible, GCF recommends Funded Activities to seek to incorporate appropriate levels of co-financing to maximize the impact of GCF proceeds, as determined on a case-by-case basis. • While maximizing co-financing is desirable, GCF avoids using co-financing metrics as stand-alone targets since maximizing climate change mitigation and adaptation results do not necessarily equate

[89] https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.C.57.Inf_.03_Scorecard_December%202019.pdf

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
		of the cost over a period of 5 years.			with minimizing or optimizing spending on climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Grant approval	Grants with up to total value **not exceeding US$10 million**, proposals are approved by the Secretariat, based on extensive quality assurance processes. For the **grants of the total value of US$10 - US$25 million**, the applications are approved by the Grants and Performance Committee, based on the recommendations from the Secretariat. For the **grants exceeding total value US$ 25 million**, applications are approved by the full board.	Grant applications for new support are approved (3 times per year) by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Gavi, based on the reviews by the Independent Review Committee (IRC).	Grants are approved by the board electronically, on a no-objection basis, based on review and recommendations from the independent panel of experts - the Technical Review Panel (TRP) and the Secretariat's Grant Approvals Committee	1. **Full-sized projects (FSPs)** approved by GEF Council=> Endorsed by GEF CEO 2. **Medium-sized projects (MSPs)** approved directly by the GEF CEO. 3. **Small grants program (SGP)** Project proposals submitted by National coordinator=> Reviewed and approved by the National Steering Committees (NSC). 4. **Enabling Activities (EAs)** approved by GEF CEO (delegated by GEF Council).	1. Main grants approved by the full board based on recommendations from Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) and Secretariat 2. RPSP program proposals are reviewed by the interdivisional technical committee of the GCF Secretariat and approved by Executive Director. A Simplified Approval Process (SAP) has been piloted and evaluated to conclude it presents no efficiency gains[90].
Implementing entities (grant management)	Grant agents (GAs) - accredited entities by GPE. At present, there are 17 such entities, mostly multi-laterals, some bilateral aid	• Direct access for governments to purchase the vaccines • CSOs working in partnership with	• Principal Recipients (PRs). These may be a government department or agency, a CSO, an academic institution, or an international organization	GEF Agencies (18), of which 10 multilateral agencies and 8 project agencies.	Accredited Entities • International: 39 • Regional direct access: 13 • National direct access: 43 (as of January 2019)

[90] Under the best-case scenario of the business-as-usual situation, the approval time for SAP could be reduced by 35 days compared with the regular funding proposal approval cycle. A recommendation is to develop a process which includes a delegated authority for approval of resources for SAP projects and programs that present no to minimal environmental and social risks https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-b25-12.pdf

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
	agencies, and international NGOs.	implementing countries as part of HSS grants	such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). • Sub-Recipients, sub-contracted by PRs		
Grant Incentives	The **GPE Multiplier** - a US$300 million innovative finance instrument - provides an incentive and the financial resources to catalyze more and better investment in education. A country can access its allocation by mobilizing at least US$3 in new external financing for every US$1 from the GPE Multiplier **Results-based financing called the variable part** or variable part financing - a mechanism whereby GPE disbursement is triggered when a pre-agreed set of results has been achieved.	The Gavi **Matching Fund** - a public-private funding mechanism to incentivize private sector investments in immunization, by matching private sector contributions in cash or in-kind to secure the resources and expertise required to modernize vaccine delivery systems. GAVI used to support HSS through performance-based funding (PBF) approach that linked funding to immunization outcomes. It has halted, after evaluating the usefulness of this grant as not adding value. The lesson learned here is that PBF should always be accompanied by evaluation and learning.	Global Fund considers **country allocations**, comprising almost 93% of overall resources as the main incentive to drive impact. On top of this, the Global Fund uses **Catalytic investments** which aim to catalyze the use of country allocations to achieve the aims of the Global Fund's 2017-2022 strategy and global partner plans. Grants are assessed annually and graded on the base of grades. Grade "A" grants are automatically disbursed, while below "A" grants are disbursed only after a discussion on how flagged issues will be addressed. Results-based funding (through **performance-based financing** pilots) are mechanisms to deal with more challenging country	To support transformational change and achieve impacts on a broader scale, as per GEF 2020 strategy, GEF supports 3 **impact programs** (each 100 mln): (1) Food Systems, Land Use, and Restoration, (2) Sustainable Forest Management, and (3) Sustainable Cities. Participating countries are expected to program the impact program incentives with their STAR allocation at a ratio of 1:2, and generate significant co-financing from various sources such as international financial institutions and donors, as well as the private sector, philanthropies or social enterprises. In an indirect way, GEF incorporates **performance aspect**s in grant-making since one of the indexes in	GCF provides **results-based payments** as part of (the final phase in) REDD+[91] that provides financial incentives to developing countries that have proved through rigorous UN-backed technical evaluation they have halted deforestation during a period of time. One of the requirements to be eligible for results-based payments is to receive UNFCCC recognition that the period countries set in measuring the emissions avoided from preventing deforestation and forest degradation is sound. These are based on measurement baselines known as forest reference emission levels and/or forest reference levels (known as FRELs).

[91] REDD+ refers to the UNFCCC-based accounting and funding mechanism that supports developing countries' efforts to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and (the plus) foster conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
			cases. Currently, GF only has a few (2-3) of such cases.	STAR allocations looks at GEF terminal evaluation results.	
Grant process, average in recent years	In 2019, for ESPIG (largest grant), from the first proposal received till grant start – **16 months**. The total duration from the maximum country allocation to grant start is more than 40 months. GPE is working on streamlining this process.	In 2019, Gavi brought its grant application process from 15–18 months to 10 months for a country to introduce a vaccine after it has submitted its application to Gavi. HSS and CCEOP support normally take 12–18 months to disburse after submission. Gavi HSS grants have been experienced substantial delays in implementation. This is evaluated to be due to challenges with delays in the IRC approval process and several other causes that cut across the entire grant cycle, including weak country capacities[92].	In Applicant Handbook 2020-2022 Global Fund states that the overall process from submission of the funding request to grant signing may take **9 months** (or longer in some cases depending on the length of grant-making).	Differs per fund. According to the new Project Cancellation Policy[93], if a medium-sized project approved from March 1, 2019, onwards, is not submitted for CEO approval within **8 months** of the date of PIF approval or if after **12 months** from the date of PIF approval the project has not been CEO approved, the project will be canceled. Correspondingly, if a full-sized project is not submitted for CEO endorsement within **12 months** of the date of Council approval or if after **18 months** from the date of Council approval, the project has not been CEO endorsed, the project is canceled.	The average time spent (2019) on the formal review process by the Secretariat of entities seeking accreditation (application submitted but not yet Board-approved) is 461 days, with the longest duration being 1,449 days (**around 48 months**). In 2019, the average time for the 102 approved projects to move through the project cycle from full proposal submission to Board approval is **9 month**s (an improvement from 11 months in 2015). The average time for Board approval to post-approval execution of the Funded Activity Agreement (FAAs) is **10 months** (an improvement from 12.4 months in 2015)[94].

[92] https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/document/2020/How-we-work-together-feb-2020.pdf The updated meta-review published in 2019 analyzes six additional evaluations of HSS support completed in 2016-2017. "Update to the 2015 Meta-Review of Gavi HSS Evaluations." Gavi Evaluation Team, 2018. https://www.gavi.org/library/gavi-documents/evaluations/gavi-hss-meta-review--update/.

[93] https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/Project_Cancellation_Policy_20181220.pdf

[94] https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/documents/977793/1474145/FPR_countries_report.pdf/d84aa3df-2190-c99d-5272-832821142319

Table 6.1f Conceptual frameworks, monitoring, and evaluation

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Conceptual results frameworks	• 5-year strategy (2016-2020 currently) with TOC, results framework and 37 corporate indicators • Other sub-strategies and policies such as private sector engagement strategy, gender equality strategy, M&E strategy.	• Gavi's previous (2016-2020) and new strategies (2021-2025) are guided by the same 4 strategic goals, translated into a results framework. • Sub-strategy such as vaccine investment strategy • Based on recommendations, Gavi started using ToC at a country level and will shift to providing support on the basis of ToCs. ITAD is assisting Gavi in developing the ToC approach. Gavi's strategy 5.0 will be accompanied by a broader ToC to show how Gavi intends to achieve its new strategy.	• There is no overall ToC for thematic areas. Recommendations are made (2019) to develop these ToCs. • The 2017-22 strategy is translated into prioritized and actionable annual implementation plans. • Other strategies and policies, translated into action plans such as Market Shaping Strategy; Gender Equality Strategy.	• Current, the seventh replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund (GEF-7) has a single strategic results framework that links three levels – global environmental trends, GEF outcomes, and GEF efficiency and effectiveness • The OPS6 evaluation cited a lack of a clear, overall theory of change as a GEF weakness.	• GCF has Fund-level Theory of Change (with assumptions explained) for the first replenishment cycle, accompanied by Results Management Framework (RMF) • Independent review of the GCF's initial RMF (2018) found logic models for mitigation and adaptation highly linear and lacking harmonization of indicators across the results chain. As a result, the RF was updated to integrated results management framework (IRMF) • Other frameworks such as risk management framework, monitoring and accountability framework

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Monitoring and reporting	**At grant level**: reports by GAs At **country level:** GPE encourages multi-stakeholder sector-wide monitoring of education sector plans with guidance on joint sector reviews (JSRs). At a **corporate level**: • Portfolio Reviews (grants), • Results Reporting based on 37 indicators	Key **corporate data** is collected on high-level indicators and reported annually. Routine reporting by a country consists of: • programmatic reporting against indicators in grant performance framework (GPF), one per country • financial reporting, which includes reporting against all forms of HSIS The new **Alliance Accountability Framework** (AAF) is designed to help in measuring the collective progress of the Alliance in implementing the new strategy	• GF makes use of Local Fund Agent (LFA), generally one per country, working closely with the Secretariat's country team to monitor and evaluate activities of a grant. • **Countries** report based on the funding requests that use the GFs modular framework, with key areas of programming, individual interventions, the associated budget, and the indicators. • With a set of impact, outcome and coverage indicators track the overall **progress of the GF**, assess the performance of partners, and evaluate the overall progress of grant recipients. • By requesting routine progress reports from the CCM/grantee and commissioning an external progress evaluation, GF monitors **individual grant recipients** on a regular basis[95].	At the **country level**: • Country portfolio monitoring • Environmental monitoring • Project monitoring **At project level** • Annual reporting by GEF Agencies • Agency-led mid-term review of full-size projects • Agency-led terminal evaluations of projects/programs, which must have an independent review At a **corporate level**: GEF-7 has corporate-level outcome targets, now simplified to 11 core indicators for the GEF-7 results framework. Starting in GEF-6, a Corporate Scorecard has tracked these outcome targets along with programming and a number of efficiency and effectiveness indicators.	**On Accreditation**: • Annual self- reporting on systems compliance with standards and safeguards. • Midterm review and any ad hoc compliance reviews by Secretariat. **On Funded Activities** (grants): • Quarterly financials, • semi-annual progress reports, • midterm and final evaluations. • Spot checks: GCF can conduct spot- checks using a risk-based system GF encourages participatory multi-stakeholder monitoring. At **a corporate level**: GCF tracks performance with 43 indicators,18 in the mitigation result area, 17 in the adaptation result area and the remaining - to inform REDD+ programs and projects. These are collected from projects, that have 4-6 required indicators.

