Summative GPE country program evaluation

Batch 4, Country 9: Republic of South Sudan

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT | MAY 2019

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RESULTS FOR DEVELOPMENT

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Acknowledgements

The evaluation team[1] hereby wishes to express its gratitude to all stakeholders who have been involved in and supported this evaluation, in particular the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI) of the Republic of South Sudan, and specifically its Undersecretary at the time of our visit, the Hon. Michael Lopuke Lotyam. We are also grateful to staff of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), of the UNICEF office in Juba, and of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) Secretariat for their assistance throughout the assignment. Finally, we are grateful to anyone who took the time to meet with us, in Juba or virtually.

The following, final version of the report was completed in April of 2019. As per the agreed process for these summative reports, feedback on draft versions of this report was solicited from the GPE Secretariat; from members of the GPE Independent Technical Review Panel (ITRP); and from members of the South Sudanese equivalent of a Local Education Group (LEG), including MoGEI, the education sector Coordinating Agency (CA), and GPE Grant Agents (GA). All feedback received was considered by the evaluation team and, as appropriate, incorporated into this final version. Any remaining mistakes and inaccuracies are ours.

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[1] The Juba mission was led by Mr. Dale E. Thompson, accompanied by Mr. Lorenzo Daieff and Mr. Hakim Monykuer Awuok. The overall team leader for the consortium is Dr. Marie-Hélène Adrien. Quality-assurance was conducted by Dr. Anette Wenderoth. Supporting contributions to this report were made by Ms. Natalie Martin.

Executive Summary

Evaluation purpose and approach

This evaluation is part of a larger study of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) that comprises 30 country level evaluations (CLE). The overall study runs from 2017 until 2020. It aims to assess (i) GPE contributions to strengthening national education systems and, ultimately, education results related to learning, equity, equality and inclusion; and hence (ii) the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of GPE's theory of change (ToC) and country-level operational model. The assessment is based on a theory-based, mixed social science research methodology known as contribution analysis.

This study was conducted between October 2018 and April 2019 and covered GPE support to the Republic of South Sudan from 2012 to 2018. It draws on document, database and literature review, as well as on consultations with a total of 58 governmental, multilateral, bilateral, academic, school-level, and non-governmental stakeholders in Juba or virtually.

Education sector context

The Republic of South Sudan emerged in 2011 from decades of conflict as the world's newest independent country and has an estimated population of about 12 million, with half under 18 years of age. In late 2013, a political power struggle and ethnic tensions resulted in civil war. A 'revitalized' settlement signed in September 2018 may offer a resolution to the crisis, but after seven years of civil war, South Sudan remains in a large humanitarian crisis.

South Sudan has operated its own, largely autonomous education system since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, before its attainment of independence in 2011. Today, the education sector falls under the purview of two federal ministries: the Ministry for General Education and Instruction (MoGEI), and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology (MoHEST).

The country had a school-aged population of 3.7 million children in 2018, growing at a rate of roughly four percent per year. There was a total of over 6000 schools nationwide in 2017, including both government and non-government schools, of which 4000 primary schools. In 2016, roughly 60 percent of schools were governmental, and 40 percent were non-governmental (run by communities, NGOs, faith-based groups, or for-profit providers).

Since independence, South Sudan has developed two General Education Strategic Plans (GESPs) to guide the sector: GESP I (2012-2017) and GESP II (2017-2022). **This evaluation focuses on the period from the ratification of GESP I in 2012 through to the late 2018 approval of a second ESPIG, therefore including (parts of) two GESPs and two ESPIGs.**

Several important implications from South Sudan's context arise, including: (i) the very high level of insecurity in the country, resulting in difficulties in providing government services; (ii) the recent increase by executive order of the number of states in South Sudan, resulting in significant diminution of the already nominal level of subnational public sector capacity; (iii) the weak and oil-dependent economy, resulting in a lack of means to expand domestic levels of investment on the part of the government; (iv) the country's very young population, which puts a substantial stress on the education system; and (v) the ongoing humanitarian crisis which results in the provision of public services, including education, being divided between weak national systems, administered by under-resourced states, and systems of humanitarian support that operate in parallel.

GPE in South Sudan

South Sudan joined the Global Partnership for Education in 2012 and is represented on the Board through the Africa 3 constituency. As of early 2019, South Sudan has received four grants from GPE: one Education Sector Plan Development Grant (ESPDG) and three Education Sector Plan Implementation Grant (ESPIGs), one of which was provided under GPE's Accelerated Funding Framework (AFF) for support in emergency and early recovery situations. UNICEF, as the grant agent (GA) for all ESPIGs, also received a Program Development Grant (PDG) in 2018 for the preparation of the 2019-2021 ESPIG. The main review period of this evaluation encompasses the 2013-2018 ESPIG (US$36.1m), which co-funded the Global Partnership for Education Programme (GPEP) in South Sudan with USAID.

GPE contributions to sector planning

State of sector planning in South Sudan, 2012-2018

Both GESPs meet the basic GPE/International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) quality standards. Both plan development processes were reasonably government-led and –owned. Both processes were also participatory and involved state-level stakeholders to the best of their abilities, as well as other stakeholders. Planning processes for both GESPs included and drew upon comprehensive ESAs.

Despite this, however, the depth and breadth of analysis for the selection and justification of strategies, the results framework, the action plan, the financial projections and other elements were limited in both GESPs. This is attributed to (a) low starting capacities in terms of sector planning in South Sudan, (b) the rushed nature of both plan development processes, and (c) the incomplete participation of key donors in both processes. GESP II is of moderately higher

quality than GESP I in terms of (a) receiving higher GPE quality ratings, (b) including an improved action plan, and (c) having better alignment between the action plan for activities and the donor funding gap.

GPE contributions to sector planning

During the 2012-2018 period, **GPE ESPIG funding requirements provided a major incentive for the development of both GESPs.** The announcement of a GPE allocation to South Sudan galvanized the planning process for GESP I, and the prospect of a second ESPIG was an important motivation for the development of the GESP II. **GPE support to Education Sector Analyses (ESAs) via an ESPDG** in 2016 was also significant in contributing to the quality and timeliness of ESA/ESP processes for the development of GESP II.

GPE's new Quality Assurance Review (QAR) contributed to improvements in the GESP II. There is no evidence, however, that GESP II development learned from limitations of the GESP I development process. Lessons from GESP I are not explicitly noted in the ESA, the ESP, the appraisal, Secretariat comments, JSR reports, or other relevant documents.

Implications for GPE

Firstly, in capacity-constrained environments such as South Sudan, there may be a trade-off between between good planning processes (i.e. being country-led, generating government ownership, and building domestic planning capacities) and good planning documents (i.e. being complete, accurate, coherent, evidence-based, and achievable).

Secondly, two components of GPE's new QAR process for ESPs—the initial GPE Secretariat comments and the independent appraisal—both complemented and to some extent duplicated each other. This may be due to the fact that two sets of feedback were provided at close interval, with Secretariat comments shared one month before the appraisal report.

GPE contributions to sector dialogue and monitoring

State of sector dialogue and monitoring in South Sudan

Sector dialogue in South Sudan happens through a multiplicity of fora with partly overlapping composition and mandates. While the National Education Forum (NEF) is noted in the GESPs as serving as the country's equivalent of a Local Education Group (LEG), it has in practice become an annual event that coincides with the annual Joint Sector Review (JSR). Regular sector dialogue has largely taken place within the Education Donor Group (EDoG), despite the fact that it is not chaired by MoGEI.

Evidence of knowledge-sharing, coordination, and collaboration between fora is mixed, with a divide among humanitarian and development actors limiting the awareness among stakeholders of what was going on in other fora.

Sector monitoring in South Sudan centers on the annual JSRs. However, these JSRs only partially meet GPE quality standards. Sector monitoring is complicated by incomplete data coverage for most years due to conflict.

GPE contributions to sector dialogue and monitoring

During the review period GPE supported existing country-led mechanisms for sector dialogue and monitoring through:

- **ESPDG funding in 2015** which supported two-thirds of the costs of the 2016 ESA, a key data reference for the sector and the GESP II development process.

- **ESPIG 2013-2018 funding** which supported annual JSRs (2014-2017), EMIS (2015, 2016 and 2018), and the development of MoGEI's Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) policy;

- **Secretariat country leads (CLs) coordination** of key development donors, commissioning

of a sectoral "lessons learned" exercise in 2017, and mediation of conversations between the grant agent (UNICEF) and MoGEI;

Overall, while GPE has been able to assist some processes/mechanisms for sector dialogue and monitoring, this has not visibly changed the nature or extent of mutual accountability, which remains fragmented and unsystematic.

Implications for GPE

In crisis contexts such as South Sudan, country-level actors who are expected to play a crucial role in GPE's country-level operational model (such as developing country partner (DCP) governments, LEGs and CAs) may be too stretched to support sector-wide processes.

GPE contributions to sector financing

State of sector financing in South Sudan, 2012-2018

Government spending on education in South Sudan is low (below 4 percent of total government expenditure for 2011-2017), and collapsed along with national oil revenues and hyperinflation in 2013 and 2017. Actual disbursements often lag far behind approved (voted) budgets. Moreover:

- The GoSS has not been able to maintain its anticipated support to GESP 2012-2017, and funding gaps have been larger than the worst-case gaps anticipated in the plan;

- Sectoral expenditures are concentrated on salaries, but with the collapse of government oil revenue post-2016, salaries of both officials and teachers have not been paid regularly and have lost value due to hyperinflation.

In contrast, education Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased significantly over the 2012-2018 review period, more than doubling in inflation-adjusted terms, from US$49m in 2011

to US$129m in 2017. Despite this, the quality and predictability of education ODA was limited over the course of the 2012-2018 review period, due largely to the ongoing crisis, as donor projects were repeatedly interrupted, closed entirely or re-packaged from development to humanitarian funding. International financing for education has become segmented between humanitarian and development programming, and is not strongly aligned to government systems or the GESP I.

GPE contributions to sector financing (domestic and ODA)

GPE's greatest contribution to sector financing in the 2012-2018 period was its own ESPIG. GPE's ESPIG 2013-2018 of US$36.1m provided six percent of total sector ODA and fifteen percent of non-humanitarian basic education ODA in 2012-2017 period (latest data).

GPE is also noted as having been one of the most stable and aligned donors in the period. GPE was one of only two major donors to not interrupt programming in South Sudan. It continued to support development activities aligned to GESP I when most donors moved to humanitarian funds. It thereby provided MoGEI with much-needed stability and predictability. In that regard, GPE's systems to support work in emergency contexts proved relevant and valuable, by enabling South Sudan to access:

- **More funding,** through the enhanced Maximum Country Allowance (MCA) formula for Fragile & Conflict-Affected Countries (FCAC)

- **Faster funding,** through GPE's Accelerated Funding Framework (AFF) funds of US$6m in 2018/19, which allowed the country to bridge a funding gap caused by delays in its most recent ESPIG application

- **Flexible funding,** through GPE's operational framework tor support to FCAC, which allowed country-level actors to change ESPIG budget lines and target activities to fit South Sudan's evolving crisis context.

However, overall, the ESPIG was modest relative to overall sector funding, only amounting to two percent of sector funding in the review period, when accounting for domestic government and household funds. Moreover, GPE was neither able to move the needle on domestic financing, given the adverse context, nor able to influence the quality (e.g. harmonization) of the overall ODA landscape.

Implications for GPE

Whilst various GPE mechanisms had little influence on domestic funds in 2012-2018, a DFID program (GESS) successfully mobilized MoGEI co-funding during the same period. GESS' approach exemplifies strategies to influence domestic financing which could complement GPE's current approaches. Of note, GPE's most recent ESPIG (2019-2021) outlines a MoGEI commitments to co-fund programming, though it is not clear to what extent these sums are re-statements of existing commitments or new funding leveraged/secured by this ESPIG.

In South Sudan, GPE's influence over donor harmonization was weak, despite occasional donor discussions about a pooled fund. **The current GPE country-level operational model does not appear to provide strong mechanisms to exercise influence over other donors.**

GPE contributions to sector plan implementation

State of sector plan implementation in South Sudan, 2012-2018

Designed in times of peace, GESP I was never implemented in times of war. Conflict that lasted the full duration of its implementation period undermined the plan's relevance (due to changed context), feasibility (due to conflict-related access and implementation challenges), and financing (due to the collapse of the GoSS's oil revenues, and the diversion of international financing to humanitarian activities). Most

factors inhibiting GESP I implementation have also affected early GESP II implementation.

GPE contributions to sector plan implementation

GPE's ESPIG 2013-2018 co-funded the Global Partnership for Education Program (GPEP) in South Sudan, along with USAID (until the latter's withdrawal in 2016). **Both ESPIG funds and the GPEP were explicitly aligned to GESP I and maintained support throughout South Sudan's crisis,** despite the repurposing of ESPIG funds several times during implementation due to the evolving context. Details of GPEP components, budget and achievements against GESP I strategic objectives are summarized as follows:

- **Focus areas:** GPEP components supported four GESP strategic goals: access, quality, adult literacy and sector management

- **Budget:** The ESPIG budget funded or co-funded activities under "access" (school construction, US$13m), quality (US$10m), sector management (US$7m), adult literacy (US$1m), and other costs (US$5m). USAID co-funded selected activities until 2016.

- **Performance:** GPEP failed to achieve half (three out of six) of its outcome indicator targets, namely, raising learning outcomes, improving school leadership, and limiting school dropouts. It did, however, achieve targets for improving school supervision, total enrolment in GPEP schools, and generating two GPEP implementation models for the rest of the sector.

GPEP's mixed performance was due to the outbreak of civil war in 2013 and evolving conflict situation thereafter, which affected the government's ability to control and administer education in large parts of the country, and led to USAID's withdrawal from GPEP in 2016.

Though individual ESPIG contributions were significant, the grant provided only a small part of (actual and required) sector funding. Whilst the ESPIG ultimately delivered some important achievements (e.g. a new curriculum), GPE's

financial contributions was overall too small to be able to move the needle in a sector with great need, and there is no evidence that it influenced other actors' support for the, by then, largely ignored sector plan (except USAID as GPEP co-funder, 2013-2016).

Implications for GPE

Plan implementation is a central element of how the GPE's ToC conceptualizes GPE's contribution to system- and impact-level change. Like in other crisis contexts, the case of South Sudan raises the question of how GPE envisions its contribution to change when a plan is overtaken by unexpected events. The current GPE country-level theory of change does not outline how GPE envisions its contributions to sector systems and impact to be channeled when plan implementation is impossible.

Country-level stakeholders expressed concerns about several aspects of the new ESPIG QAR processes regarding the increased level of effort, particularly for ministry staff, increased data requirements, lack of clarity on feedback source and criteria, lack of clarity on GPE funding eligibility, and the rushed nature of ESPIG consultations. However, stakeholders welcomed GPE's waiving of the variable tranche requirement for the ESPIG 2018-2021.

Factors other than GPE contributions affecting change

Factors that positively influenced change in the above described areas included (i) the financial and/or technical contributions of several other donors to planning processes, coordination-related activities and implementation of many sectoral activities outlined in the sector plan; (ii) the experience of UNESCO/IIEP as an ESPDG grant agent (2015-2017) with supporting planning processes; (iii) the relative stability in MoGEI leadership; and (iv) the large increase in sector ODA, albeit in response to a severe crisis.

Factors that negatively affected change include (i) the general low starting level of capacities and

resources of the GoSS; (ii) the acute conflict and crisis situation between 2013 and 2018; (iii) the dire fiscal situation of the GoSS which meant that only activities directly funded by donors were implemented; (iv) the incomplete control of the GoSS over its national territory; and (v) concerns about accountability, which made almost donors hesitant to fund the GoSS directly, limiting the scope for alignment.

Unintended results of GPE support

The evaluation did not register evidence of significant unintended positive or negative consequences of GPE support in South Sudan. There was no evidence that GPE support displaced other support, domestic or otherwise.

System level change

Main trends

During the 2012-2018 period, South Sudan undertook efforts to strengthen several aspects of the education system. However, most of these efforts could not be properly implemented, or proved inconsequential in the face of war and fiscal collapse. System-level changes (positive and negative) include:

- **Lower demand for schooling** due to insecurity, displacement and accentuated poverty due to war and inflation);

- **Lower supply of primary schools** as the number of primary classrooms did not keep pace with population growth and due to conflict-related school closures;

- **Abolition of school fees and introduction of capitation grants** sent directly to schools through a system set up with DFID support;

- **Provision of free school meals** to an average of 300,000 students (roughly 20 percent of total) in 2012-2016 by WFP;

- **Increase in number of ECD centers and secondary schools**, by as much as 40 percent

during the review period, fueled by urban non-governmental providers;

- **Development of policies on equitable access** in 2014 on girls' access and inclusive education, though there is little evidence of their implementation to date.

- DFID's GESS program launched **cash transfers for all girls from primary five to secondary four in not-for-profit schools in 2013**. Between 2013 and 2017, 200,000 girls received at least one cash transfer (CT).

- **Development of new curricula,** especially the new South Sudan 'master' curriculum as planned under GESP 2012-2017, funded principally by GPE;

- **Restructuring of MoGEI** approved in 2015, though only partly implemented to date;

- **New sector coordination manual** prepared in 2013 by MoGEI with DFID support;

- **EMIS data-collection, which started in 2007, was maintained** during most of the 2012-2018 review period, though with gaps and limited data on GESP I implementation;

- IMPACT (EU) funded the **set-up of a biometric Human Resource Information System (HRIS)** to register, process and monitor teachers and their pay in 2017.

There has been a lack of system-level change, however, in the following ways:

- **Little progress on special needs,** as there is no evidence that access to education improved for children with special needs.

- **Lack of change in availability of teachers** as partial data suggests pupil-teacher ratios, and shares of female teachers at best remained stable between 2011 and 2016;

- **No system-level progress in ensuring and improving teacher quality**, as almost all Teacher Training Institutes (TTIs) were closed during most of the 2012-2018 review period due to conflict and lack of funding;

- **No progress in the availability of teaching and learning materials**, as the primary pupil-

to-textbook ratio did not improve beyond 4:1 between 2011 and 2015;

Finally, state- and county-level management capacities deteriorated, due to the vast increase in the number of states and counties since independence due to presidential decrees. Subnational education offices lack office space, electricity, data collection systems, vehicles, capacities, and staff.

Likely links between sector plan implementation and system level change

During the 2012-2018 review period, the decisive factor for whether a system-level improvement happened was not whether it was listed in the original sector plan, but whether it was backed by donor funding, which itself was rarely plan-based. Less than a third of system-level changes are likely to have been principally driven by sector plan implementation. Almost half of the most notable system-level changes have no relation to plan implementation. Two thirds of system changes relied largely or fully on donor funding.

Implications for GPE

Most shortcomings of the education system in South Sudan are squarely whole-of-government challenges, rather than sectoral issues. Yet, few education sector efforts during the review period took a cross-sectoral lens. The **GPE ToC allows for the influence of 'external factors' but does not systematically recognize 'state capacity' as a driver of 'sector capacity'.**

Learning outcomes and equity

Changes in learning outcomes, equity and gender equality

Education access, inclusion and efficiency, as well as learning outcomes deteriorated, or at best stagnated during the review period.

Primary enrolment declined between 2011 and 2015 (from 1.4m to 1.25m) but increased again to a record 1.55m in 2017. However, growth in enrollment did not keep up with annual growth in the population of school-age (four percent). **The total number of school-aged children (6-17) out of school** rose from an estimated 1.9m in 2011 to 2.2m in 2018 and is on track to rise to 2.4m by 2020. **School life expectancy (primary and secondary combined)** dropped from six years in 2011 to five years in 2015.

Learning outcomes, as measured through DFID learning assessments for Primary 5, Primary 8 and Secondary 2 levels, were stable between 2014 and 2016, but dropped (slightly) in 2018, for both girls and boys, and both literacy and numeracy, in all three grades.

Despite this overall stagnation or deterioration of learning outcomes, **some positive changes were also noted**. These include:

- **Share of out-of-school children:** the percentage of school-aged children (6-17) out of school declined slightly during the review period, from 64 percent in 2011 to 60 percent in 2018

- **Gender equality in all indicators**: GPI values improved, modestly, across the board, e.g. for OOSC rates (GPI of 1.3 in 2011, GPI of 1.15 in 2015), as well as GER at all levels.

- **Pre-primary enrollment**: pre-primary enrollment doubled over the course of the period in absolute numbers (56k 2011, 120k 2017), as well as in GER (5.8 percent 2011, 10.3 percent 2015)

- **Secondary enrollment**: enrollment doubled in absolute numbers (44k 2011, 90k 2017), but grew only modestly in GER (9.1 percent 2011, 9.9 percent 2015). The number of pupils sitting the secondary leaving examination, however, quadrupled (1,4k in 2012 to 7,7k in 2016/17)

Likely links to observed system level changes

Improvement in gender equality across indicators is likely to have been supported by **nationwide cash transfers for girls**, particularly in supporting girls' attendance and retention at the upper primary and secondary level. Another factor that may have supported gender equality improvements were **school feeding** programs, which included specific incentives for girls.

Capitation grants are likely to have supported growth in secondary enrollment, along with growth in the number of secondary schools, driven by private, NGO or faith-based providers.

However, most system-level improvements have not yet contributed to impact-level improvements, due primarily to the fact that several system-level changes have not yet been fully rolled out (e.g. new curriculum, new supervision system, new ministry structure). Furthermore, of the three system-level changes that contributed most to impact-level changes (capitation grants, cash transfers, school feeding), only school feeding was partly driven by plan implementation. **System-level changes that were most directly linked to sector plan implementation (e.g. curriculum development, EMIS capacity) have not yet made a clear contribution to impact-level changes.**

Implications for GPE

Though system-level changes designed to promote access had the clearest links to impact-level changes during the 2012-2018 period, increasing enrollment in a context of fixed or decreasing number of operational schools and teachers has cause schools to overflow, particularly in urban centers. In this light, GPE's ESPIG's focus on improving teaching and learning was relevant in South Sudan. The latest ESPIG encouragingly accentuates this emphasis.

Conclusions/ Overall observations

GPE contributions

In sum, GPE support has made positive contributions to sector planning and sector monitoring, and to a lesser extent, to sector dialogue. Available evidence does not show that GPE has made strong contributions to better sector plan implementation, or to more and better financing for the education sector.

GPE's ToC assumes that system- and impact-level changes are caused by sector plan implementation. This was not the case in South Sudan, where system- and impact-level changes had limited links to plan implementation. In general, most GPE ToC assumptions did not fully hold in South Sudan.

This CLE validates the relevance of GPE's Operational Framework for Support to FCAC, as well as of its Accelerated Funding Framework. These mechanisms allowed GPE to both maintain its overall support envelope, and to support the restructuring of specific ESPIG components as the context evolved. Despite this, neither capacity development nor fragility considerations are as of yet mainstreamed into GPE guidance and operations, which at times limited the relevance of GPE's model.

GPE remains a unique education sector partner in that it relies on a set of sector-wide actors – DCP, LEG, CA – to design and implement its support. One challenge for GPE's country-level operational model in South Sudan was that, despite noted GPE contributions to sector dialogue, this set of actors was overall unable to perform in a fashion fully in accord with the GPE model during the 2012-2018 review period, due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis and other partner-specific factors. This poses risks for the effectiveness of the GPE model, and though the GPE Secretariat made noteworthy efforts to assist country-level actors in fostering dialogue, it ultimately could not resolve local constraints.

Coordination between development and humanitarian actors in South Sudan remained weak, despite (global level) GPE efforts to improve communication and collaboration. Further, coordination with non-traditional donors and inter-sectoral coordination were virtually non-existent during the 2012-2018 period.

GPE's 2013-2018 ESPIG laid important foundations for the future improvement of education quality, most prominently the development of a new curriculum and TLMs. **However, in the review period itself, the sector plan implementation has not (yet) led to notable system level and/or subsequent impact level changes.**

The GPE country-level ToC focusses on one policy cycle, but GPE aims to foster learning and improvement from one cycle to the next. In South Sudan, given the disruptions of the cycle just concluded, such learning and improvement were hardly possible, and the new cycle is thus likely to face many of the same challenges, such as plan achievability, limited plan implementation, fragmented sector dialogue and monitoring, insufficient financing, and a possible further weakening of the education system. The only notable cycle-to-cycle improvement is that the new ESPIG clearly builds on lessons from the old one.

Several 'new' components which have been added to the GPE model in recent years proved their worth in South Sudan. The new ESPIG QAR processes, however, were generally not well-received.

Ultimately, in the extremely difficult external context, the future of the education system does not hinge on GPE. In the medium-run, if peace prevails, it is conceivable that future ESPIG investments will pay off in terms of strengthened systems and impact. However, even in the most optimistic scenarios it will take decades to build a functional state, and along with it an education system, in South Sudan. If peace does not prevail, even the best efforts of GPE and others will not be able to stem the tide of violence. The assumptions of GPE's ToC will falter, again, but

GPE's flexibility will enable country-level actors to adapt ESPIG programming to respond to local needs in whatever way they best see fit.

Emerging good practice

Four approaches observed in South Sudan are noteworthy and of potential interest to other countries: (a) Adapt infrastructure standards and costs to the context, (b) Include private sector schools in sectoral activities and data such as annual school census, (c) Allow humanitarian assistance to education everywhere, even in 'opposition-held areas', (d) Use education as a platform to foster national reconciliation.

Strategic Questions for GPE

1) The case of South Sudan shows that system- and impact-level changes may not be driven by sector plans and related implementation efforts, particularly when changes in external circumstances reduce plan relevance and feasibility. **How can GPE update its ToC to reflect scenarios where plan implementation is not the main vehicle of change?**

2) When conflict erupts, the set of local stakeholders which GPE relies on to guide its country-level processes – DCP, LEG, and CA – may find themselves unable to play their expected roles successfully. **What mechanisms, safeguards or alternatives can GPE put in place to ensure that its country-level operational model nonetheless successfully promotes GPE's strategic goals?**

3) **Might funding CAs, as suggested by some stakeholders, be helpful to ensure sector dialogue and monitoring occurs in fragile contexts, where actors are stretched?**

4) GPE-supported sector coordination in South Sudan was limited to 'usual suspects'. **What existing or new tools can GPE leverage, at the global or country-level, to incentivize improved donor alignment and harmonization?**

5) The fact that ESPIGs are branded as being 'for and by the government' inevitably leads to frustrations when their implementation is channeled, not just through a grant agent, but through third parties. This is frequent in fragile contexts. **Can GPE clarify its position in this regard, for example by mainstreaming topics such as capacity-development and fragility across its operations and guidance?**

6) The quality of ESPIG-funded projects is determined by (a) the input of country-level stakeholders into ESPIG design and (b) the ESP, which outlines priority interventions. **In cases where external circumstances lead to low-quality input and/or plans, how can a strong ESPIG design nonetheless be ensured?**

7) Considering critiques of the new QAR process for ESPIGs, **how will GPE address the concerns expressed by country-level stakeholders with regard to the level of effort required and to the clarity of its funding and feedback criteria?**

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and purpose of this summative country level evaluation

1.   The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) is a multilateral global partnership and funding platform established in 2002 as the Education for All/Fast Track Initiative (EFA/FTI) and renamed GPE in 2011. GPE aims to strengthen education systems in developing countries, in order to ensure improved and more equitable student learning outcomes, as well as improved equity, gender equality and inclusion in education.[2] GPE is a partnership that brings together developing countries, donor countries, international organizations, civil society, teacher organizations, the private sector and foundations.

2.   This country level evaluation (CLE), of GPE's support to the national education system of the Republic of South Sudan, is part of a larger GPE study that comprises a total of 20 summative and eight formative CLEs. The overall study is part of GPE's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) strategy 2016-2020, which calls for a linked set of evaluation studies to explore how well GPE outputs and activities contribute to outcomes and impact at the country level.[3] South Sudan was selected as one of 20 summative CLE countries based on sampling criteria described in the study's inception report.[4] As per the inception report and the study's Terms of Reference (TOR), the objective of summative CLEs is:

- to assess GPE contributions to strengthening education systems and, ultimately, the achievement of education results within a partner developing country in the areas of learning, equity, equality and inclusion; and hence,

- to assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of GPE's theory of change (ToC) and of its country-level operational model.[5]

3.   The primary intended users of CLEs are members of the Global Partnership for Education, including Developing Country Partners (DCPs) and members of local education groups (LEGs) in the sampled countries, and the GPE Board of Directors. The secondary user is the Secretariat. Tertiary intended users include the wider education community at global and country levels.

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[2] Global Partnership for Education (2016): GPE 2020. Improving learning and equity through stronger education systems. https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/gpe-2020-strategic-plan.

[3] In the context of this assignment, the term 'impact' is aligned with the terminology used by GPE to refer to changes in sectoral learning, equity, gender equality, and inclusion outcomes (reflected in Strategic Goals 1 and 2 of the GPE 2016-2020 Strategic Plan). While the CLEs examine progress towards impact in this sense, they do not constitute formal impact evaluations, which usually entail counterfactual analysis based on randomized control trials.

[4] See final Inception Report, 2018, https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/country-level-evaluations-final-inception-report, and subsequent update, the Modified Approach to CLEs, 2018. www.globalpartnership.org/content/modified-approach-country-level-evaluations-fy-ii-2019-and-fy-iii-2020

[5] For details on the model, see Global Partnership for Education (2017): How GPE works in partner countries. https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/how-gpe-works-partner-countries

> **Box 1.1. Scope of this summative country level evaluation**
>
> This summative CLE is focused on eliciting insights that can help GPE assess and, if needed, improve its overall approach to supporting partner developing countries. It does *not* set out to evaluate the performance of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), of other in-country partners and stakeholders, or of specific GPE grants.
>
> The core review period for this CLE runs from the ratification of the first General Education Strategic Plan in 2012 through to the late 2018 approval of a second ESPIG, therefore including two GESPs and two ESPIGS.

1.2   Methodology overview

4.   The guiding frameworks for the evaluation are the evaluation matrix (Appendix I) and the country-level theory of change for the Republic of South Sudan (Appendix II).[6] A brief summary of the CLE methodology is provided in Appendix III of this report. For further details, please refer to the final Inception Report for the overall assignment (January 2018).

5.   For the South Sudan CLE, the evaluation team consulted a total of 58 stakeholders from the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI), from state-level ministries of education, from other ministries, agencies, and institutions of the Republic of South Sudan, from bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, from civil society coalitions and teachers' unions, from private and faith-based educational institutions, from research institutes, from non-governmental organizations, from the GPE Secretariat, and from other backgrounds (see Appendix V for a list of consulted stakeholders). Most of these stakeholders were consulted in Juba, South Sudan between November 10th and 23rd, 2018, whilst the remainder were consulted by phone/skype shortly before or after the mission. The evaluation team also reviewed a wide range of relevant documents, databases, websites as well as selected literature (see Appendix VI for a list of reviewed sources).

6.   The report presents findings related to the three 'Key Questions' (KQs) from the evaluation matrix, which trace the contribution of GPE support to GPE country-level objectives (KQ I); of these country-level objectives to better education systems (KQ II); and of better education systems to progress towards impact-level objectives in terms of learning, equity, gender equality and inclusion (KQ III). The findings of this report are accordingly presented under three sections that each correspond to one of the KQs. In turn, each section is divided into sub-sections that address key GPE contribution claims as per GPE's ToC. The three KQs and the six contribution claims (A, B, C, D, E, F) are shown in Figure 1.1.

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[6] This country-specific ToC was adapted from the generic country-level ToC that was developed in the assignment Inception Report.

Figure 1.1   The evaluation presents findings on key evaluation questions and contribution claims

7.   Throughout the report, we use tables to provide readers with broad overviews of key CLE findings on the respective issue. To facilitate quick orientation, we use a simple color-coding scheme that is based on a three-category scale in which **green** equals 'strong/high/achieved', **amber** equals 'moderate/medium/partly achieved', **red** signifies 'low/weak/not achieved', and **grey** indicates a lack of sufficient data to rate the issue. In each table, the respective meaning of the chosen color coding is clarified. The color coding is intended as a qualitative orientation tool to readers, rather than as a quantifiable measure.

1.3   Data Limitations

8.   The CLE of South Sudan encountered major data limitations in both scope, time span, and quality. Due to the ongoing civil war combined with the lack of government resources to conduct the annual school census, several years of data between 2011 and 2018 are unavailable because the census for 2012, 2014 and 2017 was not undertaken. Even in the years a census was conducted, the data was drawn from only a partial national sample, with areas experiencing extreme conflict or under insurgent control not being canvassed. This makes it difficult to compare Education Management Information System (EMIS) data over time. The lack of resources to provide data quality assurance has resulted in ambiguous, if not misleading statistical information.[7] Turning to data gathered for Joint Sector Reviews (JSRs), national and subnational

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[7] For instance, an evaluation of the first GPE-supported program (GPEP, 2013-2018) notes that there was strong and surprising variation in reading scores between schools at the time of GPEP baselining, and that the 100% pass rates reported in some locales were unlikely to be truly representative of learning outcomes on the ground. See Cambridge Education. "Evaluation of Global Partnership for Education Programme in South Sudan – Final Report", April 6, 2018, p.27.

government representatives indicated that the data presented on an annual basis in these JSRs was fragmentary at best and not the product of a consistent nationwide approach to data collection. While various partners conducted their own data gathering exercises, there was a distinct lack of commonality between various data sources, making it difficult to use this information to potentially fill in gaps related to the partial implementation of the national education census. This is especially the case with respect to data gathered by humanitarian partners, which covered different indicators, areas, and time spans from data collected by governmental and development partners.[8] This condition of fragmented data is not unique to South Sudan, but can be expected to be the norm in fragile states. Nonetheless, for the evaluation, the cumulative effect of these challenges has been to reduce the reliability of data and the ability to conduct certain kinds of analyses (e.g. across time and regions) to the same degree as for some other countries that are part of this summative evaluation series. For South Sudan, these gaps have also resulted in a weak evidence base on which to formulate sectoral plans.[9]

1.4   Structure of the report

9.   Following this introduction, **Section 2** gives an overview of the national context of South Sudan, with a focus on the education sector (section 2.1), and on the history of the country's involvement with GPE (section 2.2).

10.   **Section 3** presents evaluation findings related to GPE's contributions to education sector planning; to mutual accountability in the education sector through inclusive policy dialogue and sector monitoring; to domestic and international education sector financing; and to education sector plan implementation.

11.   **Section 4** discusses education system-level changes in South Sudan during the period under review (2012-2018), as well as any likely links between these changes and the four areas of changes discussed in section 3 (sectoral planning, mutual accountability, plan implementation, and financing).

12.   **Section 5** presents an overview of the impact-level changes in terms of equity, gender equality, inclusion and learning outcomes observable in South Sudan over the course of the 2012-2018 review period, as well as any likely links between these changes and system-level changes noted in section 4.

13.   **Section 6**, finally, presents overall conclusions of the evaluation and outlines several strategic questions to GPE, with regards to the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of GPE's country level theory of change (ToC) and of its country-level operational model.

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[8] Members of the (humanitarian) Education Cluster in South Sudan conducted annual 'Education Cluster Assessments' (ECAs) in 2016, 2017 and 2018. These are based on a nationally representative sample of roughly 400 randomly sampled schools, and a purposive sample of roughly 75 surveyed county education officers. Collected in collaboration with MoGEI, ECA data focusses on school-level indicators (e.g. facilities, attendance) and complements MoGEI's annual school census (ASC) which includes all schools. However, given their different purpose, areas of focus, and sampling approaches, ASCs' and ECAs' utility in triangulating / filling gaps in each other is limited.

[9] UNESCO 2018a:33 (table 4) provides an overview of which areas of South Sudan were covered by which data sources in 2015, 2016 and 2017, such as MoGEI's EMIS, the World Bank's "high frequency survey" in 2015 and 2016, Education Cluster Assessments in various years, South Sudan Schools' Attendance and Monitoring System (SSSAMS), the Human Resource Information System (HRIS), the Food-for-Education database, and the Refugee Education Management Information System (REMIS). The UNESCO report also notes many of the same challenges described in this section.

2 Context

2.1 Overview of South Sudan

15. The Republic of South Sudan emerged in 2011 from decades of conflict as the world's newest independent country. South Sudan has an estimated population of about 12 million with half under 18 years of age, and encompasses dozens of ethnic groups, the largest of which are the Dinka and the Nuer (UNESCO 2018a:20-21). South Sudan is a presidential federal republic where the majority of powers not related to national security are decentralized, rather than devolved, to the state level, thus leaving the national government with near exclusive policy and expenditure power, with subnational levels of government largely being responsible for implementation. South Sudan has historically been divided into three general regions: Bahr el Ghazal (Northwest), Equatoria (South), and Greater Upper Nile (GUPN, northeast). Administratively, prior to 2015, South Sudan was divided into 10 states. In October 2015, 28 states were established with an additional four created in 2017.[10]

16. In 1956, Sudan gained independence as a single unified nation that included present South Sudan. Nearly two decades of insurgency began in what is now South Sudan, followed by a period of peace between 1972 and 1983, during which large oil reserves (estimated to be the third-largest in Sub-Saharan Africa) were discovered in 1978. Hostilities lasted until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which led to the creation of the autonomous region of Southern Sudan, which operated with significant autonomy from Khartoum, including its dedicated donor support and line ministries. In 2011, a referendum was held in which over 98 percent of southern Sudanese voted in favor of secession from Sudan. In late 2013, a political power struggle and ethnic tensions in the new Republic resulted in civil war, with several areas of the country, particularly the Greater Upper Nile (GUPN) region in the North-East, falling under the control of 'in opposition' (IO) forces. Several attempts at national reconciliation failed with hostilities increasing in scope and severity especially in 2016/2017, with conflict episodes spreading to almost all areas of the country. A 'revitalized' settlement signed in Addis Abba in September 2018 may offer a resolution to the decade of crisis, although it is in the early stages of implementation.

17. Until the decision of the government to shut down oil production in January 2012 due to debates with Sudan about oil transit payments, the Government of South Sudan's (GoSS) revenue stream was primarily derived from oil production. With the shut-down still largely in effect some six years later, GoSS expenditures dropped by over 80 percent between 2014 and 2017, from over five billion to roughly one billion current US$. Poverty remains endemic with over three quarters of the population living on the equivalent of less than US$2 per day.[11] The recently released GoSS national budget for Fiscal Year 2018/2019 further illustrates the economic challenges. The budget, reporting on the previous year, clearly shows that the assumptions on which South Sudanese budgets are based are in most instances optimistic

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[10] These changes emanated from presidential decrees, loosely reflected ethnic/linguistic distinctions, and were officially an attempt to promote decentralization. However, debates emerged about whether parliamentary ratification was required for the validity of these changes. As of late 2018, several international development/humanitarian organizations continue to plan around the former ten states.

[11] OCHA, *South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan for January-December 2019*, prepared in 2018, Pg. 4.

with respect to revenue generation. Moreover, over 70 percent of expenditures in recent years have been spent on national security, public administration and infrastructure.[12]

18.   After seven years of civil war, South Sudan remains in a humanitarian crisis due to the cumulative effects of years of conflict. The number of people who require humanitarian assistance remains high at seven million, and there are over two million South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries.[13] Additionally as of September 2018, there were roughly 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).[14]

19.   Several important implications arise:

- First, the level of insecurity in the country, notwithstanding the recent peace settlement, remains very high, resulting in difficulties in providing government services.

- Second, the recent increase in the number of states in South Sudan, according to both national and state representatives, has resulted in significant diminution of the already nominal level of public sector capacity at the subnational level.

- Third, notwithstanding optimistic projections in both the South Sudan National Development Strategy (NDS) and the current year's Budget Book, the tenuous state of the economy of South Sudan and corresponding ability of the GoSS to generate revenue results in a situation where, as confirmed by senior GoSS representatives, the government has little if any means to expand its domestic level of investment.

- Fourth, the country's very young population puts a substantial stress on the education system, as well as on government finances, as over half the population is under 18, and as the section of the population aged between three and 17 is expected to grow by one million between 2015 and 2020 (source: Education Sector Analysis 2016, p.35).

- Finally, the impact of the ongoing humanitarian crisis is not likely to diminish over the medium term, leaving the provision of public services, including education, divided between weak national systems, administered by under-resourced states, and systems of humanitarian support that operate in parallel.

2.2   The Education sector in South Sudan

20.   South Sudan's education sector predates independence in 2011: as in other sectors, South Sudan has operated its own, largely autonomous ministry and to some extent education system since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, and the system transitioned relatively smoothly into the new country. Today, the vision of the South Sudanese education sector is "To build an educated and informed nation by providing quality education for all", as stipulated in the National General Education Policy (2017-2027) which is aligned with the South Sudan Vision 2040.[15] The sector is regulated by South Sudan's General Education Act 2012, which articulates the three levels of the country's formal education system (pre-primary, primary, and secondary education). The Act, as well as the Transitional Constitution of the

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[12] Figures in this paragraph are from World Bank, *South Sudan Economic Update*, July 2018, pp.5, 6, 10.

[13] See https://www.unocha.org/south-sudan, as of February 2019.

[14] OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, South Sudan, Issue 9, September 30, 2019, p.1.

[15] MoGEI. The National General Education Policy, 2017-2027. Juba, Republic of South Sudan, May 2017 draft.

Republic of South Sudan, 2011 (article 29, Section 2), stipulate that the eight-year primary education cycle is 'free and compulsory'.[16] The official age group for each schooling group is shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1   Official formal education age, by level

LEVEL OF EDUCATION	GRADES OF EDUCATION	AGE GROUP (YEARS)
Early Childhood Education (pre-school / pre-primary)	ECD 1, ECD 2	3-5
Primary Education	Lower level: P1, P2, P3, P4 Upper level: P5, P6, P7, P8	Lower level: 6-9 Upper level: 10-13
Secondary Education	S1, S2, S3, S4	14-17

Source: UNESCO (2018), Global Initiative on Out Of School Children. South Sudan Country Study. p.25.

21.   The General Education Act also outlines the division of responsibilities between national ministries, state ministries of education, country education departments, and payam education offices.[17]

- ▪ Federally, the education sector in South Sudan falls under the purview of two federal ministries: The Ministry for General Education and Instruction (MoGEI), and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology (MoHEST). MoGEI oversees pre-primary, primary, secondary, and alternative education, including adult literacy programming, as well as post-primary technical and vocational education and training (TVET), and teacher training. MoHEST oversees higher (degree-granting / university) education.[18]

- ▪ Sub-nationally, the management and delivery of education services is heavily decentralized, with schools due to be managed at the lowest possible administrative level (head teachers reporting to payam education offices,[19] and upwards therefrom). In practice, several education offices at lower administrative levels operate with little or no infrastructure, staff, or resources, in part because many new states, counties, and payams have been created in recent years as a result of presidential decrees in 2015 and 2017.

22.   The General Education Act recognizes both publicly and privately-run schools, with the latter including schools run by faith-based groups, non-governmental organizations, and commercial providers. Private schools are required to register with relevant authorities, to follow the national school curriculum, and as a part thereof, to use English as the official language of instruction from primary grade 4 onwards. In practice, Arabic instruction remains predominant in certain areas of the country, due to a lack of English instruction capacities and the heritage of the Sudanese education system.

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[16] Ministry of Justice (2012), Laws of South Sudan: General Education Act 2012 (Act No.30). http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/sites/planipolis/files/ressources/general_education_act_2012.pdf

[17] Payam are an administrative division in South Sudan, below counties.

[18] Education in South Sudan used to be overseen by one ministry, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST), which was split up into two ministries as per Presidential Decree Number 62/2010 on June 21st, 2010. See http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/sites/planipolis/files/ressources/south_sudan_ministry_of_higher_education_policy_framework_official_version.pdf. Some sources cite the split as having only occurred in 2016 (e.g. UNESCO 2017, South Sudan Education Sector Analysis 2016, footnote 34), and the use of the MoEST name, logo and letterhead remains common even in more recent documents and communications.

[19] *Payams* are the second-lowest administrative division of South Sudan, below counties and above *bomas*.

23.   Of note, South Sudan cultivates an active Alternative Education System (AES), which consists of a series of programs to provide instruction in remote areas, to pastoralist communities, and to the majority of the country's adults who have never started or completed a basic education cycle.

24.   Due to the ongoing and evolving crisis and conflict in South Sudan in recent years, it is difficult to provide an accurate general picture of the state of the national education sector today. Based on a 2018 UNESCO study supported by GPE's 2013-2018 ESPIG,[20] it can be estimated that there are, in South Sudan:

- **Schools**: a total of over 6000 schools nationwide in 2017, including both government and non-government schools, of which 725 pre-primary, 3982 primary, 281 secondary, and 1251 alternative education system (AES) schools (UNESCO 2018a:73). EMIS 2016:17 data (based on a different, incomplete geographical sample) suggests that, in 2016, roughly 60 percent of schools were governmental, and 40 percent were non-governmental (run by communities, NGOs, faith-based groups, or for-profit providers), with the share of non-governmental facilities being higher for the ECD and tertiary sub-sectors. Of note, many of these schools were damaged and/or closed due to the conflict which at times reached most of the country. In 2016, an estimated 25 percent of schools were closed nationwide, and 70 percent were closed in GUPN states (ECA 20216:48).

- **School-age children**: a school-aged population of 3.7 million children (six to 17) in 2018, currently growing at a rate of roughly four percent per year (UNESCO 2018a, annex A). Of these, an estimated 2.2 million children, or roughly 60 percent, were estimated to be out of school in 2018 (ibid, p.39).[21]

- **Enrolled students**: an estimated 1.9m students enrolled in school in 2017, of which 0.12m in pre-primary, 1.55m in primary, 0.09m in secondary, and 0.13m in AES schools (ibid, p.29).[22] For comparison, only 0.3m children were enrolled in 2005 (GESP 2017-2022, p.2).

- **Enrollment by school type**: in 2015, roughly three quarters of primary students, two thirds of AES and TVET students, one half of secondary students, and one third of pre-primary students were enrolled in government schools, with the remainder being enrolled in religious, community, international/NGO, private/for-profit, and other/unknown schools, roughly in that order of student population share, with relative shares varying across school levels and states (source: ESA 2016:49). By contrast, in 2009, roughly 83 percent of all students were in government schools.

- **Teachers**: an estimated number of between 35 and 40 thousand teachers in 2016, across all levels and types of schools, with the great majority thereof being in primary schools (72 percent) and male (82 percent), and 54 percent thereof having obtained no relevant teacher training (all data from EMIS 2016, based on a partial sample of the country).

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[20] UNESCO's 2018 out-of-school children study is used for its recent publication and the fact that it draws on several of the most recent sectoral data sources, several of which are in and of themselves incomplete in their geographic coverage. The figures are thus indicative only, with nuances, breakdowns, and changes over time further discussed in the substantive sections of this report. The full reference is UNESCO. "Global Initiative on Out of School Children (OOSC) – South Sudan Country Study", May 2018a. The study was financed by UNICEF and GPE's ESPIG 2013-2018.

[21] These figures do not count children of pre-primary school age (three to five), estimated to be 1.1m in 2016 (source: UIS). Of note, estimates of school-aged population numbers differ between UIS, which uses extrapolations from UN population data, and UNESCO's OOSC 2018 study, which extrapolates South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics Data from 2009. UNESCO's study does not provide an estimate of OOSC numbers for children of pre-primary school age, but these can be estimated to be high given the limited availability of ECD centres.

[22] The reader will note that figures for in- and out-of-school populations do not add up to figures for total school-aged population. This is due to differences in the age brackets and years covered by these indicators. Some students enrolled in school, for instance, may be over 18 and as such are not counted as 'school-age children'.

25.   South Sudan's education sector has a multi-pronged monitoring and coordination structure. At its top sits the National Education Forum (NEF), chaired by the MoGEI minister, and inclusive of representatives of MoGEI directorates, states, other line ministries, bilateral and multilateral agencies, local and international NGOs, civil society, and faith-based groups. As the NEF has not always met regularly over the course of the 2012-2018 review period, other coordination bodies such as the Joint Steering Committee and/or the Education Donor Group (EDoG) have sometimes functioned as the *de facto* Local Education Group (LEG) equivalent, for instance with respect to reviewing GPE grant applications. During the latter stages of the review period, the Coordinating Agency (CA) in South Sudan is USAID, supported by the United Kingdom (US) Department for International Development (DFID).[23] Finally, due to the ongoing humanitarian situation, South Sudan has also had an active *Education Cluster* throughout the 2012-2018 review period, which coordinates humanitarian assistance and involves representatives of the government, various international agencies, and NGO (delivery) partners. Sectoral coordination structures are further discussed in section 3.2.

26.   Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has developed two General Education Strategic Plans (GESPs) to guide the sector: GESP I (2012-2017) and GESP II (2017-2022). In parallel with GESP II, the GoSS also developed a National General Education Policy (NGEP) 2017-2027, which provides a longer-term outlook, and a 'transitional plan 2017-2018', which is embedded into the GESP II document and prioritizes a set of concrete actions for the first two years of the plan, given the volatile context.

27.   This evaluation focusses on the period from the ratification of GESP I in 2012 through to the late 2018 approval of a second ESPIG, therefore including two GESPs and two ESPIGs. However, the evaluation also refers to previous and subsequent policies, plans and grants, where relevant. The review period overlaps with periods of major conflict in South Sudan. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the period and the main policies, plans, action plans, GPE grants, and periods of conflict in South Sudan between 2011 and 2021. Details of GPE grants are further elaborated in the next section.

Table 2.2   Timeline of policies, plans and events in South Sudan's education sector, 2011-2021

CATEGORY	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Review Period		Review period for this CLE									
Sector policies	Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011										
		General Education Act, 2012										
							National General Education Policy (2017-2021)				
Sector plans		GESP I 2012-2017									
								GESP II 2017-2022[24]			
							Transitional Plan 2017-2018[25]				
		GESP I Action Plan 2012-2017									

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[23] UNESCO, and prior to that NORAD, have held the role of Coordinating Agency in the past.
[24] While the title suggests that it covered the period since 2017, the GESP was only finalized in mid-2017.
[25] Embedded in GESP II.

