INDEPENDENT REPORT OF THE GPE
‘HOSTING REVIEW’

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. This paper outlines the main findings of the Hosting Review. The Concept Note guiding the Review is found in Annex 1. The Note states that the aim is “to conduct a high level rapid review of hosting arrangements for the Global Partnership for Education including the possibility of structural independence from the World Bank”. In doing so, two hosting scenarios are proposed for consideration (i) retaining the Secretariat within the World Bank, and (ii) repositioning the Global Partnership as a separate entity.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. The Global Partnership for Education, established in 2002 (as EFA/FTI), is a unique partnership (compact) of southern governments, donor agencies, civil society organisations, private sector bodies and private foundations. The decision to host the EFA/FTI Secretariat in the World Bank was made to facilitate rapid set up and implementation (because of the range of support services provided by the Bank) and a lean governance structure. As the mid-term evaluation of FTI notes this happened “before the details of its purpose, structure and operations had been worked out” (Cambridge Education et al 2010:1). These details were not fully finalised until 2004.

2.2. As noted in the mid-term evaluation, in its origins, the FTI was entirely a donor initiative. Since then the Partnership has grown and established itself more as an inclusive decision-making body but differing interpretations about its design and implementation have persisted, and have influenced continuing debate about, and adjustments to, the FTI’s governance arrangements.

2.3. From 2010, reforms were introduced to help improve the overall performance of FTI, including a series of measures to strengthen governance and funding arrangements and the Secretariat. The recent changes in the structure of the Board of Directors and trust fund management, together with a new brand identity, provide a strong basis for further evolution of the Partnership. Notable, however, is that issues specifically pertaining to the hosting arrangement in the World Bank were not picked up at this time.

2.4. Given its relatively humble beginnings, the recent Replenishment Conference in Copenhagen 2011 marked a significant moment for the GPE, pointing to real progress in meeting education goals in GPE countries and generating financial pledges of $5.5bn overall, including from developing country partners and $1.5bn for the GPE fund. Despite this progress, a huge amount still needs to be done to address the 61 million children who remain out of school, many of them in fragile and conflict affected countries, together with the very poor quality of education that many children in school still receive. A number of donors, civil society groups and high profile supporters have continued to advocate for deeper reform of GPE to meet this challenge. One of the perceived barriers to this is GPE’s hosting arrangement with the World Bank and, more specifically, the housing of the GPE Secretariat within the Bank’s administrative structure.

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1 See the May 2012 Briefing Paper prepared by civil society organisations “A more ambitious, effective Global Partnership for Education” and written by the Global Campaign for Education and Oxfam International.
3. A FIT FOR PURPOSE ARRANGEMENT – THE ISSUES.

3.1 In assessing whether or not the hosting arrangement with the World Bank is serving GPE effectively, there are three sets of issues to consider:

1. Is the development and education context in 2012 changing perceptions of what a fit for purpose GPE should look like?
2. What does the evidence say about the costs and benefits of the current administrative arrangement with the World Bank? How fit for purpose is it?
3. Is there a credible case for changing the current administrative arrangement for GPE. If so, what would the transition path be for getting there, if not, what else needs to be done?

The context

3.2 The optics of development have changed significantly in the last decade. Global poverty rates have fallen while 75% of people living in absolute poverty now reside in middle-income countries in contrast to the 75% living in low-income countries in 1990. As Kenny (2011) and others have shown (ODI MDG Scorecard, CGD MDG Trailblazers), the first decade of the 21st century was a time when “more people lived better, longer, more peaceful and more prosperous lives than ever before” (Kenny, Foreign Policy 2010). Over the same period the number of children out of school in developing countries fell by 40 million, gender disparities in primary school enrolment narrowed and transition rates from primary to secondary school increased.

3.3 But rapid progress has not meant even or equitable progress. The number of children who remain out of school is still large; drop-out rates are high especially in sub-Saharan African countries; while primary systems that continually fail to deliver basic literacy and numeracy impose huge costs on economy and society. There is now a fading optimism that the fundamental goal of achieving universal primary completion will be achieved by 2015. The countries and localities most off-track to meet this goal are those mired in fragility and/or conflict.

3.4 New actors have entered the development space bringing in a diversity of financial flows and new ways of doing business. Shifts in the financial and authorizing environment for ODA have meant a greater emphasis on results and value for money and, in many cases, reaching the hardest to reach. There are calls for more and more innovative financing and new ways of getting things done to break down the barriers that have for so long held back progress. There is an increased appetite for solutions that bring together public, private and civil society actors, which break down silos and attract innovation. The aid effectiveness agenda has had to adapt to this changing reality with strong calls at the 4th High Level Forum in Busan 2011 to acknowledge the changing development financing landscape and the importance of differentiating the needs of different country groups from middle-income to low-income to emerging and fragile economies.

3.5 In this context the work of GPE has evolved from a largely G8/donor initiative seeking to fast track resources so that “no countries seriously committed to Education for All will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by lack of resources” (World Education Forum, 2000) to a more inclusive multilateral partnership with a wider range of eligible countries, a wider range of participating funders and a broader strategic agenda for supporting countries in achieving the full...
EFA agenda. That GPE has evolved is acknowledged by both the mid-term evaluation and recent other contributions examining GPE’s performance and future:

“The FTI today includes better representation of its various constituencies in decision-making, its governance structures have been streamlined, the dominant role of the WB has been somewhat modified, and country processes have been clarified.” (Cambridge Economics, 2010: xix);

“the GPE’s Board of Directors and leadership deserve credit for embarking on a reform process that has made notable improvements to the effectiveness of the partnership, especially at the global level....The Board of Directors has been restructured to balance the voices of recipient and donor governments....Financing decisions have been democratised....A revised charter has been agreed that expands the scope of the initiative to address the full Education for All agenda, rather than just primary education” (GCE/OXFAM 2012:4)

“Recent governance reforms have introduced some important changes..Developing countries now have a stronger voice on the board” (Center for Universal Education, Brookings 2011)

GPE as Unfinished Business

3.6 Despite important and valued changes in recent years, there is a clear view that GPE is operating below its potential in terms of both global positioning and country-level impact. This view also states that the GPE’s close association with the World Bank is constraining its ability to be transformative on the global and national stage. The main constraints as described are:

- **Resources:** GPE was set up to champion support for national education plans. Despite recent reforms it still lacks the required profile and visibility and hence ‘pulling power’ over new funding sources. Senior figures in the World Bank have not actively advocated for a strong GPE replenishment. Support from political leaders in donor countries has been limited. Private sector actors are present by not fully engaged with the operational side of GPE. There is no specific financial window under the FIF for attracting private sector funds. One possible reason is the strong association in funders’ minds between GPE and the World Bank.