[95] Grants are regularly assessed and graded on the base of grade "A" grants are automatically disbursed, while below A grants are disbursed only after a discussion on how flagged issues will be addressed.

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF

Evaluation function	• External evaluations managed by Secretariat, among them
	  • Summative and prospective country-level evaluations
	  • Programmatic evaluations
	• Specific reviews such as thematic studies, review of grant processes, replenishment work, others.
	• Periodic external reviews such as Effective Partnership Reviews to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of key actors in the country-level operational model.
	• External independent comprehensive (5-year strategy) evaluations managed by a temporary evaluation oversight committee
	• External evaluations by donors
		Gavi evaluations are carried out under the guidance of the Evaluation Advisory Committee (EAC), positioned within the Policy& Performance Department, reporting to the Board and providing oversight to the Gavi Secretariat managing
		(1)country evaluations
		• **Prospective country evaluations** in a sub-set of countries
		• **Retrospective country portfolio evaluations**, covering the full portfolio of Gavi support, for **countries with ongoing Gavi support**, every 3-5 years and for **fully self-financing countries –** 2 years after Gavi support ceases
		(2) alliance evaluation components - **thematic cross-country evaluations (retrospective or prospective)** of key Gavi strategies, policies and/or programs.
			Global Fund relies on an independent evaluation advisory group - the Technical Evaluation Reference Group (TERG) - to oversee independent evaluations on behalf of its Board.
			Evaluations:
			• periodical strategic reviews on the work of the Global Fund and the implementation of its strategies. The last one performed in 2017.
			• reviews on specific themes for internal use
			• Starting in 2017, in-depth **country-level prospective evaluations** in 8 selected countries
			
			TERG is accountable to the Global Fund Board through its Strategy Committee.
				Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) carries out independent evaluations covering a set of projects or programs (from more than one GEF Agency).
				IEO distinguishes:
				• Overall Performance Studies (OPS) every 4 years to inform the donors prior to each quadrennial replenishment
				• Thematic Evaluations on a sample of projects
				• Impact Evaluations
				• Performance Evaluations for feedback on ongoing improvements of the GEF portfolio
				• Corporate/Process Evaluations of institutional and procedural issues across the GEF
				• Country Evaluations
				The independence of the IEO evaluation function is overseen by the GEF Council.
					There is an Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) that is a core structure of the fund
					
					IEU has conducted six evaluations which include:
					1. Performance review of the GCF
					2. Evaluation of the Readiness and Preparatory Support program
					3. Evaluation of the Results Management Framework
					4. A real-time learning-oriented impact assessment
					5. Evaluation of GCF's Country Ownership Approach
					6. Assessment of GCF's Environmental and Social Safeguards

Table 6.1g Dealing with typical global fund/partnership challenges

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Challenge 1: stimulating national ownership/ government leadership	• Education Sector Plan as a prerequisite for larger grants • Government-led multi-stakeholder collaborative forum - Local Education Group (LEG) for the primary consultation on education sector development • Grant execution by government	• A requirement that country applications are reflected in the country comprehensive multi-year plan (CMYP) for new and underused vaccines, and for HSS applications - the National Health Sector Plan (NHSP) • Guidance on Inter-agency Coordinating Committee (ICC) or Health Sector Coordinating Committee (HSCC) [96] contains a recommendation for coordination to reside at a level in the health ministry. • ICC to ensure that the Expanded Programme on Immunization and the coordination of the program remains government-owned and government-led	• The new funding model requires grant applications to be aligned with national plans and targets • Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) to review and endorse funding requests and, after review by the technical review panel (TEP), nominate a principal recipient • Recommendations for a senior government official to chair CCM • In practice, CCMs are more successful in getting the proposal out than in regular monitoring and oversight. CCM evolution initiative addresses this further. The initiative categorizes CCMs per capacity and engagement with Global Fund processes	• To ensure alignment with national priorities, the GEF Project and Programme Cycle Policy require all GEF-funded activities to have the endorsement of the relevant operational focal point (typically a minister or senior government official), which is submitted as part of the project identification form (PIF) process. • The GEF (Operational and Political) Focal Points (Country Representatives) are government officials, designated by member countries, responsible for GEF activities and to ensure that GEF projects are country-driven and based on national priorities.	• Work through National Designated Authorities (NDA) or Focal Points (FPs), which issue the no-objection letter required to approve funding; proposes entities for direct access accreditation; convenes stakeholders at the national level; puts forward readiness support requests; and ensures alignment on funding proposals with national priorities (and other functions) • Support to facilitate the development of NAPs, which set national priorities for measures to address adaptation to climate change. • Country ownership is a core principle for the GCF, and direct access is considered one of its building blocks.

[96] ICC, HSCC or equivalent is a national coordination forum, bringing together governments and other relevant key immunization stakeholders.

Aspects	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Lessons on national ownership/ government leadership	• Following finding of meta-evaluation of Gavi's HSS support (2016) [97] - that due to weak country planning capacity several grants have not been designed effectively - Gavi has introduced a Joint Appraisal (JA) process, streamlined HSS guidelines and made, as part of full portfolio planning[98], HSS grant design through iterative country dialogue between country, Gavi Alliance, and other in-country stakeholders. As a result, quality of the applications have improved. • Gavi's recent update on meta-evaluation of HSS support[99] states that because financial management capacity continues to be an issue in some countries, Gavi has opted to increasingly channel its funds via Partners (most notably UNICEF). However, this comes at a cost of not developing the national systems and with concerns about national ownership and oversight.	TERG thematic review (2020) states that there was good alignment of Global Fund supported components with National Strategic Plans (NSPs) or other national health and disease planning across all case study countries. However, there was uneven alignment in use of national systems[100].	• The OPS6 evaluation found that GEF-funded focal area activities and country programs were strongly aligned to national priorities • GEF Annual Performance Report (2019) states that among the issues with implementation highlighted across several underachieving projects is insufficient government commitment/ownership • Evaluation of GEF's support to scaling up impact (2019)[101] found that ownership may be developed by engaging stakeholders through participatory processes. In at least 12 out of 20 cases, buy-in to and adoption of the intervention was attributed at least in part to participatory activities or mechanisms introduced through a GEF- supported project. Examples of such processes are public consultations during project preparation, village groups, and community-based natural resource management activities around protected areas	• Country ownership has been supported through assigning an NDA/FPs in every developing country, preparing country programs, developing and applying the no-objection process for project approval and designating Direct Access Entities (DAEs), requesting assistance from the GCF through the RPSP. • From the GCF's wide variety of funding programs (a mix of proposals and RfPs), Enhanced Direct Access (EDA)[102] strengthens country ownership. • Analysis from country visits and interviews indicate that national GCF projects have an origin within countries. There is however an issue of responsiveness to ownership other than government entities[103]

[97] The updated meta-review published in 2019 analyzes six additional evaluations of HSS support completed in 2016-2017. "Update to the 2015 Meta-Review of Gavi HSS Evaluations." Gavi Evaluation Team, 2018. https://www.gavi.org/library/gavi-documents/evaluations/gavi-hss-meta-review--update/.

[98] Formerly through the Country Engagement Framework (CEF)

[99] The updated meta-review published in 2019 analyzes six additional evaluations of HSS support completed in 2016-2017. "Update to the 2015 Meta-Review of Gavi HSS Evaluations." Gavi Evaluation Team, 2018. https://www.gavi.org/library/gavi-documents/evaluations/gavi-hss-meta-review--update/.

[100] https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/9269/terg_sustainabilitytransitioncofinancing_report_en.pdf?u=637166002330000000

[101] https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.ME_C56_Inf.03_Rev.01_Evaluation_of_GEF_support_to_Scaling-Up_Impact_May_2019%20POST-COUNCIL.pdf

[102] The Enhancing Direct Access (EDA) pilot channels climate financing to homegrown organizations in developing countries. USD 200 million have been approved for this pilot programme.

[103] GCF's Forward-looking Performance Review 2019 https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/evaluations/fpr

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF

Challenge 2: translating global arrangements /partnership principles into local structures	• A collaborative forum for education sector dialogue - Local Education Group (LEG), where the primary consultation on education sector development takes place between a government and its partners.
	• Successful support in expanding the participation in LEGs by CSOs and teacher associations.
		• To be eligible for NVS, CCEOP and HSS support, Gavi asks countries to ensure the basic functionality of their national forum (ICC or equivalent)
		• Gavi participates in joint exercises such as ICC or equivalent, but UNDAF engagement is largely managed by its technical UN partners, WHO and UNICEF.
			• Funding support through CCM
			• At least 15% of the CCM Funding Agreement amount has to be allocated to support constituency engagement for non-governmental sector activities, including civil society and key population groups, and to promote and improve the quality of stakeholder participation[104].
			• CCMs have been successful in mobilizing domestic and international partners for submission of grant proposals to the Global Fund and in enabling CSOs and affected communities to participate in the proposal preparation process. But, ill-equipped to provide adequate oversight of grant implementation.
			• To improve that, the Global Fund made changes to CCMs. Among
				• GEF does not directly support putting in place national forums but works through the Operational and Political Focal Points.
				• GEF organizes annual national workshops (called Expanded Constituency Workshop (ECW)) with GEF agencies, governments, and CSOs on GEF assistance.
				• GEF has a Country Support Team supporting National Portfolio Formulation Exercise (NPFE) at the request of recipient countries to enable countries, on a voluntary basis, to prepare for a replenishment. Approximately 15 constituencies are invited to workshops.
					• GCF does not directly support putting in place national forums but works through the National Designated Authorities (NDA) or Focal Points (FPs)
					• Through its operational framework on complementarity and coherence, the GCF seeks to drive cooperation between financing mechanisms to help countries navigate the climate finance landscape. Key pillars include:
					  • complementing actors supporting the nationally determined contribution (NDC) update process;
					  • working to scale up successes and advance programming synergies with other climate funds;
					  • utilizing opportunities for blending, parallel and sequenced finance

[104] https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/3266/core_operationalpolicy_manual_en.pdf

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
			them is CCM Evolution initiative that aims to bring about three major improvements: (i) differentiate CCMs according to country context; (ii) improve CCM performance in key areas; (iii) introduce CCM maturity levels tailored to different types of CCM. [105]		to improve predictability of finance and impact; • defining through guidance how GCF programming in specific sectors and geographies will complement other climate finance in a country-driven manner; and • advancing knowledge collaboration to synthesize and broaden knowledge dissemination.