CATEGORY	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Action plans							GESP II Action Plan 2017-2018		(not defined yet)		
Joint Sector Reviews				•[26]	•	•	•				
GPE grants			ESPIG 2013-2018, 36m								
					ESPDG 2015						
								PDG 2018, 0.07m			
								AFF 2018-2019, 6m			
									ESPIG 2019-2021, 36m		
Timeline of conflict			★ armed conflict		peace deal	★ armed conflict		peace deal			
				Level 3 emergency[27]							

2.3   GPE in Country

28.   The Republic of South Sudan joined GPE in 2012,[28] one year after the country's declaration of independence. It is represented on the Board through the Africa 3 constituency.

29.   Since joining, South Sudan has received four grants from GPE: one Education Sector Plan Development Grant (ESPDG) and three Education Sector Plan Implementation Grant (ESPIGs), one of which was provided under GPE's Accelerated Funding Framework (AFF) for support in emergency and early recovery situations. This evaluation focusses on the period of the 2013-2018 ESPIG, which was used to co-fund the Global Partnership for Education Programme (GPEP) in South Sudan with USAID, until USAID withdrew its funds in 2016.[29] UNICEF, as the grant agent (GA) for both ESPIGs, also received a Program

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[26] This was the first-ever JSR in South Sudan. It was held on November 4-7, 2014, with all states and partners (development & humanitarian) participating (source: GPEP Programme Brief, Update 1, Dec 2014, p.2). A JSR had initially been scheduled for December 2013, but it was delayed as the ministry was not ready at the time, and no new date was found given conflict in 2014 (source: GPE, South Sudan hand-over update, June 30, 2014, p.1).

[27] As per Inter-Agency Standing Committee records as of January 2019: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-transformative-agenda/news-public/l3-iasc-system-wide-response-activations-and-deactivations. International staff, including UNICEF staff managing the GPE-funded GPEP program, was evacuated from December 2013 to February 2014 and from July 2016 to September 2016. Source: GPE Secretariat, *Presentation made by country lead during June 2017 visit to South Sudan PPT*, draft 3, June 2017, p. 1.

[28] Source: GPE, *South Sudan Country Snapshot Report to LT*, August 13, 2015, p.1.

[29] GPEP was co-funded by GPE (36.1m between December 2013 and May 2018) and USAID (30.1m between December 2013 and December 2018). Source: Cambridge Education. "Evaluation of Global Partnership for Education Programme in South Sudan. Final Report." April 6, 2018. P.3. USAID withdrew in 2016, halting its disbursements at US$26 instead of 36 million, costing the GPEP program US$10m in funds (15 percent of US$66m).

Development Grant (PDG) in 2018 for the preparation of the 2019-2021 ESPIG. The values of all grants are shown in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3   GPE grants to South Sudan[30]

GRANT TYPE	YEARS	ALLOCATIONS	DISBURSEMENTS	GRANT AGENT
Program Implementation (ESPIG)	2019-2021	35,700,000	(data not yet available)	UNICEF
	2018-2019[31]	6,000,000	(data not yet available)	UNICEF
	2013-2018[32]	36,100,000	34,782,567	UNICEF
Sector Plan Development (ESPDG)	2015-2017[33]	467,079	467,079	UNESCO
Program Development Grant (PDG)	2018	71,165	(data not yet available)	UNICEF

30.   South Sudan is not eligible for the GPE multiplier (cf. June 2018 GPE Board decision).

31.   The South Sudan National Education Coalition (NEC), an umbrella organization of civil society organizations (CSOs) engaged in education advocacy, has to date received grants from the Civil Society Education Fund (CSEF) under CSEF III (2016-2018) worth a total of US$0.12 million.[34]

32.   Finally, since 2011, a number of GPE Global and Regional Activities (GRA) grants have financed activities pertaining to South Sudan, such as training and workshops for country representatives in 2015 on best practices for early reading assessments (GRA 1).[35] Further work on learning outcomes in early grades in reading was also scheduled in South Sudan under GRA 2, but was cancelled "due to civil unrest."[36] Another study due to be supported by GRA 7 in South Sudan, under UNICEF's Out of School Children Initiative, was launched in 2013 but not completed "due to conflict."[37] An OOSC study building on the 2013 effort was finally completed by UNESCO in 2018, funded by GPE's 2013-2018 South Sudan ESPIG and building on methodological frameworks developed by UNESCO and UNICEF under GRA 7.

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[30] "South Sudan", GPE website, www.globalpartnership.org/country/south-sudan. All links in this document as of February 2019.

[31] Grant provided under GPE's Guidelines for Accelerated Support in Emergency and Early Recovery Situations, approved by the Board at its meeting on November 19-20, 2012 (BOD/2012/11-12), updated in August 2015.

[32] Initially due to end in November 2017, then no-cost extended until May 2018. Source: Cambridge Education. "Evaluation of Global Partnership for Education Programme in South Sudan. Final Report." April 6, 2018. P.3.

[33] Approved on October 1st, 2015, with an expiry date initially set for June 30th, 2016. No-cost extended until November 30th, 2016 on August 16th, 2016. No-cost extended to March 31st, 2017 on December 15th, 2016. Source: minutes of Grant Application Review Committee (GARC), for dates as indicated.

[34] US$50,883 in 2016, US$69,953 in 2017. Source: South Sudan CSEF Profile, One Pager, FINAL (no date, no author). Document provided by GPE to the evaluation team. GCM's CSEF fund is funded by GPE.

[35] Source: GRA portfolio status report, Summary Products and Tools Sept 2017, excel spreadsheet, provided by GPE.

[36] Source: GPE, GRA Portfolio Status Report, June 2017, p.4

[37] Source: GRA 7, Out of School Children Initiative (OOSCI), GRA final report, January 29th, 2016.

3   GPE contributions to sector planning, dialogue/monitoring, financing, and implementation

3.1   Introduction

33.   This section summarizes findings related to Key Question I of the evaluation matrix: "Has GPE-support to South Sudan contributed to achieving country-level objectives related to sector planning, to sector dialogue and monitoring, to more/better financing for education, and to sector plan implementation? If so, then how?"[38]

34.   The GPE country-level theory of change, developed in the inception report and adapted to the South Sudan context (Appendix II), outlines four contribution claims related to GPE's influence on progress towards achieving its country-level objectives (one claim per objective).

35.   This section is structured around and tests the four contribution claims by answering two sub-questions for each phase of the policy cycle. First, in South Sudan, what characterized sector planning, mutual accountability, sector financing or ESP implementation respectively during the 2012-2018 period under review? And second, has GPE's support contributed to observed changes in these dimensions and, if so, how?

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[38] Improved planning, dialogue/monitoring, financing, and plan implementation correspond to Country-Level Objectives (CLOs) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of GPE's 2016-2020 Strategic Plan.

3.2   GPE contributions to education sector planning

36.   This section addresses the following Country Evaluation Questions (CEQs):

▪ What characterized the education sector plan in place during the core 2012-2018 period under review? (CEQ 1.1.b)

▪ Has GPE support to sector planning contributed to better (more relevant, more realistic, government-owned)? (Key Question V)[39] During the 2012-2018 review period, have there been unintended, positive or negative, consequences of GPE (financial or other) support? (CEQ 3.2)

▪ What factors other than GPE support are likely to have contributed to the observed changes (or lack thereof) in sector planning? (CEQ 3.1)

▪ What are implications of evaluation findings for GPE support to South Sudan? (Key Question IV)

37.   A high-level overview of evaluation findings on sector planning is provided in table 3.1. These observations are elaborated on through the findings and supporting evidence presented below.

Table 3.1   Overview: CLE findings on sector planning and related GPE contributions in 2012-2018[40]

DEGREE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A GOVERNMENT-OWNED, ROBUST ESP	DEGREE OF GPE CONTRIBUTION[41]	DEGREE TO WHICH UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS LIKELY HELD TRUE[42]				
Strong: South Sudan developed its first GESP. Moreover, the second GESP improved on the quality of the first in some areas. The government owned both planning processes. However, both plans still exhibit limitations in terms of quality and achievability.	**Strong**: There is evidence that both GPE funding and GPE's quality-assurance and appraisal process contributed to a better planning process and a better plan than might have otherwise been the case. GPE is likely to have been a critical actor, substantially enabling and complementing the work of other actors.	1	2	3	4	5

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[39] In particular: To what extent has the revised Quality Assurance and Review (QAR) process for education sector plans contributed to the development of better-quality education sector plans? Why? Why not? (CEQ 9); To what extent have the revised ESPDG mechanism and/or ESPIG grant requirements (under the GPE New Funding Model launched in 2015) contributed to the development of better-quality education sector plans? Why? Why not? (CEQ 10); To what extent has GPE support to inclusive sector dialogue influenced sector planning? (CEQ 11b).

[40] Colors stand for 'strong' (green) 'modest' (amber), 'minimal to not detectable' (red), or 'insufficient data' (grey)".

[41] The assessment is based on whether the CLE found evidence of (i) GPE support likely having influenced (parts of) sector planning; (ii) stakeholder perceptions on the relevance (relative influence) of GPE support (iii) existence or absence of additional or alternative factors beyond GPE support that were equally or more likely to explain (part of) the noted progress. The same assessment criteria are used for rating GPE contributions in all following sections.

[42] For sector planning, the five underlying assumptions in the country level ToC were: (1) country level stakeholders having the *capabilities* to jointly improve sector analysis and planning; (2) stakeholders having the *opportunities* (resources, time, conducive environment) to do so; (3) stakeholders having the *motivation* (incentives) to do so; (4) GPE having sufficient leverage within the country to influence sector planning, and (5) EMIS and LAS producing relevant and reliable data to inform sector planning.

Characteristics of sector planning during the 2012-2018 review period

Finding 1: **South Sudan has developed two general education strategic plans since independence. Despite limitations in terms of their content and achievability, both meet basic GPE/IIEP quality standards, an achievement in the context. Moreover, GESP II shows moderate signs of improvement relative to GESP I.**

38.   South Sudan has developed two General Education Sector Plans (GESPs) since independence, GESP I, developed in 2010/2011 for 2012-2017, and GESP II, developed in 2015/2016 for 2017-2022. Both plans focus on the same high-level objective, namely, promoting equitable access to relevant quality education. Both plans moreover respond to similar issues as identified in their respective ESAs, namely: high dropouts, low completion, regional and gender disparities, large amounts of children out of school, the need for strong alternative and adult education systems, the low quality of teaching and learning, limited financial resources, and the transition from the old Sudanese system (Arabic) to education with new and English materials. In general, South Sudan faces the challenge of building up many systems from very low levels (e.g. learning assessment, inspection, ECD, etc.), despite some progress achieved in establishing a rudimentary South Sudanese education system since the region gained substantial autonomy in 2005. Having been written in the context of conflict, the second GESP II also affords additional attention to education in emergencies. Table 3.2. summarizes key sector issues and plan priorities from both cycles.

Table 3.2   Key sector issues and plan priorities for the GESP I and GESP II planning cycles

ESA 2012 (CESR)	ESA 2016
Key issues identified (as per executive summary):	Key issues identified (as per executive summary):
• Concentration of students in early grades (overage, repeaters, dropouts), as completion rates remain low.	• The education system is struggling to meet needs in a context of political, humanitarian and economic crisis. High population growth generates pressure, budgets are tight, and conflict has jeopardized progress in coverage.
• An estimated 1m of out-of-school-children (OOSC)	• Dropout rates are high and the main source of wastage. Completion is low, and the number of OOSC has grown.
• Disparities in school participation are substantial across regional, urban-rural, and gender divides	• Disparities in school participation are substantial across regional, urban-rural, and gender divides
• Weak levels of numeracy and literacy	• The learning and teaching environment is not conducive to proper learning, and resources are unevenly spread
• Schools are overcrowded and offer partial cycles	• IDPs and refugees are being supported as best possible by a number of humanitarian actors
• 60 percent of teachers have no relevant training; 40 percent are not on the payroll; few are women	• Barriers for children with disabilities prevail
• Distribution of inputs and teachers varies regionally	• AES & TVET receive insufficient attention
• Primary school fees subsist in some areas	• New policies have been developed but not implemented
• AES is large and remains very relevant	• Salaries are too low to retain and motivate teachers
• Capacities and resources are needed on many fronts.	
• Public education spending has fallen since 2008	
GESP I 2012-2017	**GESP II 2017-2022**
Seven strategic goals:	Four priority programs:
1. increase access to general education and promote equity.	1. Access & Equity
2. improve the quality of general education.	2. Quality
3. promote adult literacy.	3. Management
4. build institutional and human capacity at the three levels of the government	4. TVET

5. increase funding for general education 6. promote partnership among stakeholders 7. monitor and evaluate GESP implementation 47 sub-objectives, 10 outcome-level targets, 250+ activity-level targets (No clear prioritization)	51 outcome-level targets, 133 activity-level targets, and 22 key priorities for 2017-2018 alone (2019-2022 TBD), including: • Pay salaries, capitation grants & cash transfers • Roll out curriculum and textbooks, also to IDPs • Train teachers and managers • Scale AES & TVET • Advocate for girls • Advocate for resources • Strengthen EMIS

39. Good planning can be assessed on two dimensions: a good *planning process* – that is government-led, participatory, inclusive, and build capacities – and a good *planning document* resulting therefrom. With regards to the latter, table 3.3 presents ratings of GESP I and GESP II plan quality, as well as an evaluator assessment of the difference between the two plans. Although GESP I was rated against ESP quality criteria and GESP II against TEP quality criteria (given certain transitional elements of the latter), comparison between both plans is warranted given the very similar structure of both documents and the fact that MoGEI considered both plans full GESPs, opposing GPE's recommendation to prepare a TEP rather than an ESP in 2016/17.[43]

Table 3.3   **GPE ratings of plan quality, and evaluator assessment of difference between plans[44]**

ESP/TEP STANDARDS	GPE PLAN QUALITY RATINGS		CHANGE/IMPROVEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO PLANS (EVALUATOR ASSESSMENT BASED ON INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS, E.G. PLAN APPRAISALS)
	GESP 2012/17 (ESP)	GESP 2017/22 (TEP)	
Overall vision (n/a)	2/2	n/a	**Some deterioration**. GESP I is more clearly aligned to national development plans than GESP II, and outlines a clearer vision. This may be because due to ongoing conflict, there were few relevant plans to align with at the time of GESP II development.
Strategic	12/14	14/14	**No change**. Though GESP II was rated as marginally better (e.g. on addressing sector efficiency), both plans exhibit similar limitations in the degree to which they justify the selection of strategies, and in the coherence between ambitions, targets, and activities.

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[43] The GESP II's final independent appraisal (Begue-Aguado 2017, p.7) notes that the GoSS was opposed to suggestions to prepare a TEP instead of an ESP: "…despite the arguments presented by the EDoG and the GPE Secretariat, the decision was firm in favour of a full 5-year Education Sector Plan… the Government wanted to send a strong and optimistic message to the international community about their commitment to build a new South Sudan in peace and stability. It was agreed, nevertheless, that a phase-by-phase action plan will be included in the GESP."

[44] GPE ratings are taken directly from GPE's ratings of plans against its results framework indicator 16a. This data was provided by the GPE Secretariat to the evaluators. To improve comparability, the table places comparable ESP/TEP criteria/sub-criteria on the same line. The numbers inside the second and third column cells indicate the number of points awarded to a given plan under GPE's indicator 16a, relative to the maximum possible number of points that could have been awarded. Most items being rated by GPE can be rated zero (not addressed), one (partially addressed), or two (fully addressed), though detailed rating guidelines vary.

ESP/TEP STANDARDS	GPE PLAN QUALITY RATINGS		CHANGE/IMPROVEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO PLANS (EVALUATOR ASSESSMENT BASED ON INTERVIEWS AND DOCUMENTS, E.G. PLAN APPRAISALS)
	GESP 2012/17 (ESP)	GESP 2017/22 (TEP)	
Holistic (ESP) / targeted (TEP)	0/2	7/8	**No change**. Both plans discuss all levels of education except tertiary and offer some discussion of capacity development needs. (GESP I is rated worse only because addressing tertiary education is required of ESPs, but not of TEPs).
Evidence-based	1/2	2/2	**No change**. Both plans are based on recent Education Sector Analyses (ESA) of comparably good quality,[45] and summarize key ESA results. However, neither draws on evidence of 'what works' to resolve ESA-identified issues, as noted in both appraisals and in Secretariat comments for GESP II.
Achievable (ESP) / operational (TEP)	14/19	8/10	**Some improvement**. Both plans are very ambitions, with little confirmed funding and low-quality implementation plans and monitoring mechanisms. However, GESP II's funding projections and action plan are of somewhat better quality than GESP I's.
Sensitive to context	2/2	4/4	**Some improvement**. Both plans mention risks and emergency preparedness but both appraisals question the quality of these provisions. GESP II does, however, discuss refugee education more.
Attentive to disparities	5/6	4/4	**No change.** Both plans afford extensive attention to gender issues, and some attention to children with disabilities. Regional or urban / rural disparities are discussed, but not extensively addressed.
Overall, at least 5/7 met for ESP? (at least 3/5 for TEP?)	yes	yes	**Some improvement**. Overall, GESP I and GESP II share some strengths and many weaknesses. However, as ratings on the dimensions of achievability and context-sensitivity show, GESP II can be considered a moderate improvement over GESP I.

40.   The table shows, first, that both plans meet the minimum number of standards to be considered 'credible' plans by GPE standards. This can be considered an achievement, in the challenging context of South Sudan.[46] Indeed, all interviewed stakeholders noted that it was good and important to have developed these plans as they provide a roadmap for the education sector, help to fundraise for the sector domestically and externally, and are a basis for collaboration. Several stakeholders (governmental and donors) also compared the GESPs favourably to plans in other sectors in South Sudan (e.g. health,

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[45] The statement that the two ESAs in 2012 and 2017 are of 'comparable quality' is based on an assessment of both ESAs against IIEP/World Bank/UNICEF/GPE guidelines. Overall, both ESAs satisfactorily address three out of five criteria (context analysis, financing analysis, and performance analysis), and do not satisfactorily address two out of five criteria (existing policies analysis and system capacity analysis). Source: evaluator assessment.

[46] See Sigsgaard, Morten. *South Sudan: Lessons from developing a national education strategic plan*. Paris: UNESCO-IIEP, 2013, p.13; Begue-Aguado, Alberto. *South Sudan Independent Appraisal Report*, Final Version, April 2017, p.6.

agriculture), and even to ESPs in other GPE-supported countries. As one donor noted: "The sector plan isn't all that bad here. Better than in other places I've seen."

41.   Second, the table shows that, despite meeting minimum GPE standards, the two plans share weaknesses. It is important to note that the most recent plan went through a quality assurance process using the TEP methodology. Though the plans cover many important aspects expected from ESP/TEPs (access, quality, disparities, capacities, financing, results frameworks, action plans, etc.), the depth and breadth of analysis for each of these components tends to be low: the selection and justification of strategies, the results framework, the action plan, the financial projections and other elements are unsatisfactory, as noted in both plans' appraisal reports.[47] Studies of both plan development processes (Sigsgaard 2013, UNESCO 2016) attribute this low quality to both (a) the low starting capacities in terms of sector planning in South Sudan, (b) the rushed nature of both plan development processes,[48] and (c) the incomplete participation of key donors in both processes.[49] Moreover, appraisal recommendations were not always incorporated into final drafts (though more so for GESP II, see box 3.2 below).

42.   Third, the table shows that, though the plans were of similar quality for four out of seven standards, GESP II is of moderately higher quality than GESP I in a few respects.[50] Reasons for improvements between GESP I and GESP II are explored in finding 3 below. The main differences are:

- **Improved GPE ratings**: though GESP was a TEP and GESP I an ESP, precluding full comparability, GESP II met five out of five TEP standards, whereas GESP I only met five out of seven ESP standards. GPE sub-criteria on which GESP II outperformed GESP I include addressing sector inefficiencies (2/2 vs 0/2), plan activities being aligned with plan strategy (2/2 vs 1/2), and mentioning and summarizing Education Sector Analysis (ESA) results (2/2 vs 1/2).[51]

- **Improved action plan**: GESP II's action plan outlines a timeline, cost, source of funding, and responsibility for implementation for each activity, whereas GESP I's action plan only outlined timeline and costs. A copy in USD is also available, which is helpful.

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[47] The strengths and weaknesses of the plans have been extensively documented in plan appraisals as well as other documents, see (1) Begue-Aguado (2017). (2) National Education Forum / Local Education Group (NEF/LEG), *Appraisal of the General Education Strategy and Action Plan, 2012 – 2017, Final Appraisal Report*, August 2012. (3) GPE, *Initial Comments: Republic of South Sudan General Education Strategic Plan 2017-2021*, February 2017.

[48] GESP I was rushed largely due to internal political pressures to complete the draft before the formal declaration of independence (Sigsgaard 2013). For GESP II, the TEP process was compressed from one year to six months (UNESCO 2016:15), partly due to the desire to meet GPE timelines to avoid a gap in ESPIG funding, and partly because the beginning of the planning process was delayed by the volatile / active conflict situation in 2015-2017.

[49] Such as of the World Bank in GESP I (source: Sigsgaard 2013, p.16) or of the EU in GESP II (source: UNESCO 2016, p.9). The reason for this lack of participation is not clear but may be related to the fact that many international organizations re-prioritized activities and/or withdrew staff from Juba at various times during the review period, due to the ongoing conflict.

[50] There are also some areas in which GESP II was not as strong as GESP I, though these were, overall, of lesser importance. GESP II is rated less well (1/2 vs 2/2) than GESP I on one GPE sub-criterion, namely, "Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are well-defined." Other elements on which GESP II is weaker than GESP I, though not captured in GPE ratings, are (a) the description of the plan's overall vision and mission, perhaps due to the semi-transitional nature of GESP II, and (b) the description of ministry capacity gaps/needs, perhaps because recent capacity audits existed at the time of GESP I design, whereas no recent ones existed at the time of GESP II design.

[51] This comparison can be made as several sub-criteria are the same / similar for ESPs and TEPs.

- **Better alignment between action plan and funding gap**: GESP II is very clear that it will be able to do very little without support from donors, and therefore does not schedule many activities for 2017/18, with many activities planned to only be completed by 2021. GESP I also noted (p.79) a large funding gap for each year (between 55 and 70 percent depending on different funding projections) but did not modify implementation timelines or ambitions accordingly.

43.   With regards to the processes of plan development, their strengths and weaknesses have been extensively documented in two studies of the GESP I and GESP II development process.[52] Based on these, and on stakeholder input collected by the evaluation team, the key characteristics of plan development processes can be synthesised as follows:

- **Shared strengths of the planning process**: (a) both plan development processes were reasonably government-led and -owned and made efforts to work with and through ministry stakeholders, despite the involvement of external consultants for certain technical aspects of the work. MoGEI staff generally reviewed their degree of participation positively and did not feel that the process was excessively run by third parties; (b) both processes were participatory and involved state-level stakeholders to the best of their abilities, as well as other stakeholders. The second GESP II process was more inclusive than the first one, as it involved humanitarian education providers (e.g. UNHCR, Education Cluster representatives), NGOs and civil society groups (e.g. for children with special needs), teachers, other line ministries, and a representative from the legislative education committee;[53] (c) both planning processes included and drew upon comprehensive ESAs, and both processes contributed to creating a conversation about education across tense regional/political lines. They thereby to some degree contributed towards building a common vision for the sector.[54]

- **Shared weaknesses of the planning process**: (a) despite efforts to make the process inclusive, several stakeholders did not participate in either planning process, such as parents, communities, youth, children, payam/district-level officials, parliament, the national statistic bureau, and certain donors; (b) the degree to which 2012 and 2017 processes built domestic planning capacities is mixed/limited. While the planning process was reasonably government led and owned, in both cases, aforementioned tight timelines and staff turnover (governmental and donor) proved challenging from a capacity-development perspective.[55]

44.   As with the quality of the final plan document, the quality of the plan development process was somewhat better for GESP II. In particular, the GESP II development process included a broader set of actors, such as NGOs/civil society and humanitarian actors, who were either not or less consulted the first time. It also consulted state ministries of education more systematically (though some consultation had happened for GESP I, too).

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[52] Sigsgaard (2013) and UNESCO (2016).

[53] See appraisal of GESP 1, pp.6-7, and p.9. Several of these improvements in inclusiveness were also mentioned in CLE interviews by both MoGEI and UN and civil society stakeholders. Involvement of states, Education Cluster and EDoG donors are also mentioned in UNESCO 2016, pp.14-15.

[54] Source: Sigsgaard (2013) and UNESCO, *Evaluation of UNESCO's role in education in emergencies and protracted crises, case study 2. Crisis-sensitive education sector planning: UNESCO-IEEP support in South Sudan*. Internal Oversight Service, Evaluation Office, IOS/EVS/PI/154.REV, Paris, September 2016. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246280.

[55] This builds on the two available evaluations of the planning cycles in South Sudan, which both comment explicitly on the capacity-development question: Sigsgaard (2013), and UNESCO (2016).

GPE contributions to sector planning

> **Finding 2:**   **GPE's funding requirements provided a major incentive for the development of both GESPs. The development of GESP II in particular was supported by several GPE mechanisms (ESPDG, GPE/IIEP guidelines, new QAR processes). These GPE contributions partially explain noted improvements between GESP I and GESP II quality, such as in the action plan. However, the degree to which GESP II drew explicitly on lessons learned from GESP I was weak and a missed opportunity.**

45.   GPE offers a series of financial and non-financial mechanisms to support sector planning. Table 3.4 provides an overview of these mechanisms, grouped by whether they are likely to have made a significant,[56] moderately significant, or limited/no contribution to funding in South Sudan. This grouping does not constitute a formal score.

Table 3.4   GPE contributions to sector planning during the 2012-2018 review period[57]

GESP I PLAN / PLANNING CYCLE	GESP II PLAN / PLANNING CYCLE
SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO SECTOR PLANNING	
• **GPE funding requirements 1 (a credible plan)**: GPE's funding model, which requires the existence of a credible sector plan, provided a major incentive for the development of both GESPs. For GESP I, the planning process started in late 2010 without clear prospects of a GPE grant, but the announcement in late 2011 of a GPE allocation to South Sudan "galvanized the process further" (Sigsgaard 2013:11). Several stakeholders (both MoGEI and donor) positively reviewed the fact that GPE requires and supports ESAs and ESPs and noted that these planning processes may not have	• **GPE funding requirement 1 (a credible plan)**: For GESP II, the prospect of a second GPE ESPIG was an important motivation to develop a new plan. As one donor noted: "If GPE wasn't there, the government would not develop the GESP [II]." • **ESPDG Funding**: GPE provided an ESPDG of US$ 467,079 in 2016, which covered roughly 60 percent of the 2016/2017 ESA and ESP development process, with the rest funded by other donors and by in-kind contributions of the GoSS.[59] GPE's contributions to ESA/ESP processes funded data-collection, data-analysis, consultations with states, drafting workshops, and some coordination and overhead costs. It is likely that without GPE's support, the funding and quality of

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[56] In this section and all sections that follow, a GPE contribution is rated 'significant' if it made a clear, positive, and noticeable difference in an outcome of interest to GPE. This outcome of interest need not necessarily be 'improved planning overall', but could be a noticeable improvement in sub-components of this desirable outcome, such as 'improved government ownership', 'improved participation', 'improved results framework', etc. Assessments are based on evaluator judgement based on interviews and documents consulted for this CLE.

[57] Inasmuch as the plan development cycle for GESP II falls within the core 2012-2018 review period for this CLE, this section considers GPE contributions two planning cycles, in line with the evaluation matrix for these CLEs. However, subsequent sections do not present similar side-by-side comparison, as these CLEs do not involve a full review of two GPE support cycles, which would in any case not be possible given that the new cycle just started.

[59] The total estimated cost of developing the ESA and ESP was US$773 thousand. Aside from GPE's contribution, which was the largest, this was covered through contributions from several other sources, including funds from Protect Education in Emergencies (PEIC), a Qatar-based Foundation; from UNICEF's Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO); and from UNESCO-IIEP. Indirect support also came from GIZ (Germany), via its Education Backup Initiative. (sources: ESPDG budget, final version, October 6, 2016; ESPDG application, 2015, p.11; ESPDG country lead initial assessment, October 1st 2015, p.3; and UNESCO 2016, p.9).

GESP I PLAN / PLANNING CYCLE	GESP II PLAN / PLANNING CYCLE
occurred, may have been delayed, or may have been of lesser quality, without GPE support. • **GPE funding for CESR**: The Country Education Status Report (CESR), undertaken by the World Bank in 2012, benefited from financial support from the GPE Education Program Development Fund (EPDF), and was co-funded by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan. GPE funding thereby contributed to strengthening the evidence basis for the development of the GESP I.[58]	the planning process would have been worse (e.g. fewer state-level consultations).[60]
MODERATE CONTRIBUTION TO SECTOR PLANNING	
(none identified in this category)	• **GPE plan Quality Assurance and Review (QAR) processes**: interviewed stakeholders did not express strong views on the strengths / weaknesses of GPE's revised QAR processes for ESPs.[61] This was partly due to the limited awareness of these processes outside a restricted set of stakeholders who were heavily involved with them. Of those who did comment, reviews were generally neutral to positive.[62] Documents, in turn, show that both initial GPE Secretariat comments (QAR I) and the independent appraisal process (QAR II) contributed to improving some parts of the GESP II (see box 3.2). • **Technical support from GPE Grant Agent**: a UNESCO study of its support to GESP II development found that

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[58] Source: p.xvii, World Bank. *Education in the Republic of South Sudan: Status and Challenges for a New System*. Washington, D.C., 2012. However, GPE did not directly support GESP I development processes (supported by UNESCO-IIEP with funding from UNICEF Juba), likely due to the fact that GPE's ESPIG allocation for South Sudan was only announced when GESP I planning processes were already nearing completion.

[60] The possibility that another donor may have supported GESP II development in the absence of GPE support cannot be formally excluded. After all, UNICEF Juba had funded GESP I development, and several donors co-funded GESP II development. However, no evidence was found in documents or consultations to suggest that GPE 'crowded out' funds in this manner. Moreover, even if UNICEF Juba had funded plan development again, it cannot be said with certainty that the overall planning budget and quality would have been equivalent, nor that it would not have reduced UNICEF Juba's budget for other education-related or lifesaving work in South Sudan.

[61] Changes to ESP Quality Assurance and Review (QAR) processes in recent years (2014-2017) include the introduction of new GPE/IIEP guidelines for ESP/TEP preparation and appraisal, the introduction of a pool of pre-vetted, trained and 'independent' appraisal consultants which LEGs can call upon; the introduction of "GPE Secretariat Initial Comments" on an early draft of the ESP, which are shared with the LEG; the requirement that the country respond to the appraisal by way of an "appraisal memo"; and the introduction of an appraisal 'quality check' conducted by the GPE Secretariat. All of these instruments/processes were used for South Sudan's GESP II. Source: GPE, *Roadmap for education sector plan development grants*, 2016. Available (as of February 2019) at https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/roadmap-education-sector-plan-development-grants

[62] One ministry official noted there was some "back-and-forth" with GPE but that it "helped us a lot", and one donor noted that GPE's QAR guidance was clear and that it provided a helpful "reality check".

GESP I PLAN / PLANNING CYCLE	GESP II PLAN / PLANNING CYCLE
	UNESCO was a strong ESPDG grant agent due to its prolonged experience with both sector planning processes and capacity development work for the GoSS (UNESCO 2016).[63]
	• **GPE/IIEP guidelines (GESP II)**: between 2012 and 2017, GPE, UNESCO/IIEP and others developed guidelines for the preparation/appraisal of ESPs, TEPs, and ESAs. Though most country-level stakeholders did not mention the guidelines or indicate any familiarity therewith, there is evidence that appraisal guidelines contributed to an improved plan by contributing to an improved GESP II appraisal (see box 3.2 below).[64]
LIMITED/NO CONTRIBUTION TO SECTOR PLANNING	
• **LEG endorsement and appraisal**: GPE's funding model also requires sector plans to be appraised and approved by local education groups (LEG), enacted by the National Education Forum (NEF) in South Sudan. For GESP I, there is limited evidence that these GPE-required or -encouraged processes contributed significantly to enhancing the quality of planning processes or outputs. The appraisal, conducted by the NEF, was communicated to GPE along with the endorsement letter,[65] and there is no evidence that its four recommendations were followed or implemented in the final GESP or in its final action plan.	• **LEG endorsement:** given weaknesses in sector dialogue noted in the next section (no real LEG, meetings called at short notice, crisis setting), there was no evidence that the Education Donor Group (EDoG) endorsement of GESP II in late 2017 contributed significantly to enhancing the quality of planning processes or outputs. The EDoG's endorsement letter for GESP II did not make further suggestions for the plan, and the six points noted in the endorsement communique (November 1st, 2017) were answered by MoGEI on February 14th, 2018 (well into the period of GESP II implementation) based entirely on the reiteration of existing commitments. • **ESPIG funding requirement 3 (data systems):** There was little evidence that the new funding model's (NFM) fixed tranche funding requirements (availability of critical sector data and learning assessments) influenced GESP II design, partly because the ESPIG application was begun well after the GESP II draft had been finalized.[66]
NOT APPLICABLE / TOO EARLY TO TELL	

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[63] As per the evaluation matrix, support provided by GPE grant agents (technical assistance, facilitation, advocacy) is considered part of GPE's 'non-financial support' as it is an important component of the GPE country-level operational model, even though GPE does not directly control this support. See Appendix I, CEQ 1.4 row, footnote on point (b).

[64] UNESCO 2016:2 also notes: "The South Sudanese ESA is based on the ESA methodological guidelines, developed by UNESCO-IIEP-Pôle de Dakar, UNICEF, GPE and the World Bank." However, it is not clear that this improved the ESA, which was not noticeably better in quality than the CESR 2012 (source: evaluator assessment).

[65] USAID, *Letter to the Head of GPE Re. Endorsement of South Sudan's General Education Strategic Plan and admission to the Global Partnership for Education*, August 31st, 2012.

[66] Evidence presented for these requirements in the ESPIG 2019-2021's application (August 2018 version, pp.6-8) is based on general statements ("The Ministry intends…"), and/or on activities to be funded by the ESPIG itself. That is, the ESPIG application relies a lot on its own forthcoming funding to satisfy requirements, with little GESP II reference.

- **Variable tranche**: neither of the two ESPIGs approved by GPE to support the two GESPs have a variable tranche (the mechanism did not exist at the time of the 2013-2018 ESPIG for GESP I, and the 2019-2021 ESPIG for GESP II was exempted from it due to the difficult context). Consequently, this does not apply here.

Box 3.1. Does the GPE requirement that countries have credible plans undermine plan ownership?

The GPE model requires that a developing country partner have in place an ESP in order to qualify for ESPIG grant support. Some stakeholders were wary of this funding requirement, noting that it risked undermining plan ownership, as the ESP would be seen as merely a means to a secure grant, rather than a tool genuinely valued for its own sake by the government. However, most stakeholders indicated that the development of a plan, especially in the context of South Sudan, was a positive factor which provided an opportunity for MoGEI decision-makers to better understand the complexities of the education sector as a whole. Stakeholders also felt that the development of the second ESP gave them a learning opportunity. As one senior GoSS official put it: "Mentally, you are looking at it [ESP process] to get money. But indirectly, in the process they show you the loopholes [in the sector] they force you to do it, two years in advance… that is good!".[67]

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46.   There is no evidence that the GESP II development process explicitly learned from, built on, and/or addressed, limitations of the GESP I development process. This is likely because GESP I was not properly implemented or monitored: its action plan was not implemented, and JSRs after 2014 did not explicitly report against the plan (see sections 3.2 and 3.4 on plan monitoring and plan implementation). Lessons from GESP I are not explicitly noted in the ESA, the ESP, the appraisal, Secretariat comments, JSR reports, or other relevant documents.[68]

47.   No unexpected positive or negative consequences of GPE support were noted. This is despite the fact that at least one study (UNESCO 2016) suggests that GPE planning and granting timelines were tight for both GESP I and GESP II, and that the resulting rush to complete the GESPs negatively affected the quality of both process and output.[69] However, interviews conducted by the CLE team did not reveal strong feelings among stakeholders about GPE deadlines. To the contrary, at least four stakeholders (3 donors, 1 senior official) expressed that the Secretariat showed flexibility in terms of timelines for GESP II, including by twice extending (at no cost) the completion date for the GESP II ESPDG.[70] Moreover, one donor noted that the tight timelines for GESP II were due primarily to delays in the launch of planning proceedings by country level stakeholders – themselves due to the volatile security situation – and not necessarily to the inherent inappropriateness of GPE timelines.

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[67] See also UNESCO 2016:11: "Stakeholders view the ESA/ESP process as more than just a tool for securing GPE funding. They also appreciate the aim to aggregate meaningful, reliable data on the education situation of South Sudan to guide planning and see its potential in improving the coordination of education actors."

[68] GESP II only references GESP I once, in passing (p.102), and does not contain a 'lessons learned' section. Similarly, the ESA 2016 only mentions GESP I twice, in passing (p.47 and p.88), and does not contain 'lessons learned'.

[69] UNESCO 2016:11 claims with regards to GESP I that "Pressure to complete the GESP before independence and in time for GPE submission meant the process was rushed and did not allow for elaborate stakeholder consultation. As a result, the plan was not internalized or appropriated by state-level education authorities." The same document claims with regards to GESP II that "the ESA process has been condensed from nine to four months, and the ESP process from one year to six months, in order to meet the deadline for submission of the ESP to the GPE Secretariat" (p.15), and that the "highly structured nature of the process" and the "tight deadlines for GPE submission" left "little space for developing more basic skills." (p.14)

[70] Of note, the first requests for an extension was received by GPE on the day the ESPDG was initially set to expire, and the second request was received after the extended timeline had expired. GPE's Grant Applications Review Committee (GARC) approved both extensions, but for the second one, it first requested additional information.

Box 3.2. How GPE's new Quality Assurance Review (QAR) process contributed to a better GESP II

The GPE-required and -funded independent appraisal provided substantial feedback and 19 recommendations for GESP II, ranging from the editorial to the strategic. The MoGEI's appraisal letter/memo notes that the feedback from the assessor was incorporated into the revised/final ESP, and a review of the ESP suggests that out of 19 recommendations, eight (42 percent) were fully implemented, five partly implemented, and six were barely or not at all implemented. Similarly, there is evidence that some recommendations from the GPE Secretariat's "initial comments", such as the development of a multi-year action plan, the addition of unit costs, and the addition of historic domestic budget data, were taken on in subsequent GESP drafts.

The following provides an example of how GPE guidelines QAR contributed to improving the GESP II action plan:

2012: The General Education Strategic Plan (GESP) 2012-2017 is accompanied by a timed and costed action plan, but the action plan does not stipulate funding sources or implementation responsibility by activity. The appraisal, written by the LEG, comments on the limitations of the action plan, but no action is taken. The appraisal does not follow any internationally harmonized structure.

2015: GPE/IIEP guidelines on ESP appraisal are published and include a section on "soundness of the action plan".

February 2017: Initial comments from the GPE Secretariat (QAR I) on the second GESP (2017-2022) suggest the need for developing an action plan to accompany the GESP. An action plan is subsequently developed.

April 2017: The independent GESP appraisal (QAR II), which is clearly structured along GPE/IIEP guidelines, makes a recommendation (#8) on the draft action plan. This recommendation appears to have been incorporated into the final GESP 2017-2022, as the final action plan is of higher quality (alignment to plan, completeness) than the draft seen by the appraiser, as well as than the action plan from GESP 2012-2017.

Of note, the GESP II appraisal is of higher quality than the GESP I appraisal, in terms of structure and of the utility of recommendations. The most likely reasons for the improvement in appraisal quality are (a) the release in 2015 of GPE/IIEP guidance on what issues an appraisal report should address, (b) the use of an external consultant trained in the use of GPE appraisal guidelines and quality criteria (rather than having the LEG write the appraisal, as in 2012), and (c) the existence of dedicated funding for the GESP II appraisal (unlike for the GESP I appraisal) which enabled the appraiser to conduct appraisal-specific stakeholder consultations in 2017.

Additional factors beyond GPE support

48.   Additional **positive** factors beyond GPE support that likely contributed to sector planning during the 2012-2018 review period include: (a) the financial and/or technical contributions of several other donors to planning processes;[71] (b) the experience of UNESCO/IIEP as an ESPDG grant agent (2015-2017) with supporting planning processes, both in general and specifically in South Sudan, where it also supported GESP I; and (c) some degree of continuity (not turnover) of senior MoGEI staff at the undersecretary and director level.

49.   Additional **negative** factors include (a) the general low starting level of capacities and resources in the young state, limiting the GoSS' ability to significantly co-finance and co-draft the plan; and (b) the acute

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[71] Such as the World Bank, the South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund, UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), and UNICEF Juba for GESP I; and UNICEF, Protect Education in Insecurity and Conflict (PEIC), GIZ (Germany) and UNESCO IIEP for GESP II. See UNESCO-IIEP. *Integrating safety, resilience and social cohesion into education sector planning and curriculum. Report on Technical workshop for central level ministry officials and state representative in South Sudan*. 2015.

and volatile conflict and crisis situation between 2013 and 2018, which generated delays, withdrawal of international staff from Juba, and logistical and political difficulties in nationwide communication. Partly due to the crisis and partly due to unknown reasons, various donors at some point limited their participation in GESP development processes, such as the World Bank for GESP I, and the EU for GESP II.[72]

Implications for GPE's ToC and country-level operational model

> **Finding 3:** In capacity-constrained environments such as South Sudan, there may be a trade-off between good planning *processes* and good sector *plans*. Whilst the GPE ToC hinges on the existence of the latter, several stakeholders stressed that good planning may be more important than good plans, and encouraged GPE to mainstream capacity development in its ESPDG processes.

50. Two international stakeholders raised the possibility of a trade-off between good planning processes (i.e. being country-led, generating government ownership, and building domestic planning capacities) and good planning documents (i.e. being complete, accurate, coherent, evidence-based, and achievable). As one international stakeholder put it, one could in theory hire external consultants to prepare a "fancy" plan, but that document would not be owned by the nation and its administrators. Vice-versa, one could let a ministry with mixed capacities lead the process to foster "learning-by-doing", at the risk of less coherent and complete documents. In this sense, although sector planning in South Sudan can be critiqued – for not building enough capacity and/or for not producing sufficiently realistic documents – any criticism has to acknowledge that the further strengthening one aspect (process or output) may, under certain circumstances, weaken the other aspect.

51. Planning processes in South Sudan attempted to be participatory and build capacities but had to contend with time constraints.[73] In this context, three stakeholders (two donors, one MoGEI) expressed the concern that planning processes relied extensively on the use of IIEP consultants. Both donors encouraged GPE to adopt an explicit capacity development lens for its ESPDG grants, with the objective that MoGEI take over planning processes in five to ten years. These comments echo lessons from the GPE/IIEP plan appraiser training programme organized in July 2016 in Paris, which highlighted that 'context is all', 'process is more important that product' and 'capacity development is critical'.[74]

> **Finding 4:** In South Sudan, GPE's new QAR processes for ESPs were used in 2016/17 for the development of GESP II. Two components thereof, the initial GPE Secretariat comments and the independent appraisal, both complemented and to some extent duplicated each other.

52. The evaluation team noted some overlap as well as some complementarity between the initial comments / feedback provided by the GPE Secretariat on GESP II, and the independent appraisal report.

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[72] For the EU, see UNESCO 2016, p.9. For the World Bank, see Sigsgaard 2013:16, who notes that "The World Bank, after producing the draft of the Country Education Status Review, did not fully engage in the GESP [I] process. According to one international advisor, given the World Bank's significant experience from South Sudan […], its non-involvement in the GESP process was a wasted opportunity."

[73] See Sigsgaard 2013 and UNESCO 2016. The latter study of ESPDG support in 2015-2016 notes that MoGEI officials were involved in all plan development activities but acknowledges that "Given the highly structured nature of the process, because of tight deadlines for GPE submission, and due to the need to obtain high quality data, there is little space for developing more basic skills." (p. 14).

[74] Source: Begue-Aguado, Alberto. *South Sudan Independent Appraisal Report*, Final Version, April 2017, p.5.

- In terms of overlap, the Secretariat and the appraisal commented on similar issues, for instance the lack of a risk/mitigation matrix. This may be due to the fact that two sets of feedback were provided at relatively close interval, with GPE Secretariat comments shared one month ahead of the draft appraisal report (February 23rd, 2017 vs March 22nd, 2017). Consequently, comments from one set of feedback likely did not have the time to be addressed before the second set of feedback. The plan was finally endorsed on June 23rd, 2017.

- In terms of complementarity, the appraisal is broader in scope (as it considers the planning process, not just the plan document itself), whereas GPE Secretariat comments are focused on the plan document itself. Moreover, the appraisal follows GPE/IIEP appraisal guidelines, whereas Secretariat comments follow the structure of the ESP document. Finally, in terms of outcomes, there is evidence for both mechanisms that at least some recommendations were taken on in subsequent drafts of the ESP, and that they built on each other (see box 3.2 above).

53. At least one international stakeholder commented on this part-duplication, part-complementarity, and invited GPE to monitor potential issues in this regard in the future. In a context were the appraisal is of high quality and where the ESPDG grant agent provides ongoing support, such as was broadly the case in South Sudan, the value proposition of the initial comments could be clarified further. The stakeholder also noted that whereas guidelines exist for appraisals, no set guidelines exist for GPE Secretariat comments, which may result in variation in the content/structure of such comments across time, countries, and authors.[75]

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[75] South Sudanese stakeholders, in turn, did not express strong familiarity or feelings with either feedback process.

3.3 GPE contributions to mutual accountability through sector dialogue and monitoring

54. This section addresses the following evaluation questions:

- Have sector dialogue and monitoring changed during the 2012-2018 review period? If so, then how and why? If not, why not? (CEQ 2.1 and 2.2)

- Has GPE contributed to observed changes in sector dialogue and monitoring? If so, then how? If not, why not? (CEQ 2.3) Has GPE support had any unintended effects, positive or negative? (CEQ 3.2)

- What factors other than GPE support are likely to have contributed to the observed changes (or lack thereof) in sector dialogue and monitoring? (CEQ 3.1)

- What are implications of evaluation findings for GPE support to South Sudan? (Key Question IV)

55. A high-level overview of evaluation findings on sector planning is provided in table 3.5. These observations are elaborated on through the findings and supporting evidence presented below.

Table 3.5   Overview: CLE findings on sector dialogue and monitoring, and related GPE contributions

PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY	DEGREE OF GPE CONTRIBUTION	DEGREE TO WHICH UNDERLYING TOC ASSUMPTIONS LIKELY HELD TRUE[76]			
Sector Dialogue: Weak. Mutual accountability was stronger pre-independence, with one central forum. Fora multiplied in the review period, and humanitarian-development links were weak.	**Modest**. Mechanisms at the heart of the GPE ToC such as LEG and CA were not fully operational, but the Secretariat actively supported sector coordination efforts.	1	2	3	4
Sector Monitoring; Modest. Annual JSRs now take place, but they are of low quality. No plan monitoring takes place. Sector data is collected but no more than prior to independence.	**Strong**. GPE's grants (ESPDG 2015 and ESPIG 2013-2018) funded much of key sector monitoring activities in the period (ESA, JSRs, EMIS data, the development of a new M&E policy) which likely would not have occurred in the same quantity / quality otherwise (though DFID and the EU also supported certain sectoral data-collection efforts).				

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[76] For sector dialogue and monitoring, the underlying assumptions in GPE's country level ToC are: (1) GPE has sufficient *leverage* at global and country levels to influence LEG existence and functioning; (2) country level stakeholders having the *capabilities* to work together to solve sector issues. (3) Stakeholders have the *opportunities* (resources, time, conducive environment) to do so; (4) stakeholders have the *motivation* (incentives) to do so.

Characteristics of sector dialogue during the 2012-2018 review period

> **Finding 5:**   During the review period, sector dialogue and coordination in South Sudan faced several challenges, including a multiplication in the number of fora in the context of an ongoing humanitarian emergency. Despite various efforts to coordinate, improvements in sector-wide dialogue have been small over time.

56.   Sector dialogue in South Sudan happens through a multiplicity of fora, with partly overlapping composition and mandates. Table 3.6 provides an overview. The relative activity and prominence of these fora has fluctuated over time, without, however, a trend towards consolidation. Official documents, such as GESP I and GESP II, name the National Education Forum (NEF), created in May 2012,[77] as "the General Education sector working group as recommended by the Ministry of Finance and Planning" (MoGEI 2018, p.4), and the master forum, chaired by MoGEI, to which all others report. However, whilst the NEF is supposed to be a regular meeting and to serve as South Sudan's Local Education Group (LEG), it has in practice become an event that coincides with the annual JSR. Instead, sector dialogue has often happened in the Education Donor Group (EDoG), despite the fact that it is not chaired by MoGEI, which attends by invitation only. Meanwhile, operational coordination between key development projects has happened in the joint steering committee (JSC), whilst humanitarian projects – financed by the same donor agencies and implemented by the same partners – are coordinated through the 'Education Cluster'.

Table 3.6   Overview of coordination bodies in South Sudan during the 2012-2018 review period

BODIES	MANDATE	MEMBERSHIP	ACTIVITY
National Education Forum (NEF)	Highest sector working group in theory since its creation in 2012, but only meets as once-yearly JSR in practice	Minister (chair), MoGEI director generals (DGs), states, donors, UN, NGO, cluster, CSO, other ministries	Quarterly or biannual meetings in theory, once a year (as a JSR) in practice to date
Education Donor Group (EDoG)	Coordination forum for main 'development'-oriented sector donors since 2011	Donors (rotating chair), PEG representatives, cluster representatives, MoGEI (by occasional invitation)[78]	Regular (e.g. monthly) meetings in theory and practice (at times held virtually or outside country when staff was evacuated)
Joint Steering Committee (JSC)[79]	Coordinates 'big' programs since 2013, e.g. GPEP (GPE / USAID), Girls' Education in	Undersecretary (chair), DGs, GPE GA, GPE CA, UNESCO, main donors, observers	Quarterly meetings in theory and more or less so in practice in 2015-2016,

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[77] The NEF was created as a merger of the then- Budget Sector Working Group and the Education Reconstruction and Development Forum (ERDF), the main coordination bodies for the region of Southern Sudan pre-independence. Source: MoEST and UNESCO, Supporting Education Sector Coordination and Planning: a Proposal, 2013.