- **Dual-accountability:** The dual-accountability arrangements for the Secretariat (viz the Bank’s management and the GPE Board) limit the degrees of freedom that the Secretariat has to deliver according to the needs and priorities of the wider partnership and to ensure a robust and open working relationship with the Bank.

- **Administrative rules and procedures:** Although GPE is governed by its own Board of Directors, the hosting arrangement means (by definition) that the Secretariat is embedded within the administrative rules and procedures of the World Bank. These rules and procedures do not allow for full independence in decision making in areas such as management and recruitment and, despite having access to the full range of Bank support services, are often too slow for the pace at which the Secretariat wants to make decisions.

- **Being ‘of’ the Bank not just ‘in’ the Bank:** Bank staff rules govern the way in which GPE staff identify themselves and operate both at HQ and in the field. This creates some identity

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confusion in the minds of stakeholders who fail to appreciate the value-added of GPE over the strong brand name of the World Bank.

- **Country operations and IDA displacement:** Limited reform of the GPE operational model at country-level - in particular, the respective roles of local donor groups versus the broader local education groups and the heavy reliance in the vast majority of countries on the World Bank as Supervising Entity (SE) for the disbursement of funds. Uneven or lack of representativeness of non-state and non-donor actors in LEGs, limited use of aid instruments in support of sector programmes and the Bank’s extensive role as supervising entity are seen to be a function of GPE’s administrative relationship with the Bank and a persistent source of confusion for GPE country partners.

3.7 Perceptions about the severity of these constraints have been heightened recently by the immediacy of 2015, the size of the funding gap and the changing nature of demands on funding to meet EFA goals. The GPE clearly recognises this challenge. In the opening statement to the Replenishment Conference 2011 the following points were made:

- UNESCO estimates that to achieve EFA by 2015, $16billion or nearly 6 times the current level of aid to basic education is required
- The need for EFA/FTI funding in the coming year will be unprecedented
- Up to 16 countries in 2011 alone will be asking for support, totalling over $1.2 billion
- Bilateral support for education is decreasing or disappearing altogether
- Currently 11 fragile states are members of the EFA/FTI partnership. Another 15 are eligible and it is likely that most of them will become EFA/FTI members in 2012

3.8 Calls for more global ambition and a stronger performance from GPE - and all EFA partner agencies – are clearly not in dispute. What is disputed by some of GPE’s interested parties is the ability of GPE to effectively step up to these calls while continuing its hosting arrangement with the World Bank.

3.9 The next section looks in some detail at the costs and benefits of the current hosting arrangement before considering the case for change and options for a way forward.

4. **HOSTING - THE COSTS AND BENEFITS**

4.1 Hosting requires the hosted entity to operate within the business model of the host, with some accommodation for the specific governance and oversight requirements on the part of the funders. The more successful hosted programmes have established representative structures and executive bodies to improve their efficiency, while institutional arrangements between a host organisation and a program have been clearly defined at the outset to avoid confusion and conflicts of interest down the line. In many respects FTI-GPE missed out the opportunity to do this early on and has played catch-up ever since.

4.2 The constraints listed above provide the entry point for assessing the costs and benefits of the current hosting arrangement (Table 1). It is important to be clear that much of the data on which the assessment is based is qualitative, drawn from individual and group interviews and grey

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3 GMR Report 2010, Brookings 2011, GCE./Oxfam 2012. Views on how large the funding gap is vary however,  
4 Further evidence is available in ODI/Liesbet Steer et al 2009
literature sources pulled together over a short time frame.\(^5\) There is limited quantitative data to be had to rigorously compare costs and benefits.\(^6\) Where possible, observations are triangulated with evidence from evaluation studies of other global and regional programmes.

\(^5\) Interviews took place over a 5 day visit to Washington DC in April and a series of telephone calls during April-May. In total 65 persons were interviewed either individually or as part of focus group discussions.

\(^6\) Nor are they all suitable for quantification.
Table 1: The Costs and Benefits of Hosting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Costs</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Positioning and leadership</strong> - being located in the Bank allows the</td>
<td>Hosting (i) limits the Secretariat’s intellectual &amp; operational independence because of the strong/dominant culture of the World Bank, (ii) creates a dual accountability problem resulting in an underpowered Secretariat (iii) constrains resource mobilisation because of the strong identification of GPE with the Bank (i.e. with an institution that already has significant resources at its command).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretariat to (i) capitalise on the Bank’s global positioning &amp;</td>
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<td>convening power on a wide range of policy and programme issues relevant</td>
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<td>to GPE, (ii) benefit from the Bank’s experience with hosting of other</td>
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<td>global and regional programmes (iii) influence/inform Bank engagement</td>
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<td>on education from within.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Globally relevant knowledge and technical support</strong> – on-demand</td>
<td>Access to internal Bank advisory &amp; knowledge networks supports the work of the Secretariat but it also privileges a Bank-centred view of issues and priorities in education. Technical support favours the Bank’s role as supervising entity and only a limited set of financing modalities at country level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>access to a wealth of technical knowledge as well as the latest sector</td>
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<td>and country data, directly supports the work of the Secretariat.</td>
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<td>Working alongside the Bank’s knowledge community strengthens the advocacy</td>
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<td>role of GPE – although this has not been used as actively as it should</td>
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<tr>
<td>have been. The Secretariat plays an important evidencing &amp; advocacy role</td>
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<td>within the Bank.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Management &amp; administrative support services</strong> – access to HR,</td>
<td>Bank processes are designed for core Bank business. HR &amp; procurement systems are too heavy duty for Secretariat needs &amp; procedures can be slow and inflexible. Insufficient flexibility of recruitment – both in terms of timing and job title - slows down the scaling up of the Secretariat and can mean a mismatch between job titles and skills required. Reliance on STC/ETC contracts adds to the transactions costs of recruitment and uncertainty for</td>
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<tr>
<td>procurement, financial management and legal support services allows the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretariat to remain administratively lean and to focus its staffing on</td>
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<td>programme delivery. Flexibility is available, particularly in</td>
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<td>procurement, but requires Secretariat staff knowing the rules and</td>
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<td>procedures.</td>
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7 The costs and benefits are qualitatively presented and based directly on the feedback provided by interviewees and from information trawled from the grey literature. They are not necessarily the views of the author.
**Travel & security** – a comprehensive travel service paid for ‘at cost’ with significant additional support. As Bank employees Secretariat staff are covered by Bank security services, including when they are in country. Working in fragile states places a high premium on this kind of service.