Aspects	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Lessons learned on partnership principles translated into local structures	Following meta-evaluation of Gavi's HSS support (2016) – that HSCCs have functioned as intended during the proposal stage but not well during grant implementation – Gavi has included the Leadership, Management and Coordination (LMC) support to governance structures, including to the HSCCs[106].	Global Fund has conducted CCM Evolution pilot in 18 countries (2018- 2019). The pilot resulted in several valuable lessons: • Keep it simple: instead of many metrics for assessment, consultants, and overlapping visits, streamline the evolution approach, strengthen central coordination and simplify how to evaluate CCMs; • Create systemic improvements through the CCM Secretariat – instead of fly in/fly out technical assistance, introduce well-qualified	The evaluation of GEF support to scaling up impact states that the GEF helped increase stakeholders' willingness to adopt an intervention by engaging them through participatory processes that increased ownership, and through knowledge and information initiatives which provided evidence of benefits.	• The concept of country ownership, as a core principle of the GCF, has been implemented with an approach limited to central national governments, thereby reducing participation and engagement with the GCF from the diverse stakeholders relevant to

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[106] The updated meta-review published in 2019 analyzes six additional evaluations of HSS support completed in 2016-2017. "Update to the 2015 Meta-Review of Gavi HSS Evaluations." Gavi Evaluation Team, 2018. https://www.gavi.org/library/gavi-documents/evaluations/gavi-hss-meta-review--update/

Aspects	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
		Oversight Officers into the CCM Secretariats to create systemic improvements in CCM maturity • Equip CCMs with the right interventions and incentives. The clearer the specific tools and the strategic intent, the easier it is for CCMs to change. • Different CCMs. CCMs will not mature in the same way so flexibility is critical [107].	In the absence of participatory processes, scaling up did not happen.	climate change, such as CSOs, PSOs, indigenous peoples and vulnerable communities[108]

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Challenge 3: supporting structures/ arrangements to stimulate implementation (including technical assistance)	• Technical Assistance as part of grants • Support of national and international CSOs and networks through Education Out Loud (previously Civil Society Fund). • Guidance on quality of Education Sector Plans, Joint Sector Reviews, LEGs, other	• Gavi relies on its core partners (WHO, UNICEF, CDC, and the World Bank) and expanded partners (including local institutions) to support countries in planning and implementing Gavi grants. • Gavi supports these partners through the Partners' Engagement Framework (PEF), central to which is the 'One TA plan' for each country that lists the support that partners are planning to provide in a given year. Through PEF, Gavi support CSO capacity	• To ensure targeted programming, during grant proposal drafting, Global Fund assesses institutional and absorptive capacity through the Capacity Assessment Tool • Throughout the proposal and program implementation phases Department of Communications and Training provides capacity-building support to both country teams and CCMs. • The Community, Rights, and Gender Strategic Initiative provides	• Country Support Team of four country relations officers – one for each region: Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; and the Middle East and North Africa. They organize regular Constituency Workshops, Expanded Constituency Workshops, and Introduction Seminars to strengthen the capacity of GEF FPs as well as UNFCCC Focal Points and Civil Society representatives. • The **Enabling Activities** grants can be accessed to support planning exercises. For example, reviewing,	• TA and capacity development is part of grants • Readiness program is all on capacity building • GCF has Regional Advisors (RAs) and Country Dialogue Specialists that liaise with the country governments/NDA/FPs to overcome difficulties related to, for example, tax regulations with local agencies, prescribed payment channels, bureaucratic delays, contractual and legal issues, institutional

[107] https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/9055/bm42_10-evolvingccmsdeliverglobalfundstrategy_report_en.pdf?u=637166000960000000
[108] GCF's Forward-looking Performance Review 2019 https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/evaluations/fpr

Aspects	GPE	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
		strengthening and their engagement in immunization. • The technical assistance provided through PEF is called targeted country assistance (TCA). This type of support mainly consists of staff permanently based in partners' country offices. It is based on the demand and needs identified by the countries themselves. • Gavi has been assessing the quality of TA (quality of partnership working with Gavi) through a survey (executed by Deloitte in 2016) and external review (executed by IOD PARC in 2019)[109].	technical assistance to support the engagement of civil society, key populations, people living with or affected by the diseases, and women's networks and organizations, independently or in partnership with the CCM • Approach to capacity development (from 2016) includes establishing a global social network together with structured support for programmatic delivery • The Global Fund has several framework agreements with technical and development partners through which technical assistance has been provided at the country level.	revising and developing National Strategies and Action Plans (e.g., National Implementation Plans, National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)). Also, national communication can be supported through EA.	rivalries, and understaffed NDA/FPs. • Private Sector Facility (PSF) projects predominantly use loans to finance projects, in most cases supported by a grant component that is usually used for **technical assistance**.

• [109] Among the recommendations of the latter are:
• (a) to move from a single year to a multiyear approach to planning and funding TCA,
• (b) to monitor results within a systems approach (instead of focus on activities, outputs and outcomes/coverage),
• (c) to move from a focus on planning to a focus on implement.,
• (d) to work at sub-national level,
• (e) to select partners on merit, based on their comparative advantage and proven past performance and their capacity for offering a strategic, innovative approaches,
(f) to adapt TCA modalities to context – a wider range of instruments; other.

Aspects	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Lessons learned on supporting structures/ arrangements to stimulate implementation	• Following meta-evaluation of Gavi's HSS support (2016), the Country Programmes unit of Gavi Secretariat has started to provide more comprehensive and timely support to countries during different stages of grant implementation (e.g. proposal development, reporting, reprogramming, etc.) or other Gavi processes[110]. • Another finding of the same meta-evaluation -that country programme management has been poor, primarily on account of weak country capacity coupled with poor planning – led to (a) increase support to governance structures, including to the HSCCs on LMC and (b) targeted country assistance through core and expanded partners planned during the JAs including the issues of LMC and program weakness at national and sub-national level	Thematic review of the Global Fund country level technical support partnership models states that: • Some global and bilateral partners observed that the Global Fund is engaging more pro-actively in technical support in countries, and that this is a departure from the 'funding agency' mandate of Global Fund • Short term interventions are delivered by externally sourced consultants. Partnerships delivered in this way tend to have less sustained impact and may be inefficient in the medium to longer term; • Insufficient communication about investments and activities among technical partners, and with the Global Fund Secretariat, leads to duplications; • Poor quality technical support or ill-timed investments that do not coordinate well with country-led processes and those of other partners leads to inefficiencies.	Evaluation of GEF support to scale up impact (2019) contains lessons that • in the absence of sufficient financing, interventions planned with an explicit long-term outlook can fail • working with long-term structures is only effective if they possess the capacities for scaling up • continuity among implementing staff contributes significantly to successful scaling up of outcomes[111].	GCF will scale-up support to DAE programming capabilities include: • rolling out dedicated training programs for DAEs and on boarding for new DAEs; • making available technical expert support throughout the project cycle; • actively promoting collaboration between international AEs and DAEs to build programming and implementation capacity; • supporting peer to peer learning between DAEs; and • promoting locally-led climate action and devolved financing approaches through DAEs.[112]

[110] The updated meta-review published in 2019 analyzes six additional evaluations of HSS support completed in 2016-2017. "Update to the 2015 Meta-Review of Gavi HSS Evaluations." Gavi Evaluation Team, 2018. https://www.gavi.org/library/gavi-documents/evaluations/gavi-hss-meta-review--update/.

[111] https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.ME_C56_Inf.03_Rev.01_Evaluation_of_GEF_support_to_Scaling-Up_Impact_May_2019%20POST-COUNCIL.pdf

[112] Following the report of the independent evaluation of the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme, 2018, updated Strategic Planfor the GCF: 2020-2023 https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-b25-09.pdf

Aspects	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF		GCF
Challenge 4: motivating collective action and mutual accountability	At **country level**: JSRs At **a corporate level**, Accountability Framework, a draft at present	**At country level: the Joint Appraisal (JA)** - an annual review of the implementation progress, performance of Gavi's support to each country, and of its contribution to improved immunization outcomes - undertaken in by a team consisting of relevant staff from the country's MoH, ICC and HSCC members, incl. CSOs, staff from Alliance partners and other immunization stakeholders, and relevant Gavi Secretariat staff. **At a corporate level: Alliance Accountability Framework** put in place recently to clarify the roles and responsibilities of funding channeled through Gavi Partners (WHO and UNICEF)	At **country level**: • The CCM is the forum for program accountability, required to ensure that Principal Recipients are accountable to government and donors for money spent • Commitment to joint assessment but limited evidence of engagement At **a corporate level**: • The 2017-2022 Strategy includes as an enabler 'Support Mutually Accountable Partnerships', which includes an explicit linkage to the Partnership Strategy.	-	At **country level**: • The participatory monitoring approach encourages the NDAs/FPs to organize country portfolio reviews involving project beneficiaries and communities affected by the GCF financed activities locally. The GCF is very explicit in calling for CSO involvement in participatory monitoring and has created some enabling environments for that. • The GCF Private Sector Facility (PSF) provides entry-level for private sector organizations (PSOs) to be involved in participatory monitoring of activities funded through the facility

Aspects	GAVI	Global Fund	GEF	GCF
Lessons on motivating collective action and mutual accountability	-	-	-	At the global level, the contribution of external stakeholders consists mostly of the role of CSO and PSO representatives as Board observers, a position that is limited, largely informal and advocacy-oriented[113]. Through its operational framework on complementarity and coherence, the GCF seeks to drive cooperation between financing mechanisms to help countries navigate the climate finance landscape. Key pillars include: a. complementing actors supporting the nationally determined contribution (NDC) update process; b. working to scale up successes and advance programming synergies with other climate funds; c. utilizing opportunities for blending, parallel and sequenced finance to improve predictability of finance and impact; d. defining through guidance how GCF programming in specific sectors and geographies will complement other climate finance; and e. advancing knowledge collaboration to synthesize and broaden knowledge dissemination

[113] GCF's Forward-looking Performance Review 2019 https://ieu.greenclimate.fund/evaluations/fpr

Table 6.1i Formal responsibilities of local structures

GPE[114]	GAVI[115]	Global Fund[116],[117]	GEF[118]	GCF[119], [120]
LEG	ICC, HSCC or equivalent	CCM	GEF's Operational FP (OFP) and Political FP (PFP)	NDAs or FP
• Reviewing and discussing **sector** diagnostics and **analysis** • Serving as a consultative forum for the government's **development** of an **ESP/ TEP** • Serving as a forum for the organization of ESP or TEP **endorsement[121] by partners**	**Strategic planning** of the programme (e.g. review and approve comprehensive strategic planning)	-	**Identifying project ideas** to meet country priorities (GEF Operational FPs)	• Communicating the country's **strategic frameworks** within which prospective entities will develop pilot proposals • Inviting and selecting subnational, national and regional entities, from the public and private sectors, to propose proposals for consideration by the Fund
Being the **process** to determine the fulfillment of the Funding Model Requirements and Equity, Efficiency and Learning Outcomes indicators (for variable part)	Programme financing (e.g. create long-term visibility on resources and facilitate resource mobilization)	**Ensuring linkages and consistency** between Global Fund grants and other national health and development programs	**Ensuring** that GEF proposals and activities are **consistent** with country priorities and the country commitments. Confirming that with the Letter of Endorsement) (GEF Operational FPs)	Seeking to **ensure consistency** of funding proposals from national, subnational, regional and international intermediaries and implementing entities with national plans and strategies;
• Developing an **ESPIG** application	**Coordination** (e.g. create transparency and promote coordination amongst stakeholders, ensure critical	• **Coordinating** the development of the national request for funding	**Facilitating** broad based in-country consultations on GEF operational matter, convening national dialogues and	**Recommending** to the Board funding proposals in the context of national climate change strategies and plans,