[78] Created in 2015 (source: GPE, *BTOR (email) for February 1-13 trip to Kenya, Eritrea, South Sudan*, June 1st, 2015). The latest version of the sector coordination manual (draft v5, December 2018, p.6, as obtained from MoGEI) notes that on EDoG "MoGEI shall be represented by the Director for Development Partners". However, in practice, MoGEI representatives, including from other directorates, have occasionally, but not always, attended by invitation. The GPE Secretariat country lead for South Sudan has also occasionally attended EDoG meetings, when in Juba.

[79] The latest version of the sector coordination manual (draft v5, December 2018, as obtained from MoGEI) also outlines a "Joint Programmes Operating Group" (JPOG) under the JSC and above the TWGs. However, this JPOG was not listed in the sector coordination sections of GESP I or GESP II and has not been active to date. It is thus not listed.

BODIES	MANDATE	MEMBERSHIP	ACTIVITY
	South Sudan (GESS, by DFID), Room to Learn (USAID), Improved Management of Education Delivery (IMED) and IMPACT (both EU)		until two projects closed in 2016
Education Cluster	Coordination forum for education in emergencies / humanitarian donors and implementing partners since 2011	UNICEF and Save the Children (co-leads), other donors / UN, implementing partners, NGOs, CSOs	Quite active, very frequent meetings during heightened crisis, somewhat less frequent at other times
Partners in Education Group (PEG)	A forum for NGOs to discuss and coordinate, created in 2015, chaired by MoGEI	MoGEI partner directorate (chair), national and international NGOs, CSOs, teachers' unions, etc.	Monthly meetings in theory, occasional in practice
National Education Coalition (NEC)	Another forum for NGOs, created in 2016, supported by CSEF grants in 2016/17, without MoGEI involvement	NEC Secretariat (chair), national and international NGOs, CSOs	Monthly meetings in theory, occasional in practice
State-level coordination instances	Fora, groups, also under the cluster system, which has 'state anchors' (leads)	State ministries of education, relevant state partners (donors, NGOs)	Rare, only in some states, only when funding is available
Others (e.g. technical working groups, TWGs)	The sector coordination structure (MoGEI, 2018) outlines provisions for up to 14 national TWGs	Ministry, donors, partners, as applicable to the technical / thematic area	Variable – some (e.g. transfer monitoring committee) meet regularly, others not yet constituted

57.   As a result, it is unclear which body constitutes (for GPE and sector-purposes) the 'Local Education Group' (LEG): the NEF is officially supposed to be the LEG and occasionally cited as such;[80] GPE documents frequently cite the EDoG as the de facto LEG;[81] and others still maintain that the LEG meets ad hoc (separately from the above fora), mostly to discuss GPE-related matters.[82] Similarly, civil society coordination also faces some duplication, as two NGO/CSO coalitions have been created in recent years, with largely identical membership (but PEG includes MoGEI, and NEC does not).

58.   Within any given forum, there are examples of proactive and successful coordination. Examples of coordination between development actors include coordination around School Management Committee toolkits (GPEP and GESS), a policy on school governance (GPEP and GESS), literacy and numeracy kits (GPEP and Room to Learn), strengthening of EMIS and sector-wide M&E strategy (GPEP and IMED).[83] Within the

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[80] For instance, authorship of the GESP I appraisal is cited as "National Education Forum / Local Education Group".

[81] For instance, GPE's South Sudan Briefing Note for Oslo Conference, June 2015, equates EDoG to the LEG, p.2.

[82] As per the latest version of the sector coordination manual (draft v5, December 2018), terms of reference for both the NEF and the EDoG cite them as being responsible for monitoring sector plan implementation. Terms of reference for the Education Cluster, the joint programmes operating group, and several technical working groups also outline the mandate for 'monitoring' the implementation of various activities falling within their purview.

[83] Source: GPEP 2015-2016 Progress report, February 2016, p.31.

humanitarian cluster, actors share "share who is doing what where" (donor) and coordinate data-collection missions, facilitated by a system of 'state anchors' (designated lead humanitarian partners, often NGOs, for each state/area of the country).

59.   However, evidence of knowledge-sharing, coordination, and collaboration *between* fora is mixed. On the one hand, the same organizations are represented on several fora (which allows for internal knowledge-sharing between their staff), and minutes from some fora indicate that updates from other fora are occasionally provided.

Box 3.3. The issue of humanitarian-development coordination in South Sudan

Several stakeholders remarked that humanitarian-development coordination in South Sudan historically has been less than optimal. Moreover, provisions set out in the first GESP have not been integrated into the work of the Education Cluster, which instead aligns its work with its own cluster response strategies. As a GPE Secretariat memo on South Sudan noted as early as 2014, "*the coherence between the (revised) education sector plan and the humanitarian response has to be improved. These are now still two separate plans, and more coherence is needed. For example, related to teacher training or to assuring examinations also for the internally displaced children in the camps. Should that be organized totally different from the normal examinations? Should one not use as well the same budget line for as in the ESP, and maybe only seek for some additional funds*?" [84] Issues of coordination continued throughout the 2012-2018 period, though fewer and fewer donors were active on the development (non-humanitarian) side of the sector, and even they only exhibited partial alignment with GESP I.

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60.   On the other hand, several stakeholders noted a divide, notably between humanitarian and development coordination (see box 3.3 above), and some interviewed stakeholders involved in one forum indicated limited awareness of what was going on in other fora. As one donor noted: "humanitarians live in their own world… emergency, emergency, emergency."

61.   Efforts have been made over the course of the 2012-2018 review period to improve some aspects of stakeholder coordination. These include (a) the creation of the MoGEI Partner Coordination unit in 2011, and its later upgrade by MoGEI to a directorate; (b) the creation of a MoGEI partner coordination manual in 2013 (supported by DFID, UNICEF and UNESCO) which outlines terms of reference for all key fora listed above in table 3.5, and which has been updated regularly in the years since; (c) the creation of two NGO/CSO groups in 2015/2016 (PEG led by MoGEI, NEC supported by a CSEF grant); and (d) several mappings of partners as early as 2013 and as recently as 2018, led by MoGEI's partner coordination unit together with the Education Cluster. These changes have added some clarity to the distribution of roles and have gradually supported the greater inclusion of civil society representatives in annual JSRs. However, overall coordination structures and practices have not fundamentally changed, and coordination manual provisions are not fully implemented. [85] Moreover, several actors remain unrepresented on sector dialogue mechanisms, including the national legislative committee on education, state-level representatives (other than at the annual NEF), teacher representatives (as South Sudan lacks a nationwide teachers' union), and a number of 'non-traditional' (non-Western) donors who have supported MoGEI in recent years (box 3.4).

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[84] Source: GPE, *South Sudan hand-over update*, June 30, 2014, p.1-2.

[85] A comparison shows that the October 2013 version of the Sector Coordination Manual and the December 2018 version outline largely the same fora, roles, and responsibilities. Yet many of these are not followed in practice, e.g. see comments on the NEF not actually meeting regularly at the top of this finding.

Box 3.4. Non-traditional donors in South Sudan – an oversight in sector coordination?

According to stakeholder interviews and news reports, China, Turkey and Egypt have provided, or have promised to provide, support to the South Sudanese education sector. Though data on specific activities, timelines and amounts was not available, at least one source suggests that Chinese experts supported the development of a curriculum framework for the first grade of primary school, and has as of 2018 printed and provided 1.3m million student and teacher textbooks "written by Chinese experts" to South Sudan.[86] Another source cites Turkey as also supporting the printing of textbooks as of 2018 (though it does not cite for which level of education).[87] Finally, a source cites Egypt helping South Sudan to develop Arabic and Islamic curricula.[88]

There is little evidence that these efforts were coordinated with GPE-backed activities, such as the development of a new South Sudanese curriculum in 2015 under the ESPIG 2018-2021, and the printing and distribution of textbooks aligned with this curriculum to all teachers and students nationwide, scheduled for 2019 under the AFF 2018-2019 and the ESPIG 2019-2021.

Minutes from EDoG, JSR and other meetings indicate that they are not represented on any sector coordination fora, and one EDoG donor confirmed that "in terms of alignment [with China] it's zero." This lack of coordination and information-sharing is a concern and may lead to the duplication of curricula and textbooks.

Representatives of China, Turkey and Egypt could not be reached by the evaluation team in Juba.

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62. Overall, stakeholders today have mixed perspectives on the quality of sector dialogue and coordination, ranging from describing them as "more than information-sharing" (MoGEI) to noting that "a lot could have been done better in terms of coordination" (donor). In general, they attributed limitations in coordination not to a lack of good will, but due to the difficult external context, which (a) led to frequent program interruptions and the transition from development to humanitarian assistance, and (b) turnover and occasional evacuation of international organizations' staff.[89] The humanitarian situation also led to the emergence of parallel fora, which, partly by definition, deliver where the government cannot, and are not designed to put the ministry in charge. As one MoGEI official noted, the multiplicity of coordination fora was "imposed on us" by different interests and donor groups. In general, MoGEI's ownership/leadership of sector dialogue was limited. However, it is unlikely for disjointed sector dialogue to have undermined sector progress much; it is rather the wide-spread violence that undermined both.

63. At the state-level, all stakeholders agreed that the level of coordination was weak and deteriorated, due to the multiplication of states over the course of the 2012-2018 period. UNESCO made plans to support state-level coordination in 2014 but these never fully came to fruition, due to the crisis.[90] Moreover, whereas each of the ten original state ministries of education used to have an EMIS focal point and a sector coordination focal point which communicated regularly with counterparts at MoGEI, this system was lost due to the multiplication of states as well as due to ongoing conflict.

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[86] See http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/03/WS5b8c8138a310add14f389245.html.

[87] See https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/south-sudan-turkey-sign-education-mou/.

[88] See http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/63271/South-Sudan-says-keen-to-benefit-from-Egypt-s-education.

[89] Regular turnover also affects coordination as the latter rests heavily on personal relationships. For instance, one donor noted that the Joint Steering Committee became temporarily less active following the departure of a key driver, DFID employee Richard Arden.

[90] Source: MoEST and UNESCO, Supporting Education Sector Coordination and Planning: a Proposal, 2013.

Strengths and weaknesses of sector monitoring

Finding 6:	**Sector monitoring in South Sudan centers on annual sector review events, which provide a unique opportunity for discussion, but do not meet JSR quality standards. Monitoring activities have not tracked or supported GESP I implementation and are at risk of not being meaningfully improved for GESP II.**

64.   Starting in late 2014, education sector stakeholders have gathered annually, usually in Juba around November, for a week-long annual Joint Sector Review (JSR) (also referred to as General Education Annual Review, GEAR, and/or as the National Education Forum, NEF). JSRs also took place in 2015 and 2017 (not in 2016 due to conflict, and not in 2018 although a belated session was held in early 2019). They are perceived as valuable opportunities for networking and information-sharing by several stakeholders: several MoGEI and state-level officials in particular noted that it was one of the few opportunities where representatives from all states were gathered in one place. This is significant in a country where conflict and flooding often make travel difficult and costly. However, these JSRs do not or only partially meet JSR quality standards, as outlined in GPE's JSR guidance (2018), and as tracked by GPE's results framework (indicator 18).[91] This low quality is, at one level, due to issues in their format and design: stakeholders consulted noted that JSRs are often a compendium of presentation upon presentation, particularly more recently due to the multiplication of states and efforts to allocate each of the now over thirty states time to speak. The low quality is driven at a deeper level by the fact that the GoSS lacks state capacity to enforce decisions taken at a national level,[92] and that donors noted that they do not rely on JSRs for their own monitoring. Thus, actors lack incentives or capacities to strengthen JSRs.

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[91] See GPE, "Joint Sector Review in the Education Sector: A Practical Guide for Organizing Effective JSRs", July 2018.

[92] Several ministerial orders released by MoGEI during the review period have not been implemented in practice, such as orders on a harmonized nationwide school calendar, on free and compulsory primary education, on peace clubs in all schools, on school inspections, and others. On the issue of school calendars, for instance, already noted in EDoG July 2015 meeting minutes, see GEAR 2017 Day 4 Report, p.3, for objections by states to implementation. A school-based stakeholder interviewed for this CLE confirmed the nationwide calendar has not yet been implemented.

Table 3.7   JSRs in South Sudan do not meet JSR quality standards as defined by GPE

JSR QUALITY STANDARDS[93]	GPE RF SCORE		EVALUATOR ASSESSMENT BASED ON DOCUMENTS (E.G. JSR AIDE-MEMOIRES, ETC.) AND CONSULTED STAKEHOLDERS
	2015 JSR (data from RF report 2017)	**2017 JSR** (data from RF report 2018)	
Participatory and inclusive	not rated	not rated	• Inclusive of state-level representatives, legislature, donors, and, increasingly since 2015, NGO/CSO representatives (PEG/NEC)[94] • Not inclusive of teachers' union,[95] of 'non-traditional' donors, or of private school groupings[96] (but inclusive of some faith-based NGOs). Some but limited representation of humanitarian actors, with moderate improvement more recently (2017 JSR). • Moderately participatory given tight schedule, but some 'discussion time' and 'group work' included in JSR agendas
Evidence-based	no	not rated	• Presentations mention EMIS, cluster, and/or state-level data as available, but general data limitations prevail • No 'annual implementation report' by MoGEI as input into JSR
Comprehensive / Aligned with shared policy frameworks	not rated	no	• Minister of higher education occasionally attends the JSR but limited discussion of higher education most years; all other key sub-sectors usually covered (TVET, AES, ECD, etc.). • No JSR report after 2014 mentions GESP I by name or reports against its strategies, indicators, or activities

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[93] JSR quality standards have evolved somewhat over time. The five JSR quality criteria scored by GPE's Results Framework (RF) indicator 18 are: (a) participatory and inclusive, (b) evidence-based, (c) comprehensive, (d) a monitoring instrument, and (e) anchored into effective policy cycle (source: GPE, Results Framework Indicators, Methodological Guidelines, version 8, June 2017, p.47). The five dimensions of an effective JSR outlined in GPE's guide for effective JSRs are: (a) inclusive and participatory, (b) aligned with shared policy frameworks, (c) evidence-based, (d) a monitoring tool, and, (e) an instrument for change embedded effectively into a policy cycle (source: GPE, Joint Sector Review in the Education Sector: A Practical Guide for Organizing Effective JSRs, July 2018, p.20). Table 3.7 lists five rows which capture both sets of standards, which ultimately overlap despite slight changes to the titles/names of each criterion over time. Years listed in the table header are years of results framework data-collection, which scored the South Sudan JSR from the previous year (i.e., GPE RF 2016 scored the 2015 JSR). Only two years of GPE RF scores were available at the time of this review. 'Not rated' indicates that GPE RF data does not provide a rating, likely due to insufficient evidence/information.

[94] Since 2015 JSR agendas have allocated time for civil society (PEG/NEC) input. This may not seem like a considerable achievement, but in a country whose civil society space is rated as 'closed' (the worse possible rating) by CIVICUS, even a beginning of civil society inclusion on sectoral fora may be deemed progress. https://monitor.civicus.org/

[95] There is no nationwide teachers' union in South Sudan at this time, but state-level union exist, and the CLE evaluation team met with representatives of one.

[96] There is presently no association of private schools of South Sudan. Source: CLE interviews.

JSR QUALITY STANDARDS[93]	GPE RF SCORE		EVALUATOR ASSESSMENT BASED ON DOCUMENTS (E.G. JSR AIDE-MEMOIRES, ETC.) AND CONSULTED STAKEHOLDERS
	2015 JSR (data from RF report 2017)	**2017 JSR** (data from RF report 2018)	
			• Repeated mentions in JSRs of General Education Act 2012, of various ministerial orders, and of the National Development Strategy (2017)
A monitoring tool	not rated	not rated	• JSRs do not monitor the implementation of recommendations from past JSRs
An instrument for change anchored in an effective policy cycle	no	no	• JSRs do make recommendations which stakeholders 'agree to implement' but no implementation matrix (with responsibilities, prioritization, timelines) is prepared

65.   As noted in table 3.7, JSRs have not monitored or supported GESP I implementation. More generally, there is little evidence that MoGEI or donors monitored and reported against GESP I or its action plan during the 2012-2018 review period. For instance, the evaluation team did not find evidence that MoGEI or state-level "monthly, quarterly and annual" reports, promised under the monitoring, reporting and evaluation chapter of GESP I (p.84 ff.), were regularly produced. A review of minutes from selected EDoG meetings (May 2014, June 2014, July 2015) also does not indicate any mention or monitoring of GESP I. Although it is too early to fully assess monitoring of GESP II, there are signs that it risks going the same way as GESP I. The evaluation team was unable to access "quarterly monitoring reports" by MoGEI, if any exist; these are promised under GESP II (p. 124) as well as under the MoGEI M&E policy (June 2017). Moreover, GESP II's transitional action plan outlines activities for 2017-2018 only, even though GESP II was only finalized in mid-2017. Now in 2019, it is not clear that a new action plan is being prepared, or that the existing one has been implemented and monitored.[97] As previously noted, the ongoing instability, the resulting lack of government resources and capacities, and low donor alignment to MoGEI plans are major hindrances.

66.   Sector monitoring is complicated by limitations in sector data. On the upside, there has been near-consistent donor support to data-collection efforts since independence (UNESCO 2016:2, box 2). MoGEI EMIS data has been collected in 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016 and 2018/19 (ongoing at the time of writing), and other donors (e.g. DFID) and Education Cluster stakeholders also maintain ongoing data-collection and -dissemination efforts. However, due to conflict, geographic data coverage has been incomplete most years, and for that reason it is difficult to compare data across years without estimates or adjustments based on various assumptions. Since independence, South Sudan has submitted comprehensive data to the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) only in 2011 and 2015.

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[97] This is not to say that no actions within that action plan is being implemented, or that no data on any relevant indicators is being collected. Indeed, there is evidence that progress is underway on both fronts. However, it is not clear that this implementation/data-collection is happening because of, or against, the GESP II or its action plan. When asked whether GESP II was being monitored, a senior governmental stakeholder answered that what was being monitored, by donors and the government together, are major donor development projects in the sector.

67.   All in all, there is limited evidence that there was mutual sector accountability centered on the sector plan. The sector plan was designed in peace and then rendered un-implementable in war; and consequently, was abandoned *as a plan*, though individual segments of it were still implemented as part of existing / new donor projects.[98] This has implications for sector plan implementation, as discussed in section 3.5.

GPE contributions to sector dialogue and monitoring

Finding 7:   GPE's financial and non-financial support has contributed to sustaining and enhancing some sector dialogue and monitoring mechanisms. However, overall, key country-level mechanisms of the GPE model (LEG, CA) are not fully operational in South Sudan, likely due to the difficult humanitarian context.

68.   GPE offers a series of financial and non-financial mechanisms to support sector dialogue and monitoring. Table 3.8 provides an overview of these mechanisms, grouped by whether they have made a significant, moderately significant, or no/limited contribution to mutual accountability in South Sudan. This grouping is indicative and does not constitute a formal score.

Table 3.8   GPE contributions to mutual accountability during the 2012-2018 review period

SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
• **ESPIG 2013-2018 funding** supported several aspects of sector monitoring, such as (a) annual JSRs 2014-2017, (b) EMIS in 2015, 2016 and 2018, and (c) the development of MoGEI's M&E policy, launched in 2017. Despite some weaknesses in each of these components, they were overall deemed significant by MoGEI and others.
• **GPE Secretariat support 2013-2018**: Secretariat country leads (CLs) for South Sudan contributed to maintaining and enhancing sector dialogue by (a) proactively coordinating conversations between key development donors, (b) commissioning a 2017 sectoral 'lessons learned' exercise, and (c) mediating conversations between the GA (UNICEF) and MoGEI (with a senior GoSS official crediting the Secretariat for doing so).[99]
• **ESPDG 2015 funding** supported two thirds of the costs of the ESA 2016, a key a data reference for the sector, and of the GESP II development process, which brought together stakeholders nationwide (see section 3.2). GPE's Results Framework indicator ten shows that in the year during which ESA data was collected, South Sudan reported eight out of 12 key indicators to UIS, as opposed to zero in 2014 .
MODERATE CONTRIBUTION TO MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

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[98] Sigsgaard 2013:15 suggests that the ESP may have been designed too late, since most donor projects were already finalized and approved by the time the GESP I was finalized. On the other hand, the same report notes that GESP I finalization was rushed – at the detriment of plan quality and ownership – in order to be completed for independence, so it is unclear how much earlier the plan could, realistically, have been finalized.

[99] Source (a): GPE, *South Sudan country update / hand-over note*, June 30, 2014, p.2, which notes: "the GPE Secretariat facilitated in the first months of 2014 various conference calls… the GPE Secretariat facilitated in the first months of 2014 various conference calls… (GPE's comparative advantage as convening power: -)." Source (b): GPE, BTOR (email) South Sudan August 21-25 trip, September 5th, 2017, which notes that "sector coordination and information sharing in South Sudan is currently relatively limited among key partners", that GPE will fund a workshop in Juba, and that "a key objective for the workshop would therefore be for partners to have a better understanding of each other's priorities and forthcoming programming in the sector". The source of funding for that workshop is not fully clear, but appears to be drawn from Secretariat, not ESPIG, funds. Source (c): see footnote after next.

- **ESPIG funding requirement 1 (credible plan)**: the requirement of a credible ESP somewhat supported sector dialogue, by partially motivating two reasonably consultative ESP development processes. However, GESP I development was underway prior to GPE's announcement of its initial indicative allocation for South Sudan, and GESP I was not ultimately at the center of sector dialogue / monitoring during the review period. For GESP II, stakeholders from all groups found that GESP II consultations provided a welcome opportunity for dialogue on key sector issues.

- **ESPIG 2013-2018 implementation**: GPE was one of the 'big four' non-humanitarian programs represented on the EDoG and the JSC. Though GPEP did not drive these fora more than the other three programs, it was actively involved with them and contributed to a spirit of coordination an information-sharing, which though declined after 2016 due to the uptick in fighting and donor staff evacuation (ESPIG evaluation 2018, p,6).

- **CSEF funding 2016/2017** supported the establishment of NEC which organizes CSO meetings and represents them at JSRs, indirectly contributing to greater NGO/CSO participation (from low levels).[100]

- **Secretariat advocacy for civil society**: GPE supported South Sudan' attendance at an international GPE workshop (Norway, 2015) with Nepal and Malawi to discuss how to foster CSO participation in the education sector. The workshop's country-level results are not clear, but at least one CSO stakeholder interviewed in Juba credited "GPE guidelines" for encouraging MoGEI to increasingly make space for civil society.

- **Global GPE events**: two senior MoGEI official noted that the fact that GPE invited not only MoGEI officials but also civil society representatives to global events (e.g. GPE's replenishment conference 2018 in Dakar) was positive and contributed to strengthening the link between the ministry and civil society.

- **Consultative ESPIG 2019-2021 application process**: documents and many stakeholders (five donors, one NGO, one MoGEI) praised GPE for being one of few sector partners to let the country lead program design and to then invites sector-wide feedback on said design, arguing that it supported dialogue and alignment.[101] One donor noted: "These [GPE funds] are the only funds where you need MoGEI's signature!" However, other stakeholders (two donors, one NGO, one state official) questioned the depth of ESPIG consultations, referencing tight timelines, limited consultation beyond the EDoG, and little time for review, as ESPIG review meetings were called at short notice.

LIMITED/NO CONTRIBUTION TO MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

- **CA**: at least three stakeholders (two MoGEI officials, one donor) described the CA role as "not very effective" (MoGEI) in supporting mutual accountability over the course of the review period to be limited. The CA was perceived as a GPE-, rather than a sector-wide mechanism, as noted in MoGEI's coordination manual (2015).

- **GA**: in view of mixed CA proactivity (see above), some stakeholders noted that the GA (UNICEF) stepped in to call and convene sector meetings, albeit primarily in relation to GPE processes. Moreover, the GA and the government experienced "points of tension" with regards to the administration of funds and the channeling of activities through third parties (NGOs). These were mediated with assistance of the GPE Secretariat.[102]

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[100] To date, CSEF funds have supported the establishment of NEC as a coalition; consultative processes in this regard with various stakeholders, the functions of a NEC coordinator; and the organization of meetings. Concrete 'results' of NEC work are not yet fully clear, as activities have been delayed due to issues in signing hosting agreements for NEC (at Oxfam) and due to ongoing insecurity and conflict, which renders work challenging. Source: CLE interviews and GPE, "Civil Society Education Fund (CSEF) Profile One Pager for the South Sudan National Education Coalition (NEC)", n.d. Of note, NEC is mentioned in the latest, 2018 version of the MoGEI sector coordination manual.

[101] The 2014 GPE country lead notes that the finalization of ESPIG/GPEP design in late 2013 involved MoGEI, UNICEF, GPE, USAID, UNESCO, DFID, the EU, and the EAC, and that this "was a major step forward in coordination and harmonization in South Sudan." (GPE, *South Sudan hand-over note*, June 30, 2014, p.1).

[102] The "points of tension" wording is drawn from GPE, *BTOR (email) South Sudan August 21-25 trip*, September 5th, 2017. The same BTOR notes that GPE Secretariat was preparing to fund a workshop in Juba to resolve tensions

- **LEG**: as noted in finding 3, a LEG never properly emerged in South Sudan. Meetings of the National Education Forum, expected to play the role of the LEG (regular meetings), were frequently scheduled, but cancelled given violence, crisis, or lack of funds. Other fora were not sector wide and focused on the implementation of major projects (including GPEP), not on plan implementation or monitoring. Meetings related to GPE processes (ESP and ESPIG review) were at times conducted by the EDoG and perceived as *ad hoc* meetings focused on GPE.
- **Technical guidance / knowledge-sharing**: evidence did not point to any GPE-generated global-level guidance or knowledge products which contributed to enhanced mutual accountability in 2012-2018 in South Sudan, likely because GPE has only much more recently developed guidance for countries on this topic.[103]
- **GPE global efforts to improve collaboration among humanitarian-development actors**: GPE and UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding in April 2016 in order to encourage UNHCR participation in LEGs. However, beyond being consulted during the GESP II process, UNHCR has not been actively involved in non-humanitarian sector fora in South Sudan. Similarly, GPE is a member of the 'global partnership' of the global Education Cluster,[104] and the latter's strategic plan 2017-2019 (Global Education Cluster 2017:24) aims to link the work of national education clusters to national sector strategies. However, there is no evidence that the cluster is increasingly aligning its work with sector plans in South Sudan (see box 3.3 above).

NOT APPLICABLE / TOO EARLY TO TELL

- **Most recent ESPIG 2019-2021 and related funding requirements**: there is no evidence that fixed tranche data-related funding requirements for the ESPIG 2019-2021 ('availability of critical data or of a plan to generate it') have stimulated sector monitoring, e.g. by influencing GESP II or its monitoring to date.[105] The ESPIG 2019-2021 itself is scheduled to provide funding for future school censuses, the consolidation of sector data from various databases, and a series of learning assessments.[106] It is too early to tell results.
- **Variable tranche mechanism**: South Sudan for now remains exempt from the variable tranche mechanism.

69.   Overall, while GPE has been able to (partially) influence some processes/mechanisms for sector dialogue and monitoring, this has not visibly changed the nature/extent of mutual accountability, which remains fragmented and unsystematic, as noted in finding 3 and 4. This is due to the conflict, to limited governmental state capacities and financial resources on all fronts, to the limited attention paid to GESP I by any stakeholder including donors, and to the humanitarian-development divide which has not been bridged. In other words, GPE may have contributed to dialogue, but the result is still relatively weak. This has implications for sector financing and plan implementation, discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5.

70.   The evaluation did not encounter evidence of significant unplanned negative effects of GPE's support. Though some stakeholders noted that separate EDoG / NEF meetings were occasionally scheduled to focus exclusively or near-exclusively on GPE-related processes (e.g. ESPIG application), such meetings are not likely to have caused the overall limited functionality of sector coordination mechanisms, and their negative contribution thereto, if any, is likely to have been small relative to other factors. One possible *positive*, unexpected consequence of GPE support is that it brought together stakeholders from

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between stakeholders. A senior governmental stakeholder interviewed for this CLE also credited the GPE Secretariat for helping to facilitate conversations between MoGEI and the ESPIG GA (UNICEF).

[103] GPE's JSR guidance (2018) is too recent to have had noticeable effects on the quality of JSRs in South Sudan at the time of writing, and it was not mentioned by interviewed stakeholders.

[104] See http://educationcluster.net/about-us/education-cluster-global-partners/, as of March 2019.

[105] Evidence presented for these requirements in the ESPIG 2019-2021's application (August 2018 version, pp.6-8) is based on general statements ("The Ministry intends…"), and/or on activities to be funded by the ESPIG itself. That is, the ESPIG application relies a lot on its own forthcoming funding to satisfy requirements, with little GESP II reference.

[106] Source: ESPIG 2019-2021 Program Document, September 2018 version (v23).

opposing factions for JSRs and for consultations on GESP II development (both processes funded by GPE). UNESCO 2016:14 argues that this provided unique and productive opportunities for exchange between warring parties on the topic of education, and ultimately, on the topic of collaborative nation-building.

Additional factors beyond GPE support

71.   Additional **positive** factors beyond GPE support that likely contributed to strengthening processes and mechanisms for mutual accountability include (a) financial support from other donors for coordination related activities, such as EU and UNICEF funding for EMIS (cf. UNESCO 2016:2), DFID support to MoGEI's partner directorate for the development of a sector coordination manual in 2013, UNESCO support to state-level coordination,[107] humanitarian funding for Education Cluster activities, and IMED (EU) funding for a visit of South Sudanese officials to The Gambia to learn from the latter's effective sector monitoring mechanism (see CLE report on The Gambia, country 4 in this series); (b) the active participation of other big donors in sector coordination mechanisms, such as EDoG and the JSC, and attempts to foster increased alignment;[108] and (c) the relative stability in domestic/regional staff of MoGEI and implementing partners, which supported institutional memory and relationships at a time of heavy international turnover and occasional evacuation.

72.   Additional **negative** factors which limited the basis for *mutual accountability* between key sector stakeholders include: (a) the ongoing conflict, resulting domestic tensions, and resulting turnover and occasional evacuation of international staff; (b) the dire fiscal situation of the GoSS (see section 3.4 on sector financing), which meant that only activities directly funded by donors were implemented, and the government was in a weak position to redirect or refuse funding or activities; (c) the incomplete control of the GoSS over its national territory during the 2012-2018 review period meant that humanitarian actors took over the lead for activities in certain areas (including, but not only, for refugees/IDPs for which they have an international mandate); and (d) the low basis of general capacities, compounded by the creation of new states in 2015 and again in 2017, which created many new institutions with very limited or no staff, resources, and ability to work.

Implications for GPE's ToC and country-level operational model

Finding 8:   **The quality of GPE country-level processes hinge on the diligent efforts of several country-level actors (DCP, LEG, CA). In crisis contexts' such as South Sudan's, these actors may be too stretched to prioritize sector-wide processes. This creates risks for GPE's country-level operational model, which does not currently provide strong instruments to mediate such a situation.**

73.   GPE is a unique donor in that its model relies on a set of country-level actors to support its country-level operations. However, in the context of South Sudan's humanitarian crisis, one key assumption of GPE's country-level ToC was found not to hold, namely, that "Stakeholders have the opportunities (resources, time, conducive environment) to work together to solve sector issues." Occasional evacuations

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[107] Based on the following funding request document: UNESCO, *Supporting Education Sector Coordination and Planning: A Proposal from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and UNESCO*, 2013. It could not be established whether or not the request was approved, and the activities were undertaken and completed.

[108] Source: GPE's *BTOR South Sudan January 11-15 trip*, 2016, notes that a DFID representative suggested considering a pooled funding mechanism for the future (p.3). EDoG members' interest in this option is again noted in GPE's BTOR South Sudan trip, June 2016 (p.1). On the topic of pooled funding, see also sector financing section 3.4 in this report.

of international staff, constant urgency and shifting priorities did not present a conducive environment for mutual accountability.

74.   As an example, the coordination work expected from the coordinating agency (CA) was rendered challenging when USAID, the CA, was barred by congressional orders from engaging directly with the GoSS due to the crisis. Moreover, regular staff evacuations and the lack of a dedicated USAID education specialist in Juba until late 2018 hindered the CA from proactively fostering sector-wide dialogue. Finally, USAID's withdrawal of funds from two non-humanitarian sector programs in 2016 (GPEP and Room to Learn) diminished its leverage over MoGEI and the EDoG (even though those funds were reinvested into humanitarian support for South Sudan, via UNICEF).[109]

75.   The weakness of the CA contributed to several of the noted weaknesses of sector coordination in South Sudan, such as few if any NEF meetings (the forum that should have been the LEG), limited monitoring of the GESP II, and meetings related to GPE processes for the review/endorsement of ESPs / ESPIGs being called with delays and often at short notice. This, in turn, had ramifications for other elements of GPE's ToC, such the quality of ESPs and ESPIGs. Stakeholders noted that because meetings were called with delays and drafts were shared at short notice, they could not prepare proper feedback, and ESP and ESPIG review meetings were akin to "rubberstamping" (donor).

76.   In this regard, two donors (not themselves current CAs) pointed out that the GPE model for the role of a CA assumes that a CA will undertake their responsibilities *pro bono*. Stakeholders were candid in pointing out that the lack of dedicated funding for CAs may have contributed to the limited effectiveness of the mechanism, as CAs may be reticent to dedicate busy staff to coordination efforts, especially in highly volatile crisis settings such as South Sudan. They thus encouraged GPE to consider funding CAs, just as GPE funds GAs through PDGs to lead ESPIG development processes. Though the proposal to fund CAs has wider ramifications that cannot be adjudicated on the basis of this CLE alone, it hints at the fact that the current GPE country-level operational model does not have strong safeguards in place to mitigate possible weaknesses of the country-level actors it relies on.

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[109] DFID supported USAID as 'co-CA' in the sector, but also faced challenges due to staff evacuations. Overall, at least two stakeholder types (GoSS, EDoG) remarked that neither USAID nor DFID were able to fully fulfil the CA role.

3.4 GPE contributions to sector financing

77. This section addresses the following evaluation questions:

- How has education sector financing (domestic and international, quantity and quality) evolved during the 2012-2018 period under review? (CEQ 1.5)

- Has GPE contributed to leveraging additional education sector financing and improving the quality of financing? If so, then how? If not, then why not? (CEQ 1.6) Have there been unintended, positive or negative, consequences of GPE financial and non-financial support? (CEQ 3.2)

- What factors other than GPE support are likely to have contributed to the observed changes (or lack thereof) in sector financing? (CEQ 3.1)

- What are implications of evaluation findings for GPE support to South Sudan? (Key Question IV)

78. A high-level overview of evaluation findings on sector financing is provided in table 3.9. These observations are elaborated on through the findings and supporting evidence presented below.

Table 3.9   Overview: CLE findings on sector financing and related likelihood of GPE contributions

PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS MORE/BETTER EDCUATION SECTOR FINANCING					LIKELIHOOD[110] OF GPE CONTRIBUTIONS TO[111]:			UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS APPLIED?[112]	
Total gov. education expenditure	Education share of gov. budget	Met 20% Goal?[113]	Total intl. education financing to country	Quality of intl. financing	Share of gov. financing	Amount of intl. financing	Quality of intl. sector financing	GPE has leverage on gov. finance	Context permits domestic or ODA improvement
Decrease overall between 2011 and 2017	**Decrease** overall between 2011 and 2017	No	**Increase** overall between 2011 and 2017	**Decrease** overall between 2011 and 2017	**Weak**.	**Modest**.	**Weak**.	1	2

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[110] Note that, different from similar tables in previous sections, the summary focuses on the 'likelihood' rather than the 'degree' of GPE contributions. This reflects the nature of the respective change processes, which make it difficult to elicit evidence on direct links between GPE support and observed changes.

[111] Assessment is based on (i) existence/absence of positive change in respective area; (ii) stakeholder views on likelihood of GPE support/funding criteria having influenced domestic or international funding decisions; (iii) absence or existence of additional factors that are as/more likely than GPE support to explain noted trends.

[112] For sector financing, the two underlying assumptions in the country level ToC were: (1) GPE has sufficient *leverage* to influence the amount and quality of domestic education sector financing, and (2) *External (contextual) factors* permit national and international stakeholders to increase/improve the quality of sector financing.

[113] One of GPE's ESPIG funding requirements is that 20 percent of government expenditure be invested in education, or that government expenditure on education show an increase toward the 20 percent threshold.

Characteristics of sector financing during the 2012-2018 review period

| Finding 9: | Government spending on education in South Sudan is low at less than five percent of total expenditures and, after a brief improvement, funding in absolute amounts collapsed in 2016 along with other governmental expenditures, due to oil revenue collapse and hyperinflation. Funding gaps are even larger than the large gaps anticipated in plans. Salaries are not always paid and have dwindled in real value. |

79.   Government spending on education is very low in South Sudan. In 2016, the government spent US$47 per primary student (UIS, 2016 US$), or roughly one tenth of GPE's estimate of the annual cost of educating a child for a year in a developing country.[114] Moreover, spending per child was 29 percent lower in 2016 than at independence (2011), when expenditures per primary student where US$66 (2016 dollars).

Table 3.10   Government sector financing deteriorated during the review period[115]

CATEGORY	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	TREND
Total domestic education expenditure, all levels, current US$ (millions), UIS	144	*	122	227	204	163	28**	Up then down
Total non-tertiary domestic education expenditure, current US$ (millions), UIS	107	*	93	171	148	80	20**	Up then down
Expenditure on education as a share of total governmental expenditure, UIS	4.0%	*	3.2%	4.1%	3.3%	0.8%	1.0%	Down
Expenditure on education as a share of GDP, UIS	0.8%	*	1.1%	1.5%	1.4%	1.5%	1.0%	Fluctuating
Share of Basic Education domestic spending relative to total education spending, UIS	63%	*	69%	63%	60%	40%	53%	Down

*not available from UIS. **large drops in real spending largely due to hyper-inflation and oil revenue collapse

80.   **Total government education expenditure**: As shown in Table 3.10, total governmental sector allocations have fluctuated over the 2012-2018 review period, driven primarily by the status of overall governmental expenditures. In 'better' years with decent oil revenue, such as 2011 and 2014-2016, the government spent US$150-200m on the entire education sector (current US$, UIS). [116] In 2013 and 2017, however, sector financing collapsed along with national oil revenues, dipping below $30m in 2017, a drop

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[114] 478 US$ in 2016 dollars, based on a conversion of the US$457 in 2012 dollars cited in this post: https://www.globalpartnership.org/funding/education-costs-per-child, retrieved March 3, 2019.

[115] This table draws on UIS data. Other available sources include UNESCO 2018a, World Bank 2018, and data from GPE's Results Framework (indicator 10). Details drawing on multiple all sources are provided in the text and in Appendix X. Sources were triangulated and despite some differences in point-estimates and some data issues (documents not providing full details on data source and methodology; issues with adjusting for inflation in periods of hyper-inflation; data gaps in certain years), all sources point to the same overarching trends and situations.

[116] UIS data in constant (inflation-adjusted) US dollars was not available. UIS data in current US dollars is provided instead, which accounts for significant SSD depreciation after 2015, but does not account for the mild depreciation of current US dollars over time. Real domestic fund trends in South Sudan are thus even a little worse than outlined.

of over 80 percent relative to 2016 (current US$ UIS). This drop is due to (a) the 80 percent collapse of government expenditure across all sectors from 2015 (US$5 billion) to 2017 (US$1 billion);[117] (b) hyperinflation, wherein the South Sudanese Pound (SSP) lost more than 75 percent of its value between mid-2016 and mid-2017;[118] and (c) the fact that actual disbursements often lag far behind approved (voted) budgets.[119]

81.   **Sector plan funding**: Consequently, the GoSS has not been able to maintain its anticipated support to GESP 2012-2017. Even the most conservative GESP I funding scenario, which foresaw a funding gap of 70 percent (5 billion SSP, roughly US$1.5 billion in 2012), anticipated that the GoSS would spend 438m SSP/year (roughly US$125m/year in 2012) to finance the plan (GESP I:79). In fact, nominal outturns for general (non-higher) education have fluctuated around 250m SSP/year between 2011 and 2017, and their real and US$ value has been eroded over time by hyperinflation (cf. UNESCO 2018a:62).[120] For GESP II, a worst-case funding gap of 34 percent (1.7 billion constant 2015 SSP, roughly US$500m) was anticipated, cumulatively, for 2017-2022. No post-2017 domestic spending data was available at the time of writing, but all stakeholders agreed that peace and resumption of oil flows were the preconditions for any success in plan funding.

82.   **Recurrent vs capital expenditures**: Interviewed donor and ministry stakeholders confirmed that the government has had no money for capital expenditures since 2014, with activities like construction and other investments relying entirely on external support (cf. UNESCO 2018a:61). Governmental expenditures have been concentrated on salaries, but with the collapse of government revenue post-2016, salaries of both officials and teachers have not been paid regularly, and lost value due to hyperinflation.[121]

83.   **Education spending as a share of total government expenditures**: As a share of total government expenditures, education spending has failed to meet either the GPE-recommended 20 percent mark, or the bar of 15 percent set by the General Education Act 2012. Since 2011, less than six percent of total governmental expenditures have been allocated to education. There has been no marked progress towards these standards, since this share has slowly decreased over time.[122] The bulk of governmental

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[117] Constant US$. Source: World Bank, *South Sudan Economic Update*, July 2018. P.10, Figure 16.

[118] Source: ibid, p.4, Figure 3, as well as ESA 2016:44, which notes exchange rates of 3 SSP/USD until early 2015, 12 SSP/USD in mid-2015, 16 SSP/USD in October 2015, 19 SSP/USD in December 2015, and 35 SSP/USD by mid-March 2016, with monthly inflation rates exceeding 200 percent in some months of 2016. As of late 2018, the rate was 130 SSP/USD. These figures are based on the commercial rate; the parallel rate depreciated even more.

[119] Source: UNESCO, *Global Initiative on Out of School Children: South Sudan Case Study,* 2018. P.62, Figure 33.

[120] This data from UNESCO 2018a may appear to differ somewhat from domestic spending data in row one of Table 3.10. The reasons is (a) UNESCO 2018a data excludes tertiary funding whereas row one in Table 3.10 includes it, and (b) UNESCO 2018a data is cited in SSP (not clear whether current or constant), and UIS data is in US$, and conversation from one to the other is very challenging given rapidly evolving inflation rates in the period. In any case, the key point here is to compare budgeted versus actual outturns from one given source (UNESCO 2018a).

[121] A secondary teacher monthly salary is 2000 South Sudanese pounds, which used to be worth US$200 but is now worth US$11 US or less (cf. ESA 2016:44). Salaries have not been adjusted to hyperinflation given lack of funds.

[122] From 4 percent in 2011 to 1 percent in 2017, according to UIS data (based on actual expenditures; UIS counts debt spending as part of government expenditure); and from 5 percent in 2012/13 to 3 percent in 2017/18, according to data from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (based on approved budgets), see UNESCO 2018a:61. GPE's own results framework data (indicator 10) suggests that education's share of total expenditures (excluding debt service) remained stable between 2012/13 (5.4 percent) and 2015/16 (5.5 percent), which is in line with other datasets but does not capture dramatic fiscal deterioration in South Sudan in 2017/2018.

expenditures in this period have been oriented towards defense and security. South Sudan's allocation of recurrent expenditures to education is the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa.[123]

84.   **Modest signs of progress:** Despite this discouraging picture, the 2012-2018 review period showed four signs that the government is committed to education. First, several sources show increases in governmental allocations to education for the 2014-2016 period, prior to financial collapse in 2016/17. This period notably included the introduction of school capitation grants (CGs) and cash transfers for girls (CTs) to support the elimination of school fees at the primary level. The GoSS funded CGs for almost all primary schools nationwide in the review period, and also substantially co-funded CTs.[124] Second, the education budget has faired relatively better than comparable social sectors, such as health: education's share of total government expenditures has exceeded health's share in all years for which data is available, both in terms of approved budgets, and of actual expenditures.[125] One interviewee also noted that the government at least ambitions to pay teacher salaries, whereas most health sector workers are not even on government payrolls. Third, two donors and a senior official noted that the government displayed a commitment to education by not interfering with the delivery of education services, and even financial support, to areas held by opposition forces. Finally, a survey of South Sudanese officials conducted by UNDP towards the development of the latest South Sudan National Development Strategy (SSNDP 2018-2021) revealed that education was ranked the second-highest priority after peace, ahead of health, hunger, and other issues.[126]

85.   **Allocations by sub-sector**: Governmental education expenditures have broadly prioritized basic education (pre-primary, primary, lower secondary), which has been allocated half or more of sectoral spending since independence, despite a light decrease of its share from 63 percent in 2011 to 53 percent in 2017 (UIS).[127] South Sudan has thus met the GPE-recommended minimum allocation of 45 percent of sectoral expenditures to primary education, for countries with a Primary Completion Rate (PCR) below 95 percent.

86.   **Household education spending**: Given the dearth of public financing for education, South Sudanese households are a key source of domestic education financing. Although the ESA 2016 collected no household-level data (cf. p.73), the CESR 2012 estimated that households spent roughly 50 percent as much as the government on education in 2009. This share is likely to have increased in recent years, given the decrease in government spending, the collapse in teacher salaries, and the parallel rise of school fees, examination fees, and private schools, despite primary school being officially free.

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[123] Source: ESA 2016, p.75, Figure 3.3.

[124] In 2017, for instance, the GoSS provided capitation grants to 3,045 primary and 238 pre-primary schools, and GESS provided capitation grants to 270 secondary and 264 primary schools. Throughout the review period, the GoSS was expected to fund primary CGs and GESS would fund secondary CGs; however, in crisis years such as 2016 when GoSS income collapsed, GESS stepped in to fund primary schools, too. In 2017, the GoSS returned to funding 90 percent of primary school grants. Sources: GESS Annual Review December 2017, which also lists figures on CTs.

[125] Sources: WB 2018:5 for budget data, 2015/16-2018/19; ESA 2016:43 for outturns data, 2011/12-2014/15; and UNESCO 2018a:61 for budget data, 2012/13 to 2017/18. All data sources support the point made in the main text.

[126] Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and UNDP, *South Sudan National Development Strategy*, 2018, p.67. The same strategy targets an education sector allocation of 15 percent by 2021 (p.59), versus 7 for health (p.60).

[127] Data from GEAR 2017, presented in UNESCO 2018a:60, suggests that the share of the education budget allocated to primary education has remained broadly stable from 49 percent in 2013 to (still) 49 percent in 2017.

Finding 10:   Education ODA has grown significantly since independence, but international financing has been disrupted significantly by conflict, segmented between humanitarian and development programming, and overall become less aligned to government systems, and less harmonized between donors.

87.   South Sudan has received a significant amount of ODA since independence, by both national and international standards. Nationally, ODA overtook total government expenditures in 2016, due principally to a collapse of the latter. Internationally, the country received 174 USD per capita in net ODA flows in 2017, among the highest levels worldwide (OECD-CRS). Total ODA has grown significantly and near-continuously since independence, from US$378m in 2011 to US$2.2 billion in 2017.

88.   Education ODA also increased significantly over the 2012-2018 review period, more than doubling in inflation-adjusted terms, from US$49m in 2011 to US$129m in 2017. On average, between 2011-2017, roughly 40 percent of these funds have been disbursed through humanitarian channels (principally the Education Cluster, funded through annual humanitarian appeals coordinated by OCHA), with the remainder funded through 'development' programming. Of the latter, the share allocated to basic education doubled over the course of the period, from 32.5 percent in 2011 to 72 percent in 2017.[128]

89.   The rise of education ODA has broadly kept pace with the rise of overall ODA flows. After 2011 – which proved to be an outlier year, in which 13 percent of total ODA were allocated to education – education's share of total ODA fluctuated around six percent for the remainder of the 2012-2017 period, with education ODA growing in line with total ODA. Throughout the period, education attracted a stable average of roughly ten percent of development financing, and a fluctuating average of roughly three percent of humanitarian appeal financing. Whilst this latter share falls below the recommended four percent allocation of humanitarian assistance to education, it falls above the current global average allocation of two percent.[129] Moreover, education appeals were exceptionally, and over time increasingly, well-funded (e.g. 117 percent in 2018), often more so than other sectors.[130]

Table 3.11   Education ODA has increased significantly in absolute terms between 2011 and 2017

FLOW	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	TREND
Total ODA, all sectors, million US$, humanitarian and development	378	1,088	1,278	1,809	1,683	1,607	2,156	Rising
Total education ODA (humanitarian and development), million US$	49	61	88	79	115	113	129	Rising
Total education ODA (humanitarian only), million US$	20	13	24	24	33	25	44	Rising
Total education ODA (development only), million US$	29	48	63	55	81	88	85	Rising

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[128] OCHA FTS data does not allow a similar breakdown by sub-sector to be done for humanitarian education funding.

[129] The four percent minimum recommended target was agreed by the Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) in 2011. See United Nations, *Global Education First Initiative: an Initiative of the UN Secretary-General*, 2011, p. 24. The two percent current allocation is noted in Global Education Cluster, *Strategic Plan 2017-2019 Revision*, August 2017, p.32.

[130] In fact, whereas the 2011-2018 average of the Education Clusters' share of total appeal volume was three percent, its average share of actual funding received was 3.2 percent.

FLOW	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	TREND
Education ODA as % of total ODA (humanitarian and development)	13.0%	5.6%	6.9%	4.4%	6.8%	7.0%	6.0%	Fluctuating
Basic education ODA (development only), million US$	9	17	21	31	54	56	61	Rising
Basic education ODA as % of total education ODA (development only)	32.5%	34.8%	33.6%	55.8%	66.2%	63.5%	71.7%	Rising

Figures represent actual disbursements in million US$, constant 2016 values (i.e. inflation-adjusted), rounded. Sources: OECD CRS, OCHA Financial Tracking Services (FTS), GPE. OECD figures adjusted to include GPE contributions. No complete dataset for 2018 was yet available at the time of writing.