Travel services are relatively costly compared to the open market. Reliance on Bank supports, particularly at country level, compounds problems of communicating a clear separate GPE identity.

**Infrastructure at country level** – an extensive network of Bank country offices provides technical and support infrastructure for Secretariat staff at country level. While this could be provided by other partners at country level the consistency/continuity across country contexts is invaluable. GPE would need to find an alternative country-level infrastructure if it were to move out of the Bank.

Drawing on Bank infrastructure at country level gives the impression to country stakeholders that GPE staff are ‘Bank staff first, GPE staff second’. Relying on Bank support at country level makes it difficult for GPE staff to scrutinise Bank performance as the supervising entity for fear of being seen as ‘disloyal’.

**Staff & staff benefits** – Bank recruitment processes are open and merit-based and ensure strong sector relevant competencies. Recent improvements mean no revolving-door between the Bank and GPE. Bank staff benefits attract and retain an internationally competitive workforce. Privileges and immunities ensure crucial protections for staff and facilitate travel. Recent efforts to underscore GPE independence are paying off.

Bank procedures (sector boards) serve core Bank business first and foremost. GPE staff must work to Bank staff rules. This compounds problems of GPE’s independent identity and gives the impression of loyalty to the Bank above loyalty to GPE. That GPE staff are Bank staff also reduces the scope for ‘challenge’ from the Secretariat when things go wrong.

**Operational issues at country level** – the Bank’s extensive role as supervising entity is as much a function of FTI’s history (when the Bank was the default implementing agency for the Catalytic Fund at country level) as anything else. Under the relatively new FIF\(^8\) structure there is nothing to

The Bank as supervising entity in the vast majority of country contexts compromises GPE independence. GPE funds are treated as ‘business as usual’ by Bank sector staff which further reduces visibility at country level. The Bank is often overly dominant in local donor groups and does not push for

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\(^8\) Financial Intermediary Fund
stop other donor partners or non-governmental organisation from acting as supervising entity, although this has not been as widely appreciated by GPE members as it should have been. Working closely with the Bank provides access to non-sectoral Ministries, particularly Ministries of Finance and to wider macro-economic and systemic discussions at country level. This benefit is currently underutilised by Secretariat staff but is crucial for delivering change in education systems (where many problems are not sector specific). Recent innovations in aid instruments, such as the Program 4 Results (P4R) modality and options for converting credits to grants, enable Bank programmes to better support sector-wide plans.

The Bank offers a limited range of aid modalities to support education sector plans at country level. The inability to co-mingle funds in sector support operations makes working through the Bank difficult and costly for recipient countries (and is one reason why IDA funds are less attractive).
4.3 As is generally the case in issues of organisation and governance, there is no single ‘right’ answer when assessing the balance of costs and benefits. What is striking is how many of the perceived costs and benefits appear as two-sides of the same coin. For every benefit there is an almost identically perceived cost, pointing to the power of individual experience and, more significantly, to the merging of issues linked to hosting with other efficiency and effectiveness concerns. Table 1 attempts to separate out issues specific to hosting but even here the boundaries are permeable with several of the perceived costs of hosting straying into matters to do with the GPE partnership on the one hand, and the operating model at country level on the other.

4.4 The section that follows seeks to weigh the main costs and benefits in order to assess the case for change (or not). The issues that go beyond hosting but are highly relevant to the perception of GPE effectiveness, are dealt with in the subsequent section.

Weighing the costs and benefits

4.5 **Positioning and Leadership** – GPE has yet to acquire a reputation as ‘the’ global champion for basic education, but this cannot be entirely, or even mainly, attributed to hosting. Rather the explanations lie in the relatively recent scaling-up of GPE resources, the absence, hitherto for, of a clear strategic plan defining GPE’s global agenda and the somewhat diffident approach to global leadership from the Partnership itself. As a primarily country-based mechanism it has also taken time for FTI-GPE to build any kind of global presence.

Perhaps most difficult of all to weigh-up are the criticisms of hosting that are borne out the dual accountability structure between the GPE Board on the one hand and World Bank management on the other. As observed in the recent IEG review of Global and Regional Partnership Programs (2012) the ‘two master’s problem’ is a feature of all hosted global and regional partnership programmes. The report summarises this as follows: “Three principal costs that have emerged from the IEG reviews (across 10 hosted programs) are (a) the need to transparently identify and manage the conflicts of interest inherent in host arrangements; (b) the two masters problem in which the head of the program management unit reports to the governing body of the program and the line management of the host organisation; the threat of organisational capture by the host organisation” (61). The IEG review also observes that the more successful global programmes have found effective ways to manage potential conflicts and work efficiently within the rules environment of the host. Notably this has worked best in situations where “Institutional arrangements between a host organisation and a program [were] sic ...clearly defined at the outset”. Efforts to do otherwise, including in the now independent global programmes such as GFATM, “…resulted in the development of ad hoc systems and processes that were duplicative and decreased efficiency” (57)

4.6 Some degree of dual accountability is inevitable in hosted programmes (including those hosted by other institutions) and the way to manage it effectively is to (a) be crystal clear about roles and responsibilities in both decision-making and oversight (preferably written down in a formal agreement or terms of reference) and (b) to be clear from the outset on what a successful working relationship looks like. In the case of GPE the latter has improved in the last 2 years. However there

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9 From late 2006 onwards
were missed opportunities at the beginning of FTI and some erosion of trust along the way which still needs some repair; even more critical as the scale of GPE ambitions increase.

4.7 The World Bank is an important player in education and the potential for cross-fertilisation between GPE and the Bank are considerable, if not always valued. As Isenam noted in 2009 “The Secretariat benefits from the opportunity that proximity brings to have an influence on FTI-funded programmes and related World Bank policies....A Secretariat outside the World Bank would likely to have less rather than more influence over World Bank policy” (23). At the same time, GPE does need to invest in a clearer strategic vision and raise its profile on the global stage in order to be seen to be relevant. This is not inconsistent with hosting but is time-sensitive with the push towards 2015 and discussions already taking place on the focus and shape of a post-2015 development framework. Action is needed whatever the hosting scenario going forward.

4.8 **Globally relevant knowledge and technical support** - The role of the Bank as a convener and broker of knowledge is something Secretariat staff value highly. Most recently, the geographic move of the Secretariat away from the education anchor in the Bank, the increase in the share of Secretariat staff recruited from outside the Bank and the increasingly open approach by the Bank to its data and knowledge sharing, has meant that many of the concerns about an overly dominant Bank have been substantially moderated. Seamless access to such a breadth and depth of data and technical knowledge is a major plus for GPE that could not be easily replicated either by moving to an alternative host or by becoming fully independent.