[114] https://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-gpe-charter_0.pdf
[115] https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/document/guidelines/Guidelines-on-Reporting-and-Renewal-of-Gavi-support-March-2020.pdf
[116] https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/7421/ccm_countrycoordinatingmechanism_policy_en.pdf?u=637166000220000000
[117] https://www.aidspan.org/gfo_article/global-fund-board-adopts-ccm-policy-and-new-ccm-code-conduct
[118] https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/documents/Project_Program_Cycle_Policy.pdf
[119] https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/process
[120] https://www.gcfreadinessprogramme.org/sites/default/files/Manual%20on%20NDA%20Roles%20and%20Responsibilities.pdf
[121] The term endorsement" in all GPE documentation means to offer public support. It does not imply formal approval or decision-making. GPE Charter https://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-gpe-charter_0.pdf

• Developing and implementation of an **ESPDG** or **PDG** application	issues rise up from the operational/technical level to be addressed)	• **Establishing** a mechanism to engage key populations, people living with or affected by diseases and civil society in a way that allows their input and voices to be heard.	participating in expanded constituency workshops (OFPs)	including through **consultation processes**
-	•**Endorsing** a full joint appraisal (an annual review) of the implementation progress and performance of Gavi's support to each country to inform the **renewal** of Gavi support for a further year •**Endorsing reprogramming requests**	-	**OFP:** • **Endorsing** project proposals in the Project Identification Form – PIF • Endorsing the MSP Approval Request (for one-step approval process) and the EA Approval Request	• Participating in the **appraisal** of the pilot proposals • Implementing the no-objection procedure (signing no-objection letter to AE proposal)
Selecting a Grant Agent	-	After review by technical review panel, **nominating** the Principal Recipient	Selecting GEF agencies for GEF projects and programs[122]	**Nominating** the selected entities for accreditation by the Fund
• Joint sector and GPE grant monitoring; • Reporting on sector and grant progress	**Operational planning** and performance **oversight** (e.g. input into operational work plan, oversee progress of the overall EPI program)	• **Overseeing the implementation** of approved grants • Approving any **reprogramming** requests	• **Providing feedback** on GEF activities, including implementation of projects • **Convening and leading a National Steering Committee** for GEF-related work (OFP)	• Participating in the **monitoring and evaluation** of the country pilot in accordance with the Fund's relevant guidelines
-	**Information dissemination** (e.g. share relevant information for the EPI programme, key stakeholders, and Gavi)	-	Aiding **communication** between GEF secretariat and county government (PFP)	**Acting** as the focal point for Fund communication

[122] https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.C.55.Inf_.07_Facilitating_Countries_Choice_of_GEF_Agencies.pdf

6.2 Selected lessons and recommendations on improving TA during implementation

1. Among recommendations from a recent external review of GAVI's PEF TCA[123] are:
   (a) in supporting TA, move from a focus on planning to a focus on implementation
   (b) monitor results within a systems approach (instead of focusing on activities, outputs, and outcomes/coverage); and
   (c) have a wider range of instruments to adapt TA modalities to context.

2. Among the lessons drawn from a recent thematic review of the Global Fund country level technical support partnership models[124] are that:
   (i) delivery of short term interventions by externally sourced consultants tend to have a less sustained impact and may be inefficient in the medium- to longer-term; and
   (ii) poor quality technical support or ill-timed investments that do not coordinate well with country led processes lead to inefficiencies.

3. The GEF's evaluation of support to scale up impact[125] (2019) contains relevant lesson that working with long-term structures for TA is only effective if they possess the capacities for scaling up.

4. Finally, GCF has put in practice recommendation of the independent evaluation of the Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme (2018), to scale-up support to DAE programming capabilities including making available technical expert support throughout the project cycle, actively promoting collaboration between international AEs and DAEs to build programming and implementation capacity, and supporting peer-to-peer learning between DAEs.[126]

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Annex Nine: List of Interviewees

Consulted for Development Effectiveness	
GPE Secretariat staff members	20
World Bank staff members	2
IEC member	1
Universalia evaluators (CLEs)	7
ITAD and Mokoro evaluators (CLEs)	6
Related to GRA grant: CSO	1
Related to GRA grant: Grant Agent	1

Consulted for Organizational Effectiveness	
Secretariat staff members	25
Board members	10 2 from DPs, 2 from DCPs, 2 from CSOs, 2 from multilateral agencies, 1 from private sector, 1 from private foundations
Chairs of Board Committees	3 (GPC, FRC, and GEC)
External consultants to GPE	3
Country partners	16 4 government officials, 9 CAs, 3 GAs
UNGEI staff member	1 (related to the gender strategy)
external consultant to GPE	1 (related to the gender strategy)
former Secretariat staff member	1 (related to the gender strategy)
Representatives of global partnerships	10 4 from Global Fund, 2 from GAVI, 2 from GCF, 2 from GEF
Independent expert in global partnerships	1

Annex Ten: Terms of Reference



Independent Summative Evaluation (ISE) of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) 2020

Terms of Reference – Updated August 8, 2019

Acronyms

DCPs	Developing country partners
EFA-FTI	Education for All – Fast Track Initiative
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
IEC	Independent Evaluation Committee
ISE	Independent Summative Evaluation
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee
R&P	Results and Performance (R&P) team of the GPE Secretariat
RFP	Request for Proposals
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIC	Strategy and Impact Committee or Working Group
STC	Short-term consultant
ToR	Terms of Reference
TTL	Task team leader
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group

1. Introduction and Background

About the Global Partnership for Education

1.1 Established in 2002, and formerly called the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI), the GPE is a multi-stakeholder partnership focused on supporting and financing education in low and lower middle-income countries and contributing to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goal on Education (SDG 4).

1.2 The GPE has undergone a series of reforms since its founding. Following a mid-term evaluation of the FTI in 2010, the GPE introduced reforms to strengthen its governance and establish more specific funding arrangements. Three replenishment events led to a growth in GPE's financial resources. The GPE adopted a new country-level funding model in 2014, revising its country-level eligibility criteria, its allocation formula, and requirements for credible Education Sector Plans, domestic financing levels, and data to access funding. The new funding model also introduced a performance-based financing component, which aimed to incentivize outcomes in the areas of learning, equity, and efficiency. The Independent Interim Evaluation of the GPE in 2015 laid the groundwork for organizational improvements, including its M&E systems and the consolidation of its core functions.

1.3 The GPE Board of Directors adopted a new strategic plan, *GPE 2020*, in December 2015, which set out the goals and objectives for the partnership between 2016 and 2020 along with a theory of change. GPE also adopted a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Strategy in 2016, which included a results framework that has been used to monitor progress across the three goals and five strategic objectives in the partnership's theory of change. In addition, the M&E strategy comprises an evaluation framework encompassing global indicators and a portfolio of country-level, programmatic and thematic evaluation studies. These previous evaluation studies have explored how well GPE inputs and activities have contributed to outcomes and impacts in different areas of the GPE's engagement and programs at the country and global levels.

About the Independent Summative Evaluation

1.4 The GPE's M&E strategy for 2016–2020 envisaged that an independent evaluation of the GPE's contribution to development results would be conducted towards the end of the current GPE 2020 strategic plan. This would use a theory-based methodology; assess achievements along the entire results chain in the GPE's theory of change, following the OECD/DAC criteria for development evaluation; draw on data collected from completed and forthcoming country, program, and thematic evaluations; and complement these with a review of GPE's organizational effectiveness.

1.5 The present ISE is expected to serve as an important input into the shaping of the next GPE strategic planning exercise following the conclusion of the 2020 strategic plan. Hence, it will inform members of the Global Partnership, and the GPE Board and management about the progress that the GPE has so far made towards achieving its strategic goals and objectives, including verifying progress on the work plan derived from the 2015 interim evaluation. While the evaluation and planning processes are taking place concurrently, the evaluation will feed

into the strategic planning process at key points during the process as well as offering the summative report.

1.6 The ISE will evaluate the overall relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, contribution to impact, and likely sustainability of the GPE at both the country and global levels, and the extent to which the GPE has achieved the specific goals and objectives articulated in the GPE 2020 strategic plan. It will evaluate how well GPE 2020 strategic plan as a whole has unfolded; the validity of GPE's theory of change according to the evidence so far available; the roles of the GPE Secretariat, developing country partners, and other stakeholders in delivering GPE 2020; and the extent to which the GPE has achieved the three main purposes and four main streams of work identified in the 2017 M&E strategy.

1.7 The ISE will also assess the extent to which the new GPE funding model and the associated planning, data, and domestic financing requirements have contributed to improving education systems in partner countries, and to observed improvements in terms of learning outcomes, equity, and gender equality. Because student-level outcomes take time to achieve and data are available only with a time lag, the ISE will also examine the extent to which the GPE is focusing on processes and substantive issues that are likely to yield results in the future, and that facilitate longer-term improvements in outcomes. The evaluation will also identify promising practices and lessons learned and formulate recommendations for improvement, taking into account possible bottlenecks and barriers.

Governance, Management and Independence of the ISE

1.8 The **Strategy and Impact Committee (SIC)** of the GPE is responsible for ensuring the budget and direction for the overall management and delivery of the ISE. The SIC will accomplish this with support from the GPE Secretariat and by working through an **Independent Evaluation Committee (IEC)** that has been appointed by the SIC.

1.9 The ISE will be conducted by a firm selected competitively according to standard World Bank procurement procedures. The present ToR represents the terms of reference for the firm to conduct the evaluation.

1.10 The IEC will oversee the conduct of the ISE by the firm to ensure that the evaluation is conducted independently of the partnership itself, including of the GPE Board and Committees. The IEC will guide the evaluation and will review the evaluation products prepared by the firm to ensure their quality, integrity, and timeliness, while preserving the independence of the evaluation. The GPE Board, the SIC, and the Secretariat will not interfere with the content and direction of the evaluation (i.e., the findings from the evaluation). Once selected, the evaluation firm will report directly to the IEC in relation to the evaluation findings, with required reviews and oversight provided by the GPE Secretariat Task Team Leader.

1.11 While the IEC has been endorsed by and will report to the SIC, the IEC will maintain an independent role (e.g., in determining the final evaluation questions and overseeing the quality of the evaluation). While the ISE will therefore be carried out independently of the GPE by the selected firm, the IEC will work closely with the SIC to coordinate the work, with

the Secretariat's Results and Performance team providing administrative support to both the IEC and SIC.

2. Evaluation Purpose and Scope

Purpose

2.1 The ISE will be instrumental in helping shape GPE's post-2020 strategy, through its reflections on the current GPE strategic plan, related operations, and governance at the global and country levels. The ISE implementation will run parallel to the new GPE strategy planning process organized separately by GPE, which formally begins in June 2019, so as to feed in a timely manner into the post-2020 strategy development. The ISE will serve as an update of the findings from the last independent evaluation of GPE that was conducted in 2015, and an assessment of the extent to which the GPE has implemented the recommended changes identified in that evaluation.

2.2 More specifically, the overarching aims of the ISE are as follows:

- **Learning —** To understand which aspects of the GPE 2020 strategy are working and which need improvement in the next GPE strategy period going forward.
- **Accountability —** To determine progress towards results and whether GPE partners are fulfilling their expected roles and responsibilities effectively.
- **Transparency —** To communicate findings and achievements broadly and confidently to all stakeholders in an effective way, including citizens and civil society.
- **Effectiveness** — To determine the extent to which the GPE operational model is fit for purpose.