90.   Whilst sector ODA increased steadily overall, its quality and predictability was limited over the course of the 2012-2018 review period, and arguably lower than it had been pre-independence. All stakeholders highlighted how "the December 2013 [conflict] incident changed the aid architecture" (GoSS official): donor projects were repeatedly interrupted, either closed entirely or re-packaged from development to humanitarian funding. As one donor noted: "Education in emergencies was almost taking over everything". DFID and GPE were the only two major donors who 'staid the course' throughout the 2012-2018 review period with major development projects launched before the 2013 crisis. Other major sector actors of that time, including USAID, EU and JICA (Japan), partially or entirely retreated from funding 'development' education work between 2014 and 2016.[131]

91.   The ongoing crisis, as well as the increasing use of humanitarian response mechanisms, also affected donors' selection of funding modalities. Before and around independence, the autonomous region of South Sudan received support through relatively harmonized funding modalities, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (2005-2013), which "placed the government in key governance and implementation roles."[132] Donors began to shift away from such pooled funds that placed the GoSS in a prominent implementation role as early as 2008, and almost entirely abandoned such modalities once civil war erupted in 2013; most work is now implemented by 'partners' (international and national NGOs).[133] During the 2012-2018 review period, neither development nor humanitarian donors aligned their programmes with GESP I: the initial concept notes for DFID's GESS and the EU's IMPACT do not refer to GESP I or II at all,[134] and the Education

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[131] USAID prematurely interrupted its contributions to the Global Partnership for Education Program (GPEP) and Room to Learn (R2L) in 2016. The European Union interrupted its IMED programme in 2016 and delayed and downscaled its new IMPACT program from 2016-2020 to 2017-2020, and from 45m to 32m Euros. Source: EU, Impact South Sudan Addendum Two, Rider number 1 to Action Fiche for the implementation of the Horn of Africa Window, T05 – EUTF – HoA – SS – 06, no date, p.1. JICA fully interrupted its activities in 2014-2015, and operated from Kampala for most of the review period (2013-2018).

[132] Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (2013), *Independent Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund South Sudan (MDTF-SS)*, Final Report, July 25th, p.18.

[133] One exception was mentioned by an interviewed GoSS official: World Bank local government support grants, which are partly channelled through GoSS and state-level accounts.

[134] The DFID document only cites the draft South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP). Sources: (a) DFID, *GESS Business Case and Summary 202511*, published August, 2017, document date not indicated, likely 2011. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202511/documents, December 2018. (b) EU, *IMPACT South Sudan Addendum 2, Rider number 1 to Action Fiche for the implementation of the Horn of Africa Window,* T05 – EUTF – HoA – SS – 06, date not indicated, likely 2015/16.

Cluster's annual strategies equally do not mention the GESP.[135] This lack of alignment can be linked to two main reasons: (a) the humanitarian nature of work, which is always less aligned to government systems, not least because it is not possible to work through the government in areas of the country it does not control; and (b) capacity/accountability issues encountered by some donors who had channelled funds through the government in the past, and who are since reticent to do so.[136]

92.   Finally, the crisis had mixed effects on donor harmonization. On the one hand, humanitarian funding, centrally managed by the Education Cluster with support from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), operates out of a common pool with a set of agreed-upon 'state anchor' organizations to further coordinate activities locally. On the other hand, development funding has moved in the other direction. Whereas pre-independence, a major cross-sectoral, multi-donor trust fund existed, there have been no significant pooled or co-funded initiatives in South Sudan in recent years, other than the GPE/USAID co-funded GPEP, from which USAID withdrew early. This is despite the fact that interviews and documents reveal several efforts towards such a pooled fund: GPE Secretariat reports on country missions to South Sudan in January 2016 and June 2016 cite EDoG conversations between key donors with regards to the possible establishment of a pooled fund, and of potential plans (never realized) of DFID and USAID co-funding for the EU's IMPACT program. However, for reasons further discussed under 'additional factors' below, no donor harmonization in terms of development funding has occurred in recent years.

GPE contributions to sector financing

Finding 11:	GPE's greatest contribution in the 2012-2018 review period was its own ESPIG funding, which continued to support development activities aligned to GESP I when most donors moved to humanitarian funds. However, GPE's ESPIG was only two percent of overall sector funding, and GPE was not able to substantially influence the quantity or quality of other domestic or international funds.

93.   GPE offers a series of financial and non-financial mechanisms to support the quantity and quality of domestic and international sector financing. Table 3.12 provides an overview of these mechanisms, grouped by whether they are likely to have made a significant, moderately significant, or no/limited contribution in South Sudan. This grouping does not constitute a formal score.

Table 3.12   GPE contributions to sector financing during the 2012-2018 review period

SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DOMESTIC FINANCING	SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
• (none)	• **ESPIG funds**: overall, during the 2012-2017 GESP I period, GPE's ESPIG of US$36.1m provided two percent of total sector funding, six percent of total sector ODA (US$584m in 2012-2017, humanitarian and non-humanitarian) and fifteen percent of non-humanitarian basic education ODA

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[135] Many interviewed Cluster stakeholders expressed little familiarity with the plan or confirmed that it had not been actively used as a basis for sectoral activities in recent years.

[136] As noted in section 3.1 on planning, some donor and NGO stakeholders felt that it was good that a sector plan existed in a general sense, as they could cite it as a reference document when applying for funding. However, in practice, our review of a sample of donor/project documents revealed few references to GESP 2012-2017.

SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DOMESTIC FINANCING	SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
	(US$240 in 2012-2017).[137] Crucially, GPE was one of only two major donors to not interrupt programming, and thereby provided some stability to MoGEI and the sector. As a donor put it, "GPE continued sustaining the ministry."
	• **MCA formula**: GPE's Maximum Country Allocation (MCA) formula allocates extra funds to Fragile & Conflict-Affected Countries (FCAC). This was highly relevant to South Sudan's education sector, given that conflict and fragility strongly inhibited domestic spending.[138]
	• **Operational framework for support to FCAC**: stakeholders familiar with the 2013-2018 ESPIG praised GPE Secretariat's flexibility in restructuring the grant to fit the evolving crisis context, as facilitated by GPE's operational framework for support to FCAC (2013).
	• **Accelerated Funding Framework (AFF) funds**: GPE's AFF[139] of US$6m in 2018/19 allowed South Sudan to access much-needed bridging funding to compensate for delays in its most recent ESPIG application.
	• **Global fundraising**: GPE's 2018 Dakar replenishment conference attracted enough funds to increase MCAs for South Sudan from US$30m pre-Dakar to US$42m after.

MODERATE CONTRIBUTION TO DOMESTIC FINANCING	MODERATE CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
• **GPE global advocacy**: Two stakeholders (one MoGEI, one NGO) cited South Sudan's invitation to the Dakar replenishment conference by GPE, along with the accompanying pledge requirement, as useful	• **ESPIG co-funding**: GPE's ESPIG was substantially co-funded by USAID,[140] until the latter withdrew the remainder of its funding (US$10m) in 2016. This co-funding was helpful in terms of donor harmonization, but

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[137] In 2012-2017, for all sub-sectors including tertiary, total government spending on education was US$893 (UIS, including authors' extrapolation for the missing datapoint for 2012 using the 2011-2017 average), household education spending was estimated as US$450m (estimated as half of government expenditure as per last available estimate, CESR 2012:108), non-humanitarian education ODA was US$421m (OECD data, plus GPE ESPIG), and humanitarian education ODA was US$163m (OCHA data). These total to roughly US$2 billion in sectoral funding during the GESP I 2012-2017 period, of which GPE's 2013-2018 ESPIG of US$36.1m accounted for just under two percent. Whilst data gaps and hyperinflation complicate calculations, the team believes this is a reasonable estimate. Of note, roughly a third of government spending was allocated to tertiary education and most household spending is allocated to vocational training. Almost all ODA is allocated to non-tertiary education (mostly basic education).

[138] The MCA formula is used by GPE to calculate the maximum ESPIG value a country is eligible for, considering factors such as size, needs, etc. GPE's brief on "GPE's Work in Countries Affected by Fragility and Conflict" (April 2018) notes that GPE "specifically weights allocations toward countries affected by fragility and conflict" (p.2).

[139] See GPE. "Guidelines for Accelerated Support in Emergencies and Early Recovery Situations", 2015.

[140] See also indicator 30 of GPE's results framework, which coded the South Sudan 2013/18 ESPIG as 'co-funded' for the 2014-2016 period, and as 'stand-alone' in 2017.

SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DOMESTIC FINANCING	SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
tools for internal advocacy to the ministry of finance. The NGO even attributed a recent increase in the 2018/19 education budget to this pledge to spend 15 percent of total expenditures on education by 2020 – "This [increase] has happened as part of the pressure of GPE." – though evidence for this claim is otherwise limited. • **GPE support for sector planning**: two senior GoSS officials cited the finalization of the GESP 2017-2022 as useful for increasing the visibility of the sector and for advocating to the ministry of finance and to cabinet for more funding, with one attributing a recent raise in education sector allocations with GESP II's passage through cabinet. However, evidence for this causal link is otherwise limited, and allocations are frequently not fully disbursed (cf. UNESCO 2018).	it is likely that USAID would have provided a similar sectoral allocation even without GPE.[141] • **ESPIG modality**: despite not funding MoGEI directly and not being 'aligned' with government systems,[142] GPE was perceived as being one of the few programs to consult and include MoGEI in its work.

LIMITED/NO CONTRIBUTION TO DOMESTIC FINANCING	LIMITED/NO CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
• **CSEF grants**: CSEF grants in 2016 and 2017 supported NEC's establishment but the coalition has not yet undertaken activities to advocate for improved domestic funding. • **GPE Secretariat advocacy**: there was limited mention in interviews, JSR reports or Back To Office Reports (BTORs) of in-country GPE Secretariat advocacy for more sector funds.	**GPE advocacy for donor harmonization**: CA or GPE Secretariat representatives participated in sectoral conversations, including about a potential pooled fund, but interviewed donors did not perceive GPE as 'catalytic' for more or better sector ODA. As put by a donor (not the EU), "The EU has not really registered GPE I think… I can't really say it has been a catalyst."[143]

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[141] Evaluators' assessment, based on the fact that USAID provided funding to South Sudan's education sector both before and after their co-funding of GPEP, on top of substantial contributions to the country's humanitarian funds. At the level of GPE-supported schools, the GPEP evaluation (2018:35) notes: "While […] GPEP supported schools benefitted from other initiatives, there is no evidence that these schools benefitted from other initiatives because they were GPEP supported schools, or that GPEP leveraged any outside funds."

[142] See indicator 29 of GPE's results framework, which in 2016 and 2017 scored the ESPIG 2013-2018's as aligned to the sector plan and as reflected in governments' multi-year expenditure framework and in MoGEI's annual progress reports. However, it was not aligned in terms of national budgeting, treasury, procurement, accounting, or audit procedures." Overall, the ESPIG only met three out of ten criteria under indicator #29, below the seven out of 10 threshold for a grant to be deemed 'aligned' to national systems by GPE."

[143] A GPE Secretariat mission report from January 2016 provides an interesting example of how the GPE Secretariat could contribute to attracting additional financing, as it notes that the GPE country lead met with World Bank representatives in Juba just as the World Bank was preparing its next country strategy and considering a return to supporting the education sector. However, the resulting World Bank Country Engagement Note finalized in 2017 ultimately did not prioritize education and focusses almost entirely on other sectors. See http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/112071516734556800/pdf/IDA-R2017-0340-11172017.pdf.

SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DOMESTIC FINANCING	SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
	• **GPE support for sector planning**: several donor and NGO stakeholders felt that it was useful to have a sector plan to justify funding. However, a review of a sample of donor documents revealed only few references to GESP I or II.

NOT APPLICABLE / TOO EARLY TO TELL
• **ESPIG funding requirement**: since 2014, under its New Funding Model (NFM), GPE requires countries to meet or move towards meeting the 20 percent target and to commit to funding their ESP. This requirement did not apply to the main 2013-2018 ESPIG in this review period, and though it applies to the 2019-2021 ESPIG, it is too early to tell whether this target is influencing domestic financing in South Sudan.[144]   • **GPE multiplier**: the multiplier mechanism did not apply to South Sudan during the 2012-2018 period.   • **ESPIG 2019-2021**: the program document for the latest GPE ESPIG 2019-2021 lists GoSS commitments to contribute funding to each of the key program outcomes (v23, September 2018, pp.27, 36, 41). Though a positive sign, it is too early to assess the disbursements and results of these commitments.

94.   Overall, GPE was not able to move the needle on the actual level domestic financing given the adverse context, not withstanding numerous GoSS commitment to eventual increases. It was also not able to significantly influence the quality of the overall ODA landscape. This is partly due to the limited number of instruments GPE has to influence this aspect, and partly due to negative additional factors preventing donor alignment and harmonization, listed below.[145] GPE however did contribute somewhat to an improved international financing environment, principally by providing MoGEI and the sector with some much-needed stability and predictability in funding and programming. In that regard, all of GPE's systems for work in emergency contexts proved relevant and valuable:

▪ **More funding**: The MCA formula for FCAC allowed South Sudan to access more funding than comparable non-FCAC countries, which was highly needed given the context.

▪ **Faster funding**: When conflict delayed the preparation of GESP II and the new ESPIG, a funding gap loomed in the already scarce non-humanitarian funding landscape (GPE and DFID). The existence of the AFF, which allows countries to quickly access up to 20 percent of their MCA with a streamlined application, allowed South Sudan to continue to enjoy GPE support in 2018-2019, whilst preparing the full GESP II and ESPIG application, the start date of which shifted to 2019. The AFF grant of US$6m prevented delays in the completion of activities begun under the ESPIG 2013-2018 (e.g. printing textbooks for the newly developed curriculum) and paved the way for activities under the subsequent 2019-2021 ESPIG (e.g. conducting a comprehensive mapping of OOSC and schools).

▪ **Flexible funding**: the operational framework for FCAC allows country-level actors to change ESPIG budget lines and target activities with relatively few restrictions to respond to changes in context, in close collaboration with the GPE Secretariat country lead. In South Sudan, this was used for instance to scale down the building of schools, the costs of which rose significantly due to widespread insecurity, and to in turn scale up curriculum-development activities.

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[144] Governmental stakeholders more frequently referenced the General Education Act target of 15 percent for education (whereof 10 percent for non-higher education), which is what South Sudan committed to, by 2020, in its Dakar pledge. See https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/pledge-south-sudan-gpes-3rd-replenishment.

[145] A new GPE tool to help countries attract domestic and international financing, the Education Sector Investment Cases (ESICs), has not yet been rolled out in South Sudan, as it is still being piloted by GPE.

95.   By enabling South Sudan to access more funding (increased MCA), more rapidly (AFF), and to restructure its use flexibly to respond to the evolving context (operational framework).

96.   The evaluation did not register evidence of significant negative/unintended effects of GPE's support in terms of sector financing. In particular, there is no evidence that GPE support displaced (crowded out) either domestic or international sector financing, as the former was constrained by external circumstance, and the latter grew throughout the 2012-2018 period (including basic education's share).

Additional factors beyond GPE support

97.   Additional **positive** factors that affected *domestic financing* beyond GPE support include the following: (a) a senior MoGEI official noted that DFID helped MoGEI make the case to the ministry of finance for capitation grants, a case which had been rejected since 2005 but was ultimately successful in 2013 thanks to DFID support (advocacy and co-funding);[146] and (b) A MoGEI stakeholder noted that MoGEI contacts at the ministry of finance, including former MoGEI staff, proved valuable allies in making the case for increased sector funding. In terms of *international financing*, it helped that DFID's GESS, as the largest sectoral support program, stayed the course unlike other donors,[147] and that the EU returned to the sector in 2017 with IMPACT, to supplement teacher salaries. Finally, the humanitarian crisis likely contributed to an overall increase in sector financing as the overall funding envelope for South Sudan rose significantly during the 2012-2018 review period.

98.   Additional **negative** factors affecting *domestic financing* include the following: the general crisis context – conflict, oil price and production collapse, hyperinflation – adversely affected the government's ability to generate, manage, and disburse funds, across all sectors including education. In terms of *international financing*, stakeholders mentioned several factors that prevented increased donor alignment to government systems, and donor harmonization between themselves, despite EDoG conversations about the idea. These include the fact that, as mentioned by one donor, bilateral agencies' accountability runs upwards to headquarters – themselves accountable to governments, parliaments, and electorates – rather than downwards towards host governments, despite the aid effectiveness principles of the Paris declaration; and relatedly, the fact that each donor "wants their own spreadsheet" of results, which makes them reticent to participate in a pooled fund in which attribution is more difficult. Moreover, at least two donors reported mitigated experiences with the multi-donor health fund in South Sudan, which made donors reticent to create such a mechanism in the education sector. One donor also noted that the limited quality of the GESP I limited their ability to credibly align with it: "It really is only an effort to align. If we drew directly on the plan, a lot of services would be left unprovided, such as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Protection of Civilians (PoC) camps, etc." Finally, as mentioned previously, concerns about conflict and accountability made almost all major hesitant to fund the GoSS directly, further limiting the scope for alignment. As one state official noted, "There is little trust of partners in MoGEI."

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[146] Following the 2016/2017 fiscal collapse, the government became unable to fund capitation grants and DFID stepped back in. However, the GoSS funded capitation grants in 2015, and returned to funding them in 2017/18.

[147] GESS will likely continue for a 2nd phase, maybe with co-funding from another donor. Source: CLE interviews.

Implications for GPE's ToC and country-level operational model

Finding 12: In South Sudan, various GPE mechanisms to influence domestic financing yielded few results. Though this can in part be attributed to the collapse of GoSS revenue, DFID's GESS program successfully mobilized MoGEI co-funding during the same period. GESS' approach exemplifies strategies to influence domestic financing which could complement GPE's current approaches.

99. The first assumption of the GPE ToC with regards to sector financing – that "GPE has sufficient leverage to influence the amount and quality of domestic education sector financing" – was found to be only partly true in South Sudan. As described in the preceding finding, GPE was not able to exert significant leverage over actual domestic financing, notwithstanding several prior GoSS commitments to increases. Although it was somewhat helpful in supporting MoGEI's advocacy for increased governmental allocations, this had little effect given the adverse external context.

100. At the same time, DFID's GESS program successfully attracted significant co-funding from MoGEI for GESS' capitation grant and cash transfer interventions. In some years such as 2017, MoGEI funded capitation grants for most nationwide primary schools (3045), with GESS funding the remainder (264). Though the details of GESS-MoGEI negotiations are not known, it is likely that several factors supported GESS in mobilizing GoSS co-funding, such as: (a) the fact that capitation grants were already promised under the GoSS' 2011 Local Services Support program, though they would likely not have been realized without external support; (b) the fact that GESS and MoGEI co-designed a capitation grant strategy (2013), inclusive of specific rules and provisions for program pilots and program scaling; (c) the fact that capitation grants are a recurrent cost that can be entrenched into a national budget; and (d) the fact that capitation grants and cash transfers covered all schools nationwide (except for-profit schools), and therefore distributed funds on a transparent and universal basis, which it was politically safe to endorse. Approaches such as GESS' could in certain contexts complement GPE's existing tools to influence domestic financing, particularly when the latter are found to be less effective.

101. Of note, the most recent GPE ESPIG (2019-2021) outlines a series of MoGEI financial commitments to funding activities and outputs that support all three ESPIG program outcomes, for a total of roughly US$14m in MoGEI commitments.[148] This is encouraging, though it is not clear to what extent these sums are re-statements of existing commitments made under GESP II, and to what extent they are additional funding leveraged/secured by this ESPIG. It is also not clear whether these commitments are of a 'one-off' nature and/or whether they signal a prolonged allocation of funds to activities of nationwide scope, such as the capitation grants and cash transfers supported by GESS and MoGEI. Finally, it is too early to tell the level of actual disbursements and results of these commitments.

Finding 13: In South Sudan, GPE's influence over donor harmonization was weak, despite donor interest in a pooled fund. The current country-level operational model does not provide strong mechanisms to exercise influence over other donors.

102. Promoting donor harmonization is one part of GPE's country-level objective with regards to sector financing. As noted in preceding findings, GPE exercised little influence over the harmonization of funding mechanisms in South Sudan. This may be due to the fact that, unlike with other country-level objectives

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[148] US$7.4m for learning spaces and US$5m for teacher incentives and allowances (outcome 1), US$0.3m for training teachers, supervisors and inspectors and US$0.2m for printing documents (outcome 2), US$0.5m for office space and US$0.3m for EMIS and M&E activities (outcome 3). Source: ESPIG 2019-2021 program document, Sept. 2018, v23.

which GPE promotes through 'hard' measures (such as direct financial support or mandatory funding requirements), GPE's support for funding harmonization relies on 'soft' measures (such as 'advocacy').

103.   In South Sudan, there is little evidence that such advocacy was undertaken to any significant degree, or that it was successful. This is despite the fact that GPE Secretariat mission reports from 2016 twice make note of EDoG members expressing interest in a sector pooled funding arrangement, a fact also referenced by a MoGEI official in interviews. However, the GPE country lead, the CA, or the GA did not appear to be either originators or active promoters of these discussions.[149] Compared to other 'mechanisms' of the GPE country-level model, GPE's ambitions to promote donor harmonization thus seem to lack an instrument to generate leverage. In South Soudan, GPE's model did not appear to provide any clear targets, schedule, guidance or definition of responsibilities towards the promotion of donor funding harmonization.

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[149] The January 2016 mission report notes that "At the Education Donor Group, the DFID representative proposed the next GPE grant could be part of a pooled funding arrangement designed to support the new sector plan, so this is an idea to be explored further." (p.3). The June 2016 mission report adds that "Education Donor Group in South Sudan has expressed the interest in a pool funding arrangement that will support 'core sector' activities. Given the low public allocation to education, the group thought that would be the best way to support the sector in an efficiency way." (p.4).

3.5   GPE contributions to sector plan implementation

104.   This section addresses the following evaluation questions:

- What have been the strengths and weaknesses of sector plan implementation during the review period? What are likely reasons for strong/weak sector plan implementation? (CEQ 1.3)

- Has GPE contributed to the observed characteristics of sector plan implementation? If so, then how? If not, why? (CEQ 1.4) Has GPE support had any unintended effects, positive or negative? (CEQ 3.2)

- What factors other than GPE support are likely to have contributed to the observed characteristics of sector plan implementation? (CEQ 3.1)

- What are implications of evaluation findings for GPE support to South Sudan? (Key Question IV)

105.   A high-level overview of evaluation findings on sector planning is provided in table 3.13. These observations are elaborated on through the findings and supporting evidence presented below.

Table 3.13   Overview: CLE findings on sector plan implementation and related GPE contributions

PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS SECTOR PLAN IMPLEMENATION	DEGREE OF GPE CONTRIBUTION	DEGREE TO WHICH UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS LIKELY HELD TRUE[150]					
Weak. The GESP 2013-2017 was never implemented *as a plan*. Designed in a time of peace and hope, the conflict starting in 2013 made the plan irrelevant in the eyes of most actors, and unachievable for the government. Some key activities were nonetheless delivered, but only because they were funded by donors, most of whom did not design their work based on the plan. No mid-term or final evaluation of the plans was undertaken.	**Weak.** GPE's ESPIG supported delivery of certain components of GESP 2013-2017, some of which – e.g. the development of a new national curriculum – were deemed significant. However, the ESPIG overall only amounted to 3.5 percent of sector funding in the review period. Beyond its ESPIG, GPE was not able to 'rally' other actors around plan implementation.	1	2	3	4	5	6

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[150] For sector plan implementation, the six underlying assumptions in the country level ToC were: (1) Relevant government actors having the *motivation* to implement the sector plan; (2) government actors gave the *opportunity* (resources, time, conducive environment) to implement the plan; (3) government actors have the technical *capabilities* to do so; (4) country level stakeholders have the motivation and opportunity to align their own activities with the priorities of the ESP; (5) country level stakeholders take part in regular, evidence based joint sector reviews and apply resulting recommendations to enhance ESP implementation; (6) the sector plan includes provisions for strengthening EMIS and LAS to produce timely, relevant and reliable data.

Strengths and weaknesses of sector plan implementation

Finding 14: **Designed in times of peace, GESP I was never properly implemented, due to war, plan quality issues, domestic financing issues, and the lack of plan implementation mechanisms. Only donor-backed activities were delivered, of which some were, and others were not, outlined in the plan.**

106.   This finding addresses two questions: (a) to what extent was GESP 2012-2017 implemented as a plan, that is, did it drive sectoral activities during the 2012-2018 review period; and (b) to what extent were activities originally set out in GESP 2012-2017 delivered during the review period.

107.   In terms of the first question, consulted stakeholders from all groups agreed that GESP 2012-2017 was never implemented as planned. Designed in times of peace, the outbreak of violent civil war that lasted the full duration of its implementation period undermined the plan's relevance (due to changed context), feasibility (due to conflict-related access and implementation challenges), and financing (due to the collapse of the GoSS's oil revenues, and the diversion of international financing to humanitarian activities). Other factors that inhibited plan implementation are listed in box 3.5 below. Consequently, GESP did not drive sectoral activities during the 2012-2018 period, nor was its progress monitored by the government, by donors, in joint sector reviews, or in other education fora (see section 3.2).[151]

108.   In terms of the second question, detailed data on plan implementation is difficult to obtain, since as described in section 3.2, its implementation was not systematically monitored.[152] Partial data compiled by the evaluation team from documents and interviews shows the following:

- Of ten outcome-level targets set by GESP in 2012 for 2017, eight (80 percent) were not met, and two could not be assessed.[153] See Appendix VII for details.

- Of 250+ activity-level targets in the action plan, the vast majority were not fully met by 2017, and almost none was met by their originally intended deadline. [154]
- However, many activity-level targets witnessed at least moderate progress (often not quantifiable for lack of monitoring data), and a sub-set were demonstrably achieved. For instance, Appendix VIII shows that, of 44 documents (policies, strategies, frameworks) which the GESP promised to develop, 36 percent were fully developed, 18 percent were partially developed, and 45 percent were likely not developed at all, as of late 2018.[155]

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[151] See UNESCO 2016:11 for a very similar assessment. The report suggests that the plan was weakly owned by the government, and completed in a rush, with limited participation, due in part to pressure to complete the plan prior to independence and to the GPE submission deadline. However, other documents do not suggest that the plan had 'issues of ownership' at its inception. The plan appraisal praises government commitment and participatory design.

[152] The promised annual progress reports, mid-term evaluation in 2015, and final evaluation in 2017 were never produced, and GEARs and other fora, such as the Cluster, have not addressed the plan since 2015 or earlier.

[153] Targets are drawn from GESP 2012-2017, section 7.5, "Results Framework" (p.86). Data is drawn from UIS, the 2015 ESA, the 2016 education statistical booklet, and UNESCO (2018). Targets were not met for primary gross enrollment rate (GER), primary net enrollment rate (NER), primary pupil-to-qualified-teacher ratio (PQTR), primary pupil-textbook ratio, gender parity index (GPI) of primary GER, female share of primary teachers, secondary GER, and secondary NER. Target achievement could not be assessed for primary dropout rate (for lack of data), and for primary pupil-classroom ratio (odd target, worse than the baseline). Of note, (a) GESP 2012-2017 did not provide 2017 targets for most indicators listed in its results framework (25 in total, only ten of which with targets); and (b) a target not being met does not necessarily mean that no progress was made. A detailed analysis of trends in terms of impact-level indicators during the review period, as well as reasons for these trends, is found in section 5.

[154] This was in part due to the ambitious frontloading of activities in 2012/13, noted already in the GESP I appraisal.

[155] Including policies, strategies, frameworks, standards, guidelines, curricula, and other materials.

109. Beyond such reporting against the number of achieved outcome- and activity-level targets, it is

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Box 3.5. Factors that inhibited GESP 2012-2017 implementation

Issues with plan design: from the outset, the plan was described as too ambitious, not financed, not realistic in its timeline, not prioritised, and not operational by its appraisal, and was rated as 'not achievable' by the Secretariat (based on GPE/IIEP standards as rated under GPE results framework indicator 16a; see section 3.1). Though ESPIG 2013-2018 application documents (2012:8) suggest that "It is anticipated that the macroeconomic environment will improve once oil revenues come on stream again… MoGEI is optimistic about […] increases in budgetary allocation and donor support", these anticipated improvements were overtaken by conflict and crisis.

Issues with implementation mechanisms and capacities: the GESP action plan did not clearly outline who was responsible for funding or implementing targets, and the "fully costed implementation plan" recommended by the appraisal was never developed. Given the subsequent collapse of governmental revenue and the fact that donors refused to channel money through the GoSS, MoGEI was unable to adequately oversee, implement, or monitor the GESP. Apart from the EMIS unit, MoGEI plan implementation capacities were not noticeably strengthened, starting with the capacity needs assessment, scheduled for 2012 but never undertaken. Sub-national supervisory and management capacities were weakened by the multiplication of states and counties.

Issues with plan financing: at inception, the total plan cost was estimated at 7.3 billion SSP (roughly US$2.4 billion in total, and US$400m per year), of which 37 percent (roughly US$148m) were recurrent costs, to be covered by the government, and 63 percent (roughly US$252m) were investment costs, to be covered by donors.[156] In practice, during 2012-2017 the government was not even able to cover two thirds of these recurrent costs, spending on average only US$100m of the US$148m required per year for general (non-tertiary) education covered (GESP I and II do not cover tertiary education, which falls under another ministry). In turn, donors provided only US$70m (28 percent) in non-humanitarian, non-tertiary funding, relative to the US$252m funds required per year to deliver on the plan's strategic objectives (as well as US$27m humanitarian education funding a year, not plan-aligned, see next).[157]

Issues with alignment to the plan: as noted in section 3.3, not all donor development funding was explicitly aligned to the GESP, with program documents for major DFID and EU programs not making any mention of GESP 2012-2017. Similarly, Education Cluster (humanitarian) funds were also not aligned with the GESP, but instead driven by an annual cluster response strategy, based on annual Education Cluster Assessments (ECAs).

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difficult to comprehensively assess progress against the GESP I. This is partly because the plan, given its low quality, does not present a coherent 'overarching' strategy or a clearly prioritized set of initiatives (see section 3.2). It is, at one end, a broad vision of improving equitable access, quality, and capacities on all

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[156] Based on this fact – namely, that MoGEI never expected to fund anything other than recurrent costs – it could be argued that what undermined the implementation of activities is not primarily the collapse of GoSS revenue, but rather the lack of alignment of donors' resources (which, overall, increased in the period) with plan activities.

[157] Own calculations based on UIS, OECD, and GESP data. Precise estimates are complicated by data gaps (e.g. UIS 2012), data differences (GESP uses 2012 prices, UIS uses current prices, OECD uses constant prices), and exchange rate fluctuations as well as the ongoing existence of both official and parallel exchange rates. The authors believe that the estimates above are a realistic portrayal of the situation but recognize that they are an approximation. The 3 SSP/USD rate in 2012 is drawn from the ESA 2016:44, and the World Bank, *Interim Strategy Note (FY 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan*, 2013, p.3. GPE's documents (updated ESPIG 2013-2018 application, 2012) appear to instead use a 4 SPP/USD exchange rate, as they estimate plan cost to be US$300m/year. With either rate, key points raised in the textbox remain valid.

fronts; and at the other end an amalgamation of many different and at times vaguely connected interventions (10 outcome-level targets, 47 sub-objectives, 250 activity targets, with mixed linkages between themselves and with the GESP implementation plan, as noted in the plan appraisal in 2012). Seeing as the plan itself is to some extent a list of activities and indicators, it is difficult to report on its implementation otherwise than by referring to these activities and indicators, particularly when no comprehensive plan implementation data / evaluation exists.

110. Since a full list of outputs would be too long, Table 3.14 therefore provides examples of GESP activity-level targets that were achieved and not achieved in the 2012-2018 review period, as well as significant activities that were achieved despite not being outlined in the GESP. With few exceptions (e.g. capitation grants, partly co-funded by the GoSS), all activities were fully funded by donors.[158] As the table shows, a number of activities that were originally listed in the GESP 2012-2017 were achieved, which may be taken as some evidence of the plan driving sector action. However, there is little reference in donor documents to the plan (see section 3.3), and some of the 'overlap' between what donors funded and what was in the plan may be due to the fact that the plan was broad in scope to begin with. Indeed, the last row of Table 3.14 also shows that some key achievements during the 2012-2018 period were not originally listed in the GESP.

Table 3.14   Review period (2012-2018) achievements against GESP 2012-2017 activity-level targets

EQUITABLE ACCESS (GESP I, Strategic Goal 1: Increase Access, promote Equity)	QUALITY (GESP I, Strategic Goals 2, 3: Improve Quality and adult Literacy)	MANAGEMENT (GESP I, Strategic Goal 4: build human and institutional capacity)
EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITY TARGETS LISTED IN THE GESP WHICH WERE ACHIEVED BY 2017		
• **Capitation grants**: launched 2013/14 (GESP mentioned CGs in narrative, not in action plan, and had set no date) • **Policy development**: Development and endorsement of national policy on girls' education (scheduled for 2012, achieved in 2015), of national policy on inclusive education (scheduled for 2012, achieved in 2014), of national AES policy (scheduled for 2012, achieved in 2014), of national TVET policy (scheduled for 2013, achieved in 2014), among others.	• **Policy development**: Development and endorsement of new South Sudanese curriculum (scheduled for 2012, achieved in 2017), and of national policy on English language instruction (scheduled for 2012, achieved in 2015), among others. • **National examination system**: South Sudan Examination Order 2011 (scheduled for 2012), establishment of National Examinations Council 2013 (scheduled for 2012), first-ever harmonized nationwide primary and secondary examinations in 2017 (scheduled for 2013) • **School governance**: South Sudan Inspection Order 2017 to set up new inspection system (scheduled for 2013), School	• **Sector coordination**: National Education Forum set up in 2012 (scheduled for 2012)

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[158] In-kind contributions of GoSS and MoGEI should also be recognized, e.g. use of MoGEI premises and staff time. Moreover, it is worth noting that a lot of GoSS staff continued working despite not always being regularly paid.

EQUITABLE ACCESS (GESP I, Strategic Goal 1: Increase Access, promote Equity)	QUALITY (GESP I, Strategic Goals 2, 3: Improve Quality and adult Literacy)	MANAGEMENT (GESP I, Strategic Goal 4: build human and institutional capacity)
	governance toolkit (2014) and handbook (2016) developed (scheduled for 2012/2013)	
EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITY TARGETS LISTED IN THE GESP WHICH WERE NOT ACHIEVED BY 2017		
• **Construction**: Construction and/or rehabilitation of 4000 ECD classrooms, 300 primary schools, 50 secondary schools, 10 TVET schools by 2017, 2000 AES centers, and 4 Teacher Training Institutes (TTI) (isolated progress but EMIS 2016 shows that overall construction targets were not achieved in any category) • **Policy implementation**: most policies listed in the above cell have not been fully rolled out yet • **Policy development**: Development of ECD policy (scheduled for 2012, not achieved) • **Teachers:** Hiring of 2000 female teachers a year (not achieved) • **School feeding**: in all schools and ECD centers by 2015 (not achieved, only 1/5 students reached annually)	• **Policy implementation**: most policies listed in the above cell have not been fully rolled out yet • **Teachers:** 5000 ECD staff trained (not achieved), 34,000 qualified teachers available by 2017 (not achieved)	• **School calendar**: nationwide harmonization of school calendar (ordered in 2017, but not achieved as of 2018) • **Plan monitoring**: Four yearly sector monitoring reports at national, state, and country-level (each), as well as a GESP mid-term evaluation in 2015 and a GESP final evaluation in 2017 • **Capacity development**: 20 percent of education staff attend trainings annually (no data, likely not achieved)
EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN THE REVIEW PERIOD WHICH WERE NOT IN THE GESP		
• **Cash transfers**: introduction in 2013/14 of nationwide cash transfers for girls in upper primary and secondary • **Policy development**: female teachers' affirmative action policy 2014; pastoralist curriculum 2017		• **MoGEI improvements**: new MoGEI structure 2015, new MoGEI website 2017, new M&E strategy 2017

Finding 15: **As of 2018, the context remains largely unchanged and early implementation of GESP 2017-2022 has been limited.**

111.   Most of the factors inhibiting GESP 2012-2017 implementation also affected early GESP 2017-2022 implementation, and continue to do so: plan quality and financing issues, uncertain political situation, limited domestic financing, absence of systematic plan monitoring or reporting, absence of strong donor

alignment (humanitarian and development) behind the plan.[159] Moreover, as noted in section 3.1, the later plan does not explicitly name or learn from the previous one. To date, little information on plan implementation is available, but available evidence suggests that the general pattern of fragmented, donor-driven (rather than plan-driven) implementation subsists.

112. There are some reasons, however, for thinking that plan implementation may yet improve: a new peace agreement was signed in late 2018; the GoSS is hopeful with regards to the resumption of oil production; the sector has a new M&E strategy aligned to GESP indicators; and the new action plan constitutes a moderate improvement over GESP 2012-2017, as noted in section 3.1. However, the GESP II (2017-2022) action plan only covered 2017-2018, and with these years now passed, the future of GESP II implementation hangs in the balance.

GPE contributions to sector plan implementation

Finding 16: **The nature of ESPIG 2013-2018 funds – explicitly aligned to the GESP 2012-2017, and committed to maintaining support throughout the crisis – made them very relevant to MoGEI operations and objectives. ESPIG implementation, however, faced conflict-related challenges, and its ability to achieve leverage and scale was constrained by its size and certain design aspects, despite several restructurings. Encouragingly, the next ESPIG 2019-2021 builds on lessons learned from the first.**

113. GPE's US$36.1m ESPIG 2013-2018 co-funded the Global Partnership for Education Program (GPEP) in South Sudan, along with USAID (until the latter's withdrawal in 2016). As the GPEP evaluation (2018:19) notes, both ESPIG funds and GPEP were "strongly aligned to the General Education Strategic Plan (GESP)." Indeed, the 2013-2018 ESPIG application (September 2012 version) explicitly mentions GESP I several times and describes and justifies ESPIG priorities against GESP priorities. Though the use of ESPIG funds was repurposed several times during implementation due to an evolving context, it remained aligned with the GESP, as new activities that were taken on (e.g. curriculum development) were also GESP I priorities.

114. As per its initial program document (September 2012 version, p.22), the overarching objective of GPEP is to support the first four strategic objectives of the GESP 2012-2017: quality, equitable access, adult literacy, and institutional and human capacity. Appendix IX provides details of GPEP components, budget and achievements against GESP I strategic goals. These can be summarized as follows:

- **Focus areas**: GPEP components supported all four targeted GESP strategic goals, including access (through school construction), quality (through the development a new curriculum, the distribution of TLMs and the training of teachers, inspectors, and supervisors), adult literacy (through support to alternative education centres) and sector management (at school level through training of school management committees, at central level through support for policy development in various areas and for annual JSRs and school censuses).[160]

- **Budget**: The ESPIG budget funded or co-funded most activities under "access" (school construction, US$13m), quality (US$10m), sector management (US$7m), adult literacy (US$1m), and other program costs (US$5m). USAID co-funded selected activities until it withdrew from GPEP in 2016.

- **Performance**: GPEP failed to achieve half (three out of six) of its outcome indicator targets, namely, raising learning outcomes, improving school leadership, and limiting school dropouts. It did achieve

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[159] Domestically, the plan has not yet received legislative endorsement, with review underway in late 2018.

[160] GPEP's program document (GPE, September 2012, p.12) indicates that a choice was made to limit GPEP's focus on gender equality given DFID/GESS' focus thereon. GPEP also did not specifically target children with disabilities.

targets for improving school supervision, total enrolment in GPEP schools, and generating two GPEP implementation models for the rest of the sector (Cambridge Education 2018:26). Detailed ESPIG achievements are outlined in Appendix IX.

115.   This mixed performance was due to several challenges GPEP faced during its implementation: (a) the outbreak of civil war in 2013 and evolving conflict situation thereafter generated many delays, including due to temporary staff evacuation of the grant agent (UNICEF) and most other international agencies from Juba; (b) the conflict affected the governments' ability to control and administer education in large parts of the country, and partners' ability to carry out activities; (c) USAID's early withdrawal from the GPEP partnership in 2016 required a restructuring of the program.[161] These challenges affected both the quantity and quality of activities delivered by GPEP.

116.   Partly due to these challenges, partly by design, the GPEP evaluation (Cambridge Education 2018:36) concludes that GPEP neither leveraged significant additional resources (unlike GESS, see section 3.4), nor achieve scale for most of its components. Of GPEP school-level components, only the distribution of early grade instruction kits and the training of school leadership were scheduled to be nationwide (and largely were, though both suffered from implementation challenges). Other activities were restricted to five states, and a third of the budget was dedicated to 25 schools, which ultimately enrolled 16,877 children, relative to an OOSC population of almost 2.2 million. However, GPEP activities at national (not school-) level – such as the development of the new curriculum, the development of various policies and strategies, the support for annual JSRs and school censuses – are of wider relevance and were deemed significant by national and international interviewees, although some remain to be fully rolled out and implemented.

117.   Due to delays in the completion of ESPIG 2018-2018 activities and in the design of GESP II, South Sudan requested and obtained an AFF grant (US$6m, see section 3.4) to bridge a GPE funding gap in 2018/2019, and specifically to print textbooks developed under the old ESPIG and to conduct studies to plan the new ESPIG. For the development of the latter, there is explicit evidence that lessons were drawn from the first ESPIG (as supported by the availability of a GPEP evaluation report), notably in terms of (a) school construction, (b) maintaining a long-term development focus, (c) focussing on fewer components, and (d) planning for delays, issues, and the possibility of scaling components up or down (source: ESPIG 2019-2021 program document, September 2018 version, p.16). Further, compared to the old ESPIG, the 2019-2021 ESPIG roughly halves its construction budget (from US$12m to 6m) and increases its quality-oriented budget (from US$10m to 15), aiming to set up an ecosystem of trained teachers, supervisors, and inspectors. Finally, by focusing on fewer components the new ESPIG is able to scale more of its activities nationwide (such as in-service teacher training, budgeted to reach all roughly 36,000 teachers).[162]

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[161] Overall, the progress report for GPEP's latest available reporting period (July-December 2017, p.7) rated progress in implementation as "moderately satisfactory", noting that: "the achievement of the program objectives continues to be challenging due to the fragile and unpredictable socio-economic and political context […] all high-likelihood risks have occurred […] making it extremely challenging to realize GPEP program outcomes." These issues led to several restructuring of GPEP, including the dropping and adding of activities, and moving money across budget lines. School construction became a particularly thorny issue, as the conflict led to a significant increase in building costs, meaning that only 29 of an initial target of 100 schools could be built. As the recently completed GPEP evaluation notes (2018), several stakeholders questioned the relevance of building 'model' permanent schools in a conflict context where they may be damaged or under-utilized, and where temporary structures would have been substantially cheaper and potentially more appropriate.

[162] Source: GPE, *ESPIG 2019-2021 program document*, version 23, 4th of September 2018.

Finding 17: Overall, GPE's contribution to sector plan implementation has been limited. Though individual ESPIG contributions were deemed significant, the ESPIG provided only a small part of (actual and required) sector funding, and GPE's country-level processes were unable to rally the sector around a plan that many stakeholders had come to see as irrelevant and unachievable.

118.   GPE uses a series of financial and non-financial mechanisms to support sector plan implementation. Table 3.15 provides an overview of these mechanisms, grouped by whether they are likely to have made a significant, moderately significant, or insignificant contribution to plan implementation in South Sudan. This grouping does not constitute a formal score.

Table 3.15   GPE contributions to sector plan implementation during the 2012-2018 review period

SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO SECTOR PLAN IMPLEMENTATION
• **ESPIG support to GESP**: GPE's ESPIG, and the GPEP it co-funded, were the only sector programs directly aligned to the GESP 2012-2017. GPEP supported several key initiatives of the plan, such as curriculum and textbook development; resourcing of AES centers, CECs and TTIs; early grade literacy and numeracy kits for 3700 schools and training of 1000 teachers therein; school inspection and supervision support and training for 10,000 school leaders and board members; the building of 25 new schools for 18,000 students; EMIS support for MoGEI; funding for GEARs (JSRs); etc.[163] Yet, overall, given budget and implementation challenges, GPEP support was mostly localized rather than nation- or system-wide. See previous finding. • **ESPIG support to sector data**: GPE funds supported annual school censuses in 2015 and 2016, an EGMA and EGRA in 2015/16, annual JRSs in 2013-2017, an ESA in 2015, a sector-wide M&E strategy in 2017, and a study on OOSC in 2018. These contributed to sector monitoring, though monitoring was not focused on the plan.
MODERATE CONTRIBUTION TO SECTOR PLAN IMPLEMENTATION
• **ESPIG share of GESP funding**: GPE's US$36m ESPIG contributed 1.5 percent of GESP 2012-2017 estimated cost (roughly US$2.4 billion), 3.5 percent of total non-tertiary sector funding in the 2012-2017 period (roughly US$1 billion, counting non-household domestic funds and non-humanitarian ODA), and ten percent of total non-tertiary, non-humanitarian sector ODA in 2012-2017 (roughly US$70m/year). Though significant because more aligned to the GESP than other donors, GPE funds are overall a small share of funding. As one senior MoGEI official noted, GPEP "was only a drop in the ocean". (data: GPE, OECD, GESP I) • **ESPIG 2013-2018 co-funding**: GPE was able to attract US$30m in co-funding from USAID for its GPEP program. Though it is likely that USAID would have also otherwise invested the funds in the sector, they may have been less explicitly aligned with GESP under a separate program than they were as used under GPEP. • **GPE operational framework for support in FCACs**: both governmental and other stakeholders praised GPE's flexibility in approving ESPIG/GPEP re-structuring in view of the evolving domestic conflict. This flexibility was supported by GPE's operational framework for support in FCACs. Several of the 'new' activities introduced subsequent to restructuring still supported GESP targets, e.g. GPEP support for curriculum development.[164] • **Program Development Grant 2015:** a PDG of US$71,156 was awarded to UNICEF Juba in 2018 to support desk review, consultations, and drafting work towards the development of the ESPIG 2019-2021 program

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[163] Source: PowerPoint presentation attached to BTOR for GPE country lead visit to South Sudan, June 2017.

[164] Despite this positive assessment of the operational framework, its contribution to sector plan implementation is rated as 'modest', not due to identified issues with the framework, but due to the fact that its contribution to plan implementation is indirect: the operational framework significantly supported an improved/more responsive ESPIG, which in turn, significantly supported plan implementation (albeit only a small share of overall sector budget).

and application package. The few stakeholders familiar with the PDG deemed it useful for GPE program development, as no other funds were available. Full results are not known as no PDG report is yet available.

LIMITED/NO CONTRIBUTION TO SECTOR PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

- **ESPIG support to strengthening plan implementation capacities**: other than through its support to MoGEI's EMIS unit, the ESPIG did not substantially strengthen MoGEI plan implementation capacities.[165]
- **Funding requirement (LEG endorsement)**: GPE's requirement that sector plans be endorsed by the LEG did not significantly enhance donor support for the plan, partly due to donors' own priorities (e.g. DFID), partly due to the changing nature of priorities once the conflict set in. At least four donors perceived plan endorsement as a GPE-related formality, rather than a sector-wide exercise. One donor mentioned "rubberstamping", and further noted: "I didn't get the sense that there was unity and all around the ESP."[166]
- **Sector dialogue**: based on the review of a sample of EDoG minutes, there is no evidence that sectoral fora have been used to discuss GESP implementation after GESP design, appraisal, and endorsement was done.
- **Secretariat visits**: GPE BTORs suggest that country lead visits to South Sudan during the review period focused on monitoring and discussing ESPIG/GPEP implementation, as opposed to GESP implementation.

NOT APPLICABLE / TOO EARLY TO TELL

- **Variable tranche**: this mechanism had not been introduced at the time of the 2013-2018 ESPIG and has not been applied to the 2018-2021 ESPIG either, as the country requested an exemption for lack of data.

119.   Overall, GPE most directly supported those aspects of the GESP funded by its ESPIG. The ESPIG was overall successful, despite not being fully disbursed (US$34.8m by completion vs US$36.1m planned, an under-disbursment of under five percent), as well as experiencing some implementation challenges (see Box 3.6). GPE grants also meaningfully contributed to sector data-collection and sector monitoring activities, although neither of these were centred on the GESP and its action plan. However, overall, GPE's financial contributions were too small to be able to move the needle in a sector with great need, and there is no evidence that it influenced other actors' support for the, by then, largely ignored sector plan (except USAID as GPEP co-funder, 2013-2016).

120.   There was no evidence that GPE support had any unintended consequences in South Sudan, positive or negative. As previously noted, ESPIG implementation did momentarily lead to tensions between the ESPIG grant agent (UNICEF) and MoGEI, but there were mediated by the GPE Secretariat, and were not, ultimately, major. UNICEF was again selected to be the GA again for the new, 2019-2021 ESPIG.

Additional factors beyond GPE support

121.   Although the sector plan was, overall, not successfully implemented, a few factors beyond GPE's support **positively** supported the implementation of some activities originally outlined in the sector plan. First, major sector donors, particularly DFID, the EU, USAID, and WFP contributed significantly to implementing many sectoral activities, some of which were aligned with the original sector plan (see box 3.7). Some of these donors supported MoGEI capacity-development (IMED) and sector data-collection

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[165] This is partly due to coordination with IMED (EU): GPEP withdrew some of its activities which would have supported the ministry's planning directorate in order to avoid overlap with IMED activities also supporting the directorate. However, IMED was then interrupted in 2016. Source: GPEP progress report, February 2016, pp.14-15.

[166] It is too early to tell whether new funding requirements, as applicable to the 2019-2021 ESPIG (e.g. fixed tranche funding requirements for data and learning assessment systems) will influence sector plan implementation. As discussed in section 3.2, they do not appear to have significantly influenced GESP II design. That said, the ESPIG promises support to these areas, which may be because these are now funding requirements. At this point, however, there is no evidence that these requirements will influence activities other than those funded by the ESPIG itself.