4.9 **Management and administrative support services** – the Secretariat was set up to operate within the administrative rules of the Bank. This has helped maintain a lean structure inside the Secretariat and contain in-house costs. But, over time, tensions have emerged between the perceived inflexibility of standard Bank rules and procedures and the way the Secretariat is seeking to expand and evolve its remit in line with GPE goals. Particular frustrations include:

- lengthy elapsed times for recruiting staff
- a recruitment process for term and long-term consultant posts managed out of HDN rather than the Secretariat with, what are perceived to be, limited opportunities for senior level appointments
- a process of cluster recruitment that makes it difficult to recruit into the Secretariat ‘on-demand’ unless it is on short term consultancy terms
- inflexible and lengthy procurement processes that, while designed to ensure full disclosure and competitiveness during the process, make it difficult to undertake small, quick turnaround and sole-source contracts – e.g. for website development, events support etc.

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11 It would be interesting and important to evidence this more carefully.
12 Relevant because interested parties beyond the GPE Secretariat can now get access to data that was previously not available externally or subject to tight disclosure rules. This offers the chance to make more transparent the relationship that GPE has with the Bank, its country partners and its wider stakeholders.
13 It is worth noting that GFATM was established to focus on three major diseases and became a knowledge broker in these areas in its own right. On moving out of WHO, GFATM took this knowledge capacity with it. GPE had a wider sector remit from the beginning and focused its early attention on coordination of planning and donor resources at the country level. Its reliance on the Bank as a key source of relevant knowledge and technical support was entirely sensible in this context. As a result its own in-house knowledge capacity is modest and would need to be very significantly scaled up if it were to become independent of the Bank.
• IT rules that limit the ability of the Secretariat to invest in its own software/systems capability

4.10 From the Bank side there is a need to ensure the integrity of its own systems and procedures and a strong incentive not to create exceptions that become unmanageable for the wider business model of the Bank. This means there are real limits to how much flexibility there is to adjust Bank procedures for a hosted programme.

4.11 There are, nevertheless, improvements that can be made to the way the Secretariat uses existing procedures – with a surge of new staff in the past 2 years there has been a very steep learning curve for the Secretariat in understanding Bank procedures, especially around HR rules and procurement. This could have been managed better if the Secretariat had a better system for internal knowledge sharing and problem solving.

4.12 Another area for improvement is the clarification of expectations around the type and performance of administrative services available to GPE. Currently the Bank has no mechanism for putting service agreements in place for hosted arrangements, basically because the Bank is the administrating entity and has no need, by definition, to establish a service agreement with itself! But given that the administrative needs of GPE are often different from Bank core business, it would help enormously if there was a clear upfront agreement on what the Bank’s administrative systems require from GPE and where GPE can get maximum help to expedite business quickly and efficiently. This would need to be an agreement that works in the best interests of both parties and signed off and owned by senior VP-level management in the Bank and by the GPE Board.

4.13 Finally, recruitment and management of senior staff, particularly the Head of the Secretariat could and should be a dual responsibility of HDN and the GPE Board while recognising that the Bank is the hiring entity and so certain rules and terms and conditions apply (see below on staff rules). This would seem to be entirely in the spirit of the hosting relationship and, in the absence of a formal policy on hosting appears not to contravene any hard and fast rule.

4.14 **Travel, security and country level infrastructure** – the benefits here are clear. The Bank offers an unparalleled infrastructure of country and regional offices that GPE staff are able to utilise (as Bank staff) when on field operations, plus extensive 24-7 travel, visa and security support. GPE staff rate this support as highly as anything else. While all these services can be procured independently and, in some cases, at lower unit cost, the integration of travel and security support with country and regional offices is much more difficult to achieve. If access to the country infrastructure of the Bank was not available, GPE staff would need to negotiate alternative arrangements with other GPE donor and multilateral partners to provide support and services while in-country. Alternatively the Secretariat could establish its own country infrastructure around the Local Education Groups (LEGs), similar to the CCM structure of GFATM. All this is feasible, but would

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14 Senior managers in HDN and the legal department were clear that setting up a parallel system of administrative rules for GPE went against the principles of hosting and was not feasible for the Bank.

15 Worth noting though that the Bank does not have a formal policy on hosting arrangements.

16 It is hard to verify this. The Bank’s services are provided at scale which does keep a check on costs to some degree, on the other hand, private sector providers are in fierce competition with one other which puts downward pressure on costs. It is really the joined up nature of Bank services and their accessibility from any part of the globe which would be hard to replicate using outsourced services.
not happen quickly, is potentially very costly and would require a much larger administrative operation than at present. Ultimately these are choices, but given the need to focus GPE’s energies on delivery, the case for transitioning away from the Banks’ infrastructure is currently less compelling than the option of ensuring maximum value out of the current arrangement.

4.15 **Staff and benefits** – the fact that Secretariat staff are hired on Bank terms and conditions and operate according to Bank staff rules has raised concerns with some external stakeholders that GPE staff are loyal to “the Bank first and GPE second”. Experience from other global programmes, particularly the Climate Investment Funds, and even the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) which is housed by the Bank but reports independently to the Bank’s Executive Board, shows that independence is possible while still operating within the authorizing environment of the Bank. The lesson here is that the culture and behaviour of staff (the mind-set) is as critical in creating a sense of independence as structures and physical location. One way to address the ‘staff loyalty’ problem is to follow the recommendation made by Isenam (2009) of a “simple statement in Terms of Reference of the Secretariat that for staff of the Secretariat loyalty to the World Bank means duly serving the interests of FTI (sic)”. This issue is already addressed in the case of World Bank staff seconded to other organizations, since they are specifically exempted from the relevant staff rule. At the time this recommendation was not taken up but could be usefully returned to as part of a package of measures clarifying the agreement between GPE and the Bank.