Scope of Work for the Consultancy Assignment

2.3 The firm will conduct an Independent Summative Evaluation (ISE) of the Global Partnership for Education that meets the following expectations, as described here and in sections 3 and 4.

2.4 The ISE will cover the time period since the last independent evaluation in 2015.

2.5 The firm will examine both the development effectiveness and the organizational effectiveness of the GPE at both the global and country levels.

2.6 "Development effectiveness" is understood in the broad sense to comprise the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, contribution to impact, and likely sustainability, appropriately interpreted for global partnership programs like the GPE.

2.7 "Organizational effectiveness" refers to the proficiency of the programs' governance and management structures, functions, and processes in facilitating the GPE's purposes and objectives in an efficient and transparent manner. Thus, this evaluation, like other evaluations of global partnership programs, goes beyond the OECD/DAC principles to include an assessment of the governance and management of the partnership at both the global and

country levels. This includes an assessment of how well the GPE country model is working, and of the alignment among governments and development partners at the country level — including bilateral and multilateral donors, grant agents, international and national CSOs, teacher organizations, philanthropic foundations, and the private sector.

2.8 The firm will examine all aspects of the GPE's work at the global and country levels, and how GPE supports partner countries to develop stronger education systems (through support to sector planning and implementation, raising and diversifying funds, mutual accountability, building and sustaining political will and commitment to education, etc.) with the aims of improving learning outcomes, equity, gender equality, and inclusion.

2.9 The firm will address the following set of evaluation issues in relation to the development effectiveness and the organizational effectiveness of the GPE, each issue being explored at the applicable level (global and/or country). Annex A provides a detailed set of evaluation questions in relation to each of the eight evaluation issues. Annex B provides a set of existing and forthcoming — but not exhaustive — data sources that will be useful in answering some of the questions around these eight issues.

A. Development Effectiveness

(1) Relevance

(2) Effectiveness and Contributions to Impact

(3) Efficiency, Additionality and Leverage

(4) Likely Sustainability

B. Organizational Effectiveness

(5) Governance and Management

(6) Administrative Efficiency

(7) Country-Level Arrangements and Processes

(8) Monitoring and Evaluation

2.10 The firm will assess the contributions of the GPE to achieving the GPE's objectives as laid out in the GPE 2020 Strategic Plan and Theory of Change, the GPE Results Framework, the New Funding Model, "How GPE Works in Partner Countries," and the 2016 Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy. It should also identify unintended outcomes, whether positive or negative, that emerge from the evaluation. Where possible, the firm will explore contributions to impact within the limits of available evidence. The evaluation is not expected to conclusively demonstrate attribution or causality between GPE inputs and intended or unintended development outcomes.

2.11 The firm will analyze the evaluation issues comparatively to understand how development effectiveness and organizational effectiveness differ operationally across different contextual conditions. Specific conditions such as the effects of conflict or challenges to the reach of central governments are likely to shape both national needs and the experience of the partnership and its funding modalities. It is important for the

evaluation to understand these differences as well as to assess the overall achievements of the GPE in order to increase the responsiveness of the GPE.

2.12 The firm will examine the extent to which the GPE has accepted and implemented the recommendations of the 2015 evaluation, and the results of implementing these recommendations.

2.13 The firm will conduct a portfolio review of what the GPE has actually funded since 2015 in terms of the type, size and country distribution of the funded activities and programs. The assessment of efficiency should describe where, what, and how GPE resources have been spent on; trends over the 2015–2020 strategic plan period; and how the preparation and disbursement speeds have affected implementation and results.

2.14 The firm will assess the extent to which the GPE Results Framework has been an effective tool. It should examine the coherence and alignment around indicators across the different partners. For example, if different partners focus on different measures for learning, etc., this could affect how well the partnership functions. If possible, it would be useful for the firm to consider whether there is need for some sort of data infrastructure at the outcome level and what shape or agreed framework this might take among GPE partners, with the GPE indicators potentially focused on GPE dimensions of partnerships, systems, and use of GPE resources.

2.15 The GPE has produced a large corpus of information and data since the 2015 evaluation as part of its M&E Strategy, including annual results reports, annual portfolio reviews, grants tracking data, country-level evaluations, programmatic evaluations, and other assessments of the GPE. (See list in Annex B.) Hence, the relatively short completion date of June 2020 for the ISE is based on the expectation that the evaluation will not require the firm to conduct extensive primary data collection. *The firm is expected to take full advantage of the available evidence to inform its findings and recommendations, as noted in the GPE's M&E Strategy, and in line with good practice.*

Expectations on the Conduct of an Evidence-based and Methodologically Sound Evaluation

2.16 The evaluation will be evidence-based. All findings and conclusions should be based on evidence which is presented in the evaluation report (including the annexes) so that these can be critically assessed, and on the triangulation of different sources of evidence to verify and substantiate assessments. Such evidence may take the form of qualitative analysis, tabulation of data, compilation of survey results, analysis such as correlation or regression analysis, objective observations of measurable data, etc. In cases where the source of information is interviews, the method of selecting those to be interviewed should be presented in the evaluation report and the findings noted as the views of particular stakeholder groups. In the case of surveys, the questionnaire, information on the population or samples, and the response rates should be presented in the report.

2.17 Further data and report preparation details to be followed are below.

- The evaluation firm should ensure that all data are collected according to ethical standards and that collected data are organized, secured and preserved for potential re-analysis in the summative GPE evaluation.

- All data and findings will remain the property of GPE at the conclusion of the evaluation contract.

- The evaluation reports should be written clearly and be impartial and constructive in tone. Each draft should be professionally edited. There should be creative use of tables and high-quality graphics.

- The evaluation firm should follow the GPE guidelines and standards for publications in terms of style and language.

- The evaluation firm will be expected to participate in the dissemination of findings from the evaluation.

- Treatment of documents that are not publicly disclosed will be done in a confidential manner.

- Firm will agree not to publish evaluation results or outputs without permission from the Board or Secretariat.

3. Evaluation Approach and Activities

3.1 The evaluation will be conducted in two stages. The first stage, from August to December 2019, will begin with an August kick-off meeting and consist of a **document review** of the existing evaluative and other GPE partnership materials (e.g., grant guidelines and including, but not only, those listed in Annex B) and **selected interviews**, concluding with an Interim Report of preliminary findings presented to the Independent Evaluation Committee (IEC) by 15 October 2019, to the Strategy and Impact Committee at its meeting on 30–31 October 2019, and to the GPE Board meeting on 10–12 December 2019.

3.2 The **first stage** will begin with a kick-off meeting in Washington and include the preparation of an ***Inception Report*** (prepared by the end of November 2019) consisting of an analysis of the gaps in the existing evaluative material to answer the evaluation questions, and a proposed evaluation methodology to address these gaps during the second stage. Members of the firm, IEC, SIC Working Group, and the GPE Secretariat will meet on/about November 1 (in Paris), immediately after the SIC meeting, to discuss and agree on the major outlines of the next stage of the evaluation.

3.3 The **second stage**, which will have its methodology elaborated in an ***Inception Report*** (draft due end-November 2019 and final due mid-December 2019), will consist of **additional mixed methods** to address the identified gaps, concluding with a ***draft Final Evaluation Report*** submitted to the IEC by the end of March 2020 and submitted to the Strategy and Impact Committee meeting in April 2020. Then the firm will submit the **Final Evaluation Report**, based on comments received from the IEC, SIC and the GPE Secretariat, and present its findings to the GPE Board meeting on 2–4 June 2020.

3.4 It is expected that **interviews** (a combination of virtual and face-to-face) during the first stage will be limited to the GPE Board and Committees, the GPE Secretariat, and the authors of the evaluative material reviewed, as deemed helpful. The **range of interviews, surveys, and other evaluation methods during the second stage** may expand to additional GPE stakeholders, including at the country level and representing a balance of all constituencies. However, it is not expected that the firm will conduct additional country visits on top of those that have already taken place during the preparation of the existing and forthcoming country-level evaluations. (See *summative and prospective case studies* and *first-year synthesis report*.)

3.5 Any **stakeholder surveys** should be administered in coordination with similar surveys conducted by the GPE Secretariat as part the strategy planning exercise running parallel to the ISE in 2019–20. Surveys should be administered in multiple languages — English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Arabic.

3.6 The firm will be responsible for delivering all reports in English. The final Interim Report and the final Evaluation Report must also be translated into French and submitted to the GPE Board at least two weeks prior to the meetings in December 2019 and June 2020. The Executive Summaries of the final Interim Report and the final Evaluation Report should also be translated into Spanish. The evaluation firm will be responsible for editing, designing, translating and printing (in English – approximately 100 copies of the final report, 70 of the interim report; in French – approximately 10) and sending of hard copies to individual recipients (of the 70, about 25 will be sent to GPE's offices in Washington and the rest to Board members, SIC members, their staff, etc. at global postal addresses).

3.7 The firm will also prepare two progress reports to the IEC in mid-September 2019 for the first stage and at the end of January 2020 for the second stage. Both reports may be PowerPoint presentations. Both may also be presented to members of the GPE Secretariat strategic planning group. The mid-September report may also be an opportunity for initial preparations for a single coordinated survey for both the ISE and the strategic planning exercise.

3.8 The final Interim Report should be no more than 50 pages and the final Evaluation Report should be no more than 75 pages, both excluding the Executive Summary and Annexes.

3.9 Deliverables will only be accepted as final upon satisfactory finalization of each evaluation deliverable, based on IEC recommendation and GPE Secretariat TTL administrative approval

3.10 The firm should arrange for all travel necessary for the accomplishment of the activities and deliverables of this TOR.

3.11 The evaluation firm should include five (5) regular face-to-face meetings with the IEC and GPE Secretariat during the course of the contract and one presentation to the GPE Board of Directors.

4. Deliverables and Timeline

4.1 The firm will provide four main deliverables:

- A draft and final Interim Report (August to December 2019)
- A draft and final Inception Report for the second stage (End-November to mid-December 2019)
- A draft final Evaluation Report (November 2019 to March 2020)
- The Final Evaluation Report (April to June 2020).

4.2 The table below provides a more detailed set of work items to be conducted in support of completing the above deliverables, as well as timeline of events for each stage of the evaluation.