Box 3.7. Key GESP 2012-2017 activities supported by other donors[167]

As noted in section 3.4, there was little evidence that key sector donors, whether humanitarian or not, intentionally aligned their sector support with GESP I during the 2013-2018 review period. Nonetheless, a number of donor-supported activities overlapped with activities foreseen under GESP I, and in a broader sense, supported some of GESP I's strategic goals (though in part because these were very broadly framed). Selected examples of the most prominent support streams from other donors are presented in this box.

Interventions focused on access and equity (GESP 2012-2017 strategic objective 1)
DFID's "Girls Education in South Sudan" (GESS) supported the introduction of nationwide capitation grants mentioned in the GESP, together with MoGEI and later the EU. GESS also supported cash transfers for girls, which, though not mentioned once in the GESP, support its gender equality vision. Finally, it supported the GESP's school governance targets by co-funding a school governance handbook and associated training, with USAID and GPE. GESS results are further discussed in section five below, based on available research (see footnote on this box).

WFP-supported school meals reached an average of 300,000 children per year (2012-2016), roughly 20 percent of primary pupils. This fell short of the GESP target of school meals for 100 percent of pupils.

UNICEF funded the design of a national girls' education strategy, a target outlined in the GESP's action plan.

Interventions focused on quality and teachers (GESP 2012-2017 strategic objective 2)
USAID co-funded GPEP activities such as school building as well as literacy and numeracy kits. Its "Room to Learn" (R2L) also trained 1600 teachers and 2300 school governance stakeholders and distributed almost 0.5m teaching/learning materials (TLMs).

The **EU**'s Improved Management of Education Delivery (IMED) funded MoGEI capacity development and data-collection activities between 2011 and 2015, and the EU's IMPACT has topped up teacher salaries since 2017.

Interventions focussed on service delivery capacity (GESP 2012-2017 strategic objective 4)
The **World Bank**'s cross-sectoral Local Governance and Service Delivery (LGSD) project supported the strengthening of payam-level service delivery, indirectly supporting GESP objectives of that nature. The **Education Cluster** supported education in emergencies in conflict-affected regions, including many teacher training activities. Seeing as the GESP was developed in

efforts (GESS, IMPACT). Second, as described in section 3.3, the major non-humanitarian sector donors made extensive efforts to coordinate their programming to avoid overlaps and leverage synergies, when the external context (conflict dynamics, staff evacuations) allowed them to do so.

122.   For factors that **negatively** affected plan implementation beyond GPE support, see finding 9.

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[167] Sources: for DFID, http://girlseducationsouthsudan.org/research-reports-2/, for documents on the program as well as evidence of its results. For USAID, https://www.winrock.org/document/room-to-learn-south-sudan/, p.30. For the EU, CLE interviews. For WFP, WFP, *South Sudan: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2011-2016)*, Report, Volume I, June 2017, p.xii. For the Education Cluster, annual Cluster response plans (various). For UNICEF, MoGEI, Girls' Education Strategy for South Sudan 2015-2017, August 2015, p. IV. For WB, http://projects.worldbank.org/p127079/local-governance-service-delivery-program?lang=en. WFP, Cluster, UNICEF and WB activities were funded by bilateral donors, primarily the US, the UK, and the EU.

Implications for GPE's ToC and country-level operational model

Finding 18:	**Plan implementation is a central element of how the GPE's ToC conceptualizes GPE's contribution to system- and impact-level change. Like in other crisis contexts, the case of South Sudan raises the question of how GPE envisions its contribution to change when a plan is overtaken by unexpected events.**

123.   Plan implementation is a central element of how the GPE's ToC conceptualizes GPE's contribution to system- and impact-level change. However, multi-year plans risk being overtaken by events, particularly in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries (FCAC), in ways that undermine the relevance and achievability of sector plans. This was the case in South Sudan.[168]

124.   GPE has taken several steps in recent years to strengthen the resilience of its model in FCAC. These include (a) the option of developing TEPs as opposed to ESPs, and the recent publication of TEP-related guidance; (b) efforts to increasingly integrate risk matrices and conflict/crisis sensitivity into all sector plans (not just TEPs); and (c) the operational framework for emergencies, which makes provisions, for instance, for reprogramming ESPIGs in the face of evolving contexts. However, these mechanisms cannot in and of themselves prevent plans from becoming irrelevant and unachievable in the face of unexpected crises. Moreover, other aspects of the GPE model, such as LEGs, CA, GA and JSRs, currently apply equally to FCAC and non-FCAC context, with little additional guidance for crisis contexts. For instance, the GPE Secretariat's recently released guidance for effective JSRs (2018) does not contain specific guidance or separate standards for JSRs in crisis contexts and makes only cursory reference to education in emergencies.

125.   In South Sudan, four out of six ToC assumptions for plan implementation did not hold: the assumptions that government actors have the motivation, opportunity, and technical capabilities to implement the plan, and the assumption that other stakeholders have the motivation and opportunity to align their activities with plan priorities, or government priorities in general.[169] The current GPE ToC does not outline how GPE envisions its contributions to sector systems and impact to be channeled when these assumptions do not hold and plan implementation becomes impossible.

Finding 19:	**GPE's new ESPIG QAR processes are perceived by country-level actors as adding much effort but limited value in terms of supporting high-quality ESPIGs. However, stakeholders welcomed the fact that GPE did not insist on using the variable tranche mechanism in South Sudan.**

126.   Stakeholders familiar with the application process for South Sudan's latest ESPIG grant expressed concerns about several aspects of the revised ESPIG application process:

- **Level of effort**: the level of effort of the current ESPIG application process was rated as high in general, and higher than previous iterations of the same process. The several rounds of submissions and feedback were perceived as confusing, particularly for ministry staff. As one donor put it: "They [GPE processes] are just becoming too complex... there's more than three QARs, there's 19!".

- **Data requirements**: a donor noted that GPE expectations for data and for budget predictions are high and difficult to fulfill, leading to the risk that "the country, just to please GPE, will make stuff up" (donor).

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[168] This was also the case Sierra Leone, see Sierra Leone CLE, 2018, country 2, batch 1 in this series of CLEs.

[169] Assumption five, that stakeholders participate in regular JSRs, was found to partly hold, and assumption six, that the plan makes provisions for strengthening EMIS and LAS, fully held. See table 3.13 at the top of this section.

- **"Who is GPE?"**: stakeholders felt that it was not always clear whether "GPE feedback" was feedback from the country lead, from the country support team, or from some higher/other instance of the Secretariat. Moreover, it was not always clear on which criteria the feedback was based. One donor suggested that it appeared that feedback "boils down to the country lead".

- **What does GPE fund**? One senior, long-term ministry official stated a lack of clarity about what is eligible for GPE funding: "Could GPE support something like hardship allowances? I don't even know." Two other South Sudanese stakeholders questioned why GPE only supports primary school, revealing that it had not been communicated to them that GPE, in fact, can support any level of education if requested by a country. One donor noted that more could be done by GPE Secretariat country leads to clearly communicate the objectives, functioning and parameters of GPE's model.

- **ESPIG consultations**: at least two donors noted that the EDoG's review of the ESPIG was rushed, with key documents being shared at short notice, thus not giving EDoG members enough time to conduct an effective review and providing constructive feedback.

- **Variable tranche**: the use of the variable tranche instrument was perceived as not desirable or feasible in South Sudan, given the scarcity of sector data and the dire humanitarian context. Stakeholders welcomed the waiving of this requirement for the ESPIG 2018-2021.

127. Overall, stakeholders preferred previous QAR mechanisms. Box 3.8 provides some additional comments on specific phases of the QAR.

Box 3.8. Details of stakeholder perceptions of different phases of the QAR process

One stakeholder described the various steps of the QAR process as follows:

The ESPIG application process starts with concept note, developed by the GA and the ministry in consultation.

In QAR 1, the GPE Secretariat country lead provides initial feedback, which can be quite directive, and usually leads to many changes in the concept note. QAR 1 involves a negotiation on ESPIG priorities between the GPE Secretariat and country-level stakeholders, with many of the GPE Secretariat's priorities being adopted.

QAR 2 is the most "formal" review round, as the GPE Secretariat provides much more substantial comments, which the country must subsequently address/respond to. However, it is not always clear at this stage who at the GPE Secretariat provides/decides QAR 2 comments, and on what basis the GPE Secretariat makes suggestions.

QAR 3 is a more internal GPE Secretariat process, with few comments/documents coming back to the country.

In addition to these rounds, there is a lot of back-and-forth with the country lead between each round - additional "micro-rounds."

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128. Of note, GPE's annual portfolio review (2018:13) indicates that a UNICEF quality assurance pilot was conducted during the QAR process for the 2019-2021 ESPIG, whereby experts from across UNICEF offices at country, regional and headquarters level were invited to comment on draft ESPIG documents at the QAR II stage. The review also notes that this process was deemed successful by all parties involved (MoGEI, UNICEF, Secretariat) and that it will be extended by UNICEF to other countries. Though this appears to be a valuable innovation, none of the stakeholders interviewed for this CLE mentioned the occurrence or significance of this process during the evaluation team's visit to Juba.

4 Progress towards stronger education systems

Introduction

129.   This section summarizes evaluation findings related to Key Question II from the evaluation matrix: "Has sector plan implementation contributed to making the overall education system in South Sudan more effective and efficient?". Key sub-questions are:

- During the 2012-2018 period under review, how has the education system changed in relation to (a) improving access to education and equity, (b) improving education quality and relevance (quality of teaching / instruction), and (c) improving sector management? If there were no changes, then why not and with what implications? (CEQ 4)

- How has sector plan implementation contributed to observed changes at the education system level? (CEQ 5)

- What are implications of evaluation findings for GPE support to South Sudan? (Key Question IV)

130.   Progress towards a stronger education system is measured by drawing on evidence of changes that go beyond specific activities or outputs, and, instead, constitute changes in the existence and functioning of relevant institutions (e.g., schools, MoGEI), as well as changes in relevant rules, norms and frameworks (e.g., standards, curricula, TLMs) that influence how actors in the education sector interact with each other.[170] To be counted as a 'system-level change', an intervention needs to be planned (not incidental or occasional), be nationwide in scope (or a pilot expected to be scaled), and be sustainable or have prospects of sustainability (e.g. government co-funding). Actual implementation is not a necessary criterion as the design of a new policy or intervention can in and of itself be a valuable first step, but timely implementation needs to at least be likely, and its likelihood is enhanced if timelines, funding and responsibilities are clearly outlined. Whether any system-level changes ultimately enhance education outcomes (enrollment, learning) is reviewed separately in section 6. After all, the fact that something is a 'system-level change' does not imply that it is effective and/or that it constitutes an improvement.

131.   Table 4.1 summarizes related CLE findings, which are further elaborated on below.

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[170] See definition of 'education systems' in the terminology table of this report. The GPE 2020 corporate results framework defines six indicators for measuring system-level change: (a) increased public expenditure on education (RF10, covered in section 3.3 on education financing); (b) equitable allocation of teachers (RF11, covered here under Access and Equity); (c) improved ratios of pupils to trained teachers at the primary level (RF12, covered here under Quality and Relevance); (d) reduced student dropout and repetition rates (RF13, covered in section 5); (e) the proportion of key education indicators the country reports to UIS (RF14, covered here under Sector Management), and (f) the existence of a learning assessment system for basic education that meets quality standards (RF15, covered here under Quality and Relevance).

Table 4.1   Overview: CLE findings on contribution of plan implementation to systems change

IMPROVEMENTS MADE DURING THE 2012-2018 REVIEW PERIOD?[171]	HAD ISSUE BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE GESP 2012-2017?[172]	LIKELIHOOD THAT GESP 2012-2017 IMPLEMENTATION CONTRBUTED TO NOTED IMPROVEMENTS[173]	DEGREE TO WHICH UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS LIKELY HELD TRUE[174]			
Access: Modest. Capitation Grants (CGs), Cash Transfers (CTs) for Girls, school feeding, some construction, especially pre-primary level.	**Partly**. CGs addressed in plan but not in action plan. Vice-versa for school feeding. CTs not mentioned at all.	**Low**. Capitation grant strategy (2013) and school feeding policy (2015) have little plan reference. Construction was not driven by GESP I.	1	2	3	4
Quality and Relevance: Modest. New curriculum and TLMs designed but not yet rolled out. Collapse of teacher attendance and of quality of teaching as salaries not paid and eroded by inflation.	**Yes**. Strategic Goals 2, 3 and 5 address quality considerations, including teacher training and pay, and call for new curricula and TLMs.	**Mixed**. Many teacher trainings but not always nationwide, systemic, or driven by the plan. However, GPEP support for curriculum and TLMs explicitly aligned to plan.				
Equity: Modest. Cash Transfers for adolescent Girls, new girls' education policy and inclusive education policy developed but, both not yet implemented.	**Partly**. Gender equality and inclusive education policies mentioned in the plan, but CTs not mentioned.	**Low**. Key intervention in the period, CTs, was not in the plan.				
Management: Modest. MoGEI restructuring approved but not implemented, some EMIS capacity development, systems set up to manage examinations, inspection, and teacher pay. No LAS yet (only some donor-backed assessments). Deterioration in state-level capacities.	**Yes**. Strategic Goals 4, 6, 7 call for capacity development and new systems for examinations, inspection, school governance.	**Mixed**. EMIS action plan (2014) does not cite GESP, and GESP capacity development activities were not undertaken. However, inspection, examinations and school governance systems directly in line with GESP.				

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[171] Rating options and related colour coding: Green = strong/comprehensive. Amber = modest/fragmented; Limited/in isolated areas only – red; Insufficient data – grey.

[172] Green = yes, comprehensively. Amber = yes, albeit partly/with gaps. Red = no or insufficiently. Grey = unclear. Of note, the fact that an issue was addressed in an ESP does guarantee that positive changes in this area were due to ESP implementation. This table thus has two columns, one for whether issue was addressed in the relevant ESP, and a second for whether there is evidence that improvements were due to ESP implementation (as opposed to, say, being due to a donor project that had little or no connection with the ESP).

[173] Green = High. Amber = Moderate; Red = Low. Grey = Insufficient data.

[174] The underlying assumptions for this contribution claim are (1) sector plan implementation leads to improvements of previous shortcomings in sector management; (2) there is sufficient national capacity (technical capabilities, political will, resources) to analyze, report on and use data and maintain EMIS and LAS; (3) ESP implementation leads to improvements of previous shortcomings in relation to learning and (4) it leads to improvements in relation to equity.

Progress towards a stronger education system during the review period

Finding 20: During the 2012-2018 period, government and partners undertook efforts to strengthen several aspects of the education system. However, most of these could not be properly implemented or proved inconsequential in the face of war and fiscal collapse. Only the introduction of capitation grants and the design of a new curriculum are likely to be lasting legacies of this review period.

132.   Due to data availability issues in South Sudan, described in section 1.3, reliable data for most system-level indicators listed in the evaluation matrix is not available. Nonetheless, this finding provides a general picture of the situation, based on documents and stakeholders consulted for this CLE. It is structured in line with the three sub-headings of CEQ 4 in the evaluation matrix: improvements in access to education, improvements in education quality and relevance, and improvements in sector management. Additionally, equity is discussed separately.

Access

133.   Overall, **both supply of and demand for primary schools worsened**. On the demand-side, existing access barriers largely remained in place (cost of schooling, distance to schools, early marriage or employment), whilst new barriers were added (insecurity, displacement and accentuated poverty due to war and inflation).[175] On the supply-side, the number of primary classrooms did not keep pace with population growth, as (a) few classrooms were built;[176] (b) as much as a quarter of schools were closed at times due to conflict;[177] and (c) a majority of schools still lack basic infrastructure.[178] Limited school supply is a challenge as school distance is always ranked prominently in surveys as a reason for dropout (see Appendix XI). Nonetheless, a number of interventions were undertaken to improve access to education:

- **Abolition of school fees and introduction of capitation grants**: The General Education Act 2012 and a ministerial order in 2015 reiterated the transitional constitution of South Sudan's stipulation that primary school is both free and compulsory. Moreover, the GoSS' 2011 Local Services Support (LSS) program made provisions for fiscal transfers to local service-providing institutions.[179] In 2013/14,

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[175] As shown by surveys of households (CESR 2009) and headmasters (EMIS 2015, EMIS 2016, ECA 2018) about the main reasons for school dropouts / for not attending schools. EMIS 2011 and EMIS 2013 do not contain such data.

[176] Different sources provide different figures, but CLE interviews confirm this statement. For instance, a state official noted that in their state, no public primary schools and only two public secondary schools had been built since 2011, despite population growth compounded by a strong influx of IDPs.

[177] ECAs estimates that 25 percent of schools were closed in 2016 and that 20 percent of schools were closed in 2018. A representative of a faith-based organization noted that only 40 out of 110 primary schools and 5 out of 12 secondary schools run by their network were currently operational (source: CLE interview). An estimated of 70 percent of schools in GUPN states were closed as of mid-2015 (source: ESA 2016:48). The ESA (2016:96) notes that teacher absenteeism may further limit access to education, but also that "there is little reliable information" on it.

[178] The ECA 2017 indicates that 25 percent of schools are "open air" and that only 40 percent of schools are permanent structures (source: UNESCO 2018a:73). The ECA 2018:21 indicates that, of 400 randomly sampled primary schools nationwide, 68 percent had no latrines. Of those that had latrines, 37 percent of toilets do not function, and 45 percent are not separated by gender. 80 percent of schools had no handwashing facilities in the vicinity of latrines. Only 59 percent of schools were within ten minutes or less of a safe water source on- or off-site. Whilst data availability issues prevent an indicator-by-indicator comparison relative to independence, it is evident from all sources that the overall quality of school infrastructure has not increased in war, relative to times of peace. It is, however, possible, that isolated improvements were seen in areas less affected by conflict, e.g. western states.

[179] Source: MoGEI-GESS, *Capitation Grants Strategy*, 2013, p.vi.

MoGEI and DFID's GESS program therefore led the introduction of nationwide capitation grants (CGs, cash transfers to schools for each pupil enrolled) to support the abolition of school fees, replace the loss of income resulting therefrom for schools, and strengthen local service-delivery. Since 2014, CGs have been provided to almost all active primary and secondary schools nationwide.[180] However, there is limited formal evidence on whether capitation grants effectively led to a reduction of school costs or to an improvement in the school environment. Most stakeholders (government and other) deemed the measure as highly positive and significant, although one non-governmental stakeholder noted that accountability for these and other financial transfers in the period was limited, with schools inflating pupil numbers for instance. There are also signs that school fees continued to be charged for a variety of items (cf. ESA 2016 p. 135) and may even have increased as teacher salaries collapsed in the second half of the 2012-2018 review period.[181] In any case, with the GoSS already shouldering over 90 percent of CGs for primary schools, CGs are expected to be sustained.

- **School feeding**: the GESP 2012-2017 stated the target of providing free school meals in "all" schools by 2017. Though this target was not reached, WFP provided schools meals to an average of 300,00 students (roughly 20 percent of total) in 2012-2016 and continues to do so at the time of writing in 600+ schools. School feeding is an important 'draw-in' factor for education, expected to reduce cost, increase enrollment, and improve learning as well as nutrition and health. WFP's school feeding was perceived as an important program by stakeholders, though not necessarily sustainable as it is presently entirely donor-funded, and ESA 2016:91 notes it has not reached areas most at need.

- **ECD and secondary school/classroom construction**: the GESP foresaw targets for school / classroom construction at all levels. During the review period, some progress towards a construction policy was made, and the GPE-backed AFF grant 2018-2019 supports a mapping of OOSC to plan future construction sites. Moreover, a cautious review of total school numbers suggests that the number of ECD centers and secondary schools grew substantially during the review period, by as much as 40 percent (from very low levels). Since the population of school age grew by four percent from 2011 to 2017, this suggests an improved availability of pre-primary and secondary education. However, there is no formal data on whether this has reduced school distance for the average household. Improvements are likely concentrated in urban non-conflict areas, and are likely to benefit only wealthier families, as both school levels charge fees, and as most new schools are likely to be private (little/no government or donor-sponsored construction). See also box 4.1.

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[180] Including both government and non-government (faith-based, NGO) schools (as long as they are not for-profit), and schools in conflict-affected areas. In 2017, for instance, the GoSS provided capitation grants to 3,045 primary and 238 pre-primary schools, and GESS provided capitation grants to 270 secondary and 264 primary schools. These numbers roughly correspond to the total estimated number of active schools nationwide at that time. Throughout the review period, the GoSS was expected to fund primary CGs and GESS would fund secondary CGs; however, in crisis years such as 2016 when GoSS income collapsed, GESS stepped in to fund primary schools, too. In 2017, the GoSS returned to funding 90 percent of primary school grants. In 2014, GESS also partnered with IMED (an EU program) which was expected to fund capitation grants for all secondary schools in South Sudan for 2 years from 2015-2017, with GESS expected to retake payment of secondary school capitation grants in 2017-18. However, IMED was subsequently interrupted in 2016, and GESS and MoGEI had to step back in. Sources: GESS Annual Review December 2017, GESS-MoGEI capitation grant strategy 2013, GESS Quarterly Report Q2-2014.

[181] One school-level stakeholder explicitly warned against enforcing the ban on primary level school fees, arguing that if fees were removed, teachers, who were already not being paid, would completely desert their posts.

Box 4.1. Non-governmental schools in South Sudan: trends and implications

The 2012-2018 review period witnessed **steady growth in the non-governmental share of education delivery**. These schools include religious, NGO, community, and for-profit private schools. The share of students at primary level attending non-governmental schools has risen from 17 percent in 2009, to 25 in 2011 and 28 in 2015 (ESA 2016:132), with similar, even more accentuated trends at pre-primary and secondary levels. This can be attributed to the resource challenges faced by the public (governmental) system, the ability of which to build schools and classrooms has been almost non-existent in recent years, other than with selected donor support.

There is no data on the consequences for access, equity and/or learning. In general, the existence of non-governmental schools increases supply of education services overall, and has contributed to sustaining at least some form of education in both rural and urban areas. Moreover, non-governmental schools do not necessarily inhibit equitable access, as only a small share of all schools are private for-profit (2-3 percent, cf. ESA 2016:49, less than five percent, ECA 2017:19), with most non-governmental schools being run by communities, religious or NGO groups. These may charge no or low fees, and in any case, governmental schools have often resorted to charging fees despite the ban as teacher salaries have not been paid regularly in recent years (and 'hidden fees' for transport, meals, etc. affect all types of schools, cf. ESA 2016:125). Finally, there is no data that monitors learning outcomes in governmental vs non-governmental schools.

From a policy standpoint, non-government schools have been broadly included in sector efforts. With the exception of private for-profit schools, non-government schools have been eligible to participate in/benefit from initiatives such as EMIS, examinations, HRIS, cash transfers, capitation grants, school feeding, and others (cf. ESA 2016:83). Moreover, MoGEI developed a private school framework in 2017 (cf. GEAR 2017 report), and though it has not yet been implemented, all schools are expected to apply the new South Sudanese curriculum, and to use English as the main language of instruction at higher grades.

Equity

134.   **Continued barriers to equitable access implied limited improvements in this regard**. Urban/rural and regional differences were accentuated due to regionally and rurally concentrated conflict (though it at times expanded nationwide) (ESA 2016:15). Poverty remained a major factor, as actual and 'invisible' costs and fees subsist at all levels (ibid p. 66, though there is no recent data on enrollment by income level). Nonetheless, some system-level efforts were undertaken during the 2012-2018 period to attempt to enhance equitable access:

▪ **Development of policies on equitable access**: in 2014, separate policies for girls' education and inclusive education, both promised under GESP 2012-2017, were launched with donor-support.[182] However, there is little evidence of implementation to date. This is likely due to a combination of low-quality design (lack of results framework and of costed implementation plan), and to the lack of implementation funding.

▪ **Nationwide cash transfers for girls' education**: in 2013, DFID's GESS program launched cash transfers for all girls from primary five to secondary four in not-for-profit schools (government, faith-based, NGO). Between 2013 and 2017, almost 200,000 girls had received at least one cash transfer (CT). These were funded largely by GESS, although the GoSS started to co-fund CTs in 2017. The CTs

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[182] UNICEF supported the girls' education policy, whilst NORAD, the Strømme Foundation and Light for the World supported the inclusive education policy. MoGEI was prominently involved in the development of both documents.

are expected to continue into the future and were seen positively by stakeholders. Their impact is reviewed in section 6.

- **Little progress on special needs**: there is no evidence that access to education improved for children with special needs during the review period. As noted, the inclusive education policy was launched but not implemented, and no other system-level efforts were registered in this area.

Quality and relevance of teaching

135.   There was **no system-level progress in the availability of teachers**. The collapse of GoSS revenues prevented the hiring of additional teachers foreseen in the GESP and necessary to achieve reduced pupil-teacher ratios, not least in the face of population growth. Partial data suggests that between 2011 and 2016, the number of teachers, number of qualified teachers, pupil-teacher ratio, pupil-qualified teacher ratio, and share of female teachers at best remained stable.[183] In fact, stakeholders from government, donors and NGOs hinted at deterioration, with teachers departing "en masse" (state government representative) in 2016-2018 given that salaries were paid irregularly and fell by a factor of up to 100 due to inflation.[184]

136.   There appears to have been **some improvement in the distribution of teachers**, with the average degree of coherence (R^2 of number of teachers and number of students per school) almost doubling from a very low 21 percent in 2009 to a still low 39 percent in 2015 (ESA 2016:113, these being the two only available datapoints). The causes for this improvement are not entirely clear, with no explanation found in either the ESA or interviews.[185] Even so, South Sudan remains the country with the lowest degree of coherence amongst comparable Sub-Saharan African countries, and there is substantial disparity in the degree of coherence across states (ibid, p.114).

137.   Similarly, there was **no system-level progress in ensuring and improving teacher quality**, as almost all Teacher Training Institutes (TTIs) were closed during most of the 2012-2018 review period due to conflict and the lack of funding. Various in-service trainings were undertaken through donor-backed humanitarian and development projects, but these were mostly not nationwide, not sustainable, and only partly coordinated.[186] One stakeholder involved in teacher training questioned the effectiveness of this

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[183] Data from EMIS, GESP I, GESP II and ESA 2016 is partly contradictory and thus not cited here (see Appendix XI). Some of it suggests an improvement in national pupil-teacher ratios (primary) between 2011 and 2015. This is likely principally due to the decrease in overall enrollment between 2011 and 2015, from 1.4m children to 1.25m (UNESCO 2018a:29). Meanwhile, no additional teachers were hired, and the number of teachers actually teaching likely decreased: data from the Education Cluster Assessment 2018 data suggests that 30 percent of teachers on average were absent from school at the time of data-collection, for a random sample of 400 schools across all states of South Sudan. However, teachers remained on payrolls even when not teaching, which likely contributed to the seeming 'improvement', in primary pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) data. Yet this is not a real improvement, as stakeholders agreed that, particularly since 2015, enrollment has risen for a fixed or reduced number of teachers, leading to lower PTRs.

[184] E.g., from US$200-300 in 2011 to US$11 in 2016, per month, at secondary level (ESA 2016:44). At least two officials interviewed for this CLE indicated that they had not been paid 'in months', and teachers in at least one state were on strike at the time of interviews due to lack of pay (source: CLE interview with an NGO).

[185] One hypothesis is that, due to conflict, rural schools with high pupil-teacher ratios that may in the past have dragged down the coherence rate closed or were not counted by EMIS. That said, this could not be verified.

[186] One stakeholder familiar with teacher training noted that training content and materials were not coordinated, whilst another similar stakeholder noted that efforts are being made to increase coordination. For instance, the website of the South Sudan Education Cluster lists some training materials. Moreover, the 'big four' development projects made efforts to coordinate, and GPEP (GPE/USAID) and Room To Learn (USAID) for instance jointly supported early grade numeracy and literacy kits, distributed nationwide. In general, trainings during the review

proliferation of short-term Continuous Professional Development (CPD) modules, including one-month 'Intensive English Course' to prepare teachers who previously taught in Arabic or national languages to teach in English, with English materials. An NGO stakeholder noted that "It's a leaking bucket, we train teachers and they go away", as many trained government teachers leave to teach in private schools, which pay more and more regularly. A donor agreed, adding that "the weak link in the education system are the teachers." (GESS)

138. There was **some progress in the relevance of education**. In particular, **new curricula were developed** (but not yet rolled out at the time of this evaluation). This prominently includes the new South Sudan 'master' curriculum as planned under GESP 2012-2017, funded through GPEP, launched in 2015 and due to be rolled out to schools in 2018/19. The new curriculum covers all levels of non-higher education, integrates new perspectives on education that are competence-based, learner-centric, and covers issues such as gender equality, life skills and peace education. Along with the curriculum, syllabi, teacher training manuals, and teacher and pupil textbooks were developed. Separate initiatives also supported the development of a pastoralist curriculum (supported by UNESCO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization), of early grade literacy and numeracy kits (supported by GPE and USAID), of a TVET policy (supported by Plan International and UNESCO), and of another set of textbooks (supported by China). However, to date, there has been **no progress in the availability of teaching and learning materials**, as the primary pupil-to-textbook ratio was 4:1 in 2011 and remained at 4:1 in 2015 (GESP II:130). This is because few textbooks have been disseminated to date: the new curriculum, for instance, had only been piloted as of end-2018, with plans to roll out textbooks and training in 2019 under new GPE funding (AFF 2018/19 and ESPIG 2019-2021). Moreover, though most ministry stakeholders considered the new curriculum an important achievement, at least four stakeholders (ministry, donor, NGO, school-level) expressed reservations about the relevance and applicability of the new curriculum, noting in one case that it was "almost the same" as the old one, and in three cases that it would be hard to use for teachers because the new curriculum and materials are in English. As the GESS Annual Review 2017 (p.8) noted with regards to its own materials, "most teachers surveyed have been unable to use the English materials (written in English) because they speak Arabic or a local language." The decision to use English is due to the political will to promote the use of the official language of the new nation, though a policy on the use of five other national languages in all lower grades 1-3 was also approved during the 2012-2018 review period.

Sector Management

139. There were **some gains in central sector management capacities, but a loss of general governmental implementation capacity due to war**. In general, stakeholders, including for instance a donor, noted that "there are a lot of good things at MoGEI", and that it is an "outlier", relative to the average line ministry in South Sudan. However, the same stakeholders noted that MoGEI was often "stretched", and its implementation capacities were hampered by whole-of-government fiscal and security issues. In terms of ministry capacity development, some activities outlined in the GESP 2012-2017, such as a staff capacity assessment, were not undertaken due to lack of GoSS funds, and because several donors avoided involving the government in education activities, especially humanitarian ones.[187] Nonetheless, the following efforts showed some progress:

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period included a mix of in-service and pre-service training. Pre-service training was less popular, because (a) most TTIs were closed, (b) teachers were often unable to travel to attend training on site, and (c) it was sensitive to train teachers from opposing sides of the conflict in one location (source: one CLE interview). In-service training was thus often preferred, due to its greater flexibility, even if it meant bringing trainers to teachers. GPEP supported the resourcing of two TTIs and several Community Education Centres, but this is not a system change.

[187] Several ministry and state officials highlighted this fact.

- **MoGEI restructuring**: though not foreseen under the GESP, a new MoGEI structure (organogram, job descriptions) was prepared and approved in 2015. It remains only partly implemented, due to funding shortages, but several departments were promoted to directorates during the review period (e.g., teacher management). There is no data on whether MoGEI restructurings, as undertaken or planned, constitute an improvement, and stakeholders did not comment on this.

- **New sector coordination manual**: though not foreseen under the GESP, MoGEI's partnership directorate (upgraded from a unit) prepared a sector coordination manual in 2013 with DFID support. The manual has been updated since, with few overall changes. As described in section 3.3, however, its provisions have not always been upheld and coordination remains partial.

- **EMIS capacities**: EMIS data-collection, which started in 2007, was maintained during most of the 2012-2018 review period (annual school census in 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2018), with support by UNICEF, the EU (IMED), and GPE (for EMIS 2015, 2015, 2018). GPE and EU-support for the EMIS unit also included annual training for MoGEI staff, e.g. in Kampala. However, the usability of EMIS data for tracking GESP progress or sectoral coordination remains limited, as it relies on annual school censuses with limited/variable geographic coverage (see section 1.3 and 2.2), and which primarily capture school enrollment data, with little to no data on sector activities, learning outcomes, household preferences, etc.[188] Similarly, the GESS-supported South Sudan Schools' Attendance and Monitoring System (SSSAMS) provided near real-time data on school enrollment and transfers, but not on GESP implementation.[189] It remains unclear whether EMIS and SSSAMS activities are sustainable, that is, whether they would continue without donor support.

- **Learning Assessment System (LAS)**: during the 2012-2018 period, several donors sponsored early grade numeracy and literacy assessments (DFID, GPE, USAID, BRAC, UNICEF – see section 5), but these individual efforts did not constitute a move towards a comprehensive, government-led LAS. South Sudan also set up the basics of a national examination system, including the examinations act passed in 2012, the national examination council set up in 2014, and the first nationwide harmonized primary leaving exams in 2017 (all actions set out in the GESP 2012-2017). However, exams have been repeatedly delayed due to lack of funds, students pay fees to sit exams, and the reliability and use of data remains limited to date, due to ongoing financial and capacity issues, and little donor support.[190] Moreover, national examinations do not constitute a standardized, comparable LAS.

- **Teacher management**: in 2017, IMPACT (EU) funded the set-up of a biometric Human Resource Information System (HRIS) to register, process and monitor teachers and their pay. It is expected that the system will be gradually handed over to the ministry. HRIS constitutes an improvement but has faced some challenges in its set-up and it is not yet clear that the ministry has the staff and financial capacities to sustain the system without donor support, though this is being worked on.

There have also been **efforts to improve school-level management and supervision**. As originally intended under GESP 2012-2017, school governance handbooks and trainings were developed and rolled out with

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[188] In the future, EMIS will also include modules that monitor the quality of classroom teaching. These modules were developed on the basis of GPE funding.

[189] GESS supports its own system as it requires near real-time data on school attendance in schools nationwide to disburse capitation grants and girl cash transfers, data which annual school censuses led by MoGEI's EMIS department cannot provide. However, there are plans to harmonize data systems, e.g. in the new ESPIG 2019-2021.

[190] GPEP (GPE and USAID) funded the development of assessment guidelines, the training of assessors, and South Sudan's first-ever EGMA/EGRA in 2015/16, but these one-off developments are not "system-level changes".

support from GPE, USAID and DFID, targeting headteachers, school management committees (SMCs), and parent-teacher associations (PTAs), and reaching most schools nationwide. An Education Cluster Assessment in 2018 showed that an impressive 97 percent of schools surveyed had SMCs. Similarly, the ministerial order on school inspection in 2017 established provisions for inspections, and GPEP supported 'supportive supervision' training for almost 1000 teachers. However, limited data shows that the number of school visits by education officers declined between 2013 and 2017,[191] and at least one ministry stakeholder pointed out that supervision remains weak and a serious issue.

140.   Finally, all stakeholders agreed that **state- and county-level management capacities deteriorated**, due to the vast increase in the number of states and counties since independence due to presidential decrees. Whilst two stakeholders (donor, state official) noted that some state-level ministries are rather effective, they and others (NGO, MoGEI) noted that many other state-, payam- and county- education offices lack office space, electricity, vehicles, capacities, and in some cases, staff. Moreover, whereas each of the ten original state ministries of education used to have an EMIS focal point and a sector coordination focal point which communicated regularly with counterparts at MoGEI, this system was lost due to the multiplication of states as well as due to ongoing conflict.

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[191] "There has been a fall in both the frequency of school visits and average number of schools visited by local education authorities. County staff reported visiting an average of 15.7 schools for an official inspection in 2017, down from 18.4 in 2015 and 26.9 in 2013." From GESS, County and Payam Education Managers Survey: Endline, Research Brief No. 13, 2018, p.3. http://girlseducationsouthsudan.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/County-and-Payam-Endline-13.pdf

Box 4.2. Conflict, displacement, and implications for the education system

Population displacement has been a major feature of the conflict in South Sudan. As of late 2018, there are over 1.5 million South Sudanese refugee children in neighboring countries, 0.3m foreign refugees in South Sudan, 1.9 million internally displaced persons within South Sudan (IDPs, of which over half are children), whereof almost 200 thousand civilians living in United Nations protection of civilians (PoC) camps within South Sudan.[192] Put otherwise, one in six persons in South Sudan is displaced, with severe implications for life including education.

During the initial years of the conflict, deterioration in education outcomes was strongest in the Greater Upper Nile (GUPN) region, most heavily affected by the fighting. However, the negative consequences of the conflict on the education system also spilled out into other regions. For instance, two state-level stakeholders noted that the displacement of GUPN-residents led to schools overcrowding in urban non-GUPN areas, such as Juba, or small urban areas within the GUPN. Increased enrollment in non-GUPN areas may thus at least partly reflect inflows of IDPs (rather than improved access for existing populations), and may well have contributed to a nationwide deterioration in measured learning outcomes (see section 5), due to reduced teaching time in rural areas (schools closed due to violence), increasing pupil-teacher ratios in urban areas, decreased availability of sufficient teaching and learning materials in the right places, and the challenge of managing increased classroom diversity (e.g. in terms of learning levels and languages).

The education cluster has been active in providing education services to IDPs, foreign refugees within South Sudan (93 thousand children supported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, cf. ESA 2016:20), South Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries, and civilians in PoC camps. Activities include the provision of temporary learning spaces, teaching and learning kits, training for teachers and school leadership, the payment of teacher incentives, and other activities (see for instance ESA 2016:56, and annual cluster response strategies). Nonetheless, enrollment in settings such as PoC camps remains low, with only 37 thousand children (40 percent girls) enrolled in primary school (a PoC GER of 46 percent, much below the 76 percent national average). (ibid).

In terms of sector plans, GESP I afforded limited attention to the aforementioned issues as it was designed prior to the 2013 crisis, in times of peace and hope around independence. GESP II, by comparison, includes references to IDPs, refugees, PoC camps and humanitarian action, in both the main plan and the 2017-2018 action plan. In terms of GPE, neither ESPIG concentrates explicitly on displaced populations, but both include components that target OOSC, with an increased focus under the new ESPIG. This division of labor was largely perceived as appropriate by interviewed governmental and partner stakeholders, with GPE focusing on system-level developments (e.g. new curriculum) and humanitarian actors focusing on IDPs, POCs and refugees.

Did ESP implementation contribute to system-level changes?

Finding 21:   During the 2012-2018 review period, the decisive factor for whether a system-level improvement happened was not whether it was listed in the original plan, but whether it was backed by donor funding, which itself was rarely plan-based. Only for GPEP support did the plan guide some system-level changes.

141.   Table 4.2 provides an overview of the 11 main system-level changes identified in the previous finding, whether they were planned under GESP 2012-2017, and whether their achievement was likely linked to said GESP implementation.

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[192] From OCHA, https://www.unocha.org/south-sudan, accessed March 2019. Though precise figures have fluctuated over the course of the 2013-2018 review period, they have been consistently very high (in terms of signifying a major humanitarian crisis) since renewed conflict broke out in 2013.

Table 4.2   *List of system-level improvements in the review period, against GESP 2012-2017*

SYSTEM-LEVEL IMPROVEMENT	IMPROVEMENT OUTLINED IN GESP I?	IMPROVEMENT DUE TO PLAN IMPLEMENTATION?	IMPROVEMENT RELIED ON DONOR FUNDS?
ALREADY SIGNIFICANT AND LIKELY SUSTAINABLE			
Capitation grants system: nationwide system (including disbursement and monitoring arrangements) for funding primary and secondary schools, 2013-now	**Partly**. CGs mentioned in passing but not included in action plan and not budgeted for.	**No**. CGs pushed by GESS. CG strategy (2013) cites Local Government Support Program 2011, not GESP.	**Partly**. CGs funded by GoSS and GESS. GESS key when GoSS could not pay for CGs (e.g. 2016).
Cash transfers system: nationwide system for cash transfers for all girls in P5 to S4, 2013-now	**No**. CTs not mentioned in GESP at all.	**No**. It was not in the plan.	**Largely**. CTs were largely funded by GESS, with some GoSS support late in the review period.
More secondary and ECD schools: up by 40 percent each, 2011-2017	**Yes**. Construction targets at all levels listed. Included community construction.	**No**. Some schools built by communities, companies or NGOs, not driven by the plan.	**Partly**. Schools built by communities, companies, NGOs, some donors.
ALREADY SIGNIFICANT BUT LIKELY NOT SUSTAINABLE			
School feeding program: free meals for 1/5 of primary pupils, 2014-now	**Partly**. Listed in action plan but unrealistic budget (< US$2/child/year).	**Partly**. Policy developed, as plan intended, but with (limited) plan references.	**Entirely**. WFP funded the policy and school feeding activities.
HRIS: biometric system to manage teacher payroll, 2017-2018	**No**. The GESP mentioned decentralized payroll capacity, but not this kind.	**No**. It was not in the plan.	**Entirely**. The EU funded the HRIS, with future plans to hand over to MoGEI.
EMIS and SSSAMS: data collection and capacity development, 2011-now	**Yes**. EMIS capacity development was in the plan (SSSAMS was not).	**Yes**. GPEP EMIS support was grounded in the plan. SSSAMS support was not.	**Entirely**. UNICEF, the EU and GPEP funded EMIS. DFID funds SSSAMS.
POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT IF IMPLEMENTED AND/OR STRENGTHENED FURTHER			
New curriculum and TLMs: new syllabi, literacy kits, textbooks, etc.	**Yes**. The GESP called for a new curriculum, textbooks and early grade kits	**Yes**. GPEP support for the new curriculum was linked to the plan.	**Entirely**. Curriculum funded by GPEP, other materials by GPEP, others
Other policies, guidelines: inclusive education, girls' education, AES policy, etc.	**Partly**. Most documents produced were included in the GESP. Some were not.	**Partly**. Most documents produce cite the GESP, but not all or not prominently.	**Largely**. With few exceptions, donors funded document development.

SYSTEM-LEVEL IMPROVEMENT	IMPROVEMENT OUTLINED IN GESP I?	IMPROVEMENT DUE TO PLAN IMPLEMENTATION?	IMPROVEMENT RELIED ON DONOR FUNDS?
MoGEI restructuring: 2015 not yet implemented	**No**. The GESP made no mention of restructuring.	**No**. It was not in the plan.	**No**. This was undertaken by MoGEI itself.
Exams: launch of national examinations council and harmonized examinations	**Yes**. The GESP called for these changes.	**Yes**. MoGEI drove those changes in line with the plan.	**Partly**. Mostly MoGEI funded with some GPEP support for training.
School-level management and supervision: new guidelines and training	**Yes**. The GESP called for improved school management practices.	**Partly**. GPEP support was aligned to the plan, USAID and DFID was not.	**Entirely**. Funded by GPE, USAID, DFID, some others.

142.   As the table shows, less than a third of system-level changes (three out of 11) are likely to have been principally driven by sector plan implementation: two as they were supported by GPEP, which was the only large donor project directly aligned with the plan, and one because it was driven by MoGEI itself. A second third of system-level changes are likely to have been partly driven by plan implementation, one because it was supported by GPEP, and two because they were was closely aligned with the original plan target (but the causal link from the plan to the implementation is not fully clear). Finally, almost half of notable system-level changes (five out of 11) have no relation to plan implementation.

143.   A second observation suggested by the table is that plan implementation – which as noted was at best partial and delayed – played no part in bringing about the three only system-level changes that were both (a) consequential during the 2012-2018 review period (in that they were implemented and likely improved education service provision, see section 6), and that at the same time are (b) likely to be sustainable. GESP also only partly had links to the category of system-level changes that are consequential, but that are likely not sustainable. In other words, the main type of system-level changes to which the existence and implementation of GESP likely contributed are those changes that, though a good start, have not yet been consequential for education service provision because they remain to be rolled out at scale.

144.   A third observation suggested by the last column in the table is that ten out of eleven system-level changes relied on at least some donor funding, and almost two thirds (seven out of 11) relied largely or entirely on donor funding. This confirms the observation, made throughout this report, that almost all key sector activities during the period hinged on donor support, including most notable system-level changes.

Implications for GPE's ToC and country-level operational model

Finding 22:	Most shortcomings of the education system in South Sudan are due neither to plan or sectoral issues, but to wider GoSS state capacity issues, and to war. Looking at the education sector in isolation, as the GPE ToC tends to do, may result in both the wrong diagnostic, and in ineffective cures, particularly in FCAC.

145.   Most issues that cripple education service delivery in South Sudan – lack of funds, lack of capacity, multiplication of states, accountability issues, insecurity, inter-ethnic tensions, implementation issues, and general poverty, hunger and disease – are squarely whole-of-government challenges rather than purely sectoral issues. Yet, few education sector efforts during the review period took a cross-sectoral lens, with selected exceptions such as WFP's school feeding work, which also addresses health and nutrition goals. To the contrary, several initiatives focused on strengthening sectoral systems instead of national ones. For

instance, UNICEF, EU and GPE support strengthened EMIS data-collection capacities at MoGEI instead of strengthening the National Bureau of Statistics. Similarly, the EU supported a new biometric system for teacher registration instead of supporting a nationwide system for the registration of public servants, including health workers and extension officers, which could have been led by the Ministry of Labor. Such narrowly focused sectoral approaches not only fail to cure ills which are deeply anchored in wider institutional weaknesses, but also potentially generate redundancies and more work, as the same systems are strengthened, without collaboration or compatibility, across sectors.

146.   The GPE ToC allows for the influence of 'external factors' but does not systematically recognize 'state capacity' as a driver of 'sector capacity'. Moreover, it does not consider avenues for cross-sectoral duplication and/or synergies. Whilst the GPE country-level operational model ultimately relies on country-level actors – DCP, LEG, CA, and GA – to identify cross-sectoral needs and opportunities in sector plans and ESPIG applications, GPE's language, orientation, and instruments – as well as decades of international development practice – are likely to promote and encourage a segmented, sectoral lens. In a world expected to "deliver as one" on the "indivisible agenda" of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), this rigid sectoral focus may not always be appropriate, or effective. The GPE ToC may thus want to consider the inherently limited influence that the implementation of any 'sectoral' plan is likely to have on education systems in FCAC.

5 Progress towards stronger equity and learning outcomes

Introduction

148. This section summarizes evaluation findings related to Key Question III from the evaluation matrix: "Have improvements at education system level contributed to progress towards impact?" Key sub-questions are:

- During the 2012-2018 period under review, what changes have occurred in relation to (a) learning outcomes in basic education, (b) equity, gender equality and inclusion in education? (CEQ 6)

- Is there evidence to link changes in learning outcomes, equity, gender equality, and inclusion to system-level changes identified under CEQ 4? (CEQ 6)

- What other factors can explain changes in learning outcomes, equity, etc.? (CEQ 6)

- What are implications of evaluation findings for GPE support to South Sudan? (Key Question IV)

149. The section a brief overview of medium-term trends in relation to basic education learning outcomes, equity, gender equality and inclusion that occurred in South Sudan up to and during the review period. The evaluation is not attempting to establish verifiable links between specific system level changes that occurred during the review period and impact-level these trends, given that the CLE covered only a relatively short timeframe and that in most cases it is likely too early to expect specific changes to be reflected in impact level trends. However, where links are plausible, those are discussed. Table 5.1 summarizes CLE findings on any such plausible links, which are further elaborated on below.

Table 5.1   Overview: CLE findings on contribution of system-level changes to impact-level changes

IMPROVEMENTS MADE DURING THE 2012-2018 REVIEW PERIOD?	LIKELIHOOD THAT TRENDS WERE INFLUENCED BY SYSTEM-LEVEL CHANGES DURING REVIEW PERIOD	DEGREE TO WHICH UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS LIKELY HELD TRUE[193]	
Equity, Gender Equality and Inclusion: Modest. Deterioration on most fronts, but improvements after 2015 in enrollment, and modestly, in gender equality indices for almost all indicators throughout the period.	**Strong.** Capitation grants, cash transfers for girls and school feeding show some evidence of having contributed to improved enrollment and gender equality.	1	2
Learning: weak. Limited data suggests deterioration or at best stagnation in learning outcomes (reading, maths).	**Weak.** Learning did not improve, and no system-level changes were able to halt stagnation / deterioration.		

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[193] The underlying assumptions for this contribution claim are (1) changes in the education system positively affect learning outcomes and equity, and (2) country-produced data on equity, efficiency and learning allow measuring/tracking these changes.

Trends in learning outcomes, equity, gender equality and inclusion in the education sector in South Sudan from 2011 to 2017

Finding 23:	Unsurprisingly given the ongoing conflict and humanitarian emergency, education access, inclusion and efficiency deteriorated or at best stagnated during most of the review period. Total enrollment, however, recovered after 2015, and gender equality indices progressed continuously, albeit modestly.

Equity, Gender Equality and Inclusion in Basic Education

150. Prior to independence in 2011, the South Sudanese education system witnessed rapid improvement, at least in terms of access: estimates suggest that enrollment doubled between 2000 and 2005, from 0.3m to 0.7m, and again from 2005 to 2010, from 0.7m to 1.4m (CESR 2012:2). During the review period (2012-2018), this progress was largely halted, and in some cases, reversed. Table 5.2 provides an overview of trends in the key impact-level indicators listed in the evaluation matrix, grouped by whether they showed improvement, stability, or deterioration. Highlights from the table include:

- *More school-age children were out of school than in school during the entire review period*, and the total number of OOSC grew throughout. Today, South Sudan has the highest proportion of OOSC in the world.[194] However, the OOSC share of the total school-age population has recently regressed slowly, as total enrollment recovered after 2015 and reached record levels in 2017/2018.

- *The collapse of education outcomes in the GUPN region drove deterioration in several nationwide indicators, such as the primary GER*. Without the GUPN, primary GER and overall primary enrollment did grow in the review period, due partly to resettlement from GUPN areas.

- *Gender equality improved across the board, albeit only modestly*, within margins of error. Data on access by income group, rural/urban and disability is limited and not comparable over time but indicates that severe gaps exist and remain.

- *Enrollment in pre-primary and secondary education doubled in terms of total student numbers*. This progress was likely concentrated in urban, non-GUPN areas.

- *Efficiency at best stagnated and likely deteriorated*, as repetition rates stagnated, and drop-out rates increased due to conflict. School life expectancy fell by almost a third.