4.16 **Operational issues at country level** - many of the concerns here are not directly related to hosting. Those that are point to the lack of a clear GPE identity at country level, a reliance on Bank-type appraisal and Q&A processes for awarding GPE implementation grants and the limited space for challenge of the performance of Bank-supervised GPE operations because of the dual loyalty problem. All these concerns have credence and point to the importance of GPE having a clear modus operandi for its country-level operations that builds on the strengths of its host and other partners while not being subsumed by them. This will follow the more GPE staff are seen to adding value to processes on the ground and the ultimate achievement of results. The benefits of having access to a broad group of stakeholders across government and the ability to draw on the technical input of Bank staff even when the Bank is not supervising entity has key advantages. But these need to be (a) used effectively and (b) used with care alongside inputs from a range of relevant professional groups and non-governmental organisations as part of an inclusive Local Education Group structure. That the latter are often lacking in legitimacy and representativeness is not the fault of the hosting arrangement but a lack of active support and engagement on the part of the Secretariat but also other influential donor partners.

4.17 Across all the main areas highlighted above and in the table, the perceived costs and benefits are fairly finely balanced. In the last two years there has been recognised improvement on the cost side which has tempered some of the concerns but by no means eliminated them. Ultimately it is a judgement call for GPE on whether to ‘do better’ with the current hosting arrangement or to invest significant time and resources in a move.

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17 GFATM already had its CCM model running before it left WHO, it also had 450 staff on leaving which rose to over 600 in the first few years of independence. Many of these additional staff were recruited for administrative roles.

18 It should surely been within the remit of the Secretariat to support LEG’s develop a more representative structure in the interests of a more inclusive and legitimate planning and implementation process?
5. **THE CASE FOR CHANGE**

5.1 Recognising that maintain the status quo is not really an option, in considering the case for change three alternative options for the Secretariat were reviewed.

- to retain the current hosting arrangement but with improvements.
- to find an alternative host organisation
- to establish a separate, independent legal entity

5.2 In each case the pros and cons were considered. Table 2 synthesises these in brief and provides some commentary on each.

**Table 2: The case for change – pros and cons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retain the current hosting arrangement with improvements</td>
<td>HDN does not view GPE as ‘an asset’ which could undermine confidence in hosting even if GPE is keen to stay</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Bank has a global mandate and shares a strong commitment to better education outcomes with GPE - no other potential host offers this.</td>
<td>• Wider changes in the Bank’s management and oversight of trust funds/global programmes could unintentionally reduce degrees of freedom further for GPE (beyond GPE’s control).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Continuity gives space to focus on strategic content &amp; improving results now, versus time spent transitioning to a new arrangement</td>
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<td>• GPE’s operational model strongly mirrors the Bank’s country-led model of engagement – for some this is part of the problem, but it is also a strength allowing for strong compatibility between the way the Bank engages at country level and the way GPE currently operates.</td>
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<td>• A low admin:spend ratio compared to global funds passes the value-for-money test at a time when resources are constrained</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Staying put channels resources to the front line rather than transition &amp; avoids adding to the multilateral architecture</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative host</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to negotiate different terms &amp; conditions for GPE hosting from the outset &amp; craft a different institutional image for GPE</td>
<td>No obvious hosts – UNOPS not well positioned globally i.e. essentially a project management organisation; UNESCO not institutionally/financially strong enough at this point; private sector option possible but would not bring country infrastructure nor immunities &amp; privileges of an international public organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition costs manageable as long as the receiving host has adequate resources to assist with set-up and allows GPE to keep its own administrative overhead down</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possibility of selecting a regional host with closer proximity to key GPE clients</td>
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IEG GRPP evaluation confirms that
non-Bank hosting arrangements experience almost all of the same challenges as those identified within the Bank.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Independent entity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>An opportunity to ‘start afresh’</strong></td>
<td><strong>Costs of transition will be high – needs to be set against some certainty of higher rewards. This is currently not clear unless aspects of the GPE model change.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A new entity could be located somewhere that more closely reflects GPE’s mission i.e. in the global South</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interruption to <em>business as usual</em> has shown to be significant in other instances</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full independence for staff and administration</strong></td>
<td><strong>New entity would need to be located where privileges and immunities can be afforded to all GPE staff, which could limit the number of suitable locations.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom to change the operating model to suit more extreme &amp; changing country circumstances</strong></td>
<td><strong>No guarantees that GPE staff would be willing to move to a new location (note that GFATM was already housed in Geneva before the transition out of WHO)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3 As discussed above, the costs and benefits of the current arrangement are fairly finely balanced. Seen together with pros and cons of the alternatives there is not a clear enough (or strongly positive) case to move the GPE Secretariat out of the Bank *right now*. GPE does have an image problem, however, that is some way to being fixed with recent branding changes, but needs more work and fairly quickly. This will only happen if the GPE Board, the Secretariat and senior management in the Bank are committed to making it happen. If that commitment is not forthcoming and/or doesn’t deliver significant enhancements in performance, then it would appear wise to pursue an alternative path.

5.4 Looking further ahead, if GPE is to be seen as the catalyst and convenor of support for education at the global level it is going to need not just an enabling, supportive host (or separate organisational structure) but a strong value proposition and a step-up in operational leadership and performance (Box 1).
Box 1: Aid Reviews of FTI-GPE

The DFID Multilateral Aid Review (2011) ranks FTI/GPE as satisfactory overall with a strong focus on poor countries and value for money. Areas of weakness include: the lack of an aggregate results framework (now addressed), weak or inflexible supervising entities or donor groups at country level that can undermine delivery, recruitment processes that are slow and difficult and slow disbursement (but with signs of improvement), poor visibility on forward funding and costs of doing business. The MAR rates the likelihood of positive change as good.

The Australian Multilateral Assessment (2012) ranks GPE as being strong on contributing to the multilateral system, partnership behaviour and cost consciousness/value for money. GPE was rated satisfactory on strategic management and performance, transparency and accountability and delivering results. The weakest area was the monitoring and reporting of results.

5.5 The next section deals briefly with some of the issues that figures strongly throughout interviews relating to hosting but point to a wider set of concerns than those elaborated in Table 1. The final section makes a recommendation on the way forward.

6. ISSUES BEYOND HOSTING

6.1 Many of the issues that are often linked to hosting are actually not directly related to hosting (at least not in the administrative or financial sense) and point to wider performance challenges for GPE and the sector as a whole. The issues most frequently raised are:

6.2 Resource mobilisation – a common concern expressed by interested parties is that GPE is not raising the level of funding that other sector global programmes have done or are doing, particularly those in health. For instance, donors committed $11.7bn to GFATM for the period 2011-13 and $4.3bn additional for GAVI for 2011-15 while, in November 2011, GPE raised commitments of $1.5bn for 2011-14, against a target of $2bn and a global funding gap thought to be as large as $16bn. Crude comparisons of this kind are actually not helpful. Education is not like health in many important respects, although it would be churlish to deny any relevant comparison. But it does raise the question of whether it is GPE’s failing that not more resources are being mobilised for education globally or something that the sector has a whole has to take more responsibility for. Work done on the financing of basic education by Steer et al (2009) cites a wide number of contributing factors: from a lack of prioritisation and leadership from bilateral donors to the lack of a clear global champion for basic education, to weak evidence and advocacy, lack of partner demand and problems of absorptive capacity.