Task	Responsible	Supports/Inputs	By When
Stage 1 (Interim and Inception Reports) – August to December 2019			
Consultancy company (vendor/contractor) begins work and participates in an in-person kick-off meeting with the IEC and Secretariat *(Washington, August date to be determined)*	Contractor	IEC/ Secretariat	13 August 2019 (estimated)-mid September
Contractor prepares draft Interim Report, preliminary findings, gap analysis, and proposed evaluation methodology for final report, based on document review of existing evaluative material and interviews with GPE Board and Secretariat	Contractor	IEC/ Secretariat	13 August to 15 October 2019
Contractor submits and presents progress report (PowerPoint format) to IEC. IEC updates SIC Working Group on progress.	Contractor/ IEC	SIC/ Secretariat	13 September 2019
Contractor **submits draft Interim Report** to IEC.	Contractor/ IEC	SIC/ Secretariat	15 October 2019
IEC submits draft Interim Report, two-page summary, and IEC comments one week in advance of the upcoming SIC meeting *(Paris).*	IEC	SIC/ Secretariat	21 October 2019
Contractor and IEC **present draft Interim Report** to SIC meeting in Paris, attended by all IEC members	Contractor/ IEC	SIC/ Secretariat	29–31 October 2019
Contractor, IEC and SIC Working Group agree on detailed design of second stage of ISE evaluation	Contractor/ IEC/ SIC	Secretariat	1 November 2019
Contractor attends 'country level evaluation' synthesis workshop in Washington, led by Universalia (and may also use the visit for data collection/meetings)	Contractor	Secretariat	Est November 2019 (Date TBD)
Contractor **submits English and French versions of final Interim Report** to IEC, SIC, and Secretariat for transmission to the Board	Contractor	IEC/ SIC/ Secretariat	25 November 2019
Contractor **submits draft Inception Report** to IEC, including detailed methodology for final report.	Contractor	IEC/ Secretariat	End-November 2019

Task	Responsible	Supports/Inputs	By When
Contract submits **final Inception Report**	Contractor		20 December 2019
Contractor **presents final Interim Report** to Board meeting (Nairobi).	Contractor/ IEC	SIC/ Secretariat	10–12 December 2019
Stage 2 (Draft Final Evaluation Report and Final Evaluation Report) – November 2019 to June 2020			
Contractor prepares draft Final Evaluation Report for review and comment by IEC	Contractor	IEC/ Secretariat	1 November 2019 to 31 March 2019
Contractor submits and presents progress report (PowerPoint format) to IEC. IEC updates SIC Working Group on progress.	Contractor	IEC	31 January 2020
Contractor **submits draft Final Evaluation Report** to IEC, including findings and recommendations.	Contractor	IEC	End-March 2020
IEC submits the draft Final Evaluation Report to the SIC at least two weeks before the SIC regular meeting, and submits comments on the report at least one week before the meeting,	IEC	Contractor/ Secretariat	Early April 2020
Contractor, IEC, and SIC discuss findings, recommendations and implications of draft Final Evaluation Report at the SIC regular meeting *(Meeting might be virtual or in a location to be determined.)*	Contractor/ IEC/ SIC	Secretariat	Mid to late April 2020
Contractor finalizes the report, and ***submits English and French versions of Final Report*** to IEC, SIC, and Secretariat for transmission to the Board	Contractor	IEC/ SIC/ Secretariat	11 May 2020
IEC clears the report and provides its observations on quality of the evaluation report to the SIC for transmission to the Board	IEC	SIC/ Secretariat	18 May 2020
Contractor and IEC ***present Final Evaluation Report findings to the Board at Board meeting*** *(Location not determined, but likely to be in a donor or development country partner city.)*	Contractor/ IEC	SIC/ Secretariat	2–4 June 2020
GPE Board responds to ISE findings	Board	SIC/ Secretariat	End June 2020

5. Technical Requirements for the Proposal

5.1 Each offeror's proposal should indicate concisely but specifically the abilities and experience of the firm and proposed team along the following four dimensions below.

5.2 ***Technical and Managerial Capabilities of the Firm (Consultants' Organization and Experience).***

- **Firm's technical and managerial capabilities** (i.e., operational and financial management systems, staffing and other arrangements in place to manage similar assignments in a tight time-frame, etc.). A focus area of the firm's work should involve

the design and implementation of evaluations and the firm should have expertise in different evaluation methodologies.

- **Experience in assembling and managing high-level technical staff to deliver on similar assignments.** The proposed firm should have a successful track record of evaluating education sector planning and implementation programs.

- **Firm's ability and commitment to meet the initial time demands of the evaluation** (this includes an initial surge of work August-October 2019 in the first stage (Interim Report) of the work).

5.3 Expertise in Conducting Independent Summative Evaluations.

- **Firm's track-record of undertaking similar independent summative evaluation assignments, specifically in designing, managing and leading evaluations in a speedy and efficient manner, with evaluation designs fit for purpose** (e.g., in managing and delivering robust multi-component evaluations of education sector progress in developing country contexts; partnership evaluations; meta-evaluations; independent summative evaluations synthesizing data from multiple sources, etc.).

- **Experience in addressing issues around the two main evaluation issues –** development effectiveness and organizational effectiveness. On development effectiveness, the firm should understand and have used the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. On organizational effectiveness, the firm should have experience in organizations and systems related to: governance and management; administrative efficiency; country level arrangements and processes; M&E. Experience with complexity and systems thinking is desired.

- **Project examples.** Brief descriptions of similar work in independent summative evaluations or evaluations that provide inputs into strategy development. If available, links to executive summaries (or full reports) should be provided.

5.4 Technical Approach, Methodology and Work Plan.

- **A summary of the overall methodological and analytical approach proposed,** focusing on the first stage of the evaluation, with an indicative approach for the second stage.

- **A comprehensive, actionable and realistic work plan** is provided for activities and deliverables, also including a contingency component and delineating roles/responsibilities.

- **A proposed evaluation matrix** that addresses the evaluation questions stipulated in Annex A**.**

5.5 Qualifications and Competence of the Key Staff related to the Assignment.

The following key profiles are expected for the as part of the core team in the technical proposal, in addition to support functions. The key staff should have masters to PhD level backgrounds.

- **Evaluation director** who is seasoned (e.g., 20+ years of experience) conducting and managing evaluations, leading a diverse team, responding to client needs, and so on.

- **Technical evaluators/researchers with a mix of expertise** — most would have 15+ years of experience — in the following areas.

    - **Evaluation design and implementation.** Expertise in education systems monitoring and evaluation in developing countries and expertise in education policy evaluation, including quantitative and qualitative approaches to such evaluation.

    - **Education sector expertise in developing country contexts,** with knowledge of such topics as education quality, education outcomes, education systems, education policy, etc. For this topic area, a PhD level expert with an education specialization, ideally with career experience working in a research capacity, is desired.

    - **On-the-ground experience of developing countries' education systems.** This would include experience in advising national or state governments on education system needs, development or implementation of education sector plans, and so on.

    - **Strategy and organizational effectiveness development and reviews.** Experience working with a management consulting firm or in-house corporate position with a strategic focus is desired. Expertise is sought on developing or shaping strategies.

    - **Expertise in analysis of public finance and aid financing.** Experience working on policy, program or project financing in/with donor agencies or government agencies would be important.

    - **French language capabilities** among some members of the team is necessary. (Other GPE languages are a plus, but French is strongly desired.)

Oral Presentation – During Technical Evaluation

5.6 Offerors ***may be*** required to make an oral presentation of the technical proposals submitted. Information from the oral presentation will also be used as part of the technical evaluation process. The WBG reserves the right to incorporate elements from oral presentations in the final Contract. The oral presentation will not encompass price proposals.

Oral Presentation Ground Rules

5.7 The selected Offerors as specified above must make an oral presentation to the WBG's evaluation panel and participate in a question and answer session. The purpose of the oral presentation and question and answer session is to validate the information provided by the Offeror in their proposal and to test the Offeror's understanding of the work that will be performed per the TOR under the prospective contract, which will be a factor in the overall technical evaluation of the proposals.

5.8 Presentation will begin approximately_2 week after receipt of proposals. The WBG will determine the date and time for each Offerors' oral presentation. The Procurement Specialist will notify Offerors of the scheduled date and time, as well as the agenda for their presentation within 1 week of the receipt of proposals. At its sole discretion, the WBG reserves the right to reschedule any Offeror's presentation. Offerors must confirm their availability on that date should they be invited.

5.9 The presentation must be made by one or more of the personnel whom the Offeror will employ to manage or supervise contract performance.

5.10 The Offeror should be prepared to answer detailed technical questions from the WBG.

5.11 During the presentation, interaction between the evaluation team and the Offeror will be limited. The WBG's Procurement Specialist will chair the meeting and ensure compliance with the ground rules. The WBG will not inform Offerors of their strengths, deficiencies or weaknesses during the presentation, and the WBG will not engage in bargaining during the presentations. The presentation does not constitute discussions with Offerors.

Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest

5.12 Evaluators must be able to undertake objective, unbiased evaluation. Therefore, each offeror must fully divulge in the Technical Proposal any activities or connections that might lead to potential or perceived conflicts of interest, and the firm should propose how it plans to mitigate and manage these conflicts during the conduct of the evaluation. This applies at both the corporate and individual levels. Failure to disclose such conflicts would constitute grounds for disqualification or termination of the contract. The ways in which any potential or perceived conflicts of interest have been managed will also be disclosed in the final evaluation report.

5.13 Actual or perceived conflicts of interest might arise from the following non-exhaustive list of circumstances:

a. Involvement in the design, implementation or monitoring of GPE-funded strategies, programs or projects, including World Bank-funded projects that are closely related to GPE-funded projects
b. Preparation of major evaluation studies, or other assessment reports, since 2015 that are likely to contribute to significant findings of the ISE
c. Existing ongoing contracts with the GPE Secretariat
d. Relationship to GPE Board member or staff
e. Serving as a member or observer on the GPE Board or Committee
f. High dependency on funding from any organization that is a GPE Board member or partner.

5.14 The consulting firm will be expected neither to engage in, nor to seek, any other GPE-funded work during the course of this consultancy. Further, the firm should report on a timely basis any possible conflicts of interest that may arise throughout the duration of the contract.

5.15 Firms are **strongly advised** to review the Corporate Procurement Policy Summary *for Vendors Doing Business with the World Bank Group*.

6. Inputs and Supervision from the Global Partnership for Education

6.1 The GPE Project Team will supervise the work of the Contractor and assist the evaluation in the following ways:

- Provide necessary documents and other GPE-related information from the Secretariat needed and requested by the firm
- Provide lists of GPE Board, Secretariat staff, and other GPE stakeholders, for the purpose of the evaluation and provide a letter of introduction for the purposes of the evaluation
- Provide the names and e-mail addresses for stakeholder surveys that are available at the Secretariat

6.2 The Secretariat will provide a form introductory letter that can be used, as appropriate, and depending on country contexts, to contact GPE actors at country level, such as for example the coordinating agencies, grant agents, or country focal points, who could be requested to:

- Provide information on GPE-supported, education-related activities since 2015
- Assist in identifying country-level stakeholders to interview or include in stakeholder surveys.

1.1 The Independent Evaluation Committee (IEC) is responsible for ensuring the overall independence and quality of the evaluation process while reporting to the Strategy and Impact Committee (SIC). This includes:

- Reviewing progress reports of the Contractor and approving all deliverables submitted by the Contractor.
- Reviewing and commenting on the Interim Report, the Inception Report, and the draft Final Report before deliverables are considered final and accepted by the Global Partnership for Education.

Annex A. Evaluation Issues and Questions

The evaluation will address the following evaluation issues and questions in relation to the development effectiveness and the organizational effectiveness of the GPE, each issue being explored at the applicable level (global and/or country).