151. In all cases, data is scarce (usually available only for 2009, 2011, and 2015), and not always comparable (for example, annual school censuses did not always reach the same areas due to conflict). For the same reason, data may underestimate deterioration as it does not cover the worst-affected areas. Data also hides strong inter- and intra-regional diversity, as well as fluctuation in time, with attendance data reported by states at times doubling or halving for a given gender group within as little as six months (cf. UNESCO 2018a:67).

152. Finally, even where Table 5.2 suggests 'improvement', improvement in all outcome-level indicators fell short of GESP I targets for 2017 (see section 3.5 and Appendix VII).

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[194] Source: GPE, South Sudan ESPIG Program Document 2019 – 2021, Version 23, September 4th, 2018, p.17.

Table 5.2   *Trends in indicators for Equity, Gender Equality and Inclusion in Basic Education*

INDICATORS THAT IMPROVED DURING THE 2012-2018 PERIOD

- **Share of OOSC**: the percentage of school-aged children (6-17) out of school declined slightly during the review period, from 64 percent in 2011 to 60 percent in 2018 (cf. UNESCO 2018 estimates). Despite this drop, these values indicate that more school-aged children were out of, rather than in, school throughout 2012-2018.
- **Gender equality in all indicators**: GPI values improved, modestly, across the board, e.g. for OOSC rates (GPI of 1.3 in 2011, GPI of 1.15 in 2015), pre-primary GER (0.94 2011, 0.96 2015), primary GER (0.66 2011, 0.71 2015), secondary GER (0.51 2011, 0.54 2015), primary and secondary school life expectancy (0.64 2011, 0.67 2015), etc. (all data UIS, see also UNESCO 2018a:28, figure 9).
- **Pre-primary enrollment**: pre-primary enrollment doubled over the course of the period in absolute numbers (56k 2011, 120k 2017, UNESCO 2018a:29), as well as in GER (5.8 percent 2011, 10.3 percent 2015, UIS).
- **Secondary enrollment**: enrollment doubled in absolute numbers (44k 2011, 90k 2017, UNESCO 2018a:29), but grew only modestly in GER (9.1 percent 2011, 9.9 percent 2015 UIS, no data for 2017). The number of pupils sitting the secondary leaving examination quadrupled (1,4k in 2012 to 7,7k in 2016/17, ESA 2016:29).

INDICATORS THAT STAGNATED DURING THE 2012-2018 PERIOD

- **Primary enrollment**: nationwide primary enrollment declined between 2011 and 2015 (from 1.4m to 1.25m), but increased again to a record 1.55m in 2017 (UNESCO 2018a:29). However, growth in enrollment did not keep up with annual growth in the population of school-age (four percent). Consequently, the nationwide GER declined from 85 percent in 2011 to 67 percent in 2015 (UIS).[195] This decline was strongly driven by a collapse in enrollment in the most conflict-affected GUPN states. If the GUPN is excluded, GER increased from 64 percent in 2009 to 72 percent in 2015 (ESA 2016:55), partly due to the resettlement of GUPN populations to non-GUPN areas.
- **Primary repetition rate**: the share of primary students repeating a grade remained stable, from 10-15 percent in 2009 (CESR 2012:42) to 9-11 percent in 2015 (ESA 2016:61, UIS).[196]
- **Primacy completion rate**: ESA 2016:18 shows an improvement in the PCR from eight percent in 2009 to 14 percent in 2015. However, it is unlikely that the PCR improved, as the dropout rate likely increased due to conflict (see below). Moreover, UIS data suggests the PCR was as high as 25 percent in 2010.
- **Access for children with special needs**: as the ESA 2016:67 notes, data on children with special needs' access to schooling is limited, unreliable, and not comparable over time. However, based on trends in other indicators, it is unlikely to have improved during the review period, and may even have deteriorated.

INDICATORS THAT DETERIORATED DURING THE 2012-2018 PERIOD

- **Number of OOSC**: the total number of school-aged children (6-17) out of school rose from an estimated 1.9m in 2011 to 2.2m in 2018, and is on track to rise to 2.4m by 2020 (cf. UNESCO 2018). The share of OOSC nonetheless declined lightly in the period as enrollment growth outpaced population growth (see above).
- **Transition rate**: the share of primary leavers continuing to secondary school fell from 87 percent in 2009 to 69 percent in 2011 (ESA 2016:18).
- **School life expectancy**: school life expectancy (primary and secondary combined) dropped from six years in 2011 to five years in 2015, according to UIS estimates.

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[195] Or from 72 percent in 2009 to 57 percent in 2015, according to ESA 2016:18 data. In general, enrollment fluctuated strongly during the review period, and figures differ by data source. GESS's SSSAMS, for instance, suggests that total enrollment (all levels) rose from 0.93m in 2014 to over 1.7m in 2018 (source: GESS, *School Sample Survey: Endline*, Research Brief No. 16, 2018, p.1).

[196] UIS registers a drop-in repetition in the first grade of primary between 17 percent in 2011 and 11 percent in 2015, but this drop is not reflected in repetition-related data on other primary grades and/or from other sources. The ESA 2016:60 explicitly notes: "No changes were observed in the level of repetition between 2009 and 2015."

- **Dropout rates**: EMIS data (2011, 2013, 2016) suggests a strong drop in primary dropout rates from 28 percent in 2011 and as much in 2013 to 6 percent in 2015. This is surprising given that several stakeholders suggested that dropouts likely increased due to conflict and lack of public financing, particularly in the GUPN.
- **AES enrollment**: the absolute number of students enrolled in AES declined from 164k in 2011 to 127k in 2017 (cf. UNESCO 2018a:29). This may have been driven by conflict, limited funding, and the closure of AES centers.
- **Regional differences**: the ESA 2016 shows that substantial national disparities remain, including in enrolment between urban and rural areas, frequently higher by 10-25 percent (cf. UNESCO 2018a:40). However, no data exists on how these disparities have evolved over time. It is likely that they have worsened, as education service delivery at times collapsed in the most severely conflict-affected areas, accentuating regional disparities.
- **Access for the poorest**: no income-disaggregated enrolment data has been collected since 2009, but the collapse in public funding and rise in fees is likely to have deteriorated the poorest' access to education.

INDICATORS FOR WHICH NO CONCLUSIVE DATA IS AVAILABLE

- **Internal Efficiency Coefficient (IEC)**: the ESA 2016:62 calculates an improvement in South Sudan's global IEC at the primacy level, from 11 in 2009 to 25 in 2015. Given that repetition rates have stagnated and drop-outs likely rose (see above row), this improvement is not plausible. No other conclusive data is available.

Learning Outcomes in Basic Education

Finding 24:	Learning outcomes did not improve, and potentially deteriorated towards the end of the review period, in all states, levels, and subjects. Girls continue to perform marginally worse than boys, though the gender gap fell slightly. Conflict, lack of teacher pay and rising enrollment are the likely main causes.

153.   The main source of evidence for learning outcomes comes from GESS learning assessments. GESS conducted baseline (2014), midline (2016) and endline (2018) literacy and numeracy assessments in a random sample of over sixty schools in seven (2014) to ten former states (2016, 2018), at Primary 5 (P5), Primary 8 (P8) and Secondary 2 (S2) levels, reaching roughly 10,000 learners (2018).[197] Results show that overall, average scores were stable between 2014 and 2016, but dropped in 2018, for both girls and boys, and both literacy and numeracy, at all three levels.[198]

- **Region**: the 2018 drop in learning outcomes was not only registered in the most severely conflict-affected GUPN states, but also in non-GUPN states (although it was smaller there, contributing to

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[197] As much as possible, all three assessments were undertaken in the same schools and with comparable questions. In 2018, for instance, assessments reached 10,266 learners (4,701 girls, 5,565 boys) in 64 schools.

[198] The only area in which 2018 scores were better than both 2014 and 2016 scores is numeracy in S2, were overall scores rose from 30 percent in 2014 to 37 percent in 2018. Both boys and girls registered a comparable improvement in this area over the period. Numeracy at S2 had started from the lowest average score of any tested category in 2014 and 2016 (and overtook P8 numeracy in 2018, as S2 rose to 37 percent and P8 fell to 35 percent). Source for all the data on GESS assessments: GESS, *Learning Assessment Endline*, Research Brief N.17, 2018. It is worth noting that the research briefs (p.2-3) lists several reasons why learning assessment endline scores may be worth than base- or mid-line scores, other than actual deterioration in learning. Alternative explanations for a decline in registered scores include (a) the fact that endline assessments were carried out three months earlier in the school year than previous assessment rounds, meaning that students in the same grade had fewer months of instruction, and (b) the higher enrollments in 2018, which suggest that the demographic characteristics of the learners may have changed, to include more children from disadvantaged families, who could be expected to have lower learning levels. Though these are reasonable alternative explanations, this finding nonetheless leans towards the interpretation that learning scores "potentially deteriorated", given overwhelming contextual challenges which compounded over time, and given qualitative impressions shared by stakeholders with regards to the deterioration in teaching and learning.

compounding existing regional differences). The nationwide drop was likely driven by school closure in conflict areas, by increasing pressures on school due to the arrival of IDPs in non-conflict areas, and by teacher absenteeism due to the absence of meaningful pay, nationwide.

- **Gender**: both boys and girls scored worse overall in 2018 than in 2014. Boys outperformed girls in most assessment categories (most combinations of years, levels, subjects), although by 2018 differences were small and had shrunk over time: the gender gap in numeracy decreased from 2.1 percent in 2014 to 0.6 percent in 2018, and in literacy decreased from 5.7 percent in 2014 to 2.7 in 2018. Moreover, the share of assessed pupils who were girls increased from 32 percent in 2014 to 48 percent in 2018. Some of these gender-related improvements may be due to GESS-supported cash transfers (see next finding).

- **Income**: recent data disaggregated by income level was not available from GESS or other sources. Data from 2010 shows that wealth and learning correlate, but not strongly (CESR 2012:70).

- **Rural/urban**: recent data disaggregated by rural/urban results was not available, from GESS or other sources.

154.   Other sources of evidence are less comprehensive or representative and cannot be used to assess learning outcomes over time or across space. GPEP, for instance, conducted English-language literacy and numeracy assessments in Primary 3 in 2014/15 (baseline) and 2017 (endline). The assessment shows some deterioration in reading skills and some improvement in numeracy skills. However, it covered only between a 100 (endline) and 400 (baseline) learners in GPE-supported schools in five (former) states, [199] and encountered issues with implausibly good baseline data (e.g. 100 percent pass rate in some states and subjects). Another potential source of learning data are the official Primary and Secondary completion examinations. Whilst these exams have taken place most years, examination difficulty is not standardized over time and primary examinations were not standardized across states until 2017. Moreover, very high pass rates (80 percent and above in 2009 and 2014, cf. ESA 2016:102) suggest exams are of very low difficulty . It is therefore not possible to use this data to compare learning outcomes across time or space. However, exam data confirms that boys slightly outperform girls in most cases (states, levels, years) and that the gender gap in pass rates narrowed slightly between 2009 and 2014 at secondary level.[200] Finally, a third set of data on learning outcomes are one-off assessments conducted throughout the 2012-2018 review period, included a USAID-funded assessment in 2013 (522 P2 students), a BRAC-funded literacy assessment in 2015 (2415 P1 students), and a GPEP funded EGMA/EGRA in 2015/16 (250 P3 students). Due to their one-off nature, results cannot be compared over time, but all consistently show very poor learning.[201]

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[199] Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Lakes, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap. Though not part of the so-called 'Greater Upper Nile' region most heavily affected by conflict, all states witnessed some violent incidents.

[200] In 2014, 75 percent of boys and 71 percent of girls passed the secondary leaving examination, a Gender Parity Index (GPI) score of 0.95. In 2009, the GPI had been slightly lower, at 0.89 (ESA 2016:102). At primary level, however, data suggests that the gender gap rose slightly, as the GPI fell from 0.99 in 2009 to 0.9 in 2014 (ibid).

[201] E.g., 99% of zero scores in P1, 97% in P2, and 45% in P3 (across these different samples and assessments, so figures are not comparable and are for indicative purposes only). Source: GPEP evaluation 2018, p. 27.

Is there evidence to link trends in learning outcomes, equity, gender equality and inclusion to system-level changes identified? What other factors can explain observed changes (or lack thereof)?

> **Finding 25:** Improvements in gender equality and enrollment can be linked to capitation grants, cash transfers and school feeding, sponsored by MoGEI, DFID, and WFP. Of these, only school feeding can be linked to sector plan implementation.

155.   Table 5.3 provides an overview of the main impact-level improvements identified in the two previous findings, and of the likelihood that system-level improvements identified in section 4 contributed thereto. As the table shows, there is evidence that **nationwide capitation grants**, **nationwide cash transfers for girls**, and **school feeding in selected areas** supported improvements in gender equality indices, secondary enrollment, and overall enrollment. There is less evidence that identified system-level changes explain the observed rise in pre-primary enrollment.

Table 5.3   Contributions of system-level improvements to identified impact-level improvements

IMPACT-LEVEL IMPROVEMENTS	LIKELIHOOD THAT SYSTEM-LEVEL CHANGES CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT?
Improvement in gender equality indices	**Strong**. Nationwide cash transfers (CTs) for girls in upper primary and secondary likely helped support girls' attendance and retention, particularly at the upper primary and secondary level. A DFID-commissioned study estimates that schools where girls received CTs increased their female enrolment share by around 2 percent, relative to schools that received no CTs.[202] Another factor that may have supported gender equality improvements is school feeding, which reached 20 percent of primary pupils between 2014 and 2016, including specific incentives for girls, and is perceived to have helped reduce the gender gap.[203] Finally, a large awareness and sensitization campaigns by GESS likely further supported girls' education.
Growth in secondary enrollment and GER	**Strong**. On top of the effect of CTs and school feeding on female enrollment above, a DFID-commissioned study estimates that "Schools that received capitation grants in the prior year increased their enrolment the following year by between 7 and 8 percent. Schools that received cash transfers the prior year increased their enrolment by between 8 and 9 percent the following year."[204] Seeing as such grants were nationwide, this likely supported growth in secondary enrollment. Another factor that supported secondary enrollment growth is growth in the number of secondary schools, driven by private, NGO, and faith-based providers.

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[202] Source: Crawfurd, Lee. *Cash Grants for Schools and Pupils can Increase Enrolment and Attendance Despite Ongoing Conflict: Findings from South Sudan*. GESS, DFID, and Center for Global Development, University of Sussex. Draft, November 2016, p.16. http://girlseducationsouthsudan.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Cash-Grants-Impact-on-Enrolment-and-Attendance.pdf

[203] Source: "Under the school feeding programme, the girls incentive programme strongly addresses the gender gap in education. It was stated that improving enrolment and retention at school has a disproportionately strong benefit for girls, in that it is believed to reduce early marriage and early pregnancy, but no supporting data was available.", WFP 2017:45.

[204] Source: Crawfurd, Lee. *The effect of financial aid from UK Aid Girls' Education South Sudan programme and EU IMPACT programme to education in South Sudan in 2017*, 30 October 2017, p.1, http://girlseducationsouthsudan.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The-effect-of-GESS-and-IMPACT-financial-aid-to-education-in-South-Sudan-in-2017-vf.pdf.

IMPACT-LEVEL IMPROVEMENTS	LIKELIHOOD THAT SYSTEM-LEVEL CHANGES CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT?
Decline in the share of OOSC and growth in total school enrollment post-2015	**Strong**. As noted above, cash transfers and capitation grants both contributed to enrollment growth and were of nationwide reach. However, they likely cannot explain the entirety of the growth in enrollment post-2015, not least as the effective value of CGs and CTs declined after 2016 due to hyperinflation. School feeding also supported access, but only reached 10-20 percent of schools (WFP 2017:37). A separate factor that may have driven higher enrollment is the displacement of rural populations to urban centers, where distance to school is lower, meaning that children who may previously have lived too far from school may now attend (but the data is not conclusive, and the burden of displacement may reduce access, too).
Growth in pre-primary enrollment and GER	**Limited**. In 2017, only 217 out of 725 pre-primary schools (30 percent) benefited from capitation grants. They did not benefit from cash transfers or school feeding. The growth in ECD enrollment is likely mostly due to the proliferation of private providers in urban areas.

156.   Two observations can be derived from this table. First, most system-level improvements listed in section 4 have not yet contributed to impact-level improvements. This is due primarily to the fact that, as noted in section 4, several system-level changes have not yet been fully implemented (e.g. new curriculum, new supervision system, new ministry structure).Secondly, of the three system-level changes that contributed most to impact-level changes (capitation grants, cash transfers, school feeding), only school feeding was partly driven by plan implementation. Vice-versa, system-level changes that were most directly linked to plan implementation (e.g. curriculum development, EMIS capacity) have not yet made a clear contribution to impact-level changes.

Implications for GPE's ToC and country-level operational model

Finding 26:   **Though system-level changes designed to enhance 'access' may have had the clearest impact during the review period, current record levels of enrolment in South Sudan have stretched schools and accentuated the learning crisis. In this light, GPE's focus on improving teaching and learning is highly relevant in South Sudan, and the latest ESPIG encouragingly further accentuates this emphasis.**

157.   As discussed in the preceding finding, system-level changes that promote access, such as capitation grants, had the clearest links to impact-level changes during the 2012-2018 review period, such as increased enrollment. However, whilst all stakeholders saluted capitation grants, cash transfers and school feeding as welcome forms of assistance for schools and households, several questioned how positive the overall rise of enrollment since 2015 has been in the South Sudanese context. At least six stakeholders (two donors, two NGOs, one state official, one other) suggested that increasing enrollment has happened in a context of a fixed or decreasing number of operational schools and teachers. This, in turn, has caused schools to overflow particularly in urban centers where internally displaced persons have resettled; has raised pupil-teacher ratios; and has further reduced the quality of teaching. "Many people came to school and the quality of the education system went down." (NGO).

158.   As such, when stakeholders were asked about their priorities for the education sector, most put the greatest emphasis on improving the quality of both teaching and learning (see box 4.3). Two stakeholders (one donor, one NGO) explicitly argued that improving teaching is more of a priority than improving attendance, as "quality will bring access" (donor). Though household and headmaster surveys in South Sudan have not usually found 'low quality' to be a major reason for school dropout/non-attendance (see Education Cluster Assessment 2018), the general relevance of the need to improve learning is evident.

159. This suggests that the focus of GPE's 2020 strategy, the first strategic goal of which is "improved learning outcomes", is highly relevant to South Sudan. Although the system-level changes supported by GPE's ESPIG 2013-2018 may not have had the same degree of impact as other system-level changes during the 2012-2018 review period (such as DFID-backed capitation grants), ESPIG interventions to improve the curriculum, early grade teaching, and school supervision are highly aligned with the priorities of sector stakeholders in South Sudan. As noted in section 3.5, the latest ESPIG 2019-2021 accentuates this focus on quality-related interventions in its budget. Although its overarching goal is to bring 400,000 out-of-school children back to school – seemingly an access issue – it aims to do so largely by improving quality. Compared to the old ESPIG, the new ESPIG roughly halved its construction budget (from US$12m to 6m) and increased its quality-oriented budget (from US$10m to 15), and budgets to train teachers nationwide. In this way, GPE's ESPIGs are likely to continue to usefully complement the work of some other sector donors, who are focused on supporting (equitable) access.

Box 4.3. Stakeholder perceptions of priorities for the South Sudanese education sector: quality a key priority

Thought different stakeholders expressed a variety of priorities, the issue of improving quality – and training teachers – resonated as a dominant concern across interviews for this CLE.

Priorities of a MoGEI official: (a) teacher training & pay, (b) classrooms / infrastructure, (c) development, printing of curriculum.

Priorities of another MoGEI official: Priority #1 now is to bring 400,000 kids who went OOSC back to school.

Pri**orities of a state-level official**: (a) supervision, inspection and accountability to improve quality; (b) providing strategic access by mapping what kind of infrastructure is needed where and how it can be combined smartly; (c) improving education at other levels than just primary school.

Priorities of an NGO stakeholder: (a) teacher training, (b) English language skills, (c) ministry capacity, (d) needs assessments and making projects needs-based, (d) ensure national policy documents get disseminated to states; (e) research on what works, learn from other countries.

Priorities of a donor: "Teachers, Materials, Schools."

Priorities of another donor: "Teachers are the weakest link in the education system."

Source: CLE interviews.

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6   Conclusions and strategic questions/issues

160.   This final section of the report draws **overall conclusions** deriving from the evaluation findings and formulates several **strategic questions** that have been raised by the findings of the South Sudan evaluation. These questions are of potential relevance for GPE overall and may warrant further exploration in other upcoming country-level evaluations.

161.   This section answers CEQ 7 and CEQ 8 from the evaluation matrix:

- What, if any, aspects of GPE support to South Sudan should be improved? What, if any, good practices have emerged related to how GPE supports countries? (CEQ 7)

- What, if any, good practices have emerged related to how countries address specific education sector challenges/how countries operate during different elements of the policy cycle? (CEQ 8)

6.1   Conclusions

162.   Overall, despite challenges, the GPE model worked reasonably well in South Sudan in 20122018, in the sense that it is not clear how vastly more impact could have easily been achieved given existing resources and the complex and difficult circumstances. Though actual system and impact-level improvements were largely undermined by external factors, GPE contributed to building important foundations for two of its country-level objectives: planning and mutual accountability.

163.   GPE's country-level ToC outlines four country-level objectives for GPE's support. Table 6.1 recapitulates this evaluation's assessment of the degree of GPE contribution to each of these.

Table 6.1   Overview of GPE contribution to country-level objectives of the GPE ToC

COUNTRY-LEVEL OBJECTIVES	RATING OF DEGREE/LIKELIHOOD OF GPE CONTRIBUTION
Sector Planning	
Mutual Accountability	Sector Dialogue
	Sector Monitoring
Sector Financing	
Sector Plan Implementation	

164.   The two areas of greatest GPE contribution were the areas of planning and mutual accountability. The presence of GPE in South Sudan resulted in more and better planning and mutual accountability than would otherwise have occurred. Stakeholders in particular highlighted the value of:

- GPE as a **unique promoter of sector-wide planning and dialogue**, through (a) its funding requirements, which require a credible ESP and the existence of a LEG, and through (b) its financial and non-financial support for ESP development, sector dialogue, and annual JSRs. These GPE contributions were perceived as highly relevant, unique, and important. One donor noted that GPE's model enables difficult conversations to be had, not least in fragile contexts: "It offers a forum for planning and discussion that otherwise would not happen. I think that's the primary value-added for

GPE." A humanitarian actor similarly noted that GPE was unique in its focus on promoting sector-wide discussion and "collective responsibility", and a ministry official noted that "GPE is not enforcing. They want something everyone accepts, us, partners, civil society, etc."

- GPE's **emphasis on empowering countries** to lead their own sector through planning and dialogue. This aspect is supported through GPE funding requirements, GPE funding, and through GPE's general messaging. As a donor noted, GPE's emphasis on government ownership is unique: "These [GPE funds] are the only sector funds where you need MoGEI's signature!".

165.   Two areas of lesser contribution during the 2012-2018 review period are sector financing and sector plan implementation. GPE was not able to rally donors around the plan, be it in terms of aligning funding to it, or in terms of driving and monitoring its implementation.

- With regard to **financing**, the current GPE 'toolbox' was not powerful enough in South Sudan to influence either the government or international partners to increase, or increasingly harmonize and align, their funding. This was largely due to external circumstances, but also points to limitations of GPE's approach to financing to date. Notwithstanding current commitments to move to 10-15 percent funding levels by 2020 (cf. South Sudan's pledge for GPE's third replenishment in 2018), it should be noted that prior commitments to raise expenditures, as laid out in GoSS annual budget books, have historically not been met. As well, the current commitment is based on macro revenue assumptions that are highly optimistic and which senior GoSS stakeholders collectively remarked will be difficult to achieve. The new Education Sector Investment Case (ESIC) approach, currently being piloted by GPE, as well as the next South Sudan ESPIG (2019-2021), which includes provisions for helping MoGEI to track public expenditures on education, may foster improvement in this regard.

- With regard to **implementation**, GPE's ESPIG 2013-2018 directly supported plan implementation, but the limitations of the initial plan in terms of quality, the collapse of domestic financing, and the lack of alignment to the plan of most other development and humanitarian financing prevented plan implementation, beyond the remit of factors GPE could influence. Selected GESP I activities that were achieved with GPE support – such as the development of a new national curriculum – were nonetheless deemed significant.

GPE's ToC assumes that system- and impact-level changes are caused by sector plan implementation. This was not the case in South Sudan, where system- and impact-level changes had limited links to plan implementation. In general, most GPE ToC assumptions did not fully hold in South Sudan.

166.   As discussed in section 4, the driving factor for whether a system-level change occurred during the 2012-2018 review period was not whether it was included in GESP 2012-2017, but whether it was backed by donor support, which itself was not primarily driven by the plan (with the exception of GPE's support). Whilst the ToC generally assumes that system-level changes would be strengthened if donors aligned their support to the sector plan, this was not necessarily the case in South Sudan, where some of the key system-level changes came out of interventions that were not prominently reflected in the sector plan. Though the counterfactual of what would have happened if all donors aligned their support go GESP I cannot be known, it is not clear that in the case of South Sudan such full alignment with the plan would have contributed to more/better system- and impact-level changes, given weaknesses in GESP I prioritization and strategy selection.

167.   In general, only two out of 23 assumptions of GPE's country-level ToC held in South Sudan (nine percent). Another 11/23 (48 percent) partly held, and the remaining ten, almost half, were found to not hold. Moreover, assumptions were found to hold decreasingly as one moved 'up' the contribution chain, from planning, to plan implementation, to system-level changes. This is illustrated in Table 6.2. It suggests that assumptions around the causal linkages between GPE support and sector plan implementation, and

between sector plan implementation, were least supported in South Sudan. Key assumptions that did not hold are assumptions with regard to plan implementation capacities, and to the link between plan implementation and system-level changes with relation to management, learning, and equity.

Table 6.2   Share of GPE ToC assumptions that were found to hold, by contribution claim[205]

AREA	PROPORTIONS OF ASSUMPTIONS THAT HELD, PARTIALLY HELD, OR DID NOT HOLD		
Sector Planning	• GPE has leverage to influence planning (#4)	• Country-level stakeholders (CLS) have the capabilities, opportunities and motivation to improve planning (#1, #2, #3) • EMIS and LAS produce relevant information to inform planning (#5)	
Sector Dialogue and Monitoring	• CLS have the capabilities to work together to solve sector issues (#2) • CLS have the motivation (incentives) to work together (#4)	• GPE has leverage to influence LEG functioning (#1) • CLS have the opportunity (conducive environment) to work together (#3)	
Sector Financing	• GPE has leverage to influence the amount and quality of domestic financing (#1)	• Contextual factors allow for increases in domestic and international funding (#2)	
Sector Plan Implementation	• Sector plan includes EMIS/LAS provisions (#6)	• CLS take part in regular, quality JSRs (#5)	• Relevant government actors have the motivation (incentives), opportunity (context), and technical capabilities to implement the sector plan (#1, #2, #3) • CLS have the motivation and opportunity to align their activities to the plan (#4)
System-Level Changes	• There is sufficient national capacity to use EMIS / LAS data (#2)	• Plan implementation leads to improvement in relation to sector management (#1), learning (#2), and equity (#4)	
Impact-Level Changes	• Changes in the education system positively affect learning and equity outcomes (#1)	• Data is available to measure those changes (#2)	
TOTAL	9%	48%	43%

This CLE validates the relevance of GPE's Operational Framework for Support to FCAC, as well as of its Accelerated Funding Framework. These mechanisms allowed GPE to both maintain its overall support envelope, and to support the restructuring of specific ESPIG components as the context evolved.

168.   Stakeholders involved with the GPE granting process, on both the governmental and the CA/GA side, praised both the stability and the flexibility of the support.

▪ In terms of **stability**, ministry officials and others highlighted how valuable it was for GPE support to maintain its support at a time of crisis, making GPE the only steady MoGEI partner along with DFID. Predictable multi-year support was particularly valuable as much ODA shifted to humanitarian channels, which operates on a short one-year window. Though stability may not be appropriate for its own sake in an evolving context, it was deemed important for MoGEI to be able to continue to exercise some level of control, and the stability in the overall envelope was complemented by flexibility in terms of the specific GESP activities supported, to better respond to the context.

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[205] The relative size and colour of cells in each row indicates the share of assumptions for a given contribution claim that was found to hold (green), partly hold (yellow), or not hold (red).

- In terms of **flexibility**, both donors and GoSS officials praised GPE for showing flexibility during the review period, such as (a) approving ESPDG and ESPIG no-cost extensions, (b) waiving the variable tranche requirement for the latest ESPIG, (c) approving several restructurings of the first ESPIG, and (d) not rigidly holding South Sudan to account for crisis-induced decreases in domestic financing. This flexibility was welcomed by a senior GoSS official, who noted that "flexibility is key as 80 percent of countries were GPE works have issues", and by a donor, who noted that "Once you get the money, I think GPE is very good". Two stakeholders (donor, MoGEI) compared GPE's flexibility favourably to that of other donors during the 2012-2018 period.

169.   More generally, this CLE highlights how several aspects of the GPE model specifically designed to support needs and flexibility in fragile contexts helped to ensure the continued relevance of GPE's support in crisis situations: (a) GPE's MCA formula ensures that FCACs receive an increased allocation; (b) GPE's Operational Framework for Support to FCAC facilitated the kind of grant restructuring which was deemed necessary at times in South Sudan; and (c) GPE's Accelerated Funding Framework allowed South Sudan to obtain an advance on its MCA to bridge a potential funding gap in 2018/2019, as the ongoing emergency caused delays in ESA, ESP and ESPIG design processes. Finally, one donor highlighted an unexpected value of GPE in crisis contexts: because GPE Secretariat staff (country leads) are based in Washington and not in the field, they tend to face less turnover, and provide valuable institutional memory in a context of high turnover of country-level stakeholders.

Despite this, neither capacity development nor fragility considerations are as of yet mainstreamed into GPE guidance and operations, which at times limited the relevance of GPE's model to South Sudan.

170.   Two UNESCO-commissioned studies of the GESP I and GESP II development processes in South Sudan testify to the fact that capacity development in general was limited in the 2012-2018 review period. GPE grants (ESPIG and ESPDG) episodically, but not systematically, focused on capacity development. Though this concern applies equally if not more to other donors, such as humanitarian ones, several ministry and selected donor stakeholders raised this issue as a concern with regards to GPE.

171.   Similarly, fragility considerations are not yet mainstreamed into GPE guidance and operations. Though TEP guidance was recently developed, guidance for other processes – such as the recently released guidance on effective JSRs (2018) or the guidelines for the monitoring of national education budgets (2019) – include little or no specific/differentiated guidance for FCACs.

GPE remains a unique education sector partner in that it relies on a set of sector-wide actors – DCP, LEG, CA – to design and implement its support. One challenge for GPE's country-level operational model in South Sudan was that, despite noted GPE contributions to sector dialogue, this set of actors was overall unable to perform in a fashion fully in accord with the GPE model during the 2012-2018 review period, due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis and other partner-specific factors. This poses risks for the effectiveness of the GPE model, and though the GPE Secretariat made noteworthy efforts to assist country-level actors in fostering dialogue, it ultimately could not resolve local constraints.

172.   GPE is a unique partner in that its model relies on a set of crucial country-level actors to support its country-level objectives. However, sectoral consultation mechanisms were severely disrupted in South Sudan due to the ongoing humanitarian emergency, as described in section 3.3.

- The leadership expected in the GPE model from the **developing country partner** was undermined by its incomplete control of national territory, by the collapse in the GoSS's domestic revenue and by accountability issues which led traditional multilateral and bilateral donors to channel support through third party implementation partners (NGOs) instead of directly working with the government as their implementation partner. This meant MoGEI was unable to drive plan

implementation and was at times only marginally involved in driving partners' education work (e.g. the Education Cluster's).

- The coordination work expected from the **coordinating agency** was rendered challenging when USAID, the CA, was barred by congressional orders from engaging directly with the Goss, although capable of engaging other partners like UNICEF and bilateral partners. Moreover, regular staff evacuations and the lack of a dedicated USAID education specialist in Juba until late 2018 further hindered the CA from proactively fostering sector-wide dialogue.

- A **Local Education Group** never properly emerged in South Sudan. The National Education Forum, expected to play the role of the LEG (regular meetings), never evolved beyond a static, annual information transfer mechanism, not promoting sector dialogue as envisioned by the GPE approach. NEF meetings were frequently scheduled, but cancelled given violence, crisis, or lack of funds. Other fora were not sector wide and focused on the implementation of major projects (including GPEP), not on plan implementation or monitoring.

- The **grant agent** for the ESPIG, UNICEF, largely fulfilled its role in terms of grant management. However, tensions arose between MoGEI and UNICEF with regards to the administration of funds and the channeling of activities through third parties (NGOs). Moreover, the GA at times had to take up CA responsibilities, such as calling meetings to endorse ESPs, as the CA did not do so. The grant agent for the ESPDG, UNESCO, also fulfilled its role but repeatedly failed to submit timely requests to the GPE Secretariat for non-cost extensions of the ESPDG grant.

173. These challenges do not point at a fundamental weakness of the GPE model for sector dialogue but highlight that in humanitarian emergencies such as South Sudan, country-level actors may be too weak and/or busy to adequately support sector-wide dialogue. This partly undermined the effectiveness of key aspects of GPE's country-level model, such as ESP and ESPIG design and review process, and negatively affected sector planning, dialogue, monitoring, and plan implementation.

Coordination between development and humanitarian actors in South Sudan remained weak, despite GPE efforts undertaken at the global level. Further, coordination with non-traditional donors and inter-sectoral coordination was virtually non-existent during the 2012-2018 review period.

174. As noted in section 3.3, coordination between development- and emergency-oriented education actors was limited during the review period. Few systematic efforts were made in South Sudan to bridge that divide, though humanitarian actors were included in the development process of GESP 2017-2021. Global efforts also did not lead to country-level change: though GPE and UNHCR signed an MoU in April 2016 whereby UNHCR participation in LEGs is encouraged, UNHCR was not active in development-oriented coordination fora in South Sudan. Similarly, though the global Education Cluster's strategic plan 2017-2019 aims to integrate country-level Education Clusters into education sector strategies and LEGs, there is no evidence yet that such a process is underway in South Sudan.

175. More generally, development-oriented coordination as supported by GPE did not expand beyond a set of 'usual suspects' (MoGEI, DFID, USAID, EU, UN, etc.). There was limited coordination with non-traditional donors, such as China, Turkey and Egypt, despite the fact that these supported MoGEI in areas, such as primary textbooks, also supported by GPE. Similarly, there was no evidence of inter-sectoral interventions beyond WFP's school feeding, despite one donor stakeholder pointing out that such support could be both efficient and effective in crisis contexts.

GPE's 2013-2018 ESPIG laid important foundations for the future improvement of education quality, most prominently the development of a new curriculum and TLMs. However, in the review period itself, its impact on education outcomes was limited, not least in comparison to that of other donors, such as

DFID. This difference may partly be due to the fact that ESPIG design can only be as good as ESP design, which determines ESPIG priorities. This is an issue in countries where plans are weak.

176.   As sections 4 and 5 discuss, the arguably two most impactful system-level contributions during the review period – nationwide capitation grants, and nationwide cash transfers for adolescent girls – were both spearheaded by DFID, with co-funding from MoGEI. By contrast, a donor noted that "the support of GPE is valued, but we can do better". Flagship achievements of GPEP – such as developing a new curriculum – have not yet been fully implemented and are yet to demonstrate that they will indeed raise the quality of teaching in South Sudan, a hypothesis which received mixed reviews from stakeholders.

177.   It is not entirely clear what explains this difference in impact. It may have been partly driven by **circumstances**. DFID's GESS assumed that the main issues for education were school- and household-level funding, and thus provided cash grants and incentives. GPE's GPEP assumed, in line with the GESP, that the main issues for education were the lack of quality TLMs and the lack of good supervision, and thus provided TLMs and training at ministry and school-level. The fact that GESS (as well as WFP school meals and EU teacher subsidies) ultimately had a bigger impact than GPEP may thus partly be due to the fact that domestic financing collapsed and poverty rose, making GESS' local injections of funds comparatively more relevant than GPE's TLMs and training for closed schools and absent teachers.

178.   However, the difference in impact may also be partly due to **strategy**. GESS ambitiously aimed for nationwide programming and successfully lobbied the GoSS to co-fund its interventions. Most GPEP components, by contrast, were not designed to be nationwide, and secured little GoSS co-funding. A comparison of DFID and GPE program design documents also reveals that whereas DFID documents explicitly discuss global research on 'what works' and rate the value-for-money and effectiveness of several alternatives, these considerations are not as explicit in GPE documents.[206] This may be because GPE expects the ESA and ESP process to have considered evidence and value-for-money in prioritizing its initiatives. However, when the level of quality at which these considerations have been included in the ESA or ESP is limited, as was the case in South Sudan (see section 3.2), the cost effectiveness or state of the art of the corresponding ESPIG program cannot be assured

Several 'new' components which have been added to the GPE model in recent years proved their worth in South Sudan. The new ESPIG QAR processes, however, were generally not well-received.

179.   The GPE 'model', along with the strategies and guidelines that accompany it, have evolved over time. At least two aspects of this model proved their worth in South Sudan:

▪ New guidance on ESP, TEP and ESA preparation and/or appraisal, prepared by the GPE Secretariat in recent years with various global partners, was used in South Sudan in the 2015-2017 planning cycle. For instance, the 2017 appraisal follows GPE/IIEP guidelines and is more useful than the 2012 one was.

▪ New QAR processes for ESP development – including initial Secretariat comments and the new appraisal processes – have likely contributed to an improved plan design, described in section 3.2.

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[206] ESPIG application forms, whether old (for ESPIG 2012-2017) or new (for ESPIG 2019-2021) require ESPIG design to be justified against sector plans, but do not ask about (a) different intervention options, (b) cost-efficiency or cost-effectiveness estimates, or (c) global / scholarly research on 'what works'. That is not to say that these considerations do not drive GPE program design: for example, an "Economic Appraisal of the GPE Programme" was conducted for ESPIG 2013-2018, which included both cost-benefit estimates and justified intervention selection against scholarly research. However, no such appraisal was found in documents available to evaluators related to ESPIG 2019-2021. Though it cannot be concluded that these considerations did not inform ESPIG design, overall, they do not appear to be prominent in documents submitted to the GPE Grant Application Review Committee.

180.   However, several stakeholders familiar with the grant development process expressed reservations about the new QAR process for ESPIGs, as described in section 3.5. They deemed it: (a) Excessively long and complicated particularly for DCPs, but also for the GA and the LEG; (b) excessively demanding in terms of data and budget predictions; and (c) not clear in terms of on what criteria feedback was based and who at GPE was driving feedback. Overall, stakeholders preferred previous QAR processes.

181.   Key components of GPE's "New Funding Model", such as the variable tranche and the multiplier mechanism, did not apply to either the old or new ESPIG in South Sudan. Stakeholders expressed appreciation for the fact that the variable tranche requirement was waived for South Sudan's ESPIG 2019-2021, as they did not think that it would have been feasible in the context. In turn, there is at this stage limited evidence that 'new' data-related ESPIG fixed tranche funding requirements (existence of EMIS and LAS data/systems or plan to develop them) are a strong mechanism to contribute to improved data systems in South Sudan, since their fulfillment is largely based on general governmental promises of action, and/or, on activities to be funded specifically by the next ESPIG. In that sense, it appears that these funding requirements appear to act more like ESPIG funding guidelines, but it may be too early to tell.

The GPE ToC focusses on one policy cycle, but GPE aims to foster learning and improvement from one cycle to the next. In South Sudan, given the disruptions of the cycle just concluded, such learning and improvement was hardly possible, and the new cycle is thus likely to face many of the same challenges, such as plan achievability, limited plan implementation, fragmented sector dialogue and monitoring, insufficient financing, and a possible further weakening of the education system. The only notable cycle-to-cycle improvement is that the new ESPIG clearly builds on lessons from the old one.

182.   As noted in section 3.1, there is little evidence that the GESP II built on the lessons of GESP I. Though some of its components show improvement, it still faces issues of strategy, funding, implementation, and monitoring. Though its priorities to some extent build on successful measures of the review period (e.g. capitation grants, cash transfers, curriculum deployment, teacher re-deployment), its action plan (2017-2018) has already expired. As such, external donor funding, including humanitarian funding, is likely to remain the main driver of sector activities at least in the medium run.

183.   In contrast, there is explicit evidence that the ESPIG 2019-2021 build on the evaluation and lessons of the ESPIG 2013-2018. The new ESPIG focusses on fewer components, considers issues of scaling, and is designed for an unpredictable operating environment. Moreover, it was designed to address certain issues from the preceding period, such as the increase in the absolute number of OOSC; the need for an 'ecosystem' of quality TLMs and teachers; the proliferation of sector data mechanisms (EMIS, SSSAMS, HRIS); the need for better data on education sector expenditures; and the need for improved sector dialogue and monitoring. It remains, however, to demonstrate its effectiveness.

Ultimately, in the extremely difficult external context, the future of the education system does not hinge on GPE. In the medium-run, if peace prevails, it is conceivable that future ESPIG investments will pay off in terms of strengthened systems and impact. However, even in the most optimistic scenarios it will take decades to build a functional state, and along with it an education system, in South Sudan.

If peace does not prevail, even the best efforts of GPE and others will not be able to stem the tide of violence. The assumptions of GPE's ToC will falter, again, but GPE's flexibility will enable country-level actors to adapt ESPIG programming to respond to local needs in whatever way they best see fit.

6.2 Good practices arising from South Sudan for other countries

Despite all challenges faced by South Sudan during the 2012-2018 review period, four 'good practices' were observed by the evaluation team that may be of interest to other countries:

- **Adapt infrastructure standards and costs to the context**. One lesson is that, in high-risk/crisis context, one should plan and budget for more affordable school buildings. It is risky to build full-fledged, costly schools if they are then occupied by armed forces, and/or, if they are deserted by unpaid teachers. It is better to invest in temporary structures, the construction and repair of which is inexpensive and fast and can involve local materials and contributors.

- **Include private sector schools in sectoral activities and data**. In South Sudan, the public education sector is struggling, and the private education sector is growing. While detailed data and documentation about private schools remains fragmented, the causes of this level of growth are consistent with those that weaken public education; lack of funds, poor quality staff and conflict. Whereas some low-income countries have taken a confrontational stance against 'non-governmental' schools, the GoSS and its partners in South Sudan have pragmatically attempted to include non-governmental schools in annual school census, and even in some sectoral support programs (e.g. capitation grants, school feeding, teacher training). This flexibility has likely contributed to a degree of improved sector data and improved (if fee-based) education service delivery, in the context of a struggling public sector.

- **Allow humanitarian assistance to education everywhere**. Several donors commended the fact that, even at the height of conflict, the GoSS, though a party to the conflict, allowed donors to deliver assistance to education and other sectors to opposition-held areas, even in the case of monetary transfers such as capitation grants. Donors noted that this is not always the case in other conflicts and saw this as a sign of GoSS commitment to education.

- **Use education as a platform to foster national reconciliation**. Sector-wide events such as consultations for the development of GESP 2017-2021 as well as annual JSRs brought together South Sudanese officials from all regions of the country to meet and discuss education. This was seen by donors and officials alike as a rare opportunity for conflict parties from opposite sides to interact in a 'safe space' dedicated to fostering a common vision of the future of education.

- In addition to these observed practices, the GPEP evaluation (Cambridge Education 2018) identified some other lessons based on its review of GPEP, supported by the ESPIG 2013-2018:

    - It can be appropriate to maintain a long-term development focus even in humanitarian contexts (whilst standing ready to scale up or down program components in response to changes in the context)

    - Programs should support ministries of education to lead sector coordination

    - Programs should focus on a limited number of components to avoid fragmentation

    - Implementation models should be planned from the program design state and should seek to strengthen the education system's ability to deliver results in schools.

6.3   Strategic questions arising from this CLE for GPE

184.   In the face of these considerations, the following strategic questions arise from this CLE for GPE. Some of the following may be particularly relevant in light of the fact that the GPE Board is currently in the process of updating its guidelines for complex emergencies.[207]

1) **The case of South Sudan shows that system- and impact-level changes may not be driven by sector plans and related implementation efforts, particularly when changes in external circumstances reduce plan relevance and feasibility. How can GPE update its ToC to reflect scenarios where plan implementation is not the main vehicle of change? And/or, does the GPE country-level ToC require FCAC-specific assumptions?**

2) **When conflict erupts, the set of local stakeholders which GPE relies on to guide its country-level processes – DCP, LEG, and CA – may find themselves unable to play their expected roles successfully. What mechanisms, safeguards or alternatives can GPE put in place to ensure that its country-level operational model nonetheless successfully promotes GPE's strategic goals?**

3) **Might funding CAs, as suggested by some stakeholders, be helpful to ensure sector dialogue and monitoring occurs in fragile contexts, where actors are stretched?**

4) **GPE-supported sector coordination in South Sudan was limited to 'usual suspects'. What existing or new tools can GPE leverage, at the global or country-level, to incentivize improved donor alignment and harmonization, particularly with regard to (a) humanitarian-development coordination, (b) coordination with 'non-traditional' donors, and (c) coordination with other sectors?**

5) **The fact that ESPIGs are branded as being 'for and by the government' inevitably leads to frustrations when their implementation is channeled, not just through a grant agent, but through third parties. This is frequent in fragile contexts. Can GPE clarify its position in this regard, for example by mainstreaming topics such as capacity-development and fragility across its operations and guidance?**

6) **The quality of ESPIG-funded projects is determined by (a) the input of country-level stakeholders into ESPIG design and (b) the ESP, which outlines priority interventions. In cases where external circumstances lead to low-quality input and/or plans, how can a strong ESPIG design nonetheless be ensured?**

7) **Considering critiques of the new QAR process for ESPIGs, how will GPE address the concerns expressed by country-level stakeholders with regards to the level of effort required and to the clarity of its funding and feedback criteria?**

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[207] See https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/operating-principles-complex-emergencies-report-gpc-december-2018.

Appendix I Revised Evaluation Matrix

A – Core evaluation questions for summative CLEs[208]

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
Key question I: Has GPE support to [country] contributed to achieving country-level objectives related to sector plan implementation, sector dialogue and monitoring, and more/better financing for education?[209] If so, then how?			
CEQ 1: Has GPE contributed to education sector plan implementation in [country] during the period under review? [210] How?			
CEQ 1.1b (summative CLE) What characterized the education sector plan in place during the core period under review?	• ESP/TEP objectives/envisaged results and related targets • <u>For ESPs</u>: Extent to which the country's sector plan met the criteria for a credible ESP as put forward in GPE/IIEP Guidelines[211] – ESP is guided by an overall vision	• Sector plan(s) for the period covered by the most recent ESPIG • GPE ESP/TEP quality assurance documents • GPE RF data (indicator 16 a-b-c-d) [214]	• Descriptive analysis

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[208] Note: this matrix includes only questions for summative evaluations (this report), not prospective evaluations. The full matrix can be found in Appendix II of the revised approach to CLEs, available at https://www.globalpartnership.org/download/file/fid/84353.

[209] OECD DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency.

[210] The core period under review varies for summative and prospective evaluations. Prospective evaluations will primarily focus on the period early 2018 to early 2020 and will relate observations of change back to the baseline established at this point. The summative evaluations will focus on the period covered by the most recent ESPIG implemented in the respective country. However, where applicable, (and subject to data availability) summative evaluations will also look at the beginning of the next policy cycle, more specifically sector planning processes and related GPE support carried out during/towards the end of the period covered by the most recent ESPIG.

[211] Global Partnership for Education, UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning. Guidelines for Education Sector Plan Appraisal. Washington and Paris. 2015. Guidelines for Education Sector Plan Preparation. Available at: https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/guidelines-education-sector-plan-preparation

[214] If the respective ESP has not been rated by GPE (i.e. if no specific information is available on indicators 16 a-d), the evaluation team will provide a broad assessment of the extent to which the ESP meets or does not meet the quality criteria. This review will be based on *existing* reviews and assessments of the sector plan, in particular the appraisal report. To the extent possible, findings of these assessments will be 'translated' in terms of the GPE/IIEP quality standards.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
	– ESP is strategic, i.e. it identifies strategies for achieving its vision, including required human, technical and financial capacities, and sets priorities) – ESP is holistic, i.e. it covers all sub-sectors as well as non-formal education and adult literacy – ESP is evidence-based, i.e. it starts from an education sector analysis – ESP is achievable – ESP is sensitive to context – ESP pays attention to disparities (e.g. between girls/boys or between groups defined geographically, ethnically/culturally or by income) • <u>For TEPs</u>: Extent to which the country's sector plan met the criteria for a credible TEP as put forward in GPE/IIEP Guidelines[212] – TEP is shared (state-driven, developed through participatory process) – TEP is evidence-based – TEP is sensitive to context and pays attention to disparities – TEP is strategic, i.e. it identifies strategies that not only help address immediate needs but lay the foundation for realizing system's long-term vision – TEP is targeted (focused on critical education needs in the short and medium term, on system capacity development, on limited number of priorities) – TEP is operational (feasible, including implementation and monitoring frameworks)	• Other relevant reports or reviews that comment on the quality of the sector plan	

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[212] Global Partnership for Education, UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning. Guidelines for Education Sector Plan Appraisal. Washington and Paris. 2016. Guidelines for Transitional Education Plan Preparation. Available at: https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/guidelines-transitional-education-plan-preparation

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
	• Extent to which the ESP/TEP meets GPE quality criteria as outlined in the GPE 2020 results framework (indicators 16a, b, c and d) [213]		
CEQ 1.2b-d (summative CLE – currently in Part B of the matrix below and labelled CEQ 9-11)			

CEQ 1.3 What have been strengths and weaknesses of sector plan implementation during the period under review?
 	