6.3 The upshot is that GPE alone cannot be held responsible for the funding gap, but it is certainly the case that it has not be as successful as it should have been in attracting new partner-funders (including those from the private sector) nor has the model of ‘crowding-in’ resources in support of education sector plans at country level worked sufficiently well. Both issues need to be addressed and can be through better positioning and attention to results (success attracts!) but neither is incompatible with the hosting arrangement with the World Bank. In fact, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), which is also a Financial Intermediary Fund in the Bank, was set up with two separate financing windows, one public sector the other private sector (managed out of IFC). The private sector window under GAFSP is slightly different from anything
GPE might want to put in place mainly because it receives funding from private firms to channel to *inter alia* private firms in partner countries. Nevertheless it means that there is no technical or administrative obstacle to attracting in private funders as long as the offer in joining in the pooled GPE fund is clear and convincing.

6.4 **IDA Displacement** – views on GPE’s resource mobilisation record are further compounded by the “IDA displacement problem”. The FTI Mid-Term Evaluation noted that one key concern voiced by interviewees both within and outside of the Bank was the risk of substitution by GPE funds of IDA education funding. Further evidence that IDA concessional lending is being routed elsewhere has recently been documented by RESULTS (2012) who find that of 28 country assistance strategies the majority have proposed that countries seek grant financing i.e. GPE funds, for education rather than IDA funds. The report also documents a more general shift away from Bank lending for basic education towards investments in vocational and higher education. This is a risk noted by the Bank itself in 2007 where it states that “Over the long term, the potential for substitution can pose a business risk for the Bank in key sectors” (WB 2007). There are, nevertheless, a number of issues that need disentangling and evidencing not just at the Bank-wide level but at the country level too. This is not the place to do this but questions that need addressing are:

- are partner countries making active choices to take grant rather than loan finance for basic education, hence selecting GPE funds and other bilateral funds over IDA?
- Is the limited number of ways in which the Bank can deliver IDA funds to the education sector – on budget but not as part of a sector budget support operation -more of a disincentive to taking on IDA than the terms themselves?
- are the priorities of IDA shifting away from basic education and, if so, is this well evidenced and how does it fit with the totality of funding in education?
- what can GPE do to encourage IDA investments ‘back into’ basic education and what is the potential for new aid instruments such as the Program for Results (P4R) in making IDA funds look more attractive at country level?

6.5 **Too few non-Bank supervising entities** - this is clearly a problem but one that says more about the reticence of other donor partners in coming forward to be supervising entities than it does of hosting per se. It also refers to the almost glacial speed with which the GPE Board has put in place an accreditation policy to broaden the range of accredited agencies that can act as supervising entities for it. The Bank has its due diligence to adhere to in relation to such a policy but other hosted global programmes, such as GFASP, started out life in the Bank with a much wider range of accredited SE’s and have sought to manage any potential conflict of interest by making those same SE’s non-voting members of the GFASP Board.

6.6 **Weak local education groups and CSO representativeness** – again a clear problem which is now well documented by the GPE Secretariat but not one that can be shown to flow directly from hosting (although there is no obvious counterfactual). That LEG’s have remained unrepresentative and weak is clearly very problematic for GPE’s model and has, to date, not had sufficient focus from a small and stretched Secretariat. With more capacity in the Secretariat’s country team this has begin to change but remains a key area for improvement in GPE’s performance whatever the

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decision on hosting, and could in fact be pivotal to any decision now or in the future for GPE to ‘go it alone’ (mainly because without strong LEG’s it is not clear what the coordinating mechanism will be for GPE at the country level).

7. OPTIONS FOR A WAY FORWARD – A SECRETARIAT IN THE BANK NOT OF THE BANK

7.1 At a time when there is a huge requirement on GPE to step-up its performance to meet EFA goals and engage positively in laying the foundations for a post-2015 agenda, it would seem to be particularly risky to be considering a major transition to a new organisational structure. While there is clear and understandable impatience from some quarters at the speed at which GPE and GPE funds are working on the ground (Brown et al 2012) it would be wrong to then jump to the conclusion that hosting is entirely at fault and that by changing it everything else, from more resources, to greater speed and more inclusiveness, would be fixed.

7.2 What this report has sought to do is demonstrate that just as GPE cannot claim all the successes in the progress that has been made towards EFA goals, neither can it be blamed for all the failings and shortcomings. Delving into the detail on costs and benefits shows that many of the perceived costs of GPE’s current arrangement are actually not directly or strictly about hosting, and those that are are either already improving or improvable (within limits).

7.3 In the final analysis deciding a way forward is a judgement but one that definitely needs to be made to counter uncertainty and the potential risk of a disorderly and costly transition. The way forward proposed here does not accept that maintaining the status quo ante is a sufficient response to the range of concerns that exist. However neither does it accept that there is sufficient evidence, to suggest that hosting on its own is inhibiting the delivery of GPE’s mission. Hosting has its limitations but it also provides GPE with a significant degree of global access and positioning, wide-ranging technical knowledge and knowledge exchange and a country infrastructure that is at the heart of the current GPE model. If a decision to move out was taken then fundamental aspects of this model would need to be changed. As one interviewee put it “it is hard to imagine GPE as independent with the same model.” There is much more to be done to improve GPE in its current organisational form. If change is not forthcoming within a reasonable time frame then there is probably a case for taking a different route and “re-imagining” what GPE can be as an independent global entity.

7.4 With this in mind the proposed way forward involves two options or stages. The options as presented can be either/or , or treated sequentially but the strong recommendation from this report is that stage one is critical to provide GPE with the space to perform better and avoid substantial transitional costs, especially at a time when donor resources are relatively tight.

7.5 Option/Stage One: Stage one is termed ‘status quo plus’ and builds on the view that hosting is not the binding constraint for GPE but that changes are required to meet the performance test of 2012 and beyond. Changes are important at a number of levels covering vision and leadership to operational performance, that would need to have clear performance criteria attached and take place over a clearly bounded timeframe.

7.6 Option/Stage Two: Stage two is termed the ‘fresh-start’ and is triggered if the required amount of change is not forthcoming from stage one. At the core of this option is the creation of an
independent Secretariat/legal entity to support GPE with significant changes to the operational model to accommodate a different set of working relationships amongst partners and between funders and supervising entities.