Development Effectiveness

(1) Relevance

- What has been the validity of the GPE 2020 Theory of Change in practice in different country contexts? To what extent has this been an effective instrument to provide guidance on the achievement of education results in developing country partners (DCPs) in terms of systems strengthening, learning, and equity?
- To what extent has the GPE delivered on its commitment to align its activities with SDG 4 and to using SDG 4 indicators in the implementation of its monitoring and evaluation strategy?
- To what extent has the GPE contributed to greater coherence in the international financial support for education in GPE-eligible countries?
- To what extent have development partners shared ownership of the GPE, including the partnership's emphasis on learning, data, gender equality, etc.?
- How well have the activities of development partners been aligned with and supported the GPE's country model? How has the degree of alignment affected the operationalization of the model?
- To what extent have GPE-supported projects reflected government priorities, the priorities of grant agents, or the priorities of other actors?
- To what extent have the objectives and design of the approved grants been consistent with the GPEs vision, mission, and strategic goals and objectives?
- To what extent has GPE financing been based on needs? To what extent, and how has GPE financing incentivized reforms to increase public expenditure and improve performance of educational systems?

(2) Effectiveness and Contributions to Impact

- What outputs and outcomes have so far been achieved, or highly likely to be achieved by 2020, in relation to the stated goals and objectives in the GPE 2020 strategy and theory of change?
- Which aspects of the 2020 strategy and operational model have been working well for making progress towards results, which have been working less well, and what improvements should be made in the next GPE strategy going forward?
- How has the partnership model added value to what bilateral and other forms of programming might have achieved over the same period?
- How effectively has the GPE ensured that planning and dialogue are evidence-based, as advocated in the GPE's theory of change?
- To what extent has GPE been successful in helping governments improve their ability to assess learning outcomes and use this information to improve educational quality?

(3) Efficiency, Additionality and Leverage

- To what extent have GPE funds been used efficiently? What have been the facilitators and barriers to efficient use of funds in different contexts?
- To what extent have GPE-supported projects been cost-effective in design and execution? How effectively has the GPE held grant agents accountable for cost-effectiveness?

- To what extent has GPE funding leveraged additional resources into the implementation of sector plans for education (a) from governments and other domestic sources, and (b) from bilateral and multilateral sources including private foundations?
- To what extent has GPE involvement led to increasing or maintaining both donor financing and/or domestic expenditures on education?
- To what extent has there been greater collective support for government priorities, rather than lots of separate projects? If so, is this delivering more sustainable results?

(4) Likely Sustainability

- What is required for the country-level outcomes that have been achieved to be sustained? What is the likelihood that these requirements will be met?
- To what extent and under what conditions are GPE-supported projects likely to have long-lasting transformational impacts?
- To what extent have education sector plans focused on addressing educational issues in a sustainable way?
- To what extent have GPE-supported projects identified risks to the sustainability of outcomes and taken steps to mitigate these risks?
- To what extent have learnings about sustainability and risk been synthesized and shared across countries?
- To what extent are GPE-supported country programs financially sustainable? How effective has been GPE's approach to leveraging domestic finance?
- What should the GPE do more of today to increase the likelihood that outcomes will be sustained in the future?

Organizational Effectiveness

(5) Governance and Management

- How well has the GPE Board performed its major functions including strategic direction, management oversight, resource mobilization, and partner relations?
- How effective has the GPE Board and management been in convening GPE stakeholders; in aligning its stakeholders towards the achievement of the GPE's goals and objectives; and in building and sustaining political will and commitment to education?
- How have changes in governance and management since the 2015 evaluation affected the GPE's organizational effectiveness?
- How well has the vision of equitable and quality education for all been communicated, promoted, operationalized in grant-making, and built into monitoring and evaluation?
- How well has the GPE communicated its findings and achievements to all stakeholders?

(6) Administrative Efficiency

- How efficiently has the GPE Secretariat carried out its administrative and management responsibilities, including managing GPE partnerships and external relations?
- How efficiently has the GPE Secretariat carried out its roles of effective leadership, budget management, and minimizing transaction costs? How efficiently has the Secretariat administered the GPE's results-based financing approach?
- How efficiently has the Secretariat adapted GPE's approach in fragile and crisis environments to allow more flexibility and a faster response in meeting urgent needs?
- How efficient have the Secretariat and grant agents been in exercising fiduciary oversight?

(7) Country-Level Arrangements and Processes

- How well have the Local Education Groups and coordinating agencies worked in relation to their GPE roles and responsibilities? To what extent have governments been in the driver's seat in convening other actors and leading a collaborative process?
- How effective have been the in-country partnership arrangements in formulating robust national education plans and the design and implementation of individual projects? To what extent have these plans led to greater donor confidence and enabled better coordination of donor efforts?
- To what extent have these arrangements triggered institutional and procedural innovations at the country level, including the expanded involvement of civil society and marginalized groups?
- What value have country-level stakeholders found in the partnership? What constraints have they experienced?

- To what extent have the resulting national plans been country-led and integrated into country-owned development strategies consistent with Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action, and the Busan Partnership for Development?

(8) Monitoring and Evaluation

- To what extent has the GPE achieved the three purposes and four main streams of work specified in its 2017 M&E strategy? To what extent have partners fulfilled their expected roles and responsibilities effectively?
- To what extent have the M&E Strategy and the Results Framework been useful tools in guiding and overseeing the GPE activities and overall operation? How well have these tracked the GPE's value added and results?
- To what extent have actors used government or partner systems of data collection and monitoring? To what extent has there been duplication of effort and increased transactions costs?
- To what extent have country-level evaluations employed consistent methodologies, and thereby generated comparable results useful for learning lessons about what works well, and what works less well? How have these lessons been synthesized and disseminated, and to what effect?
- To what extent have donors' preferences for stand-alone projects affected the frequency of Joint Sector Reviews and the monitoring of the implementation of Education Sector Plans?

Annex B. Background Documents on, and Existing/ Ongoing Evaluations and Studies of Global Partnership for Education

- *Background Documents on GPE*

  GPE 2020 Strategic Plan

  GPE M&E Strategy

  How GPE works in partner countries

  Charter for the Global Partnership for Education

  GPE operational model

- *Previous Evaluations of GPE*

  Independent Interim Evaluation of GPE 2010-2014

  Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative

- *Existing Studies under GPE's M&E Strategy*

  Annual Results Report: Published in 2017 and 2018

  - Monitoring information on theory of change indicators

  Portfolio Review: Published in 2017 and 2018

  - Information on grant implementation

  Country-level evaluations: Summative and prospective case studies and first-year synthesis report

  - Relevance and validity of GPE's country-level operational model, deeper evidence on GPE's relevance and effectiveness at the country level

  Programmatic evaluations: Education Sector Plan Development Grants evaluation, Civil Society Education Fund evaluation, and DCP pre-Board meeting evaluation

  - Relevance and effectiveness of these three instruments

- *Other Key Sources of Information*

  Governance: Board and Committee documents

  - Partnership governance and operational processes, data on GPE operations

  Partnership study (external to GPE): Effective and Efficient Partnership Review (and related annexes)

- Partnership processes, organizational management processes

Donor evaluations: Australia (not available online); Finland (2018); G7 2017 Italia (2017); Norway (2015 and 2017); United Kingdom (Annual Reviews of GPE 2015, 2016 and 2017 and Multilateral Aid Review 2016)

- Partnership processes, organizational management processes, results

Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) (2019)

- Partnership processes, organizational management processes, results

- ***Forthcoming Evaluations, Studies, and Reports***

Annual Results Report (June 2019)

Portfolio Review (October 2019)

Desk study of Variable tranche (October 2019)

- How much is invested through the Variable Tranche, for what types of outcomes, evidence on shift to or focus on outcomes, unintended effects, etc. (Only partial information is available through CLEs and current Secretariat reports.)

Desk studies of key thematic areas of GPE's grant/fund investments (November/December 2019)

- Early childhood care and education (ECCE), learning assessment systems, teachers and teaching, gender, and data systems. What are GPE's investments in those areas? What is the progress with respect to achieving objectives/outcomes in these areas?

Performance of closed Education Sector Plan Implementation Grants (June 2019)

- What is the overall, comprehensive evidence on grant performance? What can we learn from closed grants?

Independent Summative Evaluation of the Global Partnership for Education

Statement by the Independent Evaluation Committee

Chris Gerrard (chair), Moses Oketch, Michele Schweisfurth, Miguel Székely

May 21, 2020

Introduction

The four of us members of the Independent Evaluation Committee (IEC) were appointed in April 2019 to steer and manage the current Independent Summative Evaluation (ISE) of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). Appointed by and reporting to the Chair of the Strategy and Impact Committee (SIC), we have undertaken a range of sequential activities to this effect as discussed below. Our final task in accordance with our terms of reference is to "provide a final report to the Board of Directors on the integrity and quality of the evaluation, including any limitations." This is the purpose of the present statement.

Procurement of the Evaluation Team

Our first task was to prepare a Concept Note for the evaluation for the approval of the SIC, which task was completed on June 7, 2019. This reflected the decision of the SIC meeting on May 9–10 — that the evaluation should take place in two stages.

- Stage 1: A desk review synthesizing existing evaluative material and identifying evidence gaps, which would be presented to the GPE Board in December 2019.
- Stage 2: Focusing on filling these evidence gaps and producing a final report for the Board by June 2020.

Most importantly, the Concept Note also contained the approved evaluation issues and questions for the evaluation to address. In consultation with the SIC and the Results and Performance (R&P) team of the GPE Secretariat, the IEC structured the evaluation questions into two sets of four issues — four issues on development effectiveness as understood in the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, and four issues on organizational effectiveness as explicitly envisaged in GPE's 2016 Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy. The two stages of the evaluation process and the two sets of evaluation issues (both development and organizational effectiveness) subsequently pervaded the ISE process from this time forward.

The firm undertaking the evaluation was selected competitively according to the World Bank's procurement rules and procedures. Concurrently with the IEC's preparation of the Concept Note, the World Bank's procurement unit had issued a Request for Expression of Interest from eligible firms to undertake the evaluation. The IEC reviewed these expressions of interest, developed a short list, and then issued a Request for Proposals on June 26 to the short-listed firms, along with the evaluation Terms of Reference derived from the Concept Note. Then the IEC reviewed the proposals that were received and notified the winning bidder. The World Bank's procurement

unit issued the contract with MDF Training and Consulting on August 13, 2019. Neither the GPE Board nor the SIC had any involvement in the selection of the firm to undertake the evaluation.

One of the key issues during the selection process was to avoid conflicts of interest. This was a major challenge since firms that had conducted GPE evaluations since 2015 – such as the Country-Level Evaluations (CLEs) — would be in an advantaged position to undertake the ISE. Therefore, the RFP/TOR requested firms to identify potential conflicts of interest and how they would propose to manage these transparently. Given how the pool of consulting firms from which to draw evaluators with the required skills, knowledge, and experience for the evaluation could be limited, it was understood that some potential conflicts of interest might have to be managed transparently rather than avoided completely.

As it turned out, one IEC member was excluded from the selection process when they disclosed a minor, second-degree connection to one of the interested firms. At the end of the selection process, the IEC judged the winning firm to have both the best proposal overall and no conflicts of interest at the time of the decision. One member of the winning team had worked as a consultant to the first 2009 evaluation of what was then called EFA-FTI, but none had worked on the 2015 GPE evaluation, or on any GPE evaluation products commissioned since them. This absence of potential conflicts of interest was a factor in awarding the contract to MDF Training and Consulting, along with the firm's prior experience in evaluating other global partnerships, although some IEC members expressed concerns about the firm's depth of education expertise.

Only one potential conflict of interest issue arose during the evaluation process. One part-time member of the evaluation team was also involved with another firm that won a bid (halfway through the ISE process) for some operational country-level work financed by the GPE. When the IEC decided that he could not undertake both operational and evaluative work for the GPE at the same time without a conflict of interest, he chose to leave the ISE team. Then the ISE team recruited another consultant to replace him.

An additional attractive feature of MDF Training and Consulting was their local country presence with offices in several key GPE partner countries. However, at the end of the evaluation, the IEC was left with the feeling that this potential was underused, and that more relevant information at the local level could have been produced and used in addition to that in the CLEs.

Evaluation Process and Independence

The ISE team has undertaken all stages of its work under considerable time pressure. First of all, the ISE was commissioned one year earlier than previously envisaged in GPE's 2016 M&E Strategy in order to run parallel to and contribute to the current Strategic Planning exercise. The ISE has also been different from the previous 2015 evaluation because it has benefited from the large amount of evaluative work on the GPE that has taken place since 2015, pursuant to the M&E Strategy, as well as from evaluations conducted by other parties, such as the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). This having been said, because the ISE took place one year earlier than previously planned, some of evaluative materials were not available to the ISE team at the outset of the evaluation, and others (such as the final CLE synthesis report) only became available during the course of the evaluation. To offset this, the

R&P team arranged for the two firms undertaking the CLEs to present their major findings at a two-day workshop in Washington, DC, in November 2019, which was attended by four members of the ISE team.

Second, the ISE timeline has been dictated by the requirement to present the Stage 1 Interim Report and the Stage 2 Final Report to regularly scheduled meetings of the GPE Board in December 2019 and June 2020, respectively. Notwithstanding these tight timelines, the ISE team was able to get ready and run smoothly and effectively, both in September 2019 at the beginning of Stage 1 and in January 2020 at the beginning of Stage 2.

Then, the preparation of the Stage 2 Final Report was hampered by the emergence and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This required team members to work at home in physical isolation from each other since mid-March 2020, and also hindered the ISE team from conducting as many interviews with GPE stakeholders as originally envisaged as potential interviewees became occupied in responding to the pandemic in their respective countries. An ISE presentation to the GPE Board retreat (initially scheduled for March 23-25) was cancelled and rescheduled for May 6 during one of a series of webinars organized to replace the retreat. A sense-making workshop that was planned in association with the SIC meeting on April 29–30 was restructured as a four-hour virtual workshop. The late timing of this workshop, which was planned to contribute to the formulation of the final conclusions and recommendations, also compressed the amount of time that might normally have been spent by the SIC and the GPE Secretariat in reviewing and commenting on the draft final report before this was finalized and presented to the Board.

This having been said, the IEC and the ISE team made the necessary adjustments and accommodations to the planned schedule of activities to deliver the report to the Board on time. The IEC commends the ISE team for its continuous efforts in this regard. The ISE team prepared initial drafts of both the Interim and Final Reports in sufficient time for both the IEC and the R&P team to review and comment on these reports before they were finalized. Then, in addition and per standard evaluation practice, the SIC and the GPE Secretariat have also had the opportunity to review and comment on the revised final report before submitting this to the Board. The ISE team has done a thorough and diligent job in taking into account the comments received, while exercising judgment in how and how far to incorporate them, with some guidance from the IEC. However, in the spirit of independence, the ISE team remains responsible for the final version of the report, including its major findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Per the Concept Note, the R&P team in the GPE Secretariat has provided administrative, logistical, and other support to the work of the IEC and, at arm's length, to the work of the ISE team. This has included (a) providing documents and other GPE-related information needed and requested by the IEC and ISE team; and (b) assisting with access to the GPE Board, Secretariat staff, and other GPE stakeholders. Since the costs of the evaluation have been paid from the GPE trust fund, the head of the R&P team has been the signing authority on all contracts and payments to both the IEC and the ISE team. While this unavoidable fact has represented a small compromise with the principle of organizational independence, the IEC confirms that the ISE has been conducted in a way that has been behaviorally independent of the R&P team, the GPE Secretariat, the SIC, and the GPE Board.

The ISE team comprised experienced evaluators who have produced a candid and uncompromising report whose findings, conclusions, and recommendations are being reported transparently. The IEC is not aware of any outside pressures to influence these findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Although the R&P team has been closely involved in the evaluation, at no point did the IEC sense that they were providing other than factual corrections or useful information on usual practices, realistic goals and acceptable methodologies. Nor was there any sign that they were resisting any criticism or otherwise steering the process in anything other than helpful ways.

Preparation of the Interim and Final Reports

Per the evaluation TOR, the Interim Report was based primarily on a desk review of the evaluative materials produced since the previous 2015 evaluation and interviews with staff of the GPE Secretariat. The ISE team gave a powerpoint presentation on its major findings and evidence gaps to the SIC meeting in Paris on October 30, and presented the final Interim Report to the GPE Board meeting in Nairobi on December 11.

The Interim Report was able satisfactorily: (a) to distill the 44 evaluation questions in the evaluation TOR into a more manageable 19 issues (8 in relation to development effectiveness and 11 in relation to organizational effectiveness), and (b) to identify 8 major issues for further investigation during Stage 2 due to gaps in the documentary evidence concerning these issues (4 each in relation to development and organizational effectiveness). These eight issues for further investigation were first discussed at a joint meeting of the SIC, IEC, ISE team, and R&P team in Paris on November 1, and then finalized after feedback from the GPE Board meeting in Nairobi. The meetings in Paris on November 1 were attended by all IEC members and were particularly useful in developing mutual understanding among all four parties and clarifying any issues of concern.

Then the ISE team prepared an Inception Report for Stage 2 of the evaluation. In the meantime, the IEC felt that the ISE team required additional expertise with respect to (a) education and development, and (b) the economics of education, and prepared suggested TORs for the ISE team to recruit this additional expertise. The ISE team agreed and recruited two additional full-time members and one part-time subject-matter expert, also in part to compensate for the consultant who left the evaluation team (as explained above due to a conflict of interest). The IEC does not think that these personnel changes adversely affected the quality of the evaluation.

The ISE team completed the Inception Report on January 20 to the satisfaction of the IEC. The IEC accepted this as a working document to guide the second stage of the evaluation, and did not ask the ISE team to take the time to polish this and publish it due to the time pressure to complete the evaluation. While the ISE team had their own clear ideas on how to proceed with Stage 2, they were also receptive to additions and alternatives, including the benchmarking exercise with other global partnerships of similar scale and maturity.

The major issue that arose at this time was the issue of country visits. The original TOR had not envisaged the evaluation team undertaking any country visits on the grounds that these would add little value for money on top of the visits that had already taken place for the 28 CLEs. The IEC also felt that there was insufficient time to arrange meaningful country visits, that valuable

time would be lost in travel and logistics, that so much evaluative material was already available which hadn't been fully utilized, and that additional country visits would burden country-level stakeholders that had already been intensively interviewed for the CLEs. Instead, the R&P team assisted the ISE team in identifying a purposive sample of 24 country-level stakeholders, including government officials, to interview remotely. The IEC sent introductory letters to each of these individuals in advance to confirm the legitimacy of the ISE's requests for interviews.

The ISE team delivered its first draft of the final report, as agreed, on April 9, 2020. Both the IEC and the R&P team reviewed this draft and provided comments to the ISE team by April 21. Then the ISE team prepared its revised final report on May 7, taking into account comments received and the results of the sense-making workshop on April 30. The SIC and the GPE Secretariat provided their comments on this version of the report by May 14, which the ISE team has now finalized, taking these comments into account.

The ISE team benefited from being a relatively small, tight-knit team, most of whom were working more or less full-time on this evaluation. The team was of high quality and was able to move forward under very problematic and unexpected circumstances with a good attitude and flexibility to adapt. Nonetheless, differences in capacity and the challenge of the topics that each team member was assigned to address meant that some parts of the evaluation reports were stronger than others

The team leader was highly professional and engaged throughout the process. As far as the IEC is concerned, he coordinated his team satisfactorily, keeping the process moving, engaging directly with both the IEC and the R&P team, and preparing and delivering various presentations, including the sense-making workshop on April 30.

The sense-making workshop on April 30, which was attended by all IEC members as silent observers, was a valuable addition to the evaluation process. This was managed well. It focused on the major findings of the evaluation, confirming that most participants recognized these findings, and bringing issues and potential solutions to light. The workshop avoided discussing potential recommendations and giving participants what they wanted to hear. However, it would have been even more valuable if this could have taken place earlier in the process without reducing the time available for the ISE team to finalize the report, and for the SIC and GPE Secretariat to review and comment on the draft final report. Due to this compressed timeline, the IEC cannot certify that all comments received have in fact been adequately taken into account in the final version of the report.

Throughout the evaluation process, IEC members stayed in regular contact through virtual meetings among ourselves and with the ISE team, both collectively and individually. Each IEC member was assigned primary responsibility for the in-depth review of two of the eight substantive sections of the final report, in accordance with their comparative expertise and experience, but all read and commented on all sections. This helped bring to bear methodological and substantive expertise of different kinds to all chapters of the report.

The Integrity and Quality of the Final Report

Overall, the IEC concludes that the ISE team has produced a high quality report that is objectives-based and evidence-based — presenting credible links from the findings to the conclusions and recommendations. The team applied a rigorous mixed methods approach including desk reviews of evaluative materials produced since the previous 2015 evaluation; interviews with GPE Secretariat staff, Board members, and country-level stakeholders; qualitative contribution analysis based on the 28 CLEs; relevant trends in international financing for education and in GPE's allocation of funds; a fit-for-purpose analysis of the GPE's governance and management arrangements drawing on a benchmarking analysis with four other global partnerships; and the sense-making workshop on April 30.

This mixed methods approach was appropriate and necessary to capture the complexity of the evaluation task in triangulating the large amount of documentary and interview data. However, the first version of the draft final report — received on April 9 — needed considerable feedback and guidance from the IEC in order to make it consistent, convincing, and clear. The next version of the report — received on May 7 — was of much better quality, and had addressed most of the issues that had been raised by the IEC and the R&P team.

One of the key issues that needed to be resolved towards the end was the initial wide use of correlation analyses to ascertain the factors explaining ESP implementation and LEG effectiveness, how these various factors were chosen for the analyses, and how other methods such as qualitative contribution analysis complemented the correlation analyses. The Stage 1 Interim Report had identified the production of better-quality ESPs as a key strength of the GPE partnership, but their effective implementation as a subsequent weakness.

The final ISE report now provides insightful discussions concerning ESP implementation and LEG effectiveness — examining the heterogeneity of factors and contexts, and the extent to which some of this heterogeneity may be linked to variations in implementation and effectiveness. The issues found to present bottlenecks and the recommendations for unlocking these are timely given the considerable importance of the GPE partnership in arriving at consistent mechanisms for effective LEGs and for successful implementation of ESPs. The ISE team demonstrated integrity in addressing the various comments received on the need to improve its use of correlation analyses and to expand the evidence base for these findings and conclusions in the final report.

The ISE team did a more than satisfactory job in bringing all their prior work to bear in the final two chapters on conclusions and recommendations. Overall, the IEC finds that the conclusions are sound and the recommendations are solid and actionable, but many readers of the evaluation will surely want to reflect and draw some of their own conclusions and recommendations from the wealth of information presented in the evaluation as the partnership proceeds to finalize its strategic directions for the next strategy period.