What are likely reasons for strong/weak sector plan implementation?
	• Progress made towards implementing sector plan objectives/meeting implementation targets of current/most recent sector plan within envisaged timeframe (with focus on changes relevant in view of GPE 2020 envisaged impact and outcome areas).
	• Extent to which sector plan implementation is funded (expected and actual funding gap)
	• Evidence of government ownership of and leadership for plan implementation (country specific).[215]
	• Government implementation capacity and management, e.g.:
	  – Existence of clear operational/implementation plans or equivalents to guide sector plan implementation and monitoring
	  – Clear roles and responsibilities related to plan implementation and monitoring
	  – Relevant staff have required knowledge/skills/experience)
	• Extent to which development partners who have endorsed the plan have actively supported/contributed to its implementation in an aligned manner.
	• Extent to which sector dialogue and monitoring have facilitated dynamic adaptation of sector plan implementation to respond to contextual changes (where applicable)
		• Sector plan(s) for the period covered by the most recent (mostly) complete ESPIG
		• DCP government ESP/TEP implementation documents including mid-term or final reviews
		• Relevant programme or sector evaluations, including reviews preceding the period of GPE support under review
		• JSR reports
		• Reports or studies on ESP/TEP implementation commissioned by other development partners and/or the DCP government
		• CSO reports
		• Interviews
		• DCP's plan implementation progress reports
			• Descriptive analysis
			• Triangulation of data deriving from document review and interviews

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[213] If no GPE ratings on these indicators are available, evaluation team's assessment of extent to which the ESP meets the various criteria outlined under indicator 16a-d.

[215] For example, in some countries one indicator of country ownership may be the existence of measures to gradually transfer funding for specific ESP elements from GPE/development partner support to domestic funding. However, this indicator may not be applicable in all countries. Stakeholder interviews will be an important source for identifying appropriate, context-specific indicators for government ownership in each case.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
	• Extent to which the quality of the implementation plan in the ESP/TEP and of the plan itself is influencing the actual implementation (e.g. achievability, prioritization of objectives). • Stakeholder views on reasons why plan has or has not been implemented as envisaged		
CEQ 1.4 Has GPE contributed to the observed characteristics of sector plan implementation? If so, then how? If not, why not? a) Through GPE EPDG, ESPIG grants-related funding requirements and the variable tranche under the New Funding Model (NFM)[216] b) Through non-financial support (advocacy, standards, quality assurance procedures, guidelines, capacity building, and facilitation, and cross-national sharing of evidence/good practice)[217]	a) Contributions through GPE EPDG and ESPIG grants, related funding requirements and variable tranche under the NFM (where applicable) • Proportion of overall sector plan (both in terms of costs and key objectives) funded through GPE ESPIG • Absolute amount of GPE disbursement and GPE disbursement as a share of total aid to education • Evidence of GPE grants addressing gaps/needs or priorities identified by the DCP government and/or LEG • Degree of alignment of ESPIG objectives with ESP objectives. • Grant implementation is on time and on budget • Degree of achievement of/progress toward achieving ESPIG targets (showed mapped to ESPIG objectives, and sector plan objectives) • Evidence of variable tranche having influenced policy dialogue before and during sector plan implementation (where applicable) • Progress made towards sector targets outlined in GPE grant agreements as triggers for variable tranche under the NFM, compared to progress made in areas without specific targets (where applicable) • EPDG/ESPIG resources allocated to(implementation) capacity development	• ESP implementation data including joint sector reviews • GPE grant agent reports and other grant performance data • Secretariat reports, e.g. country lead back to office/mission reports • GPE ESP/TSP quality assurance documents • Other documents on GPE advocacy/facilitation • Country-specific grant applications • Interviews • Education sector analyses • Country's poverty reduction strategy paper	• Triangulation of data deriving from document review and interviews • Where applicable: Comparison of progress made towards ESPIG grant objectives linked to specific performance targets with those without targets (variable tranche under the New Funding Model)

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[216] Where applicable.

[217] Facilitation provided primarily through the GPE Secretariat, the grant agent and coordinating agency. Advocacy – including inputs from Secretariat, grant agent, coordinating agency, LEG, and GPE at global level (e.g. Board meetings, agreed upon standards). Knowledge exchange - including cross-national/global activities related to the diffusion of evidence and best practice to improve sector planning and implementation.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS

	• Stakeholder views on GPE EPDG and ESPIG grants with focus on:
	  – Value added by these grants to overall sector plan implementation;
	  – the extent to which the new (2015) funding model is clear and appropriate especially in relation to the variable tranche;
	  – how well GPE grant application processes are working for in-country stakeholders (e.g. are grant requirements clear? Are they appropriate considering available grant amounts?);
	b) Contributions through non-financial support
	• Types of GPE support (advocacy, facilitation, knowledge sharing) aimed at strengthening sustainable local/national capacities for plan implementation
	• Relevance of GPE non-financial support in light of DCP government's own capacity development plan(s) (where applicable)
	• Stakeholder views on relevance and effectiveness of GPE non-financial support with focus on:
	  – GPE non-financial support contributing to strengthening sustainable local/national capacities relevant for plan implementation
	  – GPE non-financial facilitating harmonized development partners' support to plan implementation
	• Possible causes for no/ limited GPE contribution to plan implementation.		

CEQ 1.5 How has education sector financing evolved during the period under review? a) Amounts of domestic financing b) Amounts and sources of international financing c) Quality of domestic and international financing (e.g.	a) Amounts of domestic education sector financing • Changes in country's public expenditures on education during period under review (absolute amounts and spending relative to total government expenditure) • Extent to which country has achieved, maintained, moved toward, or exceeded 20% of public expenditures on education during period under review • Changes in education recurrent spending as a percentage of total government recurrent spending	• Creditor Reporting System (CRS) by OECD-DAC • UIS data by UNESCO • National data (e.g. Education Management Information Systems, National Education Accounts, Joint Sector Reviews, public expenditure reviews)	• Trend analysis for period under review • Descriptive analysis

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
short, medium and long-term predictability, alignment with government systems)? 5. If no positive changes, then why not?	b) Amounts and sources of international financing • Changes in the number and types of international donors supporting the education sector • Changes in amounts of education sector funding from traditional and non-traditional donors (e.g. private foundations and non-DAC members) • Changes in percentage of capital expenditures and other education investments funded through donor contributions c) Quality of sector financing • Changes in the quality (predictability, alignment, harmonization/modality) of international education sector financing to country • Changes in the quality of domestic education financing (e.g. predictability, frequency and timeliness of disbursements, program versus input-based funding) • Extent to which country dedicates at least 45% of its education budget to primary education (for countries where PCR is below 95%) • Changes in allocation of specific/additional funding to marginalized groups • Changes in extent to which other donors' funding/conditional budget support is tied to the education sector	• GPE results framework indicator 29 on alignment	
CEQ 1.6 Has GPE contributed to leveraging additional education sector financing and improving the quality of financing? If yes, then how? If not, then why not? a) Through ESPIG funding and related funding requirements? b) Through the GPE multiplier funding mechanisms (where applicable)?	a) Through ESPIG funding and related requirements • Government commitment to finance the endorsed sector plan (expressed in ESPIG applications) • Extent to which GPE Program Implementation Grant-supported programs have been co-financed by other actors or are part of pooled funding mechanisms • Stakeholder views on extent to which GPE funding requirements (likely) having influenced changes in domestic education financing • Changes in relative size of GPE financial contribution in relation to other donor' contributions • Trends in external financing and domestic financing channelled through and outside of GPE, and for basic and	• ESPIG grant applications and related documents (country commitment on financing requirement • Donor pledges and contributions to ESP implementation) • Creditor Reporting System (CRS) by OECD-DAC • UIS data by UNESCO • National data (e.g. Education Management Information Systems, National Education Accounts, Joint Sector Reviews, public expenditure reviews)	• Comparative analysis (GPE versus other donor contributions) • Triangulation of quantitative analysis with interview data

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
6. Through other means, including advocacy[218] at national and/or global levels?	total education, to account for any substitution by donors or the country government • Alignment of GPE education sector program implementation grants with national systems[219] • Possible reasons for non-alignment or non-harmonization of ESPIGs (if applicable) b) Through the GPE multiplier funding mechanism • Amount received by DCP government through the GPE multiplier fund (if applicable) • Stakeholder views on clarity and efficiency of multiplier application process c) Through other means (especially advocacy) • Likelihood of GPE advocacy having contributed to country meeting/approaching goal of 20% of the total national budget dedicated to education • Changes in existing dynamics between education and finance ministries that stakeholders (at least partly) attribute to GPE advocacy220 (e.g. JSRs attended by senior MoF staff) • Amounts and quality of additional resources likely mobilized with contribution from GPE advocacy efforts at country or global levels • Amounts and sources of non-traditional financing (e.g. private or innovative finance) that can be linked to GPE leveraging	• Interviews with national actors (e.g. Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, Local Education Groups/ Development partner groups)	
CEQ 2 Has GPE contributed to strengthening mutual accountability for the education sector during the period under review? If so, then how?			
CEQ 2.1 Has sector dialogue changed during the period under review? If so, then how and why? If not, why not?	• Composition of the country's LEG (in particular civil society and teacher association representation), and changes in this composition during period under review; other dialogue mechanisms in place (if any) and dynamics between those mechanisms	• LEG meeting notes • Joint sector reviews or equivalents from before and during most recent ESPIG period • GPE sector review assessments	• Pre-post comparison • Triangulate results of document review and interviews

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[218] Through the Secretariat at country and global levels, and/or GPE board members (global level, influencing country-specific approaches of individual donors)

[219] GPE's system alignment criteria including the 10 elements of alignment and the elements of harmonization captured by RF indicators 29, 30 respectively.

[220] This advocacy can have taken place in the context of GPE support to education sector planning, sector dialogue, and/or plan implementation

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS

	• Frequency of LEG meetings, and changes in frequency during period under review
	• LEG members consulted for ESPIG application
	• Stakeholder views on changes in sector dialogue in terms of:
	  – Degree to which different actors lead, contribute to, or facilitate dialogue
	  – Inclusiveness
	  – Consistency, clarity of roles and responsibilities
	  – Meaningfulness (i.e. perceptions on whether, when and how stakeholder input is taken into account for decision making)
	  – Quality (evidence-based, transparent)
	  – Likely causes for no/limited (changes in) sector dialogue
		• ESP/TSP, and documents illustrating process of their development
		• Back to office reports/memos from Secretariat
		• ESPIG grant applications (section V – information on stakeholder consultations)
		• Interviews
			• Stakeholder analysis and mapping

CEQ 2.2 Has sector monitoring changed?
If so, then how and why? If not, why not?
	• Extent to which plan implementation is being monitored (e.g. results framework with targets, performance review meetings, annual progress reports… and actual use of these monitoring tools)
	• Frequency of joint sector reviews conducted, and changes in frequency during period under review; nature of JSR meetings held; and any other monitoring events at country level (e.g., DP meetings…)
	• Extent to which joint sector reviews conducted during period of most recent ESPIG met GPE quality standards (if data is available: compared to JSRs conducted prior to this period)
	• Evidence deriving from JSRs is reflected in DCP government decisions (e.g. adjustments to sector plan implementation) and sector planning
	• Stakeholder views on changes in JSRs in terms of them being:
	  – Inclusive and participatory, involving the right number and types of stakeholders
	  – Aligned to existing sector plan and/or policy framework
	  – Evidence based
	  – Used for learning/informing decision-making
	  – Embedded in the policy cycle (timing of JSR appropriate to inform decision making; processes in place to follow up on
		• LEG and JSR meeting notes
		• Joint sector review reports/aide memoires or equivalents from before and during most recent ESPIG period
		• GPE sector review assessments
		• Grant agent reports
		• Back to office reports/memos from Secretariat
		• Interviews
			• Pre-post comparison
			• Triangulate the results of document review and interviews

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
	JRS recommendations)[221] and recommendations are acted upon and implemented • Stakeholder views on extent to which current practices of sector dialogue and monitoring amount to 'mutual accountability' for the education sector. • Likely causes for no/ limited (changes in) sector monitoring.		
CEQ 2.3 Has GPE contributed to observed changes in sector dialogue and monitoring? If so, then how? If not, why not? a) Through GPE grants and funding requirements[222] b) Through other support (capacity development, advocacy, standards, quality assurance, guidelines, facilitation, cross-national sharing of evidence/good practice)[223]	a) Grants and funding requirements • Proportion of total costs for sector dialogue mechanisms (and/or related specific events) funded through GPE grants • Proportion of total costs for sector monitoring mechanisms (e.g. JSR) funded through GPE grants • Stakeholder views on extent to which GPE funding process (e.g. selection of grant agent, development of program document, grant application) and grant requirements positively or negatively influenced the existence and functioning of mechanisms for sector dialogue and/or monitoring b) Non-grant related support • Support is aimed at strengthening local/national capacities for conducting inclusive and evidence-based sector dialogue and monitoring • Support is targeted at gaps/weaknesses of sector dialogue/monitoring identified by DCP government and/or LEG	• LEG meeting notes • Joint sector reviews or equivalents from before and during most recent ESPIG period • GPE sector review assessments • Grant agent reports • Back to office reports/memos from Secretariat • Interviews • CSEF, KIX documents etc.	• Triangulate the results of document review and interviews

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[221] Criteria adapted from: Global Partnership for Education. Effective Joint Sector Reviews as (Mutual) Accountability Platforms. GPE Working Paper #1. Washington. June 2017. Available at: https://www.globalpartnership.org/blog/helping-partners-make-best-use-joint-sector-reviews

[222] All relevant GPE grants to country/actors in country, including CSEF and KIX, where applicable.

[223] Capacity development and facilitation primarily through Secretariat, coordinating agency (especially in relation to sector dialogue) and grant agent (especially in relation to sector monitoring). Advocacy through Secretariat (country lead), CA, as well as (possibly) GPE at the global level (e.g. Board meetings, agreed upon standards). Knowledge exchange includes cross-national/global activities organized by the Secretariat, as well as the sharing and use of insights derived from GRA and KIX grant-supported interventions. Knowledge sharing also possible through other GPE partners at country level (e.g. other donors/LEG members) if provided primarily in their role as GPE partners.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
	• Support for strengthening sector dialogue/monitoring is adapted to meet the technical and cultural requirements of the specific context in [country] a) and b) • Stakeholder view on relevance and appropriateness of GPE grants and related funding process and requirements, and of other support in relation to: – Addressing existing needs/priorities – Respecting characteristics of the national context – Adding value to country-driven processes (e.g. around JSRs) • Possible causes for no/ limited GPE contributions to dialogue/monitoring.		
CEQ 3: Has GPE support had unintended/unplanned effects? What factors other than GPE support have contributed to observed changes in sector planning, sector plan implementation, sector financing and monitoring?			
CEQ 3.1 What factors other than GPE support are likely to have contributed to the observed changes (or lack thereof) in sector planning, financing, plan implementation, and in sector dialogue and monitoring?	• Changes in nature and extent of financial/non-financial support to the education sector provided by development partners/donors (traditional/non-traditional donors including foundations) • Contributions (or lack thereof) to sector plan implementation, sector dialogue or monitoring made by actors other than GPE • Changes/events in national or regional context(s) – Political context (e.g. changes in government/leadership) – Economic context – Social/environmental contexts (e.g. natural disasters, conflict, health crises) – Other (context-specific)	• Documents illustrating changes in priorities pursued by (traditional/non-traditional) donors related implications for [country] • Relevant studies/reports commissioned by other education sector actors (e.g. donors, multilateral agencies) regarding nature/changes in their contributions and related results • Government and other (e.g. media) reports on changes in relevant national contexts and implications for the education sector • Interviews	• Triangulate the results of document review and interviews
CEQ 3.2 During the period under review, have there been unintended, positive or negative, consequences of GPE financial and non-financial support?	• Types of unintended, positive and negative, effects on sector planning, financing, sector plan implementation, sector dialogue and monitoring deriving from GPE grants and funding requirements	• All data sources outlined for CEQs 1 and 2 above • Interviews	• Triangulate the results of document review and interviews

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
	• Types of unintended, positive and negative, effects deriving from other GPE support.		
Key question II: Has sector plan implementation contributed to making the overall education system in [country] more effective and efficient?			
CEQ 4 During the period under review, how has the education system changed in relation to: a) Improving access to education and equity? b) Enhancing education quality and relevance (quality of teaching/instruction)? c) Sector Management?[224] If there were no changes in the education system, then why not and with what implications?[225]	a) Improving education access and equity - focus on extent to which DCP meets its own performance indicators, where available, e.g. related to:[226] • Changes in number of schools relative to children • Changes in the average distance to schools • Changes in costs of education to families • Changes in the availability of programs to improve children's readiness for school) • New/expanded measures put in place to ensure meeting the educational needs of children with special needs and of learners from disadvantaged groups • New/expanded measures put in place to ensure gender equality in education b) Enhancing education quality and relevance (Quality of teaching/instruction) – focus on extent to which DCP meets its own performance indicators, e.g. related to: • Changes in pupil/trained teacher ratio during period under review • Changes in equitable allocation of teachers (measured by relationship between number of teachers and number of pupils per school) • Changes in relevance and clarity of (basic education) curricula • Changes in the quality and availability of teaching and learning materials	• Education Management Information System (EMIS) • UIS data • World Bank data • Household survey data • ASER/UWEZO other citizen-led surveys • Grant agent progress reports • Implementing partner progress reports • Mid-term Evaluation reports • GPE annual Results Report • Appraisal Reports • Public expenditure reports • CSO reports • SABER database • Education financing studies • Literature on good practices in education system domains addressed in country's sector plan • Interviews • ESPIG grant applications	• Pre-post comparison of statistical data for periods under review • Triangulate the results of document review with statistical data, interviews and literature on 'good practice' in specific areas of systems strengthening

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[224] The sub-questions reflect indicators under Strategic Goal #3 as outlined in the GPE results framework as well as country-specific indicators for system-level change and elements (such as institutional strengthening) of particular interest to the Secretariat.

[225] Implications for education access and equity, quality and relevance, and sector management, as well as likely implications for progress towards learning outcomes and gender equality/equity.

[226] The noted indicators are examples of relevant measures to indicate removal of barriers to education access. Applicability may vary across countries. Where no country specific indicators and/or data are available, the CLE will draw upon UIS (and other) data on the described indicators.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
	• Changes in teacher pre-service and in-service training • Changes in incentives for schools/teachers c) Sector Management – focus on extent to which DCP meets its own performance indicators, e.g. related to: • Changes in the institutional capacity of key ministries and/or other relevant government agencies (e.g. staffing, structure, organizational culture, funding) • Changes in whether country has and how it uses EMIS data to inform policy dialogue, decision making and sector monitoring • If no functioning EMIS is in place, existence of a realistic remedial strategy in place • Changes in whether country has and how it uses quality learning assessment system within the basic education cycle during period under review (a-c): • Likely causes for no/ limited changes at system level (based on literature review and stakeholder views)	• Relevant documents/reports illustrating changes in key ministries' institutional capacity (e.g. on restructuring, internal resource allocation)	
CEQ 5 How has sector plan implementation contributed to observed changes at education system level?	• The specific measures put in place as part of sector plan implementation address previously identified bottlenecks at system level • Alternative explanations for observed changes at system level (e.g. changes due to external factors, continuation of trend that was already present before current/most recent policy cycle, targeted efforts outside of the education sector plan)	• Sources as shown for CEQ 4 • Literature on good practices in education system domains addressed in country's sector plan • Education sector analyses • Country's poverty reduction strategy paper	
Key question III: Have improvements at education system level contributed to progress towards impact?			
CEQ 6 During the period under review, what changes have occurred in relation to: a) Learning outcomes (basic education)? b) Equity, gender equality and inclusion in education? Is there evidence to link changes in learning outcomes, equity, gender equality, and inclusion to system-	Changes/trends in DCP's core indicators related to learning/equity as outlined in current sector plan and disaggregated (if data is available). For example: a) Learning outcomes • Changes/trends in learning outcomes (basic education) during period under review (by gender, by socio-economic group, by rural/urban locations) b) Equity, gender equality, and inclusion	• Sector performance data available from GPE, UIS, DCP government and other reliable sources • Teacher Development Information System (TDIS) • Education Management Information System (EMIS) • National examination data	• Pre-post comparison of available education sector data (examination of trends) during and up to 5 years before core period under review • Triangulation of statistical data with

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
level changes identified under CEQ 4? What other factors can explain changes in learning outcomes, equity, etc.?	• Changes in gross and net enrollment rates (basic education) during review period (by gender, by socio-economic group, by rural/urban) • Changes in proportion of children (girls/boys) who complete (i) primary, (ii) lower-secondary education • Changes in transition rates from primary to lower secondary education (by gender, by socio-economic group) • Changes in out of school rate for (i) primary, (ii) lower-secondary education (by gender, socio-economic group, rural/urban location) • Changes in dropout and/or repetition rates (depending on data availability) for (i) primary, (ii) lower-secondary education • Changes in the distribution of out of school children (girls/boys; children with/without disability; ethnic, geographic and/or economic backgrounds) • Plausible links between changes in country's change trajectory related to learning outcomes, equity, gender equality, and inclusion during period under review on the one hand, and specific system-level changes put in place during the same period • Additional explanations for observed changes in learning outcomes, equity, gender equality, and inclusion other than system-level changes noted under CEQ 4 and 5 • Likely reasons for impact-level changes during period under review	• International and regional learning assessment data • EGRA/EGMA data • ASER/UWEZO other citizen-led surveys • Grant agent and Implementing partner progress reports • Mid-term Evaluation reports • GPE annual Results Report • Studies/evaluation reports on education (sub)sector(s) in country commissioned by the DCP government or other development partners (where available) • Literature on key factors affecting learning outcomes, equity, equality, and inclusion in comparable settings	qualitative document analysis
Key question IV: What are implications of evaluation findings for GPE support to [country]?			
CEQ 7 What, if any, aspects of GPE support to [country] should be improved? What, if any, good practices have emerged related to how GPE supports countries? [227]	• Insights deriving from answering evaluation questions above e.g. in relation to: – Clarity and relevance of the roles and responsibilities of key GPE actors at the country level (Secretariat, GA, CA, DCP government, other actors)	• All of the above as well as (for summative evaluations) sources applied for CEQs 9, 10 and 11 (part B below)	• Triangulation of data collected, and analysis conducted for other evaluation questions

[227] For both questions CEQ 7 and 8 the notion of 'good practice' refers to acknowledging processes, mechanisms, ways of working etc. that the CLE found to work well and/or that were innovative in that specific context. The intention is not to try and identify globally relevant benchmarks or universally 'good practice'.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
	– Strengths and weaknesses of how and whether GPE key country-level actors fulfill their roles (both separately and jointly i.e. through a partnership approach) – The relative influence/benefits deriving from GPE financial and non-financial support respectively (with focus on the NFM, where applicable) – Extent to which logical links in the GPE theory of change are, or are not, supported by evidence – Extent to which originally formulated underlying assumptions of the ToC appear to apply/not apply and why – Extent to which different elements in the theory of change appear to mutually enforce/support each other (e.g. relationship sector dialogue and sector planning) – Stakeholder satisfaction with GPE support		
CEQ 8 What, if any, good practices have emerged related to how countries address specific education sector challenges/how countries operate during different elements of the policy cycle?[228]	• Insights deriving from answering evaluation questions above e.g. in relation to: – Effectiveness of approaches taken in the respective country to ensure effective sector planning, sector dialogue and monitoring, sector financing, sector plan implementation. – Successful, promising, and/or contextually innovative approaches taken as part of sector plan implementation to address specific sector challenges[229]	• All of the above as well as (for summative evaluations) sources applied for CEQs 9, 10 and 11 (part B below)	• Triangulation of data collected, and analysis conducted for other evaluation questions

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[228] This could mean, for example, highlighting strengths of existing mechanisms for sector planning that either reflect related GPE/IEEP guidelines and quality criteria or that introduce alternative/slightly different approaches that appear to work well in the respective context.

[229] For example, highlighting promising approaches taken by the respective government and development partners to try and reach out of school children. Please note that 'innovative' means 'innovative/new in the respective context', not necessarily globally new.

B – Additional/new questions for summative plus evaluations

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS
Key question V: Has GPE support to sector planning contributed to better (more relevant, more realistic, government-owned) sector plans?			
CEQ 9: To what extent has the revised QAR process for education sector plans contributed to the development of better-quality education sector plans? Why? Why not?	• Quality ratings (GPE RF indicator 16) of previous/new sector plan • Comparison of depth and clarity of appraisal reports and Secretariat comments for previous/new sector plan • Comparison of the extent to which observations/recommendations deriving from Secretariat and other stakeholders' reviews and external ESP/TEP appraisal are reflected in final plans or accompanying documents (old/new plan) • Extent to which identified strengths/weaknesses of the previous ESP and its implementation (see CEQ 1.2) are reflected in the new ESP and related implementation arrangements • Stakeholder views on strengths/weaknesses of the revised QAR process (including on whether they find GPE-IIEP criteria helpful or problematic for assessing the quality of sector plans) • Possible causes for no/limited improvements.	• Appraisal reports, appraisal memos • Secretariat feedback on draft ESP and appraisal report • GPE Results Framework indicators 16(a), 16(b), 16(c), and 16 (d) for previous and most recent ESP[230] • Evaluations/mid-term reviews of previous sector plan implementation • Country-level national development plans/strategies • Interviews • Insights deriving from desk review component of the separate study on GPE support to sector planning	• Comparative analysis (old/new sector plan and related QAR processes) • Triangulation of data deriving from document review and interviews
CEQ 10 - To what extent have the revised ESPDG mechanism and/or ESPIG grant requirements (under the NFM) contributed to the development of better-quality education sector plans? Why? Why not?	• ESPDG amounts compared to other (domestic, other DP) resources invested into sector dialogue/stakeholder consultations during plan preparation • Extent to which ESPIG process (including determination of variable part indicators where applicable) and requirements (fixed part: have an endorsed quality plan) under the NFM have been drivers of better-quality plans (including in view of fostering sector plan ownership)	• ESPDG applications and completion reports • ESPIG grant applications • Secretariat reports, e.g. country lead back to office/mission reports • Appraisal reports, appraisal memos • LEG (and other dialogue mechanism) meeting notes,	• Triangulate the results of document review and interviews

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
[230] If the respective ESP has not been rated by GPE (i.e. if no specific information is available on indicators 16 a-d), the evaluation team will provide a broad assessment of the extent to which the ESP meets or does not meet the quality criteria. This review will be based on *existing* reviews and assessments of the sector plan, in particular the appraisal report. To the extent possible, findings of these assessments will be 'translated' in terms of the GPE/IIEP quality standards.

MAIN EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND SUB- QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	ANALYSIS

	• Extent to which ESPIG application timelines have positively or negatively affected sector planning and the quality of sector plans
	• Stakeholder views on:
	  – Perceived strengths and weaknesses of the current ESPDG application criteria and process (e.g. is application effort proportional to ESPDG benefits? Do application criteria positive/negatively influence country ownership?)
	  – Perceived positive/negative effects of GPE support on ensuring a smooth transition between sector plans
	  – Alternative ways to support sector planning
	• Other factors that influenced the timing and/or quality of sector planning and/or of ownership of the new ESP/TEP (e.g. changes in country's political or socio-economic contexts)
	• Possible causes for no improvements.
		memos etc. for period relevant to most recent sector plan development
		• Insights deriving from desk review component of the separate study on GPE support to sector planning
		• Interviews	

CEQ 11: To what extent have GPE support to sector planning and to inclusive sector dialogue had mutually beneficial effects?
  a) To what extent has GPE support to sector planning influenced inclusive sector dialogue?
  b) To what extent has GPE support to inclusive sector dialogue influenced sector planning?
Why? Why not?
	a) Effects of GPE support to sector planning on sector dialogue
	• Extent to which different actors having worked together during the planning process has (likely) led to sustained improvements in sector dialogue
	b) Effects of GPE support to sector dialogue on sector planning
	  Extent to which changes in sector dialogue (e.g. existence, composition, functioning of the LEG or equivalent) has (likely) led to more inclusive, more participatory and/or more evidence-based sector planning
		• Sector plan appraisal reports for most recent and previous sector plans
		• Secretariat reports, e.g. country lead back to office/mission reports
		• LEG (and other dialogue mechanism) meeting notes, memos etc. for period relevant to development of two most recent sector plans
		• Interviews
			• Triangulate the results of document review and interviews

Appendix II GPE country-level theory of change for South Sudan

S.O. # 5

Partnership strengthening:
GPE fosters clear roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities among stakeholders in policy dialogue and their collaboration in a coordinated, harmonized way to solve sector issues

Knowledge and information exchange:
GPE promotes and facilitates cross-national sharing of evidence and good practice including through GRA 1, 5, 10, 11 and 16

S.O. # 5

1.3

GPE promotes evidence-based and inclusive national sector monitoring and adaptive

CSEF grant to NEC (2016-2017, $122,000)

GPE advocates for increased, harmonized, and better aligned international financing for education

2.7

S.O. # 1

GPE ESP standards and processes, quality assurance procedures, guidelines, capacity building and technical guidance

Government produces and owns credible and evidence-based sector plan that addresses: Education access, equity and completion, quality and relevance of education, and systems strengthening.

1.2

2.1

S.O. # 2

Mutual accountability for education sector progress through inclusive sector policy dialogue (Local Education Group) and monitoring (annual Joint Sector Reviews 2014-

2.2

S.O. # 4

International financing is mobilized for education.

PDG funding (no PDG 2012/13, $ 71,165 in 2018) and requirements

ESPIG funding and requirements (US$36.1m in 2013-2018, US$6m in 2019-2019 (AFF), US$35.7m in 2019-2021)

GPE quality assurance processes, guidelines, capacity building and technical guidance for ESPIG development/

Effective and efficient education system delivering equitable, quality educational services for all

Improved and more equitable student learning outcomes

1.1

ESPDG funding (n/a in 2011, US$0.47m in 2015-2017) and requirements

2.3

S.O. # 3

Country implements and inclusively monitors credible evidence-based, nationally-owned sector plan and thereby ensures seven main objectives (as per General Education Strategic Plan 2012-2017): (1) increase access to general education and promote equity, (2) improve the quality of general education, (3) promote adult literacy, (4) build institutional capacity, (5) increase funding for general education to support implementation of the Action Plan, (6) promote partnership among stakeholders working throughout the country, and (7) monitor and evaluation the implementation of the plan.

2.4

2.5

2.6

3.1

3.2

Country produces and shares disaggregated data on equity, and efficiency, through annual censuses conducted in 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2018.

4

Improved equity, gender equality in education

1.4

2.8

Country-specific contextual factors (negative: widespread conflict, hyperinflation, collapse of government revenue. Positive: increased international attention and funding due to crisis)

Direction of change

LEGEND

xxx	Non-financial GPE inputs/support (technical assistance, facilitation, advocacy)
xxx	GPE financial inputs/support (grants) and related funding requirements
	Country-level objectives that GPE support/influence directly contributes to. Underlined items are issues (at least partly) supported through the ESPIG-funded PDSEB sub-sector plan.
	Global-level objectives that GPE support/influence directly contributes, which have consequences at country level (policy cycle continuum)
	Global-level objectives with ramifications at country level, that are influenced but not solely driven by GPE's global and country-level interventions and/or influence
	Intermediate outcomes: Education system-level changes
	Impact: Changes in learning outcomes, equity, equality, and inclusion
	Contextual factors
S.O. # 3	Corresponding Strategic Objective in the GPE 2020 Strategic Plan

1	Numbers represent the key areas where logical linkages (explanatory mechanisms) connect different elements of the theory of change to one another ('*because of x, y happens*'). Numbers are aligned with the anticipated sequencing of achievements (1. sector plan development, 2. sector plan implementation, sector monitoring and dialogue, 3. education system-level changes, 4. envisaged impact.

Appendix III Evaluation methodology

The evaluation aims to assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of GPE's inputs at the country level and the validity of GPE's theory of change to establish if and how GPE outputs and activities contribute to outcomes and impact.[231] The guiding frameworks for the evaluation are the **evaluation matrix** (Appendix I) and the **country-level** theory of change for South Sudan (Appendix II).[232]

The overall approach to this evaluation is theory-based and uses **contribution analysis** (CA). CA is a theory-based approach to evaluation designed to identify the contribution a program or (series of) interventions is making to observed results through an increased understanding of why observed changes have occurred (or not occurred) and the roles played by the intervention and by other internal and external factors respectively.[233].

The evaluation team chose contribution analysis as the main approach to this assignment as it is particularly useful in situations (i) where a program is not experimental, but has been implemented on the basis of a relatively clearly articulated theory of change; (ii) where the change processes in questions are complex rather than one-dimensional, i.e., where change is influenced due to a variety of inter-related factors as opposed to single policy interventions that could be isolated; (iii) where the change processes in question are highly context-specific. A report deriving from applying contribution analysis does not provide definite proof, but rather provides an evidence-based line of reasoning from which plausible conclusions can be drawn on the types and reasons for contributions made by the program/intervention in question. CA draws upon both quantitative and qualitative evidence to build the 'contribution story' for the program or intervention(s) under review.

This country level evaluation (CLE), of GPE's support to the national education system of the Republic of South Sudan, is part of a larger GPE study that comprises a total of 20 summative and eight formative CLEs. In October 2018, the approach for the summative evaluations was slightly modified. Starting in FY18, these new 'summative plus' (including this evaluation) will have the following modifications:

- 'Summative plus' CLE will not only explore one policy cycle[234] and related GPE support ('first policy cycle'), but also include the beginning of the following policy cycle (the 'second policy cycle'). This will allow addressing questions around the transition from one ESP to the next and related GPE contributions,

- The CLEs will also explore strengths, weaknesses and value added of the revised GPE Quality Assurance and Review (QAR) and ESPDG mechanism.

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[231] In the context of this assignment, the term 'impact' is aligned with the terminology used by GPE to refer changes in the areas of learning, equity, gender equality and inclusion (reflected in GPE Strategic Goals 1 and 2 described in the 2020 Strategic Plan). While examining progress towards impact in this sense, the country evaluations do not constitute formal impact evaluations, which usually entail counterfactual analysis based on randomized controlled trials.

[232] This country-specific ToC was adapted from the generic country-level ToC that had been developed in the assignment Inception Report.

[233] See, for example: Mayne, J. "Addressing Cause and Effect in Simple and Complex Settings through Contribution Analysis". In *Evaluating the Complex,* R. Schwartz, K. Forss, and M. Marra (Eds.), Transaction Publishers, (2011).

[234] i.e. from sector planning and related sector dialogue to sector plan implementation and monitoring during the period covered by the most recent fully or mostly disbursed ESPIG.

- The reports for 'summative plus' will include a final section on Strategic Questions, which will summarize – if applicable – suggestions for how GPE support to the respective country can be improved, and/or which will outline overarching questions about the GPE operational model that may be worth further exploring in the context of other summative and prospective CLE.

The process for this country evaluation involved four stages: (i) assessing the availability and quality of data, adapting the country-level theory of change and conducting a country-specific stakeholder mapping to determine priorities for consultations during the in-country site visit (see Appendix IV); (ii) in-country data collection during an ten-working day mission to South Sudan from November 10th to November 23rd, 2018; (iii) assembling and assessing the GPE contribution story; and (iv) writing the evaluation report.

Data collection and analysis were conducted by a team of two international and one national consultant. Methods of data collection included:

- Document and literature review (see Appendix VI for a list of consulted documents)

- Stakeholder consultations through individual and group interviews in Juba, South Sudan. In addition, telephone interviews were conducted with the Secretariat country focal point, and USAID staff members currently based in Washington. Appendix V provides a list of consulted stakeholders. In total, the evaluation team interviewed 58 individuals (see Box iii.1), of which 13 were women.

Box iii.1: Consulted Stakeholders

Education ministry: 13
Other ministries and government agencies: 14
Grant and coordinating agents: 5
Development partners/donors: 10
Civil Society/Teacher Organizations/Parent organizations: 10
Education and research experts: 5
GPE Secretariat: 1

- Education sector performance data analysis, drawing upon publicly accessible information on learning outcomes, equity, gender equality and inclusion, and education financing.[235]

The evaluation team analyzed the available data using qualitative (descriptive, content, comparative) and quantitative techniques, thereby triangulating different data sources and methods of data collection.

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[235] The key sources of data are the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) database, data.uis.unesco.org; the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1; and country-level datasets and data sources.

Appendix IV Stakeholder mapping

STAKEHOLDER	INTEREST IN/INFLUENCE ON GPE COUNTRY-LEVEL PROGRAMMING IMPORTANCE FOR THE EVALUATION	ROLE IN THE COUNTRY-LEVEL EVALUATION
Global		
Secretariat	Interest: High. Influence: High. The Secretariat operationalizes guidance on overall direction and strategy issued by the Board. Importance: High	The main internal stakeholders and users of the evaluation; Key informants; country lead facilitated the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders.
Board members (from developing countries included in the sample)	Interest: High. Influence: High. Board members influence the direction, strategy development and management of GPE, and they ensure resources. The extent to which DCP Board members are involved in and intimately familiar with GPE grants in their respective countries likely varies. Importance: High	South Sudan is represented on the GPE Board through the Africa 3 constituency. These board members were *not* consulted during the course of this country evaluation.
Country-level		
Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI)	Interest: High Influence: High. Responsible for shaping and implementing education sector policy and managing related financing. Focal point with GPE Secretariat. Importance: High. Main partner for GPE grant design and implementation.	Key informants at country level. Directors of various key MoGEI directorates were interviewed in person during the country visit (see Appendix V, list of stakeholders).
Other line ministries involved in, or relevant for (basic) education, equity and equality issues: Ministry of Labour and Public Service (MoLPS), Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs (MoGSWRA), Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology (MoHERST), and State Ministries of Education (SMoEs)	Interest: High Influence: medium. MoLPS is responsible for managing public service and the labor market; MoGSWRA is responsible for social welfare and protection of rights (gender, religious, ethnic, persons with disabilities); and MoHERST is responsible for higher education; and SMoEs are responsible for education at the state level.	Key informants at country level (see Appendix V, list of stakeholders).

STAKEHOLDER	INTEREST IN/INFLUENCE ON GPE COUNTRY-LEVEL PROGRAMMING IMPORTANCE FOR THE EVALUATION	ROLE IN THE COUNTRY-LEVEL EVALUATION
	Importance: High. Responsible for implementing measures planned in the ESP.	
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP)	Interest: High Influence: High. Responsible for monitoring and supporting the implementation of the education sector policy and managing related financing. Importance: High.	Key informants consulted at country level. (see Appendix V, list of stakeholders).
Key Education Sector Stakeholders (national level)		
Grant Agents: UNICEF (ESPIG) and UNESCO (ESPDG)	Interest: High Influence: High. Responsible for managing the ESPDG and ESPIG in South Sudan. Importance: High	Key informant at country level. Consulted during visit in South Sudan.
Coordinating Agencies: USAID and DFID	Interest: High Influence: Medium-High. Through its facilitating role, the coordinating agency plays an important role in the functioning of the LEG. Importance: High	Key informant at country level.
Development Partners (donor agencies, multilateral and bilateral organizations): WFP, UNHCR, OCHA, DFID, EU, JICA	Interest: High Influence: Medium-High, through their participation in the LEG, in sector monitoring exercises, as well as to their own activities in the education sector. Importance: High	Key informants at country level were interviewed in person during the country visit.
Consultative groups in the education sector: National Education Forum, Joint Steering Committee, Education Donor Group (EDoG)	Interest: High Influence: High Importance: High.	Consultations conducted with individual members of these groups (e.g. MoGEI, donors, see other rows) but not with groups in session.
NGOs and faith-based organizations: Windle Trust, Africa Education Trust, ECSS, ADRA, Catholic Relief Services	Interest: High Influence: Low. Most are not members of the LEG, but several have participated in sector planning consultations and education sector reviews. Importance: Medium-High.	Key informants at country level were consulted during the country site visit.

STAKEHOLDER	INTEREST IN/INFLUENCE ON GPE COUNTRY-LEVEL PROGRAMMING IMPORTANCE FOR THE EVALUATION	ROLE IN THE COUNTRY-LEVEL EVALUATION
Civil Society coalitions and state level Teachers' Unions (no nationwide teachers' union in South Sudan)	Interest: High Influence: Low. Most are not members of the LEG but several have participated in sector planning consultations and education sector reviews Importance: Medium-High	Key informants at country level were consulted during the country site visit.
Education sector institutions/ organizations or research institutions	Interest: Medium-High Influence: Low. Most are not members of the LEG but several have participated in sector planning consultations and education sector reviews Importance: Medium	Key informants at country level were consulted during the country site visit.
Private sector representatives: private schools	Interest: Medium Influence: Low. Most are not members of the LEG but several have participated in sector planning consultations and education sector reviews Importance: Medium	Key informants at country level were consulted during the country site visit.

Appendix V List of consulted individuals

In total, 58 individuals were interviewed for this CLE, of which 13 were women (22 percent). All consulted individuals were interviewed in person in Juba by the evaluation team, except for four individuals consulted over the phone/skype.

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME, FIRST NAME	TITLE	M/W
Ministries and Agencies of the Republic of South Sudan and its constituent states			
Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI)	Hon. Michael Loupe Lotyam	Undersecretary, Office of the Minister/Undersecretary	M
	George Mogga Benjamin	Director General of Planning and Budgeting (GPE Country Focal Point)	M
	Esther Akumu Achire	Director of Partnerships and Coordination	W
	Giir Mabior Cyerdit	Deputy Director of Data and Statistics (EMIS Focal Point)	M
	Terenzio Omwony	Acting Director of Secondary Education	M
	Gibson Brown	Director of Primary Education	M
	Bullen Daniel	Assistant Director of Curriculum	M
	Samuel Dem Marier	Director of Alternative Education Systems (AES)	M
	Mr. Victor Dut	Director of Research and Policy Development (M&E Focal Point)	M
	Mading Manyok	Secretary of Secondary School Examinations, National Examinations Council	M
	Viola Omaro	Deputy Director, Early Childhood Development Unit	W
	Mali Simon Long	Deputy Director, Early Childhood Development Unit	W
	Wildat Hassan	Senior Inspector, Early Childhood Development Unit	W
Office of the President, Republic of South Sudan	Hon. Dr. John Gai Yoh	Presidential Advisor for Education Affairs (former minister of education, MoGEI)	M
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	Mr. Moses Mabior	Director General of Macro-Economic Planning and Aid Coordination	M
National Bureau of Statistics	Mr. Otwari Mark Odufa	Director of Social and Demographic Statistics	M

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME, FIRST NAME	TITLE	M/W
Ministry of Labor, Public Service and Human Resource Development	Ms. Awadia Gabriel	Acting Director General of Human Resource Development	W
Ministry of Education, Gender and Social Welfare, Jubek State	Daniel Swaka	Director General	M
	Emmanuel Natana	Director of General Education	M
Ministry of Education, Gbudwe State	Hon. Pia Philip	Minister	M
Transitional National Legislative Assembly (Committee on Education, Research, Science and Technology)	Hon. Ahmed Mohamed Musa	Chairperson (Party: SPLM)	M
	Hon. Simon Udom Aye	Deputy Chairperson (IO)	M
	Hon. Mary Atong Bak	Member (SPLM)	W
	Hon. Akuar Gamar Ujieth	Member (SPLM)	M
	Hon. Caguor Adong Manyang	Member (SPLM)	M
	Hon. John Agany Deng Kuwae	Member (SPLM)	M
	Hon. Prof. Ajang Bior Duot	Member (SPLM)	M
Multilateral donor agencies			
UNICEF (GPE ESPIG grant agent)	Peter Quamo	GPE program manager	M
	Noemi Robiati	Education Specialist	W
	Kenyi Paulino Kamba	Education Specialist	M
UNESCO (former Coordinating Agency, GPE ESPDG grant agent)	Sardar Umar Alam	Head of Office and UNESCO Representative	M
	Hai Tiet	Education Project Officer	M
WFP	Hsiao-Wei Lee	Head of Program	W
UNHCR	Mr. David Kinyera Jada	Education Officer	M
OCHA	Richard Mukhwana	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Equatoria Region	M
Bilateral donor agencies			
USAID (Coordinating Agency)	Wendy Wheaton	Education Specialist	W
	Croshelle Harris-Hussein	Education Office Director	W
	Jane Namadi	Education Specialist	W

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME, FIRST NAME	TITLE	M/W
DFID (co-Coordinating Agency)	Shaun Collins	Senior Education Advisor	M
DFID / Girl's Education in South Sudan (GESS)	Daniel Gesaka	Senior Finance Manager, Mott MacDonald (GESS implementing partner)	M
EU	Kenyi E. Kilombe	Program Manager	M
JICA	Taban G. Koma	Program Coordinator	M
Civil Society and Teachers' Union			
National Education Coalition (NEC) (CSEF grant recipient)	Mr. Ador Riak Nyiel	Lead/coordinator	M
Teacher's Union of Jubek State[236]	Bonfilio Tongum	Secretary General	M
	Lachs Benjamin	Chairman	M
	Salah Mattia Juges	Secretary, Finance	M
NGO and faith-based education service providers			
Windle Trust International	Ale Peter Michael	Acting Country Director	M
Africa Educational Trust	Jackson Okello	Country Manager	M
Episcopal Church of South Sudan (ECSS)	Mr. Lubari Stephen	Education Program Manager	M
Catholic Relief Services	Willie Kiarie	Education Program Manager	M
	Loliwa Geoffrey	?	M
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)	Simon Namana	Senior Programs Officer	M
Educational and Research Experts			
The Sudd Institute (think-tank)	Prof. Augustino Ting Mayai	Director of Research	M
Yei Teacher Training Institute	Sarah Amulo	Partnerships Manager	W

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[236] There is presently no nation-wide union of teachers, only some teacher union at the level of individual states.

ORGANIZATION	LAST NAME, FIRST NAME	TITLE	M/W
Cambridge International School (private school)	Mr. Saverious Tombe Eujenio	Managing Director	M
Nile International School (private school)	Ms. Angua Margaret Baako	Principal (Primary Section)	W
Independent appraiser	Alberto Begue-Aguado	Independent Consultant	M
GPE Secretariat			
GPE Secretariat	Fazle Rabbani	Country Lead, South Sudan	M

Appendix VI List of reviewed documents

Note: all web links in this document as of 1ˢᵗ of February, 2019.