7.7 Areas that would constitute features of stage one and two are presented below. If the approach recommended here is followed stage one in particular will need to be worked up in some detail with a clear statement of ‘what success looks like’ along with a set of performance benchmarks, timelines and an implementation plan.

**Status Quo Plus**

7.8 *Improving the performance of GPE inside the Bank:*

- More senior leadership of the Secretariat
- A clearer statement of roles and responsibilities between the Secretariat, the Board and Bank management, supported by the possible establishment of an Executive Committee of the Board to improve decision-making speed.
- A decision-making role for the Board chair in performance managing/recruiting senior leadership in the Secretariat
- Agreement with the relevant sector board that only 1 short listed candidate per GPE term/LTC post should be internal to the Bank (except for fiduciary mgmt positions)
- Agreement on a cap for staff recruited from within the Bank into the Secretariat i.e. ‘no revolving door’.
- Agreement on a modus operandi for sole source/non-competitive bidding (for Secretariat specific purposes) up to a maximum financial threshold.

7.9 *Improving operational performance at country level:*

- More independent technical input (such as an independent technical advisory committee to the Board as under GAFSP – Box 2)
- An urgent accreditation process for non-Bank supervising entities with streamlined fiduciary requirements
- Agreement that the Bank will deploy its latest ‘Program 4 Results (P4R)’ modalities where it is the supervising entity (which allows for the use of country systems & the co-mingling of funds)
- More active Secretariat support to Local Education Groups, greater representativeness & support for innovative partnerships

7.10 Clear performance criteria and benchmarks would need to be set with clear time frames for these steps to be taken and implemented. If, after sufficient elapsed time change is not forthcoming then a decision should be made to start preparing for option/stage two.
**Box 2: The Technical Advisory Committee under GAFSP**

The TAC was established to provide advice on Proposals to the Steering Committee for the public sector window (the closest to the GPE fund). Its members (up to 12 appointed by the Steering Committee) are selected based on a high level of experience and technical expertise in agriculture and food security issues. The TAC is responsible for: (a) providing due diligence to the Steering Committee to ensure the Proposals are consistent with the objectives, modalities and procedures of the Trust Fund and that Allocations to countries and regional organisations are for activities within the purpose of the Trust Fund; (b) screening country and regional applications for funds according to key criteria (c) informing the Steering Committee whether Proposals meet the eligibility criteria for Proposals and (d) recommending on indicative allocations of support through selected Supervising Entities. Members of the coordinating unit of GAFSP are not members of the TAC and do not get involved in any of the recommendations made by the TAC. While GAFSP and GPE are different to one another in important respects the role of an independent committee in exercising both due diligence on behalf of the Board and making objective recommendations on Proposals for funding and eventual allocations does add a level of objectivity that could be of considerable value to GPE.

*Source: GAFSP Governance Document – Adopted May 14, 2010*

**Stage Two – a fresh start**

7.11 The timing of the decision to move to stage two would be delicate with the 2015 deadline approaching and another GPE replenishment round planned for 2014. Given the potential risks to ongoing operations it would be sensible to flesh out and plan the approach in parallel for the initial period before committing to a timetable for change.

7.12 **Establishing an independent entity**

- A fully independent administrative body will require separate legal status (i.e. in Geneva or other domestic jurisdiction willing to provide the required ‘international status’ to staff). This is not hard to do but will require significant legal input & 12 months minimum.

- Note, both the Global Fund and GAVI had legal entity status before they transitioned from their hosts.

- Trusteeship should remain with the World Bank (alternatives exist but are unlikely to be warranted in the circumstances)

7.13 **.....and re-imagining the operational model**

- A more diverse, activist partnership using their positioning to leverage more funds and more influence for GPE

20 An important finding in the GRPP evaluation is that: “in almost every case, IEG found that changing the location of the organisation had a negative impact on the program’s efficiency during the transition” (63)

21 There are potentially many more radical options that could be considered here but are not worked up at this stage.
• Larger/stronger/more diverse Local Education Groups that provide country level coordination of all GPE resources and play a significant role in country-level resource mobilisation.

• Independent scrutiny of GPE grants

• Extensive use of non-governmental channels for managing funds in difficult environments.

• Innovative models for partnering, delivering funds and incentivising change should be at the heart of the GPE model, with quicker disbursement, more piloting and stronger use of the best evidence for delivering improved outcomes (this applies in stage 1 also)

Risks and Rewards

7.14 Stage 1 does not impose significant additional costs, except for those associated with establishing the new committees and negotiating a new Agreement with the host. The rewards are significant in terms of continuity, giving time for reforms to take hold and focusing time and energy on improving performance instead of ‘moving the chairs around’

7.15 The main risks are that:

• The proposed changes will not generate the desired improvements in strategic leadership and performance

• The partners do not rally behind a strong global agenda for GPE and hence administrative changes have little chance of making a difference

• Uncertainty over independence and identity continues to ‘blight’ GPE’s status as a global champion

7.16 It is virtually impossible at this stage to fully cost stage 2 – it depends hugely on the location, the potential for in-kind support, the costs of winding down the current arrangement and future plans around staffing etc. But the set up costs will be significant. The biggest rewards are essentially those of ‘rewriting the rule book’ with a chance for GPE to design from scratch the organisational and governance structure it needs to deliver in a rapidly changing and increasingly demanding context.

7.17 The main risks are:

• The GPE fails to rally behind the new model and the opportunity to seize the global agenda is taken over by events linked to post-2015

• Transition is disorderly, costs escalate & GPE loses reputation as a result

• Measures put in place to retain and relocate staff do not hold and GPE suffers a major short term staffing crisis

• Traditional donor partners reduce their contributions to GPE, concerned about value for money
8. CONCLUSION

8.1 At the end of the review it is clear that there is a lot of complexity and a lot of heated debate about GPE’s contribution and future, and the role of the Secretariat. As already indicated, calls for GPE to be more ambitious and more of a global champion for basic education are well taken. There is a space to be grabbed internationally to show leadership in this area and GPE should be a serious contender in that space. But issues still remain about the precise role and expectation of the Secretariat – is it the advocate and champion, or is that the role of the Partnership? Is it the challenge function within the Bank? Or is it the administrative unit for managing funds at country level? Where does the Partnership need to step up and where does the Secretariat need to improve on its efficiency and effectiveness? The logic that, because GPE is hosted by the Bank it cannot be a global leader, nor can it play a role in mobilising further resources needed to address the financing gap in education, is not borne out by the evidence and is, in the authors view, a leap too far.

8.2 With a clear vision and strong leadership from this most unique of global partnerships much more can be done to tap into the resources of partner countries and new actors, as well as more traditional funders and partners. What the GPE Secretariat needs now is some certainty to get on with the job. If a decision to transition out of the hosting arrangement with the Bank is made some time in the future it needs to be done positively and on the basis of a re-imagined partnership and operational model. While GPE has an operating model that is in part borne out of its relationship with the Bank, being IN the Bank does not mean it has to operate or appear to operate OF the Bank. This is the critical difference and an opportunity to be seized in the coming months.
REFERENCES


Isenam, Paul (2009) *mimeo*


Concept Note
A rapid review of hosting arrangements for the Global Partnership for Education

January 2012

OBJECTIVE
To conduct a high-level rapid review of hosting arrangements for the Global Partnership for Education (Global Partnership), including the possibility of structural independence from the World Bank. The review will assess the cost, resource, and legal requirements for alternative hosting arrangements including establishing the Global Partnership as a separate entity, drawing on lessons learned from other sectors e.g., health.

RELEVANCE
The Global Partnership is the only global grant-making partnership between donors and developing countries, civil society organizations, the private sector and private foundations and multilateral institutions focussed on improving education outcomes in the world’s poorest countries. Following an evaluation of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative in 2009, reforms were introduced to streamline governance and funding arrangements, and strengthen the Secretariat. The recent changes in the structure of the Board of Directors and trust fund management provide a strong governance basis for the further evolution of the Global Partnership.

The recent Copenhagen Replenishment Pledging Conference (November 2011) raised more than US$5.5 billion in new funds for education over the next three years including new commitments from developing country partners. Pledges included US$1.5 billion to the Global Partnership’s multi-donor fund. The Global Partnership expects a further US$500 million over the next year, taking the replenishment of the fund to a total of US$2 billion. While the replenishment event marked an important step forward in the Global Partnership reform process, a number of donors, civil society groups and high-profile supporters of the Global Partnership are advocating for deeper reform.

A number of commentators maintain that deep reform is essential and that the Global Partnership is not fit for the purpose of facilitating an accelerated drive toward the 2015 goals. One of the perceived major barriers to reform is a reliance on World Bank management and administrative structures. World Bank systems in areas such as commitment limit the scope for Board decisions on priorities to be translated into an appropriate staffing structure, and for flexible responses to emerging challenges and opportunities. The proposal to seek a Chief Executive Officer highlights some of these issues. Essentially, the Global Partnership is not a legal entity and therefore it suffers from dual governance, as the Secretariat is accountable to both the Global Partnership Board of Directors and the World Bank Board.

Several options for alternative hosting arrangements have been proposed by commentators over the past year. They generally posit three broad possibilities: a partnership whose Secretariat continues to be hosted by the World Bank, hosting the Secretariat in a different organization or establishing the Global Partnership as a stand-alone separate legal entity (either as a private foundation or a new international organization) with its own staff.

Recognising that more substantial reform is needed, the Board of Directors has agreed to a high-level rapid review of hosting arrangements for the Global Partnership to explore options including independence from the World Bank. The review will be conducted in early 2012. The review will inform the development of a Strategic Plan (2012 – 2013), to be presented to the Board of Directors in June 2012. The Strategic Plan will consider the Global Partnership’s institutional governance arrangements more broadly.

SCOPE OF THE REVIEW
Taking into account recent discussions by the Board of Directors, the review will explore two hosting scenarios: (i) retaining the Secretariat within the World Bank; and (ii) repositioning the Global Partnership as a separate entity. The review will be informed by, and inform analysis currently being conducted by the Brookings Institution, the Secretariat and other relevant organisations as well as draw on the evaluation conducted in 2009 and lessons from other sectors e.g., health (GAVI and GFATM). The trade-
offs/implications for each scenario, especially the cost, jurisdiction and administrative ramifications of establishing a separate entity, will be considered as part of the review.

The review will be guided by the following broad issues:

- **Detailed assessment of hosting scenarios for the Global Partnership**, including
  
  (i) *Scenario 1: continued hosting within the World Bank structure*, taking into consideration the reform directions envisioned by the Board of Directors. Effective action on this scenario would take into consideration the World Bank’s institutional capacity to support intended reform of the Global Partnership including, for example, the appointment of a high-level Chief Executive Officer to lead the Secretariat.
  
  (ii) *Scenario 2: establishing a separate entity independent of the World Bank*, either hosted within another organization or as a stand-alone entity.

- **The detailed transitional requirements for each scenario**, recognising that there would be trade-offs/implications for each scenario including: (i) anticipated timeframes; (ii) cost implications; (iii) the possible geographic location of the Secretariat and jurisdiction of the proposed separate legal entity (which may depend on the willingness of a country to provide the Global Partnership and the Secretariat staff privileges and immunities; (iv) impact on the Global Partnership’s continued operations (including trustee arrangements and IT requirements); and (v) legal ramifications (including legal status and issues related to the effect on Secretariat staff employment contracts and the ability to obtain privileges and immunities for the partnership and the Secretariat staff (including tax exemptions)).

- **Recommendations for a way forward** including timeframes, resourcing and institutional requirements.

**APPROACH**

The review will be led by an eminent person with expertise in global development architecture reform and ODA effectiveness issues. The review team will consist of at least two other persons with financial/legal expertise and experience in institutional reform and change management issues. The review will be conducted in consultation with the Board appointed Task Team. The review will draw on international evidence and, where relevant, practical examples from other organisations, donors and aid actors.

**OUTPUTS**

The review will be presented in a Working Paper of approximately 15-20 pages in length (plus annexes). The paper will be considered by all Board members, the Secretariat and other relevant World Bank staff. The paper will inform the preparation of the Strategic Plan and associated implementation plan and budget to be presented to the Board in May 2012.

**TIMING**

It is proposed that the Working Paper be drafted by the mid March 2012 for discussion with Board members and the Secretariat and finalised by the end of March in preparation for the next face-to-face meeting of the Board of Directors anticipated to be held in June 2012. The paper will draw on analytical work already undertaken or underway in areas of specific relevance to the review.

Following discussions with the Board, the Secretariat and the World Bank the review lead may be approached to cooperate on further analysis to inform implementation of the review’s recommendations. Other donors and organisations could be engaged in subsequent analysis.

**FUNDING**

Costs associated with preparing the Working Paper will be met by the Secretariat, Chair and/or donors of the Global Partnership.