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Appendix VII Progress on GESP 2012-2017 implementation

Progress on GESP 2012-2017 outcome-level targets

PLAN PRIORITY FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86	BASELINE 2011 FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86, VARIOUS SOURCES	TARGET 2017 FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86	PROGRESS / ACHIEVEMENT? VARIOUS SOURCES
Primary GER	68.8% (ESP I:86) 85% UIS 2011 63.51% (ESP I:23) 52% OOSC own calc 71.6% 2009 ESA:18	92%	62.3% (ESP 2:13) 67% UIS 2015 78% EMIS 2016:23 44% OOSC own calc 2015 47% OOSC own calc 2017 56.5% 2015 ESA:18
Primary NER	44.4% (ESP I:86) 41% UIS 2011 estimate	63%	32% UIS 2015 estimate
Primary NIR	14.5% (ESP I:86) 21% UIS 2011	n/a	17% UIS 2015 estimate
Primary completion rate (PCR)	10.3% (ESP I:86) 24.6% UIS 2010 12% secondary GIR (EMIS 2011:72) 6% secondary GER (EMIS 2011: 69) 8% 2009 (ESA:18)	n/a	14% (ESP 2:40) UIS no data 12.5% secondary GIR (EMIS 2016:23) 10% secondary GER (EMIS 2016:23) 14% 2015 (ESA:18)
Primary pupil: classroom ratio	134:1 (ESP I:86) UIS no data 125:1 2011 (EMIS 2011:20) 114:1 2012 (EMIS 2015:24)	185:1	57:1 2015 (ESP II:130) UIS no data 56:1 2015 (ESA:111) 105:1 2016 (EMIS 2016:37) 85:1 2016 (EMIS 2015:24)

PLAN PRIORITY FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86	BASELINE 2011 FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86, VARIOUS SOURCES	TARGET 2017 FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86	PROGRESS / ACHIEVEMENT? VARIOUS SOURCES
Primary pupil: teacher ratio	53:1 (ESP I:86) 50:1 UIS 2011 estimate UNESCO 2018a:64 state data 2012	n/a	47:1 UIS 2015 estimate UNESCO 2018a:64 state data 2015 shows it same as in 2012 45:1 2015 ESA:110 (77:1 if only permanent teachers counted)
Primary pupil: qual. teacher ratio	117:1 (ESP I:86) 131:1 (ESP 1:28) 125:1 (EMIS 2011:57) UIS no data	50:1	57:1 (gov) (ESP 2:43) 105:1 (EMIS 2016:37) 85:1 (EMIS 2015:16) 55:1 UIS 2015 estimate
Primary pupil: textbook ratio	4:1 (ESP I:86) 5:1 UIS 2011 data	1:1	4:1 2015 (ESP II:130) UIS no data
Primary repetition avg by grade	9.2% (ESP I:86) UIS no data	n/a	UIS no data 9% 2015 ESA:61 primary 11% 2015 (EMIS 2016:24)
Primary leaving exam pass rate	81.5% (ESP I:86) UIS no data	n/a	UIS no data 81% 2014 ESA:102
Primary dropout rate	27.3% (ESP I:86) UIS no data 28% 2011 (EMIS 2011:68)	15%	UIS no data 6.4% 2015 (EMIS 2016:25) 8% 2015 (EMIS 2015:74)
Primary GPI of GER	0.59 (ESP I:86) 0.66 UIS 2011 0.71 (EMIS 2011:44) 0.66 (OOSC 28)	1.0	0.75 (ESP 2:41) 0.71 UIS 2015 0.75 (EMIS 2016:31) 0.73 (EMIS 2015:16) 0.71 (OOSC 28)

PLAN PRIORITY FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86	BASELINE 2011 FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86, VARIOUS SOURCES	TARGET 2017 FROM GESP I RESULTS FRAMEWORK, P.86	PROGRESS / ACHIEVEMENT? VARIOUS SOURCES
Primary % of female teachers	12.3% (ESP I:86) UIS no data OOSC quote	30%	UIS no data 15%, UNESCO 2018a:65 14% ESA:106 2015
Secondary GER	4.2% (ESP I:86) 9% UIS 2011 5.9% 2009 ESA:18	8%	10% UIS 2015 6.5% 2015 ESA:18
Secondary NER	1.6% (ESP I:86) 4.8% UIS 2011 estimate	3.0%	4.9% UIS 2015 estimate
Secondary NIR	0.4% (ESP I:86) UIS no data	n/a	UIS no data
Secondary pupil: teacher ratio	15:1 (ESP I:86) UIS no data	n/a	27:1 UIS 2015 estimate
Secondary GPI of GER	0.41 (ESP I:86) 0.51 UIS 2011	n/a	0.54 UIS 2015
Share of trained teachers	44.4% (ESP I:86) 44% primary (EMIS 2011:55 estimate) 44% UIS 2011 estimate (primary, 'trained')	n/a	41% overall, 28% primary (ESP 2:21) 46% overall, 42% primary (EMIS 2016:35) 43% overall, 38% primary (EMIS 2015:15) 84% UIS 2015 estimate (primary, 'qualified') 38% 2015 ESA:106 (primary)
Share of GDP spent on education	7% - (likely incorrect value) 0.8% UIS 2011	n/a	1% UIS 2017

Appendix VIII Overview of progress on deliverables planned under GESP 2012-2017

PLANNED UNDER GESP 2012-2017	COMPLETED AS OF 2018?
GESP STRATEGIC GOAL 1: ACCESS AND EQUITY	
Construction implementation manual developed by 2012	x
Construction implementation strategy developed by 2013	x
National policy on girls' education developed	V, 2015
National policy on special needs education developed	V, 2014 (called inclusive education policy)
National policy for AES developed	V, 2014
Minimum standard for EiE developed	V, 2012
National policy on distance learning by 2013	x
National policy on adult education & lifelong learning developed	Partly (not stand-alone, part of AES policy)
Adult education inspection framework by 2013	V (part of 2017 inspection order)
National policy on private schools developed	V, 2017 (not yet implemented)
Regulations for private schools issued	Partly (part of policy)
GESP STRATEGIC GOAL 2: QUALITY OF LEARNING	
National teacher development policy, standards and program inspection framework developed	Partly (Teacher Development Management System (TDMS)) (Yei TTI)
National school curriculum revised	V, 2017 (not yet rolled out)
ECD, primary, secondary, AES and TVET textbooks are developed	V, 2018 (being distributed)
Common national school inspection framework	V, 2017
Research policy framework developed	x
National headteacher standards developed	x
School governance regulations enacted	Partly (school governance manuals produced 2014 and 2016)
School self-assessment framework and school development plan framework developed	V, 2016 (part of governance manual)
South Sudan Examination Provisional Order enacted	V, 2011

PLANNED UNDER GESP 2012-2017	COMPLETED AS OF 2018?
Policy framework for teacher accreditation, certification and assessment of learning developed	Partly (one interview suggests so, but no document found)
Policy framework for ECD developed	x
Teacher Retention strategy developed	x
National TVET policy, strategy, standards, teacher training programmes, curriculum, and learning resources developed	V, 2015
National lifeskills policy framework developed	x
Develop learner support strategy	x
Policy, strategy, standards for English instruction developed	V, 2015
Policy, strategy, standards for national language instruction developed	Partly (draft already existed)
Teacher code of conduct updated	V, 2012 (emergency cluster)
Learner code of conduct updated	x
Behaviour management guidance developed	x
GESP STRATEGIC GOAL 3: ADULT LITERACY	
National policy, strategy, revised curriculum, standards, learning resources and certification programmes developed for basic literacy and numeracy	V, 2014-16 (Room to Learn)
GESP STRATEGIC GOAL 4: INSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN CAPACITY	
Training needs assessment in national, state and county administration	x
GESP STRATEGIC GOAL 5: FUNDING FOR EDUCATION	
Fund-raising strategy and sector aid financing plan developed annually	x
GESP STRATEGIC GOAL 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE PLAN	
4 NEF monitoring reports / year	x
4 SEF monitoring reports / year	x
4 CEF monitoring reports / year	x
Implementation evaluation framework developed	Partly (new M&E strategy launched 2017)
Mid-term evaluation by 2015	x
Final evaluation by 2017	x

PLANNED UNDER GESP 2012-2017	COMPLETED AS OF 2018?
OUTPUTS NOT OUTLINED IN THE ACTION PLAN, BUT MENTIONED IN THE NARRATIVE PARTS OF GESP 2012-2017	
The development of a policy for Teacher Training and Certification and for Teacher Conditions of Service for General Education	X
Development of a policy on Child-friendly School Standards	X
Development of a school feeding policy	V, 2015
Development of a Risk Reduction and Emergency Response policy	Sort of (INEE minimum standards, 2012)
TOTALS	
TOTAL planned	40 outputs or groups of outputs
TOTAL completed	15 = 37.5% --- 16 = 36%
TOTAL partly or indirectly completed	6 = 15% --- 8 = 18%
TOTAL yes OR partly	21 = 52.5% --- 24 = 55%
TOTAL not completed	19 = 47.5% --- 20 = 45%

Appendix IX Areas of ESPIG contributions

A. GPEP components, budget and achievements against GESP I strategic goals

GESP OBJECTIVES	GPEP COMPONENTS AND ESPIG 2013-2018 CONTRIBUTIONS[237]	ESPIG 2019-2021 COMPONENTS[238]
Access & Equity (GESP I strategic goal 1, GESP II priority programme 1)	Total ESPIG allocation to equitable access: **US$12.9 million** • Improvements to physical infrastructure to enhance learning: construction and equipping of 25 model schools (component B3, funded by USAID and GPE, GPE contribution **US$12.9m**). Total enrollment in GPE schools target met (baseline 13686, target 14436, endline 16877). Number of dropouts from GPE schools target not met (baseline 1442, target 1200, endline 2461).	Component 1: Equitable Access. **Funding: US$8,6m** • Up to date mapping of OOSC • Increasing learning spaces with community support • Community mobilisation and advocacy/ awareness
Quality (GESP I strategic goal 2, GESP II priority programme 2)	Total ESPIG allocation to quality: **US$9.9 million** • Strengthening primary school leadership and Strengthening school inspection and supportive supervision: development of primary leadership, inspection and supervision standards; in- and pre-service training for 8970 school leaders and 696 trainers and supervisors (component A2 and A3, A2 funded by GPE, **US$5.6m**, A3 funded by USAID). Leadership index target not met (baseline 2014 83 percent, target 2018 90 percent, endline 2018 85 percent), supervision and inspection index target met (baseline 70, target 80, endline 83). • Providing learning support services to primary schools: training of 980 teachers on early grade instruction, distribution of kits to 3700 schools, capacitation and resourcing of 5 community education centres and two teacher training institutes (component B1, funded by GPE, **US$3.1m**). No linked outcome target.	Component 2: Quality Education. **Funding: US$15,3m** • Training • Development of textbooks and material for new curriculum • School management, supervision and inspection

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[237] Sources: ESPIG evaluation (Cambridge Education 2018), ESPIG Budget (GPE Expenditure Projections, Fall 2017 revised spreadsheet), and CL presentation, June 2017 visit to South Sudan (June 2017).

[238] Source: ESPIG 2019-2021 Program Document, September 2018 version (v23).

	• <u>Strengthening literacy and numeracy in primary schools</u>: development of a new national curriculum and design of corresponding textbooks; EGMA/EGRA in selected schools for primary grade three (P3); early grade literacy and numeracy kits developed (component A1, co-funded by GPE and USAID, GPE contribution **US$1.2m**). Proportion of students who can read at the end of P3 target not met (baseline 2014 43 percent, target 2018 48 percent, endline 2018 17 percent).	
Adult literacy (GESP I strategic goal 3, GESP II priority programme 4)	Total ESPIG allocation to adult literacy: **US$1 million** • <u>Support to OOSC and young people</u>: study on OOSC in 2018, support to development of Pastoralist Education Strategic Framework, procurement of equipment for alternative education system centres (component B4, funded by GPE, **US$1m**). No linked target.	(no major activities)
Sector Management (GESP I strategic goal 4, GESP II priority programme 3)	Total ESPIG allocation to adult literacy: **US$7 million** • <u>Support to sector policy development, strategic planning and review</u>: development and approval of English Language Policy Framework, Annual Joint Sector Reviews, Girls' Education Strategy 2018-2022, M&E Strategy, EMIS data (component A4, funded by GPE, GPE contribution **US$5.2m**). No linked target. • <u>Research and Communication on GPEP results</u>: action research on GPEP results, final GPEP evaluation (component C, funded by GPE, **US$1.3m**). Target met of at least two GPEP models to showcase (M&E strategy approved, school construction standards approved). • <u>Support to School Management Committees (SMCs)</u>: training of 325 SMC members, (component B2, funded by USAID and GPE, GPE contribution **US$0.5m**). No linked outcome target.	Component 3: Efficiency. **Funding: US$6,5m** • EMIS • Monitoring and Evaluation • Sector Coordination
Other ESPIG components	• GPEP planning, administration management costs (funded by USAID and GPE, GPE contribution **US$5.2m**)	Component 4: Program Management and Supervision. **Funding: US$5,2m**
Total ESPIG allocation	US$36.1m from GPE (planned; disbursed, US$34.8m)	US$35.7m from GPE (planned)

Overarching ESPIG objective	Supporting GESP strategic objectives 1 (sub-components 4, 5, 6, 12), 2 (sub-components 1, 4, 5), 3 (sub-components 3, 5) and 4 (sub-components 4, 5). Source: Program Document, September 2012 version, pp.22-23.	"The overall goal of the GPE II programme is to ensure that by end 2021, the number of boys and girls out of school in target areas of South Sudan decreases by 15 per cent; while ensuring an increased equitable access to quality education through working closely with other development partner-funded programmes." Source: Program Document, September 2018 version, p.20.

B. ESPIG contributions against categories used by GPE to code ESPIG focus areas.

GPE ESPIG CODES	DID ESPIG 2013-2018 FUND WORK IN THIS AREA?
Learning	
Teacher training	Yes. GPE-supported Primary School Leadership Programme (PSLP) designed both basic and accredited courses accredited by the University of Juba and endorsed by MoGEI.
Standards, Curriculum and Learning Materials	Yes. Support for development of new curriculum, of numeracy and literacy kits, of English Language Policy Framework, of approval of five national languages of instruction. of the Pastoralist Education Strategic Framework
Learning Assessment Systems	Yes. Support for National Examinations Council (training of examiners), funding for EGMA/EGRA study in 2015.
Teacher Management	No.
Use of Information Communication Technology in learning	No.
Equity	
Education Facilities	Yes. School construction.
Cash transfers and other incentives for students	No.
Gender Equality	Yes. Development of the Girls' Education Strategy 2018-2022.
Access for out-of-school children	Yes. Conducting an OOSC study to identify the profiles of children who were 'left behind. Support for Community Girls Schools.
Adult Learning	No.
Well Being Programs	No.

Support to children with disabilities/special needs	No.
Systems	
Systems strengthening at the Central level	Yes. Some support for EMIS unit capacity development. Support for the development of a sectoral Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy that is gender sensitive. Supporting the organization of annual General Education Annual Reviews (GEAR).
Systems strengthening at the decentralized and school levels	Yes. Strengthening primary school leadership, school inspection and supportive supervision. GPE-supported Primary School Leadership Programme (PSLP) designed both basic and accredited courses accredited by the University of Juba and endorsed by MoGEI.
EMIS (Education Management Information Systems)	Yes. Support for EMIS capacity development and annual school census in 2015, 2016, 2018.

Source for ESPIG 2013-2018 contributions: see GPE, *ESPIG 2019-2021 program document*, version 23, 4th of September 2018, p.15.

Appendix X Selected sector financing data

ISSUE	DATA
DOMESTIC FINANCING	
Total domestic education expenditure from 2011 (date of independence) to latest available data	**Fluctuating** 312 US$ (constant PPP) in 2011 to 352m US$ (constant PPP) in 2016, to 198 US$ (constant PPP) in 2017 (2011-2017 average 287m US$ constant PPP, no data 2012). Source: UIS 2019. (in absolute, nominal, unadjusted US$, UIS indicates a strong fluctuation: 144m in 2011 to 204m in 2015 to 28m in 2017) -- UNESCO 2018a: 64 suggests that approved budgets rose between 2011/12 and 2017/18, but that actual outturns remained the same between 2011/12 and 2016/17 (in SSP, unclear if nominal or real, likely nominal). -- Up from 367m SSP in 2012/13 to 609m SSP in 2015/16 (nominal, need to adjust for inflation – between Jan and July 2016 SSP value halved, and again by end 2016, cf. WB econ update December 2018). Source: GPE RF 2017, DOC03 – Results Framework indicator 10 - Results Sheets (48 templates)
Education share of total government expenditures from 2011 (date of independence) to latest available data	**Decrease**, from 4.0% in 2011 to 1.0% in 2017 (2011-2017 average is 2.7%, no data 2012, peak in 2013 at 4.1%). Source: UIS 2019, based on actual expenditures. UIS data counts debt as part of total government expenditures. -- UNESCO 2018a:61 also indicates a decrease in education's share of total expenditures, from 5% in 2012/13 to 3% in 2017/18 (calculation based on approved budgets, not actual expenditures). -- Stable from 5.4% in 2012/2013 (actual expenditure) to 5.5% in 2015/2016 (actual expenditure) (2014-2016 average is 4.9%). Stable from 6.4% (budgeted expenditure) in 2013/2014 to 6.6% (budget expenditure) in 2015/16. Source: GPE Results Framework (RF) 2017, DOC02 – RF indicator 10 - Master File Database. GPE data does not count debt as part of total government expenditures.
% of domestic education financing allocated to Basic education from 2011 (date of independence) to latest available data	**Decrease** from 63% in 2011 to 53% in 2017 (2011-2017 average was 58%, no data 2012). Source: UIS 2019

ISSUE	DATA
DOMESTIC FINANCING	
Funding by expenditure type (salary, non-salary recurrent, investment)	Governmental expenditures have been concentrated entirely on recurrent costs (salaries, school capitation grants, cash transfers), but with the collapse of governmental revenue post-2016, salaries of both officials and teachers have not been paid regularly or at all, and lost value due to hyperinflation. UENSCO 2018:61 "MoGEI has not budgeted funds outside those required to meet recurrent costs, and after 2014, no funds were allocated to meet capital requirements for activities such as school construction."
INTERNATIONAL FINANCING	
Total ODA (all sectors) during review period from 2011 (date of independence) to latest available data	**Strong increase** of 468 percent, from 378m in 2011 to 2156m (highest-ever) in 2017. (2011-2017 average was 1428m). This includes both humanitarian and non-humanitarian funds, as well as GPE funding. Source: OECD-CRS, 2019, and GPE grant data.
Total amount of ODA to education from 2011 (date of independence) to latest available data	**Strong increase** of 163 percent, from 49m in 2011 to 129m in 2017. (2011-2017 average was 91m). This includes both humanitarian and non-humanitarian funds, as well as GPE funding. Source: OECD-CRS, 2019, and GPE grant data.
Education ODA as share of overall ODA from 2011 (date of independence) to latest available data	**Stable as a share of total ODA**, from 6 percent in 2012 to 6 percent in 2018 (2012-2017 average was 6 percent, 2011 was an outlier at 13 percent). This includes both humanitarian and non-humanitarian funds, as well as GPE funding, in both total and sector ODA. Source: OECD CRS and OCHA FTS, 2019 **Slight decrease as a share of total non-humanitarian ODA**, from 11 percent in 2011 to 10 percent in 2017. (2011-2017 average was 10.5 percent). Source: OECD-CRS, 2019 **Slight increase as a share of humanitarian appeal funding**, from 5.3 percent in 2011 to 5.1 percent in 2018 (2011-2018 average was 3.2 percent). Source: Financial Tracking Services, OCHA, 2019
ESPIG amount as share of education ODA during review period	GPE's ESPIG of US$36m provided seven percent of the US$524m of sector funding over the 2013-2017 period. This counts both development and humanitarian funding. Source: OECD CRS and OCHA FTS, 2019. The ESPIG contributed 17 percent of basic education funding of US$223m over the same period. This counts only development funding, as no sub-division for basic education was available for humanitarian funding. Source: OECD CRS. GPE's ESPIG of US$36m provided ten percent of the US$374m of non-humanitarian sector ODA in 2013-2017 (US$70m/year). Source: OECD CRS.

ISSUE	DATA
DOMESTIC FINANCING	
ESPIG amount as share of financing required to fill the ESP funding gap at as estimated at the time of approval	Under the most conservative estimate, the GESP was expected to have a funding gap of 70 percent of its total cost, i.e. 70 percent of US$2.4 billion, i.e. US$1.68 billion. GPE's US$36m ESPIG contributed 2 percent of this funding gap as estimated in original plan documents.
ESPIG amount as % of total estimated/expected ESP financing	GPE's US$36m ESPIG contributed 1.5 percent of GESP 2012-2017 total cost (US$2.4 billion) as estimated in original plan documents.
ESPIG amount as % of actual ESP financing (if data is available)	No data on actual ESP financing during the review period, but GPE's US$36m ESPIG can be estimated to have contributed 3.5 percent of total sector financing in the period of intended GESP implementation, 2012-2017 (which was roughly US$1 billion, counting both domestic funds and non-humanitarian ODA). However, in practice, most sector financing during this period was not aligned with the plan and did not directly funds its implementation.

Appendix XI Selected system-level data

Changes suited to remove barriers to equitable access to education

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
Changes in # of schools relative to # of children	**The number of schools has risen at all levels between 2011 and 2017**. The number of pre-primary schools increased by 40% from 447 in 2011 to 725 in 2017. The number of primary schools increased by 16% from 3447 in 2011 to 3,982 in 2017. The number of secondary schools has risen by 43% from 196 schools in 2011 to 281 in 2017. The number of AES schools has risen by 14% from 1101 in 2011 to 1251 in 2017. The combined number of these four types of schools has risen by 20% from 5191 in 2011 to 6239 in 2017. Data source: UNESCO 2018a:72-73. 2011 data based on EMIS 2011. 2017 data based on GEAR2017 data and represents all 33 states except Terekeka, which was not present at the GEAR. **The number of children of school-age (5-17) has risen by 25 percent from 3.2m in 2011 to 4.0m in 2017**. Source: UNESCO 2018a:102. Original source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2009. **The number of children of school-age has thus risen faster than the total number of basic education schools**. IT has risen faster than the number of primary schools and AES centres, but more slowly than the number of pre-primary and secondary schools. **20% of schools in the country were estimated to not be functioning in October 2018**, primarily due to insecurity, followed by departures of teachers and students, the inconsistency of teacher pay, and the lack of TLMs. Source: Education Cluster Assessment 2018, pp.15-16. This figure was 25% in 2016 and 12% in 2017 (source: ECA 2016:16).
Changes in average distance to school	*No data on actual average distance to school is available. However, data on school distance being an issue for access is available.* **School distance is always ranked prominently as a reason for school non-attendance and/or dropout. Its prominence as a factor cited may have fallen marginally over time, not primarily due to improvements in distance, but due to the rise of other factors, such as displacement due to conflict.** • **In 2009, school distance was cited as the second most common reason for not attending school (23%)**, behind inability to pay fees (24%). In rural settings it was the main reason (24%) ahead of fees (22%), in urban settings it was a less prominent reason (9%) behind fees (39%), and other reasons. Source: CESR:53, original source, household survey 2009. • EMIS 2011 and 2013 do not contain data on the main reasons for school non-attendance/cost. • In 2014, "The 2014 Draft National Inclusive Education Policy (MoEST, 2014) lists three main barriers preventing people with disabilities from accessing education: (i) long distances to school (84% of cases), (ii) negative attitudes (52%), and (iii) lack of teacher experience (42%). Teasing and bullying were mentioned in 24% of cases." Source: ESA 2016:67. • **In 2015 long distance to school was ranked second (12%) behind school cost (20%) about the main reason for primary dropouts** in a survey of headteachers (ahead of displacement, 9%), and joint fourth after cost (18%), marriage (17%), family issues (12%), and displacement (8%) as a main reason for secondary dropout. (ESA 2016:66). For females in secondary, marriage/pregnancy was by far the most cited factor, 32% (ibid). • **In 2016, long distance to school was ranked first (15%) as the main reason for student dropout** (not by level), in front of inability to pay school fees (14%), displacement (14%) and family issues (12%). (other/unknown: 24%). Source: EMIS 2016:p.27. Of note, the percentage of drop-outs due to distance varied significantly across states for which data

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
	was available, from 6% in Amadi to 27% in Gogrial (UNESCO 2018a:72, original source EMIS 2015). • **In 2018, long distance to school was ranked fifth (7%) as the most important reason for dropouts** (same % for boys and girls), behind lack of food (14% boys, 12% girls), domestic duties (18% girls, 5% boys), marriage (35% girls, 5% boys), inability to pay fees (11% boys, 7% girls), and looking for a job/cattle rearing (23% boys, n/a girls). Source: Education cluster assessment, October 2018, p.26. Random nationwide sample of 400 primary schools surveyed. **The share of primary schools offering a full primary cycle may have slightly improved since 2009**. • In 2011, 83% of primary schools did not offer a full cycle. Source: GESP I:34, original source, EMIS 2011. • Over 2013–2015, 41% of pupils (550,000, of which 390,000 in GUPN states) attended one of the 73% of primary schools that did not offer the next grade. In non-GUPN states, only 19% of pupils face grade discontinuity. Source: ESA 2016:72. • In 2015, 58% of primary students attended one of the 74% of primary schools in South Sudan which did not offer a full primacy cycle (54% and 72% respectively in non-GUPN states). Source: ESA 2016:64. South Sudan Education Sector Analysis, 2016 Figure ES6. Share of schools offering a given grade in primary, 2009 and 2015 (%) *Sources*: World Bank, 2012; MoEST, 2008–2015. Authors' computations. Source: ESA 2016:22
Changes in costs of education to families	*No data on actual average cost of education to families is available in a way that would allow comparisons over time. However, data on school distance being an issue for access is available.* • **In 2009, inability to pay fees (24%) was cited as the second most common reason for not attending school, ahead of distance (23%)**, behind. In urban settings it was the main reason (39%), in rural settings it was a the second reason (22%) behind distance (24%). Source: CESR:53, original source, household survey 2009.

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
	• **In 2015 school cost (20%) was ranked first as the main reason for primary dropouts** in a survey of headteachers (ahead of distance, 12%, displacement, 9%). For females in secondary, marriage/pregnancy was by far the most cited factor, 32% (ibid).
	• **In 2016, inability to pay fees was ranked second (14%) as reason for school dropout (any level), after distance to school (15%)**, and along with displacement (14%) and family issues (12%). (other/unknown: 24%). Source: EMIS 2016:p.27.
	• **In 2018, inability to pay fees was ranked third (11% boys, 7% girls) as the most important reason for dropouts** (same % for boys and girls), behind lack of food (14% boys, 12% girls), domestic duties (18% girls, 5% boys), marriage (35% girls, 5% boys), inability to pay fees (11% boys, 7% girls), and looking for a job/cattle rearing (23% boys, n/a girls). Source: Education cluster assessment, October 2018, p.26. Random nationwide sample of 400 primary schools surveyed.
	ESA 2016:135 provides an overview of the kinds of expenses households are expected to cover.
	Figure A2. Expenses that schools expect students to cover, by item and sector, June 2014 (%) Regis./tuition fees: Secondary 87, Primary 78 Exam fees: Secondary 66, Primary 72 Uniform: Secondary 41, Primary 34 Exercise books: Secondary 35, Primary 30 Events: Secondary 14, Primary 11 SMC/PTA costs: 10 Meals: Secondary 21, Primary 9 Gen. Maintenance: Secondary 13, Primary 9 Transport: Secondary 10, Primary 6 Textbooks: Secondary 8, Primary 6 Vol. teachers: Secondary 9, Primary 4 ■ Secondary ■ Primary *Source:* GESS, 2014a.
Changes in availability of programs to improve children's readiness for school	In 2009, there were 400 government-paid staff that worked in 75 nursery schools. (CESR 2012, p. 29). In 2015, there were 3,148 pre-primary teachers (937 in government schools) (ESA 2016, p. 25). "High dropout rate between P1 and P2 could be linked to poor pupil preparedness following low coverage of pre-primary." (ESA 2016, p.18) The number of pre-primary schools rose from 447 in 2011 to 725 in 2017 (UNESCO 2018a:73).
New/expanded measures put in place to meet the educational needs of children with special needs and learners	Few significant/large-scale measures undertaken during the review period. The 2016 ESA notes: "MoEST with the support of NGOs is currently working on ways to improve access and teaching conditions for children with disabilities (including sensitization campaigns, and teaching and learning materials sensitive to special needs pupils)." (ESA 2016, p. 68)

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
from disadvantaged groups	
New/expanded measures put in place to further gender equality in education	During the period, nationwide cash transfers for adolescent girls (primary five to eight and secondary one to four) were introduced. Approximately 127,000 girls (out of 140,500 girls enrolled from P5 through S4) received direct cash transfers in 2015 (ESA, p. 19) Moreover, "MoEST has recently developed a national girl's education strategy that provides a framework of action to remove various barriers (social, school-based, and policy and system-based) preventing girls from obtaining an education." (ESA, p. 70). However, it has not yet been implemented. The new South Sudanese curriculum emphasises gender equity (ESA, p. 93). It has been finalized and is in the process of being rolled out as of early 2019.
Other (may vary by country)	The ESA 2016:22 notes that classroom conditions marginally improved between 2009 and 2015: "In 2015, 36% of classrooms were permanent structures and 27% were semi-permanent, compared with 25% and 29%, respectively, in 2009." It further notes: "Most schools lack basic facilities and equipment. While most schools have access to toilets (85% have toilets, and 54% have separate toilets for male and female), fewer than half of primary schools have access to water (32%) and a health centre (9%), and only 58% have a playground. At secondary level, access to facilities is better: 83% of schools have access to water and 88% have toilets (84% have separated toilets), but only 58% have a playground [...]. A large number of schools also lack basic learning equipment such as desks and chairs, blackboards, and chalk." ESA 2016:22

Changes suited to remove barriers to quality education

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
Changes in Pupil/teacher ratios (PTR, primary)	**2009**: • 50:1 UIS 2011 estimate • 53:1 (ESP I:86) • Between 2007 and 2009, pupil-teacher ratio in primary schools increased from 43:1 to 52:1 (when including volunteer teachers – it was 81:1 in 2009 when excluding volunteers). (CESR, p. 6; 31) • Average pupil-teacher ratio varies between 31:1 (Central Equatoria) and 84:1 (Jonglei) (excluding volunteers, the range is 44 and 139 for each state respectively). Wide range in teacher distribution across schools (CESR, p. 8) **2015**: • 47:1 UIS 2015 estimate • 45:1 2015 ESA:110 (77:1 if only permanent teachers counted) • Due to reliance on volunteer and part-time teachers, the pupil-teacher ratio in government schools ranges from 19:1 (secondary schools) to 44:1 (primary). In AES and pre-primary, it is 28:1 and 37:1, respectively. If volunteers are not considered, PTR rises to 75:1 in primary. (ESA 2016, p. 24) • Disparities are strong, especially in primary where PTRs range from 33:1 in Western Equatoria to 59:1 in Jonglei (ESA 2016, p.11) UNESCO 2018a:64 state data shows that PTRs were similar in 2012 and in 2015

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
Changes in pupil/trained teacher ratio	**2011:** 117:1 (ESP I:86) 131:1 (ESP 1:28) 125:1 (EMIS 2011:57) UIS: no data --- **2015**: 57:1 (government schools) (ESP 2:43) 85:1 (EMIS 2015:16) 55:1 UIS 2015 estimate --- **2016**: 105:1 (EMIS 2016:37)
Changes in equitable allocation of teachers (measured by relationship between number of teachers and number of pupils per school)	Number of teachers in primary **2011**: 26k (EMIS 2011:57) / 29k (UIS) Number of teachers in primary **2015**: 25k (EMIS 2015:15) / 27k (UIS) Number of teachers overall (2015): 40,911 (ESP 2:22) --- **2009**: Number of teachers per school in 2009 was 8.3 (inc. volunteers) in primary (CESR, p. 31) and 14 in secondary (p. 34) CESR (p.9) provides an overview of the relationship between the number of teachers and the number of students in any given school. --- **2015**: ESA 2016 (p.113) provides an overview of the relationship between the number of teachers and the number of students in any given school. Teacher deployment to schools is poor. The degree of coherence is 39%. However, this is an improvement from 2009 when teachers were allocated to school according to pupil numbers in only 21% of cases (ibid, p. 113)
Changes in relevance and clarity of (basic education) curricula	Improvement: a new South Sudanese curriculum was developed during the review period (along with corresponding TLMs). Dissemination and training on new curriculum and TLMs in ongoing in 2019. -- **2009**: "many schools still operate under a foreign curriculum, for example, following the Kenyan or Ugandan system" (CESR, p. 4). "A variety of curricula were adopted across states…MoE is in the process of introducing a national curriculum and schools are gradually adopting it. In 2009, more than 60% of grade 4 classrooms had implemented the national curriculum, and more than 95% of grade 1 classrooms had done so." (p. 78) -- **2015**:

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
	"the country recently adopted a revised curriculum that addresses issues of safety, resilience, and social cohesion….the peacebuilding aspects of this curriculum incorporate components such as life skills and peace education" (ESA 2016, p. 10) The new curriculum uses English as the language of instruction from P4 onwards. There is active student participation in the new curriculum framework, which emphasizes student-centred learning. (p. 23; 92) New curriculum covers all levels from ECDE to secondary. It emphasizes that "learning should be relevant to the lives of learners and reflect the local context and cultures". It emphasizes inclusive learning and gender equity. (p.93) Series of booklets were developed addressing these various components such as co-existence with others, self-esteem, effects of conflict and conflict resolution, initiating dialogue and behaviour change, which are being used within schools and with out-of-school youth. (p. 93)
Changes in availability and quality of teaching and learning materials	**2009**: average pupil:textbook ratio is 3:1 in primary for math and English (CESR, p. 6). About 20% of students on average had access to a math or English textbook in Grades 3-5. The ratio in grades 1-4 for English textbooks is 3:1 and for math 6.7:1, whereas for grades 5-8, the ratios were 3:1 for both English and Math (p.75-76). --- No change in **2015** "Textbooks are in short supply and are poorly allocated to schools, especially in risk-prone areas. On average, there is one textbook for every three pupils for English and mathematics. From the lowest to highest level of risk, the number of pupils per English textbook more than triples, from two to seven." ESA 2016:22 "The number of pupils per textbook ranges from 2.3 to 5.5, with upper grades facing a more acute lack of textbooks (5:1) than lower grades (2.5:1) in both subjects" (p.118) Distribution of textbooks last occurred in 2013 and there were major inefficiencies in the distribution chain. Many did not reach schools and/or not in adequate numbers. Some may have been destroyed or looted in conflict areas. (p. 120). New curriculum is being rolled out but new textbooks have not yet been printed and distributed (p. 105) Lifespan of a textbook in South Sudan is about five years. MoGEI has no warehouse to stock books and storage facilities are not available in all states or counties (p. 120) -- Humanitarian support: schools were supplied with teaching and learning materials (e.g. school-in-a-box, recreational kits). Total of 72,152 female-oriented materials and 108,980 male-oriented materials were distributed in targeted areas (ESA 2016, p.6)
Changes to pre-service teacher training	Some support by donors to Teacher Training Institutes (TTIs), but these were mostly closed during the review period. **% of qualified teachers**: (data does not differentiate between pre- and in-service training) **2011** 44% primary (EMIS 2011:55 estimate) **2015** 43% overall, 38% primary (EMIS 2015:15)

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
	41% overall, 28% primary (ESP 2:21) **2016** 46% overall, 42% primary (EMIS 2016:35)
Changes to in-service teacher training	Many in-service trainings undertaken during the review-period, but no change in the 'system' of in-service training. **% of qualified teachers**: Same as above
Changes in incentives for schools/teachers	No new incentives as such, but EU IMPACT program has provided some cash transfers to teachers since 2017, to make up for the difficulty experience by the GoSS in paying salaries. However, this is explicitly designed as a temporary program and not intended to be a new or long-lasting intervention or incentive.
Other (may vary by country): primary pupil-classroom ratio	**2009**: average of 129 pupils per classroom (CESR, p.6) **2011**: 125:1 (EMIS 2011:57) 131:1 (GESP I:28) **2015**: Average number of pupils registered per class is 56, decreasing rom P1 (75 pupils/class) to P8 (39 pupils /class) (ESA 2016, p. 11) 85:1 (EMIS 2015:16) 57:1 (gov) (ESP 2:43) **2016** 105:1 (EMIS 2016:37)

Progress in strengthening sector management

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
Changes in the institutional capacity of key ministries and/or other relevant government agencies (e.g. staffing, structure, organizational culture, funding)	A new MoGEI structure (and corresponding unit and job descriptions) was developed but has not yet been fully rolled out. Some departments were upgraded from units to directorates during the review period, e.g., teacher management.
Is a quality learning assessment system (LAS) within basic education cycle in place?	Not really. A National Examinations Council exists, with secondary examinations harmonized nationwide throughout the review period, and primary examinations harmonized nationwide since 2017. However, examinations are not standardized over time, and they do not strictly speaking constitute standardized learning assessments comparable across time and space.
Changes in how country <u>uses</u> LAS.	No LAS exists. Isolated, donor-financed learning assessments conducted in the 2012-2018 review period. Some steps towards a harmonized nationwide primary and secondary leaving examination system were also taken by the government, but no progress towards LAS "system".

ISSUE	OBSERVATIONS
Does country have functioning EMIS?	Yes, partly functioning. EMIS data-collection did not occur in all years, but only 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2018. However, different years covered different areas
Changes in how country <u>uses</u> EMIS data to inform policy dialogue, decision making and sector monitoring	Limited evidence of use of EMIS data and/or of changes therein, other than presentations made about EMIS data at annual JSRs, and citing of EMIS data in sector plans and ESAs.
Other (country specific)	A new sector-wide M&E strategy was developed during the review period.

Appendix XII Selected impact-level data

Impact level trends

Note: in the last column, green signifies improvement (not necessarily increase), amber signifies stagnation or fluctuation around a broadly stable trend, red signifies deterioration, and grey signifies no data (or no value judgement, e.g. with regards to rate of population growth).

	PRE-2011	2011	2015 (ESA 2016)	POST-2015	TREND
Out-of-school children					
Population of school age (6-17) [239]	n/a	2.9m (UNESCO 2018a: 102)	3.2m (UNESCO 2018a: 102)	3.5m 2017, 3.7m 2018 (UNESCO 2018a: 102)	Up, 4% / year
Population out of school (6-17)	No UIS data No other data	1.86m UIS estimate 0.94m (age 6-13) (ESP 1:30), of 2.2m	2.4m UIS estimate 1.95m (UNESCO 2018a: 39)	No UIS data 2.1m 2017, 2.2m 2018 (UNESCO 2018a: 39)	
Share of out-of-school children (6-17)	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 64% (UNESCO 2018a)	No UIS data 61% (UNESCO 2018a)	No UIS data 60% 2018 (UNESCO 2018a)	
Out of School Children – GPI	1.06 (primary, household data, 2010, UIS)	Total 1.3, Primary 1.2, L Secondary: 1.5 UIS estimate	Total 1.15, Primary 1.1, L Secondary: 1.2 UIS estimate	No UIS data	
Out of School Children – non-GUPN	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Out of School Children – by income, region, ethnic, rural	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Out of School Children – by special needs	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Absolute Enrollment Numbers					

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[239] UIS data exists but this row uses UNESCO 2018 data (p.102), for which the original source is: South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, 2009.

	PRE-2011	2011	2015 (ESA 2016)	POST-2015	TREND
# of pupils in pre-primary school	No UIS data 0k 2009, UNESCO 2018a:29	56k (27f) UIS 56k UNESCO 2018a:29	111k (53f) UIS 111k UNESCO 2018a:29	No UIS data 120k 2017, UNESCO 2018a:29	
# of pupils in primary school	No UIS data 1.16m 2008, UNESCO 2018a:29 0.3m 2000, 0.7m 2005, 1.4m 2009 (CESR:2)	1.5m (.57 f) UIS 1.4m UNESCO 2018a:29	1.3m (.52f) UIS 1.25m UNESCO 2018a:29	No UIS data 1.55m 2017, UNESCO 2018a:29	2009-15 down 15-17 up
# of pupils in secondary (lower & upper)	No UIS data 25k 2008, UNESCO 2018a:29	134k (45f) UIS 44k UNESCO 2018a:29	164k (56f) UIS 66k UNESCO 2018a:29	No UIS data 90k 2017, UNESCO 2018a:29	
# of pupils in AES centers	No UIS data 85k 2008, UNESCO 2018a: 29 (but iffy data)	No UIS data 165k UNESCO 2018a:29	No UIS data 141k UNESCO 2018a:29	No UIS data 127k 2017, UNESCO 2018a:29	Up till 2013, down since & overall
Total # of pupils in above levels	No UIS data 0.3m 2005 (GESP II:2)	No UIS data 0.93m 2014, SSSAMS data	No UIS data 1.3m (GESP II:2)	No UIS data 1.9m 2017, UNESCO 2018a:29 1.7m 2017, SSSAMS data	
Pre-primary data					
Pre-primary NER	No UIS data No other data	3.8% UIS (estimate)	6.0% UIS 9.7% ESA:55	No UIS data No other data	
Pre-primary GER	No UIS data No other data	5.8% UIS 6%, 6% boys, 6% girls GPE web	10.3% UIS 10%, 11% boys, 10% girls GPE web	No UIS data No other data	
Pre-primary GER – non-GUPN	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Pre-primary GER - GPI	No UIS data No other data	0.94 UIS	0.95 UIS	No UIS data No other data	
Primary data					

	PRE-2011	2011	2015 (ESA 2016)	POST-2015	TREND
Primary NER	No UIS data No other data	41% UIS estimate 44.4% (ESP I:86)	32% 2015 UIS estimate	No UIS data No other data	
Primary NIR	No UIS data No other data	21% UIS 14.5% (ESP I:86)	17% 2015 UIS estimate	No UIS data No other data	
Primary GER	No UIS data 71.6% 2009 ESA:18	85% UIS 63.5% EMIS 2011 63.5% (ESP I:23) 69% (ESP I:86)	67% UIS 78% EMIS 2016:23 62% (ESP 2:13) 56.5% 2015 ESA:18 (62% incl. ALP, CGS)	No UIS data 76% EMIS 2016:23	
Primary GER – non-GUPN	No UIS data 64% ESA:55 2009 (73 incl. ALP, CGS)	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 72% ESA:55 (79 incl. ALP, CGS)	No UIS data No other data	
Primary GER – GPI	No UIS data No other data	0.66 UIS 0.71 (EMIS 2011:44) 0.59 (ESP I:86) 0.66 (UNESCO 2018a: 28)	0.71 UIS 0.73 (EMIS 2015:16) 0.71 (UNESCO 2018a: 28) 0.75 (ESP 2:41)	No UIS data 0.75 (EMIS 2016:31)	
Primary GER – by income, region, ethnic, rural	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Primary PCR	25% 2010 UIS 8% 2009 (ESA:18)	No UIS data 12% secondary GIR (EMIS 2011:72) 10.3% (ESP I:86) 2011: roughly 25%, 35% male, 18% female (GPE web)	No UIS data 11.5% secondary GIR (EMIS 2015:23) 14% (ESP 2:40 and ESA:18)	No UIS data 12.5% secondary GIR (EMIS 2016:23)	
Primary PCR – non-GUPN	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	

	PRE-2011	2011	2015 (ESA 2016)	POST-2015	TREND
Primary PCR - GPI	0.58 GPIA UIS 2010 0.53 2009 ESA:60	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 0.55 2009 ESA:60	No UIS data No other data	
– by income, region, ethnic, rural	UIS 2010 data on region, rural, income	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Primary to secondary transition rates					
Transition rate from primary to secondary	No UIS data 87% 2009 ESA:18	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 69% ESA:18	No UIS data No other data	
Transition rate from primary to secondary – non-GUPN	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Transition rate from primary to secondary - GPI	No UIS data 0.73 ESA:60 2009	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 0.9 ESA:60	No UIS data	
– by income, region, ethnic, rural	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Secondary data					
Secondary NER	No UIS data No other data	4.8% UIS 1.6% (ESP I:86)	4.9% UIS	No UIS data	
Secondary NIR	No UIS data No other data	0.4% (ESP I:86) UIS no data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Secondary GER	No UIS data 6% 2009 ESA:55 (incl. technical secondary)	9.1% UIS 6% secondary GER (EMIS 2011: 69) 4.2% (ESP I:86)	9.9% UIS 11% secondary GER (EMIS 2015:23) 6.5% 2015 ESA:55 (incl. technical secondary)	No UIS data 10% secondary GER (EMIS 2016:23)	
Secondary GER – non-GUPN	No UIS data 7% ESA:55 2009	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 9% ESA:55	No UIS data No other data	
Secondary GER – GPI	No UIS data No other data	0.51 UIS 0.41 (ESP I:86)	0.54 UIS	No UIS data No other data	

	PRE-2011	2011	2015 (ESA 2016)	POST-2015	TREND
– by income, region, ethnic, rural	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Secondary PCR	14.6% lower, 5.51% upper (UIS 2010)	16.9% overall, 21.7% male, 11.9% female (GPE web)	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Secondary PCR – non-GUPN	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Secondary PCR – GPI (adjusted)	0.44 lower, 0.32 upper (UIS 2010) 0.57 ESA:60 2009	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 0.55 ESA:60	No UIS data No other data	
– by income, region, ethnic, rural	UIS 2010 by region, rural, income	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Education at other levels					
AES per 100k	No UIS data 2500 in 2009 (ESA:55)	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 1300 (ESA:55)	No UIS data No other data	
TVET per 100k	No UIS data 44 in 2009 (ESA:55)	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 43 (ESA:55)	No UIS data No other data	
Tertiary / 100k	No UIS data 276 in 2009 (ESA:55)	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 101 (ESA:55)	No UIS data No other data	
Dropout rates					
Primary dropout rate	No UIS data No other data	UIS no 28% 2011 (EMIS 2011:68) 27.3% (ESP I:86)	UIS no 6.4% 2015 (EMIS 2016:25) 8% 2015 (EMIS 2015:74)	No UIS data No other data	(data may be wrong, as improvement is surprising)
Primary dropout rate – non GUPN	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Primary dropout rate - GPI	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	
Repetition rates					

	PRE-2011	2011	2015 (ESA 2016)	POST-2015	TREND
Primary repetition rate (% of repeaters, all grades)	No UIS data 10% 2009 (EMIS data), 15% 2009 (NBHS data), CESR 2012:42 (10 & 23, P1 only)	16.7% UIS (P1 only) 9.2% (ESP I:86)	10.5% UIS (P1 only) 9% 2015 (ESA:61 primary, 11%P1, 4% secondary) 11% 2015 (EMIS 2016:24)	No UIS data No other data	
Primary repetition rate – non GUPN	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data Primary repetition worse in non-GUPN (10%), but secondary better, ESA 2016:61	No UIS data No other data	
Primary repetition rate - GPI	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data No other data	1.25 GPI (ESA 2016:61) 1.1 GPI secondary (ibid) GPI worse in 2-3 non-GUPN states (ibid)	No UIS data No other data	
Efficiency indicators					
School life expectancy, primary and secondary	No UIS data No other data	6.2 (4.8f) UIS estimate	5.0 (4.0f) UIS estimate 5 nationwide, 2.2 GUPN, 6.2. non-GUPN (ESA 2016:62)	No UIS data No other data	
School life expectancy, primary and secondary - GPI	No UIS data No other data	0.64 UIS estimate	0.67 UIS estimate	No UIS data No other data	
Internal efficiency coefficient (IEC)	No UIS data 11 primary (ESA 2016:62) 2009	No UIS data No other data	No UIS data 25 primary, 46 secondary (ESA 2016:62)	No UIS data No other data	

Appendix XIII Terminology

Alignment	Basing support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures. [240]
Basic education	Pre-primary (i.e., education before Grade 1), primary (Grades 1-6), lower secondary (Grades 7-9), and adult literacy education, in formal and non-formal settings. This corresponds to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 levels 0-2.
Capacity	In the context of this evaluation we understand capacity as the foundation for behavior change in individuals, groups or institutions. Capacity encompasses the three interrelated dimensions of *motivation* (political will, social norms, habitual processes), *opportunity* (factors outside of individuals e.g. resources, enabling environment) and capabilities (knowledge, skills). [241]
Education Management and Information System (EMIS)	A system for the collection, integration, processing, maintenance and dissemination of data and information to support decision-making, policy-analysis and formulation, planning, monitoring and management at all levels of an education system. It is a system of people, technology, models, methods, processes, procedures, rules and regulations that function together to provide education leaders, decision-makers and managers at all levels with a comprehensive and integrated set of relevant, reliable, unambiguous and timely data and information to support them in fulfilling their responsibilities. [242]
Education systems	Collections of institutions, actions and processes that affect the educational status of citizens in the short and long run. [243] Education systems are made up of a large number of actors (teachers, parents, politicians, bureaucrats, civil society organizations) interacting with each other in different institutions (schools, ministry departments) for different reasons (developing curriculums, monitoring school performance, managing teachers). All these interactions are governed by rules, beliefs, and behavioral norms that affect how actors react and adapt to changes in the system. [244]
Equity	In the context of education, equity refers to securing all children's rights to education, and their rights within and through education to realize their potential and aspirations. It requires implementing and institutionalizing arrangements that help ensure all children can achieve these aims. [245]

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[240] OECD, Glossary of Aid Effectiveness Terms. http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/aideffectivenessglossary.htm. GPE understands 'country systems' to relate to a set of seven dimensions: Plan, Budget, Treasury, Procurement, Accounting, Audit and Report. Source: Methodology Sheet for Global Partnership for Education (GPE) Indicators. Indicator (29) Proportion of GPE grants aligned to national systems.

[241] Mayne, John. *The COM-B Theory of Change Model*. Working paper. February 2017

[242] GPE 2020 Results Framework Indicator 20 Methodology Sheet.

[243] Moore, Mark. 2015. Creating Efficient, Effective, and Just Educational Systems through Multi-Sector Strategies of Reform. RISE Working Paper 15/004, Research on Improving Systems of Education, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, Oxford, U.K.

[244] World Bank. 2003. World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington, DC: World Bank; New York: Oxford University Press.

[245] Equity and Inclusion in Education. A guide to support education sector plan preparation, revision and appraisal. GPE 2010; p.3. Available at:

Financial additionality	This incorporates two not mutually exclusive components: (a) an increase in the total amount of funds available for a given educational purpose, without the substitution or redistribution of existing resources; and (b) positive change in the quality of funding (e.g., predictability of aid, use of pooled funding mechanisms, co-financing, non-traditional financing sources, alignment with national priorities).
Gender equality	The equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of women, men, girls, and boys, and equal power to shape their own lives and contribute to society. It encompasses the narrower concept of gender equity, which primarily concerns fairness and justice regarding benefits and needs.[246]
Harmonization	The degree of coordination between technical and financial partners in how they structure their external assistance (e.g., pooled funds, shared financial or procurement processes), to present a common and simplified interface for developing country partners. The aim of harmonization is to reduce transaction costs and increase the effectiveness of the assistance provided by reducing demands on recipient countries to meet with different donors' reporting processes and procedures, along with uncoordinated country analytic work and missions.[247]
Inclusion	Adequately responding to the diversity of needs among all learners, through increasing participation in learning, cultures, and communities, and reducing exclusion from and within education.[248]

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file:///C:/Users/anett/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/2010-04-GPE-Equity-and-Inclusion-Guide.pdf

[246] GPE Gender Equality Policy and Strategy 2016-2020. GPE 2016, p. 5f. Available at:
http://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/2016-06-gpe-gender-equality-policy-strategy.pdf

[247] Adapted from OECD, Glossary of Aid Effectiveness Terms
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/aideffectivenessglossary.htm, and from Methodology Sheet for Global Partnership for Education (GPE) Indicators. Indicator (30) Proportion of GPE grants using: (a) co-financed project or (b) sector pooled funding mechanisms.

[248] GPE 2010, p.3.

Appendix XIV Acronyms

AES	Alternative Education System
AFF	Accelerated Funding Framework
BTOR	Back To Office Reports (of the GPE Secretariat)
CA	Coordinating Agency
CEQ	Country Evaluation Question
CESR	Country Education Status Report
CLE	Country-Level Evaluation
CLS	Country-Level Stakeholder
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSEF	Civil Society Education Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CT	Cash Transfer
DCP	Developing Country Partner
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EDoG	Education Donor Group
EGMA	Early Grades Math Assessment
EGRA	Early Grades Reading Assessment
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ESA	Education Sector Analysis
ESP	Education Sector Plan
ESPDG	Education Sector Plan Development Grant
ESPIG	Education Sector Plan Implementation Grant
EU	European Union
FCAC	Fragile & Conflict-Affected Countries
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GA	Grant Agent
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

GEAR	General Education Annual Review
GER	Gross Enrollment Rate
GESP	General Education Strategic Plan
GESS	Girls' Education South Sudan
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
GPEP	Global Partnership for Education Program
GRA	Global and Regional Activities
GUPN	Greater Upper Nile (region)
HRIS	Human Resource Information System
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
IO	In Opposition (forces)
IMED	Improved Management of Education Delivery (EU program)
ITRP	Independent Technical Review Panel (of GPE)
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
JSR	Joint Sector Review
KQ	Key Question
LAS	Learning Assessment System
LEG	Local Education Group
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCA	Maximum Country Allocation
MoEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (previous MoGEI name)
MoGEI	Ministry of General Education and Instruction
MoHEST	Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology
NEC	National Education Coalition
NEF	National Education Forum
NER	Net Enrollment Rate
NFM	New Funding Model (GPE)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OOSC	Out-of-School Children
PCR	Primary Completion Rate
PDG	Program Development Grant
PEG	Partners in Education Group
PTR	Pupil Teacher Ratio
QAR	Quality Assurance Review
RF	(GPE) Results Framework
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SSP	South Sudanese Pound
SSSAMS	South Sudan Schools' Attendance and Monitoring System
TEP	Transitional Education Plan
TLM(s)	Teaching and Learning Materials
ToC	Theory of change
TOR	Terms of Reference
TVET	Technical and Vocational Examination and Training
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme